Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Lasmis v. Dong-E, G.R. No. 173021
Lasmis v. Dong-E, G.R. No. 173021
173021 October 20, 2010 The heirs of Ap-ap then executed, for a ₱500.00 consideration, a Deed of Quitclaim9 on
February 26, 1964 in favor of their brother Gilbert Semon (Margarita’s father).
DELFIN LAMSIS, MAYNARD MONDIGUING, JOSE VALDEZ, JR. and Heirs of AGUSTIN
KITMA, represented by EUGENE KITMA, Petitioners, Sometime between 1976 and 1978,10 Gilbert Semon together with his wife Mary Lamsis,
vs. allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a portion of Lot
MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E, Respondent. No. 1 together with their respective families.11 They were allowed to erect their houses,
introduce improvements, and plant trees thereon. When Manolo Lamsis and Nancy
DECISION Lamsis-Kitma died sometime in the 1980s, their children, petitioners Delfin Lamsis
(Delfin) and Agustin Kitma (Agustin), took possession of certain portions of Lot No. 1.
Delfin possessed 4,000 square meters of Lot No. 1, while Agustin occupied 5,000 square
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
meters thereof.12 Nevertheless, the heirs of Gilbert Semon tolerated the acts of their
first cousins.
There is laches when a party is aware, even in the early stages of the proceedings, of a
possible jurisdictional objection, and has every opportunity to raise said objection, but
When Gilbert Semon died in 1983,13 his children extrajudicially partitioned the property
fails to do so, even on appeal.
among themselves and allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of Margarita.14 Since then,
Margarita allegedly paid the realty tax over Lot No. 115 and occupied and improved the
This is a Petition for Review1 assailing the March 30, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of property together with her husband; while at the same time, tolerating her first cousins’
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 as well as its May 26, 2006 Resolution3 which occupation of portions of the same lot.
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed
Decision reads:
This state of affairs changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began
expanding their occupation on the subject property and selling portions thereof.16 Delfin
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit allegedly sold a 400-square meter portion of Lot No. 1 to petitioner
and the judgment dated January 8, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in Civil Maynard17 Mondiguing (Maynard) while Agustin sold another portion to petitioner Jose
Case No. 4140-R is AFFIRMED in toto. Valdez (Jose).18
In order to debunk petitioners’ claim that the Smiths owned the subject property, On the matter of the applicant[s’] indiguinity [sic] and qualifications, there is no doubt
Margarita presented a certified copy of a Resolution from the Land Management Office that they are members of the National Cultural Communities, particularly the Ibaloi
denying the Smiths’ application for recognition of the subject property as part of their tribe. They are the legitimate grandchildren of Ap-Ap (one name) who lived along the
ancestral land.25 The resolution explains that the application had to be denied because Asin Road area. His legal heirs are: Orani Ap-Ap, married to Calado Salda; Rita Ap-Ap,
the Smiths did not "possess, occupy or utilize all or a portion of the property x x x. The married to Jose Bacacan; Sucdad Ap-Ap, married to Oragon Wakit; and Gilbert Semon, a
actual occupants (who were not named in the resolution) whose improvements are former vice-mayor of Tuba, Benguet, [who] adopted the common name of their father
visible are not in any way related to the applicant or his co-heirs."26 Semon, as it is the customary practice among the early Ibalois. x x x
To bolster her claim of ownership and possession, Margarita introduced as evidence an On the matter regarding the inheritance of the heirs of Ap-Ap, it is important to state
unnumbered resolution of the Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands [that] Gilbert Semon consolidated ownership thereof and became the sole heir in 1964,
(CSTFAL) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), acting by way of a "Deed of Quitclaim" executed by the heirs in his favor. As to the respective
favorably on her and her siblings’ ancestral land claim over a portion of the 186,090- share of the applicants[’] co-heirs, the same was properly adjudicated in 1989 with the
square meter property.27 The said resolution states: execution of an "Extrajudicial Settlement/ Partition of Estate with Waiver of Rights."
The land subject of the instant application is the ancestral land of the herein applicants. With regard to the overlapping issue, it is pertinent to state that application No. Bg-L-
Well-established is the fact that the land treated herein was first declared for taxation 066 of Thomas Smith has already been denied by us in our Resolution dated November
purposes in 1922 under Tax Declaration No. 363 by the applicant’s grandfather Ap-Ap 1997. As to the other adverse claims therein by reason of previous conveyances in favor
(one name). Said application was reconstructed in 1965 after the original got lost during of third parties, the same were likewise excluded resulting in the reduction of the area
the war. These tax declarations were issued and recorded in the Municipality of Tuba, originally applied from ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND NINETY (186,090)
Benguet, considering that the land was then within the territorial jurisdiction of the said SQUARE METERS, more or less to ONE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
municipality. That upon the death of declarant Ap-Ap his heirs x x x transferred the tax FORTY TWO (110,342) SQUARE METERS, more or less. Considering the foregoing
declaration in their name, [which tax declaration is] now with the City assessor’s office developments, we find no legal and procedural obstacle in giving due course to the
of Baguio. instant application.
