Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Historical Background of The US Biowarfare Program
Historical Background of The US Biowarfare Program
In light of the current FBI/Patriot Act investigations against Critical Art Ensemble
(CAE), it is worthwhile to point out two moments from the history of the US
government’s involvement in biowarfare. The first concerns the specific issue of
access to knowledge, education, and resources in the life sciences. The second
concerns the general backdrop of US biodefense ideology. All of this information
has been confirmed by several sources, and has been in the public domain for
some time (see the references below).
Although the particulars of the investigation against CAE have not been made
clear, the charges made against them surround particular strains of bacteria
which Steve Kurtz was culturing: Serratia marcescens and Bacillus globigii. As
has been noted, both bacteria are non-lethal, commonly found in wind-blown
dust or the soil, and are often used for educational purposes in biology labs
across the US. They have also been used by the US biological warfare program.
A short chronology follows:
1945: At the end of World War II, leaders of the infamous “Unit 731” in Japan are
in US custody. From 1932-45, Unit 731 conducted a series of biological tests on
Chinese prisoners and civilians, including intentional infection with a range of
diseases, and the release of experimental plague bombs. It is estimated that
some 10,000 people died from Unit 731 experiments. After the war, the US
government brokers a deal with Unit 731 leaders. In exchange for the knowledge
gained through their experiments, Unit 731 leaders would be granted immunity
against war crimes prosecution. A Fort Detrick study found many similarities
between the scientific research interests of Unit 731 and the US biological
warfare program, including the types of biological agents studied, and the use of
simulants.
1969: President Nixon terminates the offensive biological warfare program and
orders all stockpiled weapons destroyed. National Security decisions 35 (Nov.
1969, microorganisms) and 44 (Feb. 1970, toxins) mandated the cessation of
offensive biological research, and destruction of the biological arsenal. Following
this, the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)
is established to continue the development of medical defenses against potential
biological attack.
1972: More than 100 nations (including the US and Soviet Union) sign the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the world’s first treaty banning
an entire class of weapons. It prohibits the possession of biological agents
except for “prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.” The BWC
currently has more than 140 signatory countries. Yet there is still no clear
protocol for enforcing the BWC.
1998: President Clinton sets aside over $60 million for DARPA’s biological
weapons defense research. Spurred on by the threat of biological weapons in the
Persian Gulf, the DARPA projects include the development of computer
technologies for managing a bioweapons attack, mobile sensors to detect the
presence of harmful biological agents in the air, new diagnostic technologies, and
further research into the effects of pathogens and toxins on the immune system.
It is part of an ongoing trend, in which non-defense departments within the
government undertake biodefense projects.
2001: By mid-year, there is broad support for the BWC draft Protocol, which was
initiated in 1991. At the same time, the US Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) releases a position paper opposing the
Protocol’s proposal of routine investigations. This, along with US military
interests, signals a growing US ambivalence of the towards the BWC Protocol.
2001, July: The Bush Administration effectively abandons the BWC. At the 24th
negotiating session of the BWC in Geneva, in a statement to the Ad Hoc Group
of Biological Weapons Convention States Parties, Ambassador Donald Mahley,
the U.S. Special Negotiator, states that the U.S. would be unable to further
support the BWC on three grounds: (i) The lack of any protocol for enforcing the
BWC meant that it could not adequately detect covert proliferation (e.g. terrorist
activities); (ii) the monitoring and inspection procedures outlined in the BWC
could be a financial risk to U.S. pharmaceutical companies, in that their
proprietary knowledge may be compromised by inspections; (iii) the BWC would
negatively impact the U.S. Biodefense program and its classified defensive
research. With over 140 countries signed to the BWC, and over 50 ready to sign
in favor of a prompt completion of the BWC protocols, the U.S. decision brings
the process to a standstill.
2001, September: A week before the September 11th attacks, a New York Times
article reveals the existence of three secret US bioweapons programs: A CIA
program called Clear Vision (1997-2000), whose purpose was to field test a
Soviet-designed germ bomb that US officials feared was being sold on the
international market; A program called Project Bacchus, begun in 1998 and run
by the Pentagon’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, to assemble a germ lab in
the Nevada desert using only commercially available materials; A program run by
the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency to create a genetically-engineered,
antibiotic-resistant strain of anthrax (1997-present; contracted to the Battelle
Memorial Institute in Ohio). All three classified programs are in direct violation of
the BWC, and are, arguably, offensive programs.
2001, October: A week after the September 11th attacks on the World Trade
Center, a letter containing anthrax spores (dated 9/11) is mailed to the offices of
Tom Brokaw at NBC News in New York. Two other identical letters were
simultaneously mailed to the New York Post and the office of Senator Tom
Daschle in Washington D.C. By the end of the year, 18 people have been
infected with anthrax, and 5 people had died of inhalation anthrax or
complications resulting from the infection. An FBI investigation traced the
particular strain of anthrax used (the “Ames” strain) to the US army’s lab at Fort
Detrick. The perpetrators of the attacks have still not been found.
2001, October: The US Patriot Act is signed in, providing Federal and national
law enforcement officials with enhanced counter-terrorism capacities.
2002, January: The proposal for the US Bioterrorism Act is put forth, whose full
title is the “Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002.” It is signed in in June 2002.
2002, June: An additional measure to the US Patriot Act denies certain persons
access to dangerous biological agents and toxins (some 50 “select” biological
agents). Such persons include drug users, dishonorably discharged military
personnel, suspected terrorists, and citizens of countries suspected of terrorist
activity (currently, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, Syria).
2002, June: The FBI begins the investigation of Tomas Foral, a graduate student,
working in a pathology laboratory at the University of Connecticut. Foral was
asked by a professor to clean out a failed freezer, in which he found vials of cow
tissue infected with anthrax. Foral asked the professor what to do with them, and
conflicting views on what was said led Floral to save two vials of the anthrax. An
anonymous tip led the FBI to the vials, and charged Foral with violating the US
Patriot Act.
3. References
Cole, Leonard. Clouds of Secrecy: The Army’s Germ Warfare Tests over
Populated Areas. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988.
Endicott, Stephen, and Edward Hagerman. The United States and Biological
Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea. Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1999.
Harris, Robert, and Jeremy Paxman. A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret History
of Biological and Chemical Warfare. New York: Hill & Wang, 1982.
Mangold, Tom, and Jeff Goldberg. Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of
Biological Warfare. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999.
Regis, Ed. The Biology of Doom: The History of America’s Secret Germ Warfare
Project. New York: Henry Holt, 1999.
Kevles, Daniel. “Biotech’s Big Chill.” MIT Technology Review 106.6 (August
2003): 40-50.
Ray, Ellen, and William Schapp, eds. Bioterror: Manufacturing Wars the
American Way. New York: Ocean Press, 2003.
Geissler, Erhard, and John Ellis van Courtland Moon, eds. Biological and Toxin
Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945.
Oxford: Oxford University Press/Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, 1999.
Poupard, James A., and Linda A. Miller. “History of Biological Warfare: Catapults
to Capsomeres.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 666 (1992): 9-19.