Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Legal Ethics Session 3 1: Adm. Matter No. 1625. February 12, 1990. ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, Complainant
Legal Ethics Session 3 1: Adm. Matter No. 1625. February 12, 1990. ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, Complainant
agreement, respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a public
Adm. Matter No. 1625. February 12, 1990.*
auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the project they
ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness
even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him
Lawyers; Reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of complaints against lawyers
[Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].
is not mandatory. —The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary
to respondent’s claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon
Same; Same; Same; Submission to the court of falsified documents constitutes willful
the Court [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
disregard of the lawyer’s solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. —
80578, October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents
under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of
purporting to be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement. Based on
Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of
evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor Gen-eral found that in the document filed by
the IBP by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the
respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the addendum to
Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and recommendation of the
the land development agreement—namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T.
investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its
Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautista—were made to appear as having signed
final action on the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the investigating
the original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters “(SGD.)” before each of
official and the evidence presented by the parties during the investigation.
their names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed the
original and duplicate original (Exh. “2”) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor
Same; Malpractice; Purchase by a lawyer of his client’s property or interest in litigation is
Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor Fortunado only
a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice. —The record shows that respondent
signed the xerox copy (Exh. “2-A”) after respondent wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them
prepared a document entitled “Transfer of Rights” which was signed by the Fortunados on
to sign the said xerox copy attached to the letter and to send it back to him after signing
August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of the
[Rejoinder to Complainant’s Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent
Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. m., and TCT No. T-3041,
acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had
with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the
not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent’s
time the document was executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned properties were
Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus
the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First Instance of
when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex
Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case [See Annex “B” of
“A” of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly
Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring one-half (1/2) of
misled the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and
the subject properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer
Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to
from acquiring his client’s property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take
act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the
part by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the
court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of
purchase by a lawyer of his client’s property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional
Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional
ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v.
Responsibility].
Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].
Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; Champertous agreements are against public policy
Same; Same; Disbarment; Transgression by a lawyer of any provision of law will justify
especially where the lawyer agrees to carry out the action at his own expense in consideration
suspension or disbarment.—The very first Canon of the new Code states that “a lawyer shall
of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute. —Although a lawyer may in good faith,
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The
process” (Italics supplied). Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires
agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for
every lawyer to take an oath to “obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the
reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein.” And for any violation of this oath, a
attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous
lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules
[JBP Holdings Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy
of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system.
especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own
The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which
expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v.
the Court will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the
Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts violates
Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and to society.
the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur
administrative sanctions.
Same; Same; Same; A lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his private
dealings, and his failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action. —Even assuming that the
Same; Conflict of Interest; A lawyer may represent clients of con-flicting interest if such
certificate of sale was annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that
clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel.
respondent failed to inform the complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the
—The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as
negotiations for the land development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to
counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the
the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and
Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after
condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent
considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor General’s findings on the matter. The evidence
does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining
presented by respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the
to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 2
knowledge and consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney’s fees from the Fortunados, while knowing
23, 1976 clearly states that they gave their consent when respondent accepted the case of fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of
recognized exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is where the Iligan City;
clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel
[Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional
5.Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified documents purporting
Responsibility].
to be true copies of “Addendum to the Land Development Agreement dated August 30,
1971”
Same; Respondent lawyer, suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for
having “miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar”. —The
Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the law and submitting the same document to the Fiscal’s Office of Quezon City, in connection with
and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant designated as I.S. No. 75-
administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has “miserably failed to live up to the 12936;
standards expected of a member of the Bar.” [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July
29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the 6.Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his client;
nature of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case,
respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
7.Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis before the
Court of First Instance and the Fiscal’s Office of Quezon City;
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Serious Misconduct.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court. 8.Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal’s Office by making false
assertion of facts in his pleadings;
RESOLUTION
9.Filing petitions “cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally tell a lie, he
does not tell the truth either.”
PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A. Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18,
Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath. 1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent’s answer on
Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.
motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by
making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the
respondent’s motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted
complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent by the Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits “A”
committed the following acts: to “PP”, while respondent appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits “1” to
“11”. The parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.
1.Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that
Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all the long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his
expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the
the property in litigation. Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that
the delay in the investigation of the case was due to the “numerous requests for postponement
2.Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143, wherein Eusebio Lopez, of scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file their
Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said case being terminated, acting as counsel respective memoranda.” [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent
for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490; filed a reply to the Solicitor General’s comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated
January 16, 1989 the Court required the Solicitor General to submit his report and
recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.
3.Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which properties
are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the case was still On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that
pending; Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that
respondent committed the following acts of misconduct:
4.Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on
August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in a.transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of
Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty the case where the properties were involved;
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 3
b.concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the present case which has
development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the execution lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.
of said agreement; and
Respondent’s assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the
referral of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
c.misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two
General respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce
signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to
additional evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due
appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor
process. The record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no
General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].
less than eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-
examine the complainant who appeared as a witness against him.
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of II.
Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally,
on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer this case to the IBP,
The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the
containing additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings.
acts of misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.
I. After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the
Solicitor General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power.
respondent’s contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
was limited to the determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with the The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled “Transfer of Rights” which was
case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative complaint signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent onehalf
against him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of (1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650
Rule 139-B provides that: sq. m., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139 entitled services to the latter. At the time the document was executed, respondent knew that the
“DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS.” All cases pending investigation by the Office abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending
of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the
Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where Fortunados in said case [See Annex “B” of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing
the investigation has been substantially completed. the document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent
violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client’s property or interest
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent’s involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New
claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client’s property or interest
[Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v.
October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].
terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [ Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-
B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which
by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme states that “[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation
Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and recommendation of the which he is conducting,” does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional
investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its Responsibility. He therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation
final action on the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the investigating is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary
official and the evidence presented by the parties during the investigation. action under the new Code of Professional Responsibility.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that “a lawyer
Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
been substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the process” (Italics supplied). Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires
investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor every lawyer to take an oath to “obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the
General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein.” And for any violation of this oath, a
was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules
motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986, of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system.
the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which
p. 353]. the Court will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and to society.
made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as
prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 4
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a public auction so
prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the project they were jointly
relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his
rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him [ Custodio v.
with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].
failed to emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that “a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents
reposed in him.” On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that “a lawyer shall hold in trust all purporting to be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement.
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.” Hence, notwithstanding Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document
the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the filed by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the
abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the addendum to the land development agreement—namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T.
prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client’s property in litigation Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautista—were made to
constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought against appear as having signed the original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters
him. “(SGD.)” before each of their names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and
complainant who signed the original and duplicate original (Exh. “2”) and the two other parties,
Respondent’s next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith
implemented, because the land development agreement on which the transfer depended was and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. “2-A”) after respondent wrote them on
later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of Rights that the May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox copy attached to the letter and to send it back
assignment of the properties of the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant’s Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover,
implementation of the land development agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to sign,
Rights provides that: but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973
[Respondent’s Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
. . . for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, Filipino, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on May 23,
married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City, rendered to 1973 as Annex “A” of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he
our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do transfer and convey to the said ATTY. knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith
RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty
interests in the above-described property, together with all the improvements found therein as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek
[Annex “D” of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Italics supplied]. to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to Professional Responsibility].
respondent to be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land
development agreement was implemented. Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was
committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the agreement
the time the land development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that:
T-1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The land development agreement was
executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971. We [the Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon
Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the
complainant in an antigraft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon Alfaro T. Fortunado [signed]
the request of complainant and was understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that Editha T. Fortunado [signed]
since complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the Nestor T. Fortunado [signed]
land involved in their land development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, CONFORME
the sale was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves Ramon A. Gonzales [signed]
as constructive notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.
[Annex “A” to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was
annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethicswhich provides that a lawyer may
complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations for the land
not properly agree with aclient to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule16.04,
development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of
Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyermay in good faith, advance the expenses
ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous
of litigation, the sameshould be subject to reimbursement. The agreement betweenrespondent
conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent does not exempt
and the Fortunados, however, does not provide forreimbursement to respondent of litigation
respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land
expenses paid byhim. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of
which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development agreement,
proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp.
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 5
324 (1958)]. Suchagreements are against public policy especially where, as inthis case, the circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the
attorney has agreed to carry on the action at hisown expense in consideration of some bargain personal record of Atty. Gonzales.
to have part ofthe thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F.
242 (1918)]. The execution of these contractsviolates the fiduciary relationship between the SO ORDERED.
lawyer and hisclient, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions. Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin and Cortés, JJ., concur.
The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as Gutierrez, Jr., J., No part. Had no part in deliberations.
counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Sarmiento, J., No part, he is a close neighbor.
Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after Griño-Aquino, J., No part; had no part in deliberation.
considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor General’s findings on the matter. The evidence Medialdea, J., No part in deliberation.
presented by respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the Regalado, J., No part; did not participate in deliberation.
knowledge and consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June Respondent suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
23, 1976 clearly states that they gave their consent when respondent accepted the case of Note.—Failure of lawyer to live up to the high standards of the law profession his name in
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the Roll of Attorneys should be striken out. (Diaz vs. Gering, 141 SCRA 46.)
recognized exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is where the
clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel
[Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional
Responsibility].
Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the
Court of First Instance and the Fiscal’s Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing
him.
The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General’s investigation of this case, Civil Case
No. Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the
complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the
City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report and
Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for
holding that the complaints for libel and perjury were used by respondent to harass
complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering that it was still pending resolution, the
Solicitor General made no finding on complainant’s claim that it was a mere ploy by respondent
to harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-18060 was
left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was pending resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds
that there is no basis for holding that the respondent’s sole purpose in filing the aforementioned
cases was to harass complainant.
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the
above discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated
the law and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to
assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has “miserably failed to
live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar.”[Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter
No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that,
considering the nature of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and
circumstances of the case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months.
Annex B xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
GUAM DIVORCE
terms, i.e., “legal support services” vis-a-vis “legal services”, common sense would readily
DON PARKINSON dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas,
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota constitute practice of law?
Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. xxx
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent’s
foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,
strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to
LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy advertise one’s legal services).
CLINIC, INC. 1
Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent’s act of
522-2041; 521-0767 establishing a “legal clinic” and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as practice as aforedescribed. 4
hereinbefore quoted. xxx
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said A. The use of the name “The Legal Clinic, Inc.” gives the impression that respondent corporation
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
rendering of “legal support services” through paralegals with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 8
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in
the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public. Annex “A” of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words “Just
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the Married” on its bumper and seems to address those planning a “secret marriage,” if not
very name being used by respondent—“The Legal Clinic, Inc.” Such a name, it is respectfully suggesting a “secret marriage,” makes light of the “special contract of permanent union,” the
submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic inviolable social institution,” which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to
connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term “Legal Clinic” emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors. encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license.
Furthermore, the respondent’s name, as published in the advertisements subject of the
present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression If the article “Rx for Legal Problems” is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the
that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed (a bigamous marriage
nature of the service or services being offered. in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts
does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering “legal support services” as
claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the “legal support services” respondent offers do not
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between “legal services” and “legal constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
support services,” as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal
room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
lawyers, whether true or not. ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good,
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
law, morals, public order and public policy. xxx
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication
meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also
however, emphasize a Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the
Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is: services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in
Article 26. x x x. general.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law. evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but
instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows: encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements Bar. To prohibit them from “encroaching” upon the legal profession will deny the profession of
may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer
will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal
accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and
encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in the profession
considered “the dark side” of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of, illegal practice.
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services,
Rule 1.02.—A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar.
lessening confidence in the legal system. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the
more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public
in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 9
undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for
considerations involved. respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are “strictly non-diagnostic, non- The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
advisory.” It is not controverted, however, that if the services “involve giving legal advice or Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the
counseling,” such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that practice of law when he:
FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case. “x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising persons, firms, associations
xxx or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
2.10. Annex “A” may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
marriage can be secret. representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
2.11. Annex “B” may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
(which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).”
“paralegal services” or “legal support services”, and not legal services are available.” 11
This Court, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase “practice of law” becomes exigent for a stated:
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause “practice of law” has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The “The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
term, some of which we now take into account. management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12 proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.13 conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three “Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of
principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14 always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
of law.15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
law.16Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18 customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod,19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we rests upon all attorneys (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-
laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute “practice of law,” thus: 666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc.
Black defines “practice of law” as: v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144).”
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised,
constitute “practice of law.”
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 13
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent’s own description of
the services it has been offering, to wit: The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. “When they come, we start by analyzing
the problem. That’s what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what’s bothering
“Legal support services basically consist of giving ready information by trained paralegals to you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms, and so on. That’s how we
laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it’s referred to one of our
of computers and modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, specialists.”
transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment.
research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. “Things like preparing a simple deed
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital, the
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again,
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business kung baga sa ospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It’s just like a common cold or
registrations; educational of employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like diarrhea,” explains Atty. Nogales.
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries
that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of Those cases which require more extensive “treatment” are dealt with accordingly. “If you had a
preparatory to emigration to that foreign country, and other matters that do not involve rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts, and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the
other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services.20 right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal
with that problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relative’s will, then you
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the gather evidence to support the case.”21
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials,
these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against
and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts
merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within engaged in the practice of law.22
the jurisprudential definition of “practice of law.” Such a conclusion will not be altered by the
fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted
research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the
Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled “Rx for Legal Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
Problems,” where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an
corporation was given by its own “proprietor,” Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales: individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of
moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U.N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client’s to the disciplinary control of the court.24
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take The same rule is observed in the American jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to
care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal draw support for his thesis.
problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the
requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically
so provide.25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 14
have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the
persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs vs.
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the
legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights, claims, or present proceeding,39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of
law.26The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over the ethics of his profession. It being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that “the practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent’s position that the concept in the malpractice.” It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done. offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. “The most
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, * * * is the establishment
there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the “paralegal” or “legal assistant” evolved of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced
in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of but must be the outcome of the character and conduct.” (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up
Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is
been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as
States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29 community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render propaganda.40
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor.30 Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely,
or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the
for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an restrictions.41
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law.31 That policy should continue to be
one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state.32 with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative
data. “Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public
use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities;
give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
publicity to attract legal business.35 Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.” 42
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort
to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other like brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society
self-laudation.36 program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the
The standards of the legal profession codemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession.43
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The proscription against advertising of
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 15
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are
telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It
name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different
may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a
branch of law.44 corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This
interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions. province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona,45 which is repeatedly invoked and due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent’s corporate
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is
bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any
or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes “A” and “B” of this petition,
for, expressly or impliedly whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by
Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be
a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are “not applicable in any state unless and until it is furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of
implemented by such authority in that state.” 46 This goes to show that an exception to the the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide,
the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Meloand Quiason, JJ., concur.
case at bar. Respondent restrained and enjoined from issuing or causing the publication of the
questioned advertisement.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the
decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television Notes.—Lawyers may not engage in forum-shopping by splitting actions or appeals ( Tan
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 212).
characteristics of lawyers:
Reason for award of attorney’s fees must be stated in the court’s decision ( Policarpio vs.
Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 729).
Trustworthy................................................................... from 71% to 14%
Professional.................................................................. from 71% to 14%
Honest........................................................................... from 65% to 14%
Dignified....................................................................... from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity
has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point
in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times,
to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert
all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action,
to advertise his services except in allowable instances48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major
stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is
hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 16
of Judgment dated Sep-tember 21, 1982 and Receipt of Payment dated September 22,
A.C. No. 2519. August 29, 2000.*
1982, hereto attached as Annexes “A” and “B,” respectively), without our knowledge;
TEODORO R. RIVERA, ANTONIO D. AQUINO and FELIXBERTO D. AQUINO,
complainants, vs. ATTY. SERGIO ANGELES, respondent.
6.That Atty. Sergio Angeles never informed the undersigned of the amount of P42,999.00
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Respondent’s act of deceit and malpractice indubitably he received from Mr. Silva nor remitted to them even a part of that amount;
demonstrated his failure to live up to his sworn duties as a lawyer; Supreme Court repeatedly
stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer’s equipment 7.That a demand letter was sent to Atty. Sergio Angeles which was received by him on
in the practice of his profession.—The Court finds merit in the recommendation of the February 17, 1983, but as of this date the under-signed have not yet received any reply.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Respondent’s act of deceit and malpractice indubitably (See Exhibits “C” and “D” at-tached).”
demonstrated his failure to live up to his sworn duties as a lawyer. The Supreme Court
repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer’s
equipment in the practice of his profession. For it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants In his Comment filed on June 21, 1983, respondent denied the accusations and stated that he
for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust has the right to retain the said amount of P42,999.00 and to apply the same to professional fees
and confidence. due him under the subsequent agreement first with complainant Teodoro Rivera and later with
Mrs. Dely Dimson Rivera as embodied in the Deed of Assignment (Annex “8”) 2 or under the
Same; Same; A lawyer has a right to be paid for the legal services he has extended to previous agreement of 20% of P206,000.00.
his client but such right should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the
money intended for his clients.—The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for Complainants, in their Reply,3 vehemently denied the assignment of their rights to
the legal services he has extended to his client but such right should not be exercised respondent.
whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There should never
be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to the fees of his own Thereafter, this case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
lawyer. recommendation in our Resolution dated November 21, 1983. The Office of the Solicitor General
considered this case submitted for resolution on April 30, 1985 by declaring respondent’s right to
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. The facts are stated in the present evidence as considered waived due to the latter’s failure to appear on the scheduled
resolution of the Court. hearings. However, the records from said Office do not show any resolution.
In October 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued an Order requiring the parties to
RESOLUTION manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting this case, or whether
supervening events have transpired which render this case moot and academic or otherwise.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: The copy of said Order sent to the complainants was received by their counsel on October 30,
1998 while the copy to the respondent was returned unclaimed.
On March 25, 1983, complainants filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Sergio Angeles Investigating Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo submitted his report on April 29, 1999 finding
on the grounds of Deceit and Malpractice. The Affidavit-Complaint 1 reads as follows: respondent Atty. Sergio Angeles guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
specifically Rule 1.01, Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 thereof and recommends his indefinite
“1.The undersigned are plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. Q-12841 and Q-13128 of the Court of suspension from the practice of law.
First Instance of Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City;
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on June 19, 1999, issued a
resolution, the decretal portion of which reads:
2.Atty. Sergio Angeles is their counsel of record in the said cases and his office is located
at Suite 335, URC Building, 2123 España, Manila;
“RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-151
Adm. Case No. 2519
3.That after receiving favorable decision from the CFI on May 21, 1973 and sustained by Teodoro R. Rivera, et al. vs.
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court an alias writ of execution was issued in said Atty. Sergio Angeles
cases;
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
4.That in the first week of January 1983 we obtained from the CFI a sheriff’s return, dated Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
November 10, 1982, stating that no leviable property can be found in the premises of the part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
defendants; by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment that Atty.
Sergio Angeles is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR for his having been
5.That on or before January 13, 1983, we learned that Mr. Rodolfo M. Silva, one of the found guilty of practicing deceit in dealing with his client.”
defendants in said cases had already given Atty. An-geles a partial settlement of the
judgment in the amount of P42,999.00 (as evidenced by xerox copies of Partial Settlement
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 17
The Court finds merit in the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Respondent’s act of deceit and malpractice indubitably demonstrated his failure to live up to his
sworn duties as a lawyer. The Supreme Court repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity
and good moral character as part of a lawyer’s equipment in the practice of his profession. 4 For
it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished
whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. 5
The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has
extended to his client but such right should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to
himself the money intended for his clients. There should never be an instance where the victor
in litigation loses everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sergio Angeles, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR for having been found guilty of practicing deceit in dealing with his client. This
Resolution shall take effect immediately and copies thereof furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines and appended to respondent’s personal record.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Respondent Sergio Angeles suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year for
practicing deceit.
Note.—It cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. ( Busiños vs.
Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1998])
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 18
Before us is a verified letter-complaint 1 for disbarment against Attys. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr.;
Adm. Case No. 3910. August 14, 2000.*
Andres Canares, Jr. and Crispulo Ducusin for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of the
JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and
lawyer’s oath. Investigation proceeded only against respondent Villalon because it was
CRISPULO DUCUSIN, respondents.
discovered that Andres Canares was not a lawyer while Atty. Crispulo Ducusin passed away on
February 3, 1996.2
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
In the letter-complaint,3 complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent Villalon,
character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering him unworthy to continue
as counsel for the family of complainant, spoke to the father of complainant and asked that he
as an officer of the court.—The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with
be given the title over a property owned by complainant located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and
the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A
covered by TCT No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly had to
lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or
verify the proper measurements of the subject property. Sometime in November, 1991,
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and
however, complainant and his family were surprised when several people entered the subject
good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Canon 7 of the
property and, when confronted by the companions of complainant, the latter were told that they
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that “a lawyer shall at all times uphold the
were workers of Canares and were there to construct a piggery. Complainant complained to the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession.” The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by
barangay authorities in Pinugay and narrated the incident but respondent Canares did not
clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end,
appear before it and continued with the construction of the piggery in the presence of armed
nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any
men who were watching over the construction. Complainant then went to respondent Villalon to
degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession.
complain about the people of respondent Canares but nothing was done.
Same; Same; Land Titles; Sales; It is basic law that conveyance or transfer of any titled
real property must be in writing, signed by the registered owner or at least his attorney-in-fact Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent Canares. In his Reply however,
by virtue of a proper special power of attorney and duly notarized, and a lawyer, is presumed to the latter answered that the subject property was already sold by complainant to respondent
know, or ought to know, this process. —It has been established that the subject parcel of land, Canares in the amount of P450,000,00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
with an area of five (5) hectares located in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and Property dated December 5, 1991 and notarized by respondent Atty. Crispulo Ducusin.
registered in the name of complainant herein, Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists Complainant, however, averred that he never sold the property, signed any document nor
nonetheless that the property was orally given to him by complainant’s father, Jose Ducat, Sr., received any money therefor, and he also denied having appeared before respondent Ducusin
allegedly with the complete knowledge of the fact that the subject property belonged to his son, who was the notary public for DE LEON, JR., J.:
Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that conveyance or transfer of any titled real property
must be in writing, signed by the registered owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of Before us is a verified letter-complaint 1 for disbarment against Attys. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr.;
a proper special power of attorney and duly notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is Andres Canares, Jr. and Crispulo Ducusin for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of the
presumed to know, or ought to know, this process. Worse, when the transfer was first reduced lawyer’s oath. Investigation proceeded only against respondent Villalon because it was
in writing in October, 1991 per Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land, purportedly in favor of “Atty. discovered that Andres Canares was not a lawyer while Atty. Crispulo Ducusin passed away on
Arsenio C. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr.,” respondent Villalon knew that it was Jose Ducat, February 3, 1996.2
Sr. who signed the said document of sale without any Special Power of Attorney from the
(registered owner thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and that Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his wife, In the letter-complaint,3 complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent Villalon,
Maria Cabrido, under the word “Conforme.” as counsel for the family of complainant, spoke to the father of complainant and asked that he
be given the title over a property owned by complainant located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and
Same, Same; Public confidence in law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible covered by TCT No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly had to
and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. —Public confidence in law and lawyers may be verify the proper measurements of the subject property. Sometime in November, 1991,
eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer however, complainant and his family were surprised when several people entered the subject
should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the property and, when confronted by the companions of complainant, the latter were told that they
integrity of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are expected to always live up to the were workers of Canares and were there to construct a piggery. Complainant complained to the
standards of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility barangay authorities in Pinugay and narrated the incident but respondent Canares did not
inasmuch as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and appear before it and continued with the construction of the piggery in the presence of armed
demands utmost fidelity and good faith. men who were watching over the construction. Complainant then went to respondent Villalon to
complain about the people of respondent Canares but nothing was done.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent Canares. In his Reply however,
the latter answered that the subject property was already sold by complainant to respondent
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Canares in the amount of P450,000,00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Castillo, Salazar, Lazaro, Tuazon and Associates for complainant.
Property dated December 5, 1991 and notarized by respondent Atty. Crispulo Ducusin.
Complainant, however, averred that he never sold the property, signed any document nor
received any money therefor, and he also denied having appeared before respondent Ducusin
DE LEON, JR., J.: who was the notary public for In his Rejoinder,6 respondent Villalon denied the allegations of
complainant and maintained that he is a member of good standing of the Integrated Bar and
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 19
that he has always preserved the high standards of the legal profession. Respondent Villalon executed said document which denial is not too difficult to believe in the light of the
expressed his willingness to have the Deed of Sale examined by the National Bureau of circumstances already mentioned.
Investigation and reiterated that the subject property was orally given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.
and it was only in October, 1991 that the conveyance was reduced in writing. He added that the FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. “2” for the respondent and Exh. “A-
complainant knew that his father, Jose Ducat, Sr., was the person who signed the said 3” for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr.
document for and in his behalf and that this was done with his consent and knowledge. over the subject property (which respondent claims he prepared upon instruction of Jose Ducat,
Sr.) is likewise of questionable character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied
This Court referred7 the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, having executed said document. He claims that he has never sold said property to Andres
report and recommendation. Canares, Jr. whom he does not know; that he has never appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin
to subscribe to the document; and that he has never received the amount of P450,000.00
On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving representing the consideration of said transaction. More importantly, the infirmity of the said
the report and recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner who found respondent Atty. Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property was supplied by the respondent no less when he
Villalon guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years and admitted that there was no payment of P450,000.00 and that the same was placed in the
likewise directed respondent Atty. Villalon to deliver to the complainant his TCT No. M-3023 document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a consideration. Accordingly, and
within ten (10) days from receipt of notice, otherwise, this will result in his disbarment. being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know the irregularity of his act and that he should
have treated the document as another scrap of worthless paper instead of utilizing the same to
The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez are as follows: substantiate his defense.8
Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and
candid manner. The sincerity and demeanor they displayed while testifying before the After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, it appears that the findings of
Commission inspire belief as to the truth of what they are saying. More importantly, respondent facts and observations of the Investigating Commissioner, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
failed to impute any ill-motive on the part of the complainant and his witness which can impel which were all adopted by its Board of Governors, are well-taken, the same being supported by
them to institute the instant complaint and testify falsely against him. To be sure, the testimony the evidence adduced.
of the complainant and his witness deserves the Commission’s full faith and credence.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of
Respondent’s evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His defense (that he truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be
considered himself the owner of the subject property which was allegedly given to him by Jose disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in the face of a welter of contravening and incontrovertible facts. which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor,
thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.9 Canon 7 of the Code of
FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly Professional Responsibility mandates that “a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
respondent (being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give dignity of the legal profession.” The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require
to him the said property unless the former is duly authorized by the complainant through a in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should
Special Power of Attorney. No such authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the
vigorously denied having given the subject property to the respondent. This denial is not too confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession. 10
difficult to believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat, Sr.) is not the owner of said
property. It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of five (5) hectares located
in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and registered in the name of complainant herein,
SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance of a real Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless that the property was orally given to him
property, whether gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in writing. Accordingly, it is by complainant’s father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the complete knowledge of the fact that
unbelievable that he would consider himself the owner of the subject property on the basis of the subject property belonged to his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that
the verbal or oral “giving” of the property by Jose Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the conveyance or transfer of any titled real property must be in writing, signed by the registered
latter may have said that. owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of a proper special power of attorney and duly
notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is presumed to know, or ought to know, this
THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. “1” for the respondent and Exh. “A-2” for process. Worse, when the transfer was first reduced in writing in October, 1991 per Deed of
the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio Sale of Parcel of Land,11 purportedly in favor of “Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon and/or Andres Canares,
Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. covering the subject parcel of land which respondent Jr.,” respondent Villalon knew that it was Jose Ducat, Sr. who signed the said document of sale
prepared allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier without any Special Power of Attorney from the registered owner thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and
adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of that Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his wife, Maria Cabrido, under the word “Conforme.” As
Parcel of Land is a falsified document as admitted by the respondent himself when he said that regards the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991,
the signature over the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by covering the same property, this time purportedly in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. only,
Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat, respondent Villalon admitted that there was in fact no payment of P450,000.00 and that the said
Sr. in affixing his wife’s signature is tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have amount was placed in that document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a
treated the said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper instead consideration.
of relying on the same to substantiate his claim that the subject property was given to him by
Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 20
All these taken together, coupled with complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.’s strong and credible
denial that he allegedly sold the subject property to respondent Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Mendoza (Actg. Chairman), Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
Jr. and that he allegedly appeared before respondent notary public Ducusin, convince us that Bellosillo, J. (Chairman), On leave.
respondent Villalon’s acts herein complained of which constitute gross misconduct were duly Respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year
proven. for gross misconduct and warned against repetition of similar act.
