REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Department of Labor and Employment

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
Quezon City

Rica B. Andres, Evangeline B.

Corpuz, Ial Lovely Aidalor T.
Minoza, and Cristina O. Valencia

Complainants,

NLRC NCR Case No. (L)-

01-01782-19
-versus-

STAFFHOUSE INTERNATIONAL
RESOURCES CORPORATION,
MUEEN RECRUITMENT
COMPANY, and MARC R.
CAPISTRANO JR.

Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x

POSITION PAPER FOR RESPONDENTS

Respondents Staffhouse International Resources Corporation,

Mueen Recruitment Company, and Marc R. Capistrano Jr.,
respectfully submit this Position Paper:

I.
NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action filed by complainants for alleged illegal

dismissal and non-payment of salaries, overtime pay, vacation leave
pay, sick leave pay, 13th month pay, maltreatment, and unexpired
portion of the employment contract. As will be shown hereunder, the
complaint against the respondents is bereft of any factual and legal
basis.
Page 1 of 16
 II.
THE PARTIES

1. Complainant Rica B. Andres, is of legal age, Filipino

(Andres).

2. Complainant Evangeline B. Corpuz, is of legal age,

Filipino (Corpuz).

3. Complainant Ial Lovely Aidalor T. Minoz, is of legal age,

Filipino (Minoz).

4. Complainant Cristina O. Valencia, is of legal age, Filipino

(Valencia).

5. Respondent Staffhouse International Resources

Corporation (Staffhouse), is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines with office address
at No. 43 West Point St., Cubao, Quezon City. Respondent Staffhouse
is duly licensed to engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers for overseas employment.

6. Respondent Mueen Recruitment Company (Mueen), is a

foreign corporation represented by its authorized recruitment agent,
Staffhouse.

7. Respondent Marc R. Capistrano (Capistrano) is of legal

age, Filipino, and the General Manager of respondent Staffhouse and
holds office at the abovementioned address of Staffhouse.

III.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

8. Staffhouse is a corporation duly-licensed to engage in the

recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment as
evidenced by POEA License no. 117-LB-071015-R valid until July 12,

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2019.1 It is one the top overseas recruitment agencies of the
Philippines.

9. Mueen Recruitment Company (Mueen), on the other

hand, is a publicly-listed company in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
and is likewise duly-licensed and certified by the POEA as evidenced
by their certification.2

10. Through Staffhouse, complainants were recruited by

Mueen as cleaners and employment contracts were executed between
them. They were assigned to work as cleaners with various
employers. Mueen handles the transportation of the complainants to
and from their work assignments.

11. The employment contracts of the complainants were

processed through the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). Thereafter, Staffhouse proceeded with the
processing of the necessary requirements for complainants’ overseas
employment. They were then issued the required Overseas
Employment Certificates.

12. From 2017 to 2018, complainants left the Philippines and

commenced employment in Saudi Arabia. However, the
complainants requested repatriation at the POEA citing health
reasons for alleged long hours of work. Noteworthy is the fact that
the complainants had not completed their employment contracts and
had raised complaints as early as six (6) weeks at site.

13. On______ complainant ____ executed a resignation letter

stating that:_____________

14. On ______________, in the presence of SENA Desk

Officer ___________________ from the Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA), complainant ____________ voluntarily
agreed to settle with Staffhouse by signing an “Affidavit of Quitclaim,
Compromise, and Waiver”3 agreeing that for the consideration of
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) she shall no longer have any
1
A copy of the “Certificate of Renewal” of Staffhouse from the POEA is attached hereto as Annex
“1”.
2
A copy of the “POEA Certification” of Mueen from the POEA is attached hereto as Annex “2”.
3
A copy of the “Affidavit of Quitclaim, Compromise, and Waiver” of complainant AMOR dated
23 May 2018 is attached hereto as Annex “3”.

Page 3 of 16
claims against Staffhouse. This affidavit was notarized and signed in
the presence of officers of the OWWA.

