Social Justice - Calalang v. Williams Et Al., 70 Phil., 726 (1940)
Social Justice - Calalang v. Williams Et Al., 70 Phil., 726 (1940)
726
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of
prohibition, against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director
of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the Cit y
of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas Street, from 7:30 a. m. to 12:30 p. m. and from
1:30 p. m. to 5:30 p. m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to' Echague Street, from 7 a.
m. to 11 p.m., for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the
resokjfeion aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions orCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads^fiiat on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-
drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on
August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public
Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles,
between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules
and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not now allowed to pass and
pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the
use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This
contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has
nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases, namely:
'The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.' (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St.,
88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an
executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to
whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U. S. vs. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing
tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the 'necessity' of the case."
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal
liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations icomplained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe 'transit upon_and avoid
obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly
was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which
is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at_ the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in
order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons
and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity.,piJlje_state (U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because
then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline,
so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater
authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people.
The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins vs. Los Angeles (195 U. S.
223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future,
because of the changed situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be
required to yield to the public good." And in People vs. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing civilization is bringing
within the police power of the state today things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of
civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of
the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many
questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered."
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-bring and economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however,
is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in
its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of ill
the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of rowers
underlying the existence of all governments on th$ time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. "The welfare of the people shall be
the supreme law"
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a
society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons,
and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Writ denied.