G.R. No.

127240             March 27, 2000

ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting petitioner Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of
Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment
and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the
age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as
the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in §2, and lack of
the disqualifications enumerated in §3 of the law, stated —

17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of Instruction
No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as
SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special Committee
on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of
petitions for naturalization by administrative process was suspended;

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his
testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being
asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness present any witness against him, he
remarked:

Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the sense
that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our
part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of
the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the
testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself. 3

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine
citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which he is
or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to
conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2;
(4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared,
also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.4

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with the
Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,5 in which petitioner stated that in addition to his
name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however,
failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must
fail.6 The state also annexed income tax returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net
income could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner
claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then again in
church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were
married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The
State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract8 and a Joint-Affidavit9 executed by petitioner and
his wife. These documents show that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage
license had been required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had
been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according to the State,
belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been married.

The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, 10 petitioner resided at
"J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition.

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted, reversed the trial court
and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases, the
State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on
appeal. 11 The appellate court held:

As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this
present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his
previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the
petition for naturalization and failure to include the same militates against a decision in his favor. . . This is
a mandatory requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come
forward and inform the authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his application for
citizenship.

Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly resided in "J.M.
Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires the applicant
to state in his petition "his present and former places of residence." This requirement is mandatory and
failure of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for
the provision is to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the government, upon the
publication of the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their objections against the
petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the public and said agencies
of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .

Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he lived-in with his
wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that the
"applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three
children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and irreproachable as required by the Revised
Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalization . . .

Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses,
commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income tax return "because he
is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It is not only that the person having
the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment
gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able to
provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus
avoid one's becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are in their old age,
petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by their children. The monthly
pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his income to make it lucrative
because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said pensions are contingent, speculative and
precarious. . .
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN NATURALIZATION CASES,
THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF
DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF
THE CASE.

II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN BY SOME OTHER
NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER STATED IN HIS PETITION
AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.

IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A
PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely
been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial
court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper
devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued, because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.

The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court which provides that —

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added).

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by petitioner is
clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules
may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the
case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears
to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings
are not covered by the rule on res judicata. 14 Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State
from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence
before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his
fundamental right to procedural due process. 15 We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting
the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object
to their admissibility. 16 Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the
documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did,
in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:

The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was supposedly
filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case number of the alleged petition
for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually filed by the appellee
is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and should not be considered by the Honorable Court
in resolving the instant appeal. 17
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a
typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to
the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet 18 of the Special Committee on
Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence
to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the State.

Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents — namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's
marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax returns — are all
public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to
make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these
documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.

One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle all the issues
raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his
petition, in accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization.
Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant
Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, such
publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7. 20 This is allegedly because the publication effectively
satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the
government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information
regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have lived at one time or
another. 21 It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor
of the government and against the applicant. 22 As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the
applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence. 23 This
provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of
"substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the
instant petition ought to be denied.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 107383             February 20, 1996

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private
respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered
the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents
consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence
in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered
judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties
described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress"
and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr.
Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to
pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia
Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the
documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Hence this petition.

There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin,
and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason,
the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to
return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision
of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v.
Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's
comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix
did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred
in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things,
private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in
evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial
court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix;
Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:"2
 On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:

....

4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there
was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents
Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a
petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set
aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's
request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked
upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the
questioned annexes, At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use
petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice.

Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath,
Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him.
Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and use
the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration that his use
of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their genuiness and
authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision
in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.

It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and papers,
enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court
was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed
and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
"the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable"3 is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."4 Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of
the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received
in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom
of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this
has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150224             May 19, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, sentencing
appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide, and ordering him
to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the
amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of
P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1

Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:

That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of a certain KATHYLYN D. UBA,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a bladed weapon stab the latter
inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death of the victim, and on the occasion or by reason
thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of force and violence had carnal
knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

The facts are:

On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba, were
on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They
were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through
Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning.3

At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in
Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she
intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave, she would just stay home and wash
her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the house.4

Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. They saw
appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the back door of the kitchen to have a
drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring
to the house of his mother.5

At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the ladder from
the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the house.6 She later noticed
appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at the back of the
house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang.7

At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing a black
shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and
that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellant’s eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her
husband was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyn’s husband then arrived and appellant immediately
left and went towards the back of the house of Isabel.8

In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off. She
called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the water
container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the second floor
of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get
a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.9
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her
granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by
Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines protruding out of
her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police.10

At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in Isabel Dawang’s
house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba
with multiple stab wounds.

The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder of the house
of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.

The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver at
the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of
Isabel.

When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns’s death,11 however, he
was placed under police custody.

On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar Abagan
accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station. They suddenly heard
someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He’s running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited
through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters
away from the station when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him.12 He was charged with Rape with Homicide.
When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."

After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was
accordingly, sentenced to Death.

Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his Brief, appellant
assigns the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.

II

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS
CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.

The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant. This Court
will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there
appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted.13 Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a
reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better and unique
position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.14 Absent any
showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
which would affect the result of the case, the trial judge’s assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court’s
highest respect.15 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by
improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.16

The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which provides that
an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is
presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.17

Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised, were found
on the victim’s abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to spill out of her body.18 Rigor
mortis of the vicitm’s body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998.
According to him, the time of death may be approximated from between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the
completion of rigor mortis.19 In other words, the estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to
12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within which the lone presence of appellant lurking in
the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.

It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo,
indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim,20 Dr. Bartolo discovered
the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the
introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through sexual intercourse with the victim.21 In
addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was
manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm indicating resistance to the appellant’s assault on
her virtue.22

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen from the
vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.

DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms.23 A person’s DNA is the same in
each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the
DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and
rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the
same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.25

DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a
crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For purposes of
criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can
assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction
of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.

DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the
same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as
hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber
from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victim’s body during the
assault.27 Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a
victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples
to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.28

The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing,
tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for
analysis has become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.29

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness
on DNA print or identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was determined that the gene
type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination.31 The blood sample
taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and
CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists
between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the
course of the trial.

Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine criminal
justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can
benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the
prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be
used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which
testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is
one such novel procedure.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR
testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is
reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.

Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial court
appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba;
(2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the
victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was
seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel
Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the
ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a
black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan
saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was
found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The
victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor
of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery;
(10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty
white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H",
compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was
detained but was subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt.35

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads to a
fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To
determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as well
as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-
incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.

This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of
the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.

We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken
from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may be
admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is
no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately after the incident, the police
authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of
the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to
determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.

It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted in
open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.

Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional on the
ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law.

This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves
the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post
facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the probative
weight of the evidence presented.

Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied shirt,
notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawang’s house during the time when the
crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with clear
and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places at the same time, especially in this case where the
two places are located in the same barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of
the crime, and requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens
his alibi.

As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed reversible error in
convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on reasonable doubt.

Appellant’s assertion cannot be sustained.

Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere conjectures or
suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more than a minimum of probative value,"
suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus value."41 This may be necessary to preclude the
trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty
conclusions. Evidence without "plus value" may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is
incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that would
result from its admission.

The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the court can
properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires
moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces
and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt.42 This requires that the circumstances, taken
together, should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that
the accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged.43 In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus
far, we rule that the present case passes the test of moral certainty.

However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.44

Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw the victim alive
in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang.45 She witnessed the appellant running down the
stairs of Isabel’s house and proceeding to the back of the same house.46 She also testified that a few days before
the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came
from the school."47 The victim told Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days
before her naked and violated body was found dead in her grandmother’s house on June 25, 1998.48 In addition,
Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her husband, "this
Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family."49 According to Judilyn, who was personally present during an argument
between her aunt and the appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If
you leave me, I will kill all your family and your relatives x x x."50 These statements were not contradicted by
appellant.

Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is a rule in criminal
law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of
the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or
from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.51

Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the occasion thereof, in order
to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victim’s lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her
untimely demise.

The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a
woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by
reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed the
woman.52 However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father, step-father, uncle, or the common-
law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed.53 Moral influence or
ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.54 The fact that the victim’s hymen is intact does not
negate a finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female genital organ, even
without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape.55 The strength and dilatability of the
hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal
lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender age.56

In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than the victim Kathylyn
Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-law, together with the victim
and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the house of his parents, approximately one hundred (100)
meters from his mother-in-law’s house. Being a relative by affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in
legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the victim.

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by reason or on the occasion
of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court maintain their position that R.A. 7659
is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority
that the law is not unconstitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred by the family of the victim that
have been proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00,58 and moral damages of P75,000.0059 should be awarded in
the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded as part of the civil liability
since the crime was not committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.60

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25 in Criminal
Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to pay the family of the victim Kathylyn Uba
civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral
damages. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED.

Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25
of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the
possible exercise of the pardoning power.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155208             March 27, 2007

NENA LAZALITA* TATING, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING, and the COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Assailed in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court are the Decision1 dated February 22, 2002 and the
Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, which affirmed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60.

The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land denominated as Lot 56 of Subdivision plan
Psd-31182, located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. The subject lot, containing an area of 200 square
meters, was owned by Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating (Daniela) as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-4393 issued by the Registry of Deeds of the City of Cadiz.3

On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita
Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in
favor of Nena.4 Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena.5 She declared
the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973,
1975 to 1986 and 1988.6 However, the land remained in possession of Daniela.

On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no intention of selling
the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in
favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her
defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property;
she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.7

Daniela died on July 29, 19888 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and Cirilo
who predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner.

In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn
statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return
of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela.9 Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case
amicably proved futile.

Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a complaint with the
RTC of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against Nena praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new title
and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela.10 The complaint also prayed for the award of moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. On March 19, 1993, the plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint with leave of court for the purpose of excluding Ricardo as a party plaintiff, he having died
intestate and without issue in March 1991.11 He left Carlos, Felicidad, Julio, and Nena as his sole heirs.
In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation attended the execution of the subject Deed of
Absolute Sale. She also denied having received the letter of her uncle, Carlos. She prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint, and in her counterclaim, she asked the trial court for the award of actual, exemplary and moral
damages as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.12

Trial ensued. On November 4, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant, and hereby declaring the document of sale dated October 14, 1969 (Exh. "Q") executed between
Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating and Nena Lazalita Tating as NULL and VOID and further ordering:

1. The Register of Deeds of Cadiz City to cancel TCT No. 5975 and in lieu thereof to issue a new title in the
names of Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼) portion of the property; Felicidad Tating
Marcella, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼) portion; Julio Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼)
portion and Nena Lazalita Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼) portion, all of lot 56 after payment
of the prescribed fees;

2. The City Assessor of the City of Cadiz to cancel Tax Declaration No. 143-00672 and in lieu thereof issue
a new Tax Declaration in the names of Carlos Tating, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion; Felicidad Tating Marcella, ¼
Pro-indiviso portion; Julio Tating, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion; and Nena Lazalita Tating, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion,
all of lot 56 as well as the house standing thereon be likewise declared in the names of the persons
mentioned in the same proportions as above-stated after payment of the prescribed fees;

3. The defendant is furthermore ordered to pay plaintiffs the sum of ₱20,000.00 by way of moral
damages, ₱10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages, ₱5,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees and ₱3,000.00
by way of litigation expenses; and to

4. Pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.13

Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the judgment of
the RTC.14

Nena’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated August 22, 2002.15

Hence, herein petition for certiorari anchored on the ground that the CA "has decided the instant case without due
regard to and in violation of the applicable laws and Decisions of this Honorable Court and also because the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which it has affirmed, is not supported by and is even against the evidence on
record."16

At the outset, it must be stated that the filing of the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is inappropriate. Considering that the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA finally disposed of the case,
the proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Court notes that while the instant petition is denominated as a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, there is no allegation that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the
petition actually avers errors of judgment, rather than of jurisdiction, which are the proper subjects of a petition
for review on certiorari. Hence, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest
of justice, the Court decided to treat the present petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45,
especially considering that it was filed within the reglementary period for filing the same.17
As to the merits of the case, petitioner contends that the case for the private respondents rests on the proposition
that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 14, 1969 is simulated because Daniela’s actual intention was not to
dispose of her property but simply to help petitioner by providing her with a collateral. Petitioner asserts that the
sole evidence which persuaded both the RTC and the CA in holding that the subject deed was simulated was the
Sworn Statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. However, petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement
should have been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that Daniela has long been dead when the
document was offered in evidence, thereby denying petitioner the right to cross-examine her.

Petitioner also contends that while the subject deed was executed on October 14, 1969, the Sworn Statement was
purportedly executed only on December 28, 1977 and was discovered only after the death of Daniela in
1994.18 Petitioner argues that if the deed of sale is indeed simulated, Daniela would have taken action against the
petitioner during her lifetime. However, the fact remains that up to the time of her death or almost 20 years after
the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, she never uttered a word of complaint against petitioner.

Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in departing from the doctrine held time and again by the
Supreme Court that clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere preponderance is required to show the
falsity or nullity of a notarial document. Petitioner also argues that the RTC and the CA erred in its pronouncement
that the transaction between Daniela and petitioner created a trust relationship between them because of the
settled rule that where the terms of a contract are clear, it should be given full effect.

In their Comment and Memorandum, private respondents contend that petitioner failed to show that the CA or
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at their assailed judgments; that Daniela’s Sworn
Statement is sufficient evidence to prove that the contract of sale by and between her and petitioner was merely
simulated; and that, in effect, the agreement between petitioner and Daniela created a trust relationship between
them.

The Court finds for the petitioner.

The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela is simulated. A contract is
simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if the parties conceal their true
agreement (relatively simulated).19 The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the
intention of the parties.20 Such intention is determined from the express terms of their agreement as well as from
their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.21

In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving their allegation that the
subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is the sworn statement of Daniela
dated December 28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private respondents’
evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative weight to this document.

There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should
not be equated with weight of evidence.22 The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence
while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade.23 Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.24 It is settled that affidavits are classified as
hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in
writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing
them.25 Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant.26 For this reason,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand
to testify thereon.27 The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn
statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead,
the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement for purposes of proving
that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship
was created between them.

Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation that Daniela, in
fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the subject deed of sale in favor of
petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his complaint and
he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant.28 Aside
from Daniela’s sworn statement, private respondents failed to present any other documentary evidence to prove
their claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different intention when
she entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.

In Suntay v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is the complete
absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert his rights of ownership over the
disputed property.30 In the present case, however, the evidence clearly shows that petitioner declared the
property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name. Petitioner has shown that from 1972 to 1988 she
religiously paid the real estate taxes due on the said lot and that it was only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay
the taxes thereon. While tax receipts and declarations and receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are not, in themselves, incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property.31 The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his
adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed
revenues to the Government.32 Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.33 On the
other hand, private respondents failed to present even a single tax receipt or declaration showing that Daniela
paid taxes due on the disputed lot as proof that she claims ownership thereof. The only Tax Declaration in the
name of Daniela, which private respondents presented in evidence, refers only to the house standing on the lot in
controversy.34 Even the said Tax Declaration contains a notation that herein petitioner owns the lot (Lot 56) upon
which said house was built.

Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute Sale did not really reflect the real
intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained silent until her death; she never told any of her relatives regarding
her actual purpose in executing the subject deed; she simply chose to make known her true intentions through the
sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977, the existence of which she kept secret from her relatives;
and despite her declaration therein that she is appealing for help in order to get back the subject lot, she never
took any concrete step to recover the subject property from petitioner until her death more than ten years later.

It is true that Daniela retained physical possession of the property even after she executed the subject Absolute
Deed of Sale and even after title to the property was transferred in petitioner’s favor. In fact, Daniela continued to
occupy the property in dispute until her death in 1988 while, in the meantime, petitioner continued to reside in
Manila. However, it is well-established that ownership and possession are two entirely different legal
concepts.35 Just as possession is not a definite proof of ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent with
ownership. The first paragraph of Article 1498 of the Civil Code states that when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the
contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Possession, along with
ownership, is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance.36 Thus, in light of the
circumstances of the present case, it is of no legal consequence that petitioner did not take actual possession or
occupation of the disputed property after the execution of the deed of sale in her favor because she was already
able to perfect and complete her ownership of and title over the subject property.

As to Daniela’s affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted by petitioner, which confirmed the validity of the sale of the
disputed lot in her favor, the same has no probative value, as the sworn statement earlier adverted to, for being
hearsay. Naturally, private respondents were not able to cross-examine the deceased-affiant on her declarations
contained in the said affidavit.
However, even if Daniela’s affidavit of June 9, 1983 is disregarded, the fact remains that private respondents failed
to prove by clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere preponderance of evidence37 that the contract of
sale between Daniela and petitioner was simulated. The legal presumption is in favor of the validity of contracts
and the party who impugns its regularity has the burden of proving its simulation.38 Since private respondents
failed to discharge the burden of proving their allegation that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela
was simulated, the presumption of regularity and validity of the October 14, 1969 Deed of Absolute Sale stands.

Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela to be valid and not
fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust relationship was
created between them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 64122, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Civil
Case No. 278-C, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint of the private respondents is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 173476               February 22, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the conditions of admissibility
under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the
res gestae, or both.

Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and was
ultimately found guilty of the felony by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Manila on September 23, 2004. On
appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) through its decision promulgated on November
24, 2005.1
Salafranca has come to the Court on a final appeal, continuing to challenge the credibility of the witnesses who had
incriminated him.

The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports
Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk
to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estaño in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine
General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estaño that it was Salafranca who had
stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention;
and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years,
who was in the complex at the time.2

As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long period, despite the warrant for his
arrest being issued. He was finally arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila City Jail.

After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, stating:

The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered two (2) stabbing blows to the victim while
holding Johnny Bolanon with his left arm encircled around Bolanon’s neck stabbing the latter with the use of his
right hand at the right sub costal area which caused Bolanon’s death. Not only because it was testified to by
Augusto Mendoza but corroborated by Rodolfo Estaño, the victim’s uncle who brought Bolanon to the hospital and
who relayed to the court that when he aided Bolanon and even on their way to the hospital while the latter was
suffering from hard breathing, victim Bolanon was able to say that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him.3

The RTC appreciated treachery based on the testimony of Prosecution witness Mendoza on how Salafranca had
effected his attack

against Bolanon, observing that by "encircling his (accused) left arm, while behind the victim on the latter’s neck
and stabbing the victim with the use of his right hand," Salafranca did not give Bolanon "any opportunity to defend
himself."4 The RTC noted inconsistencies in Salafranca’s and his witness’ testimonies, as well as the fact that he had
fled from his residence the day after the incident and had stayed away in Bataan for eight years until his arrest. The
RTC opined that had he not been hiding, there would be no reason for him to immediately leave his residence,
especially because he was also working near the area.5

The RTC disposed thus:

With the above observations and findings, accused Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby found guilty of the crime of
Murder defined and punished under Article 248 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in relation to Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code with the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery (248 par. 1 as
amended) without any mitigating nor other aggravating circumstance attendant to its commission, Rodrigo
Salafranca is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

He shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

His body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of the Bureau of Correction, National Penitentiary,
Muntinlupa City thru the City Jail Warden of Manila.

He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱50,000.00 representing death indemnity.

There being no claim of other damages, no pronouncement is hereby made.

SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC,7 citing the dying declaration made to his uncle
pointing to Salafranca as his assailant,8 and Salafranca’s positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza.9 It
stressed that Salafranca’s denial and his alibi of being in his home during the incident did not overcome the
positive identification, especially as his unexplained flight after the stabbing, leaving his home and employment,
constituted a circumstance highly indicative of his guilt.10

Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

The appeal lacks merit.

Discrediting Mendoza and Estaño as witnesses against Salafranca would be unwarranted. The RTC and the CA
correctly concluded that Mendoza and Estaño were credible and reliable. The determination of the competence
and credibility of witnesses at trial rested primarily with the RTC as the trial court due to its unique and unequalled
position of observing their deportment during testimony, and of assessing their credibility and appreciating their
truthfulness, honesty and candor. Absent a substantial reason to justify the reversal of the assessment made and
conclusions reached by the RTC, the CA as the reviewing court was bound by such assessment and
conclusions,11 considering that the CA as the appellate court could neither substitute its assessment nor draw
different conclusions without a persuasive showing that the RTC misappreciated the circumstances or omitted
significant evidentiary matters that would alter the result.12 Salafranca did not persuasively show a misappreciation
or omission by the RTC. Hence, the Court, in this appeal, is in no position to undo or to contradict the findings of
the RTC and the CA, which were entitled to great weight and respect.13

Salafranca’s denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive identification by Mendoza as the assailant of
Bolanon. The lower courts properly accorded full faith to such incrimination by Mendoza considering that
Salafranca did not even project any ill motive that could have impelled Mendoza to testify against him unless it was
upon the truth.14

Based on Mendoza’s account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind and had "encircled his left arm over
the neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the stabbing blow using the right(hand) and coming from wnnt (sic) up right
sideways and another one encircling the blow towards below the left nipple."15 Relying on Mendoza’s recollection
of how Salafranca had attacked Bolanon, the RTC found treachery to be attendant in the killing. This finding the CA
concurred with. We join the CA’s concurrence because Mendoza’s eyewitness account of the manner of attack
remained uncontested by Salafranca who merely insisted on his alibi. The method and means Salafranca employed
constituted a surprise deadly attack against Bolanon from behind and included an aggressive physical control of
the latter’s movements that ensured the success of the attack without any retaliation or defense on the part of
Bolanon. According to the Revised Penal Code,16 treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

The Court further notes Estaño’s testimony on the utterance by Bolanon of statements identifying Salafranca as his
assailant right after the stabbing incident. The testimony follows:

Q Can you tell what happened on the said date?

A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest.

Q What time was that?

A 12:50 a.m.
Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say?

A "Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako."

Q What did you do?

A I immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH.

Q On the way to the PGH what transpired?

A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed him?, and he answered, Rod Salafranca.

Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca?

A Yes, Sir.

Q How long have you known him?

A "Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami."

Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Will you look around and point him to us?

A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name of Rod Salafranca.)

COURT

When he told you the name of his assailant what was his condition?

A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk anymore because he will just suffer more.

Q What happened when you told him that?

A He kept silent.

Q What time did you arrive at the PGH?

A I cannot remember the time because I was already confused at that time.

Q When you arrived at the PGH what happened?

A He was brought to Emergency Room.

Q When he was brought to the emergency room what happened?

A He was pronounced dead.17

It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estaño, his uncle, to seek help
right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estaño had hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the Philippine
General Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estaño had asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and
the latter had told Estaño that his assailant had been Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had
seemed to be having a hard time breathing, causing Estaño to advise him not to talk anymore; and that about ten
minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and had been pronounced
dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res
gestae, considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and
right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of
which was an exception to the hearsay rule.18

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be
admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is
under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the
declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.19

All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estaño, identifying
Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his
impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estaño, was then experiencing
great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission,
which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s
belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial
evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his
physician.20 Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived.
Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.

A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception
to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.21

The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the
identity of the assailant to Estaño, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca.
Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his
identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified
Salafranca as the perpetrator.

The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular
litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act."22 In a general way, res gestae refers to the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.23 The
rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement.24 The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act,
declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.25
We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death indemnity of ₱50,000.00. We
declare that the surviving heirs of Bolanon were entitled by law to more than such indemnity, because the
damages to be awarded when death occurs due to a crime may include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death
of the victim (which was granted herein); (b) actual or compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary
damages; and (e) temperate damages.26

We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further granted moral damages which were different from the death
indemnity.27 The death indemnity compensated the loss of life due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral
damages would justly assuage the mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving family of the
victim.28 Although mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving heirs were not quantifiable with
mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of
Bolanon to their moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, the amount of ₱50,000.00 is reasonable as moral
damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,29 we are bound to award despite the absence of any
allegation and proof of the heirs’ mental anguish and emotional suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on
human nature and experience having shown that:

xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s
family.1âwphi1 It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the
victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the
deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the
gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them.30

The CA and the RTC committed another omission consisting in their non-recognition of the right of the heirs of
Bolanon to temperate damages. It is already settled that when actual damages for burial and related expenses are
not substantiated by receipts, temperate damages of at least ₱25,000.00 are warranted, for it would certainly be
unfair to the surviving heirs of the victim to deny them compensation by way of actual damages.31

Moreover, the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil
liability "when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances."32 The Civil Code permits
such damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."33 Conformably with such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC
should have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages because of the
attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant circumstance in murder, and, as
such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. The Court explained so in People v. Catubig:34

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of
which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an
award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary
but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is
a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In
fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should
entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the
Civil Code.

For the purpose of fixing the exemplary damages, the sum of ₱30,000.00 is deemed reasonable and
proper,35 because we think that a lesser amount could not result in genuine exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 24, 2005, but
MODIFIES the awards of civil damages by adding to the amount of ₱50,000.00 awarded as death indemnity the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, all of which awards shall bear interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.

The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128538       February 28, 2001

SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., DANILO ARRIETA and LEOPOLDO
HALILI, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a petition for review, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated in November 12, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45742 entitled "State Investment House, Inc., v. Danilo Arrieta, et
al., and SCC Chemical Corporation." The questioned decision affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 33, dated March 22, 1993, in Civil Case NO. 84-25881, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the following: a) To pay plaintiff
State Investment House, Inc., the sum of P150,483.16 with interest thereon at 30% per annum reckond
(sic) from April, 1984 until the whole amount is fully paid; b) To pay plaintiff an amount equivalent to 25%
of the total amount due and demandable as attorney's fees and to pay the cost(s) of suit.

SO ORDERED.1

Equally challenged in this petition is the Resolution of the appellate court dated February 27, 1997, denying SCC
Chemicals Corporation's motion for reconsideration.