The land consisting of four (4) lots with a total area of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX Now therefore, we hereby [resolve] that the application for Recognition of Ancestral
THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE METERS, is covered by Psu-198317 duly Land Claim filed by the Heirs of Gilbert Semon, represented by Juanito Semon, be
approved by the Director of Lands on October 4, 1963 in the name of Ap-Ap (one name). granted [and] a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) be issued to the herein
In 1964, the same land was the subject of a petition filed by Gilbert Semon, as applicants by the Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Visayas
petitioner, before the Court of First Instance of the City of Baguio in the reopening of Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, through the Regional Executive Director, DENR-CAR,
Judicial Proceedings under Civil Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 for the registration Diego Silang Street, Baguio City. The area of the claim stated herein above is however
and the issuance of Certificate of Title of said land. The land registration case was subject to the outcome of the final survey to be forthwith executed.
however overtaken by the decision of the Supreme Court declaring such judicial
proceedings null and void because the courts of law have no jurisdiction. Carried this 23rd day of June 1998.28
It has been sufficiently substantiated by the applicants that prior to and at the time of The resolution was not signed by two members of the CSTFAL on the ground that the
the pendency of the land registration case and henceforth up to and including the signing of the unnumbered resolution was overtaken by the enactment of the Republic
Act (RA) No. 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). The IPRA (2) Ordering the [petitioners] Delfin Lamsis, Agustin Kitma, Menard
removed the authority of the DENR to issue ancestral land claim certificates and Mondiguing and Jose Valdez, Jr., to vacate the area they are presently
transferred the same to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).29 The occupying that is within Lot 1 of PSU 198317 belonging to the [respondent]
Ancestral Land Application No. Bg-L-064 of the Heirs of Gilbert Semon was transferred and to surrender possession thereof to the [respondent];
to the NCIP, Cordillera Administrative Region, La Trinidad, Benguet and re-docketed as
Case No. 05-RHO-CAR-03.30 The petitioners filed their protest in the said case before the (3) To pay [respondent] attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱10,000.00; and
NCIP. The same has been submitted for resolution.
(4) To pay the costs of suit.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court31
SO ORDERED.36
After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court found that it
preponderates in favor of respondent’s long-time possession of and claim of ownership
It appears that no motion for reconsideration was filed before the trial court.
over the subject property.32 The survey plan of the subject property in the name of the
Nevetheless, the trial court issued an Order37 allowing the petitioners’ Notice of
Heirs of Ap-ap executed way back in 1962 and the tax declarations thereafter issued to
Appeal.38
the respondent and her siblings all support her claim that her family and their
predecessors-in-interest have all been in possession of the property to the exclusion of
others. The court likewise gave credence to the documentary evidence of the transfer of Ruling of the Court of Appeals39
the land from the Heirs of Ap-ap to respondent’s father and, eventually to respondent
herself. The series of transfers of the property were indications of the respondent’s and The sole issue resolved by the appellate court was whether the trial court erred in ruling
her predecessors’ interest over the property. The court opined that while these pieces in favor of respondent in light of the adduced evidence. Citing the rule on
of documentary evidence were not conclusive proof of actual possession, they lend preponderance of evidence, the CA held that the respondent was able to discharge her
credence to respondent’s claim because, "in the ordinary course of things, persons will burden in proving her title and interest to the subject property. Her documentary
not execute legal documents dealing with real property, unless they believe, and have evidence were amply supported by the testimonial evidence of her witnesses.
the basis to believe, that they have an interest in the property subject of the legal
documents x x x."33 In contrast, petitioners only made bare allegations in their testimonies that are
insufficient to overcome respondent’s documentary evidence.
