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LIST OF CASES the original registry in the chattel mortgage of the building and the
Property machinery installed therein, nor the annotation in that registry of
the sale of the mortgaged property, had any effect whatever so far
LEUNG YEE, Plaintiff-appellant, -versus- FRANK L. as the building was concerned.
STRONG MACHINERY COMPANY and J. G.
WILLIAMSON, Defendants-appellees. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -
versus- COURT OF APPEALS, MYLO O. QUINTO and
G.R. No. L-11658, FIRST DIVISION, February 15, 1918, CARSON, J. JESUSA CHRISTINE S. CHUPUICO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 109946, FIRST DIVISION, February 9, 1996, BELOSILLO,
A factory building is real property, and the mere fact that it is J.
mortgaged and sold, separate and apart from the land on which What divests the government of title to the land is the issuance
it stands, in no wise changes its character as real property. Here, of the sales patent and its subsequent registration with the
the building of strong materials in which the rice-cleaning Register of Deeds. It is the registration and issuance of the
machinery was installed by the "Compañia Agricola Filipina" was certificate of title that segregate public lands from the mass of
real property, and the mere fact that the parties seem to have public domain and convert it into private property. Since the
dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood disputed lot was still the subject of a Free Patent Application
in no wise changed its character as real property. when mortgaged to DBP and no patent was granted to the
Spouses Olidiana, the lot remained part of the public domain.
FACTS:
FACTS:
Compañia Agricola Filipina bought rice-cleaning machinery from
Frank L. Strong Machinery Company and to secure the payment of DBP granted a loan to Spouses Olidiana which was secured by a
such, it executed a chattel mortgage over such machineries real estate mortgage on several properties. At the time of the
including the building to which they are installed. This mortgage mortgage, the disputed lot was still the subject of a Free Patent
was registered in the chattel mortgage registry. Due to its failure application filed by the Spouses Olidiana with the Bureau of Lands
to pay, the mortgaged property was sold and was bought by Strong but registered under their name for taxation purposes. Spouses
Machinery Company. Later, Strong Machinery Company took Olidiana amended their Free Patent application over several
possession of the said building. Unknown to Strong Machinery parcels of land, in which they waived all their rights and interests
Company, the same buildings are likewise subject of another over the disputed lot in favor of Chupuico and Quinto. Thereafter,
mortgage executed by Compañia Agricola Filipina in favor of each of them obtained original certificate of title over the
Leung Yee to secure its outstanding obligation. Compañia Agricola subdivided lot. For failure of Spouses Olidiana to comply with their
Filipina also defaulted in his obligation which prompted Yee to mortgage contract, DBP extrajudicially foreclosed all their
levy execution upon the building. Yee subsequently bought the mortgaged properties, and was awarded as the highest bidder.
property in an auction sale and was issued a sheriff's certificate of When DBP tried to register the sale, it was discovered that the lot
the sale which he latter registered. The defendant machinery had already been divided into 2 parcels, belonging to Chupuico and
company filed with the sheriff a sworn statement setting up its Quinto, respectively. DBP then filed an action for quieting of title.
claim of title and demanding the release of the property from the RTC ruled against DBP as the
levy. Upon execution of the necessary bond, the sheriff sold the Spouses Olidiana were not yet owners in fee simple when they
property to Yee. Thereafter, Yee instituted an action to recover mortgaged the property and that the property was still a public
possession of the building from the machinery company. The RTC land when mortgaged to DBP, thus it could not have been the
relied on Article 1473 of the Civil Code and ruled in favor in favor subject of a valid mortgage. The CA affirmed such decision.
of the machinery company holding that the company had its title
to the building registered prior to the date of registry of the ISSUE:
plaintiff's certificate.
Whether the lot was still a public land which could not have been
ISSUE: validly mortgaged. (YES)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- indorsement of the executive secretary is not the law or
DAMIAN ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, DEOGRACIAS presidential proclamation required for converting land of the
ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA ERMITAÑO DE public domain into patrimonial property and rendering it
GUZMAN, ALICIA ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, SALVADOR susceptible to prescription. There then was no viable declaration
ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, DOMINGA ERMITAÑO, rendering the Iligan property to have been patrimonial property
NATIVIDAD ENCARNACION, MELBA E. TORRES, FLORA at the onset. Accordingly, regardless of the length of petitioners'
MANALO, SOCORRO DELA ROSA, JOSE ERMITAÑO, possession, no title could vest on them by way of prescription.
ESMERANDO ERMITAÑO, TRICOM DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and FILOMENO ERMITAÑO, Respondents. FACTS
G.R. No. 137887, FIRST DIVISION, February 28, 2000, YNARES- The Regional Trial Court's May 20, 2002 Decision awarded
SANTIAGO, J. compensation to Leopoldo and Soledad
Delfin (Delfin Spouses) for an Iligan City property subsequently
Forest lands are not capable of private appropriation and occupied by respondent National
possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into Housing Authority. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision
private property, unless and until such lands were reclassified reversed the Regional Trial Court's May 20, 2002 Decision and
and considered disposable and alienable. Here, the property dismissed the Delfin Spouses' complaint seeking compensation.
subject of De Guzmans’ application was only declared alienable The assailed
in 1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest land incapable Court of Appeals Resolution denied their Motion for
of private appropriation. Reconsideration.
executive order, which stated that petitioners' property was no the Iligan Property, it follows that petitioners must be
longer needed for any public or quasi-public purposes: compensated for its taking.