Notes.—A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court—his duties to the court are
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper more significant than those which he owes to his client. ( City Sheriff, Iligan City vs.
conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a Fortunado, 288 SCRA 190 [1998])
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members
of the Bar are expected to always live up to the standards of the legal profession as embodied in While, indeed, the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer, nevertheless, is
the Code of Professional Responsibility inasmuch as the relationship between an attorney and entitled to be duly compensated for professional services rendered. ( J.K. Mercado and Sons
his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. 12 Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. v. De Vera,317 SCRA 339 [1999])
We find, however, the IBP’s recommended penalty of two (2) years suspension to be imposed A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of
upon respondent Atty. Villalon too severe in the light of the facts obtaining in the case at bar. his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney. ( Tucay vs. Tucay, 318 SCRA
In Cesar V. Roces vs. Atty. Jose G. Aportadera, 13this Court suspended therein respondent Atty. 229 [1999])
Aportadera for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law for two main reasons:
(i)His dubious involvement in the preparation and notarization of the falsified sale of his
client’s property merits the penalty of suspension imposed on him by the IBP Board of
Governors; and
(ii)The NBI investigation reveals that: (1) respondent misrepresented himself to Gregorio
Licuanan as being duly authorized by Isabel Roces to sell her property; (2) it was
respondent who prepared the various deeds of sale over Isabel’s subdivision lots; (3)
Isabel was already confined at a hospital in Metro Manila on January 4, 1980, the deed’s
date of execution; (4) respondent knew that Isabel was hospitalized in Metro Manila
when he subscribed the deed; (5) he knew that Isabel died in Metro Manila soon after
her confinement; and (6) he did not give the seller a copy of the questioned deed of
sale.14
Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the said case of Aportadera, the record does not show
that respondent Villalon had any direct participation in the notarization by respondent notary
public Crispulo Ducusin of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5,
1991,15which was supposedly signed by complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. who, however, strongly
denied having signed the same. The earlier Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land dated “this ___day of
October 1991,” allegedly signed by Jose S. Ducat, Sr., as vendor, covering the same property, in
favor of respondent “Arsenio S. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr.” was not notarized. The
record also shows that Jose Ducat, Sr. and complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. are father and son and
that they live in the same house at 912 Leo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. It is not also disputed that
respondent Villalon has been the lawyer for a number of years of the family of Jose Ducat, Sr.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross
misconduct, and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent
Villalon is further directed to deliver to the registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat, Jr., the
latter’s TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property within a period of sixty (60) days from
receipt of this Decision, at his sole expense; and that failure on his part to do so will result in his
disbarment.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalon’s personal record in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 21
to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
1
right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also
the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust.”
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME “SYCIP,
SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.” LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, Same; Same; Same; Custom; Continued use of a deceased or former partner’s name in
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. the firm names of law partnerships not sanctioned by local custom; Reason; Possibility of
ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES, JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. deception upon the public where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used. —It is
CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased
IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by
V. PESIGAN, petitioners. local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use. It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM or allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner’s name in the firm names of law
NAME “OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES.” RICARDO J. ROMULO, partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, identify the more active and/or more senior
BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA. REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, members or partners of the law firm . A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of
EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners. other law firms in this country would show how their firm names have evolved and changed
from time to time as the composition of the partnership changed. The possibility of deception
Civil Law; Partnership; Firm Name; Use in the partnership name of the names of upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues to be
deceased partners contrary to Art. 1815 of the Civil Code; Names in a firm name of a used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar
partnership must be living partners; Reasons. —Inasmuch as “Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
Hernandez and Castillo” and “Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes” are partnerships,
the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Concept of Customs; To be admissible
1815 of the Civil Code. x x x It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name custom must be proved as a fact; Distinctions between juridical custom and social custom. —Not
of a partnership must either be those of living partners and, in the case of non-partners, should so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has
be living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced)
prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A
liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. A local custom as a source
old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by
of the Canons of Professional Ethics “prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and competent evidence like any other fact. We find such proof of the existence of a local custom,
heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something
future business of the deceased lawyer’s clients, both because the recipients of such division are is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of
not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom.
of the recipient.” Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so
entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there with the latter.
can be no corresponding liability.
Same; Same; Same; Practice of Law; Practice of law not considered money-making
Same; Same; Same; Commercial Partnership; Art. 1840 refers to commercial partnership trade but peculiarly related to the administration of justice .—The practice of law is intimately
with goodwill, not professional partnerships; Goodwill cannot arise in a professional partnership . and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be considered like an
—Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect ordinary "money-making trade."
rather than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good, will but whose reputation
depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a Aquino, J.: dissenting:
saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional
partnership consisting of lawyers.
Civil Law; Partnership; Firm Name; Use of firm name of deceased partner of law firm;
Purpose of continued use of names of decesed founders of law firms; is a legitimate motivation;
Same; Same; Same; Practice of Law; Partnership for the practice of law, nature of.—A
Retention of the name of the deceased partner in the law firm not illegal per se. —Obviously, the
partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is to
professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use
retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta
of a trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy. “A partnership for the practice
and the benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law
of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. x x x
practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation. The retention of their names is not illegal per se.
It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on a trade or business or of holding
That practice was followed before the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the
property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in
death of Judge Ross, the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his
law practice is improper.”
name was retained in the frim name with an indication of the year when he died. No one
complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or
Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to practice law, nature of .—“The right to practice law
unethical.
is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited,
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 22
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953
RESOLUTION when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that
of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: to desist from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, “who has long
been dead.”
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty.
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964,
Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio
entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins &
Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the
Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a
names of the firms, the names of partners who had passed awy. In the Court's Resolution of
Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it “would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is
September2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.
still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead.” In a Manifestation dated May 21,
1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
those now being raised by petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name “Perkins
& Ponce Enrile” be held proper.
1. Under the law, a partnership is notprohibited from continuing its business under a firm
name which includes the name explicity sanctions the practice when it provides in the last
paragraph that:
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved:
“The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the
“After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates
name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of
for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to
the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or partner-ship.” 1
depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and
Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm designation, the name of C. D.
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has
Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of
authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name,
the relations between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of
of the name of a deceased partner;2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the
professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise
practice of accountancy—a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in
to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name
respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client—to acquire and use a
“PERKINS” from their firm name.”
trade name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the
continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.
partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of a “trade name.” 3
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name
of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of
A. Inasmuch as “Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo” and “Ozaeta, Romulo, De
Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that:
Leon, Mabanta and Reyes” are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of
deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides:
“x x x The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
“Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include
through this use. x x x”4
the name of one or more of the partners.
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective
“Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name,
deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days;
shall be subject to the liability of a partner.”
the stationeries now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their
respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either
national and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners’
be those of living partners and, in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be
deaths.5
subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from
including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a
of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot he held liable as the old members to the creditors of
professional firm’s name;6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the
a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional
Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the
Ethics “prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of
individual members of the firm.7
a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased
lawyer’s clients, both because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such
6. The continued use of a deceased partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships
payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient.” Accordingly,
has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession
neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death
of most countries in the world.8
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 23
of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there can be no corresponding x x x x x x x x x
liability.
“Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of
the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can
tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able 1.A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may
lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another attain the highest eminence without making much money.
able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s reputation established
by deceased partners. 2.A relation as an ‘officer of court’ to the administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by
petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code
entitled “Dissolution and Winding Up.” The Article primarily deals with the exemption from 3.A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for
debts contracted by the person or partnership which continues the business using the 4.A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness
partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice,
contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory: to formal reorganization. or dealing directly with their clients.”13
Secondly Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather
“The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege
than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on
or franchise.14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
the personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a seleable
ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal
goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional
standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and
partnership consisting of lawyers.9
partaking of the nature of a public trust.”16
“As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a
Association17 in support of their petitions.
stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset
inseparable from the good will of the firm x x x x.” (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Italics
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a
supplied)
deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice
is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition
On the other hand,
or deception is practiced through this use.
“x x x a professional partnership the reputation of which depends on the individual skill of the
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued
members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good will to be distributed as
use of a deceased or former partner’s name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names,
a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be,
under our custom, identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law
especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an
firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country
asset. x x x” (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Italics supplied)
would show how their firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
composition of the partnership changed.
professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use
of a trade name in connection with the practice of accoun-tancy.10
“The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners designated by
it is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by custom this purports to
“A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
identify the active members. x x x
association for a particular purpose. x x x It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of
carrying on trade or business or of holding property.” 11 Thus, it has been stated that “the use of
“There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety of
a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.” 12
adding the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased
partner who was never a partner with the new one .” (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207-
“The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice of
208) (Italics supplied).
law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a ‘profession.’ x x x
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a
deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel
“Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal Profession, ( The
might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as ‘a group of men pursuing
a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service,—no less a public service
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a
because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood.’
deceased partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is
sanctioned by custom.
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 24
be no such thing as a lawyers’ or physicians’ strike. The best service of the professional man is
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does
petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation of reward. This spirit of
the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of
bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any sound administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a profession,
statutory provision or legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure and
stated therein: maintain that spirit.”25
“The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no statutory In fine, petitioners’ desire to preserve the identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must
provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the bow to legal and ethical impediments.
American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association provides in part as follows:
‘The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner, when permissible by local ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the
custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced names “SYCIP” and “OZAETA” from their respective firm names. Those names may, however,
through this use.’ There is no question as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years
of deceased members with the approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The during which they served as such.
Appellate Division of the First Department has considered the matter and reached the conclusion SO ORDERED.
that such practice should not be prohibited. (Italics supplied)
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerreroand De Castro, JJ., concur.
x x x x x x x x x Fernando, C. J., and Abad-Santos, J., take no part.
Barredo, J., joins Justices Antonio and Aquino in their dissent.
Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., concur in the dissenting opinion of Justice Ramon C.
“Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The use
Aquino.
of the firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners.” 18
Aquino, J., see attached dissent
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has
been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced)
CERTIFICATION
as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a
source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly FERNANDO C.J.:
established by competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a
local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices
because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the being of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom Juridical custom must be differentiated Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the under-signed did not participate in the disposition of
from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with
such statute. Not so with the latter. the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon
Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then,
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother-in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to
system.22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the
directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased partners in their firm opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: “Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may,
designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating
proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership the years during which they served as such.” It represents a happy compromise.
is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Customs which are contrary to law, public order or
public policy shall not be countenanced.24
DISSENTING OPINION
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and
should not be considered like an ordinary “money-making trade.” AQUINO, J.:
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a
deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked
is the canon that the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, “when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical” as long as “no imposition or deception is practised
through this use” (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated
in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice
Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be
stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their
deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of
Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those
respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war
by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law
firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an
indication of the year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge
Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.
Petition denied.
Although the heir of a partner ordinarily becomes a limited partner for his own protection, yet
the heir may disregard it and instead elect to become a collective or general partner, with all the
rights and obligations of one. (Goquiolay vs. Sycip, 9 SCRA 663).
An action for the liquidation of a partnership is a personal one, which may be brought in the
place of residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant. (Claridades vs. Mercader, 17 SCRA 1).
A general partner cannot sell partnership property without authority from other partners.