15. On _____________________, in the presence of SENA

Desk Officer _____________ from the OWWA, complainant
__________________ voluntarily agreed to settle with Staffhouse by
signing an “Affidavit of Quitclaim, Compromise, and Waiver”4 agreeing
that for the consideration of Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) she
shall no longer have any claims against Staffhouse. This affidavit was
notarized and signed in the presence of officers of the OWWA.

16. On _________, complainants filed the instant case with

the National Labor Commission (NLRC).

17. Hence, this verified Position Paper for the respondents.

IV.
ISSUES

A. WHETHER OR NOT SETTLEMENT BY

COMPLAINANTS AMOR AND RESURRECCION
BEFORE THE OWWA IS BINDING ON THE NLRC.

C. WHETHER OR NOT COMPLAINANTS WERE

ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.

D. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT MARC

CAPISTRANO SHOULD BE HELD PERSONALLY
AND SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH RESPONDENT
COMPANY FOR THE MONETARY CLAIMS
CLAIMED BY THE COMPLAINANTS

V.
ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION

A. There was no illegal

dismissal in the instant case as

4
A copy of the “Affidavit of Quitclaim, Compromise, and Waiver” of complainant
RESURRECCION dated 28 December 2018 is attached hereto as Annex “4”.

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the complainants voluntarily
resigned as evidenced by their
resignation letters

18. Dismissal connotes a permanent severance or complete

separation of the worker from the service on the initiative of the
employer regardless of the reasons therefor.5

19. On the other hand, resignation is the voluntary act of an

employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal
reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service,
and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from
employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an
office, with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by
the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur
with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before
and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining
whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment.6

20. In the instant case, clearly the complainants voluntarily

resigned from their employment. Complainants___________ each
executed reagination letters.

21. Moreover, apart from the voluntary repatriation of the

complainants, they even executed a Declaration of Waiver, Release, and
Quitclaim with SAED agreeing that for a certain amount, they are
waiving all statutory rights and claims arising from their
employment. Clearly, the acts of the complainants show that they
indeed voluntarily resigned.

1. Petitioner tendered his resignation from his position

willfully and voluntarily. He understood the nature and
consequences of his voluntary act. Petitioner’s separation from
respondent WCP was of his own volition and doing by voluntarily

5
Industrial & Transport Equipment, Inc., et al. vs. Tugade, et al., G.R. No. 158539, January 15, 2009;
Mayon Hotel & Restaurant, et al. vs. Adana, et al., G.R. No. 157634, May 16, 2005; Jo Cinema Corp., et
al. vs. Abellana, et al., G.R. No. 132837, June 28, 2001.
6
Iladan vs. La Suerte. Manpower Agency, Inc, G.R. No. 203882, January 11, 2016.

Page 5 of 16
tendering his resignation letter on 20 October 2016. There was no
dismissal to speak of whether legally or illegally.

2. , the simple truth is that herein petitioner voluntarily and

willfully resigned from his employment without being coerced by
anyone. He has carefully and personally arrived at the decision to
leave the company. The circumstances surrounding petitioner
Villaescusa’s resignation should be given weight in determining
whether he had intended to resign.

3. In sum, it would appear that what transpired in this case

was caused by an employee's error of judgment and not by the
employer's application of means vitiating the consent to resign. To
reiterate, it would be utterly unfair to attribute to private respondents
the commission of illegal dismissal and to impose upon them the
burden of paying for the damages or accepting back the complainant
who unequivocally manifested his intent and willingness to sever his
employment ties.7

4. Clearly, petitioner Villaescusa was not forced,

intimidated or coerced to resign. No threat was employed by the
private respondents to inveigle petitioner into resigning from her
position. Certainly, there is no rhyme or reason for private
respondent Barraclough to coerce or intimidate herein petitioner or
even make threats on him and force him into resigning from her
employment with private respondent WCP.

7
See BMG Records (Phils.), Inc. et al., vs. Aparecio, G.R. No. 153290, September 5, 2007.

Page 6 of 16
A. The instant complaint
should be dismissed since
complainants AMOR and
RESURRECCION have already
signed Affidavits of Quitclaim,
Compromise, and Waiver in the
presence of the OWWA for their
working period in total and
acknowledged that they will not
maintain any action arising from
the Employment Contract.

