Territorial Integrity and Political 

Independence   
  Samuel KN Blay
Subject(s): Sources, foundations and principles of international law; Foreign relations; Territory; Use of force, war,
  peace and neutrality
This article was last updated March 2010

A. On the Concepts Generally

1 Territorial integrity and political independence are two core elements of Statehood. Territorial integrity
refers to the territorial ‘oneness’ or ‘wholeness’ of the → State. As a norm of international law, it protects
the territorial framework of the independent State and is an essential foundation of the → sovereignty of
States. It extends principally over land territory, the → territorial sea appurtenant to the land, and the
seabed and subsoil of the territorial sea. Political independence refers to the autonomy in the affairs of the
State with respect to its institutions, freedom of political decisions, policy making, and in matters pertaining
to its domestic and foreign affairs. The two concepts of territorial integrity and political  independenceare
thus linked as the foundation of the sovereign State. They provide the basis for the external affirmation by
the international community of the sovereignty of a State and the legitimacy of the occupation and use of
its territory free from outside external interference or threat, and the right of the State to make decisions
affecting its territory (→ Jurisdiction of States).
  B. Historical Evolution
  1. The Inter-War Period
2 Territorial integrity and political independence emerged as important international concepts at the end of
World War I. The earliest manifestation of the concepts in international relations was at the end of the war,
in Woodrow Wilson's famous Fourteen Points (→ Fourteen Points of Wilson [1918]) in which he
mentioned: ‘specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of
political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike’ (XIV). The concepts were
later to be included in Art. 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations under which members of the  →
League of Nations undertook ‘to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial
integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League’ (Covenant of the League of
Nations [signed 28 June 1919, entered into force 10 January 1920] (1919) 225 CTS 195). In the event of
any → aggression in breach of the Covenant, the League Council was to advise upon the means by which
the obligation should be fulfilled.
3 The powers of the Council under the Article were thus vague, but the Article clearly imposed a legal
obligation on members and laid the foundation for the two concepts in international law. As the basis for a
legal obligation, Art. 10 was invoked on a considerable number of occasions and seems to have been
regarded as a general principle to which appeal could be made whenever a serious threat to the
personality of a State was apprehended. Persia, as then named, appealed to the League by virtue of Arts
10 and 11 Covenant after the Russian bombardment of Enzeli. Art. 10 was invoked by Austria in a
complaint to the Council concerning alleged frontier violations by Hungary in 1921. When Bulgaria
appealed to the League in 1925 following a Greek invasion, it referred to Arts 10 and 11, but the Council
took action under Art. 11 alone.
4 In what came to be called the Stimson Note (‘Identic Notes from the United States Secretary of State to the
Chinese and Japanese Governments, January 8, 1932’) the United States referred to the two concepts in
1932 when it indicated that it would not accept the legality of any de facto situation or recognize any treaty
between the governments of Japan and the State of Manchukuo in China ‘which may impair the rights of
 the United States … including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence or the territorial and
administrative integrity of the Republic of China’ (see also → Doctrines [Monroe, Hallstein, Brezhnev,
Stimson]).While the Stimson Note did not make a specific reference to Art. 10 League Covenant, it
nonetheless reflected the prevailing ideas in international law regarding political independence and
territorial integrity. Indeed, not long after the Stimson Note, the two concepts were incorporated in the
Convention on Rights and Duties of States (‘Montevideo Convention’), Art. 3 of which dealt with the right of
a State to defend its integrity andindependence regardless of whether its political legitimacy was
recognized by the other States.
  2. The Concepts within the United Nation System
5 Conscious of the territorial issues that underpinned World War II, the founding members of the United
Nations were keen to emphasize the issue of territorial inviolability and the concepts of territorial integrity
and political independence. The preamble of the → United Nations Charter foreshadows the place of the
concepts in the notion of the ‘equal rights of … nations large and small’ (Charter of the United Nations
[adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945] 145 BSP 805). The two concepts were
incorporated in substantive terms in the Charter under Art. 2(4) stipulating that

[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or the use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purpose of the United Nations.
6 At the → Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944), the original draft of Art. 2(4) was restrictive and only
prohibited members from the ‘the use or threat of force in their international relations in any manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization’. The words ‘against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state’ were added to the Charter at the insistence of smaller countries that
wanted some assurance that the more powerful States could not use force at the expense of weaker
states. As the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht wrote, ‘territorial integrity, especially where coupled with
political independence, is synonymous with territorial inviolability’ (Oppenheim 154).
7 For smaller and weaker States, ‘territorial inviolability’ provided an essential foundation for sovereign
equality (→ States, Sovereign Equality) undisturbed by external threats. Indeed, the combination of the
word ‘threat’ in Art. 2(4), as an equally impermissible activity as the use of force (→ Use of Force,
Prohibition of Threat), with the expression ‘politicalindependence’ meant that a State was protected not
only from physical acts of violence against its territorial integrity and political independence, but also from
threats which could be directed against and eventually influence the freedom of its decision-making and
the normal operation of its organs.
8 In international law and in the practice of the United Nations, it is generally agreed that the notion of
territorial integrity must be taken to refer to effective control and possession and not, necessarily, to a de
jure recognized title to the territory in question. Consequently, loss of territorial integrity of a State implies
loss of control and possession of the land, airspace, or sea, totally or partially, regardless of whether the
former were based upon a legal title or a de facto situation. In practice, it is established that it is not only
the direct occupation of a State's territory which constitutes a violation of its territorial integrity, but also the
indirect involvement in its internal affairs such as the aid of rebels by a third State to gain control of all or a
part of its territory. Thus in the → Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case
(Nicaragua v United States of America), for instance, Nicaragua's ‘fundamental contention’ was that the
conduct of the United States in assisting the Contra rebels was a violation of the United Nations Charter
and the Charter of the → Organization of American States (OAS). The International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’)
 found in favour of Nicaragua.
9 The notion of ‘political independence’ lends itself to easier interpretation since it is obvious that the
political independence of a State is infringed in all cases in which foreign acts tend to control the organs of
a State and influence their capacity to decide through the threat or use of force or through subversive
measures or pressures exerted upon them. It is interesting to note that in the cases brought before the
United Nations based on claims of violation of political independence, frequent references have been
made to the maintenance of foreign troops on the territory of a State contrary to the will of the local
government. Early complaints against such a phenomenon may be detected in the Soviet protest against
the continuing presence of British troops in Greece (1946). More recent action includes United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004) of 2 September 2004 to end Syrian occupation of Lebanon.
10 The concepts of territorial integrity and political independence have followed the course of the evolution of
international relations since the → decolonization period in the late 1950s. In 1960, through the adoption of
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 14 December
(UNGA Res 1514 [XV]), the United Nations General Assembly enriched the surrounding environment of
the two concepts by admitting two new elements into it: that all peoples―and not only States―have an
inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty, and the integrity of their national
territory; and that by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and they freely pursue
their economic, social, and cultural development. This latter element, namely the inclusion of economic,
social, and cultural considerations in the concepts of independence and integrity, seems to enlarge the two
concepts in new, hitherto unconsidered directions. It must also be noted that the element of the ‘peoples’
as entitled to integrity of their national territory and independence is further reinforced in the
same Declaration when it is stated that

[a]ll armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in
order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence and the
integrity of their national territory shall be respected (para.4).
11 The next reaffirmation of the continuing significance of territorial integrity and political independence is to
be found in the → Friendly Relations  Declaration  (1970) (Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations UNGA Res 2625 [XXV]). In this instrument, the expressions ‘territorial integrity’ and
‘political independence’ occupy an important position, intertwined, this time not only with the principle of
the prohibition of the threat or use of force but also with the principle of sovereign equality of States.
12 The concepts of territorial integrity and political independence appear recurrently in the preamble of the
Friendly Relations Resolution. First, the United Nations General Assembly recalls the duty of States to
refrain in their international relations from military, political, economic, or any other form of coercion aimed
against the political independence or territorial integrity of any State. In addition, it considers it essential
that all States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State. Second, the General Assembly expresses its
conviction that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial
integrity of a State or country, or at its political independence, is incompatible with the purposes and
principles of the Charter. Finally, the General Assembly considers that the → codification and progressive
development of international law, including the prohibition of the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence would promote the realization of the purposes of the United Nations.
13 In the elaboration of the principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
 use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the General Assembly
proceeds to a number of specifications which to give substance to the object which is protected by the
prohibition contained in the principle. Thus, under the Friendly Relations Resolution

[e]very State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the existing international
boundaries of another State or as a means of solving international disputes, including territorial disputes
and problems concerning frontiers of States. … Every State likewise has the duty to refrain from the threat
or use of force to violate international lines of demarcation, such as armistice lines, established by or
pursuant to an international agreement to which it is partly, or which it is otherwise bound to respect.
14 Moreover, this Resolution specifies that

[e]very State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or
armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State.
15 It also proclaims that

[e]very State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil
strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed
towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat
or use of force.
16 Finally the Resolution proclaims that