(Goquiolay vs. Sycip, 9 SCRA 663).
Condonation by creditor of share in partnership debt of one partner does not increase pro
rata of other partners. (Island Sales, Inc. vs. United Pioneers Construction Company , 65 SCRA
554.)
A partner has no obligation to account to anyone for properties acquired after dissolution of
partnership in absence of proof he violated trust of deceased partner during existence of
partnership. (Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425.)
The partnership profits distribution to the partners should be reduced by the amounts of
income tax assessed against the partnership. ( Ona vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 45
SCRA 74.)
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 26
Bar Matter No. 44. November 29, 1983.* RESOLUTION
EUFROSINA YAP TAN, complainant, vs. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent
Bar Matter No. 59. November 29, 1983.* MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
BENJAMIN CABIGON, complainant, vs. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
At issue in the above-entitled consolidated cases is the petition of respondent Nicolas El.
SBC No. 624. November 29, 1983.*
Sabandal, a successful Bar examinee in 1978, to be admitted to the Philippine Bar and to be
CORNELIO AGNIS and DIOMEDES D. AGNIS, complainants, vs. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL,
allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
respondent.
Complainants-oppositors, namely, Eufrosina Y. Tan (Bar Matter No. 44, Eufrosina Y. Tan vs.
Legal Ethics; Administrative Complaints; Unauthorized practice of law by a successful bar
Nicolas E. Sabandal); Benjamin Cabigon (Bar Matter No. 59, Benjamin Cabigon vs. Nicolas E.
examinee; A successful bar examinee who holds himself out as a lawyer by appearing in court
Sabandal); and Cornelio Agnis, et al. (SBC-624, Cornelio Agnis, et al. vs. Nicolas E. Sabandal),
although he had not been admitted to the Philippine Bar and allowed to sign the Roll of A
have opposed the petition. They have charged respondent with: illegal practice of law for
ttorneys, is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. —However, the evidence supports the
accepting clients and for his appearances as a lawyer even if he has not yet been admitted to
charge of unauthorized practice of law. While respondent's infraction may be mitigated in that
the Bar; dishonesty, for filling up daily time records as an Investigator of the Bureau of Lands
he appeared for his in-laws in CAR Cases Nos. 347 and 326 where they were parties, it is clear
during those days that he appeared as counsel; falsification of public documents; gross
from the proceedings in CAR Case No. 347 that he clarified his position only after the opposing
dishonesty in public service; and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
counsel had objected to his appearance. Besides, he specifically manifested "Atty. Nicolas
Sabandal, appearing for the defendants, Your Honor" (Exhibit "A-1"). He called himself
The above-entitled cases, upon respondent's Motion, were ordered consolidated in the
"attorney" knowing full well that he was not yet admitted to the Bar. Oppositor's evidence
Resolution of the Court dated November 12,1982, and were referred to the Office of the Chief
sufficiently shows that respondent had held himself out as an "attorney" in the agrarian, civil
Attorney for investigation, report and recommendation.
and criminal cases mentioned by said oppositors. Respondent cannot shift the blame on the
stenographer, for he could have easily asked for rectification. Even if respondent appeared
At the hearings conducted on March 23, 24 and 25, 1983, only complainants-oppositors
merely in collaboration with Atty, Senen Angeles in the several cases, that collaboration could
Eufrosina Y. Tan and Benjamin Cabigon, complainants in Bar Matters 44 and 59, respectively,
only have been ostensibly as a lawyer. Oppositors had also presented evidence of proceedings
appeared with their respective counsel and presented their evidence, oral and documentary. The
wherein witnesses testified as to respondent's being their lawyer and their compensating him for
other complainantsoppositors, namely, Diomedes D. Agnis, Dr. Gabriel Catane, Hedy Catane,
his services (Exhibits "D-8" and "D-9"). It may be that in the Court of a municipality, even non-
Antonio Agnis and Fe E. Agnis, complainants in SBC-624, failed to appear at the hearings
lawyers may appear (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court). If respondent had so manifested, no
despite several notices sent to them by registered mail at their addresses of record. Cornelio
one could have challenged him. What he did, however, was to hold himself out as a lawyer and
Agnis had died in the meantime.
even to write the Station Commander of Roxas, complaining of harassment to "our clients",
when he could not but have known that he could not yet engage in the practice of law. His
Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal waived his right to attend the investigations for reasons of
argument that the term "client" is a "dependent or person under the protection of another and
financial constraints and his belief that the evidence he had already submitted together with his
not a person who engages in the prof ession'' is puerile.
pleadings are sufficient to prove his case so that he felt it unnecessary to submit additional
evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Penalty; Lack of showing by successful bar examinee to
show his fitness for admission to the bar; Application to take the lawyer's oath and to sign the
In support of her charge of deception by appearing as counsel and accepting clients, Eufrosina
Roll of Attorneys, denied. —Respondent's additional defense-that the code of professional ethics
Yap Tan, in Bar Matter No. 44, testified on and submitted the following documentary evidence:
does not apply to him as he is not yet a member of the Bar proves him unfit to be admitted to
(1) photostatic copies of transcripts of stenographic notes of (a) the hearing in CAR Case No.
the profession that exacts the highest ethical conduct of all its members, and good moral
347 entitled Eufrosina Y. Tan vs. Spouses Daniel Iman and Rosa Carreon, et als., before the
character even for applicants for admission to the Bar. He could at least have shown his fitness
Court of Agrarian Relations, XVI Regional District, Branch III, on June 23, 1981, wherein
for admission by showing adherence to and observance of the standards of conduct required by
respondent manifested "Atty. Nicolas Sabandal, appearing for the defendants, Your Honor" and
all who aspire to profess the law. x x x the petition of Nicolas El. Sabandal to be allowed to take
alleged that Atty. Senen Angeles, counsel of record, was sick (Exhibits "A" and "A-1"); (b) the
the oath as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys in accordance with
hearings in Civil Case No. 98 entitled Benjamin Cabigon, et al. vs. Florentina Buntoran, et al., for
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby denied.
Forcible Entry and Damages, before the Municipal Court of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte, on
September 23, 1980, wherein one of the appearances recorded was that of "Atty. Nicolas
Sabandal: For the defendants", and where respondent manifested "Your Honor please,
BAR MATTER in the Supreme Court. Admission to the Philippine Bar and to be allowed to sign appearing for the defendants in collaboration with Atty. Angeles" (Exhibits "H", "H-1" and "H-
the Roll of Attorneys. 3"), and on December 16, 1980 when respondent made a manifestation for the defendants
(Exhibits "I" and "1-2"); (2) xerox copy of a letter dated June 21, 1981 written by respondent to
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court. the Station Commander of Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte, Obdulio Villanueva, in which respondent
Nelbert T, Poculan for respondent Sabandal in BM 59. wrote in part: "we are informed that your office is being used by Mrs. Tan to harass our clients x
Alberto Concha for oppositors in BM 44. x x" (Exhibits "B" and "B-1"); and (3) copy of the Order of Judge Nicanor M. Ilicito, Jr., in CAR
Case No. 326, entitled Sps. Daniel and Rosk Iman vs. Eufrosina Yap Tan, stating in part that
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 27
"plaintiffs, through Atty. Nicolas Sabandal, informed the Court that plaintiff's counsel on record, As his documentary evidence, respondent submitted: (1) a photostatic copy of a subpoena for
Atty. Cyril Ruiz, is in bed and could not come in today's hearing" (Exhibits "G" and "G-1"). the first day of trial in Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607 and 622 issued by the Municipal Court of
Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte, addressed to Atty. Senen O. Angeles, Dipolog City and Atty.
