Taiwan's Tribe
Taiwan's Tribe
Michael Rudolph
University of Heidelberg
Germany
Keywords:
Abstract:
On March 12, 1996, the newly elected Taipei city mayor Chen Shuibian
announced that the street in front of the president’s palace in Taipei – “Long
live Chiang Kai-shek Road” – had been renamed to “Ketagalan Avenue”.
The Ketagalan were one of the Aboriginal groups in Taiwan that had as-
similated to Han society long before.
© Koninklijke Brill NV. Leiden 2004 Historiography East & West 2:1
The Emergence of the Concept of “Ethnic Group” in Taiwan 87
have not been transformed into cultural memory yet may fall into – or may
be left to – oblivion.
關鍵字:
臺灣原住民,南島語族,本土文化主義,文化記憶,文化復興,族群,
民族主義論述,臺灣史。
摘要:
1996 年 3 月 12 日,新當選的臺北市長陳水扁宣布,位於總統府前的介
壽路改名為凱達格蘭大道。凱達格蘭是在很久以前,被漢族社會同化的
㆒支臺灣原住民族。
即為「新臺灣㆟民族」的結果。在這個過程㆗,臺灣原住民在政治、歷
史和文化關係㆗佔有重要的㆞位。
* * *
90 Rudolph
Introduction
When Li Denghui (李登輝) was officially elected president in 1990 and hence
reconfirmed in his role as the first Taiwan-born president in Taiwan’s history,
a profound cultural transformation took place on the island. After four cen-
turies of domination by foreign powers (the Spanish, the Dutch, the Chinese,
the Japanese and the Mainlanders (lit.: “people from the external provinces”
who had come as refugees from the mainland with Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石)
after 1945), the issue of the Taiwanese search for identity became a theme of
growing significance in the political arena, tolerated now as it did not conflict
with Li’s endeavour to consolidate his power vis-à-vis the Mainlanders who
were still represented in the government and in the military. At the same time,
a re-evaluation of Taiwan’s relationship to the communist mainland also
occurred in an attempt to hinder this development by more and more aggres-
sive challenges to Taiwan’s sovereignty and once again emphasizing the
cultural and genetic homogeneity of Taiwan’s and China’s population.1
© Koninklijke Brill NV. Leiden 2003 Historiography East & West 2:1
The Emergence of the Concept of “Ethnic Group” in Taiwan 91
動),2 a movement that in the years succeeding to its foundation in 1984 had
developed rather slowly in its struggle against discrimination and social
marginalization, but that after 1990 suddenly received growing respect.
This paper explores the reasons behind the re-evaluation of the status of
Aborigines in Taiwan. As I indicated above, endogenous as well as exogenous
factors should be considered. While the integration of this group into the
political and cultural discourse of Taiwan originally happened only occasio-
nally in the course of “ethnization” that took place during the power struggle
between Taiwan’s Han and Taiwan’s Mainlander-Han, it became soon clear
that Aborigines – once defined and marked as a distinct ethnic group – could
play a decisive role in the process of identity formation of Taiwan’s popula-
tion, due to the characteristics of “authenticity” and “indiginity” that stuck to
them. In other words, Aborigines were given a key position in the process of
the construction of an over-arching Taiwanese identity and the construction
of an alternative cultural memory in Taiwan after 1990.
Endeavours to reorganize collective memory in Taiwan after the lifting of martial law in
1987
2 The term Yuanzhumin – a direct translation from the English term “Ab-originals” –
was chosen in 1984 by members of the Aboriginal movement as a substitute for the
official term “mountain compatriots”. It took ten years for this new ethnonym to be
officially recognized by the second constitutional amendment of June 28, 1994, and
two more years until the government yielded to pressure from aboriginal legislators to
establish a committee to represent Aborigines on the central level (Rudolph 1996).
