Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent Little Sarah A. Agdeppa Jesus Amparo
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent Little Sarah A. Agdeppa Jesus Amparo
SYNOPSIS
The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit. According to the Court, the
Court of Appeals committed no error in holding that Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over original petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Section 21 of B.P. 129. Petitioner has
apparently confused the separate and distinct remedies of an appeal through a petition for
review of a decision of a quasi-judicial agency under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and a
special civil action for certiorari through a petition for review under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The Court stressed that an appellate jurisdiction is separate and distinct from the
jurisdiction to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari. An appellate jurisdiction refers to a
process which is a continuation of the original suit and not a commencement of a new
action. In contrast, to invoke a court's jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari requires the
commencement of a new and original action therefor, independent of the proceedings
which gave rise to the questioned decision or order. The Court also found no reason to
disturb the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the present case falls under the recognized
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2020 cdasiaonline.com
exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Where the act complained
of is patently illegal since the administrative body acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with such grave abuse of discretion as to be tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies is no longer required and resort to the courts
through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is already permitted.IcTCHD
SYLLABUS
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 370 OF THE S PANISH CIVIL CODE AND ARTICLE 461 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE ARE APPLICABLE ONLY WHEN THE RIVER BEDS ARE ABANDONED
THROUGH THE NATURAL CHANGE IN THE COURSE OF THE WATERS; SUBJECT LAND IN
CASE AT BAR BECAME DRY AS A RESULT OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN IRRIGATION BY
THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION. — Had the disputed portion of the
Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect, the subject land would
clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the
aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are abandoned through the
natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the land
occupied by the new course," and the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire
them only after paying their value. And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of
the present Civil Code are applicable only when "[r]iver beds are abandoned through the
natural change in the course of the waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by
both the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land
became dry as a result of the construction of an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation
Administration. Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a
change in the course of a river, not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it
is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation,
commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public
dominion.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES , J : p
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that this case, be, as hereby it is, dismissed and
this case (sic), dropped from the records. The Miscellaneous Sales Application
(New) of Jesse Cachopero is hereby rejected and in lieu thereof, he shall le a
revocable permit application for the land in question after excluding from the
southern part of the land the area of ve (5) meters for right of way purposes as
shown in the sketch drawn at the back of this order. The segregation survey of the
area shall be at the pro-rata expense of the parties.
SO ORDERED. 2 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Petitioner thereafter instituted an action for ejectment against respondent and his
wife before the Municipal Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato, docketed as Civil Case No.
711. A judgment based on a compromise was rendered in said case under the following
terms and conditions:
That plaintiff is willing to give a two (2)-meter wide exit alley on the eastern
portion of said lot as road-right-of-way up to the point of the NIA road on the west
of Lot No. 2586-G-28, (LRC) Psd-105462;
T h a t defendants hereby promise to remove all their improvements
introduced fronting the residence of the plaintiff before August 31, 1989; and the
plaintiff shall likewise remove all her existing improvements on the same area;
xxx xxx xxx 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequently or on May 21, 1991, respondent led another MSA with the DENR
Regional O ce of Cotabato involving a portion of the same lot subject of his rst MSA,
covering an area of 334 square meters, more or less (the subject land), and docketed as
DENR-XII-Claim No. 050-90. This time, the MSA was supported by a certi cation 4 dated
January 9, 1989 issued by the O ce of the Mayor of Midsayap and an Indorsement 5
dated January 16, 1989 by the District Engineer of the Department of Public Works and
Highways stating that the subject land is suitable for residential purposes and no longer
needed by the municipal government.
Petitioner likewise led a protest against her brother-respondent's second MSA,
alleging a preferential right over the subject land, she being the adjacent and riparian
owner, and maintaining that it is her only access to the national highway. She thus
reiterated her demand for a five (5)-meter road right of way through the land.