22.As evidenced by the attached Annexes “5” and “6”, complainants

AMOR and RESURRECCION already executed their respective
Affidavit of Quitclaim, Compromise, and Waiver. The quitclaims
signed by complainants AMOR and RESURRECCION were
executed in the presence of the OWWA and SENA Desk Officer
Rodrigo C. Mendoza.

23.Under Section 2, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the Single

Entry Approach settlements shall be final and binding.

Rule V
Settlement of Disputes

“Section 2. Effect of Settlement- Any settlement agreement

reached by the parties before the SEADO shall be final and
binding.”

24.The Affidavit of Quitclaim, Compromise, and Waiver being a valid

quitclaim, should have the force and effect of law between the
parties. As held in Aujero vs. PhilComSat8:

“While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by
employees who are inveigled or pressured into signing them by
unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal
responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary

8
G.R. No. 193484, January 18, 2012.

Page 7 of 16
 settlement of a laborer's claims should be respected by the courts as
the law between the parties.”

25.Thus, given the validity of the quitclaims executed before the

OWWA, this Honorable Office is equally bound to respect the said
quitclaims. Consequently, the instant complaint should be
dismissed.

B. The instant complaint should

be dismissed since complainants
AQUINDE, BACORDO, UMALI,
and RABIT have already signed a
Compromise Agreement in the
presence of the Labor Arbiter.
Complainants have agreed as to
the amount of settlement and
have already received partial
payment from Staffhouse.

26.The execution of a Compromise Agreement signed and entered

into by complainants AQUINDE, BACORDO, UMALI, and
RABIT during the mediation proceedings is a valid and binding
agreement between the parties.

27.In Magbanua vs. Uy9, the Supreme Court held:

xxx

“A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make

reciprocal concessions in order to resolve their differences and thus
avoid or put an end to a lawsuit. They adjust their difficulties in the
manner they have agreed upon, disregarding the possible gain in
litigation and keeping in mind that such gain is balanced by the
danger of losing.”10
xxx

The validity of the agreement is determined by compliance with the

requisites and principles of contracts, not by when it was entered
into. As provided by the law on contracts, a valid compromise
must have the following elements: (1) the consent of the parties to
the compromise, (2) an object certain that is the subject matter of
9
G.R. No. 161003, May 6, 2005.
10
Ibid.

Page 8 of 16
 the compromise, and (3) the cause of the obligation that is
established.”
xxx

28.In the instant case, there was already consent on the part of the
complainants when they voluntarily agreed as to the amount of
settlement and received half of the amount. In fact, the
complainants were assisted by counsel who adequately explained
the terms and conditions of the agreement. As there is already a
meeting of the minds, the Compromise Agreement is already
perfected between the parties. In Republic vs. Florendo11:

“A compromise agreement is a simple contract which is perfected

by mere consent. From that moment of the meeting of the minds of
the parties, it becomes binding on them. To be valid, judicial
approval is not required.”12

29.Since the Compromise Agreement has already been perfected

between the parties, the instant complaint should be dismissed
based on the simple reason that that the case has already been
settled and is ready for execution. In fact, there is already partial
payment given by Staffhouse to complainants. Being a perfected
contract, complainants are bound to comply with the terms and
conditions therein which should lead to the dismissal of the
instant case.

C. Granting, for the sake of pure

argument, that complainants can
still pursue the instant action
despite having executed Affidavit
of Quitclaim, Compromise, and
Waiver and Compromise
Agreement, nevertheless, the
instant action should still be
dismissed on the grounds that
there was no illegal dismissal in
the instant case.

11
G.R. No. 166866, March 27, 2008.
12
Ibid.

Page 9 of 16
30.As to allegations of illegal dismissal, the instant complaint must
likewise fall.

31.Dismissal connotes a permanent severance or complete separation

of the worker from the service on the initiative of the employer
regardless of the reasons therefor.13

32.On the other hand, resignation is the voluntary act of an employee

who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons
cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one
has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It
is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the
intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of
relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the
overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and
after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining
whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her
employment.14

33.In the instant case, clearly the complainants voluntarily resigned

from their employment. The complainants chose to be repatriated
back to the Philippines while they were still under contract with
Mueen. Moreover, there is no proof to show that the complainants
were forced to resign by the respondents.

