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Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of The Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions in Brief
Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of The Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions in Brief
Michael E. DeVine
Analyst in Intelligence and National Security
R45175
Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the
June 14, 2019
Intelligence Community: Selected Michael E. DeVine
Definitions in Brief Analyst in Intelligence and
National Security
This report provides background and definitions for covert action and clandestine activities [email protected]
carried out by the Intelligence Community (IC) and military. Congress has defined several of
these terms in statute; others appear only in committee reports. Still others are military terms. For a copy of the full report,
These definitions describe activities that support U.S. national security policy, and are, therefore, please call 7-5700 or visit
www.crs.gov.
important to Congress’s intelligence and defense oversight responsibilities.
Confusion over the proper jurisdiction for congressional oversight can occur when covert action or clandestine intelligence
activities appear similar to certain military operations that may employ clandestine methodology or have objectives similar to
those for covert action. Intelligence and military matters fall under different authorities of the U.S. Code, and have, as a
result, different statutory requirements for providing notification to Congress. Applicable statutes that govern intelligence
activities under Title 50 of the U.S. Code emphasize prior notification to the congressional intelligence committees for each
separate activity. Under its Title 10 U.S. Code authorities, however, the Department of Defense generally provides
notification of certain types of secret or clandestine military operations to the Armed Services committees after their
commencement, often by briefing Congress as part of a larger, supported military operation or campaign.
The IC, for example, in conducting a covert action, must generally provide prior notification to the congressional intelligence
committees by means of a presidential finding describing plans to have an intelligence operation influence political, military,
or economic conditions abroad while concealing U.S. sponsorship. The military, on the other hand, under Title 10, has the
implicit authority to conduct operations that resemble covert action, but that DOD classifies as operational preparation of the
environment (OPE). OPE is handled differently for oversight purposes, despite sharing with covert action a number of
characteristics that heighten Congress’s interest: a serious risk of exposure, compromise of information, loss of life, and a
possible requirement to conceal U.S. sponsorship.
An understanding of how these terms are used can help Congress navigate potential challenges in conducting oversight. This
report is the first of three reports on covert action and clandestine activities of the IC. The second, CRS Report R45191,
Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Notification Requirements in Brief, by
Michael E. DeVine, describes the different statutory requirements for keeping Congress informed of these activities. The
third, CRS Report R45196, Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Framework for
Congressional Oversight In Brief, by Michael E. DeVine, is intended to assist Congress in assessing the premises justifying
covert action and clandestine activities, their impact on national security, operational viability, funding requirements, and
possible long-term or unintended consequences.
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Defining Title 10 and Title 50 Authorities ....................................................................................... 3
Selected Terms, Definitions, and Descriptions ................................................................................ 4
Covert Action ............................................................................................................................ 4
Clandestine Activities................................................................................................................ 5
Traditional Military Activities and Routine Support ................................................................. 6
Other-than-Routine Support ...................................................................................................... 7
Operational Preparation of the Environment ............................................................................ 7
Sensitive Military Operations ................................................................................................... 9
Sensitive Military Cyber Operations .................................................................................. 9
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 10
Introduction
Congressional oversight of the intelligence community (IC) 1 enables Members to gain insight into
and offer advice on programs and activities that can significantly influence U.S. foreign policy
and its outcomes. This In Brief addresses Congress’s ongoing interest in oversight of covert
action and clandestine activities.
The distinction between government agency activities described as covert and clandestine can be
confusing. Which agencies are authorized to conduct covert action and clandestine activities?
What are their legal authorities for doing so? Which military terms describe activities that might
seem similar but are distinct from covert action?
Covert action is codified as an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence
political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United
States will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. Covert operations are “planned and
executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.”2
While not defined by statute, DOD doctrine describes clandestine activities as “operations
sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure
secrecy or concealment” that may include relatively passive intelligence collection information
gathering operations.3 Unlike covert action, clandestine activities do not require prior notice to
Congress via a presidential finding, but may still require notification of Congress. This definition
differentiates clandestine from covert, using clandestine to signify the tactical concealment of the
activity. By comparison, covert operations are “planned and executed as to conceal the identity of
or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.”4
Background
Prior to 1974, no statute existed that enabled Congress to conduct oversight of the IC. Congress
exercised what some have described as “benign neglect” of intelligence.5 In earlier instances,
when it could have exercised greater oversight—such as over the CIA’s orchestration of the 1953
coup in Iran—Congress trusted that the executive branch and IC were acting in accordance with
the law. Congress also did not question whether particular covert actions or other sensitive
intelligence activities were viable as a means of supporting U.S. national security.