After another investigation of the subject land, DENR Regional Executive Director
Macorro Macumbal issued an Order dated February 17, 1994 stating that it was suitable
for residential purposes but that, in light of the con icting interest of the parties, it be sold
at public auction. Respondent's second MSA was accordingly dismissed, viz:
In the ocular investigation of the premises, it was established that the said
property is a dried bed of Salunayan Creek resulting from the construction of the
irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration; that it is suitable for
residential purpose . . .
xxx xxx xxx
It is evident that under the law, property of the public domain situated
within the rst (1st) to fourth class municipalities are disposable by sales only.
Since municipality of Midsayap, Cotabato is classi ed as third (3rd) class
municipality and the property in dispute, Lot no. (MSA-XII-6)-1669, is situated in
the poblacion of Midsayap, Cotabato, and considering the con icting interest of
the herein parties, it is therefore equitable to dispose the same by sale at a public
auction pursuant to Section 67, C.A. No. 141, as amended, pertinent clause of
which provides:
Respondent led a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-said order of the DENR
Regional Executive Director, but it was denied by Order of February 27, 1995 by the OIC
Regional Executive Director of Region XII, Cotabato City in this wise:
A meticulous scrutiny of the records disclosed that Civil Case No. 711 for
ejectment, decided on the basis of compromise agreement of the parties dated
August 10, 1989, involved "transfer of the house from Lot No. MSA XII-6-1669 to
the litigant's parents' property situated at the back of protestant property, Lot No.
2586-G-28 (LRC), Psd-105462." Whereas the issue in DENR XII Claim No. 050-90
involved the disposition of lot no. (MSA II-6)-1669 a residential public land being
exclusively vested with the Director of Lands (Sec. 4, C.A. 141).
The two (2) meters wide exit alley provided in the compromise agreement
was established by the protestant from her private property (Lot No. 2586-G-28
(LRC), Psd-105462) for the bene t of her brother, herein respondent, upon his
transfer to their parents property at the back of Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC), Psd-
105462. Whereas the five (5) meters wide easement imposed on Lot No. (MSA-XII-
6)-1669, a public land, provided in the decision in DENR Claim No. 050-90 is in
accordance with Article 670 of the New Civil Code . . .
Respondent thereupon led on April 3, 1995 with the RTC of Midsayap, Cotabato a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction
and temporary restraining order assailing the Orders dated February 17, 1994 and
February 27, 1995 of the DENR Regional Executive Director and OIC Regional Executive
Director of Region XII, Cotabato, attributing grave abuse of discretion in the issuance
thereof.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the petition, alleging lack of jurisdiction and
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
By Order of March 26, 1997, the RTC denied respondent's petition for certiorari for
lack of merit and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, as it did deny his motion for
reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals, before which respondent assailed the RTC orders by petition
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2020 cdasiaonline.com
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, granted said petition, and accordingly reversed
and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC and ordered the DENR to process the MSA of
respondent. 8
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 9 of the appellate court's decision having
been denied by Resolution of March 2, 2000, 1 0 she lodged the present petition, alleging
that the Court of Appeals acted contrary to law and jurisprudence 1) in holding that the
RTC of Midsayap had jurisdiction over respondent's petition, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not applicable to the instant case, and the contested land is
public land; and 2) in ordering the processing of respondent's MSA pursuant to R.A. 730.
11
Petitioner contends that the RTC of Midsayap had no jurisdiction over respondent's
petition for certiorari as (a) it "is in the nature of an appeal" 1 2 falling within the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals under Section 9(3) 1 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129), as
amended; and (b) respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies when he failed to
appeal the questioned Orders to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. 1 4
Petitioner's petition fails.