That it is very clear in the 4th Indorsement of the Executive HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A.
Secretary dated April 24, 1954 the portion thereof that will not be Malabanan), Petitioners, -versus- REPUBLIC OF THE
needed for any public or quasi-public purposes, be disposed in PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
favor of the actual occupants under the administration of the G.R. No. 179987, EN BANC, September 3, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.
Bureau of Lands (copy of the Executive Order is herewith attached A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such
for ready reference) reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify public
lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department,
However, a mere indorsement of the executive secretary is not the not in the courts. If, however, public land will be classified as
law or presidential proclamation required for converting land of neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or
the public domain into patrimonial property and rendering it when public land is no longer intended for public service or for
susceptible to prescription. There then was no viable declaration the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively
rendering the Iligan property to have been patrimonial property removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
at the onset. Accordingly, regardless of the length of petitioners' declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a
possession, no title could vest on them by way of prescription. law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation
in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that
While petitioners may not claim title by prescription, they may, effect.
nevertheless, claim title pursuant to Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public Land Act). they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
Section 48 enabled the confirmation of claims and issuance of titles of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite
in favor of citizens occupying or claiming to own lands of the public character and period of possession – possession and
domain or an interest therein. Section 48 (b) specifically pertained occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
since June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be considered
to those who "have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
ipso jure converted to private property even upon the
notorious possession and, occupation of agricultural lands of the
subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since
FACTS
June 12, 1945"Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act therefore
requires that two (2) requisites be satisfied before claims of title
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
to public domain lands may be confirmed: first, that the land
covering the property he purchased from Eduardo Velazco,
subject of the claim is agricultural land; and second, open,
claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and
continuous, notorious, and exclusive possession of the land since
disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his
June 12, 1945.
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of
That the Iligan property was alienable and disposable, agricultural
the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the
land, has been admitted. What is claimed instead is that
judicial confirmation of his title.
petitioners' possession is debunked by how the Iligan Property
was supposedly part of a military reservation area57 which was
The application was granted by the RTC. However, the OSG for the
subsequently reserved for Iligan City's slum improvement and
Republic appealed the judgment to the CA, which reversed the RTC
resettlement program, and the relocation of families who were
Judgment.
dislocated by the National Steel Corporation's five-year expansion
program.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the
CA, his heirs elevated the said decision to this Court through a
Indeed, by virtue of Proclamation No. 2143 (erroneously referred
petition for review on certiorari.
to by respondent as Proclamation No. 2151) certain parcels of land
in Barrio Suarez, Iligan City were reserved for slum-improvement
The petition was denied.
and resettlement program purposes. The proclamation
characterized the covered area as "disposable parcel of public
Petitioners and the Republic filed Motions for Reconsideration.
land"
ISSUE:
Clearly then, petitioners acquired title over the Iligan Property
pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public
Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the property
Land Act.
was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. (NO)
First, there is no issue that the Iligan Property had already been RULING:
declared to be alienable and disposable land. Respondent has
admitted this and Deputy Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr.'s
Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either
letters to the Director of Land attest to this. of public dominion or of private ownership. Land is considered of
public dominion if it either:
Second, although the Delfin Spouses' testimonial evidence and tax
(a) is intended for public use; or
declarations showed that their possession went only as far back as
(b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is
1952, Deputy Public Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr.'s letters to the intended for some public service or for the development of the
Director of Land nevertheless attest to a previous finding that the national wealth.
property had already been occupied as early as June 1945.
Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or
although of such character but no longer intended for public use
Having shown that the requisites of Section 48(b) of the Public or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the
Land Act have been satisfied and having established their rights to
4
State. Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of both instruments. Not all the elements of a donation of an
the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private immovable property are present in the instant case.
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept FACTS
first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through
the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of
domain belong to the State. This means that the State is the source the spouses Simeon Guzman (naturalized American) and Helen
of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the Meyers Guzman (American citizen). In 1968, Simeon died leaving
conservation of such patrimony. to his heirs, Helen and David, an estate consisting of several
parcels of land in Bulacan.
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate, dividing and adjudicating to themselves
Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public all of the property, and registered it to the RD a year after. In 1981,
domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning, transferring and
them to private persons. conveying her ½ share of the properties to David. But since it was
A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such not registered, she executed another Deed of Quitclaim to confirm
reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify public the first.
lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department,
not in the courts. If, however, public land will be classified as In 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the OSG and furnished it with
neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or documents showing that David’s ownership of ½ of the estate was
when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the defective. He argued that Art. XII of the Constitution only allows
development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing Filipinos to acquire private lands in the country. The only
the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such instances when a foreigner may acquire private property are by
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural-born
Congress or by a citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship. Moreover, it contends that
Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly the Deeds of Quitclaim executed by Helen were really donations
authorized by law to that effect. Thus, until the Executive inter vivos.
