G.R. No.

L-6407, July 29, 1954 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE
VS. PASCUAL CASTRO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Apolonio Bustos, the complainant, was the head teacher of the barrio school of San Jose,
Macabebe, Pampanga, and Pascual Castro, the accused, a teacher in said school. In the morning
of January 19, 1952, while the complainant was on his way to the barrio chapel to hear mass he
met a group of persons including the accused. The complainant invited the accused to hear mass
but instead of accepting his invitation a discussion ensued in the course of which the accused
gave the complainant a fist blow on the face causing him injuries which required medical
attendance for a period of five days.
On April 14, 1952, a complaint for slight physical injuries was lodged by the complainant against
the accused in the Justice of the Peace Court of Macabebe, Pampanga. After trial, the accused
was found guilty as charged and sentenced to suffer fifteen days of arresto menor and to pay the
costs. From this decision, the accused appealed to the Court of First Instance where he pleaded
not guilty. Before trial on the merits, but after he had entered his plea, the accused moved to
dismiss the charge on the ground that the crime had already prescribed. This plea was ignored,
and after the presentation of evidence, the court rendered judgment reiterating the same
penalty imposed upon the accused by the inferior court. Hence, this appeal.

The only issue to be determined is whether the lower court erred in not dismissing the
information on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed.

It appears that the incident which gave rise to the injuries now complained of occurred on
January 19, 1952 while the corresponding criminal complaint was filed before the justice of the
peace court on April 14, 1952, or after the period of two months had elapsed. And considering
that a light offense prescribes in two months (article 90, Revised Penal Code), it is now
contended that the crime had already prescribed and as such it cannot serve as basis of criminal
prosecution.

The Solicitor General does not agree with this contention. He claims that, since the accused
failed to move to quash before pleading, he must be deemed to have waived this defense under
rule 113, section 10, of the Rules of Court.

The rule thus invoked in effect provides that if the accused does not move to quash the
information before he pleads thereto, "he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are
grounds for a motion to quash except when the complaint or information does not charge an
offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the same." And one of the grounds on which a
motion to quash may be predicated is that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.
(Section 2, paragraph f, rule 113.) On the other hand, the law provides that the criminal liability
may be extinguished by prescription of the crime. (Article 89, Revised Penal Code).

The question that now arises is: Does the failure of the accused to move to quash before
pleading constitute a waiver to raise the question of prescription at a later stage of the case?

A case in point is People vs. Moran, 44 Phil., 387. In that case, the accused was charged with a
violation of the election law. He was found guilty and convicted and the judgment was affirmed,
with slight modification, by the Supreme Court. Pending reconsideration of the decision, the
accused moved to dismiss the case setting up the plea of prescription. After the Attorney
General was given an opportunity to answer the motion, and the parties had submitted
memoranda in support of their respective contentions, the court ruled that the crime had
already prescribed holding that this defense can not de deemed waived even if the case had
been decided by the lower court and was pending appeal in the Supreme Court. The philosophy
behind this ruling was aptly stated as follows: "Although the general rule is that the defense of
prescription is not available unless expressly set up in the lower court, as in that case it is
presumed to have been waived and cannot be taken advantage of thereafter, yet this rule is not
always of absolute application in criminal cases, such as that in which prescription of the crime
is expressly provided by law, for the State not having then the right to prosecute, or continue
prosecuting, nor to punish, or continue punishing, the offense, or to continue holding the
defendant subject to its action through the imposition of the penalty, the court must so declare."
And elaborating on this proposition, the Court went on to state as follows:

"As prescription of the crime is the loss by the State of the right to prosecute and punish the
same, it is absolutely indisputable that from the moment the State has lost or waived such right,
the defendant may, at any stage of the proceeding, demand and ask that the same be finally
dismissed and he be acquitted from the complaint, and such petition is proper and effective
even if the court taking cognizance of the case has already rendered judgment and said
judgment is merely in suspense, pending the resolution of a motion for a reconsideration and
new trial, and this is the more so since in such a case there is not yet any final and irrevocable
judgment."

The ruling above adverted to squarely applies to the present case. Here, the rule provides that
the plea of prescription should be set up before arraignment, or before the accused pleads to the
charge, as otherwise the defense would be deemed waived; but, as was well said in the Moran
case, this rule is not of absolute application, especially when it conflicts with a substantive
provision of the law, such as that which refers to prescription of crimes. Since, under the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has only the power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings,
practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law, and cannot cover substantive
rights (section 13, article VIII, of the Constitution), the rule we are considering cannot be
interpreted or given such scope or extent that would come into conflict or defeat an express
provision of our substantive law. One of such provisions is article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that the prescription of crime has the effect of totally extinguishing the criminal
liability. And so we hold that the ruling laid down in the Moran case still holds good even if it
were laid down before the adoption of the present Rules of Court.