3 Assmann, who works with the theoretical framework of Maurice Halbwachs, divides
collective memory into two dimensions: communicative and cultural. The former
92 Rudolph
Among the most engaged “cultural architects” at that time were the
members of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which had
been founded in 1986 but only fully legalized in 1989. Most DPP members
were of Hoklo-origin – i.e., the biggest Han-Chinese group on the island
comprising approx. 75% of the total population – and they contended that
the Taiwanese had a four-hundred-year-old history on Taiwan.5 This history
included the common experiences of a creative pioneer settler people from
South China that developed a particular language and culture after their
exodus from China in the 17th century and that had endured domination by
several foreign powers, every one of whom subjugated Taiwan’s population
through force. Incidents that were still remembered by the people were the
incident of February 28, 1947, as well as the Formosa incident in 1979. It was
these facts that constituted the culture of the Taiwanese, and it was these facts
that should be mediated in Taiwan’s schools, instead of Mandarin, the
Yangtze, Peking opera, the Great Wall and the Anti-Japanese War.
represents the experiences people share with other members of their generation (this
kind of memory begins when a generation grows up and ends when it dies), while the
latter refers to the condensation of memory into mythical narrations, liturgically
repeated and remembered in festivals, rites etc. (Assmann 1997: 50).
4 I use both “Taiwanese Han” and “Taiwan’s Han” to refer to members of the
6 Wu Feng was a Han merchant in the 17th century who is said to have dedicated
himself to educate Aborigines and who was in exchange cruelly killed by the former
head-hunters.
94 Rudolph
The willingness to accept the demands of the Aborigines – a people that had
previously never been highly valued in Taiwan – was closely related to the
perception of these people as a special “ethnic group” in Taiwan.
However, things were quite different in Taiwan. Here, the term “ethnic
group” was introduced no earlier than the 1980s. Though the Japanese term
“minzoku” (民族) (“minzu” 民族 in Chinese) had long been used to refer to
the “Chinese people / nation” (zhonghua minzu ㆗華民族) as well as to “eth-
nic Chinese” (hanren minzu 漢㆟民族), people in Taiwan did not use the term
“minzu” for differentiation within Taiwan’s society itself. The only exception
The Emergence of the Concept of “Ethnic Group” in Taiwan 95
The first person to define “zuqun” – a term unknown in the People’s Re-
public of China (PRC) until the early 1990s – was Xie Shizhong (謝世忠), a
representative of Taiwan’s younger generation of anthropologists. After a stay
with the Dai in Yunnan, Xie contends in an article on China’s ethnic politics
published in 1989, that the main difference between “people/nation” (minzu)
und “ethnic group” (zuqun) in the Chinese context is that a “minzu” is usually
an etically determined group, that is, a group that has been – in most cases
artificially – determined by the state. In contrast, “zuqun” is a group that
reflects the actual living conditions and the point of view of the analysed.
Hence, it is an emically determined group that is authentic and still possesses
natural power. On the basis of this understanding, Xie suggests that “minzu”
should only be used when one talks about a state-determined, juristically
defined group of people, while in all other cases one should better use “zu-
qun”.7
A group that also exists in the inner A group that exists in the hearts and
world of its members minds of its creators (i.e., the Chi-
nese scholars that were in charge of
the classification in 1955)
These accounts raise the question why people in Taiwan might have felt such
an intense need for distinction or demarcation from other Han-Chinese
groups. The analysis of Zhang Maogui – a sociologist from Academia Sinica –
provides us with an insight how the ”ethnic question” in Taiwan developed.8
As Zhang makes clear, distinctions between different groups of Taiwan’s
population existed before the lifting of martial law in 1987. But these distinc-
tions were perceived within the category of ”provincial origins” (shengji 省籍).
The most important distinction was made between “people from the external
provinces” (waishengren 外省㆟) and the “people from Taiwan Province” (ben-
shengren 本省㆟). The former group, whose members comprised approxima-
tely 12% of the island’s population, consisted of Han-Chinese from all
provinces on the mainland; the latter group consisted mainly of Hoklo-spea-
kers and Hakka-speakers in Taiwan, who were Han as well and hence were
also members of the Sino-Tibetan language family. A further often neglected
part of the last mentioned group were the Aborigines, who were called
“mountain compatriots” (shandi tongbao 山㆞同胞) and who were divided into
at least 12 different groups with distinct languages, all belonging to the
Austronesian language family. These different kinds of origins were inscribed
on people’s identity cards (origin from one of the mainland provinces existing
prior to 1945, or “origin from Taiwan-province”, or “origin from the Moun-
tain-area of Taiwan-province”). While the KMT strictly denied the existence
of any ethnically, culturally or socially unequal treatment, this measure
guaranteed members of the second and third Mainlander generation in the
agnate line privileged access to professions in the military as well as the state
and educational sectors (jun gong jiao 軍公教) until far into the 1980s.