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, Republic filed with RTC a Petition for Escheat praying that ½ of
or until David’s interest be forfeited in its favor. RTC dismissed. CA
Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends affirmed.
the land to be used for public service or for the development of
national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable. ISSUE
However, in the case at bar, the petitioners failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors- Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos (NO)
in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945.
Without satisfying the requisite character and period of HELD
possession – possession and occupation that is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the
cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the
upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality
or animus donandi. When applied to a donation of an immovable
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the property, the law further requires that the donation be made in a
land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) public document and that there should be an acceptance thereof
of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public
to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the document.7 In cases where the acceptance is made in a separate
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the instrument, it is mandated that the donor should be notified
President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both instruments.
intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth. Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer of the
properties by virtue of a Deed of Quitclaim resulted in the (1)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- DAVID reduction of her patrimony as donor and the (2) consequent
REY GUZMAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA increase in the patrimony of David as donee. However, Helen’s (3)
G. ABELA, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of David was not
MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH, Respondents. sufficiently established. The 2 Quitclaims reveal that Helen
G.R. No. 132964. SECOND DIVISION, February 18, 2000, intended to convey to her son certain parcels of land and to re-
BELLOSILLO, J. affirm it, she executed a waiver and renunciation of her rights over
these properties. It is clear that Helen merely contemplated a
There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the waiver of her rights, title, interest over the lands in favor of David,
reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the not a donation. She was also aware that donation was not possible.
patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the proper form
liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a donation of an and registration to make the donation valid is lacking. The SPA
immovable property, the law further requires that the donation executed by David in favor of Atty. Abela was not his acceptance,
be made in a public document and that there should be an but an acknowledgment that David owns the property referred to
acceptance thereof made in the same deed of donation or in a and that he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name.
separate public document.7 In cases where the acceptance is Further, there was nothing in the SPA to show that he indeed
made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor accept the donation.
should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in
5
However, the inexistence of a donation does not make the The petitioner filed an opposition dated September 18, 1995 to the
repudiation of Helen in favor David valid. respondent's application for registration of title, alleging among
There is NO valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already others: (1) That neither the respondent nor her predecessors-in
accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together with interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12,
dividing and adjudicating between them all the properties. By 1945 or prior thereto; (2) That the muniments of title and/or the
virtue of that settlement, the properties were registered in their tax declarations and tax payment receipts of the respondent
names and for 11 years, they possessed the land in the concept of attached to or alleged in the application do not constitute
owner. Thus, the 2 Quitclaims have no legal force and effect. Helen competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the
still owns ½ of the property. land applied for or of their open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of an
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- owner since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto; and that said
DIOSDADA I. GIELCZYK, Respondent. muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and the tax
declarations and/or tax payment receipts indicate the pretended
G.R. No. 179990, FIRST DIVISION, October 23, 2013, REYES, J. possession of the respondent to be of recent vintage; (3) That the
respondent can no longer avail of the claim of ownership in fee
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court further simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant since she has failed to
clarified the difference between Section file an appropriate application for registration within the period of
14(1) and Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The former refers to six months from February 16, 1976 as required by Presidential
registration of title on the basis Decree (P.D.) No. 892. From the records, the petitioner further
of possession, while the latter entitles the applicant to the alleged that the instant application was filed on July 7, 1995; and,
registration of his property on the basis (4) That the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public
of prescription. Moreover, under Section 48(b) of the PLA, as domain belonging to the petitioner and that the said parcel is not
amended by Republic Act No. 1472, the 30-year period is in subject to private appropriation.
relation to possession without regard to the Civil Code, while
under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the 30-year period On November 3, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of
involves extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code, the respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Thus, the petitioner filed the present Petition for Review under
In this case, the respondent failed to meet the required period of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
possession and occupation for purposes of prescription. From
the time of the declaration on September 1, 1965 that the ISSUE:
properties in question are purportedly alienable and disposable
up to the filing of the application of the respondent on July 17, Whether the respondent was able to prove that she and her
1995, the respondent and her predecessors-in-interest had predecessors-in-interest have been in open, complete, continuous,
possessed and occupied the said properties for only 29 years
notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession over the lands
and 10 months, short of two months to complete the whole 30-
subject of the application for original registration for a period of
year possession period.
over 40 years through mere tax declarations and in the absence of
Furthermore, the respondent failed to show that she or her
proof when the subject lots were declared alienable and
predecessors-in-interest have exercised acts of dominion over
disposable lands of the public domain. (No)
the said parcels of land. In fact, it was only the respondent who
testified to substantiate her allegations in the application. She
RULING:
did not present anyone else to support her claim of "open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
The respondent failed to completely prove that there was
occupation." Unfortunately, her testimony simply made general
an expressed State declaration that the properties in
declarations without further proof.
question are no longer intended for public use, public
service, the development of the national wealth and have
FACTS:
been converted into patrimonial property, and to meet the
period of possession and occupation required by law.