The learned dissenter opines that the Moran case has already lost its validity because at the
time it was decided there was no rule prescribing waiver of prescription and, besides, this
question was not raised and could not have been raised because the law was enacted only when
the case was already pending in the Supreme Court. In other words, the learned dissenter is of
the opinion that the Moran case cannot be invoked as authority because the question of waiver
was not specially raised therein unlike the present case.

We cannot agree to this apprisal of the Moran case for precisely the ruling laid down therein
was predicated upon the theory that the defense of prescription, even if not set up in its proper
time, is not deemed waived it being an exception to the general rule. Thus, it was there said that,
"Although the general rule is that the defense of prescription is not available unless expressly
set up in the lower court, as in that case it is presumed to have been waived and cannot be taken
advantage of thereafter, yet this rule is not always of absolute application in criminal cases * *
*."

It is true that the doctrine in the Moran case was not adhered to in the case of Santos vs. Supt. of
the Phil. Training School for Girls, 55 Phil., 345, but that was because the plea of prescription
was raised in a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus. It has been held that such plea is not
available "on an application for a writ of Habeas Corpus (16 C. J. 416), for the reason that "All
questions which may arise in the orderly course of a criminal prosecution are to be determined
by the court to whose jurisdiction the defendant has been subjected by the law, and the fact that
a defendant has a good and sufficient defense to a criminal charge on which he is held will not
entitle him to his discharge on Habeas Corpus." (12 R. C. L. 1206.)[1] (Italics supplied). The
Santos case did not nullify our ruling in the Moran case.

An attempt was made to maintain the case by showing that as a result of the incident in
question a criminal complaint for attempted homicide was filed against the accused prior to the
charge of slight physical injuries which was dismissed without prejudice and must have had the
effect' of interrupting the period of prescription; but this attempt cannot be given serious
consideration it appearing that the date when the criminal complaint for attempted homicide
was filed, does not appear in the record. The only data we have on hand is that the complaint
was dismissed on March 27, 1952. The failure of the Government to furnish us sufficient data
prevents us from concluding that the prescription period has not yet elapsed since the charge
for attempted homicide may have been filed after March 20, 1952 and dismissed on March 27.
Under the facts presently obtaining the only alternative is to dismiss the case as prayed for by
the defense.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the case is dismissed, with cost de
oficio.
Paras, C. J., Pablo, Padilla, Jugo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Reyes, A.J., concurs in the result.

[1] These authorities are quoted by the ponente in the Santos case (55 Phil., 345).

DISSENTING
BENGZON, J.:

Without saying so, the decision strikes down Rule 113 sections 2(f) and 10 of the Rules of Court
providing that if the defendant does not, before pleading, move to quash on the ground that the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished "he shall be taken to have waived" such
defense. The Court confesses, sotto voce, that it exceeded its constitutional powers in
promulgating such rule or its pertinent portion, because it takes away a substantial right.

Willingness to admit error is always praiseworthy; but when such acknowledgment is due to a
short-sighted view of jurisdictional posts and boundaries, regrets are surely in order.

For the record I must state, it was not my privilege to take part in the preparation and
promulgation of the Rules of Court of 1940. None the less it is my duty, as a member of the Court
now, to exert efforts exploring the nature and extent of Rule 113, with a view to upholding it if
legally possible, preserving intact the Court's regulatory powers under the Constitution. On this
subject, to give in easily enhances no judicial virtue.

Following P. vs. Moran (1923), the majority brushes aside Rule 113 and declares that
prescription may be asserted by the accused for the first time, even after pleading and even on
appeal; but the fundamental facts must be borne in mind that Moran was tried for violation of
the Election Law, at a time when no period of prescription for such offenses existed[1]; that
during the pendency of his appeal the law was amended, and for the first time a prescription
period was fixed, and that he immediately invoked it. The Court had to agree that Moran made
no waiver, because he could not have waived something (prescription) that did not exist when
he was tried in the court below.[2]