The discourse of “Taiwan’s four great ethnic groups” and Taiwan’s Aborigines
After it was legalized in 1989, the opposition DPP had to find a way to appeal
to those groups in Taiwan who were different in language, culture, social
needs and problems and for whom a direct identification with the Hoklo and
their understanding of national identity was difficult. Not only Hakka, but
also members of the Aboriginal groups were afraid that a sudden seizure of
power of those people who called themselves ”Taiwanese” would only bring
about another period of suppression and domination. In order to convince
these groups of the common nationalist project and to win their votes, the
DPP introduced the concept of “Taiwan’s four great ethnic groups” (Taiwan si
da zuqun 台灣㆕大族群) in 1989. This concept not only emphasized cultural
differences, differences in experience and the particularities of the different
cultural groups in Taiwan, but also pointed to a multitude of commonalities
especially in terms of historical experience.9
9 The reasons why the DPP regarded fair ethnic politics as essential for Taiwan can be
read in the “Policy-White Book” of the DPP of 1993 (Minzhu jinbudang 1993). A
chapter entitled “Ethnic and Cultural Politics” first summarizes the negative impacts
of the traditional nationalism of “One great China, one Chinese People / Nation”
that gave rise to the ruthless sinicization and mandarinization of Taiwan’s people by
the KMT. Melting together “Taiwan’s four great ethnic groups” into the abstraction
of “one Chinese People/Nation – the Chinese” not only nurtured the PRC’s quest for
The Emergence of the Concept of “Ethnic Group” in Taiwan 99
The new concept, however, still had further political functions that went
beyond the DPP’s attempts to gain the trust of non-Hoklo groups: it had also
the potential to overcome the dichotomy of provincial identity in Taiwan (a
dichotomy that had been crystallized in the categories “descent from external
provinces” and “Taiwan-province”) in a terminological way. Quite differently
from this older terminology, the new term “Taiwan’s four great ethnic
groups” no longer suggested that the people on the island just differed in
regard to their regional origins in a common nation “China”.10 On the
contrary, it suggested that each of the groups differed from each other in
terms of language and culture. From this point on, it proved to be much more
difficult to contend that the “cultural entity was congruent with the political
entity”.
Additionally, the concept of “Taiwan’s four great ethnic groups” also had an
important function in international politics. The idea of the “Chinese nation/
people” (Zhonghua minzu), which suggested a genealogical and cultural rela-
tionship of all people in Taiwan and mainland China, could be challenged
(waisheng zuqun) still caused some offence, as the category of “province” was still visible
here. In 1995, there were attempts to replace the term by “new inhabitants” (xinzhumin
新住民).
100 Rudolph
11 Nevertheless, the term “minzu” was set aside for the time being. When Aboriginal
intellectuals attempted to add the label “minzu” to their own group (e.g., Yuanzhu minzu
原住民族), this endeavour was not much welcomed by Taiwan’s Han intellectuals.
The Emergence of the Concept of “Ethnic Group” in Taiwan 101
I admit that I’m a Han, my ancestors come from Canton. Hence, I can
say that I’m a Han and that I belong to the Han nation / people. However,
my ancestors here in Taiwan may very well have a blood relationship with
the Pingpu aborigines (平埔族). Perhaps I am not a pure Han anymore, I
might very well be a new Han who has melted together with the Aborigi-
nes … just a new Han. If we are eager to make ourselves distinguishable
from China and from the Chinese, this perspective would be of some help.
To call ourselves “new Taiwanese” would aid in our internationally rec-
ognized scope of existence as well as a better recognition of our status
from the outside. I often explain that the Taiwanese and the Chinese are
brothers: They may have the same ancestors ... . On the other hand, I re-
cently heard that in Taidong they once again found another one of Tai-
wan’s original inhabitants who is supposed to have lived here more than
10 thousand years ago. If this is true, this would be much longer ago than
the 5000 years since the Yellow Emperor. Thus, it must be evaluated again
whether we are really sons and grandsons of the Yellow Emperor (yanhuang
zisun 炎黃子孫).12
Taiwan internet site that points to the alleged genetic fusion of Han and Aborigines. It
says: “The majority of Taiwanese are descendants of Austronesians (60%) and only a
minor proportion of Taiwanese are descendants of immigrants from mainland China,
no matter whether they are speaking Holo, Hakka, Chinese, or English today. This is
also supported by recent biological research findings indicating that blood DNA
profiles of most Taiwanese are different from those of Chinese.”