On July 17, 1995, the respondent sought the registration under her
In the assailed decision granting the respondent's application for
name of the lands denominated as Lot No. 3135-A and Lot No.
registration of title, the CA explained that the RTC's decision was
3136-A of Plans Csd-072219-004552 and Csd-072219-004551.
based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 and not on Section 14(1)
Both lands were situated in Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu. In her
of the same decree.
verified application in LRC Case No. N-452, the respondent
claimed that she is the owner of the two parcels of land.
The Court agrees with the CA's finding that the RTC's grant of the
respondent's application for registration of title was based on
The respondent further alleged the following: (a) that the said
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 and not on Section 14(1) of the same
parcels of land were last assessed for taxation at P2,400.00; (b)
decree. As the CA, citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
that to the best of her knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage
Appeals and Naguit, correctly explained, an applicant may apply
nor encumbrance of any kind affecting said land, nor any person
for registration of title through prescription under Section 14(2)
having interest therein, legal or equitable; (c) that she had been in
of P.D. No. 1529, stating that patrimonial properties of the State
open, complete, continuous, and peaceful possession in the
are susceptible of prescription and that there is a rich
concept of an owner over said parcels of land up to the present
jurisprudential precedents which rule that properties classified as
time for more than 30 years, including the possession of her
alienable public land may be converted into private property by
predecessors-in-interest; (d) that she acquired title to said land by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30
virtue of the deeds of absolute sale; and (e) that said land is not
years.
occupied.
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,[36] the Court further
clarified the difference between Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)
6
of P.D. No. 1529. The former refers to registration of title on the In Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan v. Municipality of
basis of possession, while the latter entitles the applicant to the Buruanga, Aklan,[45]the Court ruled that for an applicant to ipso
registration of his property on the basis of prescription. jure or by operation of law acquire government grant or vested
Registration under the first mode is extended under the aegis of title to a lot, he must be in open, continuous, exclusive and
the P.D. No. 1529 and the Public Land Act (PLA) while under the notorious possession and occupation of the lot.
second mode is made available both by P.D. No. 1529 and the Civil A simple claim of "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
Code. Moreover, under Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by possession and occupation" does not suffice. An applicant for a
Republic Act No. 1472, the 30-year period is in relation to grant or title over a lot must be able to show that he has exercised
possession without regard to the Civil Code, while under Section acts of dominion over the property in question. The applicant's
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the 30-year period involves extraordinary possession must not be simply a nominal claim where he only
prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in plants a sign or symbol of possession. In other words, his
relation to Article 1137. possession of the property must be patent, visible, apparent,
notorious and not clandestine; it should be uninterrupted,
Indeed, the foregoing jurisprudence clearly shows the basis of the unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; it should
respondent's application for registration of title. However, the demonstrate exclusive dominion over the land and an
petitioner argued that the respondent failed to show proof of an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and it should be
expressed State declaration that the properties in question are no conspicuous, which means generally known and talked of by the
longer intended for public use, public service, the development of public or the people in the neighborhood.
the national wealth or have been converted into patrimonial
property. It pointed out that the certification which the In the instant case, the respondent failed to show that she or her
respondent submitted did not indicate when the lands applied for predecessors-in-interest have exercised acts of dominion over the
were declared alienable and disposable. said parcels of land. In fact, it was only the respondent who
testified to substantiate her allegations in the application. She did
On this point, the Court cannot completely agree with the not present anyone else to support her claim of "open, continuous,
petitioner. Indeed, the respondent attempted to show proof as to exclusive and notorious possession and occupation."
when the subject lands were declared alienable and disposable. Unfortunately, her testimony simply made general declarations
While the RTC and the CA failed to cite the evidence which the without further proof. In the continuance of her testimony, the
respondent submitted, the Court cannot, in the name of substantial respondent added no further information for this Court to
justice and equity, close its eyes to the September 23, 2004 conclude that she indeed exercised specific acts of dominion aside
Certification issued and signed by Fedencio P. Carreon (Carreon), from paying taxes. The respondent's cross-examination further
OIC, CENRO, which the respondent attached in her Appellee's brief revealed that she and her predecessors-in-interest have not
in the CA. exercised specific acts of dominion over the properties.