True, there were dicta regarding non-waivability of the defense of prescription, in view of its
nature. But in the year 1923 Rule 113 sections 2(f) and 10 had not yet been adopted.[3]
Obviously in the absence of positive legal rules, the Court could then (1923) and did expound,
abstract principles of criminal law about waiver of prescription. Now that the Rules of Court
(1940) provide otherwise expressly, the philosophical observations in People vs. Moran have
lost their validity. If necessary it should be declared that the Rules modified pro tanto the
theories described in that case. In fact those theories were limitedif not overruledin Santos vs.
Superintendent, 55 Phil., 345, wherein Virginia Santos having been finally convicted of violation
of ordinance, filed Habeas Corpus proceedings, alleging the offense had prescribed. Revoking
the lower court that upheld prescription, we said prescription may be, and was waived through
failure to allege it on time:

"In granting the writ, the lower court relied upon the ruling by this court in People vs. Moran
(44 Phil., 387), which was; an ordinary criminal case and not an Habeas Corpus proceedings and
where the prescription of the violation of the Election Law was only alleged after the whole
proceedings were over, because only then had the Legislature passed a law to that effect. In that
case there was no waiver of that defense for the simple reason that there was no prescription. If
the plea of prescription will not be admitted by the court in Habeas Corpus proceedings, it is
precisely for the reason that it is deemed to have been waived. * * *

That the defense of prescription must be alleged during the proceedings in prosecution of the
offense alleged to have prescribed, is a doctrine recognized by this court in United States vs.
Serapio (23 Phil., 584) where the principle is supported by citations of Aldeguer vs. Hoskyn (2
Phil., 500), Domingo vs. Osorio (7 Phil., 405), Maxilom vs. Tabotabo (9 Phil., 390), Harty vs. Luna
(13 Phil., 31) and Sunico vs. Ramirez (14 Phil., 500)." (55 Phil., 345).

We held, expressly in the above case that the defense of prescription is waived if not alleged
during the proceedings, notwithstanding "the State has lost" the right to punish. By the Rules we
made it clear afterwards that it must be alleged before pleading; otherwise it is waived. This
decision now confesses we had no power so to direct. Did we also exceed our power in the many
cases upholding waiver of prescription? (U. S. vs. Serapio etc. supra.)

In a few words this decision reaches the conclusion that prescription being a substantial right, it
is beyond this court's power to regulate and debar.

Such a broad statement, sweeps away repeated practices, specially in civil cases. However I will
answer it as follows: substantial rights may be lostand have been lostthrough failure to comply
with rules of procedure or through the neglect duly to set them up.[4]

Again the privilege against double jeopardy is a constitutional right even more substantial; but
according to our Rules it is waived if not seasonably pleaded. And we said so in repeated
decisions listed in the footnote,[5] wherein we declined to philosophize (along the lines of the
Moran dicta), that as the first jeopardy meant "the loss by the State of its right to prosecute and
punish" the accused again, "it is absolutely indisputable that from the moment the state has lost
or waived such right, the defendant may at any stage of the proceedings demand and ask that
the same be finally dismissed" because "the State not having then the right to prosecute" a
second time "or to continue holding the defendant subject to its action thru the imposition of
the penalty, the court must so declare."

In those cases we also refused to consider that a constitutional rightmore than merely
substantive should not be taken away by operation of court decisions, or the Rules.

It is undeniable that the matter of formulating defense to define issues, and the proofs allowable
is procedural in nature, a matter of pleading and practice. That is exactly the scope of sees. 2(f)
and 10 Rule 113. They warn the defendant in advance: if you do not allege prescription, before
pleading, it will not be deemed an issue, and it cannot be proved. If he makes no allegations, he
renounces the defense. The Rules do not take it away. For all we know, the accused may have
reasons to want acquittal on the merits, not on a plea of prescription.

It might be asserted that prescription needs no proof, because the information fixes the date of
the crime's commission, and prescription may be counted up to the date of filing of such
information, which date the court knows. The assertion forgets that prescription begins to run,
not necessarily from the crime's commission, but "from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents". (Article 31 Revised Penal
Code).

The learned ponente will reply of course, that in this case the physical injuries had to be known
on the same day they were inflicted, and that prescription began immediately. Correct. But we
are writing doctrines for all cases. In malversation, forgery, bribery and other offenses the crime
is not usually known on the same day it is committed. Evidence of that day is, therefore needed,
upon proper allegations. Herein lies the raison d'etre of the rule in question.

