68 Heirs of Domingo Valientes vs. Ramas

10/14/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 638
G.R. No. 157852. December 15, 2010.*
HEIRS OF DOMINGO VALIENTES, petitioners, vs. Hon.

ReInerio (Abraham) B. Ramas, Acting Presiding Judge,
RTC, Branch 29, 9th Judicial Region, San Miguel,
Zamboanga del Sur and Vilma V. Minor, respondents.
Actions; Motions to Dismiss; Pleadings, Practice and

Procedure; It stretches the bounds of credulity for petitioners to
argue that a defendant in a case should appeal the dismissal order
she prayed for just because other grounds for dismissal were not
considered by the court.—Firstly, it stretches the bounds of
credulity for petitioners to argue that a defendant in a case should
appeal the dismissal order she prayed for just because other
grounds for dismissal were not considered by the court. Secondly,
and more importantly, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
provides: “Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.—
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations,
the court shall dismiss the claim. The second sentence of this
provision does not only supply exceptions to the rule that defenses
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases motu proprio
on any of the enumerated grounds—(1) lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4)
prescription—provided that the ground for dismissal is apparent
from the pleadings or the evidence on record.
Same; Same; Same; Laches; While laches is not included in
the enumeration under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the
Court has ruled in previous cases that laches need not be
specifically pleaded and may be considered by the court on its own
initiative in determining the rights of the parties.—We therefore
rule that private respondent Minor cannot be deemed to have
waived the defense of prescription, and that the Court of Appeals
may consider the same motu proprio. Furthermore, as regards the
pronouncement by the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 98-
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017522e1e5d02aa57cce003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/15
021 is likewise heavily infirmed with laches, we rule that the

Court of Appeals is not in error when it
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
445
VOL. 638, DECEMBER 15, 2010 445
Heirs of Domingo Valientes vs. Ramas
considered the same motu proprio. While not included in the

above enumeration under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,
we have ruled in previous cases that laches need not be
specifically pleaded and may be considered by the court on its own
initiative in determining the rights of the parties.
Same; Reconveyance; Quieting of Title; Prescription; Trusts;
When the plaintiff in an action for reconveyance is not in
possession of the subject property, the action prescribes in ten years
from the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance
of the certificate of title over the property, but when the plaintiff is
in possession of the subject property, the action, being in effect that
of quieting of title to the property, does not prescribe.—The cause
of action of petitioners in Civil Case No. 98-021, wherein they
claim that private respondent Minor’s predecessor-in-interest
acquired the subject property by forgery, can indeed be considered
as that of enforcing an implied trust. In particular, Article 1456 of
the Civil Code provides: “Art. 1456. If property is acquired
through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes.” However, the Court made
a clear distinction in Olviga: when the plaintiff in such action
is not in possession of the subject property, the action
prescribes in ten years from the date of registration of the deed or
the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
When the plaintiff is in possession of the subject property,
the action, being in effect that of quieting of title to the property,
does not prescribe. In the case at bar, petitioners (who are the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 98-021) are not in possession of the
subject property. Civil Case No. 98-021, if it were to be considered
as that of enforcing an implied trust, should have therefore been
filed within ten years from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427 on
December 22, 1969. Civil Case No. 98-021 was, however, filed on
August 20, 1998, which was way beyond the prescriptive period.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; Articles 1141, 1134

and 1137 of the Civil Code are general rules on prescription which
should give way to the special statute on registered lands,
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree.—The theory of petitioners is that the Motion
to Dismiss hypothetically admits the allegations of the complaint,
including the allegations thereon that the spouses Belen were
successful in fraudulently acquiring TCT No. T-5,427 in their
favor by means of the forged VENTA DEFINITIVA. Thus, for
purposes of ruling on a Motion to Dismiss, it is hypothetically
admitted that private respondent Minor’s predecessors-in-interest
are in bad faith. The applicable prescriptive period, therefore, is
that provided in Article 1141 in relation to Article 1137 of the
Civil Code, which is
446
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
thirty years. Civil Case No. 98-021 was filed on August 20, 1998,
28 years and eight months from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427
on December 22, 1969. Articles 1141, 1134 and 1137 of the Civil
Code, however, are general rules on prescription which should
give way to the special statute on registered lands, Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree. Under the Torrens System as enshrined in P.D. No. 1529,
the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued become
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of
entry of the decree of registration, without prejudice to an action
for damages against the applicant or any person responsible for
the fraud.
Certiorari; Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in
proceedings or correct erroneous conclusions of law or fact—as
long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors
committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing
more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely
appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari.—As a final
note, it should be pointed out that in choosing to file a Petition for
Certiorari before this Court, petitioners are required to prove
nothing less than grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Court of Appeals. We have consistently held that “certiorari will
not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or correct erroneous
conclusions of law or fact. As long as a court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment
which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil

action of certiorari.” In the case at bar, petitioners proved neither
grave abuse of discretion, nor even a simple error of judgment on
the part of the Court of Appeals. The present petition should,
therefore, fail.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals dated August 16, 2002 and the
subsequent Resolution
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 111-115; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los

Santos with then Acting Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia and Associate
Justice Marina L. Buzon, concurring.
447
VOL. 638, DECEMBER 15, 2010 447

denying reconsideration dated January 16, 2003 in CA-

G.R. SP No. 68501.
Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Domingo
Valientes who, before his death, was the owner of a parcel
of land in Gabay, Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur then
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-18,208
of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur. In 1939,
Domingo Valientes mortgaged the subject property to
secure his loan to the spouses Leon Belen and Brigida
Sescon (spouses Belen). In the 1950s, the Valientes family
purportedly attempted, but failed, to retrieve the subject
property from the spouses Belen. Through an allegedly
forged document captioned VENTA DEFINITIVA
purporting to be a deed of sale of the subject property
between Domingo Valientes and the spouses Belen, the
latter obtained Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
5,427 in their name. On February 28, 1970, Maria
Valientes Bucoy and Vicente Valientes, legitimate children
of the late Domingo Valientes, had their Affidavit of
Adverse Claim2 duly entered in the Memorandum of
Encumbrances at the back of TCT No. T-5,427. Upon the
death of the spouses Belen, their surviving heirs Brigida
Sescon Belen and Maria Lina Belen executed an

extrajudicial settlement with partition and sale in favor of
private respondent Vilma Valencia-Minor, the present
possessor of the subject property.
On June 20, 1979, herein private respondent Minor
filed with the then Court of First Instance of Pagadian City
a “PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF
MEMORANDUM OF ENCUMBRANCE APPEARING IN
TCT NO. T-5,427 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF
ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR,” which was docketed as SPL
Case No. 1861.3 On July 31, 2000, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) granted Minor’s prayer to allow the Register
of Deeds to have the title to the subject property
transferred to her name.
In the meantime, on August 20, 1998, petitioners filed
a Complaint before the RTC of San Miguel, Zamboanga del
Sur for the “CANCELLATION OF TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO.
_______________
2 CA Rollo, pp. 40-41.

3 Id., at pp. 38-39.
448

T-5,427, RECONVEYANCE, WITH ACCOUNTING,

RECEIVERSHIP AND APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION PLUS
DAMAGES.” The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. 98-021.4
Private respondent Minor filed an Omnibus Motion to
Dismiss Civil Case No. 98-021 on the grounds of forum
shopping and litis pendentia. On August 3, 2000, the RTC
issued an order in open court ruling that forum shopping
does not apply. On September 22, 2000, private
respondent Minor filed a Motion for Reconsideration5 of the
August 3, 2000 Order. On May 7, 2001, the RTC issued an
Order granting the Motion for Reconsideration by
dismissing Civil Case No. 98-021 on the ground of forum
shopping.6 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration7
on May 30, 2001, but the same was denied by the RTC in
its Order8 dated September 18, 2001.
On November 12, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court
of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari9 assailing the RTC
Orders dated May 7, 2001 and September 18, 2001.

Petitioners raised the sole issue of whether the trial court
was correct in finding that Civil Case No. 98-021
constitutes forum shopping, litis pendentia or res judicata
with SPL Case No. 186. The Petition was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 68501.
The Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision on
said petition on August 16, 2002. Despite agreeing with
petitioners that there was no forum shopping, litis
pendentia or res judicata in the filing of Civil Case No. 98-
021, the Court of Appeals, asserting that it has the
discretion to review matters not otherwise assigned as
errors on appeal if it finds that their consideration is
necessary at arriving at a
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 30-34.