1 The IC is a federation of 17 component organizations spread across two independent agencies and six separate
departments of the federal government. Many IC components reside within the DOD organizational structure, including
the DIA, the NGA, the NRO, the NSA, and the intelligence components of the military service branches. For more on
the IC, see CRS In Focus IF10525, Defense Primer: National and Defense Intelligence, by Michael E. DeVine, as well
as P.L. 108-458 (the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, also known as IRTPA) and Executive
Order 12333, as amended. See also Andru E. Wall, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military
Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert Action,” Harvard National Security Journal, vol. 3, no. 1 (2011): 85-142.
2 Central Intelligence Agency, Glossary of Counterinsurgency Terms, May 19, 1962, at
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R003000050019-6.pdf.
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, April 2019, p. 37, at
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.
4 Central Intelligence Agency, Glossary of Counterinsurgency Terms, May 19, 1962, at
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R003000050019-6.pdf.
5 James S. Van Wagenen, A Review of Congressional Oversight: Critics and Defenders (Washington DC: Center for
In the 1970s, controversy over public disclosure of the CIA’s covert action programs in Southeast
Asia and the agency’s domestic surveillance of the antiwar movement spurred Congress to
become more involved in intelligence oversight. In 1974, the Hughes-Ryan amendment of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (§32 of P.L. 93-559) provided the first statutory basis for
notification to Congress and congressional oversight of covert action operations. Investigations in
1975 by two congressional select committees—in the Senate, chaired by Senator Frank Church,
and in the House, chaired by Representative Otis Pike—provided the first formal effort to
understand the scope of past intelligence activities. These committees became the model for a
permanent oversight framework that could hold the IC accountable for spending appropriated
funds ethically and legally and on programs and activities that supported identifiable national
security objectives. In 1976, Congress established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(SSCI), followed by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in 1977.
Congress later refined its oversight of the IC when the executive branch directed covert action
operations without notifying Congress in advance. In August 1980, out of concern for
maintaining operational security, President Carter chose not to inform Congress prior to the
attempt to rescue American hostages held by the Iranian regime. In the mid-1980s, the Reagan
Administration did not inform Congress about a covert initiative to divert funds raised from the
sale of arms to Iran to support the Contras in Nicaragua. Through the Intelligence Authorization
Acts (IAA) of 1981 (P.L. 96-450) and 1991 (P.L. 102-88), Congress revised procedures to try to
ensure that the executive branch would, in the future, provide timely, comprehensive notification
of all covert action and other “significant anticipated intelligence activity.”6
While congressional oversight emphasized the jurisdiction of SSCI and HPSCI over intelligence,
seen as a matter separate and distinct from congressional defense committees’ jurisdiction over
military matters,7 the evolution of practice in the field after 9/11 made it increasingly difficult to
distinguish between intelligence and military activities. In an effort to increase the government’s
overall effectiveness in the post-9/11 environment, the military and intelligence communities
increasingly integrated their activities. A reportable intelligence activity, therefore, was often of
interest to the congressional defense as well as intelligence committees. Yet, in Congress, the
intelligence and defense committees have different notification standards and processes. The cited
and exercised statutory authority for a particular intelligence or defense activity has determined
the jurisdiction thereof: Title 50 of the U.S. Code provides the statutory authority for intelligence
activities, regardless of which department or agency carries them out; Title 10 of the U.S. Code
provides the statutory authority for military activities, carried out, by definition, only by DOD.
These separate authorities have the potential for artificially defining intelligence activities as
separate and distinct from military activities. Yet intelligence and military operations have
become more integrated since 9/11, may have a similar impact on national security and foreign
relations, share similar objectives, employ similar methodologies, and similarly risk the loss of
life. The following sections provide an explanation of the distinctions between Title 10 and Title
6 See Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1991, Title VI, §1325 (S. 1325, 102nd Congress); and Intelligence
Authorization Act for 1981 (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-94/pdf/STATUTE-94-Pg1975.pdf). Specified
“significant anticipated intelligence activities” and “significant intelligence failures” other than covert action that are
reportable to Congress can be found in Intelligence Directive 112, Congressional Notification, June 29, 2017
(https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/71017/6-29-17_ICD-112_17-00383_U_SIGNED.PDF).