Yet I will meet the issue even on this particular ground. This crime, the decision states was
known on the same day, Jan. 19, 1952; and as the information is dated April 14, 1952; i. e. more
than two months later, therefore prescription and acquittal. With all due respect, there seems to
be a jump to conclusions. The period might have been "interrupted" by the filing of a complaint
or by defendant's escape to foreign countries, as expressly provided in Article 90 Revised Penal
Code. In fact the justice of the peace, and the court of first instance, say a criminal complaint for
attempted homicide had previously been filed which was subsequently dismissed without
prejudice. However, despite such information, the majority decision gives the point no serious
consideration "it appearing that the date when the criminal complaint for attempted homicide
was filed does not appear in the record", the Government having failed "to furnish us sufficient
data". To be sure, the Fiscal service will be surprised to infer what is left unsaid: "because it is
the duty of the prosecution to prove that the crime has not prescribed, even of the accused does
not raise the point".

If the ponente should insist that the accused here invoked prescription, my answer would be:
the allegation was late, and according to Rule 113, prescription was waived.
His reply should then be: but the prosecution ought to have known that Rule 113 was a nullity
because it was beyond this Court's power, and there was no waiver.

No rejoinder is necessary . . . Need it be stressed that the prosecution had a right to rely on the
Rule promulgated by the highest court of the land? Could it presume to know better?

And this leads to the inequitable result of the majority's position: Having acted according to
Rule 113 and disregarded prescription, the State is left "holding the bag" when we strike such
Rule down. Fairness, I submit, requires that the prosecution should at least be allowed, to prove
the interruption of the period which it asserts.

Or do we advise litigants to stick to the Rules at their own peril?

Montemayor, J., concurs:

This decision, and more, can be found at https://www.digest.ph/decisions/people-vs-castro-14

[ GR No. 139405, Mar 13, 2001 ]

On October 27, 1988, herein respondent, Arturo Pacificador y Fullon, and his erstwhile co-
accused, Jose T. Marcelo,[4] were charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of violation
of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, in an Information[5] that reads:
That on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, in Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, Arturo
Pacificador, then Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation, a
government-owned corporation, and therefore, a public officer, and Jose T. Marcelo, Jr., then
President of the Philippine Smelters Corporation, a private corporation, conspiring and
confederating with one another and with other individuals, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly, and with evident bad faith promote, facilitate, effect and cause the
sale, transfer and conveyance by the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation of its ownership
and all its titles, rights and interests over parcels of land in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte
where the Jose Panganiban Smelting Plant is located including all the reclaimed and foreshore
areas of about 50 hectares to the Philippine Smelters Corporation by virtue of a contract, the
terms and conditions of which are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Government
as the consideration thereof is only P85,144.50 while the fair market value thereof at that time
was P862,150.00, thereby giving the Philippine Smelters Corporation unwarranted benefits,
advantages and profits and causing undue injury, damage and prejudice to the government in
the amount of P777,005.50.
After his arraignment, the respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information in Criminal
Case No. 13044 on July 15, 1998 on the following grounds:
1)
The court has no jurisdiction since the crime charged had been extinguished by prescription;
and

2)
The information does not charge an offense in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of San Mauricio Mining Corporation, et al., vs. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et al., G.R. No. L-
47859 and L-57132 dated July 10, 1981.
On August 21, 1998 the petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.

On November 10, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the Motion to Dismiss
the Information ruling that:
The information in this case, dated October 19, 1988, was filed with the Sandiganbayan on
October 27, 1988 on which date the existing jurisprudence on matters of prescription of the
offense was the ruling enunciated in Francisco v. Court of Appeals (May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA
538) to the effect that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office also interrupts the period
of prescription of the offense.

The offense charged was allegedly committed from December 16, 1975 to January 6, 1976. The
running of the period of prescription of the offense may have started on January 6, 1976 but
was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the appropriate investigating body. In the
case at bench, We find in the record no proof, or even an allegation, of the precise date of filing
of the complaint with the appropriate investigating body which investigated this case,to enable
us to determine with certainty if the offense charged have (sic) indeed prescribed.