However, following our ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. From the foregoing testimony of the lone witness (the applicant-
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,[41] this CENRO respondent herself), the Court can deduce that, besides
Certification by itself is insufficient to establish that a public land intermittently paying the tax dues on Lot No. 3135-A, the
is alienable and disposable. While the certification refers to respondent did not exercise acts of dominion over it. Neither can
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063 dated September 1, the Court give credence to the respondent's claim that her
1965, the respondent should have submitted a certified true copy predecessors-in-interest had exercised dominion over the
thereof to substantiate the alienable character of the land. In any property since the respondent failed to present any witness who
case, the Court does not need to further discuss whether the would substantiate her allegation. The pieces of documentary
respondent was able to overcome the burden of proving that the evidence, specifically the tax declarations and the deeds of
land no longer forms part of the public domain to support her absolute sale, can neither be relied upon because the same
application for original land registration because of other revealed no indication of any improvement that would have the
deficiencies in her application. Court conclude that the respondent exercised specific acts of
dominion. For instance, the deed of absolute sale simply said that
Indeed, the respondent failed to meet the required period of the improvements on Lot No. 3135-A consisted of two (2) coconut
possession and occupation for purposes of prescription. From the trees, one (1) mango tree, one (1) caimito tree and one (1) jackfruit
time of the declaration on September 1, 1965 that the properties tree.[56]The tax declarations have not shown any indication
in question are purportedly alienable and disposable up to the supporting the respondent's claim that she exercised specific acts
filing of the application of the respondent on July 17, 1995, the of dominion.
respondent and her predecessors-in-interest had possessed and
occupied the said properties for only 29 years and 10 months, As to Lot No. 3136-A, the deed of absolute sale showed that there
short of two months to complete the whole 30-year possession were 14 coconut trees, eight (8) jackfruit trees, and a residential
period. building, which was actually possessed by the vendor Constancio
Ceniza. Moreover, it was only in Tax Declaration Nos. 29200,
The respondent failed to present specific acts of ownership 04210 and 13275 where it was declared that a residential building
to substantiate her claim of open, continuous, exclusive, has been built in Lot No. 3136-A.[58] And based on the records,
notorious and adverse possession in the concept of an Tax Declaration No. 29200, where the residential building was
owner. first indicated, is dated 1981. It may be said then that it was only
in 1981 when the respondent's predecessors-in-interest exercised
The petitioner contends that the respondent failed to present specific acts of dominion over Lot No. 3136-A, the period of which
specific acts of ownership to substantiate the latter's claim of open, consists barely of 14 years. Thus, the respondent has not
continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession in the completed the required 30 years of "open, continuous, exclusive
concept of an owner. Here, the Court agrees with the petitioner's and notorious possession and occupation."
argument.
Clearly, from the pieces of documentary and testimonial evidence,
and considering that the respondent did not present any other
7
witness to support her claim, the Court has no other recourse but
to declare that she has not presented the premium of evidence RULING:
needed to award her title over the two parcels of land.
The Torrens system was adopted to obviate possible conflicts of
FLORENTINO W. LEONG AND ELENA LEONG, ET AL., title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the
Petitioners, -versus- EDNA C. Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of
SEE, Respondent. inquiring further. One need not inquire beyond the four corners of
the certificate of title when dealing with registered property.
G.R. No. 194077, SECOND DIVISION, December 03, 2014, Leonen, An innocent purchaser for value refers to someone who buys the
J. property of another without notice that some other person has a
right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the
Spouses owned the subject property wherein petitioner Elena time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another
was allowed to stay. Upon the spouses’ divorce, the property person’s claim. One claiming to be an innocent purchaser for value
went to the wife. She sold it to the respondent See. The Court has the burden of proving such status.
held that See was a buyer in good faith. She went to the Register The Court cited the ruling of the trial court: “By her overt acts,
of Deeds to verify the title and relied on the marriage settlement Edna See with her father verified the authenticity of Carmelita’s
agreement. The Court found that she exerted due diligence. An land title at the Registry of Deeds of Manila. There was no
innocent purchaser for value refers to someone who buys the annotation on the same, and thus, it is deemed a clean title. Also,
property of another without notice that some other person has a she relied on the duly executed and notarized
right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the Certificate of Authority issued by the State of Illinois and
time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another Certificate of Authentication issued by the
person’s claim. Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Illinois in support to
the Waiver of Interest incorporated in the Deed of Absolute Sale
FACTS: presented to her by Carmelita.
Examination of the assailed Certificate of Authority shows that it
The spouses Florentino Leong and Carmelita Leong used to own is valid and regular on its face. The assailed Certificate of Authority
the property located at De Guzman is a notarized document and therefore, presumed to be valid and
Street, Quiapo, Manila. Elena Leong is Florentino's sister-in-law. duly executed. Thus, Edna See’s reliance on the notarial
She had stayed with her in-laws on the property rental-free for acknowledgment found in the duly notarized Certificate of
over two decades until the building they lived in was razed by fire. Authority presented by Carmelita is sufficient evidence of good
They then constructed makeshift houses, and the rental-free faith.”
arrangement continued.