7 The four congressional defense committees include the Armed Services and Appropriations committees of the Senate
and House. See 10 U.S.C. §101(a)(16). One member from each of the House defense committees also is a member of
the HPSCI. One member from each party from each of the Senate defense committees is also a member of the SSCI.
50 authorities, and definitions of key intelligence and military activities associated that can
sometimes be confused, yet which have distinct requirements for congressional oversight.
8 For a discussion of the organization and contents of the U.S. Code, see U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the
Law Revision Counsel, “Detailed Guide to the United States Code Content and Features,” available at
http://uscode.house.gov/detailed_guide.xhtml.
9 Robert Chesney, “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate.” Journal of
National Security Law & Policy vol. 5, no. 2 (2012): p. 615-616; see also Joshua Kuyers, “‘Operational Preparation of
the Environment: ‘Intelligence Activity’ or ‘Covert Action’ by Any Other Name?” American University National
Security Law Brief, vol. 4, no. 1 (2013): 21-40.
10
See section with subheading “Covert Action” in “Questions for the Record for Admiral Dennis C. Blair upon
Nomination to be Director of National Intelligence,” Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 22, 2009, pp.
14-16, available at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/blairresponses2.pdf. See also Andru
E. Wall, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities &
Covert Action,” Harvard National Security Journal, vol. 3, no. 1 (2011): 85-142.
11 See CRS In Focus IF10534, Defense Primer: President’s Constitutional Authority with Regard to the Armed Forces,
by Jennifer K. Elsea, and CRS In Focus IF10535, Defense Primer: Congress’s Constitutional Authority with Regard to
the Armed Forces, by Jennifer K. Elsea. See also CRS Report R42699, The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and
Practice, by Matthew C. Weed, and CRS Report R43983, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Issues
Concerning Its Continued Application, by Matthew C. Weed. See also Robert Chesney, “Military-Intelligence
dual role of the Secretary of Defense under Title 10 and Title 50 to exercise authority, direction,
and control over those elements of the IC that reside within the DOD organizational structure as
support for the argument that Title 10 and Title 50 should be viewed as “mutually reinforcing.”12
Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate.” Journal of National Security Law & Policy, vol. 5, no. 2
(2012): pp. 615-616.
12 Andru E. Wall, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence
Activities & Covert Action,” Harvard National Security Journal, vol. 3, no. 1 (2011): 85-142.
13
See 50 U.S.C. §3093(e).
14 “[T]here are areas of the world where a little covert action can forestall much more serious problems later.” William
Colby, late Director of the CIA. Randall B. Woods, Shadow Warrior: William Egan Colby and the CIA, (New York:
Basic Books, 2013), p. 472.
15 The late Director of the CIA, William Colby, once observed that it should be assumed the U.S. role in a covert action
will become public knowledge at some point. See Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Public Policy
(Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2015), p. 231.
16 50 U.S.C. §3093(a).
17 Ibid., §3093(f).
may authorize other “departments, agencies or entities of the United States Government,” such as
DOD, to conduct covert action.18
Offensive cyberspace operations—defined as operations “intended to project power by the
application of force in and through cyberspace”— may also be called covert action if they are
conducted under authority of Title 50 of the U.S. Code, Section 3093, which provides the
statutory provisions for oversight of covert action.19
Historic examples of covert action include the CIA’s orchestration of the 1953 coup in Iran; the
1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba; the Vietnam-era secret war in Laos; and support to both the
Polish Solidarity labor union in the 1970s and 1980s and to the Mujahidin in Afghanistan during
the 1980s. A number of these examples took place prior to the statutory requirement for issuing a
presidential finding and highlight the mixed record and often unforeseen consequences of covert
action historically.
Clandestine Activities
The term clandestine activity is not defined by statute. DOD doctrine defines clandestine
activities as “operations sponsored or conducted by governmental departments in such a way as to
assure secrecy or concealment” that may include relatively “passive” intelligence collection and
information gathering operations.20 Unlike covert action, clandestine activities do not require a
presidential finding, but they may require notification of Congress.
This definition differentiates clandestine from covert, using clandestine to signify the tactical
concealment of the activity. By comparison, covert activities can be characterized as the strategic
concealment of the United States’ sponsorship of activities that aim to effect change in the
political, economic, military, or diplomatic behavior of an overseas target. Because clandestine
activities necessarily involve sensitive sources and methods of military operations or intelligence
collection, their compromise through unauthorized disclosure can risk the lives of the personnel
involved and gravely damage U.S. national security.