D. Respondent Capistrano cannot

be held personally liable for
corporate liabilities, if there are
any.

34.In Pabalan v. NLRC,15 it was held that "a corporation is vested by law
with a personality separate and distinct from the persons composing it,
including its officers, as well as from that of any other legal entity to which
it may be related." Officers of a corporation are not personally liable
for their official acts unless it is shown that they have exceeded their
authority. The legal fiction that a corporation has a personality
13
Industrial & Transport Equipment, Inc., et al. vs. Tugade, et al., G.R. No. 158539, January 15, 2009;
Mayon Hotel & Restaurant, et al. vs. Adana, et al., G.R. No. 157634, May 16, 2005; Jo Cinema Corp., et
al. vs. Abellana, et al., G.R. No. 132837, June 28, 2001.
14
Iladan vs. La Suerte. Manpower Agency, Inc, G.R. No. 203882, January 11, 2016.
15
184 SCRA 495.

Page 10 of 16
 separate and distinct from stockholders and members may be
disregarded only when it is used as a means to perpetuate fraud or
an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation,
the circumvention of statutes, and/or to confuse legitimate issues.
Moreover, the shield of corporate fiction should be pierced (only)
when it is deliberately and maliciously designed to evade financial
obligations to employees.16

35.In MAM Realty Development Corporation v. National Labor

Relations Commission, et al.,17 the Supreme Court resolved the
question of when to hold a director or officer of a corporation
solidarily obligated with the latter for a corporate liability. In
holding that the vice-president of the petitioner corporation
cannot be held personally liable for the employees’ claims for
wage differentials, "ECOLA," overtime pay, incentive leave pay,
13th month pay, holiday pay and rest day pay, the Court stressed
that solidary liabilities may be incurred only when exceptional
circumstances warrant, as in the following cases:

“1. When directors and trustees or, in

appropriate cases, the officers of a corporation —

(a) vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts

of the corporation;

(b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence in

directing the corporate affairs;

(c) are guilty of conflict of interest to the

prejudice of the corporation, its stockholders or
members, and other persons.

2. When a director or officer has consented to

the issuance of watered stocks or who, having
knowledge thereof, did not forthwith file with the
corporate secretary his written objection thereto.

16
Ibid.
17
G.R. No. 114787, 2 June 1995.

Page 11 of 16
 3. When the director, trustee or officer has
contractually agreed or stipulated to hold himself
personally and solidarily liable with the
Corporation.

4. When a director, trustee or officer is made,

by specific provision of law, personally liable for his
corporate action.”

36.In labor cases in particular, the Supreme Court has held that
corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the
corporation for the termination of employment of corporate
employees only if done with malice or in bad faith. Bad faith or
negligence is a question of fact and is evidentiary. It has been held
that bad faith does not connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty
through some motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of the
nature of fraud.18 Needless to state, it is imperative that ultimate
facts of the officers’ having acted in excess of their authorities, or
acted willfully or in bad faith should be alleged in the complaint
and satisfactorily proven.

37.In the present case, nothing of this sort was even presented by the
complainants against Capistrano. As borne by the pieces of
evidence at hand, the case of herein individual respondents is way
off the above-cited exceptional instances mentioned in the MAM
Realty19 case. Herein Capistrano, therefore, should be exonerated
from any liability considering that he has not committed any
malicious act or any act tending to show bad faith on his part.

38.As shown above, the complainants voluntarily resigned. It could

not be said that the legal personality of the individual respondents
and Staffhouse was used as a means to perpetuate fraud or an
illegal act or as a vehicle to get rid of complainant. There is,
therefore, neither rhyme nor reason for piercing the veil of corporate
18
Malayang Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa, et al., v. Ramos, et al., G.R. No. 113907, 20 April 2001.
19
Supra.

Page 12 of 16
 fiction. There is no single evidence or proof of malice or bad faith
on the part of herein individual respondent in connection with the
claimed dismissal of complainants.