Florentino and Carmelita immigrated to the United States and The Court found that Edna exerted due diligence when she
eventually had their marriage dissolved in Illinois. A provision in ascertained the authenticity of the documents attached to the deed
their marital settlement agreement states that “Florentino shall of sale. These further inquiries were considered by the lower
convey and quitclaim all of his right, title and interest in and to 540 courts in finding See to be an innocent purchaser in good faith and
De Guzman Street, Manila, Philippines . . . to Carmelita.” for value. Edna, an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value
Intercalated in the lower margin of page 12 of the instrument was with title in her name, has a better right to the property than Elena.
a long-hand scribbling of a proviso, purporting to be a footnote Elena’s possession was neither adverse to nor in the concept of
remark: “Neither party shall evict or charge rent to relatives of the owner.
parties, or convey title, until it has been established that Florentino
has clear title to the Malabon property. HEIRS OF BIENVENIDO AND ARACELI TANYAG, namely:
Clear title to be established by the attorneys for the parties or the ARTURO TANYAG, AIDA T. JOCSON AND ZENAIDA T.
ruling of a court of competent jurisdiction. In the event Florentino VELOSO, Petitioners, -versus-
does not obtain clear title, this court reserves jurisdiction to SALOME E. GABRIEL, NESTOR R. GABRIEL, LUZ
reapportion the properties or their values to effect a 50-50 GABRIEL-ARNEDO married to ARTURO
division of the value of the 2 remaining ARNEDO, NORA GABRIEL-CALINGO married to FELIX
Philippine properties. Carmelita sold the land to Edna. In lieu of CALINGO, PILAR M. MENDIOLA, MINERVA GABRIEL-
Florentino's signature of conformity in the deed of absolute sale, NATIVIDAD married to EUSTAQUIO NATIVIDAD, and
Carmelita presented to Edna and her father a waiver of interest ERLINDA VELASQUEZ married to HERMINIO VELASQUEZ,
notarized in Illinois. In this waiver, Florentino reiterated his Respondents.
quitclaim over his right, title, and interest to the land.
Consequently, the land’s title was transferred to Edna's name. G.R. No. 175763, FIRST DIVISION, April 11, 2012, Corona, C.J.
Edna was aware of the Leong relatives staying in the makeshift
houses on the land. Carmelita assured her that her nieces and Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
nephews would move out, but demands to vacate were unheeded. through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty
Edna filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Elena years, without need of title or of good faith.
and the other relatives of the Leong ex-spouses. Florentino filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of contract, title, and damages To successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of
against Carmelita, Edna, and the Manila Register of Deeds, alleging a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must
that the sale was without his consent. The two cases were prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and
consolidated. second, his title thereto.
The trial court granted Edna possession and ownership over the
subject property. The appellate court affirmed the ruling. FACTS:
declared in the name of Jose Gabriel, while the second parcel (“Lot or of good faith. Here, petitioners have been in continuous, public
2”) consisting of 147 square meters was originally declared in the and adverse possession of the subject land for 31 years. Having
name of Agueda Dinguinbayan. For several years, these lands lined possessed the property for such period and in the character
with bamboo plants remained undeveloped and uninhabited. required by law as sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive
Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel, sister prescription, petitioners have indeed acquired ownership over the
of Jose Gabriel, as part of her inheritance as declared by her in a subject property. Such right cannot be defeated by respondents’
1944 notarized instrument (“Affidavit of Sale”) whereby she sold acts of declaring again the property for tax purposes in 1979 and
the said property to spouses Gabriel Sulit and Cornelia Sanga. obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in their name in 1998.
Lot 1 allegedly came into the possession of Benita Gabriel’s own
daughter, Florencia Gabriel Sulit, when her father-in-law Gabriel Petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents’ adverse
Sulit gave it to her as part of inheritance of his son, Eliseo Sulit who possession since 1962. Civil interruption takes place with the
was Florencia’s husband. Florencia Sulit sold the same lot to service of judicial summons to the possessor and not by filing of a
Bienvenido S. Tanyag, father of petitioners, as evidenced by a mere Notice of Adverse Claim. In this case, while there was a
notarized deed of sale dated October 14, 1964. Petitioners then Notice of Adverse Claim, such cannot take the place of the judicial
took possession of the property, paid the real estate taxes due on summons required for under the law. Petitioners’ right as owner,
the land and declared the same for tax purposes issued in 1969 in however, does not extend to Lot 2 because they failed to
the name of Bienvenido’s wife, Araceli C. Tanyag. substantiate their claim over the same by virtue of a deed of sale
from the original declared owner, Dinguinbayan.