On the same issue, in Bar Matter No. 59, complainant Benjamin Cabigon testified on and Benedicto O. Cainta, Dipolog City, dated September 3, 1980, to show that they, not respondent,
presented the following exhibits: (1) the appearance of respondent in Civil Case No. 98, the were the counsel of record (Annex "3", Amended Comment); (2) Certification from the Clerk of
Forcible Entry case entitled Cabigon vs. Bonturan before the Municipal Court of Roxas (Exhibit Court of the Municipal Court of Roxas that the dates of respondent's appearance in Criminal
"B"), already mentioned by Eufrosina Tan in Bar Matter No. 44; (2) a Certification by the Court Cases Nos. 606, 607 and 622 was October 1, 1980 and not 1981; and in Criminal Case No. 622,
Clerk, Interpreter I, of the Municipal Court of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte, that respondent had the date was October 16, 1980 and not October 16, 1981 (Annex . "1", Comment); (3) a
appeared before said Court on October 1, 1981 in Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607, and 622; on certification by the District Lands Officer, Benjamin Cabading, of the District Land Office No. IX-
October 16, 1981 and August 12, 1981 in Criminal Case No. 622; and on July 29, 1981 in 8, Bureau of Lands, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte on the leaves of absences of respondent
Criminal Case No. 667 (Exhibit "A"); (3) the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 667 on October 1, 1980, October 16, 1980 July 29, 1981 and August 12, 1981 (Annex "3",
(People vs. Florentina Bonturan, et als.) for Qualified Theft of Forest Products wherein Felipe Comment), together with Civil Service Form No. 48 (Annexes "6", "7", and "8", Amended
Inggo testified that respondent was the lawyer of the Bonturans (Exhibit "D-3"), while accused Comment) wherein he recorded his leaves of absences to prove that he applied for leave
Bernardo Gatina declared that respondent was his lawyer (Exhibits "D-6" and "D-7"); so also whenever he appeared either for a friend or his parentsin-law, and to disprove dishonesty
with the accused, Antonio Ganuran, who gave the same declaration and added that he used to (Annex "3", Comment); (4) duplicate copies of the reinvestigation report (Annex "A") and the
pay respondent and Atty. Angeles for handling his cases (Exhibits "D-8" and "D-9"). Amended Information (Annex "B") filed by Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal Rodolfo T. Mata, in
the Court of First Instance, 16th Judicial District, Dipolog City in Criminal Case No. 2734 for
To prove her other charges as to the unfitness of respondent to be a member of the Bar, Qualified Theft of Forest Products wherefrom respondent's name was dropped as one of the
Eufrosina Tan exhibited a Warrant of Arrest against respondent in Criminal Case No. 667 entitled accused on the ground that his inclusion was based on hearsay evidence (Annex "A", Motion to
People vs. Florentina Buntoran, et al. for the crime of Qualified Theft of Forest Products for Submit Additional Counter Evidence); as well as the Order of the Court dropping him from the
having allegedly ordered the felling and sawing of a dao tree (Exhibit "E"), and the Amended Information (Annex "C", ibid.); (5) the dismissal of the charge against him by the Director of
Complaint in the same case including respondent among the accused (Exhibits "F" and "F-1"); Lands in Dagpin vs. Sabandal, et al. (Annex "1", petitioner's Motion to Dismiss); (6) the
and the administrative charge against respondent in the Bureau of Lands and before the Tanod- dismissal of the charge against him for falsification of public document by the Tanodbayan
bayan for falsification of public documents. (Annex "1", petitioner's Manifestation dated February 9, 1981; Annex "2", Reply); (7) Affidavit of
Atty. Nelbert T. Poculan, who had helped respondent prepare his original Comment, denying the
For his part, Benjamin Cabigon (in Bar Matter No. 59) also presented a transcript of proceedings truth of the statement in the Comment that "respondent absented himself from his work and
during the preliminary investigation on July 6, 1981 in the same Criminal Case No. 667 (People appeared to protect the rights of Dandoy" alleging that respondent's purpose in absenting
vs. Florentina Buntoran, et al.) before the Municipal Court for Qualified Theft of Forest himself was "to procure materials for his nipa residence" (Annex "1", Amended Comment); (8)
Products wherein the defense of three of the accused was that it was respondent who had Affidavit of Atty. Senen O. Angeles wherein Atty. Angeles declared that he was the counsel of
ordered the cutting of the dao tree (Exhibits ''D-2'',''D-4" and ' 'D-5"). record in Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607 and 622, not the respondent who merely accompanied
accused Lito Dandoy in Criminal Case 622 to the Court (Annex "4", Amended Comment); (9) an
In his defense, respondent maintained that the charges against him were "baseless and Affidavit of Lito Dandoy, one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 606 and 607 for Qualified
mere products of oppositor's bedevilled mind, for the truth being that petitioner's admission to Theft of Coconuts, and the accused in Criminal Case No. 622 for Slight Physical Injuries, to the
the Philippine Bar is a sharp thorn in the throat of oppositor Eufrosina Tan, who had been effect that respondent was his intimate friend to whom he turned for help when a Warrant of
waging a campaign of ejectment against her tenant-farmers some of whom are relatives and Arrest was issued against him; that it was upon his insistence that respondent accompanied him
friends of petitioners"; and a scheme by Cabigon "to stifle anybody who extends assistance to to the Municipal Court of Roxas and that he gave no compensation, in cash or kind, to
his opponents and to press the Subano settlers of Gusa, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte, to give respondent for the latter's help (Annex "5", Amended Comment).
up their ancestral lands to Cabigon"; that he was merely assisting his parents-in-law, Daniel
Iman and Rosa Carreon, in CAR cases Nos. 347 and 326 as allowed under Sec. 14(k) of PD 946, From the array of evidence presented by the parties, it is evident that the charges of
and that it was the stenographer who had inadvertently entered his name as "Atty. Sabandal" in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross dishonesty in public service and
those cases; that being an employee of the Bureau of Lands does not bar him from attending to falsification of public documents, have not been substantiated.
personal cases applying by analogy section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, nor does he need
any authority to appear from said Bureau since the cases are not work connected; that insofar However, the evidence supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. While respondent's
as Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607 and 622 of the Municipal Court of Roxas are concerned, it was infraction may be mitigated in that he appeared for his in-laws in CAR Cases Nos. 347 and 326
Atty. Senen O. Angeles who was the counsel of record as shown by the Notice of Hearing where they were parties, it is clear from the proceedings in CAR Case No. 347 that he clarified
(Annex '"3", Amended Comment); that on the dates that those cases were set on hearing, he his position only after the opposing counsel had objected to his appearance. Besides, he
was on leave as shown by a Certification of the District Land Officer (Annex "9", Amended specifically manifested "Atty. Nicolas Sabandal, appearing for the defendants, Your Honor"
Comment); that in appearing in those cases he was merely helping distressed friends and (Exhibit "A-1"). He called himself "attorney" knowing full well that he was not yet admitted to
relatives; that if he had absented himsel from office it was to attend to his personal needs and the Bar. Oppositors' evidence sufficiently shows that respondent had held himself out as an
procure materials f or the nipa house that he was building and not to attend to the case of Lito "attorney" in the agrarian, civil and criminal cases mentioned by said oppositors. Respondent
Dandoy, one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 606 and 607; that the term "client" should cannot shift the blame on the stenographer, for he could have easily asked for rectification.
be construed as a "dependent or person under the protection of another and not a person who Even if respondent appeared merely in collaboration with Atty. Senen Angeles in the several
engages in the profession"; and that the Code of Ethics does not apply to him but only to cases, that collaboration could only have been ostensibly as a lawyer. Oppositors had also
members of the Bar. presented evidence of proceedings wherein witnesses testified as to respondent's being their
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 28
lawyer and their compensating him for his services (Exhibits "D-8" and "D-9"). It may be that in
the Court of a municipality, even non-lawyers may appear (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court). If
respondent had so manifested, no one could have challenged him. What he did, however, was
to hold himself out as a lawyer, and even to write the Station Commander of Roxas, complaining
of harassment to "our clients", when he could not but have known that he could not yet engage
in the practice of law. His argument that the term "client" is a "dependent or person under the
protection of another and not a person who engages in the profession" is puerile.
Respondent's additional defense that the code of professional ethics does not apply to him
as he is not yet a member of the Bar proves him unfit to be admitted to the profession that
exacts the highest ethical conduct of all its members, and good moral character even for
applicants for admission to the Bar, He could at least have shown his fitness for admission by
showing adherence to and observance of the standards of conduct required by all who aspire to
profess the law.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition of Nicolas El. Sabandal to be allowed to take the oath as
member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys in accordance with Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court is hereby denied.
Notes.—Persistent use of an additional initial not appearing in the Roll of Attorneys despite
warning by the Court to refrain from such use suggests lack of candor and respect for the
Court. (Pangan vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1.)
In the past, persons who did not even attend law school were admitted to the practice of
law. (In re: Juan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722.)
An attorney cannot charge his client a percentage of the amount recovered as his fees in
the absence of an express agreement. (Dearing vs. Fred Wilson & Co., 98 SCRA 758.)
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 29
Adm. Case No. 1053. September 7, 1979.*
This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the “Roll of Attorneys”
SANTA PANGAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DION1SIO RAMOS, respondent.
is “Dionisio D. Ramos”. The attorney’s roll or register is the official record containing the names
and signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Practice of Law; Role of Attorneys;Nature Of; Lawyer enjoined
name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law.
to use the name inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law. —The attorney’s roll or
register is the official record containing the names and signatures of those who are authorized
The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he “will do no falsehood”. As an
to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll
officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of “truthfulness, candor
of Attorneys in his practice of law.
and frankness”.1 Indeed, candor and frankness should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at
every stage. This has to be so because the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining
Same; Same; Same; Oath of Attorney; Obligation of attorney under his oath of office is
the truth. In representing himself to the court as “Pedro D.D. Ramos” instead of “Dionisio D.
to be candor and frank in his dealings with the court .—The official oath obliges the attorney
Ramos”, respondent has violated his solemn oath.
solemnly to swear that he “will do no falsehood”. As an officer in the temple of justice, an
attorney has irrefragable obligations of “truthfulness, candor and frankness”. Indeed, candor
The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
and frankness should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage. This has to be so
confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor, cannot be overemphasized.
because the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth.
These injunctions circumscribe the general duty of entire devotion of the attorney to the client.
As stated in a case, his “high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts
Same; Same; Duty of attorney to the courts; General duty of entire devotion of attorney
of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates his oath
to client.—The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
of office when he resorts to deception, or permits his client to do so.”2
causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor, cannot be
overemphasized. These injunctions circumscribe the general duty of entire devotion of the
In using the name of “Pedro D.D. Ramos” before the courts instead of the name by which
attorney to the client. As stated in a case, his “high vocation is to correctly inform the court
he was authorized to practice law—Dionisio D. Ramos—respondent in effect resorted to
upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct
deception. He demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts. The circumstance that
conclusions. He violates his oath of office when he resorts to deception, or permits his client to
this is his first aberration in this regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe penalty.
do so.”
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely
Same; Same; Same; Lawyer who use before the courts a name other than the name
REPRIMANDED and warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspension
inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys resorted to deception and demonstrated lack of candor in
or disbarment from the practice of law.
dealing with the courts; Offending attorney reprimanded and warned; Case at bar. —In using the
name of “Pedro D.D. Ramos” before the courts instead of the name by which he was authorized
It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed, the Investigator of this
to practice law—Dionisio D. Ramos—respondent in effect resorted to deception. He
Court is directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as soon as possible. The
demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts, The circumstance that this is his first
request of complainant to appear in the afore-mentioned hearing, assisted by her counsel, Atty.
aberration in this regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe penalty. x x x In view of the
Jose U. Lontoc, is hereby granted.
foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely REPRIMANDED and warned that a
SO ORDERED.
repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspension or disbarment from the practice of
Barredo, (Chairman), Concepcion Jr. and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
law.
Santos, is on official leave.
Aquino, J., in the result.
Respondent reprimanded.
RESOLUTION
Notes.—A lawyer as counsel de oficio is duty bound to exert his best efforts in behalf of an
ANTONIO, J.: indigent client. (People vs. Estebia, 27 SCRA 106).