102 Rudolph
were convinced that the coins must have come to Taiwan through trade with
mainland China, another group of scholars argued that the pieces must have
been brought along by Taiwan’s Aborigines themselves, who (or whose
relatives) perhaps still lived on the mainland at that time. Chen Fangming (陳
芳明), one of the most important cultural politicians of the DPP, commented
on the significance of the excavations of Shisanhang for the history of Taiwan
in 1991:
The “relics of Shisanhang” are cultural relics of the ancestors of the Pingpu
groups in Taiwan. If one researched these relics, one would discover the
cultural truth of the island before the immigration of Han to Taiwan.
Such research would not only lead to a correction of the 400-year-old-
history of Taiwan that took the Han as its centre, it would also lead to the
resurrection of the culture of the Pingpu, what might result in a prolonga-
tion of Taiwan’s history for some thousand years.16
The renaming of the “Long live Chiang Kai-shek-Street” into “Ketagalan Boule-
vard” by the Taipei city government in a manner that must have annoyed
quite a few people, as well as Chen Shuibian’s severe criticism of the op-
ponents as ”supporters of the egoistical cultural superiority thinking of
the Han-people / nation”, made it clear that the legacy of the KMT was
to be abolished. By changing the street name one could instantly break
the authority of the new and the old KMT and please socially weak
groups like the Yuanzhumin that have been neglected by the government for
a long time. It further makes clear that if the Taipei city government – at
a time when Communist China incessantly emphasizes its unshakeable
view of “China’s sovereignty over Taiwan” – uses a name of the Yuanzhu-
min-ethnic groups of the Taipei basin as street name in front of the presi-
dent’s palace, then the meaning is – on a higher level – to demonstrate the
political conviction of the DPP that “Taiwan is Taiwan and China is
China” and to make – for the sake of its national status – a demarcation
from other political influences. After the renaming, the presidential palace
now appears in a light symbolizing the “Taiwanese / Indigenous” (bentu
本土) and symbolizing its affiliation to Taiwan. 17
Reamalgation of “Taiwan’s four great ethnic groups” into “Taiwan’s fate-and-life commu-
nity”
Since the discourse of “Taiwan’s great ethnic groups” was suitable to streng-
thening the position of Taiwan’s Han in general, it soon spread beyond the
political opposition. Even within the mainstream-wing of the KMT-govern-
ment around Li Denghui, it received increasing approval in the early 1990s.19
Leaders in the KMT-government as well as the DPP were aware that at a
time when the homogenising national frame of the “Chinese nation/people”
imported by the Mainlanders was being undermined with all its symbols,
another solidarity-endowing political concept that would keep the people of
Taiwan together and that encourage them to form a new “nation/people”
was desirable. A concept that seemed capable of uniting the “four ethnic
groups” was “Taiwan’s fate-community” (Taiwan mingyun gongtongti 命運共同
體). Shortly after its creation by the opposition party in 1990, the term was
taken up by President Li Denghui, modified slightly as “Taiwan’s life-commu-
nity” (Taiwan shengming gongtongti 台灣生命共同體). A couple of further
directives and slogans of Li Denghui in 1993 and 1994 furthered this trend
and intensified the impression that now even the official side appealed to
Taiwan’s inhabitants to form an autonomous national community with an
autonomous national identity. (Notably, the emphasis on the necessity of a
“Management of Great Taiwan and the Construction of a New Centre of
Chinese Culture” (jingying da Taiwan, jianli xin zhongyuan 經營大台灣, 建立新
㆗原) or the appeal to form a “New Taiwanese” seemed to leave no doubt
about Li’s real intention).
the Ketagalan survive the great flood that engulfed Taiwan 6000 years ago and could
spread across the Pacific world.
19 In the course of the formation of the New China Party in 1993, it became evident
that even Taiwan’s second- and third generation Mainlander-Han, who had developed
an increasing “consciousness of crisis” (waishengren weiji yyishi 外省㆟危急意識) in the
years following Li Denghui’s election, had largely accepted the new categorization: in
order to be elected, they called themselves “the party that represented the interests of
the “Mainlanders ethnic group” (waishengren zuqun 外省族群)” (Zhang Maogui 1996).