The second ground submitted by the accused-movant is precipitate at this stage of the
proceedings, as it involves a matter of defense.
Thereupon, on December 7, 1998, respondent Pacificador moved for the reconsideration of the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his Motion to Dismiss, contending that:
1)
The prosecution of the crime charged is time-barred by prescription as shown by facts and
circumstances on record and of judicial notice; and

2)
It is not precipitate for the Honorable Court to consider the Supreme Court ruling in San
Mauricio Mining Co. vs. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et al., declaring the basic deed of sale as not
illegal and with justly adequate consideration.
On February 3, 1999, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its Resolution of November 10, 1998 and
dismissed the Information in Criminal Case No. 139405 against the respondent on the ground of
prescription. It ruled thus:
In Our resolution denying accused Pacificador's Motion to Dismiss, We applied Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code and the doctrine laid down in Francisco vs. CA (122 SCRA 538) to the effect
that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office or investigating body interrupts the
running of the period of prescription. This is where We committed an oversight. Instead of
applying Act No. 3326, as amended, xxx, We utilized Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.

In this case, as the offense involved is the violation of R.A. 3019, a special law, it follows that in
computing the prescriptive period of the offense, it is not the provision contained in the Revised
Penal Code that should govern but that of Act No. 3326. xxx

In Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr., (211 SCRA 277), the Supreme Court, in a clear language, held that the
proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 are "judicial proceedings" and do not
include administrative proceedings. xxx

The offense imputed on accused was allegedly committed from December 6, 1975 to January 6,
1976. The offense prescribed on January 3, 1986, or ten years from January 6, 1976.
The Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the Sandiganbayan on July
23, 1999.

Hence, the petition.

In its Brief,[6] the petitioner contends that, contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, the
provision of Act No. 3326[7] on prescription of offenses punishable under special laws is not
applicable to the instant criminal case for the reason that Republic Act No. 3019 provides for its
own prescriptive period. Section 11 thereof provides that offenses committed and punishable
under the said law shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. However, inasmuch as Republic Act No.
3019 does not state exactly when the fifteen-year prescriptive period begins to run, Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code should be applied suppletorily.[8] Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
which adopts the "discovery rule" for the prescription of offenses, provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.- The period of prescription shall commence to
run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents, and shall be interrupted by filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted
or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago.
Petitioner also contends that the crime, subject of this case should be deemed as discovered
only on May 13, 1987 when a complaint was filed with the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) by the then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez. Hence, the filing of the
information on October 27, 1988 with the Sandiganbayan was well within the prescriptive
period.

Additionally, petitioner contends that the ordinary principles of prescription do not apply in
this case for the reason that the respondent effectively concealed his criminal acts which
prevented the discovery of the offense until May 13, 1987. Even on the assumption that the
registration of the Deed of Sale was on December 29, 1975 when that document was executed
by the parties, and thus, amounted to a constructive notice to the whole world of the existence
of the said Deed of Sale, the registration thereof could not have given notice of fraudulent acts of
the parties to the sale. The situation prevailing at that time, that is, during the authoritarian
regime of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, did not permit the investigative and prosecuting
arms of the government to institute complaints against him, his wife and his cronies.

In his Comment,[9] respondent Arturo Pacificador argued that Act No. 3326 governs the
prescription of offenses punishable under special laws; that the registration of the Deed of Sale
in question is the correct reckoning or starting point for prescription inasmuch as the fact of
registration of said Deed of Sale in effect gave notice to the whole world not only of its existence
but also of all the facts contained therein; that, aside from the ground of prescription, the
Information in Criminal Case No. 13044 should be dismissed on the ground that it does not
charge an offense inasmuch as the issue of whether or not the contract of sale was
disadvantageous to the government had long been settled in the case of San Mauricio Mining Co.
v. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et al.,[10] and that the dismissal of the criminal case against him
by the Sandiganbayan on the ground of prescription is tantamount to acquittal which bars
prosecution of the respondent for the same offense under Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court.

The petition is not impressed with merit.

It has been settled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the computation of prescription of
offenses defined and penalized by special laws. In the case of People v. Sandiganbayan,[11] this
Court ruled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 was correctly applied by the anti-graft court in
determining the reckoning period for prescription in a case involving the crime of violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. In the fairly recent case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[12] we categorically ruled that:
Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A. No.
3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive
period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription should begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. (Emphasis ours)

The prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
double jeopardy.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall
commence to run on the day it was committed.
It can be gleaned from the Information in this case that respondent Pacificador allegedly
committed the crime charged "on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to
January 6, 1976." Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, provides that the
offenses committed under the said statute shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. It appears
however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was
approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said
statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided
in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the
reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein private respondent),
cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10)
years from January 6, 1976.

The petitioner, however, vehemently denies having any knowledge of the crime at the time it
was allegedly committed by the respondent. It claims that the crime charged in the Information
should be deemed as discovered only on May 13, 1987 when the then Solicitor General,
Francisco Chavez, filed a complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) against the respondent, for violation of the provision of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

We are not convinced. This Court takes notice of the fact that the subject Deed of Sale dated
December 29, 1975 relative to the sale of the parcels of land by the National Steel Corporation
to the Philippine Smelters Corporation, was registered shortly thereafter in the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Camarines Norte. Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title No.
0440 in the name of the National Steel Corporation was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 13060 was issued in the name of the vendee Philippine Smelters
Corporation. On February 28, 1977, the Philippine Smelters Corporation even filed an action for
quieting of title with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, docketed therein as
Civil Case No. 2882,[13] which case forms the basis for the Sandiganbayan to deduce that the
subject Deed of Sale may be deemed registered on the said date, at the latest.[14]
While petitioner may not have knowledge of the alleged crime at the time of its commission, the
registration of the subject Deed of Sale with the Registry of Deeds constitutes constructive
notice thereof to the whole world inlcuding the petitioner. Well entrenched is the
jurisprudential rule that registration of deeds in the public real estate registry is a notice thereof
to the whole world. The registration is a constructive notice of its contents as well as all
interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with the knowledge of
what it contains.[15] Hence, even if the period of prescription is reckoned from February 28,
1977, the crime had already prescribed when the Information in this case was filed with the
Sandiganbayan on October 27, 1988.

It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation of the law on
prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted.[16] The
said legal principle takes into account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes which is
an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender. In the case of
People v. Moran,[17] this Court amply discussed the nature of the statute of limitations in
criminal cases, as follows:
The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty,
declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the offender shall
be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from
henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are
blotted out. Hence, it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the
defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and
grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the
legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to
it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.
The instant case should be distinguished from the cases of People v. Duque[18] and Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto[19] wherein we upheld the view
that the prescriptive period started to run only upon the discovery of the illegal nature of the
acts constituting the offense. The first case involves the crime of illegal recruitment where the
accused, Napoleon Duque, was found to have misrepresented himself to several job applicants
as a registered employment agent duly recognized by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA). Due to the said misrepresentation of the accused, the applicable prescriptive
period began to run not from the time of recruitment of job applicants by the accused but from
the time his recruitment activities were ascertained by the complainants and the POEA to have
been carried out without any license or authority from the government. The second, or Desierto
case, which was decided by this Court on October 25, 1999, involves the grant of alleged behest
loans by certain government-owned and controlled financial institutions to several individuals
and corporations closely associated with the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his
relatives. It was alleged that the public officials concerned, who were charged in the
corresponding Informations, connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans in
covering up the anomalous transactions. Under the circumstances, it was impossible for the
State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the
questioned transactions were made. The prescriptive period started to run only upon discovery
of the alleged illegality of the transactions after the investigations thereon were conducted.
In the case at bar, the petitioner contends that respondent concealed his criminal acts that
effectively prevented discovery thereof. The records of this case do not specifically show how
the respondent allegedly employed acts that could prevent the discovery of any illegality in the
transaction other than the bare assertion of the petitioner. There is also no allegation that the
government officials involved in the transactions connived or conspired with respondent
Pacificador. The said government officials were not even charged in the instant Information. On
the other hand, it was never disputed by the petitioner that the subject Deed of Sale was duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Camarines Norte and that the
corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13060 was subsequently issued to the vendee,
Philippine Smelters Corporation.[20]

In view of the foregoing, we do not find it necessary to discuss the other points raised by the
respondent in his Comment as additional grounds for the denial of the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Facts:

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in
violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of
Rizal.

The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990

The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal on May 30, 1990.[2]

The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on
October 2, 1990.

The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but
the motion was denied.

the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the following provisions of
the Rule on Summary Procedure:
Section 1. Scope. -- This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:

B. Criminal Cases:

1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

2. Violations of rental law;

3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged
does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos

(P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the

Section 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation:

Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be
commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal
by... the offended party.

She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription
for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin to Run,"

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: x x x Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and... punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.

Section 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing
violations of law not included in the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied)

Issues:

the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances.

Ruling:

That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to
offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in... the
last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not
governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers
are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the
petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by... that
rule... the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the
special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules... on
Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"... the instant
case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months,
[8] and is thus covered by the

Rule on Summary Procedure.

under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably
with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary
judicial proceedings until its too late.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner
commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on
July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326.

It was not interrupted by the filing... of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that
could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial
Court of Rodriguez, but this was done... only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already
prescribed.