The background of this case, as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals, is as follows:

On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) through its chairman, private respondent
Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc.,
(hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty
charges of 2% per month on the remaining balance of the principal upon non-payment on the due date-January 12,
1984. To secure the payment of the loan, Danilo Arrieta and private respondent Leopoldo Halili executed a
Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity
date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but
notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.

On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment
against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that the promissory note upon
which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding effect for lack or failure of consideration.

The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an effort to settle the dispute
amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following stipulation of facts was agreed upon:

1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant and that it has
jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits and that plaintiff and the defendant have each the
capacity to sue and to be sued in this present action;
 2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation dated April
4, 1984 together with a statement of account of even date which were both received by the herein
defendant; and

3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation the latter acting
through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito Bermundo executed a promissory note last December
13, 1983 for the amount of P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984.2

The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants were liable to the plaintiff and
to what extent was the liability.

SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was postponed several times
due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was calendared several times for hearing but
each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to have
waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for decision.

On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.

Aggrieved by the verdict, SCC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
45742.

On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the latter had a case
against it. SCC argued that the lone witness presented by SIHI to prove its claim was insufficient as the competency
of the witness was not established and there was no showing that he had personal knowledge of the transaction.
SCC further maintained that no proof was shown of the genuineness of the signatures in the documentary exhibits
presented as evidence and that these signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally, SCC
pointed out that the original copies of the documents were not presented in court.

On November 12, 1996, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment appealed from.

On December 11, 1996 SCC filed its motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution
dated February 27, 1997.

Hence, petitioner's recourse to this Court relying on the following assignments of error:

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROVED
ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AND OVERCAME IT'S BURDEN OF PROOF.

II

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.

We find the pertinent issues submitted for resolution to be:

(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error of law in holding that private respondent SIHI had
proved its cause of action by preponderant evidence; and
 (2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the award of attorney's fees to SIHI.

Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that SIHI introduced documentary evidence through the testimony of a
witness whose competence was not established and whose personal knowledge of the truthfulness of the facts
testified to was not demonstrated. It argues that the same was in violation of Sections 363 and 48,4 Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court and it was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have ruled otherwise. In addition, SCC points
out that the sole witness of SIHI did not profess to have seen the document presented in evidence executed or
written by SCC. Thus, no proof of its genuineness was adduced. SIHI thus ran afoul of Section 2,5 Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, which requires proof of due execution and authenticity of private documents before the same can
be received as evidence. Petitioner likewise submits that none of the signatures affixed in the documentary
evidence presented by SIHI were offered in evidence. It vehemently argues that such was in violation of the
requirement of Section 34,6 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It was thus an error of law on the part of the appellate
court to consider the same. Finally, petitioner posits that the non-production of the originals of the documents
presented in evidence allows the presumption of suppression of evidence provided for in Section 3 (e),7 Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court, to come into play.

Petitioner's arguments lack merit; they fail to persuade us.

We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed to appear several times on scheduled hearing dates
despite due notice to it and counsel. On all those scheduled hearing dates, petitioner was supposed to cross-
examine the lone witness offered by SIHI to prove its case. Petitioner now charges the appellate court with
committing an error of law when it failed to disallow the admission in evidence of said testimony pursuant to the
"hearsay rule" contained in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 130, Section 36 reads:

SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is
excluded and carries no probative value.8 However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to
object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.9 The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right
of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that
the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay.10 However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The
repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was afforded
several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party's witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to
take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent court when it sustained
the trial court's finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party's witness. It is now
too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.

Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a
competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the requirements of
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.

Respecting petitioner's other submissions, the same are moot and academic. As correctly found by the Court of
Appeals, petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it through private respondent Arrieta
and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of signatures. The admission having
been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under
Section, 411 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.
Nor will petitioner's reliance on the "best evidence rule"12 advance its cause. Respondent SIHI had no need to
present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the
execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner to be
questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these documents was sufficient to establish its
obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of
extinguishment of said obligation. No reversible error was thus committed by the appellate court when it held
petitioner liable on its obligation, pursuant to Article 1159 of the Civil Code which reads:

ART. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and
should be complied with in good faith.

On the second issue, petitioner charges the Court of Appeals with reversible error for having sustained the trial
court'' award of attorney'' fees. Petitioner relies on Radio Communications of the Philippines v. Rodriguez, 182
SCRA 899, 909 (1990), where we held that when attorney's fees are awarded, the reason for the award of
attorney's fees must be stated in the text of the court's decision. Petitioner submits that since the trial court did
not state any reason for awarding the same, the award of attorney's fees should have been disallowed by the
appellate court.1âwphi1.nêt

We find for petitioner in this regard.

It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule, hence it is necessary for the trial
court to make findings of fact and law, which would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of the
award.13 Otherwise stated, given the failure by the trial court to explicitly state the rationale for the award of
attorney's fees, the same shall be disallowed. In the present case, a perusal of the records shows that the trial
court failed to explain the award of attorney's fees. We hold that the same should thereby be deleted.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The decision dated November 12, 1996 of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees to private respondent SIHI is hereby
deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

RULE 129

G.R. No. 143276             July 20, 2004

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.
 DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19.3422 hectares
of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-6296. A portion of the land consisting of 6.2330 hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to
coconut and 0.7600 planted to palay) was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, as amended, otherwise known as the
1 

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as 2 

amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, the Land Bank of the
3 

Philippines (Landbank), petitioner, made the following valuation of the property:

4 

Acquired property Area in hectares Value

Coconut land 5.4730 P148,675.19
Riceland 0.7600 25,243.36
P173,918.55

Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as
amended, a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD
rendered its Decision affirming the Landbank's valuation.

Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a petition for
determination of just compensation, docketed as Civil Case No. 6806. Impleaded as respondents
were the DAR and the Landbank. Petitioners therein prayed for a compensation of P100,000.00 per
hectare for both coconut land and riceland, or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00.

During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC the following
admissions of facts: (1) the subject property is governed by the provisions of R.A. 6657, as
amended; (2) it was distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries; and (3) the Landbank deposited the
provisional compensation based on the valuation made by the DAR. 5

On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and
directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 6

In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed the just compensation for the
coconut land at P657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00, which is
beyond respondents' valuation of P623,000.00. The court further awarded compounded interest
at P79,732.00 in cash. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses Dr. Vicente Banal and
Leonidas Arenas-Banal, for the 5.4730 hectares of coconut land the sum of SIX HUNDRED
FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN PESOS (P657,137.00) in
cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law;

2. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners for the .7600 hectares of riceland the
sum of FORTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P46,000.00) in cash and in bonds in the
proportion provided by law; and

3. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum of SEVENTY-NINE

THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P79,732.00) as the compounded
interest in cash.

IT IS SO ORDERED." 7

In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts established in
another case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679, "Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al."), using the
following formula:

For the coconut land

1. Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of coconut) = Net
Income (NI)

2. NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization formula

under Republic Act No. 3844 ) 8 

For the riceland

1. 2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH (using
the formula under Executive Order No. 228 ) 9 

2. AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest (pursuant to DAR

AO No. 13, Series of 1994)

Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 52163.

On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming in toto the judgment of the
10 

trial court. The Landbank's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. 11

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial
court's valuation of the land. As earlier mentioned, there was no trial on the merits.
To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the Landbank is charged
"primarily" with "the determination of the land valuation and compensation for all private lands
suitable for agriculture under the Voluntary Offer to Sell or Compulsory Acquisition arrangement…"
For its part, the DAR relies on the determination of the land valuation and compensation by the
Landbank. 12

Based on the Landbank's valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner. If the
13 

landowner accepts the offer, the Landbank shall pay him the purchase price of the land after he
executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the
government. In case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR
14 

adjudicator conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the
15 

land by requiring the landowner, the Landbank and other interested parties to submit evidence as to
the just compensation for the land. These functions by the DAR are in accordance with its quasi-
16 

judicial powers under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, as amended, which provides:

"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except
those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

x x x."

A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC
designated as a Special Agrarian Court "for final determination of just compensation."
17  18

In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court and, on its own
19 

initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, "appoint one or more commissioners to examine,
investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute, including the valuation of properties, and to
file a written report thereof x x x." In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider
20 

several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, thus:

"Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost

of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and
income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made
by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed
by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property, as well as the
non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land, shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation."

These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series
of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued pursuant to the
DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object and purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended. 21

The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows:

"LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

LV = Land Value

CNI = Capitalized Net Income

 CS = Comparable Sales

MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable.

A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula shall
be:

LV = MV x 2"

Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental requirements in
determining just compensation for the property. Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely
ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous since
the determination of just compensation involves the examination of the following factors specified in
Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended:

1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;

2. the current value of like properties;

3. its nature, actual use and income;

4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;

5. the assessment made by government assessors;

6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by
the government to the property; and

7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on
the said land, if any.

Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only during a hearing
wherein the contending parties present their respective evidence. In fact, to underscore the intricate
nature of determining the valuation of the land, Section 58 of the same law even authorizes the
Special Agrarian Courts to appoint commissioners for such purpose.

Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents' property is P703,137.00, merely
took judicial notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and
applied the same to this case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or
consent of the parties, thus:
 "x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares, defendants
determined the average gross production per year at 506.95 kilos only, but in the very
recent case of Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al., filed and decided by this court in Civil
Case No. 6679 also for just compensation for coconut lands and Riceland situated at Basud,
Camarines Norte wherein also the lands in the above-entitled case are situated, the value
fixed therein was 1,061.52 kilos per annum per hectare for coconut land and the price
per kilo is P8.82, but in the instant case the price per kilo is P9.70. In the present case,
we consider 506.95 kilos average gross production per year per hectare to be very low
considering that farm practice for coconut lands is harvest every forty-five days. We cannot
also comprehended why in the Rodriguez case and in this case there is a great variance in
average production per year when in the two cases the lands are both coconut lands and in
the same place of Basud, Camarines Norte. We believe that it is more fair to adapt the
1,061.52 kilos per hectare per year as average gross production. In the Rodriguez case,
the defendants fixed the average gross production of palay at 3,000 kilos or 60 cavans per
year. The court is also constrained to apply this yearly palay production in the
Rodriguez case to the case at bar.

xxx   xxx   xxx

"As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the area of the coconut land taken
under CARP is 5.4730 hectares. But as already noted, the average gross production a
year of 506.96 kilos per hectare fixed by Landbank is too low as compared to the
Rodriguez case which was 1,061 kilos when the coconut land in both cases are in the
same town of Basud, Camarines Norte, compelling this court then to adapt 1,061 kilos
as the average gross production a year of the coconut land in this case. We have to
apply also the price of P9.70 per kilo as this is the value that Landbank fixed for this case.

"The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of the gross income. So, the net income
of the coconut land is 1,061 x .70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per hectare. Applying the
capitalization formula of R.A. 3844 to the net income of P7,204.19 divided by 6%, the legal
rate of interest, equals P120,069.00 per hectare. Therefore, the just compensation for the
5.4730 hectares is P657,137.00.

"The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as of October 21, 1972 has an area
of .7600 hectare. If in the Rodriguez case the Landbank fixed the average gross production
of 3000 kilos or 60 cavans of palay per year, then the .7600 hectare in this case would be 46
cavans. The value of the riceland therefore in this case is 46 cavans x 2.5 x P400.00
equals P46,000.00. 22

"PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO 13, granted

interest on the compensation at 6% compounded annually. The compounded interest on the
46 cavans for 26 years is 199.33 cavans. At P400.00 per cavan, the value of the
compounded interest is P79,732.00." (emphasis added)
23 

Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or
before the same judge. They may only do so "in the absence of objection" and "with the knowledge
24 

of the opposing party," which are not obtaining here.

25 

Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special
Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on
the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
 "SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of
any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

"After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case." (emphasis added)

The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.

Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No. 228 and 26 

R.A. No. 3844, as amended, in determining the valuation of the property; and in granting
27 

compounded interest pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. It must be
28 

stressed that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn,
while R.A. 3844 governs agricultural leasehold relation between "the person who furnishes the
landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who
personally cultivates the same." Here, the land is planted to coconut and rice and does not involve
29 

agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial court should have applied is the formula in DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.

As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR Administrative Order No.
13, Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land but to those lands taken under Presidential
Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228 whose owners have not been compensated. In this
30 

case, the property is covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have been paid the
provisional compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.

While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial discretion, however,
such discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the law. Here, the RTC wantonly
disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations. (DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No.11).

In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the valuation of the
subject land. Thus, we deem it proper to remand this case to the RTC for trial on the merits wherein
the parties may present their respective evidence. In determining the valuation of the subject
property, the trial court shall consider the factors provided under Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as
amended, mentioned earlier. The formula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, shall be used in
the valuation of the land. Furthermore, upon its own initiative, or at the instance of any of the parties,
the trial court may appoint one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts
relevant to the dispute.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52163 is REVERSED. Civil Case No. 6806 is REMANDED to the
RTC, Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, for trial on the merits with dispatch. The trial judge is
directed to observe strictly the procedures specified above in determining the proper valuation of the
subject property.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100901 July 16, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS @ "Commander Falcasantos," AWALON KAMLON

HASSAN @ "Commander Kamlon," MAJID SAMSON @ "Commander Bungi," JUMATIYA
AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y
MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y
SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL @ "Ajid" and several JOHN and
JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in another case, also
pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and
documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to remind the bench and the bar that reclusion
perpetua is not synonymous with life imprisonment.

The Case

On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case Nos. 10060, 10061,
10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for kidnapping (Crim Case Nos. 10065, 10066 and
10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were filed   before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City
1

against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina
Hassan de Kamming,   Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam   Taruk Alah,
2 3

Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid," and several John and Jane Does. The Informations for kidnapping for
ransom, which set forth identical allegations save for the names of the victims, read as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating together,
mutually aiding and assisting one another, with threats to kill the person of FELIX
ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060]   and for the purpose of extorting ransom
4

from the said Felix Rosario or his families or employer, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, KIDNAP the person of said Felix Rosario,   a male public
5

officer of the City Government of Zamboanga, who was then aboard a Cimarron
vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which was being ambushed by the herein accused at
the highway of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo, Zamboanga City, and brought said Felix
Rosario   to different mountainous places of Zamboanga City and Zamboanga del
6

Sur, where he was detained, held hostage and deprived of his liberty until February
2, 1989, the day when he was released only after payment of the ransom was made
to herein accused, to the damage and prejudice of said victim; there being present
an aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the
aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.

The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, likewise
alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being all
private individuals, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and
assisting one another, by means of threats and intimidation of person, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously KIDNAP, take and drag away and detain the
person of MONICO SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No. 10065]   a male public7

officer of the City Government of Zamboanga, against his will, there being present an
aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of
armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma
Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Jalina
Hassan and Freddie Manuel.  8

On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the
merits ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the assailed 36-page Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration, this Court
renders its judgment, ordering and finding:

1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias "AJID" and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot [g]uilty of

the eight charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping, their guilt not
having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered, unless
detained for some other offense besides these 8 cases (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-
10067).

2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y

MENDOZA and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as principals by conspiracy in all
these 8 cases for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping (Crim. Cases Nos.
10060-10067).

Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid of armed
men who insured impunity. Therefore, the penalties imposed on them shall be at
their maximum period.

WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and pursuant to Art.
267 of the Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments are imposed on Jainuddin
Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Kadjirul Plasin y
Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).

For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer and
pursuant to Art. 267, Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another life imprisonment is
imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza
and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No. 10066)

For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar, and their
kidnapping not having lasted more than five days, pursuant to Art. 268, Revised
Penal Code, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same four accused —
Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul
Plasin y Alih — are sentenced to serve two (2) jail terms ranging from ten (10) years
of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065 and 10067).

3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges of

[k]idnapping and she is acquitted of these charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066
and 10067).
 But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five charges of
[k]idnapping for [r]ansom.

WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five (5)

imprisonments, ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to
EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos.
10060-1 0064).

4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN (charged as

Jalina Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges for
[k]idnapping and are, therefore, ACQUITTED of these three charges. (Crim. Cases
Nos. 10065, 10066 & 10067).

But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as accomplices in
the five charges for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being miners, they are entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which lowers the penalty imposable on
them by one degree.

WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced to serve
five imprisonments ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum
to TEN YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF prision mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases
Nos. 10060-10064).

Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders "convicted

of an offense punishable by death or life" by Presidential Decree No. 1179 and
Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of which [k]idnapping for [r]ansom is such an offense)
the sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin de Kamming are
NOT suspended but must be served by them.

Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are sentenced
further to return the following personal effects taken on December 12, 1988, the day
of the kidnapping, or their value in money, their liability being solidary.

To Jessica Calunod:
One (1) Seiko wrist watchP P 250.00
One Bracelet P 2,400.00
One Shoulder Bag P 200.00
Cash P 200.00
To Armado C. Bacarro:
One (1) wrist watch P 800.00
One Necklace P 300.00
One Calculator P 295.00
Eyeglasses P 500.00
One Steel Tape P 250.00
To Edilberto S. Perez:
One (1) Rayban P 1,000.00
One Wrist WatchP P 1,800.00
Cash P 300.00
To Virginia San Agustin-
Gara:
One (1)Wrist Watch P 850.00

The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall be
extended to those sentenced.

The cases against Majid Samson, alias "Commander Bungi" Awalon Kamlon a.k.a.

"Commander Kamlon" Carlos Falcasantos and several "John Does" and Jane "Does"
are ARCHIVED until their arrest.

Costs against the accused convicted.