106 Rudolph
20 The idea officially propagated was ”that only through participation in cultural acti-
vities in one’s own community, could civil consciousness and responsibility be devel-
oped and finally be adapted to a national level”. However, the activities mentioned
surely also served the generating of cultural memory in Assmann’s sense.
21 Chen Hua 1998: 2; 13. In his article, Chen Hua also refers to Halbwachs.
The Emergence of the Concept of “Ethnic Group” in Taiwan 107
The most important support for the claims to Taiwan being part of the
Pacific world came from Peter Bellwood, a well-known Australian linguist. In
22 Chen Guangxing 1994: 167. Chen here analyses to what degree cultural discourses
supported the government’s economic interests in Taiwan in the early 1990s.
108 Rudolph
Of course, the “Austronization” that seized Taiwan since the early 1990s did
not remain unnoticed in the PRC. The new kind of nationalist discourse in
Taiwan that referred to the hybridity of Taiwan’s inhabitants and that hence
remained implicit in the discourse of “race”, was now countered with argu-
ments stressing “racial origins”.23 For instance, an article entitled “Evidence
of the genealogical (xueyuan 血緣) origin of Taiwan’s Yuanzhumin” in the
foreign edition of People’s Daily on 16.2.1996 pointed to new archaeological
findings, according to which the so-called gaoshanzu groups (高山族) had
originally come from the mainland and partly even from northern -China to
Taiwan and hence must have been Chinese.24 The author of the article
enthusiastically contended that these findings should also have a direct impact
on the important national question of reunification of Taiwan and China. In
his introduction to the article, he remarks:
Conclusion
Since the early 1990s, Taiwan’s Aborigines have suddenly received attention
again. On the one hand, this stemmed from Taiwan’s efforts to demonstrate
democratic developments to a domestic as well as foreign audience. On the
other hand, Taiwanese Han elites in the DPP as well as in the KMT increas-
ingly realized the necessity of ethnic, cultural and historical particularity for
the construction of an autonomous, independent Taiwanese identity, and by
24 “Gaoshanzu” is the term that was used in Taiwan’s academic circles for Taiwan’s
Aborigines until the “Name correction movement of Taiwan’s Yuanzhumin” in the early
1990s (at that time, most scholars switched to “Yuanzhumin”). “Gaoshanzu” includes all
the different groups of Aborigines with their different languages and often deals with
them as one group (much as “Yuanzhumin” stands for one of four ethnic groups in
Taiwan). In the PRC, most people still use the term “Gaoshanzu” rather than “Yuan-
zhumin”, because “Gaoshanzu” is one of the 56 officially determined “nationalities”
(minzu) in China.
25 “Xianzhumin” was one of the terms used by the opponents of the term “Yuanzhumin”
27 In terms of theory, the intellectual architects of this movement were very much
aware of the significance of their efforts, as books entitled “Creation of Taiwan’s New
Culture” showed at the time (Zhang Yanxian 1993).
28 During the Qing period (on Taiwan: 1683-1895), Taiwan’s different populations
were still too separated from each other to form a common collective memory. As for
the Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945), this period was too short to allow communica-
tive memory to develop the correspondences and condensations of cultural memory;
hence, there also was not enough time for the formation of a lasting collective mem-
ory.
29 Wu Yaofeng 1994. Wu was the head of the personnel department of the provincial
This paper has only dealt with Taiwan’s Aborigines in Taiwan’s recent po-
litical and cultural discourses. As for Taiwan’s Aboriginal people themselves,
we do not yet know whether the re-evaluation of their cultures and languages
will have positive or negative effects on the people. While ordinary members
of Aboriginal society in the mid-1990s usually still took a rather sceptical
stance towards the new development, young intellectuals of Aboriginal
society and Han society often acted as moderators in the process described.
Especially those elements that pointed to the particularity of Taiwan’s Abo-
rigines – including many aspects that were avoided by ordinary people and
that were not openly referred to, for instance the former headhunting prac-
tices and tattooing culture or the traditional naming practices31 – were now
newly staged and – equipped with the label of “authenticity” – presented to
the whole Chinese-speaking world by making use of the multi-medial capaci-
ties of the internet.32 As I have argued before, democratic ideals could be
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