This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio An attorney’s duty of prime importance is to observe and maintain the respect due to the
Ramos for contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and March 13, courts of justice and judicial officers. ( People vs. Estebia, 27 SCRA 106; Cruz vs. GSIS, 27 SCRA
1979, the hearings in this administrative case were postponed on the basis of respondent’s 174).
motions for postpone-ment. These motions were predicated on respondent’s allegations that on
said dates he had a case set for hearing before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, It is the duty of lawyers to evaluate the urgency and importance of registered letters sent
entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case No. 35906). Upon verification, the attorney of by courts. (Antonio vs. Ramos, 2 SCRA 731).
record of the accused in said case is one “Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Doña Salud Bldg.,
Dasmariñas, Manila.” Respondent admits that he used the name of “Pedro D.D. Ramos” before An award of 15% as attorney’s fees is reasonable. ( Cosmopolitan Insurance Co. vs.
said court in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he had a right to do so Reyes, 15 SCRA 258).
because in his Birth Certificate (Annex “A”), his name is “Pedro Dionisio Ramos”, and his parents
are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and that the “D.D.” in “Pedro D.D. Ramos” is but an
abbreviation of “Dionisio Dayaw”, his other given name and maternal surname.
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 30
A lawyer is guilty of gross misconduct in office where he displays his revolver and puts it on
his lap in order to intimidate his client into signing a petition which the former has prepared.
(Vda. de Barrera vs. Laput, 26 SCRA 44).
The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in
either his professional or nonprofessional activities. ( Rayong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859).
The standard of personal and professional integrity which should be applied to persons
submitted to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape the
penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty. ( Royong vs.
Oblena, 7 SCRA 859.)
When the lawyer’s integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and
show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all is
expected of him. (Quingwa vs. Puno, 19 SCRA 439.)
Where a lawyer makes false statement just to get or extract money from his client, his acts
constitute professional misconduct, for which he deserves disciplined. ( In re: Arafiles, 35 SCRA
61.)
The false statement made by a lawyer on an information sheet sworn and subscribed by
him to be true, upon which same statement, administrative and criminal charges have been filed
against him, may be a ground for disbarment. (Calo vs. Degamo, 20 SCRA 447.)
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 31
conditional pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In re
Adm. Case No. L-363. July 31, 1962.
Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
GUTIERREZ,respondent.
office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes
Attorneys-at-law; Disbarment; Conviction of crime involving moral turpitude. —Under
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S.
Section 5, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended
Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or
from his office as attorney by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in
Murder is such a crime.
general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. State ex rel.
Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279, pp. 428-429.
Same; Same; Same; "Moral turpitude" construed.—The term "moral turpitude" includes
every thing which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. (In re Base, 41
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to
Phil. 275). As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in
respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed
the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general,
by him squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and
contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. (State ex rel. Conklin
thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent proceeding for his disbarment on
vs.Buckingham, 34 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279, pp. 428-429.)
the ground of such conviction, this Court decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to
strike an attorney's name from the rolls are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making
Same; Same; Same; Effect of Pardon.—The rule that pardon operates to wipe out the
the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon
conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon
operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the
has been granted applies only where the pardon is absolute, but net when, as in this case the
attorney after the pardon has been granted."
pardon granted is conditional and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of the penalty. In
such a case, the attorney must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for the crime he has
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the
committed.
Court proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was
absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to support
Same; Requisite for the Practice of Law. —The practice of law is a privilege accorded only
it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte
to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the
Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:
admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic
preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are
"We are of opinion that after he received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony
neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission; the lawyer must continue to adhere to them
conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226. This
or else incur the risk of suspension or removal.
record, when offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not,
therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been thus
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this
would not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act of executive grace
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there
Victoriano A. Savellano for complainant. cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191."
Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is as
MAKALINTAL, J.: follows:
"A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender;
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October
and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence of guilt, so
5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was
that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense.
convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together
If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon
with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the
conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities,
judgment of conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-7101), but the penalty was
and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new
changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted
credit and capacity."
a conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison
term was remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the
Philippines."
unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte
Garland, which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offenses by him committed in connection
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case,
with the rebellion (civil war) against the government of the United States."
filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of
lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time,
The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent
admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding his previous conviction but pleading the
Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 32
pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its
having been committed in band, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent being
municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of a motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado
Gutierrez,supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged
from the profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid
standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of
Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of
good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission:
the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As
stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the
lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all
men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore
the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious
example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic."
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for
which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his
name stricken from the roll of lawyers.
Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala,
JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Respondent disbarred.
Note.—To the same effect is In re Avanceña, Adm. Case No. 407, Aug. 15, 1967, 20 SCRA
1012.
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 33
1.Insofar as the first case against respondent Jaime S. Linsangan is concerned, the report
Adm. Case No. 944. July 25, 1974.*
contains the following: “In support of her complaint filed with this Honorable Court,
FLORA NARIDO, complainant, vs. ATTORNEY JAIME S. LINSANGAN, respondent.
complainant Narido heavily relies on the refusal of respondent Linsangan to withdraw—
despite warning—the affidavit of Milagros M. Vergel de Dios * * *, which affidavit Narido
Attorneys; Complaint for violation of attorney’s oath by submitting a perjured statement;
claims to be perjured. * * * Mrs. Narido and Atty. Risma threatened Atty. Linsangan with
When complaint deemed without merit; Case at bar.— It was found as a fact that there was
disbarment should he insist in offering the affidavit of Mrs. Vergel de Dios." 1 Nonetheless,
nothing improper in presenting such affidavit, its alleged falsity not being proven. Even if it were
such affidavit was filed. It was found as a fact that there was nothing improper in
otherwise, still there was no showing of respondent having violated his attorney’s oath for
presenting such affidavit, its alleged falsity not being proven. Even if it were otherwise,
submitting a perjured affidavit. With respect to the other allegations in the complaint, suffice it
still there was no showing of respondent having violated his attorney’s oath for
to say that there is no evidence showing the attorney’s awareness of the falsity thereof,
submitting a perjured affidavit. Thus the report continues: “With respect to the other
assuming arguendo that they are indeed false. As testified by the attorney, he has no intention
allegations in the affidavit, suffice it to say that there is no evidence showing Atty.
whatsoever of misleading any court or judicial body, or of violating his attorney’s oath.
Linsangan’s awareness of the falsity thereof, assuming arguendo that they are indeed
false. As testified by Atty. Linsangan he has no intention whatsoever of misleading any
Same; Complaint for instigating the client to file an administrative case against another
court or judicial body, or of violating his attorney’s oath."2
attorney; When complaint deemed without merit; Case at bar. —It seems unkind to allude evil
motive to the attorney. It is perhaps more apt to state that his missionary zeal to fight for the
rights of his clients triggered him into filing the administrative case. He should be admired for 2.As for the charge against Attorney Risma, the report stated the following: “This
his dedication in championing the cause of the poor. His client is a destitute woman. She needed administrative complaint stemmed from the belief of Atty. Linsangan that Atty. Risma ‘by
every centavo of the award. To her, any delay in the payment thereof meant grave injustice; it virtue of his financial interest in the Award,’ instigated the filing of Administrative Case
meant deprivation and starvation. Faced with the dilemma of his client, the attorney had to rise No. 944 ‘in order to accomplish a short cut in winning a case even by intimidation or
to the challenge. In view of this, it is more in keeping with Christian precept to say that it must unfounded threats, by depriving a party of due process and at the expense,
have been the plight of his client—rather than his alleged financial interest—that compelled him embarrassment, humiliation, and defamation of his undersigned brother-respondent/ * *
to advise his client to file the case against the other attorney. * It seems unkind to allude evil motive to Atty. Risma. It is perhaps more apt to state
that Atty. Risma’s missionary zeal to fight for the rights of his clients triggered him into
Same; Mutual bickering and recrimination between attorneys should be avoided; Reason. filing Administrative Case No. 944. We should admire Atty. Risma’s dedication in
—Mutual bickerings and unjustifiable recriminations, between brother attorneys detract from the championing the cause of the poor. Mrs. Narido, his client, is a destitute woman. She
dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this court. needed every centavo of the award. To her, any delay in the payment thereof meant
grave injustice; it meant deprivation and starvation. Faced with the dilemma of his client,
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES in the Supreme Court. Atty. Risma had to rise to the challenge. In view of this, it is more in keeping with
Christian precepts to say that it must have been the plight of Mrs. Narido—rather than his
alleged financial interest—that compelled Atty. Risma to advise his client to file the case
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
against Atty. Linsangan. * * * There being no direct evidence to show the alleged bad
RESOLUTION faith of Atty. Risma in advising his client to file Administrative Case No. 944 against Atty.
Linsangan, the benefit of the doubt should be resolved in favor of Atty. Risma.
FERNANDO, J.: Consequently, the charge of instigating the filing of ‘disbarment proceedings against a
brother attorney with improper motives and without just ground’ necessarily fails." 3
The spectacle presented by two members of the bar engaged in bickering and recrimination is
far from edifying, although it is understandable, if not justifiable, that at times zeal in the 3.From the above, it was the recommendation that on such charges, both respondents
defense of one’s client may be carried to the point of undue skepticism and doubt as to the should be exculpated. It being shown in the investigation, however, although it was not
motives of opposing counsel. Some such reflection is induced by these two administrative cases one of the charges in the counter-complaint filed against him that respondent Risma
wherein respondents Jaime S. Linsangan and Rufino B. Risma, who represented adverse parties would seek to collect fifteen per cent of the recovery obtained by his client, contrary to
in a workmen’s compensation case, did mutually hurl accusation at each other. The charge the explicit provision in the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowing only a maximum of ten
against respondent Linsangan filed by a certain Flora Narido is that he violated the attorney’s per cent and that only where the case is appealed, there was likewise a recommendation
oath by submitting a perjured statement. When required to answer, not only did he deny the for admonition or reprimand. The aptness of such a penalty was predicated on the fact
complaint but he would also hold respondent Risma accountable for having instigated his client, that respondent Risma had not received a single centavo from the client. Moreover, it
the complainant, Flora Narido, to file a false and malicious complaint resulting in what was clear such contract for attorney’s fees would not be enforced. In the meanwhile, he
respondent Linsangan called “embarrassment, humiliation and defamation” of a brother in a had been serving his poverty-stricken client faithfully and well, even advancing some of
profession. the necessary expenses. What was recommended commends itself for acceptance.