[t]he territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use of force in
contravention of the provisions of the Charter. The territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition
by another State resulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat
or use of force shall be recognized as legal.
17 The inclusion of the two concepts in the Friendly Relations Resolution within the purview of the principle of
the sovereign equality of States has raised them from their monolithic coexistence with the principle of the
prohibition of the threat or use of force and their consequent ‘negative’ definition in the context of
international law. Acceptance by the Friendly Relations Resolution of these concepts as parts of the
sovereign equality of States has put them in their right perspective, giving them an affirmative status in
international law.
18 Two other documents emerging from the activity of the United Nations General Assembly complete the
image of territorial integrity and political independence. The first is the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty of
21 December 1965 (UNGA Res 2131 [XX]), where the General Assembly, concerned at the increasing
threat to international peace due to armed and other direct or indirect forms of interference threatening the
sovereign personality and the political independence of States, stated that all peoples have an inalienable
right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty, and the integrity of their national territory, and
that, by virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social, and cultural developments. As in the case of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, thisDeclaration also encompasses the freedom of economic, social, and
cultural development of a people.
19 Another instrument of significance in the evolution of the two concepts is the Resolution on the Definition of
Aggression of 14 December 1974 (UNGA Res 3314 [XXIX]). Under this resolution, the General Assembly
 reaffirms the duty of States not to use armed force to deprive peoples of their right to → self-determination,
freedom, and independence, or to disrupt territorial integrity. The resolution defines ‘aggression’ as the use
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another
State.
20 The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and the Resolution on Aggression reflect in their texts
the development of the concepts of territorial integrity and political independence in the circumstances of
an enlarged United Nations Organization, heavily influenced by new, small, mainly ex-colonial States (→
Colonialism) with particular problems of integration within the international system, mindful of the past and
prospective role of the Northern Hemisphere with respect to their sovereignty and integrity.
21 In the United Nations, particularly in the Security Council, the two concepts have become established as
important building blocks in the resolution of most disputes involving territory and or the use of force. For
instance, in Eastern Europe the United Nations consistently relied on the concepts as important
foundations for peace and security following the dismantling of the former Soviet Union, and in the former
Yugoslavia (→ Yugoslavia, Dissolution of) and the subsequent conflicts in → Kosovo, → Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and → Nagorny-Karabakh. In the Nagorny-Karabakh question, the Security Council
condemned the Armenian invasion and occupation of Azerbaijan's territories and reaffirmed the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, in four Resolutions: 822 (30 April 1993), 853 (29 July
1993), 874 (14 October 1993), and 884 (12 November 1993), which reaffirmed (a) the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and all other States in the region; (b) the inviolability of international
borders; and (c) the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory (→ Territory,
Acquisition). In resolutions 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999 and 1297 (2000) of 12 May 2000, the Security
Council reaffirmed the two concepts in relation to the resolution of the conflicts in the  Kosovo and the
Congo (→ Congo, Democratic Republic of the) respectively.
22 The two concepts remain very much an important element in the operation of the United Nations. At the
2005 World Summit Outcome world leaders re-dedicated themselves to support all efforts to uphold the
sovereign equality of all States, and to respect their territorial integrity and political independence (UNGA
Res 60/1 ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ [12 September 2005] GAOR 60 th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 3).
  3. The Concepts outside the United Nations System
23 Outside the UN system, territorial integrity predates the United Nations' recognition of the concepts. In the
early 19thcentury when Spain's former Latin American colonies achieved their independence, they adopted
the → uti possidetis doctrine, under which each State's colonial administrative borders were established
and accepted as the international borders.
24 The doctrine of uti possidetis became a precedent followed most notably in post-colonial Africa in dealing
with the issue of territorial integrity and political independence. In the process of acquiring territories in the
colonial period in Africa, the European powers had adopted boundaries during the Berlin Conference in
1896 without regard to tribal ‘natural’ boundaries between the different tribes. The ‘artificial’ national  →
boundaries became the basis of most of the post-colonial States in Africa. As various African States
gained their independence on the basis of their acquired colonial boundaries, there was a concern that
territorial claims and counterclaims to reunite the various tribes on the basis of their ‘natural’ boundaries
could lead to conflicts and political instability and threaten the territorial integrity of several States. The
question of territorial integrity therefore received particular attention in the Charter of the Organization of
African Unity (‘OAU’) ([adopted 25 May, entered into force 13 September 1963] 479 UNTS 39). In the
Charter, African States express their determination to safeguard and consolidate ‘the hard-
won independence’ as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their States. Art. 11 OAU Charter
 states that the defence of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence constitutes a purpose of the
Organization.
25 While respect for inherited colonial boundaries was implicit in the OAU members commitment to territorial
integrity in the Organizations, there was a view that the ‘colonial boundaries rule’ needed explicit
articulation. In 1964, following the view that it is only by acceptance of the frontiers bequeathed to them by
the colonialists can permanent peace reign on the African continent, the OAU formally adopted Resolution
16/1 ‘Border Disputes among African States’ of 1964 in which all Member States pledged ‘to respect the
borders existing on their achievement of national independence’ consistent with the principle of uti
possidetis.
26 The strong adherence of African states to uti possidetis as the basis for respecting territorial integrity in the
African context established regional customary law regarding territory boundaries inherited from the
colonial period. This in part explains the African collective objection to the recognition of Biafra ( → Biafra
Conflict) as a secessionist State from Nigeria, and other secessionist movement on the continent (→
Secession).
27 In 1999 the → African Union (AU) was established in place of the OAU (‘Sirte Declaration’ [9 September
1999] EAHG/Draft/Decl. [IV] Rev 1). Like its predecessor organization, the AU also makes it its objective to
‘defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States’ (Art. 3 Constitutive Act
of the African Union [done 11 July 2000, entered into force 26 May 2001] 2158 UNTS 3). In 2002 the AU
concluded the African Union No-Aggression and Common Defence Pact which includes attacks ‘against
the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity’ in the definition of aggression (Art. 1(c)).
Consistent with the Friendly Relations Resolution, and the Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, the
Pact also provides that:

[e]ach State Party shall prevent its territory and its people from being used for encouraging or committing
acts of subversion, hostility, aggression and other harmful practices that might threaten the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of a Member State or regional peace and security (Art. 5 (b)).
28 The secession of → Eritrea from Ethiopia and its subsequent recognition by the OAU in 1993 stands out
as an exception to the recognition and acceptance of inherited colonial boundaries as the basis of
territorial integrity in Africa. Another potential exception is that of the Southern → Sudan. In 2005 the
Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (‘SPLM/A’) signed the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (‘CPA’) after decades of secessionist insurgency by the southern Sudanese. Under the
terms of the CPA the government is required to hold a → referendum at the end of a six-year interim
period in 2011, to allow the southerners to secede if they so wish. If the southerners secede following a
vote in a referendum, it will be the second instance in the history of the continent of the recognition of an
alteration of the an inherited colonial boundary and an implicit rejection of inviolability of sovereignty and
territorial integrity founded on inherited colonial boundaries in Africa.
29 A notable feature of the cases of Eritrea and the Southern Sudan is that they are both internal claims; they
are not external territorial claims on the parent States. In the context of Africa, the two examples permit a
modern interpretation of territorial integrity based on colonial boundaries and the doctrine uti possidetis to
allow for secessionist self-determination.
30 Elsewhere outside the United Nations system, the concepts of territorial integrity and
political independence may also be found in most regional arrangements in international relations. These
include: → Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (1961); → Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (1973);
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976); → South Asian Association for Regional
 Cooperation (SAARC) (1985); → Andean Community of Nations (CAN) (1989–present); →
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (1991–present); Conference on Interaction and Confidence
Building Measures in Asia (‘CICA’) (1999) GUUAM/GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic
Development (2001); South-East European Cooperation Process (2000) Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (‘SCO’) (2000).
31 The most comprehensive approach to date to the concepts of territorial integrity and
political independence outside the United Nations system is to be found in the → Helsinki Final Act (1975).
In this important document on East-West relations, the concepts of territorial integrity and
political independence enjoy the status of rights under international law, while the notion of territorial
integrity unequivocally acquires the status of a principle guiding the relations of the participating States.
32 In section I, the Final Act provides that

[t]he participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as the rights
inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical
equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence.

The section goes on to refer to the rights of States to freely choose and develop their political, social,
economic, and cultural systems, to define and conduct as they wish their relations with other States, to
belong or not to belong to international organizations, and to be or not to be a party to bilateral or
multilateral treaties, including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance (→ Alliances).
33 Section II combines the concepts of territorial integrity and political independence together with the notion
of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in the traditional manner. Section IV is dedicated to a
circumscription of the principle of territorial integrity. The text is rather awkward in that it follows a wording
which, instead of defining the notion and delimiting its scope, generally refers to the Charter of the United
Nations and to the practice established therein. The wording of this section was a compromise between
the views of a number of Eastern European countries which had intended to broaden the scope of the
concept; and the views, on the other hand, of the Western countries which had intended to keep the notion
within the orthodox limits set down by the UN system.
34 While the Helsinki Accords were concluded in the period of the → Cold War (1947–91), they remain an
important element in international law and relations in the post Cold War environment in which Europe has
seen the emergence of several new States (→ New States and International Law) and in which the notions
of territorial integrity and political independencefeature prominently. Indeed, to the extent that the Final Act
outlines general principles of international behaviour and security, its contents remain valid today as it did
in the Cold War. In the words of US Secretary of State Rice, the Final Act provides the ‘foundations of
peaceful democratic’ transformation and ‘lasting security’.
  C. Qualifications and Challenges to Territorial Integrity and Political Independence
35 The idea of territorial inviolability encompassed in the concepts of territorial integrity and
political independence is not absolute. In the public international law context, the principles of territorial
integrity, political independence, and indeed the sovereignty of the State are subject to important
limitations and qualifications of self-determination, → human rights, and humanitarian law (→
Humanitarian Law, International). → Self-defence in the context of fighting → terrorism has also important
implications on the traditional concepts of territorial integrity and political independence.
  1. Self-Determination and Territorial Integrity
36 Self-determination defined as ‘the right of a people to freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ is generally regarded as an operative legal right in
international law. The principle was used as the primary basis for decolonization. In the colonial context,
self-determination was used by ‘freedom fighters’ under international law as a right and not a violation of
territorial integrity (see also → National Liberation Movements). Its legal status was thus narrowly defined
and confined to colonial territories. In the post-colonial context, a claim by a section of a State for self-
determination is generally secessionist in character and presents a major challenge to the concepts of
territorial integrity and political independence. The Canadian Supreme Court in the Reference re
Secession of Quebec case thus declared that ‘international law expects that the right to self-determination
will be exercised by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign states and consistently with the
maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states’ and that the right to unilateral secession ‘arises only
in the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances’ ( Re Reference by the
Governor in Council concerning Certain Questions relating to the Secession of Quebec from
Canada (1999) 115 ILR 536). In Africa where secessionist self-determination claims are a feature of the
post-colonial political environment, the States have persistently rejected the principle as being inconsistent
with concepts of territorial integrity and uti possidetis until the recent case of Eritrea and, potentially, the
case of the Southern Sudan.
37 There is no clear rule of international law that supports or rejects self-determination in the post-colonial
context on the grounds that it breaches territorial integrity. On the other hand, when viewed as a human
right, it is arguable that self-determination of a people within a sovereign State is a necessary pre-condition
for the proper exercise of their democratic rights. This provides weight to the view that where a people are
subject to ‘extreme and unremitting persecution’ coupled with the ‘lack of any reasonable prospect for
reasonable challenge’ the demands of territorial integrity and politicalindependence may give way to self-
determination. Thus in general, cases of self-determination that have succeeded with subsequent
international → recognition for the claimants are characterized by three features: an effective claim
process, clear evidence of an inability or unwillingness of the parent State to regain control over the
claimants, and the absence of protest against international recognition of the claimant. For instance, in the
secession of East Pakistan from the rest of Pakistan to form Bangladesh, once it became clear after the
Indo-Pakistan war in 1971 that Pakistan had lost control over the territory and was not able to regain it, the
way was paved for its acceptance into the United Nations. Pakistan as the parent State did not mount an
international campaign against the recognition of Bangladesh.
38 Similarly, in the case of the secession of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania from the former Soviet Union,
evidence of the inability of the Soviet Union as the parent State at the time was an important determining
factor in the success of their claims. Before their secession, the three had maintained their right to self-
determination on the basis of their earlier (pre-Soviet → annexation) status as independent States. While
most Western States objected to the Soviet annexation of the three States, they stopped short of formal
recognition of the States given the Cold War environment at the time. However, after the February 1991
referendum in Lithuania in which the country voted overwhelmingly for independence, the conditions
changed. In spite of an initial statement by the Soviet Union that the referendum was illegal, it took no
effective protest measures against the spate of recognitions of the three States that followed the
Lithuanian referendum. The three States were subsequently admitted into the United Nations in 1991
without any queries as to their right of self-determination, notwithstanding the obvious impact on the
territorial integrity of the then Soviet Union.
39 The case of the → Baltic States contrasts sharply with the case of the Turkish Republic of Northern →
 Cyprus (‘TRNC’) in which both the Republic of → Cyprus and the United Nations have consistently
discouraged any form of recognition of the territory with continuing efforts by Cyprus as the parent State to
reunite the territory. Cyprus has consistently maintained its right to territorial integrity with respect to
northern Cyprus and the duty of → non-recognition of TRNC by other States. In the case of the TRNC,
unlike the Baltic States and Bangladesh, the parent State has persisted in its efforts to regain control and
has consistently opposed recognition by other States while affirming its territorial integrity. While there is
no duty to recognize in international law, there is a duty of non-recognition. Recognition of the TRNC in
such circumstance would be a breach of the duty of non-recognition and constitute an interference in the
domestic affairs and the territorial integrity of Cyprus.
40 The reaffirmation of sovereignty and territorial integrity constantly brings up the tensions between the two
concepts on the one hand and the right to self-determination on the other hand. The potential for the
tension was recognized in the General Assembly as long ago as in Resolution 1514 (XV)  Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in the 1960s when the General Assembly
declared that all peoples ‘have the right to self-determination’ (para. 2), but then noted also that, any
‘attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country
is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations’ (para. 6). The tension
is reflected in the practice of the Security Council with an apparent bias by the Council to favour territorial
integrity over self-determination claims unless dictates of human rights and peace and security demand
otherwise. In the case of the Kurdish demands in Iraq, the Security Council consistently affirmed the
dependence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Iraq in Resolution 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991 and
Resolution 1546 (2004) of 8 June 2004 without reference to the demands of the Kurdish people to self-
determination.
41 In general, balancing the competing demands of self-determination and territorial integrity is a delicate
process that may also be dictated by pragmatism to meet the interest of international, or regional, peace
and security. For instance in dealing with the Kosovo conflict in 1999, the Security Council affirmed the
‘commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia’ in Resolution 1244. Thus, in responding to the demands of Kosovofor self-determination which
was one of the underlying causes of the conflict, the Council only affirmed ‘substantial autonomy and
meaningful self-administration for Kosovo’. The substance of Resolution 1244 was however temporary. In
the Resolution, the Security Council placed the Kosovo province under UNMIK's administration pending a
determination of its final status. In the Ahtisaari Plan in 2006, which was adopted by the Council to deal
with the status of Kosovo, the province was allowed its ‘meaningful determination’ in apparent conflict with
the territorial integrity of → Serbia by being granted the right to a national flag and anthem and the right to
conclude international agreements and to seek membership in international institutions (‘Letter Dated 26
March 2007 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council’ UN Doc
S/2007/168).
42 The choice of ‘meaningful self-determination’ for Kosovo over a strict adherence to territorial integrity in
favour of Serbia in the Ahtisaari Plan may be considered a pragmatic recognition that
forcing Kosovo Albanians back into a constitutional relationship with Serbia to honour its territorial integrity
would potentially reignite violence, and thereby undermine peace and security in the region and the
stability of Serbia itself.
  2. Humanitarian Intervention and Territorial Integrity
43 → Humanitarian intervention typically involves the use of force by one or more States to intervene in or
enter a sovereign State with the stated objective of assisting a resident population in the State who are
 subject to gross human rights abuses. By its very nature, forceful intervention poses an immediate
challenge to territorial integrity and politicalindependence. Apart from the conflict with the two concepts,
such intervention also potentially conflicts with the principle of the prohibition of force ( → Use of Force,
Prohibition of) under Art. 2(4) and the non-intervention provision of Art. 2(7) UN Charter. In spite of the
potential conflicts, the debate over humanitarian intervention has persisted in international law because of
human rights imperatives and the commitment of the international community to humanitarian causes.
44 During the 1963 United Nations General Assembly debate on the issue of intervention, the Mexican
representative Gomez Robledo stated in the Sixth Committee:

Under Art 2 Paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter, it was clear that the use of force was permissible in
only two cases: enforcement action ordered by the Security Council under Art 42, and in conformity with
Art 51, individual or collective self-defense in the event of armed attack (GAOR 18 th Session 6th Committee
806th Meeting 113).

With respect to the non-intervention principle, it is hardly possible for humanitarian intervention to occur
consistently with Art. 2(7) without infringing the territorial integrity or political independence of the State
concerned. This is because intervention usually involves a significant impact or influence on the domestic
political process and organization of the State.
45 The traditional international law position does not favour humanitarian intervention. This has been made
clear by United Nations General Assembly resolutions, declarations, and assertions, as well as by frequent
condemnation of States that have employed humanitarian arguments to justify their actions in the domestic
affairs of other States. However, in the clearly humanitarian interventions in the 1970s and 1980s,
particularly the → Vietnam invasion of Cambodia (→ Cambodia Conflicts [Kampuchea]) and the Tanzanian
invasion of Uganda, the international community appear to have recognized the actions as warranted by
the gravity of the humanitarian circumstances.
46 The traditional international law resistance to humanitarian intervention was premised more on the
absence of clearly defined rules for such intervention and the concern that the intervening States might
use the intervention to serve their own interests in breach of the territorial integrity and
political independence of the intervened State. It is by no means clear that States opposed humanitarian
intervention purely to preserve territorial integrity and political independence irrespective of the
humanitarian implications for the beneficiary population.
47 Whatever the traditional international law position may have been, it is arguable that there are now
emerging trends that favour humanitarian intervention as a qualification to territorial integrity and
political independence. In the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case the ICJ
admitted the permissibility of ‘strictly humanitarian aid’ as an exception to unlawful interventions (para.
242). In the Iraqi Kurds' rebellion against the Iraqi government after the liberation of Kuwait (→ Iraq-Kuwait
War [1990–91]), the Security Council did not sanction forceful intervention to assist the Kurds. It permitted
only humanitarian aid. This notwithstanding, allied forces claiming the authority of Resolution 688 (1991) of
5 April 1991 and the earlier Resolution 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, distributed food to the refugees,
set up camps for them, and more importantly defended them against Iraqi attacks by creating a protective
zone and excluding Iraqi troops from the Kurdish region. In 1995 the massacres in Markale triggered
the → North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1999 NATO
justified its bombing of Yugoslavia on the necessity of protecting the KosovoAlbanian people from what
was described as aggression and → ethnic cleansing, by the military of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
 and Serbian paramilitary police forces.
48 In addition, the 1994 genocide in → Rwanda in which an estimated 800,000 were killed has forced a
reconsideration of the law on humanitarian intervention. In the 2005 World Summit Outcomes Document,
world leaders at the United Nations accepted in para.139 that they

… are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in
accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case by case basis and in cooperation with
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national
authorities manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity.
49 Security Council Resolution 1674 of 28 April 2006 reaffirmed ‘the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of
the 2005 World Summit Outcomes Document regarding the → responsibility to protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’.
50 It is to be noted that para. 139 of the World Summit Outcomes clearly stated that any ‘collective action’
must be in ‘accordance with the UN Charter including Chapter VII’. To the extent that Art. 2(4) permits the
use of force not inconsistent with the Charter, such collective action for humanitarian intervention will
accordingly be consistent with the Charter and a significant qualification to the concepts of territorial
integrity and political independence.
51 The rhetoric at the United Nations suggests that the Organization is evolving towards a less rigid
adherence of territorial integrity and political independence. The principal test for any change in the UN's
approach to the concepts of territorial integrity and humanitarian intervention after the World Summit was
Darfur in Southern Sudan. However, the rhetoric of the UN has not been matched by any realistic or
practical action of humanitarian intervention in the case of Darfur.
52 Notwithstanding the lack of effective intervention in Darfur, the statements at the UN mark a clear
development in favour of humanitarian intervention as a qualification to territorial integrity and
political independence. It is, however, important to note that the scope of humanitarian intervention
remains problematic. There is general agreement that to be legitimate, humanitarian intervention must only
be pursued where:

- there has been prior determination by the UNSC of a current and deteriorating grave crisis threatening
international peace and security;

- there has been articulation by the UN Security Council or General Assembly of specific policies for
resolution of the crisis;

- the situation can be averted by the use of force and only by the use of force (and that all alternative
means have been exhausted);

- the use of force is conducted by a multi-national force with emphasis on regional subsidiarity; and

- any use of force is governed by the existing laws of war with particular regard to the laws of
proportionality and discrimination.
  3. Terrorism and Territorial Integrity and Political Independence
53 The increasing incidents of terrorism and the ability of terrorist groups to secure training camps and
 facilities in sympathetic States have brought important implications for territorial integrity and
political independence. In the need to combat terrorism, the issue arises as to whether a State is entitled to
pursue suspected terrorists in another State without infringing the concepts of territorial integrity and
political independence. The situation is well typified in the US commando attacks to capture suspected Al
Qaeda terrorists in Mogadishu, Somalia; the US invasion of Afghanistan (→ Afghanistan, Conflict) to
overthrow the → Taliban in 2001; and Israel's attacks against Lebanon's main airport, highways, military
bases, and other targets, in retaliation for attacks by Hezbollah guerrilla rockets against Israel in July 2006.
54 The pursuit of terrorists by a State into the territory of another State necessarily invokes the complex
relationship between territorial integrity and political independence on the one hand, and the issues of
aggression and the right of self-defence on the other hand. United Nations General Assembly Resolution
3314 (XXIX) defines aggression as ‘the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of another State’ (Art. 1). Materially, the ‘invasion or attack by the armed
forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary’ qualifies
as aggression (Art. 3). The Resolution also provides that the ‘action of a State in allowing its territory… to
be used by [another] State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State’ also qualifies as
aggression (Art. 3 (f)). Based on the Resolution, it would seem to follow that a State that permits its
territory to be used by terrorists to commit attacks against another State ipso facto commits aggression
against the State that is attacked by the terrorists. This would in turn permit the right of self-defence under
Art. 51 UN Charter and allow an attack on the territory of the receiving State notwithstanding the concepts
of, and the prohibitions against breaching, territorial integrity and politicalindependence of the State. For
instance in the case of the US attacks against Afghanistan, the US action was justified on the principle of
self-defence and reinforced by the ambiguous language of Security Council Resolution 1368 of 12
September 2001 in which the preamble recognized the ‘inherent right of individual and collective self-
defence’ in relation to the September 11 attacks against the United States. The UN → High Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Changesthus noted that Resolution 1368 ‘opened the way for United States-led
military action against the Taliban regime in self-defence’ (‘A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’ in UNGA ‘Note by the
Secretary-General’ [2 December 2004] UN Doc A/59/565, 8).
55 However, on the issue of terrorism and the question of aggression, one needs to tread carefully. The
Resolution on the Definition of Aggression is very specific in its use of terminology. The Resolution
specifically deals with the action of a State in allowing its territory to be used by another State as such
against a third State. The difficulty is that terrorist organizations however efficient and well organized they
may be in their structure and administration are not States. But on the other hand, terrorist organizations
as → non-State actors have become increasingly important agents of conflict and State failure (→ Failing
States). More significantly, while they may seek sanctuary and training facilities within a State, they are
likely to operate beyond the State's control or sponsorship. The attack by the Hezbollah in Lebanon
against Israel that prompted the conflict in 2006 is a typical example. The modus operandi of terrorist
organizations thus does not necessarily trigger the definition of aggression. On the other hand, in both the
UN Charter and in customary international law, the definition of → armed attack that triggers the right to
self-defence is not necessarily stated in terms of an attack by a State as such. It therefore leaves room for
the conclusion that when an armed attack by a non-State actor occurs against a State, that State is entitled
to the right of self-defence including action in pursuit of the non-State actors where they are resident in
another State. Such an action will not be a breach of the principle of territorial integrity and
political independence if it is confined to the destruction of the terrorist organization. While the action of the
 non-State terrorist actors may not be attributable to the host State, the failure or inability of the State to
control the non-State actors in itself lends weight to the right of the aggrieved State to take measures
against the non-State actors in the host State, without being in breach of the concepts of territorial integrity
and political independence. To be consistent with the rules on non-aggression and respect for the
concepts of territorial integrity and political independence, however, such action must be preceded by
efforts to secure the assistance of the host State to abate the activities of the non-State actors. It is the
failure or inability of the host State to abate such activities that would lend legitimacy to the action of the
aggrieved State.
56 In the context of the so called ‘War on Terror’, it is thus arguable that a limited use of force that specifically
targets a specific terrorist organization in the territory of a State would not violate that State's territorial
integrity or politicalindependence and would be consistent with Art. 2(4) UN Charter if the host State is
unable to stop the action of the terrorist activity. Moreover, eliminating the threat of terrorism is consistent
with the principles of numerous conventions and pronouncements of UN bodies that have condemned
terrorism as a practice. For instance, Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 of September 2001
reaffirmed that terrorist acts constitute ‘threats to international peace and security’ and resolved that States
should take all necessary steps to prevent terrorist acts.
  D. Conclusion
57 Since the development of international law in the middle of the last century, the world has transformed
rapidly with globalization. Life has become more complex; values, needs, and expectations change.
International law is a product of its environment, thus the standards and benchmarks acceded to in
previous years will continually be subjected to new interpretations and calls for reforms as the international
community is confronted with new challenges. The concepts of territorial integrity and
political independence are not new, but today they face challenges in the form of socio-economic and
political predicaments not foreseen a century ago when international political leaders adopted these ideas
as the basis on which to minimize territorial revisionism and to foster international order. If one measures
the strength of the two concepts over time, it is easy to conclude that they have had considerable impact
on the international behaviour of States. The two concepts now serve as the basis for measuring
standards of behaviour in international law and have thus become the basis for legitimate behaviour. Since
the adoption of the UN Charter, the international community has witnessed the consolidation of the two
concepts into important international norms against → territorial changes particularly through the use of
force. More significantly, there has been a general evolution in respect for the concepts. The many UN
resolutions on the two concepts, and the actuality of State practice regarding them as evidenced by the
inclusion of the concepts in numerous international instruments, all lead to the firm conclusion that they
have acquired the status of independent principles of law in the international legal system.