In contrast, the trial court found nothing on record to substantiate the allegations of the
petititioners that they and their parents were the long-time possessors of the subject Petitioners moved for a reconsideration40 of the adverse decision but the same was
property. Their own statements belied their assertions. Petitioner Maynard and Jose denied.
both admitted that they could not secure title for the property from the Bureau of Lands
because there were pending ancestral land claims over the property.34 Petitioner Hence this petition, which was initially denied for failure to show that the CA committed
Agustin’s Townsite Sales Application over the property was held in abeyance because of any reversible error.41 Upon petitioners’ motion for reconsideration,42 the petition was
respondent’s own claim, which was eventually favorably considered by the CSTFAL.35 reinstated in the Court’s January 15, 2007 Resolution.43
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads: Petitioners’ arguments
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Petitioners assign as error the CA’s appreciation of the evidence already affirmed and
[respondent] and against the [petitioners] – considered by the trial court. They maintain that the change in the presiding judges who
heard and decided their case resulted in the appreciation of what would otherwise be
(1) Declaring the transfer of a portion of Lot 1 of PSU 198317 made by the inadmissible evidence.44 Petitioners ask that the Court exempt their petition from the
[petitioner] Delfin Lamsis to Menard Mondiguing and Jose Valdez, Jr. null and general rule that a trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded
void; great respect on appeal.
To support their claim that the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling in favor of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto
respondent, they assailed the various pieces of evidence offered by respondent. They itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged
maintain that the Deed of Quitclaim executed by the Heirs of Ap-ap is spurious and lacks with an administrative body of special competence."53 The courts should stand aside in
the parties’ and witnesses’ signatures. Moreover, it is a mere photocopy, which was order to prevent the possibility of creating conflicting decisions.54
never authenticated by the notary public in court and no reasons were proferred
regarding the existence, loss, and contents of the original copy.45 Under the best Respondent’s arguments
evidence rule, the Deed of Quitclaim is inadmissible in evidence and should have been
disregarded by the court.
Respondent opines that the appellate court did not commit any reversible error in
affirming the trial court’s decision. The present petition is a mere dilatory tactic to
Respondent did not prove that she and her husband possessed the subject property frustrate the speedy administration of justice.55
since time immemorial. Petitioners argue that respondent admitted possessing and
cultivating only the land that lies outside the subject property.46
Respondent also asserts that questions of fact are prohibited in a Rule 45
petition.56 Thus, the appreciation and consideration of the factual issues are no longer
Petitioners next assail the weight to be given to respondent’s muniments of ownership, reviewable.57
such as the tax declarations and the survey plan. They insist that these are not
indubitable proofs of respondent’s ownership over the subject property given that there
The issue of lack of jurisdiction is raised for the first time in the petition before this
are other claimants to the land (who are not parties to this case) who also possess a
Court. It was never raised before the trial court or the CA. Thus, respondent insists that
survey plan over the subject property.47
petitioners are now barred by laches from attacking the trial court’s jurisdiction over the
case. Citing Aragon v. Court of Appeals,58 respondent argues that the jurisdictional issue
Petitioners then assert their superior right to the property as the present possessors should have been raised at the appellate level at the very least so as to avail of the
thereof. They cite pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code which presume good faith doctrine that the ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case may be
possession on the part of the possessor and puts the burden on the plaintiff in an action raised at any stage of the proceedings even on appeal.59
to recover to prove her superior title.48
Respondent maintains that there is no room for the application of litis pendentia
Petitioners next assert that they have a right to the subject property by the operation of because the issues in the application for ancestral land claim are different from the issue
acquisitive prescription. They posit that they have been in possession of a public land in a reivindicatory action. The issue before the NCIP is whether the Government, as
publicly, peacefully, exclusively and in the concept of owners for more than 30 years. grantor, will recognize the ancestral land claim of respondent over a public alienable
Respondent’s assertion that petitioners are merely possessors by tolerance is land; while the issue in the reivindicatory case before the trial court is ownership,
unsubstantiated.49 possession, and right to recover the real property.60
Petitioners also maintain that the reivindicatory action should be dismissed for lack of Given that the elements of lis pendens are absent in case at bar, the allegation of forum-
jurisdiction in light of the enactment of the IPRA, which gives original and exclusive shopping is also bereft of merit. Any judgment to be rendered by the NCIP will not
jurisdiction over disputes involving ancestral lands and domains to the NCIP.50 They amount to res judicata in the instant case.61
assert that the customary laws of the Ibaloi tribe of the Benguet Province should be
applied to their dispute as mandated by Section 65, Chapter IX of RA 8371, which states:
Issues
"When disputes involve ICCs/IPs,51 customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
the dispute."
The petitioners present the following issues for our consideration:
In the alternative that jurisdiction over an accion reivindicatoria is held to be vested in
the trial court, the petitioners insist that the courts should dismiss the reivindicatory 1. Whether the appellate court disregarded material facts and circumstances in
action on the ground of litis pendentia.52 They likewise argue that NCIP has primary affirming the trial court’s decision;
jurisdiction over ancestral lands, hence, the courts should not interfere "when the
dispute demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special 2. Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription;
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal x x x In cases where
3. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the The fact that respondent’s documents traverse several decades, from the 1960s to the
effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 at the time 1990s, is an indication that she and her family never abandoned their right to the
that the complaint was instituted; property and have continuously exercised rights of ownership over the same.