5 Id., at pp. 52-53.
6 Id., at pp. 59-61.
7 Id., at pp. 62-69.
8 Id., at pp. 78-80.
9 Id., at pp. 5-22.
449
VOL. 638, DECEMBER 15, 2010 449

complete and just resolution of the case,10 held that Civil

Case No. 98-021 cannot prosper on the grounds of
prescription and laches.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, wherein petitioners
raised the following grounds for assailing the Court of
Appeals’ Decision:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT APPLIED
PRESCRIPTION IN THE PRESENT PETITION, AFTER ALL,
WHEN SHE DID NOT APPEAL THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT ON THE SOLE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA,
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS DEEMED TO HAVE ALREADY
WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION.
II

IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION, THE
PRESENT ACTION, ALTHOUGH CAPTIONED FOR
CANCELLATION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. T-5,427, RECONVEYANCE AND ETC., SUBSTANTIALLY,
IS FOR QUIETING OF TITLE, HENCE, PRESCRIPTION WILL
NOT LIE.
III
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN APPLYING THE CASES OF
TENIO-OBSEQUIO VERSUS COURT OF APPEALS, 330 SCRA
88, AND DECLARO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 346 SCRA 57
WHEN FACTS OBTAINING IN SAID CASES ARE NOT
ATTENDANT IN THE PRESENT CASE FOR CANCELLATION
OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-5,427 ON THE
GROUND OF FORGERY OR BY REASON OF FORGED
DOCUMENT CAPTIONED VENTA DEFINITIVA.
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 114.
450

IV
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT [RENEGED] FROM
ITS SOLEMN DUTY TO RENDER SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE
DUE THE PARTIES RATHER THAN THE SANCTIFICATION
OF TECHNICAL RULES OR EQUITY ON PRESCRIPTION.11
Authority of the Court of Appeals to Dismiss the

Complaint on the Grounds of Prescription and
Laches Despite Respondent’s Failure to Appeal
the Dismissal Order
Petitioners recount that private respondent Minor
interposed prescription as one of her grounds for the
dismissal of the case in her Answer with Affirmative
Defenses. When private respondent Minor’s Motion to
Dismiss was denied by the RTC in open court, she filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dwelling on forum shopping,
litis pendentia and/or res judicata.12 The trial court
proceeded to dismiss the case on the ground of forum

shopping.13 Petitioners now claim before us that private
respondent Minor’s failure to appeal the RTC’s dismissal of
the complaint on the sole ground of forum shopping
constituted a waiver of the defense of prescription.
Petitioners further argue that the consideration by the
Court of Appeals of grounds not assigned as errors in the
Appellee’s Brief runs contrary to the precepts of fair play,
good taste and estoppel.14
We rule in favor of private respondent Minor on this
issue.
Firstly, it stretches the bounds of credulity for
petitioners to argue that a defendant in a case should
appeal the dismissal order she prayed for just because
other grounds for dismissal were not considered by the
court.
_______________
11 Rollo, pp. 20-21.

12 CA Rollo, pp. 52-53.
13 Id., at pp. 59-61.
14 Rollo, p. 317, Petitioner’s memorandum.
451
VOL. 638, DECEMBER 15, 2010 451

Secondly, and more importantly, Section 1, Rule 9 of the

Rules of Court provides:
“Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.—Defenses

and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations,
the court shall dismiss the claim.”
The second sentence of this provision does not only

supply exceptions to the rule that defenses not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases motu proprio
on any of the enumerated grounds—(1) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata;
and (4) prescription—provided that the ground for
dismissal is apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on

record.
We therefore rule that private respondent Minor cannot
be deemed to have waived the defense of prescription, and
that the Court of Appeals may consider the same motu
proprio. Furthermore, as regards the pronouncement by
the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 98-021 is likewise
heavily infirmed with laches, we rule that the Court of
Appeals is not in error when it considered the same motu
proprio. While not included in the above enumeration
under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, we have
ruled in previous cases that laches need not be specifically
pleaded and may be considered by the court on its own
initiative in determining the rights of the parties.15
Having thus determined the authority of the Court of
Appeals to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds of
prescription and laches despite private respondent Minor’s
failure to appeal the dismissal Order, We shall now proceed
to determine whether or not prescrip-
_______________
15 Logronio v. Taleseo, 370 Phil. 907, 918; 312 SCRA 52, 62 (1999);
Rumarate v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 168222, April 18, 2006, 487 SCRA 317,
335-336.
452

tion or laches has already set in to bar the filing of Civil

Case No. 98-021.
Imprescriptibility of Quieting of Title
After the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of petitioners
on the issue of whether Civil Case No. 98-021 is already
barred by forum shopping, res judicata or litis pendentia,
the appellate court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal
order, but on the grounds of prescription and laches:
“Be that as it may, this Court is imbued with sufficient