United Nations (UN)   

  Jochen A Frowein
  Subject(s): Universal international organizations and institutions; Overview articles
This article was last updated July 2009
  A. Origins
1 When the →  United Nations Charter was adopted in San Francisco on 26 June 1945, World War II had
 ended on the European continent but still continued in the Pacific. The decision to establish an
organization embracing all countries in the world to preserve the peace after the war had come to an, end
goes back to the → Atlantic Charter (1941) of 14 August 1941 (204 LNTS 384), in which President
Franklin D Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared that ‘after the final destruction of the
Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in
safety within their own boundaries’ (Principle 6). The two statesmen also expressed their desire ‘to bring
about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all,
improved labour standards, economic advancement, and social security’ (Principle 5). On New Year's Day
1942 the Declaration by the United Nations (‘UN’) was signed in Washington DC (204 LNTS 381), and 26
governments subscribed to the common programme of purposes and principles embodied in the Atlantic
Charter.
2 The first concrete steps towards the creation of the United Nations were taken during the late summer of
1944 at the →Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944), Washington DC, by representatives of the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States and, in a second phase, also by those of China. The
Four Powers reached a number of agreements—which came to be known as the Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals—on the purposes and principles of the organization, its membership, and principal organs.
Although the permanent representation of the ‘Big Five’ (including France) in the central organ for the
preservation of the peace—the UN Security Council—was already agreed upon, the voting procedure to
be used in it could not then be settled. This question was later discussed at the  →  Yalta Conference
(1945), and the three participants, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, accepted the voting formula which was
later embodied in Art. 27 UN Charter. The invitation to the ‘Conference of United Nations’ which met at
San Francisco from 25 April to 26 June 1945 for the preparation of the Charter was sponsored by the
United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China; France having decided not to act as a
sponsoring nation. The Conference adopted the UN Charter, which entered into force on 24 October 1945
(see also →  United Nations Charter, History of). There were 51 original members of the organization. In
2009 the number of members is 192.
3 The organization of the United Nations was conceived as an answer to the failure of its predecessor,
the →  League of Nations. The important innovations of the UN were the complete outlawing of the use of
force between States except in →self-defence, and the system of → collective security, with the Security
Council having the competence to take action by military force (see also →  Use of Force, Prohibition of).
  B. Structure
4 According to Art. 7 UN Charter, the principal organs of the UN are: the General Assembly (→  United
Nations, General Assembly), the Security Council (→ United Nations, Security Council), the Economic and
Social Council (→ United Nations, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)), the Trusteeship Council
(→  United Nations Trusteeship System), the→  International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the Secretariat.
The most important organs for realizing the principal function of the organization, ie to keep the peace, are
the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretary-General (→United Nations, Secretary-
General).
5 The Security Council has ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’
(Art. 24 (1) UN Charter) and is composed of the five permanent members (China, France, now Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States) and ten members elected for two years, having regard to
equitable geographical distribution (Art. 23 (1) UN Charter). Every permanent member has the right
of → veto in all decisions, with the exception of procedural matters (Art. 27 (3) UN Charter). Whether a
matter is procedural or not will be decided by a vote which is regarded as non-procedural because at that
 stage it will not have been clarified whether the matter at issue is procedural or not. This approach was laid
down by a statement of the four sponsoring powers at the San Francisco Conference and has not been
challenged since. Despite the wording of Art. 27 (3) UN Charter, abstention and even non-participation by
permanent members has not in practice hindered the adoption of a decision. This interpretation of the UN
Charter was confirmed by the ICJ in its Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)
(Advisory Opinion) ([1971] ICJ Rep 16; →  South West Africa/Namibia (Advisory Opinions and
Judgments)).
6 In the General Assembly each member has one vote; decisions on important matters require a two-thirds
majority (Art. 18 UN Charter, which includes a definition of ‘important questions’; → International
Organizations or Institutions, Voting Rules and Procedures). The Secretary-General is appointed by the
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. According to the UN Charter, the
General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international
peace and security and discuss ‘any questions’ relating thereto and make recommendations (Art. 11 UN
Charter). The decisions to maintain or restore international peace and security are to be taken by the
Security Council (Chapters VI and VII). According to Art. 12 UN Charter, the General Assembly may not
make any recommendations while the Security Council is exercising its functions. During the period until
1990 the Security Council has frequently been unable to reach a decision due to lack of unanimity among
the permanent members. This situation led to the famous →  Uniting for Peace Resolution (1950) adopted
by the General Assembly on 3 November 1950 during the →Korean War (1950–53). The Resolution
confirmed the power of the General Assembly to recommend action as soon as the Security Council fails
to act and when this is required by any nine members (originally seven) of the Security Council. Although
initially its legality was much disputed, the possibility of calling emergency sessions of the General
Assembly has been used frequently even by those States who had originally objected to the Resolution.
7 The Secretary-General has only comparatively few functions under the UN Charter. But the other principal
organs, especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, may entrust to the Secretary-General
functions within the area of their competence (Art. 98 UN Charter). In practice, the Secretary-General has
carried out the important role of mediator in many instances (→  Conciliation; → Mediation).
8 ECOSOC is a nucleus for the many activities of the UN in the fields of economic, social, cultural,
educational, health (→Public Health, International Co-operation), and related matters, many of which are
the final responsibility of the General Assembly. Its activities in the field of →  human rights have also been
important and led to the adoption by the General Assembly of the →  Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948), the → International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the → International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) (both in force since 1976). ECOSOC is
composed of 27 members elected by the General Assembly. Chapters XI and XII UN Charter concerning
non-self-governing territories have been the basis of a supervised and regulated process
of → decolonization unprecedented in history which has more than doubled the number of independent
States in the world.
9 The ICJ based on its statute which forms an annex to the UN Charter is ‘the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations’ (Art. 92 UN Charter). Of primary importance for the role of the Court within the structure of
the Organization is the power of the General Assembly and the Security Council to request an advisory
opinion on any legal question under Art. 96 UN Charter (→  Advisory Opinions). This provision may be
extended by a resolution of the General Assembly to other organs and United Nations Specialized
Agencies (→ United Nations, Specialized Agencies), as has happened on several occasions. The practice
 of the Court in particular since about 1980 has been of great importance for the development of
international law.
  C. Development of the UN
  1. Growth of Membership
10 From the original 51 members the UN has grown to 192 by 2009. Most of the new members are former
colonies which gained their independence after 1945 or States which became members after the
disintegration of the former Soviet Union or of Yugoslavia. Several very small States with a population of
far below one million, sometimes even below 100,000, have been admitted, although there had been
discussions until 1971 over whether → micro States should be allowed to become members. Only a few
very small States preferred not to apply for membership, eg Nauru and the Cook Islands. Of the States
divided after World War II, the two German States, then the Federal Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic (‘GDR’), were admitted in 1973 (see also → Germany, Legal Status after World War
II). With the reunification of Germany in 1990 the Federal Republic of Germany remained a Member State
while the GDR acceded to the Federal Republic and lost its membership. The reunited Vietnam was
admitted in 1977. The seat of China in the UN organs was taken by the representatives of the People's
Republic of China under UNGA Res 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971 (GAOR 26 th Session Supp 29, 2).
The two Korean States were admitted to membership in 1991. Switzerland which had not sought
membership for a long period was admitted in 2002. → Taiwan is the only territory with a considerable
population which has not become a member and is not represented in the United Nations.
  2. Impact of World Politics
11 The deterioration of East-West relations after 1948, commonly called the period of the → Cold War (1947–
91), had a considerable influence on the UN. The veto power was used frequently by the Soviet Union,
and the Security Council could not fulfil its primary task. Open hostilities in Korea, Vietnam, and the Middle
East could not be prevented by the UN. The Untied Nations →  peacekeeping system developed in a
direction not foreseen by the UN Charter. While military →sanctions were used during this period only in
connection with Southern Rhodesia (UNSC Res 221 (1966) (9 April 1966) SCOR 21 st Year
5; → Rhodesia/Zimbabwe), Untied Nations Forces were used several times fairly successfully with
the →consensus of all concerned (see also → International Military Forces). Economic sanctions under
Chapter VII were applied against South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. This situation changed completely
after 1990. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disappearance of the East-West conflict which had
lasted for almost 50 years, the United Nations system, as designed in 1945, could be, for the first time,
tested as to its possibilities. While binding decisions by the Security Council under  Chapter VII UN
Charter were practically excluded during the East-West conflict, they have become a normal occurrence
since 1990. In many conflicts the Security Council has applied its competence under Chapter VII.
Economic boycotts of a far-reaching nature have been decided on the basis of Art. 41 UN Charter.
Authorization to use armed force has been given by the Security Council in several instances. However, it
has also become clear that States may be willing to use armed force unilaterally without formal
authorization by the Security Council as happened against Iraq in 1998 and in 2003 (→  Iraq, Invasion of
(2003)) as well as against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 (see also →  Kosovo).
  3. Charter Amendments and Proposals for Reform
12 The only amendments to the UN Charter which have been adopted since the Organization came into
existence concerned the enlargement of the Security Council and ECOSOC as well as the consequences
of this enlargement for the voting procedure in the Security Council. For several years discussions have
 been held in the ‘Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the
Role of the Organization’ with a view to amend the UN Charter. The question whether Germany, Japan,
India, Brazil, and possibly other States should become permanent members of the Security Council has
been discussed but no consensus has been reached. A report by a High-Level Panel ‘A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility’ of 2004 has addressed the issue of UN reform as well as the challenges
for the Organization.
  D. Maintenance of International Peace and Security
  1. Breach of the Peace and Threat to the Peace in Art. 39 UN Charter
13 The Security Council has determined in a great number of cases that a breach of the peace occurred or a
threat to the peace existed. This started in 1990 when Iraq occupied Kuwait and the Security Council
immediately determined a breach of the peace and authorized Member States co-operating with the
government of Kuwait to use military force (UNSC Res 661 (1990) (6 August 1990) SCOR 45 th Year
19; UNSC Res 678 (1990) (29 November 1990) SCOR 45 th Year 27). The Security Council also applied
Chapter VII from 1991 onwards concerning the former Yugoslavia. Since then resolutions based on
Chapter VII have become normal practice of the Security Council.
14 The experience of the practice since 1990 has shown that Chapter VII measures mainly concerned internal
conflicts or conflicts which developed from internal ones into international conflicts. This happened
concerning the former Yugoslavia where the former federal entities gained full sovereignty during the
conflict (→ Yugoslavia, Dissolution of). Sometimes the Security Council expressly determined that a civil
war was a threat to the peace in the region, for instance in UNSC Res 788 (1992) of 19 November 1992
(SCOR 47th Year 99) concerning Liberia. Concerning Haiti the Security Council decided that a threat to the
peace existed because the democratic government had not been reinstated and persecution existed which
could increase the number of Haitians seeking refuge in neighbouring Member States (UNSC Res 841
(1993) (16 June 1993) SCOR 48 th Year 119). In UNSC Res 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998 (SCOR
53rd Year 13) the Security Council affirmed that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constituted a
threat to peace and security in the region. In this practice the Security Council based its evaluation on the
recognition that States do not live in isolation and that extreme violence or human rights violations within a
country is likely to destabilize a region.
15 On the basis of Art. 41 UN Charter the Security Council has introduced arms embargos, far-reaching
economic sanctions, and targeted sanctions aimed at individuals. Under the system established for
terrorists States are obliged to freeze economic assets of suspected terrorists. Also, travel bans have been
laid down. The Security Council used Chapter VII to create a system of supervision for Iraqi petroleum
sales to finance the compensation fund set up (UNSC Res 706 (1991) (15 August 1991) SCOR 46 th Year
21). The Security Council also adopted the Oil for Food Programme under Art. 41 UN Charter making it
possible that Iraq use special funds for foodstuff and medical supplies (UNSC Res 986 (1995) (14 April
1995) SCOR 50th Year 101).
  2. The Authorization to Use Armed Force
16 In many cases the Security Council has authorized Member States to use armed force. This happened
after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq with UNSC Res 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, or with  UNSC Res
794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 (SCOR 47 th Year 63), concerning the authorization for Member States ‘to
use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief
operations in Somalia’ (at para. 10). It was clear that military means should be used in that respect.
Concerning Yugoslavia the Security Council authorized the use of force in several resolutions. In UNSC
 Res 816 (1993) of 31 March 1993 (SCOR 48 th Year 4) the flight prohibition which had already been
established was connected with an authorization to use force. Military aircraft violating the flight prohibition
were shot down on the basis of this resolution. In UNSC Res 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993 (SCOR 48 th Year
13), the Security Council authorized Member States to take all necessary measures through the use of air
power in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to support the Untied
Nations force present there in the performance of its mandate. Concerning Rwanda, UNSC Res 929
(1994) of 29 June 1994 (SCOR 49 th Year 10) authorized the use of force and UNSC Res 940 (1994) of 31
July 1994 (SCOR 49th Year 51) authorized the use of force against Haiti in a limited way. In UNSC Res
1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999 (SCOR 54 th Year 32) the Security Council authorized Member States and
relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo. This was
again a clear authorization to use military force. Although Art. 43 UN Charter includes an obligation in
principle of all Member States to make available to the Security Council armed forces, this obligation was
never implemented. According to Arts 43 (2) and (3) UN Charterspecific agreements had to be concluded
in that respect which never happened. Therefore, the authorization for Member States to use armed force
is the only possibility for the Security Council to take military action in case of a threat to or breach of the
peace.
  3. Authorization for Regional Organizations to Use Armed Force
17 According to Art. 53 (1) UN Charter no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or
by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. Enforcement action in this sense
refers to the use of military force. Economic boycotts by regional organizations are lawful if they are
covered by the statute of the organization and lawful under general public international law. Only for the
use of armed force, where the general prohibition of Art. 2 (4) UN Charter is applicable, do regional
organizations need the authorization by the Security Council. The Security Council has given this
authorization in some cases but has used different wording which is not always absolutely clear. In UNSC
Res 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992 (SCOR 47 th Year 29) the Security Council gave the mandate to
control maritime shipping in the Adriatic Sea and expressly stated that it acted ‘under  Chapters VII and VIII
of the Charter of the United Nations’ (at para. 12). This can only be seen as the formal authorization to use
armed force. Indeed armed inspections of shipping were carried out by NATO and WEU naval forces.
Again, in UNSC Res 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997 (SCOR 52 nd Year 83) the Security Council authorized
ECOWAS to use force if necessary to halt inward maritime shipping.
18 Other references to regional organizations are less clear. In many resolutions concerning former
Yugoslavia the Security Council just added ‘recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the
United Nations’ when it in fact referred to NATO. In other resolutions it addressed the States and asked
that they ‘acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements’ should take measures. In those
cases the wording is reminiscent of Art. 48 (2) of Chapter VII UN Charter, according to which decisions by
the Security Council shall be carried out by the members of the United Nations directly and through their
action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members. Nevertheless, it would seem
that a special mentioning of the organizations in the resolution must be interpreted as authorization in the
sense of Art. 53 UN Charter. In UNSC Res 1031 (1995) of 15 December 1995 (SCOR 50 th Year 18) which
created the legal basis for the Implementation Force (‘IFOR’) the Security Council referred to action by
Member States ‘acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A’ (at para.
12). This is again a reference to NATO and must be seen as an authorization under Art. 53 UN Charter. In
UNSC Res 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999 the Security Council expressly ‘authorizes Member States and
relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo … with all
 necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities’ (at para. 7).
19 It is not always evident whether the use of armed forces by regional organizations needs the authorization
of the Security Council. This is particularly so where the consent of the territorial State may exist and the
regional organization therefore uses peacekeeping forces which cannot be seen as enforcement action.
Sometimes the Security Council, after a period of doubt, has expressed the view that there was
peacekeeping in the traditional sense not needing formal authorization. InUNSC Res 937 (1994) of 21 July
1994 (SCOR 49th Year 65) the Security Council referred to the situation in Abkhazia:

recognizing that the deployment of a CIS peace-keeping force to the area is predicated upon the request
and consent of the parties to the conflict (at Pmbl) … Welcomes the contribution made by the Russian
Federation and indications of further contributions from other members of the CIS, of a peace-keeping
force, in response to the request of the parties (at para. 4).
  4. Action to Restore Peace after the Use of Armed Force
20 After the liberation of Kuwait, UNSC Res 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 (SCOR 46 th Year 11) set up for the first
time a detailed system of supervision concerning Iraq to restore peace and security in the area. The
Security Council decided that Iraq was to accept unconditionally the destruction, removal, or rendering
harmless under international supervision of all chemical and biological weapons and all ballistic missiles
with a range greater than 150 kilometres. The resolution also set up a fund for claims against Iraq. A
procedure for granting compensation was developed and has been implemented by a compensation
commission located in Geneva (→  United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC)). On the basis of
UNSC Res 687 (1991) a boundary commission was set up which was given the task to demarcate the
boundary between Iraq and Kuwait. On 21 May 1993 its Final Report on the Demarcation of the
International Boundary between the Republic of Iraq and the State of Kuwait by the United Nations Iraq-
Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission ((20 May 1993) UN Doc S/25811/Appendix) was
communicated to the Security Council which by UNSC Res 833 (1993) of 27 May 1993 (SCOR 48 th Year
36) acting under Chapter VII reaffirmed that the decisions of the commission regarding the demarcation
are final and guaranteed the inviolability of the boundary.
  5. Measures against War Criminals
21 With UNSC Res 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993 (SCOR 48 th Year 28) the Security Council decided that an
international tribunal would be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. On 25
May 1993, the Security Council, by UNSC Res 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 (SCOR 48 th Year
29) established the →  International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and adopted its
statute as annex to the resolution. The ICTY has been operative since then and has developed an
impressive case law. A similar tribunal has been set up by UNSC Res 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994
(SCOR 49th Year 15) for Rwanda. These examples show that the Security Council has far-reaching powers
to deal with situations after armed conflicts.
  E. Other Activities
  1. General Political Activities
22 Since the General Assembly has a wide mandate to discuss all matters related to peace and
security, →  disarmament and political co-operation (Arts 11 and 13 UN Charter), there are hardly any
matters of international concern which have not been at issue in the debates of the General Assembly. The
problems of disarmament have been discussed repeatedly at special sessions. Many important treaties
 have been adopted as a consequence of discussions in the General Assembly. The UN Conference on the
Law of the Sea, the most important example of an effort to regulate a matter of grave concern to the
international community by consensus, was instituted by the General Assembly and led to the adoption of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (concluded 10 December 1982, entered into force 16
November 1994) 1833 UNTS 396; see also →  Law of the Sea).
  2. Economic and Social Questions
23 Art. 55 UN Charter lays down the principle according to which it is the task of the UN to promote higher
standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development.
This article has been the basis of numerous activities; inter alia the creation of UN Specialized Agencies,
conferences, and organizations. The international economic order has been and remains on the agenda of
the General Assembly during most sessions. The problem of overcoming the economic North-South divide
in the world has been studied continuously.
  3. Human Rights
24 It was the experience with National Socialism and World War II which led to the inclusion of Art. 55 (c) in
the UN Charter, according to which the UN shall promote ‘universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly in 1948 was the first step
towards the implementation of this task. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both signed in 1966 and entering into
force in 1976, are the most important examples of UN activities in the field of human rights. The United
Nations Commission on Human Rights was established as a sub-commission of ECOSOC for discussion
and possibly investigation of alleged violations of human rights. In 2006 the Commission was transformed
into the United Nations Human Rights Council (→  United Nations Commission on Human Rights/United
Nations Human Rights Council). From the beginning the decision to mention the promotion of human rights
as one of the tasks of the UN precluded their being regarded as ‘essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state’ in the sense of Art. 2 (7) UN Charter (see also →  Domaine réservé). However, this view was
always disputed by some important States, during the cold war by the communist States.
  4. Decolonization
25 The process of decolonization brought about under the supervision of the UN has been one of the most
successful activities. The UN Trusteeship System was based on the objective of
reaching independence for the territories concerned, at least as one alternative (Art. 76 (b) UN Charter).
But under Chapter XI the principle of → self-determination was recognized for all non-self-governing
territories, a principle that was further emphasized in the Declaration on the Granting ofIndependence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples (UNGA Res 1514 (XV) (14 December 1960) GAOR 15 th Session Supp 16
vol 1, 66). By 1980, most colonial territories had reached independence and had become sovereign
members of the UN.
  5. Development of International Law and Codification
26 The era since the foundation of the UN has been of great importance for the development of international
law. The →codification and progressive development of international law through multilateral treaties has
made unprecedented progress. In other areas new problems have been regulated by treaties. The UN has
acted as a central agency for this development. The General Assembly established the →  International
Law Commission (ILC) already in 1947, and this organ has prepared some of the most important
codification treaties, such as the → Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), the →  Vienna
 Convention on Consular Relations (1963), and the →  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969).
The ILC has also adopted detailed rules on important areas of international law without proposing to
transform them into treaties. These rules may be indications of generally recognized rules of international
law or may play a role in shaping customary international law. Among the most important examples are the
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts ((2001) GAOR 56 th Session Supp
10, 43) published with detailed commentaries by the ILC. Other draft treaties were prepared by committees
of the General Assembly or specific drafting conferences. The development of the law of the sea was
brought about by several conferences on the law of the sea initiated by the General Assembly. Resolutions
and declarations adopted by the General Assembly have also contributed to the clarification and
development of international law. A good example is the Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations (UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) GAOR 25 th Session Supp 28, 121; →  Friendly
Relations Declaration (1970)). Although the General Assembly has of course no competence to create
new law, these resolutions may indicate how Member States see the legal obligations under general
international law, and may show the existence or non-existence of consensus over important legal
developments. Resolutions and declarations have been quoted by the ICJ and are used in legal arguments
between States, showing that they play an important role in the development of present-day public
international law.
  F. Legal Status of the UN
  1. International Legal Personality
27 The UN Charter does not expressly regulate the international legal personality of the UN. It is clear,
however, that the UN is seen as a subject of international law where the conclusion of international
agreements is expressly provided for (eg in Art. 43 UN Charter; →  Subjects of International Law). The ICJ
has recognized that the UN is in possession ‘of a large measure of international personality and the
capacity to operate upon an international plane’ (→  Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 174; at 179). In fact, the UN has concluded a
considerable number of international agreements, such as headquarters agreements for the UN seats in
New York and Geneva, agreements concerning peacekeeping operations, agreements concerning specific
meetings or conferences organized by the UN, and agreements related to the privileges and immunities
enjoyed by the UN on the basis of theConvention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of
1946 (‘CPIUN’; see also → International Organizations or Institutions, Headquarters; →  International
Organizations or Institutions, Privileges and Immunities). Also, the UN has acted on the international plane
by demanding reparation for injuries suffered by its representatives and by accepting responsibility for
damages caused by its agents, especially in the course of peacekeeping operations (→  International
Organizations or Institutions, Responsibility and Liability). Thus, the UN enjoys a far-reaching international
legal personality.
  2. Legal Status in Municipal Law
28 According to Art. 104 UN Charter, the Organization is to ‘enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such
legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes’. The
CPIUN of 1946 provides in Art. I Sec. 1: ‘The United Nations shall possess juridical personality. It shall
have the capacity: (a) to contract; (b) to acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property; (c) to
institute legal proceedings’. This convention is in force for most Member States of the UN and clarifies the
position of the Organization under Art. 104 UN Charter.
  3. Privileges and Immunities
29 Art. 105 UN Charter provides that the UN and its officials as well as the representatives of members shall
enjoy privileges and immunities. Under Art. 105 (3) UN Charter the General Assembly has the right to
propose conventions to specify the details of these rights. In accordance with this provision, the CPIUN,
adopted by the General Assembly on 13 February 1946 (UNGA Res 22 (I)), grants full immunity to the
Organization, the representatives of the members and the officials except where it has been waived
(→  Waiver). The ICJ delivered an advisory opinion in 1999 on a request by the ECOSOC concerning
the Difference relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights (Advisory Opinion) ([1999] ICJ Rep 62). The Court found that the rapporteur enjoyed
immunity which had to be respected.
  4. Status of UN Headquarters
30 The legal status of the seat of the UN in the City of New York was regulated by the  Agreement between
the United Nations and the United States regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations (‘UN
Headquarters Agreement’). The Headquarters District is put ‘under the control and authority of the United
Nations as provided in this agreement’ (Art. III Sec. (7) (a) UN Headquarters Agreement). Although United
States federal, state, and local law remains applicable in the District, it may be superseded by UN
regulations. The Headquarters District is to be inviolable. United States officers and officials may not enter
the District to perform official functions except with the consent of the Secretary-General. Transit to and
from the Headquarters District is guaranteed by the agreement. Police protection for the Headquarters
District is also regulated in the agreement. Similar agreements were concluded between the UN and
Switzerland relating to the ‘Ariana Site’ in Geneva, on the basis of which the UN premises in Geneva are
inviolable and immune from search or other interference. Disputes under the Headquarters Agreements
are to be decided by arbitration on the basis of special provisions. The ICJ was asked on 2 March 1988 by
the General Assembly to give an advisory opinion on the question of whether the United States, as a party
to the agreement between the United Nations and the United States regarding the Headquarters, was
under an obligation to enter into arbitration in accordance with Sec. 21 UN Headquarters
Agreement (→ United Nations Headquarters Agreement, Obligation to Arbitrate (Advisory Opinion)). The
ICJ was unanimously of the opinion ‘that the United States of America as a party to the agreement … is
under an obligation … to enter into arbitration for the settlement of the dispute between itself and the
United Nations’ (Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations
Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947 (Advisory Opinion) [1988] ICJ Rep 12; at para. 58). The dispute
concerned the status of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) observer mission.
  G. Financing and Budget
31 Under Art. 17 UN Charter, the General Assembly is to consider and approve the budget of the
Organization and apportion the expenses between the members. The biennial budget is initially submitted
by the Secretary-General and reviewed by a 16-member expert Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions which recommends modifications to the General Assembly. Contributions of
members constitute the main source of funds for the regular budget which amounted to US$2.4 billion for
2007. How much a State pays is determined primarily by its total national income in relation to that of other
Member States. The US, Japan, and Germany pay 47% of the regular budget (2007). The US pays the
maximum contribution possible, ie 22%, Japan 16%, Germany 8%, UK 6%, France 6%, and Italy 5%. Only
11 other States pay more than 1%. A quarter of members pay only 0.001% which is the minimum.
32 The regular budget covers administrative and other expenses of the central Secretariat and the other
principle organs of the UN. Many other activities are financed mainly by voluntary contributions made
outside the regular budget, such as those made to the peacekeeping operations, the →  United Nations
 Development Programme (UNDP), and the → World Food Programme (WFP).
  H. Special Legal Problems
  1. Binding Nature of UN Decisions
33 Art. 25 UN Charter obliges all members ‘to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in
accordance with the present Charter’. It is clear that this obligation exists primarily for decisions taken
under Chapter VII where Art. 39 UN Charter empowers the Security Council to make recommendations or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Arts 41 and 42 UN Charter, to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Recommendations are not binding but decisions create an obligation.
The ICJ has rejected the view that Art. 25 UN Charter applies only in relation to Chapter VII. Rather, the
Court expressed the opinion in 1971 that the language of a resolution should be carefully analyzed before
a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. The Court even speaks of ‘the powers under  Article 25’
(South West Africa/Namibia (Advisory Opinion) at para. 114). It is very doubtful whether this position is
correct. As Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice has pointed out in his dissenting opinion:

If, under the relevant chapter or article of the Charter, the decision is not binding, Article 25 cannot make it
so. If the effect of that Article were automatically to make all decisions of the Security Council binding, then
the words "in accordance with the present Charter" would be quite superfluous (South West
Africa/Namibia (Advisory Opinion) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice) [1971] ICJ Rep 220; at para.
113).

In practice, the Organization acts on the understanding that the decisions of the Security Council outside
Chapter VII are not automatically binding on the States concerned. The wording of Chapter VI shows that,
here, only non-binding recommendations can be made by the Security Council.
34 As for the General Assembly, Arts 10–14 UN Charter are the basis for making recommendations which are
not binding, although the States concerned are under an obligation to consider their content. The ICJ has
stated, however, that

it would not be correct to assume that, because the General Assembly is in principle vested with
recommendatory powers, it is debarred from adopting, in specific cases within the framework of its
competence, resolutions which make determinations or have operative design (ibid para. 105).

Again, it is not quite clear under which circumstances this rule would apply except in cases where internal
matters of the UN are at issue, for instance, decisions on budgetary matters (see also → International
Organizations or Institutions, Internal Law and Rules).
  2. Legality of UN Acts
35 As the ICJ has pointed out, there is no procedure for determining the validity of acts of the UN. Therefore,
‘each organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction’ (Certain Expenses of the United
Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion) 168). The Court has also stated that
‘[a] resolution of a properly constituted organ of the United Nations which is passed in accordance with that
organ's rules of procedure, and is declared by its President to have been so passed, must be presumed to
have been validly adopted’ (South West Africa/Namibia (Advisory Opinion) para. 20). In the Certain
Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion), the Court
hinted at the possibility that the violation of internal provisions may not make the act itself illegal if it is
within the functions of the Organization. A presumption is seen to exist for actions appropriate for the
 fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the UN not being ultra vires (at 168). Where no possibility exists
of settling by judicial procedure a dispute as to the lawfulness of any act of an international organization,
the danger is always present that the States concerned may take the law into their own hands. This is what
happened when the Soviet Union and France refused to pay their share of the budget for peacekeeping
operations because they considered these acts to be illegal under the UN Charter. The advisory opinion of
the ICJ which was requested in this case was not binding and was, in fact, not accepted by the two States.
Unless a compromise is found, a dispute as to the legality of UN acts may well lead to the non-recognition
of the acts by the States concerned. For the financing of peacekeeping operations, compromises were in
fact found. A special budget for the peacekeeping operations has been established ever since. It is a
considerable weakness of the UN system that, unlike in the European Union, no procedure for binding
settlement of disputes as to the legality of UN acts exists.
  3. UN Acts in Municipal Law
36 Decisions of the UN are directed towards the Member States if they do not concern internal matters of the
Organization, where they may be addressed to another organ. Even where direct obligations are created
for the State by the decision, it is up to its internal law to determine whether State organs can comply with
it (→ International Law and Domestic (Municipal) Law, Law and Decisions of International Organizations
and Courts). When the United States adopted legislation in violation of Security Council resolutions
introducing a trade embargo against Rhodesia, United States courts had to apply United States legislation
(Charles Coles Diggs v George P Shultz, Secretary of Treasury, United States Court of Appeal for the
District of Columbia Circuit (31 October 1972) (1972) 11 ILM 1252). Resolutions by UN organs will not
create individual rights enforceable before national courts (Charles Coles Diggs v Frederick B Dent United
States District Court for the District of Columbia (13 May 1975) (1975) 14 ILM 797). When the Postmaster-
General of Australia interrupted the telephone connections of the Rhodesian Information Centre, the High
Court of Australia held that resolutions of the Security Council are not part of the law of the Commonwealth
(Bradley v The Commonwealth High Court of Australia (Canberra 10 September 1973) 128
Commonwealth Law Reports 557). In Attorney-General v Nissan (United Kingdom House of Lords (11
February 1969) [1969] 1 All ER 629) the British House of Lords refused to accord the UN the position of a
foreign State concerning acts relating to the seizure of a hotel on Cyprus.
37 In the very important judgment Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council
of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities by the European Court of Justice of
3 September 2008 in the cases concerning the listing procedure as to YA Kadi and Al Barakaat
International Foundation, the Court held that fundamental rights as protected by European Community law
limit the implementation of Security Council decisions (→ Kadi Case). The lack of any procedure of judicial
review was seen by the Court as a violation of the fundamental rights protected by European Community
law. The Court held that the implementing regulation of the European Community must be amended to
bring it into conformity with fundamental rights. The judgment is of considerable importance because it
clarifies that the binding nature of Security Council decisions does not automatically override the protection
of fundamental rights in municipal or regional law.
38 There may be situations, where municipal courts have to respect the erga omnes objective effect of UN
acts unless this entails their State becoming responsible under international law. This could be the
consequence of Security Council resolutions declaring → annexation[s] of territory to be ‘null and void’
(cf UNSC Res 497 (1981) (17 December 1981) SCOR 36 th Year 6, declaring Israeli measures concerning
the Golan to be ‘null and void’). After the General Assembly had terminated the mandate for Namibia, the
ICJ found that this act had validity erga omnes and had to be respected by all States. The illegal presence
 of South Africa in the territory should not be recognized, according to the ICJ. This applies also to the
recognition of acts performed by the illegal administration, except for certain categories of acts, for
instance, registration of births, deaths, and marriages (South West Africa/Namibia (Advisory Opinion) para.
125).
39 Similarly the Security Council, after the invasion of northern Cyprus by Turkey, adopted UNSC Res 541
(1983) of 18 November 1983 (SCOR 38 th Year 15) declaring the proclamation of the establishment of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (‘TRNC’) to be legally invalid and called upon all States not to
recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus. The European Court of Human Rights
based itself on the Security Council resolutions as evidence for the invalidity of the establishment of the
TRNC and applied the principle laid down in the Namibia case. It concluded that some remedies existing to
the advantage of individuals could be seen as being remedies to be exhausted under the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’; Cyprus v
Turkey [ECtHR] Reports 2001-IV, 1).
  4. Withdrawal from the UN
40 The UN Charter does not provide for the withdrawal of members from the organization. This was a clear
decision taken at San Francisco. At first there were even proposals to make participation ‘obligatory’ but
this was rejected. A declarationadopted by a committee during the drafting of the UN Charter shows that it
was not considered to be the intention to compel those members to continue their ‘cooperation in the
Organization’ who wish to withdraw for specific reasons (United Nations (ed) Documents of the United
Nations Conference on International Organization San Francisco, 1945 vol 7Commission I: General
Provisions (United Nations Information Organization New York 1945) 273). When Indonesia informed the
Secretary-General that she had decided ‘to withdraw from the United Nations’ on 20 January 1965 (United
Nations (ed) Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs Supp 3 vol 1 Articles 1–22 of the
Charter (United Nations New York 1972) 189), the attention of the UN was drawn to that problem and the
earnest hope was expressed that Indonesia would resume full co-operation in due course. On 19
September 1966 Indonesia informed the Secretary-General that she had ‘decided to resume full co-
operation with the United Nations and to resume participation in its activities starting with the twenty-first
session of the General Assembly’ (ibid 190). The President of the General Assembly then made a
statement according to which Indonesia had not withdrawn from the UN but had only ceased to co-
operate. Since the members of the UN have ratified the UN Charter, which does not provide for
withdrawal, it can be argued that this possibility does not exist. It seems, however, that under ‘exceptional
circumstances’ States will recognize a withdrawal as justified. Withdrawal has, of course, to be
distinguished from issues arising by State succession and by extinction of States. Issues of that sort had to
be solved when the old Member State Yugoslavia disintegrated. The new States coming into existence
with the secession were all admitted to membership on the basis of the normal procedure. As to the State
from which the new Member States had seceded, and which acted first under the name of Yugoslavia,
then Serbia and Montenegro, and then Serbia, difficult problems arose. After a period of uncertainty Serbia
and Montenegro was admitted as a new Member State, Montenegro then seceded from this State and the
State called itself Serbia.
  5. Suspension; Expulsion
41 According to Art. 5 UN Charter, a member against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken
may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly
upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The Security Council may restore these rights and
privileges. This article has never been applied. The same is true for Art. 6 UN Charter, which gives the
 General Assembly, again upon the recommendation of the Security Council, the competence to expel a
member which has ‘persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter’. A very dubious
practice has been developed in the General Assembly, however, where the credentials of the South
African delegates have not been recognized in a period after 1971 before the changes of 1989 because of
the lack of representativeness of the Government of South Africa of the majority of the South African
people (see also →  Apartheid). In 1974 the South African delegates were excluded from the General
Assembly, and South Africa has not participated in the work of the General Assembly before the
constitutional changes in South Africa. The procedure which was applied there may well be called a
circumvention of Arts 5 and 6 UN Charter, which clearly regulates the matters of suspension and
expulsion.
42 Problems have also arisen in connection with Art. 19 UN Charter, under which a State ‘shall have no vote
in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due
from it for the preceding two full years’. When several countries had objected to peacekeeping operations
as not being in conformity with the UN Charter and had not paid those parts of their contributions
attributable to those operations, the applicability of Art. 19 UN Charter had to be clarified. A compromise
was reached to proceed by consensus without formal vote in the General Assembly, thereby avoiding the
issue under Art. 19 UN Charter (Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs Supp 3 vol 1 Articles 1–22
of the Charter 396–99). A special procedure for the financing of peacekeeping operations was applied from
then on.
  6. Responsibility of the United Nations
43 Since the United Nations has legal personality and is involved in far-reaching international activities, in
particular concerning peacekeeping, it follows that the Organization may become responsible under
international law. This is generally recognized and there are many cases where the United Nations have
accepted that such responsibility may exist. In his report Financing of the United Nations Protection Force
the Secretary-General on 29 September 1996 stated that the

international responsibility of the United Nations for the activities of United Nations forces is an attribute of
its international legal personality and its capacity to bear international rights and obligations (at para. 6).

In several cases the UN have paid compensation to individuals who suffered damage by non-justified
action of United Nations personnel. Frequently the UN has established ‘local claims review boards’ to
settle claims. It is not always clear what law is being applied when compensation is being agreed upon. It
would seem correct to assume that international law may be the basis for claims of compensation where
the UN and its organs exercise UN authority based on the UN Charter. Where UN personnel is involved in
traffic accidents one may come to the conclusion that the local law applies. Although international law is
not generally a limitation for UN activities it would seem to be generally recognized that the UN is bound to
respect → ius cogens as well as individual human rights. Where violations of these rules occur the UN is
liable. A considerable problem exists since there are no judicial remedies available against the UN.
Because of the immunity of the organization national courts will normally not have jurisdiction to decide on
the merits. However, the question must be asked whether the UN should not be seen under an obligation
to waive immunity where responsibility for important violations of international law are at issue.
The → genocide at Srebrenica, recognized by the ICJ, is an example. A procedure in the Netherlands may
clarify this matter. It is interesting to note that there are also tendencies to reject immunity. An Advisory
Commission to the Dutch Government for example, in a report on responsibility for UN peace operations,
 stated that national courts should, in case of a claim against the UN, inquire whether an adequate
alternative internal remedy is available. If this is not the case the court should reject a plea of immunity
(Advisory Committee on International Law Affairs ‘Report on Responsibility for Wrongful Acts Committed
During UN Peacekeeping Operations’ (2002) para. 4.5.1). The ILC is preparing a report on the
international responsibility of international organizations. The European Court of Human Rights has
decided that actions by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovoand the Kosovo Force
are to be attributed only to the UN and, therefore, applications against Member States of the ECHR are
incompatible ratione personae (Agim Behrami and Bekir Behrami v France and Ruzhdi Saramati v France,
Germany and Norway (Decision of Admissibility) of 2 May 2007). This is highly problematic. English courts
have underlined the importance of the ECHR where British forces in Iraq interned people on the basis of a
UN resolution. The Court held that the resolution qualified convention law as to internment but not as to the
obligations under Art. 3 ECHR not to torture or not to apply inhumane treatment (The Queen on the
Application of Mazin Jumaa Gatteh al Skeini v Secretary of State for Defence England and Wales High
Court of Justice (Queen's Bench Division) (14 December 2004) (2004) EWHC 2911).
  I. General Evaluation
44 As a world-wide organization with a mandate to concern itself with all the issues vital to the preservation of
mankind and to the overcoming of the great dangers to peace threatening the globe, the UN can achieve
nothing without the support of its members. The organization is a mirror of the conditions existing in the
international society of States. With a veto power in the Security Council the structure of the organization
takes account of the differences existing between States as far as their political importance is concerned.
Of course, the political importance of several non-permanent Member States may be seen as justifying
their admission to permanent membership. However, no consensus has been reached on that matter.
Where the permanent members are in agreement as to the method to solve a specific dangerous situation,
the UN may serve as the institutional structure through which the influence of the most important powers
may be exercised and may become more acceptable to smaller countries. Where there is a rift between
the permanent members, whether or not the veto will be used will depend on the importance of the
question. Even then the forum of discussion in the Security Council may not be without influence in the
final resolution of the problem. In the General Assembly all important issues concerning the international
society can be addressed. A sort of ‘parliamentary procedure’ which the States of the world have to use to
justify their general policy has been created.
45 With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the disappearance of the East-West conflict which had lasted
for almost 50 years, the United Nations system, as designed in 1945, could be, for the first time, tested as
to its possibilities. Since then the Security Council has applied its competence under Chapter VII in many
cases. The Security Council has moved into the centre of UN activities as far as preservation of peace is
concerned. Open → aggression, as by Iraq against Kuwait, could be answered by very clear and strong
United Nations action. In other cases UN action was less successful. Although the Secretary-General has
expressed the wish that States may negotiate treaties under Art. 43 UN Charter for making it possible that
the UN has military forces available under its control, no State has shown any intention to implement that
demand. It would seem that the UN Charter, in 1945, was modelled on the basis of the situation during
World War II when use of armed force against the aggressor seemed quite natural and it was believed that
States could be willing to transfer the decision to use their troops to the United Nations. However, no
government has been willing to do that in a period of general peace and it is unlikely that anything will
change here. However, the UN response to external and internal threats to the peace is rather impressive.
The Security Council has not hesitated to address resolutions based on Chapter VII also to non State
 entities as factions in internal conflicts. This is based on the view that the Security Council has full
jurisdiction at least concerning the territory of all Member States.
46 The development of public international law can no longer be separated from the organization of the
United Nations. It has become the most important world-wide law-creating body. It is frequently stated that
the possibilities for → peaceful change, mentioned in Art. 14 UN Charter, should be strengthened. The
process of decolonization brought about within the UN framework is probably the best example of peaceful
change in history.
47 The United Nations organization is not only essential concerning peace and security, but also to address
issues which concern mankind as a whole. Compared with the difficult history of the League of Nations,
which never became the recognized forum of all the States in the world, the development of the UN has
been much more successful. Its contribution to international law in the second half of the 20 th century and
in the 21st century can be seen throughout this encyclopedia.