SO ORDERED.  9

On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and
Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal.   In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same
10

appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of their application for "amnesty." In
our March 19, 1997 Resolution, we granted their motion. Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains
for the consideration of this Court. 
11

The Facts

The Version of the Prosecution

The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:

On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government

agencies, organized themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government
projects in Zamboanga City. The group was composed of Virginia Gara, as the head
of the team; Armando Bacarro, representing the Commission on Audit; Felix del
Rosario, representing the non-government: Edilberto Perez, representing the City
Assessor's Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan Basa of the City Budget Office and
Monico Saavedra, the driver from the City Engineer's Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22,
1990.)

On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School to check
on two of its classrooms. After inspecting the same, they proceeded to the Talaga
Footbridge. The group was not able to reach the place because on their way, they
were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their guns at them (p. 4,
TSN, ibid.).
 The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of their
personal belongings. They were then ordered to walk to the mountain by the leader
of the armed men who introduced himself as Commander Falcasantos (p. 5,
TSN, ibid.).

While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government troops
which caused their group to be divided. Finally, they were able to regroup
themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men joined the others. (pp. 7-8,
TSN, ibid.).

The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest. During their
captivity, the victims were able to recognize their captors who were at all times
armed with guns. The wives of the kidnappers performed the basic chores like
cooking. (pp. 9-10. TSN, ibid.)

Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes which
demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange for twenty (20)
sets of uniform. (p. 15, TSN, ibid.)

On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 o'clock noontime, the victims were informed
that they would be released. They started walking until around 7:00 o'clock in the
evening of that day. At around 12:00 o'clock midnight, the victims were released after
Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received the ransom money. (p. 19,
TSN, ibid.) The total amount paid was P122,000.00. The same was reached after
several negotiations between Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga City and the
representatives of the kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)

. . . 
12

The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims themselves:
Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Calixto Francisco,
and Monico Saavedra.

The Version of the Defense

The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows: 13

On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, while weeding their farm in
Sinaburan, Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya Amlani was picked up
by soldiers and brought to a place where one army battalion was stationed. Thereat,
her five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin,
Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel were already detained. In the afternoon of the
same day, appellants spouses Jailon Kulais and Norma Sahiddan were brought to
the battalion station and likewise detained thereat. On May 30, 1990, the eight (8)
accused were transported to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City. Here on the same date,
they were joined by accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin.

At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from the
captivity of Carlos Falcasantos and company who in 1988 kidnapped and brought
her to the mountains. Against their will, she stayed with Falcasantos and his two
wives for two months, during which she slept with Falcasantos as aide of the wives
 and was made to cook food, wash clothes, fetch water and run other errands for
everybody. An armed guard was assigned to watch her, so that, for sometime, she
had to bear the ill-treatment of Falcasantos' other wives one of whom was armed.
After about two months, while she was cooking and Falcasantos and his two wives
were bathing in the river, and while her guard was not looking, she took her chance
and made a successful dash for freedom. (TSN, January 29, 1992, pp. 2-15)

Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who was thirteen
years old at the time (she was fifteen years old when the trial of the instant cases
commenced). She was kidnapped by Daing Kamming and brought to the mountains
where he slept with her. She stayed with him for less than a month sleeping on forest
ground and otherwise performing housekeeping errands for Kamming and his men.
She made good her escape during an encounter between the group of Kamming and
military troops. She hid in the bushes and came out at Ligui-an where she took a
"bachelor" bus in going back to her mother's house at Pudos, Guiligan, Tungawan,
Zamboanga del Sur. One day, at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while she was
harvesting palay at the neighboring village of Tigbalangao, military men picked her
up to Ticbanuang where there was an army battalion detachment. From Ticbawuang,
she was brought to Vitali, then to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City, where on her
arrival, she met all the other accused for the first time except Freddie Manuel. (Ibid.,
pp. 16-21)

Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of Sinaburan,

Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of a day in
May, while she and her husband were in their farm, soldiers arrested them. The
soldiers did not tell them why they were being arrested, neither were they shown any
papers. The two of them were just made to board a six by six truck. There were no
other civilians in the truck. The truck brought the spouses to the army battalion and
placed them inside the building where there were civilians and soldiers. Among the
civilians present were her six co-accused Hadjirul Plasin, Salvador Mamaril,
Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel and Jumatiya Amlani. That
night, the eight of them were brought to Tictapul, Zamboanga City; then to Vitali; and,
finally, to the Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City where they stayed for six days and six
nights. On the seventh day, the accused were brought to the City Jail, Zamboanga
City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp. 6-11)

The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore narrated, was
arrested with his wife the day the soldiers came to their farm on May 28, 1990. He
has shared with his wife the ordeals that followed in the wake of their arrest and in
the duration of their confinement up to the present. (TSN, January 22, 1991 pp. 2-4).

The Trial Court's Ruling

The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one count of
kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six terms of "life
imprisonment." It also found him guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of
Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated as follows:

Principally, the issue here is one of credibility — both of the witnesses and their
version of what had happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989. On this
pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to [p]rosecution witnesses and their
testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and convincing. No taint of evil or
dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to [p]rosecution witnesses. To this Court,
who saw all the witnesses testify, [p]rosecution witnesses testified only because they
were impelled by [a] sense of justice, of duty and of truth.

Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of alibis.

The individual testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on what happened
to each of them on May 27, 28 and 29, 1990. None of the accused explained where
he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989, when
[p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven of the nine accused were keeping
the five or six hostages named by [p]rosecution evidence.

The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the course of
the captivity of the five kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1) Jumatiya Amlani; (2)
Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon Kulais; (5) Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador
Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.

The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid", and Imam
Taruk Alah. These two must, therefore, be declared acquitted based on reasonable
doubt.

The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty as
conspirators as charged in the eight Informations; or only as accomplices?
Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping group to which the seven accused
belonged had formed themselves into an armed band for the purpose of kidnapping
for ransom. This armed band had cut themselves off from established communities,
lived in the mountains and forests, moved from place to place in order to hide their
hostages. The wives of these armed band moved along with their husbands,
attending to their needs, giving them material and moral support. These wives also
attended to the needs of the kidnap victims, sleeping with them or comforting them.

x x x           x x x          x x x

II The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin.
The Court holds these four men guilty as conspirators in the 8 cases of kidnapping.
Unlike the three women-accused, these male accused were armed. They actively
participated in keeping their hostages by fighting off the military and CAFGUS, in
transferring their hostages from place to place, and in guarding the kidnap hostages.
Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais were positively identified as among the nine
armed men who had kidnapped the eight kidnap victims on December 12, 1988.

The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is
supported by the rulings of our Supreme Court quoted below.

(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to prove
conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions and
circumstances which may vary according to the purposes to be accomplished and
from which may logically be inferred that there was a common design, understanding
or agreement among the conspirators to commit the offense charged. (People vs.
Cabrera, 43 Phil 64; People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)

(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which
existed between the sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party
 created by them, and they are all equally responsible for the murder in question.
(U.S. vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)

(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through
the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual
whose evil will actively contribute to the wrongdoing is in law responsible for the
whole, the same as though performed by himself alone. (People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25
SCRA 759, 772 (1968).)  14

The Assigned Errors

The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:

The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in another
case by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team leader of the
government troops which allegedly captured the accused-appellants in an encounter;
thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their right to cross-examine him.

II

On the assumption that Lt. Feliciano's testimony could be validly taken judicial notice
of, the trial court, nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the same for being highly
improbable and contradictory.

III

The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha
Hussin and Norma Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al., with material and
moral comfort, hence, are guilty as accomplices in all the kidnapping for ransom
cases.

IV

The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and Norma
Sahiddan the benefits of suspension of sentence given to youth offenders
considering that they were minors at the time of the commission of the offense.  15

As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had withdrawn their appeal,
and as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which pertain to them only, will no longer be dealt
with. Only the following issues pertaining to Appellant Jailon Kulais will be discussed: (1) judicial
notice of other pending cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, and (3) denial as a
defense. In addition, the Court will pass upon the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

First Issue:
 Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process

Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice of
the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of the
government troops that captured him and his purported cohorts.   Because he was allegedly
16

deprived of his right to cross-examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he
contends that the latter's testimony should not be used against him.  17

True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard
and are actually pending before the same judge.   This is especially true in criminal cases, where the
18

accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.

Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the
testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the
appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on
the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando
Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations
conducted by appellant's counsel. At best, then, the trial court's mention of Lieutenant Feliciano's
testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially
prejudiced Appellant Kulais.

Second Issue:

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latter's testimony:

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons?

A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.

Q And during those days did you come to know any of the persons
who were with the group?

A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed there

for fifty-four days.

Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you know
them?

A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and

Commander Kamlon we came to know first our foster parents, those
who were assigned to give us some food.

Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men who will
take care of you?

A Yes.
Q And to whom were you assigned?

A To Ila Abdurasa.

Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you are
assigned to, who else did you come to know?