Petitioner has apparently confused the separate and distinct remedies of an appeal
(i.e. through a petition for review of a decision of a quasi judicial agency under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court) and a special civil action for certiorari (i.e. through a petition for review
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court). In Silverio v. Court of Appeals, 1 5 this Court, speaking
through then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, distinguished between these two modes of
judicial review as follows:
The provisions of the Rules of Court permit an aggrieved party, in the
general types of cases, to take a cause and apply for relief to the appellate courts
by way of either of two distinctly different and dissimilar modes — through the
broad process of appeal or the limited special civil action of certiorari. An appeal
brings up for review errors of judgment committed by a court with jurisdiction
over the subject of the suit and the persons of the parties or any such error
committed by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction amounting to nothing
more than an error of judgment. On the other hand, the writ of certiorari issues for
the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari "cannot legally be used for
any other purpose." In terms of its function, the writ of certiorari serves "to keep an
inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing
such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction" or to relieve
parties from arbitrary acts of courts — acts which courts have no power or
authority in law to perform. 1 6 (Italics, emphasis and underscoring supplied)
True, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort rst to
the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under
their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review, and
non-observance thereof is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint, 2 3 the rationale
being:
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the
courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and
discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an
opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any
previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and
convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination
by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily
becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner. 2 4
To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, however, it must be clearly shown
that there is a patent and grave abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility. 2 7
The crux of the case at bar is, therefore, whether the DENR Regional Executive
Director and OIC Regional Director acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Orders dated February 17, 1994 and
February 27, 1995, respectively.
In resolving respondent's second MSA and petitioner's protest thereto, the DENR
Regional Executive Director, after considering the con icting interest of the parties, found
it equitable to resolve the same by directing the sale of the subject land at public auction
pursuant to Section 67, C.A. No. 141, as amended.
Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as "The Public Land
Act," provides the procedure for the disposition of lands of the public domain which are
open to disposition or concession and intended to be used for residential, commercial,
industrial or other productive purposes other than agricultural, to wit:
SEC. 67. The lease or sale shall be made through oral bidding; and
adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder. However, where an applicant
has made improvements on the land by virtue of a permit issued to him by
competent authority, the sale or lease shall be made by sealed bidding as
prescribed in Section twenty-six of this Act, the provisions of which shall be
applied wherever applicable. If all or part of the lots remain unleased or unsold,
the Director of Lands shall from time to time announce in the O cial Gazette or
in any other newspapers of general circulation, the lease or sale of those lots, if
necessary. (Emphasis supplied)
With the enactment of Republic Act No. 730 2 8 on June 18, 1952, however, an
exception to the foregoing procedure was created by authorizing disposition of lands of
the public domain by private sale, instead of bidding, provided that: (1) the applicant has in
his favor the conditions speci ed therein and (2) the area applied for is not more than
1,000 square meters. 2 9 The pertinent provision of R.A. 730 thus provides:
SEC. 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 61 and 67 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 293, any Filipino
citizen of legal age who is not the owner of a home lot in the municipality or city
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2020 cdasiaonline.com
in which he resides and who has in good faith established his residence on a
parcel of the public land of the Republic of the Philippines which is not needed for
the public service, shall be given preference to purchase at a private sale of which
reasonable notice shall be given to him not more than one thousand square
meters at a price to be xed by the Director of Lands with the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It shall be an essential condition
of this sale that the occupant has constructed his house on the land and actually
resided therein. Ten percent of the purchase price shall be paid upon the approval
of the sale and the balance may be paid in full, or in ten equal annual
installments.
SEC. 2. Land acquired under the provisions of this Act shall not be
subject to any restrictions against encumbrance or alienation before and after the
issuance of the patents thereon. 3 0
SEC. 3. The provisions of the Public Land Act with respect to the sale
of lands for residential purposes which are not inconsistent herewith shall be
applicable.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Given the foregoing provisions of R.A. 730 which took effect on June 18, 1952, and
the DENR Regional Executive Director's February 17, 1994 nding that the subject land was
"suitable for residential purposes," it was incumbent upon him to determine whether the
provisions of R.A. 730 were applicable to respondent's MSA. As held by the Court of
Appeals:
Finally, petitioner contends that the DENR Regional Executive Director and
OIC Regional Executive Director gravely erred in ordering the sale of the subject lot
through oral bidding applying Section 67, Commonwealth Act No. 141 and not
Republic Act 730 authorizing the sale of public land without bidding.
We agree with the petitioner.
"When public land lots of not more than 1,000 sq. ms. are used, or to
be used as a residence . . . they can be sold on private sales under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 730."
In Agura vs. Serfino, Sr., (204 SCRA 569), the Supreme Court held that:
The Regional Director, however, summarily chose to apply Section 67 of the Public
Land Act upon a nding that it was more "equitable" in light of the "con icting interest" of
the parties. In his "Answer" to respondent's petition before the RTC, the Director justi ed
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2020 cdasiaonline.com
his non-application of R.A. 730 in this wise:
. . . Republic Act No. 730 is not applicable to the case at bar, the land being
disputed, Republic Act No. 730 requisite (sic) vas not meet (sic) that for this law
to apply to a particular case, the land must be in the rst place not a land in
con ict. There being a pending protest for nal adjudication, the said con ict
continues to exist thus an impediment to the application of Republic Act 730 3 2
(Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, under Section 102 of the same Public Land Act, it is the duty of the
Director of the Lands Management Bureau to, after due hearing, verify whether the grounds
of a protest or objection to an MSA are well founded, and, if so, to cancel the MSA:
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2020 cdasiaonline.com
SEC. 102. Any person, corporation, or association may file an objection
under oath to any application or concession under this Act, grounded on any
reason su cient under this Act for the denial or cancellation of the application or
the denial of the patent or grant. If, after the applicant or grantee has been given
suitable opportunity to be duly heard, the objection is found to be well founded,
the Director of Lands shall deny or cancel the application or deny patent or grant,
and the person objecting shall, if quali ed, be granted a prior right of entry for a
term of sixty days from the date of the notice. (Emphasis supplied)
There was thus clearly a positive duty on the part of the DENR Director to process
respondent's MSA, and to ascertain, particularly in light of petitioner's protest, whether
respondent was quali ed to purchase the subject land at a private sale pursuant to R.A.
730. This, he did not do.
In ne, by abdicating his duty to process respondent's MSA and summarily ordering,
without factual or legal basis, that the subject land be disposed of via oral bidding
pursuant to Section 67 of the Public Land Act, the Director acted with patent grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As the Court of Appeals held:
Considering that the assailed Orders of public respondent DENR Regional
Executive Director applying Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and
ordering the sale of the subject lot by oral bidding are patently erroneous, the
authority of the court to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is
warranted. 3 7
The Director's commission of grave abuse of discretion does not, however, mean
that respondent automatically has the better right to the subject land. As mandated by law,
the Director must process respondent's MSA, conduct an investigation, and determine
whether the material facts set forth therein are true to bring it within the coverage of R.A.
730.
A thorough investigation is all the more imperative considering that petitioner's
protest raises serious factual issues regarding respondent's quali cation to purchase the
subject land — in particular, whether he already owns a home lot in Midsayap and whether
he has, in good faith, constructed his house on the subject land and actually resided
therein. These factual issues are properly within the authority of the DENR and the Land
Management Bureau, which are tasked with carrying out the provisions of the Public Land
Act and R.A. 730, 3 8 do determine, after both parties have been given an opportunity to
fully present their evidence.
As for petitioner's claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up
bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and
that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966,
when she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession
under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the
same must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man 3 9 and not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, 4 0 the adverse
possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the con rmation of an imperfect
title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. 4 1 It is only after
the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that
the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for
purposes of an imperfect title. 4 2
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2020 cdasiaonline.com
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and ow of the sea. 4 3 As such, under Articles 420(1) 4 4 and
502(1) 4 5 of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the
public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. 4 6 And, absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek
has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.
This, in fact, was the very reason behind the denial of respondent's rst MSA, the
District Engineer having certi ed that the government may need the subject land for future
expansion, and the o ce of the Municipal Mayor having certi ed that it was needed by the
municipal government for future public improvements. 4 7 Consequently, it was only after
the same o ces subsequently certi ed 4 8 that the subject land was suitable for
residential purposes and no longer needed by the municipal government that it became
alienable and disposable. Confronted with similar factual circumstances, this Court in
Bracewell v. Court of Appeals 4 9 held:
Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that
the land is alienable public land. On this score, we agree with respondents that
petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are
alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively shown by the
government that the same were only classi ed as alienable or disposable on
March 27, 1972. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-
interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by
virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable
land at that time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession
which may be the basis of a grant of title or con rmation of an imperfect title
refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. 5 0 (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 461 provides for compensation for the loss of the land occupied by the new bed
since it is believed more equitable to compensate the actual losers than to add land to
those who have lost nothing. 5 5 Thus, the abandoned river bed is given to the owner(s)
of the land(s) onto which the river changed its course instead of the riparian owner(s).
56
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in
the course of a river, not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not
even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation,
commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public
dominion. 6 1
Finally, while this Court notes that petitioner offered to purchase the subject land
from the government, 6 2 she did so through an informal letter dated August 9, 1989 6 3
instead of the prescribed form. By such move, she is deemed to have acknowledged that
the subject land is public land, for it would be absurd for her to have applied for its
purchase if she believed it was hers. She is thus stopped from claiming otherwise. 6 4
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.
Corona, J ., is on leave.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2020 cdasiaonline.com
Footnotes
3. Rollo at 47–48.
4. Records at 30.
5. Id. at 31.
6. DENR Order dated February 17, 1994, Rollo at 49–50.
7. Id. at 52.
8. Id. at 67.
9. CA Rollo at 74–121.
10. Rollo at 68–69.
11. Id. at 13–15.
12. Id. at 19.
13. SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards, or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph
of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
xxx xxx xxx
16 Id. at 538-539 (citations omitted); see also Fortich v. Corona, 289 SCRA 624, 642 (1998)
and Fernando v. Vasquez, et al., 31 SCRA 288 (1970).
21. Significantly, respondent Cachopero filed his petition in 1995, before the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure took effect. Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the present Rules of Court, a
petition assailing acts or omissions of quasi-judicial agencies should now be filed with
the Court of Appeals, viz:
SEC. 4. Where petition filed. — The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the
Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court
of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition
shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (Italics supplied)
22. Rollo at 66.
23. Castro v. Gloria, 363 SCRA 417, 422 (2001).
24. Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 357 SCRA 599, 604 (2001) (citations omitted).
25. Castro v. Gloria, supra at 422.
26. China Banking Corp. v. Members of the Board of Trustees, Home Development Mutual
Fund, 307 SCRA 443, 449-450 (1999) (citations omitted).
27. J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 24, 34 (2000) citing Lalican
v. Vergara, 276 SCRA 518 (1997); see also San Miguel Corporation v. Sandiganbayan,
340 SCRA 289, 310-311 (2000); Cuison v. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 159, 171 (1998).
28. AN ACT TO PERMIT THE SALE WITHOUT PUBLIC AUCTION OF PUBLIC LANDS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES TO QUALIFIED
APPLICANTS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS.
41. Palomo v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 392, 401 (1997); vide Villarico v. Court of
Appeals, 309 SCRA 193, 198 (1999).
42. Republic v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 476 (1987); Director of Land Management v.
Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 455 (1989); see also Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil.
335, 339 (1960).
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
xxx xxx xxx (italics supplied.)
52. Mijares v. Nery, 3 Phil. 195 (1904); Insular Government v. Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 505 (1911);
Barretto v. Tuazon, 59 Phil. 845 (1934).
53. See Agne v. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793, 805 (1990) and Pascual v. Sarmiento, et
al., 37 Phil. 170, 177 (1917).
54. Lara v. Del Rosario, 94 Phil. 778, 783 (1954); Raymundo v. Peñas, 96 Phil. 311, 313
(1954); Hilario, Jr. v. City of Manila, 126 Phil. 128, 135 (1967).