Examples of clandestine activities include intelligence recruitment of, or collection by, a foreign
intelligence asset, and military sensitive site exploitation (SSE) of, or surveillance of, a facility in
a denied or hostile area. SSE is one of many military operations that can be conducted
clandestinely, without the acknowledgement—at least initially—of U.S. sponsorship. These
examples of clandestine activities can be further categorized as traditional military activities or
routine or other-than-routine support for traditional military activities, operational preparation of
the environment (OPE), and sensitive military operations, all of which are discussed in more
18 Ibid., §3093(a)(3), “Each finding shall specify each department, agency, or entity of the United States Government
authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in such action. Any employee, contractor, or contract
agent of a department, agency, or entity of the United States Government other than the Central Intelligence Agency
directed to participate in any way in a covert action shall be subject either to the policies and regulations of the Central
Intelligence Agency, or to written policies or regulations adopted by such department, agency, or entity, to govern
such participation.” [emphasis added]
19 See CRS In Focus IF10537, Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations, by Catherine A. Theohary. See also Joint Pub
3-12, Cyberspace Operations (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 8, 2018), pp. X, GL-5.
20 Joint Staff, “Joint Operations,” Joint Publication 3-0, January 17, 2017, change 1 of October 22, 2018, available at
detail below. Clandestine activities can also include defensive or offensive operations in
cyberspace, in which both the activity and U.S. sponsorship may be unacknowledged and
classified.21
21 See CRS In Focus IF10537, Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations, by Catherine A. Theohary. Offensive
cyberspace operations are defined in Joint Pub 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, p. GL-5, as operations “intended to
project power in and through cyberspace.” See also note to §111 of Title 10 U.S.C., P.L. 112-81, div. A, title IV, §954,
125 Stat. 1551: “Congress affirms that the Department of Defense has the capability, and upon direction by the
President may conduct offensive operations in cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and interests subject to—(1) the
policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows for kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed
conflict; and (2) the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. §1541 et seq.).” JP 3-12 p. GL-4 defines defensive cyberspace
operations as “missions to preserve the ability to utilize blue cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks,
cyberspace-enabled devices, and other designated systems by defeating on-going or imminent malicious cyberspace
activity.”
22 See 50 U.S.C. §3093(e)
23 See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, conference report to
accompany H.R. 1455, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., July 25, 1991, H.Rept. 102-166, p. 29-30.
Other-than-Routine Support
Only the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has definitively categorized other-than-
routine support to military operations as a type of covert action that includes a range of
activities in which the U.S. role is unacknowledged and that may be intended to influence
political, military, or economic conditions abroad while concealing U.S. sponsorship of
another country prior to commencement of the principal operation.
[T]he Committee [Senate Select Committee on Intelligence] would regard as ‘other-than
routine’ support (requiring a finding and reporting to the committee) such activities as
clandestinely recruiting and/or training of foreign nationals with access to the target
country actively to participate in and support a U.S. military contingency operation;
clandestine efforts to influence foreign nationals of the target country concerned to take
certain actions in the event a U.S. military contingency operation is executed; clandestine
efforts to influence and effect public opinion in the country concerned where U.S.
sponsorship of such efforts is concealed; and clandestine efforts to influence foreign
officials in third countries to take certain actions in the event a U.S. military contingency
operation is executed. (Traditional diplomatic activities would be excluded by other parts
of this section.)
In other words, the Committee believes that when support to a possible military
contingency operation involves other than unilateral efforts by U.S. agencies in support of
such operation, to include covert U.S. attempts to recruit, influence, or train foreign
nationals, either within or outside the target country, to provide witting support to such
operation, should it occur, such support is not "routine." In such circumstances, the risks
to the United States and the U.S. element involved have, by definition, grown to a point
where a substantial policy issue is posed, and because such actions begin to constitute
efforts in and of themselves to covertly influence events overseas (as well as provide
support to military operations).24 [emphasis added]
Congress’s discussion of other-than-routine support is limited to general discussion of covert
action and routine support in the conference reports accompanying the Intelligence Authorization
Act for 1991 (P.L. 102-88). It is not defined in statute and is not a term in DOD’s lexicon. From
DOD’s perspective, these kinds of operations fall within a category of traditional military
activities termed operational preparation of the environment, or OPE. This distinction
underscores the inherent tension between Title 10 and Title 50 authorities, insofar as the standards
and processes for congressional notification of covert action—to include other-than-routine
support— differ from those for traditional military activities, including OPE [See CRS Report
R45191, Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected
Notification Requirements in Brief, by Michael E. DeVine].