A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2) wives
of Commander Falcasantos — Mating and Janira — another brother
in-law of Commander Kamlon, Usman, the wife of Kamlon, Tira.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days and
you really came to know them. Will you still be able to recognize
these persons if you will see the[m] again?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any of
those you mentioned are here?

A Yes, they are here.

Q Some of them are here?

A Some of them are here.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing?

A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was one of

those nine armed men who took us from the highway.

RTC INTERPRETER:

Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his

name, he gave his name as JAILON KULAIS.

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle and
made you alight, what else was he doing while you were in their
captivity?

A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband of

Nana.

COURT:
 Q Who?

A Tangkong.

xxx xxx xxx  19

Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarro's testimony pointing to appellant as one of the
culprits:

FISCAL CAJAYON:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q And what happened then?

A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who will
be the one [to] g[i]ve food to us.

Q [To] whom were you assigned?

A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife. [D]o
you remember how he looks like?

A Yes.

Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that said
Tangkong and his wife are here?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us?

A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name he

identified [himself] as Jailon Kulais.

Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get that
name?

A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the camp.

x x x           x x x          x x x

ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)

Q When did you first meet Tangkong?

 A That was on December 11, because I remember he was the one
who took us.

Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you stated
that Mr. Mamaril was one of those who stopped the bus and took you
to the hill and you did not mention Tangkong?

A I did not mention but I can remember his face.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host even if
he did not tell you that he [was] one of those who stopped you, you
would not recognize him?

A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my
shoes.

COURT:

Q Who?

A Tangkong, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx  20

Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez' candid narration:

FISCAL CAJAYON:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Who else?

A The last man.

Q Did you come to know his name?

A Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in Court

who identified himself as Jailon Kulais.)

Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain?

A The same, guarding us.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK.

Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine armed
men on your way from [the] Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot Bridge.
[W]hat do you mean by ambushed?
 A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.

Q They did not fire any shots?

A But they were pointing their guns at us.

Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to [the]
Talaga Footbridge, you stated [that] one of them [was] Commander
Falcasantos?

A Yes.

Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that group?

A Yes.

Q Will you please identify?

A That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting in court

who identified himself as Jailon Kulais.)

x x x           x x x          x x x

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN.

Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the camp?

FISCAL CAJAYON:

Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he used
the word Tangkong.

ATTY. FABIAN

Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean?

A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have their

time two hours another will be on duty guarding us.

Q Where did you meet Tangkong?

A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us.

xxx xxx xxx  21

It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that kidnapping or
detention did take place: the five victims were held, against their will, for fifty-three days from
December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident that Appellant Kulais was a member of the
group of armed men who staged the kidnapping, and that he was one of those who guarded the
victims during the entire period of their captivity. His participation gives credence to the conclusion of
the trial court that he was a conspirator.

Kidnapping

for Ransom

That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is also apparent
from the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying the accused and narrating the
circumstances surrounding the writing of the ransom letters.

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there
were these meetings for possible negotiation with the City
Government. What do you mean by this? What were you supposed to
negotiate?

A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after the
terms.  22

Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms?

A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by
Commander Falcasantos to write the letter, the ransom letter.

Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were you
asked to write for your ransom?

A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them.

Q Why will you able to identify the same?

A Because I was the one who wrote it.

Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship?

A Yes.

Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us by

the Honorable City Mayor Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 — there are five
letters all handwritten.

COURT:

Original?

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Original, your Honor.

Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any of
these were the ones you were asked to write.

A (Witness going over [letters])

This one — 2 pages. This one — 2 pages. No more.

Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in these
letters, what else will make you remember that these are really the
ones you wrote while there?

A The signature is there.

Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.

A And over it is a signature.

Q That is your signature?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?

A Yes, there is the other signature.

Q There are names — other names here — Eddie Perez, Allan Basa,
Armando Bacarro, Felix Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there are
signatures above the same. Did you come up to know who signed
this one?

A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons. [sic].

Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan, and

there is the signature above the same. Did you come to know who
signed it?

A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Jessica, I am going over this letter . . . Could you please read to us

the portion here which says the terms? . . .

A (Witness reading) "Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo ang

kantidad nga P100,000 ug P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga uniforms sa
Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989).  23

x x x           x x x          x x x

INTERPRETER (Translation):
This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of P100,000.00
and P14,000.00 in exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform on Friday,
February 3, 1989.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is dated
January 21, 1988.   Now, could you please explain to us why it is
24

dated January 21, 1988 and the other one Enero 31, 1989 or January
31, 1989?

A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989.

Q January 21, 1989?

A Yes.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned?

Please go over this.

A (Going over the letter)

Yes, ma'am.

Q Could you please read it aloud to us?

A (Witness reading)

Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga

completong uniformer (7 colors marine type wala nay labot ang
sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large size.  25

x x x           x x x          x x x

INTERPRETER:

They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete

uniform (7 colors, marine-type not including the shoes), one half
medium, one half large.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q After having written these letters, did you come to know after [they
were] signed by your companions and all of you, do you know if these
letters were sent? If you know only.
 A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me by
Falcasantos to inform the City Mayor that initial as P500,000.00, and
when we were already — I was asked again to write, we were
ordered to affix our signature to serve as proof that all of us are
alive.   [sic]
26

Calunod's testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro   and Edilberto
27

Perez.   The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver the ransom, and the
28

release of the hostages upon payment of the money were testified to by Zamboanga City Mayor
Vitaliano Agan   and Teddy Mejia. 
29 30

The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code,   having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private individual, having been clearly
31

identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the trial court's finding of appellant's guilt on
five counts of kidnapping for ransom.

Kidnapping of

Public Officers

Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members of the
government monitoring team abducted by appellant's group. The three testified to the fact of
kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify the appellant. Even so, appellant's identity as
one of the kidnappers was sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were with
Gara, Saavedra and Francisco when the abduction occurred.

That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours   does nor matter. In People
32

vs. Domasian,   the victim was similarly held for three hours, and was released even before his
33

parents received the ransom note. The accused therein argued that they could not be held guilty of
kidnapping as no enclosure was involved, and that only grave coercion was committed, if at
all.   Convicting appellants of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the
34

Revised Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his
liberty when he was restrained from going home. The Court justified the conviction by holding that
the offense consisted not only in placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving
him, in any manner, of his liberty.   Likewise, in People vs. Santos,   the Court held that since the
35 36

appellant was charged and convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4, it was not the duration of the
deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact that the victim, a minor, was locked up.

Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a few hours is
immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public officers   — Gara was a fiscal analyst for the
37

City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City Engineer's Office, and Francisco was a barangay
councilman at the time the kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais should be punished, therefore,
under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art, 268, as the trial court held.

The present case is different from People vs. Astorga,   which held that the crime committed was not
38

kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave coercion. The appellant in that case had
tricked his seven-year-old victim into going with him to a place he alone knew. His plans, however,
were foiled when a group of people became suspicious and rescued the girl from him. The Court
noted that the victim's testimony and the other pieces of evidence did not indicate that the appellant
wanted to detain her, or that he actually detained her.
In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably established that the
victims were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof beyond reasonable doubt that
kidnapping took place, and that appellant was a member of the armed group which abducted the
victims.

Third Issue:

Denial and Alibi

The appellant's bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the
prosecution witnesses' positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the
positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the
defense.   Between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one
39

hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails.   Jessica Calunod, Armando
40

Bacarro and Edilberto Perez testified in a clear, straightforward and frank manner; and their
testimonies were compatible on material points. Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap
victims and none was found by this Court.

We agree with the trial court's observation that the appellant did not meet the charges against him
head on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the day he was arrested and on
subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did not explain where he was during the questioned dates
(December 12, 1988 to February 3, 1989); neither did he rebut Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, when
they identified him as one of their kidnappers.

Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment

The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life imprisonment. The penalty
for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the
crimes happened in 1988, when the capital penalty was proscribed by the Constitution, the
maximum penalty that could have been imposed was reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment is not
synonymous with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it
accessory penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a definite extent or duration. Life
imprisonment is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion
perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the Revised Penal Code.  41

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of kidnapping for
ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty imposed is hereby
MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of his
five convictions for kidnapping for ransom; and to three terms of reclusion perpetua, one each for the
kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the other
accused who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the personal effects, or their
monetary value, taken from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to pay the amount of
P122,000 representing the ransom money paid to the kidnappers. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 114776           February 2, 2000

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well as its
Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:

Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then Director of Flight
Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant company
[herein private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila.

On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote to plaintiff,
offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of two
(2) years commencing on January 21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced
working on January 20, 1979. After passing the six-month probation period, plaintiffs
appointment was confirmed effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).

On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five (5)
years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and conditions set
forth in the contract of employment, which the latter accepted (Annex "C" p. 31, Rec.).

During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in command of a
flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff apologized.
(Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).

Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail of the aircraft
scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was suspended for a few days until he
was investigated by board headed by Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded.

On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion training at
Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at dependant's expense. Having successfully completed
and passed the training course, plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo duty as
captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed as captain of the A-300 fleet
commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp.
34-38, Rec.).

Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures. Seventeen

(17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant's
requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate
pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised them to take advance leaves. (Exh. "15",
p. 466, Rec.)

Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to terminate its
excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however, immediately terminate it's
A-300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among
 the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was
not one of the twelve.

On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1,

1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex
"I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff
requested a three-month notice to afford him time to exhaust all possible avenues for
reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1) month
salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).

Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor
Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion was
resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for
damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before the court a quo (Complaint,
pp. 1-10, Rec.).

Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts
have no jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal
dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in the course of plaintiffs
employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant to
Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other
aspects of his employment contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus,
defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall have
jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).

In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the items demanded in
a complaint are the natural consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation and not
labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is
beyond the field of specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on
the employee's dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal and the consequence
thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)

On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss (pp. 82-84, Ibid).
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid.)

On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds relied upon in its
motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel
from instituting the complaint and that he has no cause of action . (pp. 102-115)1

On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano and

against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts
of —

SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at

the time of payment, as and for unearned compensation with legal interest from the filing of
the complaint until fully paid;
 SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at
the time of payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00 as consequential damages with
legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;

P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;
and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.

Costs against defendant.

SO ORDERED.2

Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of jurisdiction,
validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.

On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,

. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-
appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied.

Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:

1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN

YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING
FROM AN INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS
UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?

2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY HIS

EMPLOYER?

3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE

THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?

At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine
law, thus:

Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the
Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore
Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the
Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that
claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The
defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied.4
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said
court.5 On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from
raising further the issue of jurisdiction.6

Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or on Article 1146
of the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of employment effective November 1, 1982, was
based on an employment contract which is under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10
years as provided for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court based on Article
1146 where prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court concluded that the
action for illegal dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was
withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court, had already prescribed.

In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here pertinent. What is
applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:

Art. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employee-employer relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time
the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.

xxx     xxx     xxx

What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by this Court.
In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil
Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the
prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW
applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations.9

More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim was based on a written
contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:

. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to "money
claims specifically recoverable under said Code" but covers all money claims arising from an
employee-employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764
[1994]; and Uy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .

It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable to
money claims arising from employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over
Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that
"where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
designed therefore should prevail." (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157
SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.11

In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's
action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4)
years after the effective date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.

In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-
appelle only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.
We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which sets the prescription
period at three (3) years and which governs under this jurisdiction.

Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his complaint for
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission. However, this
claim deserves scant consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International,
Inc., vs., Court of Appeals, we held that "although the commencement of a civil action stops the
running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the
plaintiff leaves in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all."12

Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was valid, the
appellate court found that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of
employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said,

It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties. From the moment
the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their nature, may be in
keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer of
employment, he was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the contract, among
others, the right of mutual termination by giving three months written notice or by payment of
three months salary. Such provision is clear and readily understandable, hence, there is no
room for interpretation.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the provisions of the

Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must be noted that when
plaintiff-appellee's employment was confirmed, he applied for membership with the
Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the signatory to the aforementioned
Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped from questioning the legality of the said
agreement or any proviso contained therein.13

Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision is amply
supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the reason for the retrenchment:

When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline industry
resulting in a slow down in the company's growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian
Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice but to adopt cost cutting measures,
such as cutting down services, number of frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number
of flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As a result, defendant-
appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots, including plaintiff-appellee, which it found to be in
excess of what is reasonably needed.14

All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that petitioner's
termination from employment was for an authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice and
opportunity to be heard, by respondent company. No error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore,
could be attributed to respondent appellate court. 1âwphi1.nêt

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. CV
No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195649               April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

THE CASE

This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No.
10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying
Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2
February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco
(respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a U.S. passport.

FACTS

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent

naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado
applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor.5

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all
allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest
myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
America.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and
belief.7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:

I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities.

I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that
he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April
2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of
Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel
record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the
country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010,
certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent
travel records:

DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 057782700

DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 05778270012

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following
documents as evidence:14

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated
03 April 2009;

2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio
Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time
resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his
family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;

3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated
03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado
went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;

4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office
of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from
January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and

5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has
been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s
contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua
failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not
conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local
Government Code."17

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim
that he is a Filipino citizen.18

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on
03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

xxxx

Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to
renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to
run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained
use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined
as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to
avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC

First Division reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s
proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby
ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991
take effect.20

The Motion for Reconsideration and

the Motion for Intervention

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that
"the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to
law."21 He raised the following contentions:22

1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of
his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;

2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is
not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to
swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;

3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his
Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;

4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and
the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23

5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;

6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over
the case; and

7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which
should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and
who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and
filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to
Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division
correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for
Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is
prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling
undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final
adjudication of the case.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."

As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which
allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has
been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be
prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of
the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code
to take effect.

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for
disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having
been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his
Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time,
April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.

xxxx

The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his
renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not
operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case
of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The
petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino,
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of
citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their
original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to
be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen
who chose greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in
the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the
mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.

xxxx

The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he
applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was
not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about
three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the
respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for
his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12,
2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably
pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control during that
time.25

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of
foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.

"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in
this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it
is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily
denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his
American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation.
Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26

On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:

Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to
the United States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges
of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to
his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with
the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for
running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections.

Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them
is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a
citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is
disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for
the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his
citizenship.

Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the
highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for
disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him
after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His
ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when
they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the law.27

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed
as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc
for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now
seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public
office.

Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s
disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the
Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the
succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."

There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as
the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.

A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.

The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is
applicable to this case.

OUR RULING

Intervention of a rival candidate in a

disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate
who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the
disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the
votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.

It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC
En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Mercado v. Manzano28

clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:

That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification
against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision,
intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet
been no final judgment rendered.29

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc
has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-
placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by
the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this
Court.

Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents
therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The
elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has
ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by
Balua against Arnado will attain finality.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required
to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.
x x x31

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of
Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these
twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when
he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA,
and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By
taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the
time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual
citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing
an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of
the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the
date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both
countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United
States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time,
only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as
a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can
be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act
No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s)
himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
America."38

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing
himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a
dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself
as an American citizen by using his US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid
for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a
positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the
certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual
citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify
as a candidate for public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but
by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not
qualified to run for a local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or
from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after
renouncing his American citizenship.

This Court has previously ruled that:

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the
time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once
any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not
just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates
the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently
using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that
he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.

It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any
elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his
foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public
office.

Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of
the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to
obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later.43

The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought
naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That
Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US
passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of
representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.

The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We
cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used
his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US
passport on 24 November 2009.

Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he
renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US
passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of
Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US
passport.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil
and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are
afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands
full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship,
has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

We now resolve the next issue.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential
spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election
contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address
the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

The Facts of the case are as follows:

On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office
of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were
opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the
election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to
the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No.
2045 having intervened.46

Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a
second re-election absent the four year interruption.

The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred
from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47

This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the
effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in
the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."

The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the
two situations, thus:

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to
hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that
some other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of
canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its
mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the
manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be
determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to
the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the
deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we
have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for
supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers)
obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former
must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the
sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one
case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the
question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis
supplied)

Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the
strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is
without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained
the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the
contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no
one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that
town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be
elected and to hold the office of municipal president."

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be
proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the
municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings
based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on
respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and
additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49

On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to
stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and
explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical.

Let us examine the statement:

"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another
candidate?

When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging
another eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the winner and
bestowing upon him that "wreath?"

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express
legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of
material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed
upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the
electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the
elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of
ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal
requirements of eligibility to run for public office.

The popular vote does not cure the

ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that
certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials,
those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not
qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the
electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate.
To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications
and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the
electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in
our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we
pronounced:

x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation
of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially
if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled
that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election
victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53

We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient
basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in
the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of
candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws,
that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after
the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-
ang v. COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling.
We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling
can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For
one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates
election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an
informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC
which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being
rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section
78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due
course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins.
To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an
election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a
magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any
disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so
he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that
its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not
democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an
open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
1âwphi1

Maquiling is not a second-placer as

he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the
highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void
COC cannot produce any legal effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate
candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who
turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does
not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be
eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware
within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said
candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified
candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes
the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not
necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed
as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified
candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no
moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the
filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado
failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15
June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not
involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was
both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual
citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of
the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that
Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his
answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed
the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification
which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves
Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule
on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC
En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL
ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE
MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10
May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO