People VS Jimenez
People VS Jimenez
GR No. 209215
Date: September 17, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, Ponente: BRION, J
vs.
MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR., Respondent.
(Petitioner/s) (Respondent/s)
DOCTRINE: , the Court declared that if one induces another to commit a crime, the influence is the
determining cause of the crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not have been committed; it is the
inducer who sets into motion the execution of the criminal act.
To place the Chua ruling in proper perspective, the Court considered the principal by inducement as the
most guilty based on the specific acts done by the two accused and bearing in mind the elements
constitutive of the crime of falsification of private documents where the element of "damage" arose through
the principal by inducement’s encashment of the falsified check. This led the Court to declare that the
principal by inducement is the "most guilty" (or properly, the more guilty) between the two accused.
FACTS
On May 18, 2009 and June 11, 2009, Montero (a former employee of the BSJ Company owned by the
Jimenezes) executed sworn statements confessing his participation in the killing ofRuby Rose Barrameda
(Ruby Rose),and naming petitioner Jimenez, Lope Jimenez (Lope, the petitioner Jimenez’s younger
brother),Lennard A. Descalso (Lennard) alias "Spyke," Robert Ponce (Robert) alias "Obet," and Eric
Fernandez (Eric), as his coconspirators.2
The statements of Montero which provided the details on where the alleged steel casing containing the body
of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the recovery of a cadaver, encased ina drum and steel casing, near or
practically at the place that Montero pointed to.
On August 20, 2009, the People, through the state prosecutors, filed an Information before the RTC,
charging Jimenez, Lope, Lennard, Robert, Eric and Montero of murder for the killing of Ruby Rose.
The CA held that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering Montero’s discharge to
become a state witness because the prosecution had complied with the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Furthermore, the CA agreed with Judge Docena that Montero is not the most guilty among the accused
because the principals by inducement are more guilty than the principals by direct participation. To the CA,
this finding is highly factual in nature and it would not interfere with the trial court’s exercise of discretion
on factual issues in the absence of showing that the court had acted with grave abuse of discretion
ISSUE/S
RATIO
We also do not agree with Jimenez that the CA erred in finding that Montero is not the most guilty.
By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the
commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the
accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered to have lesser
orthe least guilt taking into account his degree of participation in the commission of the offense. What the
rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty would be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty
in terms of participation would be penalized. Before dwelling on the parties’ substantive arguments, we find
it necessary to first correct the rulings of the CA that are not exactly correct. Contrary to the CA’s findings,
a principal by inducement is not automatically the most guilty in a conspiracy. The decision of the Court in
People v. Baharan did not involve the resolution of a motion to discharge an accused to become a state
witness. Instead, the pronouncement of the Court related to the culpability of a principal by inducement
whose coinducement act was the determining cause for the commission of the crime. Thus viewed, Baharan
cannot be the basis of a peremptory pronouncement that a principal by inducement is more guilty than the
principal by direct participation.
In Chua v. People, which involved a motion to discharge an accused, the Court declared that if one induces
another to commit a crime, the influence is the determining cause of the crime. Without the inducement, the
crime would not have been committed; it is the inducer who sets into motion the execution of the criminal
act. place the Chua ruling in proper perspective, the Court considered the principal by inducement as the
most guilty based on the specific acts done by the two accused and bearing in mind the elements
constitutive of the crime of falsification of private documents where the element of "damage" arose through
the principal by inducement’s encashment of the falsified check. This led the Court to declare that the
principal by inducement is the "most guilty" (or properly, the more guilty) between the two accused.
Thus, as a rule, for purposes of resolving a motion to discharge an accused as a state witness,what are
controlling are the specific acts of the accused in relation to the crime committed.We cannot also agree with
Jimenez’ argument that a principal by direct participation is more guilty than the principal by inducement as
the Revised Penal Code penalizes the principal by inducement only when the principal by direct
participation has executed the crime.
RULING
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition in G.R. No. 209195 and affirm the CA's amended decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 121167 insofar as it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Docena in granting
the People's motion to discharge Montero as a state witness.
We GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 209215 and modify the CA's amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
121167 in accordance with our ruling that Judge Docena's denial of the motion for inhibition was proper.
SO ORDERED.
(Nifas)