On September 9, 1971, this Court referred the above .administrative cases to the Solicitor 4.This further observation is not amiss. The two respondents would be well-advised to
General for investigation, report and recommendation. Such report and recommendation was heed these words from Justice Laurel, announced in Javier v. Cornejo:4 “It should be
submitted on May 31 of this year. observed, in this connection, that mutual bickerings and unjustifiable recriminations,
between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not
receive any sympathy from this court."5
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 34
5.One last word. The report submitted by the Solicitor General is characterized by
thoroughness and diligence, but its quality would have been improved had there been on
the part of the Solicitor concerned a more adequate grasp of notable opinions of this
Court on legal ethics from Justice Malcolm on, thus obviating the need for reliance on
secondary authorities, both Philippine and American.
WHEREFORE, the complaint in Administrative Case No. 944 against respondent Jaime S,
Linsangan is dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent Rufino B. Risma in Administrative Case No.
1025 is exculpated from the charge of having instigated the filing of an unfounded suit. He is,
however, admonished to exercise greater care in ascertaining how much under our law he could
recover by way of attorney’s fees. The contract entered into between him and his client as to his
being entitled to fifteen per cent of the award granted her in a workmen’s compensation suit is
declared to be of no force and effect, the penalty imposed being that of admonition merely only
because he had made no effort to collect on the same and had even advanced expenses for a
poor client. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the records of both respondents.
Makalintal,
C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz
Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Complaint (Adm. Case No. 944) dismissed; respondent (Adm. Case No. 1025) admonished.
Notes.—It is the duty of an attorney not only to abstain from all offensive personality and
to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required
by the justice of the cause with which he is charged (Rule 138, Sec. 20 [f], Rules of Court), but
also to observe and maintain the respect due to the court of justice and judicial officers (Rule
138, Sec. 20 [b], Rules of Court).
Malpractice is one of the grounds for removal or suspension of a member of the bar. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice (Rule 138, Sec. 27, Rules of Court).
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 37
were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who apparently had caused to be
A.C. No. 4807. March 22, 2000.*
published some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member Student
MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant, vs. ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN,
Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and after a series of hearings, it found the
REGINA D. BALMORES, CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of
students guilty of the use of indecent language and unauthorized use of the student publication
PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, respondents.
funds. The body recommended the penalty of expulsion against the erring students.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as
The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC
a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.—Although aware that the students were represented by
President, gave rise to the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March 1997
counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their parents
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil case was still pending,
without at the very least communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who
letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf
was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent, whether by
of some of the expelled students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason
design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics
Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC
and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands
President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter
required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC President;
letter of apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of the Code of Professional Ethics. Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22 September
1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the AMACC
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. President; and letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito, assisted by his
parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with the AMACC President.
VITUG, J.: Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a Manifestation,
dated 06 June 1997, was filed with the trial court where the civil case was pending by Attorney
Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics, specifically
of the manifestation was furnished complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June 1997, Judge
Canon 9 thereof, viz.:
Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
“A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party
On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (“IBP”)
represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter
passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:
with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most
particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and
“RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
he should not undertake to advise him as to law.”
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex ‘A,’ and, finding the recommendation fully supported
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment Atty. Meinrado
Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores,
Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his
Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the hired counsel of some
duty and DISMISSAL of the case against the other Respondents for they did not take part in the
expelled students from the AMA Computer College (“AMACC”), in an action for the Issuance of a
negotiation of the case.”
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-
30549 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that respondents, then
It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were
counsel for the defendants, procured and effected on separate occasions, without his
formalized, complainant was by then already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the
knowledge, compromise agreements (“Re-Admission Agreements”) with four of his clients in the
civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the
aforementioned civil case which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might
students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to
have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil, criminal and
negotiate with them and their parents without at the very least communicating the matter to
administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act of respondents
their lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This
was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or
failure of respondent, whether by design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of
suspension from the practice of law.
the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague.
Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents had
taken part in the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or execution of the various ReAdmission
The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the
Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the time with the
administrative aspect of the controversy is belied by the Manifestation 1 which, among other
Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had nothing
things, explicitly contained the following stipulation; viz.:
to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were executed for the sole purpose of
effecting the settlement of an administrative case involving nine students of AMACC who were
“1. Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their
expelled therefrom upon the recommendation of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The students,
parents/guardian already executed a Re-Admission Agreement with AMACC President, AMABLE
namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon,
R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE MANUAL FOR
Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo B. Villareiz,
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 38
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to terminate all civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings which they may have against the AMACC arising from their previous
dismissal.
“x x x x x x x x x
“3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No. Q-
97-30549 will be filed them.”
The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP Board of
Governors in their findings; nevertheless, the recommended six-month suspension would appear
to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given the circumstances and the explanation of respondent.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney
and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Respondent Atty. Meinrado C. Pangulayan suspended from practice of law for three (3) months.
Case against other respondents dismissed.
Note.—Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn
promises he makes when taking the lawyer’s oath. (In Re: Al Argosino, 270 SCRA 26[1997])
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 39
Likewise you are entitled to commission, 50/50 from domestic, inheritance and
Adm. Case No. 1261. December 29, 1983.*
commercial from our said clients or in any criminal cases where they are involved.
TAN TEK BENG, complainant, vs. TIMOTEO A. DAVID, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Malpractice; Practice of soliciting cases at law for "2.I shall not deal directly with our clients without your consent.
the purpose of gain either personally or through paid agents is void and tantamount to
malpractice; Malpractice, defined.—We hold that the said agreement is void because it was "3.You shall take care of collecting our fees as well as advances for expenses for the
tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of cases referred to us by our clients and careful in safeguarding our interest.
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers" (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer.
Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828, "4,It is understood that legal expenses that we shall recover from the debtors shall be
amending sec. 21 of Act No. 190). That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion turned over to our clients. Other clients who directly or indirectly have been approached
that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. "The lawyer may not seek or obtain or related (sic) to you as a result of your labor are your clients.
employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097
cited in In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm, J., Jayme vs. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Arce vs. "I hereby pledge in the name of God, our Heavenly Father, that I will be sincere, honest
Philippine National Bank, 62 Phil. 569). and fair with you in connection with our transactions with our clients. Likewise you must be
sincere, honest and fair with me.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Lawyer guilty of malpractice for entering into a void Very truly yours,
and unethical agreement between him and a paid agent who solicits cases for the lawyer. —We (Sgd.) Illegible
censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical agreement. TIMOTEO A. DAVID
We discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not
know legal ethics) but because David should have known better.
"P.S.
Same; Same; Same; Unprofessional conduct in an attorney, meaning of.
—"Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his I will be responsible for all documents entrusted me by our clients.
profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C. J.S. 743). (Sgd.) Initial
"CONFORME to the above and likewise will reciprocate my sincerity to Atty. David as stated
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
in the last paragraph of this letter.
(Sgd.) Tan Tek Beng
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. MR. TAN TEK BENG"
Basilio Lanoria for complainant.
Timoteo A David for and in his own behalf. The foregoing was a reiteration of an agreement dated August 5, 1969. Note that in said
agreement lawyer David not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an
intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients.
AQUINO, J.:
The business relationship between David and Tan Tek Beng did not last. There were mutual
The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against lawyer Timoteo A. accusations of doublecross. For allegedly not living up to the agreement, Tan Tek Beng in 1973
David (admitted to the bar in 1945) for not giving Tan Tek Beng, a nonlawyer (alleged denounced David to Presidential Assistant Ronaldo B. Zamora, to the Office of Civil Relations at
missionary of the Seventh Day Adventists), one-half of the attorney's fees received by David Camp Crame and to this Court. He did not file any civil action to enforce the agreement.
from the clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng. Their agreement reads:
"December 3, 1970 In his 1974 comment, David clarified that the partnership was composed of himself as
manager, Tan Tek Beng as assistant manager and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as president and
financier. When Jacinto became ill and the costs of office maintenance mounted, David
"Mr. Tan Tek Beng
suggested that Tan Tek Beng should also invest some money or shoulder a part of the business
"Manila
expenses but Tan Tek Beng refused.
"Dear Mr. Tan: This case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Hearings were scheduled from 1974 to 1981. It was proposed that respondent should submit a
In compliance with your request, I am now putting into writing our agreement which must be stipulation of facts but that did not materialize because the scheduled hearings were not held
followed in connection with the accounts that you will entrust to me for collection. Our terms due to the nonavailability of Tan Tek Beng and his counsel.
and conditions shall be as follows:
On September 16, 1977 Tan Tek Beng died at the Philippine Union Colleges Compound,
"1.On all commission or attorney's fees that we shall receive from our clients by virtue of Baesa, Caloocan City but it was only in the manifestation of his counsel dated August 10, 1981
the collection that we shall be able to effect on their accounts, we shall divide fifty-fifty,
LEGAL ETHICS SESSION 3 40
that the Solicitor General's Office was informed of that fact. A report on this case dated March Participation of a lawyer in transactions that led to fraudulent issuance of a transfer
21, 1983 was submitted by the Solicitor General to this Court certificate of title in his client's name violative of his oath as a member of the bar. ( Vda, de Laig
vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 637.)
We hold that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is
"the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid It is presumed that an attorney performed his duties in accordance with his oath. This
agents or brokers" Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any presumption must be rebutted by a clear preponderance of evidence. Where complainant admits
malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and that she did not cohabit with the respondent lawyer and could not substantiate the allegations in
technical meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828, amending sec. 21 of Act No. 190). her complaint, the presumption of innocence is not overcome. (Maderazo vs. Del Rosario, 73
SCRA 540.)
That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a
profession, not a business. 'The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 53
Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm, J., Jayme vs. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Arce vs. Philippine National Bank, 62
Phil. 569). The commercialization of law practice is condemned in certain canons of professional
ethics adopted by the American Bar Association:
"34.Division of Fees.— No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another
lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility."
We censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical agreement
We discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not
know legal ethics) but because David should have known better.
"Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his
profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C.J.S. 743).
Notes.—The preparation and ratification of an immoral affidavit are disgraceful acts which
constitute gross misconduct in office and a violation of the attorney's oath. for which attorneys
may be disciplined by the courts. (Acuña vs. Dunca, 2 SCRA 289.)
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a
privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications
duly ascertained and certified. (In re: Sycip, 92 SCRA 1.)