4. If the trial court retains jurisdiction, whether the ancestral land claim Moreover, respondent’s version of how the petitioners came to occupy the property
pending before the NCIP should take precedence over the reivindicatory coincides with the same timeline given by the petitioners themselves. The only
action.62 difference is that petitioners maintain they came into possession by tolerance of the
Smith family, while respondent maintains that it was her parents who gave permission
Our Ruling to petitioners. Given the context under which the parties’ respective statements were
made, the Court is inclined to believe the respondent’s version, as both the trial and
appellate courts have concluded, since her version is corroborated by the documentary
Whether the appellate court disregarded material facts and circumstances in affirming
evidence.
the trial court’s decision
Likewise apropos is the following explanation: As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the
proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by
The fact that the [respondents] were able to secure [TCTs over the property] did not the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at the time of
operate to vest upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens system does not the filing of the complaint.
create or vest title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership x x x
If the [respondents] wished to assert their ownership, they should have filed a judicial An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of Tijam
action for recovery of possession and not merely to have the land registered under their v. Sibonghanoy,79 the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from
respective names. x x x Certificates of title do not establish ownership.73 (Emphasis raising the court’s lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect, for an
supplied) unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
A registration proceeding is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership. In fact, if it is right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to
later on found in another case (where the issue of ownership is squarely adjudicated) assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it."80 Wisely, some cases81 have
that the registrant is not the owner of the property, the real owner can file a cautioned against applying Tijam, except for the most exceptional cases where the
reconveyance case and have the title transferred to his name.74 factual milieu is similar to Tijam.
Given that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands) is not a In Tijam, the surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial court
conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will not constitute litis pendentia on a but failed to do so. Instead, the surety participated in the proceedings and filed
reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership.75 "For litis pendentia to be a ground for pleadings, other than a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. When the case reached
the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or the appellate court, the surety again participated in the case and filed their pleadings
at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of therein. It was only after receiving the appellate court’s adverse decision that the surety
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) awoke from its slumber and filed a motion to dismiss, in lieu of a motion for
the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that reconsideration. The CA certified the matter to this Court, which then ruled that the
any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is surety was already barred by laches from raising the jurisdiction issue.
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case."76 The third element is
missing, for any judgment in the certification case would not constitute res judicata or In case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the presence of
be conclusive on the ownership issue involved in the reivindicatory case. Since there is laches cannot be ignored. If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches for raising the issue
no litis pendentia, there is no reason for the reivindicatory case to be suspended or of jurisdiction for the first time in the CA, what more for petitioners in the instant case
dismissed in favor of the certification case. who raised the issue for the first time in their petition before this Court.
Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot agree with petitioners’ contention
that respondent committed forum-shopping. Settled is the rule that "forum shopping
At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998, the IPRA was already in effect but WE CONCUR:
the petitioners never raised the same as a ground for dismissal; instead they filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the property did not meet the RENATO C. CORONA
jurisdictional value for the RTC. They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into Chief Justice
consideration. Chairperson
When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the petitioners no longer raised the PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
issue of the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. Instead, they proceeded to trial, all the time Associate Justice Associate Justice
aware of the existence of the IPRA as evidenced by the cross-examination82 conducted
by petitioners’ lawyer on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. In the cross-
examination, it was revealed that the petitioners were aware that the DENR, through JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
the CSTFAL, had lost its jurisdiction over ancestral land claims by virtue of the enactment Associate Justice
of the IPRA. They assailed the validity of the CSTFAL resolution favoring respondent on
the ground that the CSTFAL had been rendered functus officio under the IPRA.
CERTIFICATION
Inexplicably, petitioners still did not question the trial court’s jurisdiction.1avvphi1
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court, they only raised as errors the trial
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
court’s appreciation of the evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom. In
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
their brief, they once again assailed the CSTFAL’s resolution as having been rendered
functus officio by the enactment of IPRA.83 But nowhere did petitioners assail the trial
court’s ruling for having been rendered without jurisdiction. RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
It is only before this Court, eight years after the filing of the complaint, after the trial
court had already conducted a full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits,
after the appellate court had made a thorough review of the records, and after
petitioners have twice encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate
courts — that petitioners now want to expunge all the efforts that have gone into the
litigation and resolution of their case and start all over again. This practice cannot be
allowed.
Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ theory about the effect of IPRA is
correct (a matter which need not be decided here), they are already barred by laches
from raising their jurisdictional objection under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The March
30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 and its May 26, 2006
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.