environment defined as a “composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect
the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.”25
Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, a doctrine issuance of the Joint Staff, describes
preparation of the environment as an “umbrella term for operations and activities conducted by
selectively trained special operations forces to develop an environment for potential future special
operations,” with “close-target reconnaissance … reception, staging, onward movement, and
integration ... of forces ... [and] infrastructure development” cited as examples of such activities.26
Congress has expressed concern that the military overuses OPE to describe a range of military
activities that can include, among other things, clandestine military intelligence collection that is
neither subject to oversight by the congressional intelligence committees nor jurisdiction of the
congressional defense committees.
In the “Areas of Special Interest” segment of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI) report (H.Rept. 111-186) for its version of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for FY2010 (H.R. 2701), the committee indicated that it
… [noted] with concern the blurred distinction between the intelligence-gathering activities
carried out by the [CIA] and the clandestine operations of the [DOD]…In categorizing its
clandestine activities, DOD frequently labels them as [OPE] to distinguish particular
operations as traditional military activities and not as intelligence functions. The
Committee observes, though, that overuse of this term has made the distinction all but
meaningless. The determination as to whether an operation will be categorized as an
intelligence activity is made on a case-by-case basis; there are no clear guidelines or
principles for making consistent determinations. The Director of National Intelligence
himself has acknowledged that there is no bright line between traditional intelligence
missions carried out by the military and the operations of the CIA.
Clandestine military intelligence-gathering operations, even those legitimately recognized as OPE,
carry the same diplomatic and national security risks as traditional intelligence-gathering
activities. While the purpose of many such operations is to gather intelligence, DOD has shown a
propensity to apply the OPE label where the slightest nexus of a theoretical, distant military
operation might one day exist. Consequently, these activities often escape the scrutiny of the
intelligence committees, and the congressional defense committees cannot be expected to exercise
oversight outside of their jurisdiction.27
In a section titled “Jurisdictional Statement on Defense Intelligence” under the “Committee
Priorities” segment of its report (H.Rept. 114-573) accompanying the Intelligence Authorization
Act of 2017 (H.R. 5077), the HPSCI reiterated that it is
...concerned that many intelligence and intelligence-related activities continue to be characterized as
‘battlespace awareness,’ ‘situational awareness,’ and – especially – [OPE].... The continued failure to subject
OPE and other activities to Committee scrutiny precludes the Committee from fully executing its statutorily
mandated oversight role on behalf of the House and the American people, including by specifically
25 See Joint Staff, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” April 2019, pp. 164 and 165 available at
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf. See also Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-05,
“Special Operations,” July 16, 2014, available at
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf?ver=2018-03-15-111255-653, and Joint Staff,
Joint Publication 3-0, “Joint Operations,” January 17, 2017 incorporating Change 1 of October 22, 2018, available at
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-910.
26 Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, “Special Operations,” July 16, 2014, available at
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf?ver=2018-03-15-111255-653.
27 See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,” report together
with minority and additional views to accompany H.R. 2701, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June 26, 2009, pp. 48-49.
authorizing intelligence and intelligence-related activities as required by Section 504(e) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. §3094(e)). Therefore, the Committee directs [DOD] to ensure that the
Committee receives proper insight and access to information regarding all intelligence and intelligence-
related activities of [DOD], including those presently funded outside the MIP. The Committee further
encourages [DOD], in meeting this direction, to err on the side of inclusivity and not to withhold information
based on arbitrary or overly technical distinctions such as funding source, characterization of the activities in
question, or the fact that the activities in question may have a nexus to ongoing or anticipated military
operations.28
28 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017,” report together
with minority views to accompany H.R. 5077, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., May 18, 2016, H.Rept. 114-573, p. 9-10.
29 10 U.S.C. §130f(d).
30 10 U.S.C. §395(c)(1)(A)-(B). Prior to reclassification and renumbering of the U.S. Code, the statute governing
Michael E. DeVine
Analyst in Intelligence and National Security
[email protected], 7-1126
Acknowledgments
Heidi Peters provided invaluable support to this report.