Obligations erga omnes   

  Jochen A Frowein
  Subject(s): Sources, foundations and principles of international law; Law of treaties
This article was last updated December 2008
  A. Obligations erga omnes as a New Phenomenon in Public International Law
1 The → International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd
(Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase) (→  Barcelona Traction Case) that there are two different categories of
obligations under public international law. The Court stated that there are ‘obligations of a State towards
the international community as a whole’ which are ‘the concern of all States’ and for whose protection all
States have a ‘legal interest’. These obligations are fundamentally different from those existing vis-à-vis
another State.
2 Only one year before the Barcelona Traction Case, in 1969, the → Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (1969)(‘VCLT’) had been adopted. The VCLT had for the first time recognized the existence
of → ius cogens in public international law. The recognition by the community of States of the existence of
norms from which no derogation is permitted implied that there exists a hierarchy of norms also in public
international law. Almost as a logical consequence, the ICJ underlined the interest of the whole
international community in the respect of and →  compliance with these fundamental norms. The ICJ has
confirmed the existence of obligations erga omnes in East Timor (Portugal v Australia) (‘East Timor Case’,
para. 29; →  Timor) and in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory (Advisory Opinion) (‘Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion’,paras 155–60).
3 Although →  ius cogens and obligations erga omnes have different legal consequences, they are related to
each other in important aspects. A rule from which no derogation is permitted because of its fundamental
nature will normally be one in whose performance all States seem to have a legal interest. This is
confirmed by pertinent case law. In the Barcelona Traction Case for instance the ICJ described
obligations erga omnes in the following terms:

Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of
aggression and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human
 person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination (para. 34; See
also → Aggression; → Genocide; → Slavery; →Racial and Religious Discrimination).
4 In the East Timor Case and in the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion (paras 155–59) the ICJ qualified as
obligations erga omnesthe obligation to respect the right of self-determination as well as certain obligations
under →  international humanitarian law.
5 The ICJ did not explain in detail how these rights which are the concern of all States may be enforced. In
the Barcelona Traction Case the Court stressed that on the universal level the instruments which
embody →  human rights do not confer on States the capacity to protect the victims of infringements of
such rights irrespective of their nationality. The ICJ mentioned Art. 24 (now Art. 33) →  European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) (‘ECHR’) to illustrate
that regional systems may contain such possibilities (Barcelona Traction Case para. 91).
6 In the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion the ICJ circumscribed the obligations of third States as follows:

Given the character and the importance of the rights and obligations involved, the Court is of the view that
all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the
wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem. They are also under an
obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction. It is
also for all States, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to see to it that any
impediment, resulting from the construction of the wall, to the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right
to self-determination is brought to an end. In addition, all the States parties to the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 are under an obligation,
while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with
international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention (para. 159; See
also → Jerusalem; → United Nations Charter; →  Self-Determination; → Geneva Conventions I–IV
(1949); →  Civilian Population in Armed Conflict).
7 Obligations erga omnes should be clearly distinguished from treaty obligations which may sometimes be
obligations erga omnes regarding parts of the treaty (see Art. 60 VCLT). It is, on the other hand, quite
possible that obligations erga omnesare also laid down in a treaty as in the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (see also →Treaties, Third-Party Effect).
  B. Early Indications
8 There exists an important tradition in international law for the view that States which are not directly
affected may react, even with →  reprisals, against breaches of international law of a specific nature. The
doctrine according to which intervention was permissible under certain circumstances frequently dealt with
that issue (→ Humanitarian Intervention). Writers in the 19th century, for instance Heffter, conceded that
States may act as advocates for the international community and mankind in general and may enforce
respect for human rights. Heffter stated in 1866:

Du reste une tierce puissance pourrait participer aux représailles d'une autre, lorsque sa coopération
aurait pour but de mettre un terme aux violations du droit international ou a des procédés contraires à
l'humanité et à la justice. En ce cas les états ne font que remplir une mission commune qui leur est tracée
naturellement. Organes suprêmes et multiples de l'humanité, ils sont appelés à en faire respecter les lois
partout où elles sont violées (211).
  C. The Contribution of the International Law Commission (‘ILC’)
9 In 1976 the reports of the then Special Rapporteur of the → International Law Commission (ILC), Roberto
Ago, analysed the issues in detail. He raised the question whether all violations of public international law
give rise to the same regime of →State responsibility or whether there are differences. Ius cogens having
been recognized in public international law, he regarded it as contradictory that the relation of responsibility
on the basis of a breach should only exist between the State having violated the rule and the directly
violated State. He introduced the idea that a distinction should be made between the delict and the crime.
On this basis the International Law Commission provisionally adopted Art. 19 Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (‘Draft Articles on State Responsibility’; →  State
Responsibility) defining international crimes (→  International Criminal Law). The breaches of international
law concerning the maintenance of international peace, self-determination, obligations safeguarding the
human being, such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide, and → apartheid, and the obligations to
safeguard and preserve the human environment were considered to be international crimes (see
also → Environment and Human Rights; →  Environment, International Protection). The notion of
international crime was eventually abandoned by the ILC; but the articles adopted by the ILC in 2001
recognize that obligations may be owed to the ‘international community as a whole’ (Arts 33, 42, and 48
Draft Articles on State Responsibility). If that is the case, special rules of State responsibility apply (Arts 48,
54 Draft Articles on State Responsibility). In particular, any State other than the injured State is entitled to
invoke the responsibility of another State for obligations erga omnes under Art. 48 Draft Articles on State
Responsibility. If there exists an obligation erga omnesevery State may claim from the responsible State
cessation of the internationally wrongful act, if necessary assurances and→  guarantee[s] of non-repetition,
and performance of the obligation of reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of
the obligation breached (→ Reparations; → War Reparations).
  D. The Resolution of the Institut de Droit International on Obligations erga omnes of 2005
10 In 2005 the → Institut de Droit international (Institute of International Law) adopted the Resolution on
Obligations erga omnes in International Law (‘Obligations erga omnes Resolution’) on the basis of a report
by Giorgio Gaja. The Institute treated as obligations erga omnes obligations under general international
law which a State owes to the international community, in view of its common values and its concern for
compliance, so that a breach of that obligation enables all States to take action (Art. 1 (a) Obligations erga
omnes Resolution). The Institute added those obligations under a multilateral treaty that a State Party to
the treaty owes in any given case to all the other States Parties to the same treaty, in view of their common
values and concern for compliance, so that a breach of that obligation enables all these States to take
action (Art. 1 (b) Obligations erga omnes Resolution). The →  preamble to the Obligations erga
omnes Resolution states that a wide → consensus exists to effect that the prohibition of acts of
aggression, prohibition of genocide, obligations concerning the protection of basic human rights,
obligations relating to self-determination, and obligations relating to the environment of common spaces
are examples of obligations reflecting those fundamental values. According to Art. 2 Obligations erga
omnes Resolution in case of a breach of an obligation erga omnes all the States to which the obligation is
owed are entitled, even if they are not specially affected by the breach, to claim from the responsible State
in particular: cessation of the internationally wrongful act, performance of the obligation of reparation in the
interest of the State, entity, or individual which is especially affected by the breach. Restitution should be
effected unless materially impossible.
11 Where a jurisdictional link between a State alleged to have committed a breach of an obligation erga
omnes and a State to which the obligation is owed exists the latter State has standing to bring a claim to
the International Court of Justice or other international judicial institutions in relation to a dispute
 concerning compliance with that obligation (Art. 3 Obligationserga omnes Resolution). Where a widely
acknowledged grave breach of an erga omnes obligation occurs, all the States to which the obligation is
owed shall endeavour to bring the breach to an end through lawful means in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations. They shall not recognize as lawful a situation created by the breach, and are entitled
to take non-forcible →  countermeasures under conditions analogous to those applying to a State specially
affected by breach (Art. 5 Obligations erga omnes Resolution).
  E. State Practice as to Reactions of Not Directly Affected States
12 There have been several cases where States which were not directly affected have taken measures
against States violating fundamental rules of public international law. Those reactions consisted
in →  retorsion[s] but in some cases also in reprisals. One of the earliest examples concerns the reaction to
the taking of →  hostages in the American embassy in Tehran in 1980 (→ United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran Case (United States of America v Iran)). On 22 April 1980 the Foreign Ministers
of the European Community decided to take measures to impose → sanctions against Iran. All contracts
concluded after 4 November 1979, the date when the hostages were taken, were suspended. The Member
States of the European Community referred to a threat to peace (→ Peace, Threat to) and security and to
the fact that the Security Council could not adopt a resolution imposing sanctions, just because of the
Soviet →  veto. When the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan the United Nations General Assembly
condemned the action and the United States applied a series of embargo (→ Economic Sanctions)
measures against the Soviet Union. In 1981 the Heads of State and Government (→ Heads of
State; → Heads of Governments and Other Senior Officials) declared that Afghanistan had violated its
obligations under the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft because it had given
refuge to the hijackers of a Pakistani aircraft. Consequently the Heads of State and Government proposed
to suspend all flights to and from Afghanistan unless it immediately took steps to comply with its
obligations. When emergency law (→Emergency, State of) was declared in Poland on 13 December 1981
several States imposed sanctions against the Soviet Union because they regarded the latter as
responsible for a threat to international peace by moving troops to the Polish border. When Argentina
invaded the →  Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas in 1982 the European Community imposed sanctions which
were considered as lawful on the basis of the violation of one of the fundamental rules of public
international law. On 1 September 1983 a Korean airliner was shot down by Soviet fighters (→  Korean Air
Lines Incident (1983)). When the action was discussed in the United Nations Security Council a
condemnation was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Several States acted unilaterally by suspending the
landing of Aeroflot flights on their territory for periods from 15 to 60 days. Of considerable interest is the
flight-ban decided by the Council of the European Community against Yugoslavia in 1998–99 because of
the violations of international human rights in →  Kosovo. The United Kingdom had first objected to a
disregard of air-traffic agreements but was persuaded that this was legally possible (Frowein (2000) 443–
44 n 51).
13 Those are only a few examples. The ILC has left open the possibility of States other than an injured State
to take countermeasures (Art. 54 Draft Articles on State Responsibility). Art. 54 Draft Articles on State
Responsibility imply that such a possibility might exist (‘lawful measures’). The ILC called the practice
‘limited and rather embryonic’ (Draft Articles on State Responsibility 137). C J Tams however, whose
analysis of the matter is probably the best so far and who cites 15 cases between 1970 and 2003,
illustrates that the contrary is the case. This seems to show that → state practice clearly confirms the right
of States to take countermeasures where obligations erga omnes have been breached. The ILC even cites
six of these examples but eventually leaves the question open (Draft Articles on State Responsibility 138–
 39). Art. 54 Draft Articles on State Responsibility imply, however, that measures taken by States not
directly affected may be lawful.
  F. Evaluation
14 As a consequence of the development of international law into more than a reciprocal relationship among
individual States it seems that the notion of obligations erga omnes has been recognized. Reactions
against the violation of such obligations should preferably be organized within an institutionalized system
of the international community. The most important system of that nature is Chapter VII United Nations
Charter. However, present-day international law seems to permit non-forcible proportionate
countermeasures of States against violations of obligations erga omnes where no institutional system
exists or an existing system does not function properly. The reactions to the shooting down of the Korean
airliner as indicated earlier are a typical example of that sort.