VI.
RESERVATION

39.Respondents respectfully reserve their right to present additional

documentary and testimonial evidence in the course of these
proceedings. Respondents likewise respectfully reserve the right
to file a Supplemental Position Paper and other allied pleadings as
they may deem necessary.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully

prayed that this Honorable Office DISMISS the instant complaint for
utter lack of merit.

Other reliefs, just and equitable under the circumstances are

likewise prayed for.

Pasig City for Quezon City; 26 March 2019.

SOLIS MEDINA
LIMPINGCO AND FAJARDO LAW
OFFICES
Counsel for Respondents
11th Floor East Tower
Philippine Stock Exchange Center
Exchange Road, Ortigas Business Center
Pasig City
Tel No.: 634-6722
Email: [email protected]

By:

Page 13 of 16
 JOSE GERARDO A. MEDINA
PTR No. 5214231/01.08.2019/Pasig
IBP Life Member Roll No. 00628
SC Roll of Attorneys No. 36650
MCLE Compliance No. VI-
0015563
21 December 2018

and

CHRISTIAN V. URBINA
PTR No. 5214238/01.08.2019/Pasig
IBP No. 066485/01.10.2019/Q.C.
SC Roll of Attorneys No. 68572
Admitted to the Bar in 2017

January 11, 2016

G.R. No. 203882

LORELEI O. ILADAN, Petitioner,

vs.
LA SUERTE INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER AGENCY, INC., and
DEBBIE LAO, Respondents.

In the instant case, Iladan executed a resignation letter in her own

handwriting. She also accepted the amount of P35,000.00 as financial
assistance and executed an Affidavit of Release, Waiver and
Page 14 of 16
Quitclaim and an Agreement, as settlement and waiver of any cause
of action against respondents. The affidavit of waiver and the
settlement were acknowledged/subscribed before Labor Attache
Romulo on August 6, 2009, and duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate. An affidavit of waiver duly acknowledged before a notary
public is a public document which cannot be impugned by mere self-
serving allegations. Proof of an irregularity in its execution is
absolutely essential. The Agreement likewise bears the signature of
Conciliator-Mediator Diaz. Thus, the signatures of these officials
sufficiently prove that Iladan was duly assisted when she signed the
waiver and settlement. Concededly, the presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty. In this case, no such evidence was
presented. Besides, "[t]he Court has ruled that a waiver or quitclaim
is a valid and binding agreement between the parties, provided that
it constitutes a credible and reasonable settlement, and that the one
accomplishing it has done so voluntarily and with a full
understanding of its import." Absent any extant and clear proof of
the alleged coercion and threats Iladan allegedly received from
respondents that led her to terminate her employment relations with
respondents, it can be concluded that Iladan resigned voluntarily.

G.R. No. 175988 August 24, 2007

MA. FININA E. VICENTE, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former Seventeenth Division and
CINDERELLA MARKETING CORPORATION, Respondents.

The NLRC cannot disregard the resignation letter dated February 15,
2000 on the allegation that its submission was a product of an
unintelligent and confused decision due to the disdain shown by Mr.
Tecson absent any sufficient proof of force or intimidation. Likewise,
it was erroneous for the Labor Arbiter not to give evidentiary weight
on the resignation letter on the ground that it was fabricated as it was
not signed by petitioner. A careful scrutiny of the said letter shows
Page 15 of 16
that it bears the signature of petitioner. More importantly, petitioner
admitted having submitted the said letter, albeit, due to an alleged
intimidation.

Subsequently, petitioner stopped reporting for work although she

met with the officers of the corporation to settle her accountabilities
but never raised the alleged intimidation employed on her. Also,
though the complaint was filed within the 4-year prescriptive period,
its belated filing supports the contention of respondent that it was a
mere afterthought.24 Taken together, these circumstances are
substantial proof that petitioner’s resignation was voluntary.

Hence, petitioner cannot take refuge in the argument that it is the

employer who bears the burden of proof that the resignation is
voluntary and not the product of coercion or intimidation. Having
submitted a resignation letter, it is then incumbent upon her to prove
that the resignation was not voluntary but was actually a case of
constructive dismissal25 with clear, positive, and convincing
evidence.26 Petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of constructive
dismissal.

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