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Regina v Dudley and Stephens

PavlinaHojeckd

6
1. Introduction tood to refer, was not consulted . Stephens, although sceptical at
Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, the famous story of a shipwrec- first, was eventually persuaded that their only hope of survival lay
ked boat, two starving castaways and their act of cannibalism is in killing and eating the boy, by then drifting in and out of con-
one of the most important criminal law cases in the common law sciousness and by far the weakest of the four.'
world. It set the tone on the troubled issue of whether the defence On the day of the act in question, Dudley and Stephens spoke
of "necessity" should be available in circumstances where life was of their having families, and suggested that it would be better to
taken in order to preserve another's life. Holding that no such kill the boy in order to save their lives, and Dudley proposed, that
defence is available, judges placed strict limits on the doctrine of if there was no vessel in sight by the following morning the boy
necessity and influenced the development of defences to crimes in should be killed. The next day, no vessel appearing, Dudley sug-
the common law for another hundred years. In fact, the decision gested to Stephen and Brooks that the boy had better be killed.
still influences the law to the present day, as we will see while dis- Stephens agreed to the act, Brooks dissented. The boy was lying at
covering the latest developments in this area of law. the bottom of the boat helpless and extremely weakened by fami-
The significance of Regina v. Dudley and Stephens lies in the fact ne and drinking seawater, unable to make any resistance. Dudley
that the English courts, for the first time, decisively and absolute- then approached the boy with the words, "Richard, your hour has
ly laid down the common law concerning this issue and upheld the come" and, receiving faint reply, "What? Me, sir?" answered "Yes,
principle that human life is to be protected at all costs, that life my boy" and stabbed him in the neck?
shall not be taken or sacrificed even to preserve one's own life and For the next four days all three men, including Brooks, fed on
that the defence of necessity is no excuse. the boy's body and drank his blood. On the fourth day after the
This case is also a great human rights case. Here, an important act was committed, the three men were sighted by a German bark,
principle was at stake: when, and under what circumstances, might the Montezuma and picked up by it, in the lowest state of pro-
one take the life of another in the eyes of the law? Resolving this stration. They were carried to the port of Falmouth, where they
problem, the court showed how strongh the common law viewed faithfully recounted the details of the shipwreck and Richard
the value of human life. The right to life was upheld as an undeni- Parker's death to the authorities. They were then charged with
able right, no matter what the circumstances of the situation were. murder and tried at Exeter."
The decision reached in Regina v Dudley and Stephens is also
a very controversial one. In this article, we will discover what cru- 3. Unusual procedure
cial questions the jury and the court were asked to resolve and the Once the three were arrested, they were brought before the
attitude adopted. Further, we will also explore the criticisms of the Falmouth borough Magistrates. This was a preliminary inquiry to
solutions found in the verdict as well as the later development of determine whether charges against the men should be proceeded
this legal issue. with or whether the men should be set free. They were charged
with murder and held in custody for a further hearing.
2. Facts of the Case On 6 November 1884, the crewmembers were tried at Exeter.
On 5 May 1884, the English yacht Mignonette started its voy- Much to the discontent of the intentions of the authorities invol-
age to Sydney, Australia from the village of Tollesbury in Essex. ved, there was a great crowd at the courtroom, showing its sym-
There was a crew of four on board: Tom Dudley, the captain; pathy in favour of the prisoners. Arguably for this reason, the trial
Edwin Stephens, the mate; Edmund Brooks, a crewman; and judge, Baron Huddleston, decided to take an unusual step and
Richard Parker, the ship's boy.' The voyage was uneventful until asked the jury to return a special verdict. He explained to them
July 5 when, having deviated from the main trade route in search that this was a procedure commonly used to ensure that the case
of fair weather, 1,600 miles off the Cape of Good Hope, the yacht would be reviewed by a higher court."
was hit by a massive wave and sank within minutes, forcing the By this step, the jury was basically confined to determining the
2
crew to put to sea in their lifeboat, a 13-foot open dinghy. facts and was not allowed to render a proper verdict." Moreover,
For the first ten days, the crew survived on two tins of turnips, it is believed that the special verdict was drafted by Baron
whatever rainwater they succeeded in collecting, and the innards Huddleston himself. Also, curiously, the special verdict contained
3
and skin of a turtle, hauled aboard on the fourth day . The boat no finding as to whether it was "necessary" to sacrifice the life of
was drifting on the ocean, probably more than a thousand miles Richard Parker".
away from land.4 In the special verdict, the jury found that: "if the men had not
On the eighteenth day, after seven days without food and five fed upon the body of the boy, they would probably not have sur-
without water, Dudley proposed that lots should be drawn so that vived to be picked up and rescued, but would within the four days
one of them could be sacrificed to feed the others.5 Brooks rejec- have died of famine; that the boy, being in a much weaker condi-
ted the proposal and Richard Parker, to whom they were unders- tion, was likely to have died before them; that at the time of the

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act in question there was no sail in sight, nor any reasonable pro- sidered. Coleridge, stated that it is clear that Bracton is speaking of
spect of relief, that under the circumstances there appeared to the "necessity in the ordinary sense, the repelling by violence - violen-
prisoners every probability that, unless they fed, or very soon fed, ce justified so far as it was necessary for the object any illegal vio-
upon the boy or one of themselves, they would die of starvation; lence used towards oneself""' and that he is thinking of physical
that there was no appreciable chance of saving life except by killing danger.
someone for the others to eat; that, assuming any necessity to kill The Chief Justice hurried to add however, that Bracton's view,
anybody, there was no greater necessity for killing the boy than any is not supported by the great authority of Lord Hale. In Hale's opi-
of the other three men."" nion, "the necessity which justifies homicide is that only which has
After returning the special verdict, setting out the facts only, the always been, and is now, considered a justification."" According to
matter was referred to the Queens Bench Division for its decision. him, necessity, which justifies homicide, is of two kinds: 1. That
necessity which is of a private nature and 2. That necessity which
4. The Appeal relates to the public justice and safety. The private justification is
The case was argued and decided on 4 and 9 December 1884, where "that necessity which obliged a man to his own defence and
in the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division, before an safeguard"2 0 To Coleridge, it is clear that Hale regarded the priva-
expanded panel of judges consisting of Lord Coleridge, Chief te necessity which justified, and alone justified, the taking the life
Justice; Grove and Denman Judges; Pollock and Huddleston (the of another for the safeguard of one's own to be what is commonly
trial judge), Barons. called self-defence.
The prisoners' counsel, Mr. Collins, argued that English law To make it even clearer, he cites the words of Lord Hale
did recognise a defence of necessity, that applied to the facts, justi- himself: "Ifa man be desperately assaulted, and in peril of death,
fied or excused the killing of Parker. It was with this contention and cannot otherwise escape, unless to satisfy his assailant's fury he
that the Court was mainly concerned. He referred to a case men- will kill an innocent person present, the fear and actual force will
tioned in the medical work of Nicolas Tulpius, a Dutch writer, in not acquit him of the crime and punishment of murder if he com-
which several seamen were stranded, cast lots to see who would be mit the fact, for he ought rather to die himself than to kill an inno-
sacrificed, and subsequently were "treated with kindness by the cent; but if he cannot otherwise save his own life, the law permits
Dutch and sent home to St. Christopher."" The court, however, him in his own defence to kill the assailant, for, by the violence of
decided not to argue at length with counsel's arguments. After the the assault and the offence committed upon him by the assailant
cousel's speech, Lord Coleridge simply commented, "We need not himself, the law of nature and necessity hath made him his own
trouble you, Mr. Attorney-General to reply, as we are all of the opi- protector cum debiro moderamine inculpate tuteloe."21
nion that the prisoners must be convicted." The Attorney General Furthermore, Hale touched upon the issue of extreme necessi-
then suggested that it was proper for the court to pronounce sen- ty either of hunger or clothing: "I take it that here in England,...
tence. if a person, being under necessity for want of victuals or clothes,
The judgment of the court was handed down by Lord shall upon that account.. steal another man's goods, it is a felony
22
Coleridge, Chief Justice. After stating the facts, he recited the spe- and crime by the laws of England punishable with death." If the-
cial verdict, adding his opinion that the prisoners "might possibly refore, Lord Hale is clear, as he is, that extreme necessity of hunger
have been picked up the next day by a passing ship: or they might does not justify larceny, he would certainly, as Coleridge wanted to
possibly not have been picked up at all; in either case it is obvious demonstrate, be clear in denying necessity to murder.
that the killing of the boy would have been an unnecessary and Several other English authorities were reviewed by Lord
profitless act." He also noted that "it is not even suggested that his Coleridge: Sir Michael Foster's Discourseon Homicide, Sir Edward
death was due to any violence on his part attempted against, or East, Stanndforde and Lord Russell. The conclusion is easy to pre-
6
even so much as feared by, them who killed him."' dict: they all share Lord Hale's view. Lord Bacon's broad proposi-
Subsequently, Lord Coleridge proceeded to discuss the merits tion that a threat to one's existence justifies the taking of an inno-
of the case: "There renains to be considered the real question in cent life was rejected as not being "law at the present day"".
the case, whether killing, under the circumstances set forth in the But what about precedent cases that would offer the court much
verdict, be or not be murder. The contention that it could be anyt- needed guidance? "Decided cases there are none"," stated
17
hing else was to the minds of us all both new and strange." To Coleridge firmly. The case of seven English sailors referred to by
solve the "real question" of the case, the ChiefJustice threw himself counsel, mentioned in a medical treatise published in Amsterdam,
into a lengthy review of legal texts. His aim was to find out if there appeared to him as an authority in an English court, as unsatisfac-
is any such defence of necessity to murder. tory as possible." 5 A previous American case, United States v
Firstly, he discussed the various definitions of murder in books Holmes, in which sailors were found guilty for throwing passengers
of authority, which imply that, "in order to save your own life you overboard to save others26, was, according to Lord Coleridge, cor-
may lawfully take away the life of another, when that other is neit- rectly decided but on the somewhat strange ground that the proper
her attempting nor threatening yours, nor is guilty of any illegal mode of determining who was to be sacrificed was to vote upon the
act whatever towards you or anyone else." According to Coleridge, subject by ballot. In fact, the court in Holmes recognised necessity
these definitions, when examined, do not sustain the contention. as a defence to murder. Naturally, for the ChiefJustice, this case was
Bracton, writing in the time of Henry III, was the first to be con- not an "authority satisfactory to a court in this country"".

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Neither did Lord Coleridge find any guidance in the words of country ... will men ever shrink...It is not correct, therefore, to say
the Commission for preparing the Criminal Code. They stated: that there is any absolute and unqualified necessity to preserve
"We are not prepared to suggest that necessity should in every case one's life.""
be a justification; we are equally unprepared to suggest that neces- According to Lord Coleridge, to admit the defence of necessity
sity should in no case be a defence. We judge it better to leave such in this case would be a very dangerous thing to do and could be
3
questions to be dealt with when, if ever, they arise in practice by the "legal cloak for unbridled passion and atrocious crime" .
applying the principles of law to the circumstances of the particu- A number of questions, to which it is very difficult to find an ans-
lar case."25 wer would arise: Who is to be the judge of this sort of necessity?
The Chief Justice then proceeded to "apply the principles of By what measure is the comparative value of lives to be measured?
law to the circumstances of this particular case" and found that the Is it to be strength, or intellect, or what? Should it be the one who
deliberate killing of Richard Parker was clearly murder, unless the is to profit by it to decide who is to be killed? And finally: Was it
killing can be justified by some well recognised excuse admitted by more necessary to kill Richard Parker than one of the grown men?
law. It is further admitted that there was in this case no such excu- The answer for Lord Coleridge was clearly, no.
se, unless the killing was justified by what has been called necessi- At the end of his judgement, the Chief Justice explains his posi-
ty. "But the temptation to the act which existed here was not what don. "It must not be supposed that, in refusing to admit tempta-
the law has ever called necessity. Nor is this to be regretted. tion to be an excuse for crime, it is forgotten how terrible the
Though law and morality are not the same, and though many temptation was, how awful the suffering.. We are often compelled
things may be immoral which are not necessarily illegal, yet the to set up standards we cannot reach ourselves, and to lay down
absolute divorce of law from morality would be of fatal consequ- rules which we could not ourselves satisfy But a man has no right
ence, and such divorce would follow if the temptation to murder to declare temptation to be an excuse, though he might himself
in this case were to be held by law an absolute defence of it. It is have yielded to it, nor allow compassion for the criminal to chan-
not so, To preserve one's life is, generally speaking, a duty, but it ge or weaken in any manner the legal definition of the crime.""
may be the plainest and the highest duty to sacrifice it .... these Thus, Tom Dudley and Edwin Stephens were both found guil-
duties impose on men the moral necessity, not of the preservation, cy of murder and sentenced to death. The sentence was later com-
but of the sacrifice, of their lives for others, from which in no muted to six months' imprisonment, without hard labour.

11.

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5. Criticisms of the Verdict Here, one cannot simply show their lack of criminal intent.
The decision in Regina v Dudley and Stephens provoked much Although they did not wish for anyone to starve as a result of their
criticism, which can be divided into two groups: criticism of the inaction, they knew that this would happen. Instead, according to
legal opinion of the verdict and criticism of the decision being Stacy, Lord Coleridge appeals to the act/omission distinction.
a political tool of Home Office policy. The Anglo-American rule is that, absent special circumstances
Firstly, let us review the major points of the legal opinion criti- that impose a duty to act, a person has no general legal responsi-
cisms first. The most important standpoint in the verdict is its bility for the consequences of an omission. However, to Stacy,
rejection of the concept of self-preservation as defence to murder Dudley and Stephens had responsibility for Parker's death because
on the ground that such a rule would violate the principle that no his death resulted from Dudley's action. But Lord Coleridge impli-
person's life is worth more than another's and its proposition of the citly assumed that those on the lifeboat had no duties toward one
duty of self sacrifice instead. another sufficient to impose an obligation to take action. They
Sir James Stephen commented on Lord Coleridge's opinion therefore would have had no legal responsibility for the consequ-
three years later: "I should have agreed with the rest of the Court ences of their inaction. Stacy concludes that whilst it remains true
had I been a member of it in R. v. Dudley though not in all the rea- that recognition of a necessity defence might lead to some killings
soning of the judgment. ... I could not go so far as to say, as the that are not necessary, non-recognition of the defence could result
judgment delivered by Lord Coleridge says, that any case can in an even greater number of preventable deaths of innocents.
impose on a man "a duty" (if the word means a legal duty) "not to The second limb of opposition, emphasises the undue presen-
live but to die.. Whatever estimate may be formed of self-sacrifi- ce of policy making in the court's decision. While studying this
ce, it seems to me to be a duty of which the law can take no noti- case one cannot avoid asking why it was that a trial was held in the
ce, if indeed it is a duty at all, which is not a legal question." case of Dudley and Stephens? Public opinion was strongly in
Another interesting comment on Coleridge's duty of self-sacrifi- favour of Dudley and Stephens. For centuries, past events before
ce comes from Tom Stacy, Professor of Law at the University of the described incident, represented precedents on what to do in an
Michigan. Lord Coleridge revokes that self-sacrifice as a duty of emergency situation on the high seas. The custom of the sea see-
dying for others is recognised in war and supported by med to permit, or at least ignore, the practice of sacrificing one to
Jesus's "Great Example." However, his view that the duty of sacrifi- save others." No previous case of similar circumstances except the
cing oneself for others should have required Dudley and Stephens Holmes case had gone to court.
to do nothing appears curious to Stacy. In contrast with the exam- So why such a drastic change in 1884 in the case of
ples of war and Jesus, in which self-sacrifice saves others from Mignonette? The 1880s were a time when civilization flowered. It
destruction or evil, he says, "self-sacrifice in the lifeboat would have found itself at great difficulty to condone a practice of sacrificing
had the perverse consequence of causing others to die. Instead of a fellow human being to save others outside the context of war. For
requiring that all starve together, the duty of self-sacrifice would the peace and dignity of the kingdom, therefore, it was essential
seem to have required one of the crewmen co voluntarily allow that some clear-cut ruling be made to set a definitive rule in the
himself to be killed so that the others might survive."' To Stacy, the issues of life and death on the high seas which would be preceden-
strange position of Lord Coleridge can only be understood in light tial for other similar situations. That is why the Home Secretary, as
of the unstated premise that Dudley and Stephens would have had we now know from various documents, made such an effort to put
no responsibility for causing the deaths of others through inaction. Dudley and Stephens on trial, having already determined that the
Another form of opposition to the verdict comes from utilita- death sentences should be commuted to brief terms of imprison-
rian legal thinkers. According to them, Coleridge obscures the fact ment. It also appears that the judiciary, knowing where the sym-
that Parker's death may have saved the lives of three men. This idea pathy of the public lay, had already made their mind up on the,
is based on a theoretical foundation: of utility. Here, an action is issue of guilt, and virtually bypassed the jury."
justified if it produces more utility in terms of its future consequ-
ences than do alternative actions. This standpoint would seem to 6. Later Developments
support the necessity of killing in this case. "Dudley and Stephens' The Dudley and Stephens decision laid down a very strict rule
choice was between doing nothing, which they were reasonably of criminal law tempered only by judicial discretion to give a light
certain would cause the death of all four, or shortening the life of sentence and left a very enduring mark on the understanding of
a semi-conscious boy who already was very close to death, thereby necessity in the common law world. In 1931, a distinguished
giving the other three a good chance to live. Surely saving three American judge, Benjamin Cardozo supported Coleridge's opini-
lives would produce more utility than having all four die." 4 For on: "Where two or more are overtaken by a common disaster,
Lord Coleridge, however, this view is too short-sighted because it there is no right on the part of one to save the lives of some by the
ignores the long-term consequences of a rule permitting necessity killing of another." 3'
killings. Moreover, the decision played a decisive role in the exclusion of
Further in this direction, professor Stacy analyses the verdict on murder from the purview of duress per rninas - a situation when
the act/omission basis. He points out that Lord Coleridge gave no one's actions were constrained by direct human threats. In the Irish
consideration to any responsibility Dudley and Stephens would case of Whelan (1934/, the Court of Criminal Appeal cited
have had for the death of all four as consequence of their inaction. Murnaghan J, saying that "murder is a crime so heinous that [it]

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should not be committed even for the price of life and in such case. The principle set in this case theerefore appears to be that
3
a case the strongest duress would not be any justifscarion"" In Stea- it is lawful to kill B where, as it is known, B is threatened with
ne (1947y', Lord Goddard also speaking obiter, excluded murder imminent death but even the short continuation of his life
from the ambit of duress. Even earlier, American case law followed would kill A as well.
the same path (Arp v. State', 1983; State i. Nargashian, 1904.) To end this review of the latest developments on necessity as
Then, in 1969, gradual erosion of the strict rule began by the a defence to murder, let us mention an interesting remark by the
dictum in R. v. Kray (Ronald", stating that duress was available authors of the Smith & Hogan textbook of criminal law. They
to an accessory to murder. Taking Kray as a basis, in D.P for think that following the destruction of the World Trade Center
Northern Ireland v. Lynch (1975/3 the majority of the House of in New York "it now appears to be recognized that it would be
Lords held that duress was available to an accomplice to murder. lawful to shoot down the plane, killing all the innocent passen-
The high point in this direction was, however, reached earlier in gers and crew if this were the only way to prevent a much grea-
a South African case of S. v. Goliath (1972)". There, duress was Ter impending disaster", and this on the basis of necessity as
accepted as a defence to murder: "It is generally accepted... that for a defence."
the ordinary person in general his life is more valuable than that of
another....