discretion to review matters, not otherwise assigned as errors on
appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving
at a complete and just resolution of the case (Heirs of Ramon
Durano, Sr. vs. Uy, 344 SCRA 238).
The case cannot prosper because an action for reconveyance is
a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name, which
must be filed within ten years from the issuance of the title since
such issuance operates as a constructive notice (Declaro vs. Court
of Appeals, 346 SCRA 57). Where a party has neglected to assert
his rights over a property in question for an unreasonably long
period, he is estopped from questioning the validity of another
person’s title to the property (Ibid.) Long inaction and passivity in
asserting one’s rights over a disputed property precludes him
from recovering said property (Po Lam vs. Court vs. Court of
Appeals, 347 SCRA 86).
In conclusion, petitioners’ cause of action has already
prescribed and now heavily infirmed with laches.”16
Petitioners claim that although the complaint was

captioned for “CANCELLATION OF TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-5,427,
RECONVEYANCE, WITH ACCOUNTING,
RECEIVERSHIP, AND APPLICATION FOR A WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION
PLUS DAMAGES,” the complaint is substantially in the
nature of an action to quiet title which allegedly does not
prescribe. Petitioners also allege that the cases cited by the
Court of Appeals in ruling that prescription has set
_______________
16 Rollo, p. 114.
453
VOL. 638, DECEMBER 15, 2010 453

in, particularly that of Declaro v. Court of Appeals,17 which

in turn cites Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals,18 are
inapplicable to the case at bar since neither fraud nor
forgery was attendant in said cases.
As regards petitioners’ claim that the complaint in Civil
Case No. 98-021 is really one of quieting of title which does
not prescribe, it appears that petitioners are referring to
the doctrine laid down in the often-cited case of Heirs of
Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals,19 wherein we held:
“With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a

number of times before that an action for reconveyance of a parcel
of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the
deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this rule
applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property,

since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual
possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in
effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.”20
The cause of action of petitioners in Civil Case No. 98-

021, wherein they claim that private respondent Minor’s
predecessor-in-interest acquired the subject property by
forgery, can indeed be considered as that of enforcing an
implied trust. In particular, Article 1456 of the Civil Code
provides:
“Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud,

the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of
an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes.”
However, the Court made a clear distinction in Olviga:

when the plaintiff in such action is not in possession
of the subject property, the action prescribes in ten
years from the date of registration of the deed or the date of
the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
When the plaintiff is in possession of the sub-
_______________
17 399 Phil. 616; 346 SCRA 57 (2000).

18 G.R. No. 107967, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 550.
19 G.R. No. 104813, October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 330.
20 Id., at pp. 334-335.
454

ject property, the action, being in effect that of quieting of

title to the property, does not prescribe. In the case at bar,
petitioners (who are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 98-021)
are not in possession of the subject property. Civil Case No.
98-021, if it were to be considered as that of enforcing an
implied trust, should have therefore been filed within ten
years from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427 on December
22, 1969. Civil Case No. 98-021 was, however, filed on
August 20, 1998, which was way beyond the prescriptive
period.
As an alternative argument, petitioners claim that the
prescriptive period for filing their complaint is thirty years,
pursuant to Article 1141 of the Civil Code, in connection
with Articles 1134 and 1137 thereof, which respectively

provide:
“Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after

thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for
the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable
property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession
of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables
also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof
for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.”
The theory of petitioners is that the Motion to Dismiss

hypothetically admits the allegations of the complaint,
including the allegations thereon that the spouses Belen
were successful in fraudulently acquiring TCT No. T-5,427
in their favor by means of the forged VENTA
DEFINITIVA. Thus, for purposes of ruling on a Motion to
Dismiss, it is hypothetically admitted that private
respondent Minor’s predecessors-in-interest are in bad
faith. The applicable prescriptive period, therefore, is that
provided in Article 1141 in relation to Article 1137 of the
Civil Code, which is thirty years. Civil Case No. 98-021 was
filed on August 20, 1998, 28 years and eight months from
the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427 on December 22, 1969.
Articles 1141, 1134 and 1137 of the Civil Code, however,
are general rules on prescription which should give way to
the special statute on registered lands, Presidential Decree
No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree. Under the Torrens System as
455
VOL. 638, DECEMBER 15, 2010 455

enshrined in P.D. No. 1529, the decree of registration and

the certificate of title issued become incontrovertible upon
the expiration of one year from the date of entry of the
decree of registration, without prejudice to an action for
damages against the applicant or any person responsible
for the fraud.21
As previously discussed, however, we have allowed
actions for reconveyance based on implied trusts even
beyond such one-year period, for such actions respect the
decree of registration as incontrovertible. We explained this

in Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr.:22
_______________
21 Presidential Decree No. 1529, Sections 31 and 32 provide:

Section 31. Decree of registration.—x x x
The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto,
subject only to such exceptions or liens as may be provided by law. It shall
be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the National
Government and all branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application or notice, the same being included in the general description
“To all whom it may concern.”
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for
value.—The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by
reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the
government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by
actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year
from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in
no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent
purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose
rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for
value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in
any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the
applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.
22 G.R. No. L-38387, January 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431.
456

“We have ruled before in Amerol vs. Bagumbaran that

notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already
issued in the name of another person, he can still be compelled
under the law to reconvey the subject property to the rightful
owner. The property registered is deemed to be held in trust for
the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered. After
all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one
who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds

title in bad faith.
In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's
name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right.
This is what reconveyance is all about.
Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust is not absolute nor is it imprescriptible. An
action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
must perforce prescribe in ten years from the issuance of the
Torrens title over the property.”23
As discussed above, Civil Case No. 98-021 was filed

more than 28 years from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427.
This period is unreasonably long for a party seeking to
enforce its right to file the appropriate case. Thus,
petitioners’ claim that they had not slept on their rights is
patently unconvincing.
As a final note, it should be pointed out that in choosing
to file a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, petitioners
are required to prove nothing less than grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. We have
consistently held that “certiorari will not be issued to cure
errors in proceedings or correct erroneous conclusions of
law or fact. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction,
any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than errors of
judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by
a special civil action of certiorari.”24 In the case at bar,
petitioners proved neither grave abuse of discretion, nor
even a simple error of judgment on the part of the Court of
Appeals. The present petition should, therefore, fail.
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 442.

24 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 1,
41-42; 257 SCRA 200, 257 (1996).
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10/14/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 638

G.R. No. 157852. December 15, 2010.*

HEIRS OF DOMINGO VALIENTES, petitioners, vs. Hon.

Actions; Motions to Dismiss; Pleadings, Practice and

021 is likewise heavily infirmed with laches, we rule that the

VOL. 638, DECEMBER 15, 2010 445

Heirs of Domingo Valientes vs. Ramas

considered the same motu proprio. While not included in the

Same; Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; Articles 1141, 1134

446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Domingo Valientes vs. Ramas

which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

1 Rollo, pp. 111-115; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los

VOL. 638, DECEMBER 15, 2010 447

denying reconsideration dated January 16, 2003 in CA-

Sescon Belen and Maria Lina Belen executed an

2 CA Rollo, pp. 40-41.

448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

T-5,427, RECONVEYANCE, WITH ACCOUNTING,

Orders dated May 7, 2001 and September 18, 2001.

4 Id., at pp. 30-34.

VOL. 638, DECEMBER 15, 2010 449

complete and just resolution of the case,10 held that Civil

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

10 Id., at pp. 114.

450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Authority of the Court of Appeals to Dismiss the

proceeded to dismiss the case on the ground of forum

11 Rollo, pp. 20-21.

VOL. 638, DECEMBER 15, 2010 451

Secondly, and more importantly, Section 1, Rule 9 of the

“Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.—Defenses

The second sentence of this provision does not only

dismissal is apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on

452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tion or laches has already set in to bar the filing of Civil

“Be that as it may, this Court is imbued with sufficient

Petitioners claim that although the complaint was

VOL. 638, DECEMBER 15, 2010 453

in, particularly that of Declaro v. Court of Appeals,17 which

“With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a

applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property,

The cause of action of petitioners in Civil Case No. 98-

“Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud,

However, the Court made a clear distinction in Olviga:

17 399 Phil. 616; 346 SCRA 57 (2000).

454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ject property, the action, being in effect that of quieting of

with Articles 1134 and 1137 thereof, which respectively

“Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after

The theory of petitioners is that the Motion to Dismiss

VOL. 638, DECEMBER 15, 2010 455

enshrined in P.D. No. 1529, the decree of registration and

decree of registration as incontrovertible. We explained this

21 Presidential Decree No. 1529, Sections 31 and 32 provide:

456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“We have ruled before in Amerol vs. Bagumbaran that

who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds

As discussed above, Civil Case No. 98-021 was filed

23 Id., at pp. 442.

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