45
Should the criminal law then staer that compulsion 7. Significance of Dudley and Stephens
could never be a defence to a charge of murder, it would demand To conclude this analysis of the Dudley andStephens case, let us
that a person who killed another under duress...would have to contemplate the real significance of its decision. Lord
comply with a higher standard than that demanded of the average Coleridge's verdict clearly and decisively sets the rule that no mat-
person. I do not think that such an exception to the general rule ter how harsh the circumstances of the situation are, there is no
46
which applies in criminal law is justified." defence of necessity to murder in common law. That is, to save
This erosion was only a temporary affair. In Abbott one's own life, one cannot willingly take somebody else's innocent
vR (1977v, duress was rejected as a defence to the principal in life. Stating that where there is a problem of choice between inno-
murder and the u-turn was completed by the important decision cent lives, no individual is entitled to decide who should die, the
of Howe (1987s. Here, the House of Lords had to decide whet- court reaffirmed that everybody has an equal right to life and shall
her to perpetuate the distinction between principals and accom- enjoy the same protection under common law.
plices. They decided not to do so and, unanimously rejecting the Even though this doctrine was unanimously confirmed in the
Lynch doctrine, favoured the rule that renders duress and necessi- recent case of Howe, we should not overestimate its scope. Firstly,
ty unavailable as defences in all prosecutions for murder. neither Lord Coleridge's dismissal of Holmes nor his rejection of
Speaking for the court, Lord Hailsham returned to the Dudley the lottery principle form part of the ratio decidendi and are not
and Stephens concept of heroic sacrifice: " In general, I must say largely accepted by legal writers. More importantly, the Dudley
that I do not at all accept in relation to the defence of murder it is and Stephens doctrine does not seem to apply where there is no
either good morals, good policy or good law to suggest, as did the need to select a victim, as we saw in the case of conjoined twins.
majority in Lynch and the minority in Abbott that the ordinary It has also been suggested that the Dudley case would be distin-
man of reasonable fortitude is not to be supposed to be capable of guishable, where the person sacrificed has innocently imperilled
4
heroism if he is asked to take an innocent life rather than sacrifice the lives of others. Even though the strict protection of the right
his own. Doubtless in actual practice many will succumb to temp- to life in the decision of Regina v Dudley and Stephens, later con-
tation, as they did in Dudley and Stephens But many will firmed in Howe, continues to be a part of the common law, it
not.. I have known in my lifetime of too many acts of heroism by would be premature to conclude that necessity can never be
ordinary human beings..." Furthermore, on the basis of Howe, a defence to murder nor that further developments of this issue-
the House of Lords in Gores (1992J7, held that duress cannot be are improbable. U
a defence to attempted murder either,
Notwithstanding all this, it would be premature to conclude Bibliography:
that necessity can never be a defence to murder in common law. In Cox's Criminal Law Cases, Vol. XV, 1882-1886, Reports of Cases inCriminai Law,
the recent case of conjoined twins (Re A [children], 2000)" B, in argued and determined in all courts in England and Ireand, Horace Cox,
order to save the life of the stronger, A. The situation here was that London, 1886
there were two connected twins, which each had their own head, MrAuley, Finbarr; McCurcheon, Paul J.: Criminal Lability - A Grammar, Round
brain, heart, and lungs. The parents and the physicians understo- Hall Sweet & Maxwell, Dublin, 2000
od that allowing them to remain joined would cause both to die. Smith &Hogan: Criminal Law, 10 edition, Butterworths, 2002
The alternative was to separate the twins surgically," but if the Ashworth, Andrew, Principles of Criminal Law, 3rdedition, Oxford University Press,
operation was performed, B would be killed and A would probab- 1999
ly live, as indeed happened. If the operation was not performed, Simeone, Joseph J.: "Survivors" of the Eternal Sea: A Short True Story: Saint
both would die. Louis University Law Journal, 45 St. Louis L.J. 1123, 2001
The court based their decision on necessity, distinguishing Hasoas, John: From Cannibalism to Caesareans: Two Conceptions
Dudley and Stephens, because there was no problem of selection - of Fundamental Rights: Northwestern University Law Review, 89 Nw. U.L.
00.
the weaker condition of B was one of the circumstances of the Rev. 900

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Stacy Tom: Acts, Omissions, and the Necessity of Killing Innocents, in American Cox, p.636
Journal of Criminal Law, 29 Am. J. Crim. L. 481, Summer 2002 Cox, p.635
Chase, Anthony: Fear Eats the Soul, Yale Law Journal, 94 Yale L.J. 1253 April, Cox, p.635
1985 Stacey, Tom: Acts, Omissions, and the Necessity of Killing Innocents; American
Alidridge, Peter Duress, duress of circumstances and necessity, New Law Journal of Criminal Law, 29 Am. J. Crim. L. 481, Summer 2002. Holmes was
Journal, Vol 139 No. 6414, 30 June 1989 a crewmember of a ship that sank. He was indicted for participating in throwing
passengers in a dangerously overloaded lifeboat overboard. Justice Baldwin
Paviina Hojeckd is a 5th year student at the Faculty of Law, Charles instructed the jury that what was done would be excusable only if those crew
University in Prague. She is a member of the Editorial Board of the members not essential to the boat's operation had sacrificed themselves first.
Common Law Review and is currently studying in University of Limerick, Cox, p.635
Ireland. Her areas of interest are Intellectual Property Law, EC Law and Cox, p.636
Common Law. Cox, p.636, 637
Cox, p. 637
Cox, p.637
Hasnas, John: From Cannibalism to Caesareans: Two Conceptions of Chase, Anthony: Fear Eats the Soul, 94 Yale L.J. 1253 Yale Law Journal,
Fundamental Rights: Northwestern University Law Review, 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. April, 1985
900 Stacy
2 McAuley, Finbarr; McCutcheon, Paul J.: Criminal Liability - AGrammar, Round Stacy
Hall Sweet & Maxwell, Dublin, 2000, p.797 Simeone
McAuley, p.797 -8 Chase
Cox's Criminal Law Cases, Vol. XV, 1882-1886, Reports of Cases in Criminal McAuley, p. 800
Law, argued and determined in all courts in England and Ireland, Horace Cox, (1934) 1.R.518 at 526
London, 1886, p.625 McAuley, p.832, Murnaghan's remarks were however, obiter, the ratio being
6 McAuley, p.798 that duress was available to a charge of receiving stolen goods
* Cox, p. 625 (1947) 1 K.B. 997
7 McAuley, p.798 (1893) 97 Ala. 5
S Cox, p. 626 (1969)53 Cr. App. R. 569
* McAuley, p.798 (1975) A.C. 653
Cox, p.625 1972(3) S.A.1, (A)30A
Simeone, Joseph J.: 'Survivors" of the Etemal Sea: AShort True Story: Saint McAuley, p.833
Louis University Law Journal, 45 St. Louis L.J. 1123, 2001 McAuley, p.833
2 McAuley, p.798 (1977) A.C. 775
1 Simeone (1987) A.C. 417
1 Cox, p. 626 McAuley, p.834
t5 (1992) A.C. 412
12
Cox, p.631 (2000) 4 All ER 961, (2001) Crim. CR 400, CA (Crim. Div.)
17
Cox, p.632 Stacy
Cox, p.633 Smith & Hogan: Criminal Law, 10th edition, Butterworths, 2002
Cox, p.633 McAuley, p. 801: for example, where one falls over a precipice while roped to
20
Cox, p.633 another climber who then cuts his loose to save his own te; or when one
21
Cox, p.633 blocks the only escape from a sinking ship and is pushed to death by those
22
Cox, p.634 desperate to clamber to safety

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36 Common Law Review