As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by Agueda
Dinguinbayan to Araceli Tanyag under Deed of Sale executed on Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an
October 22, 1968. Thereupon, petitioners took possession of said action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who
property and declared the same for tax purposes. Petitioners claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the
claimed to have continuously, publicly, notoriously and adversely identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto. In regard
occupied both Lots 1 and 2 through their caretaker Juana to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who
Quinones; they fenced the premises and introduced improvements claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix the
on the land. Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, identity of the land he is claiming by describing the location, area
secured in his name Lot 1 indicating therein an increased area of and boundaries thereof. In this case, petitioners failed to identify
1,763 square meters. Lot 2 by providing evidence of the metes and bounds thereof, so
On March 20, 2000, petitioners instituted a civil case alleging that that the same may be compared with the technical description
respondents never occupied the whole 686 square meters of Lot 1 contained in OCT No. 1035. The testimony of Dinguinbayan’s son
and fraudulently caused the inclusion of Lot 2 in such that Lot 1 would not suffice because said he merely stated the boundary
consisting of 686 square meters originally declared in the name of owners as indicated in the 1966 and 1967 tax declarations of his
Jose Gabriel was increased to 1,763 square meters. They mother. Arturo Tayag claimed that he had the lots surveyed in the
contended that the issuance of OCT No. 1035 on October 28, 1998 1970s in preparation for the consolidation of the two parcels.
over the subject land in the name of respondent’s heirs of Jose However, no such plan was presented in court.
Gabriel was null and void from the beginning.
GERARDO MENDOZA, TRINIA AND IYLENE ALL
On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no SURNAMED MENDOZA v. SOLEDAD SALINAS
cause of action against them for they have not established their
ownership over the subject property covered by a Torrens title in G.R. No. 152827, THIRD DIVISION, February 6, 2007, AUSTRIA-
respondents’ name. They further argued that OCT No. 1035 had MARTINEZ, J.
become unassailable one year after its issuance and petitioners
failed to establish that it was irregularly or unlawfully procured. In Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, the term
"judicial process" could mean no less than an ejectment suit or
ISSUE: reinvindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the
contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.
Whether petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive Thus, one who claims to be the owner of a property possessed
prescription. (Yes) by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its
physical recovery, not summarily through a motion for the
RULING: issuance of a writ of possession.
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a It is noted that, in this case, there already exists a final and
possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen executory decision disregarding Salinas' claim for possession
into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, over the property. An action for unlawful detainer was filed by
public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession is open when it is Salinas against the Mendozas but was dismissed by the MTCC.
patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is Salinas did not appeal the case but filed for a writ of possession
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or in the land registration case.
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show
exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his FACTS:
own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that
it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is the
the neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse Order dated April 2, 2002 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of of Olongapo City, Branch 72, acting as Land Registration Court, in
acquisitive prescription. LRC Case No. N-04-0-97, granting respondent's prayer for the
issuance of a writ of possession in her favor. The assailed Order
Article 1137 of the Civil Code provides that “ownership and other was issued by the RTC after it rendered a favorable judgment on
real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted respondent's application for registration in its Decision dated
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title
9
November 3, 1998, and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P- HEIRS OF BIENVENIDO and ARACELI TANYAG, namely
10053 was issued in her name covering a parcel of land. ARTURO TANYAG, AIDA T. JOCSON and ZENAID T.
VELOSO vs. SALOME E. GABRIEL, ET AL.
Petitioners opposed respondent's application for the issuance of a
writ of possession claiming that they were not oppositors/parties G.R. No. 175763, FIRST DIVISION, April 11, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR.,
to the registration case and they have been in actual physical J.
possession of the property since 1964. The RTC, however, rejected
their arguments and granted respondent's application for the Art. 1137of the Civil Code provides that “ownership and other
issuance of a writ of possession per herein assailed Order. Hence, real rights over immovables also prescribe through
the present petition. uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith.”
Petitioners set forth the lone assignment of error that the RTC
erred in issuing the writ of possession and acted with grave abuse In the case of Heirs of MarcelinaAzardon-Crisologo v. Rañon,
of discretion amounting to lack and excess of jurisdiction. this Court citing Article 1123 of the Civil Code held that civil
Petitioners reiterate their argument that they cannot be ousted of interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to
their possession of the property, having been in actual possession the possessor and not by filing of a mere Notice of Adverse
of the property since 1964, as evidenced by petitioner Gerardo C. Claim.
Mendoza's Sales Application made in January 1986 over the Here, petitioners have been in continuous, public and adverse
following property: A parcel of land situated at Burgos St., Bo. possession of the subject land for 31 years.
Barretto, O.C. Bounded on the North., by Benjamin Salinas; South., Having possessed the property for such period and in the
by Gloria Montemayor; East., by Benjamin Salinas &ConradoPilapil character required by law as sufficient for extraordinary
and West., Burgos St. situated in Bo. Barretto, Olongapo City, acquisitive prescription, petitioners have indeed acquired
ownership over the subject property. Also, Petitioners were not
Zambales, and containing an area of 932 square meters x xx. and a
able to interrupt respondents’ adverse possession since 1962.
Declaration of Real Property for the years 1976 and 1985, among
Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial
others.
summons to the possessor and not by filing of a mere Notice of
Adverse Claim. In this case, while there was a Notice of Adverse
Respondent counters that the present petition should be
Claim, such cannot take the place of the judicial summons
dismissed, arguing that the petition should have been initially with
required for under the law.
the Court of Appeals, based on the principle of hierarchy of courts,
and that the general order of default on October 8, 1998 issued by FACTS:
the RTC binds them. and personal notice was not necessary.
Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land located at
ISSUE:
Ruhale, Barangay Calzada, Municipality of Taguig. The first parcel
(“Lot 1”) with an area of 686 square meters was originally
Whether or not writ of possession should be issued in favor of
declared in the name of Jose Gabriel, while the second parcel (“Lot
Salinas?
2”) consisting of 147 square meters was originally declared in the
name of Agueda Dinguinbayan. For several years, these lands lined
RULING:
with bamboo plants remained undeveloped and uninhabited.
Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel, sister
No. The issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial duty of
of Jose Gabriel, as part of her inheritance as declared by her in a
the court in a decree of registration in an original land registration
1944 notarized instrument (“Affidavit of Sale”) whereby she sold
proceeding. Such ministerial duty, however, ceases to be so with
the said property to spouses Gabriel Sulit and Cornelia Sanga.
particular regard to petitioners who are actual possessors of the
property under a claim of ownership. This conclusion is supported
Lot 1 allegedly came into the possession of Benita Gabriel’s own
by Article 433 of the Civil Code, which provides:
daughter, Florencia Gabriel Sulit, when her father-in-law Gabriel
Sulit gave it to her as part of inheritance of his son, Eliseo Sulit who
Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable
was Florencia’s husband. Florencia Sulit sold the same lot to
presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial
Bienvenido S. Tanyag, father of petitioners, as evidenced by a
process for the recovery of the property. In Philippine National
notarized deed of sale dated October 14, 1964. Petitioners then
Bank v. Court of Appeals, the term "judicial process" could mean
took possession of the property, paid the real estate taxes due on
no less than an ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action, in which
the land and declared the same for tax purposes issued in 1969 in
the ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly
the name of Bienvenido’s wife, Araceli C. Tanyag. As to Lot 2,
heard and adjudicated. Thus, one who claims to be the owner of a
petitioners averred that it was sold by AguedaDinguinbayan to
property possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial
AraceliTanyag under Deed of Sale executed on October 22, 1968.
action for its physical recovery, not summarily through a motion
Thereupon, petitioners took possession of said property and
for the issuance of a writ of possession.
declared the same for tax purposes. Petitioners claimed to have
It is noted that, in this case, there already exists a final and
continuously, publicly, notoriously and adversely occupied both
executory decision disregarding Salinas' claim for possession over
Lots 1 and 2 through their caretaker Juana Quinones; they fenced
the property. An action for unlawful detainer was filed by Salinas
the premises and introduced improvements on the land.
against the Mendozas but was dismissed by the MTCC. Salinas did
Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, secured in
not appeal the case but filed for a writ of possession in the land
his name Lot 1 indicating therein an increased area of 1,763 square
registration case. Moreover, the Mendozas opposed Salinas'
meters.
application for the issuance of a writ of possession and apprised
On March 20, 2000, petitioners instituted a civil case alleging that
their actual, peaceful, physical and uninterrupted possession. The
respondents never occupied the whole 686 square meters of Lot 1
RTC, nevertheless, ruled that a writ of possession may be issued in
and fraudulently caused the inclusion of Lot 2 in such that Lot 1
a land registration proceeding. Thus, it was erroneous for the RTC
consisting of 686 square meters originally declared in the name of
to have issued the writ of possession against the Mendozas.
Jose Gabriel was increased to 1,763 square meters. They
10
contended that the issuance of OCT No. 1035 on October 28, 1998 However, no such plan was presented in court.
over the subject land in the name of respondent’s heirs of Jose
Gabriel was null and void from the beginning. MAGDALENA T. VILLASI vs. SPOUSES FILOMENO GARCIA
AND ERMELINDA HALILI- GARCIA
On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no
cause of action against them for they have not established their G.R. No. 190106, SECOND DIVISION, January 15, 2014, Perez, J.
ownership over the subject property covered by a Torrens title in
respondents’ name. They further argued that OCT No. 1035 had In Buduhan v. Pakurao,we underscored the significance of a tax
become unassailable one year after its issuance and petitioners declaration as proof that a holder has claim of title, and, we gave
failed to establish that it was irregularly or unlawfully procured. weight to the demonstrable interest of the claimant holding a tax
receipt:
ISSUE: Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are
not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
Whether petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in
prescription? his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in
his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at
RULING: least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
Yes. Petitioners acquired part of the property (Lot 1) through purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to
acquisitive prescription. Acquisitive prescription is a mode of obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim
acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse of against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.
concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious ownership.
and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, In this case, the Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they have
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the a bona fide title to the building in question. In contrast, Villasi
was able to satisfactorily establish the ownership of FGCI thru
adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and
the pieces of evidence she appended to her opposition. Worthy
an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious
to note is the fact that the building in litigation was declared for
when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of
taxation purposes in the name of FGCI and not in the Spouses
by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who
Garcias'.
asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence
of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.
FACTS:
Article 1137 of the Civil Code provides that “ownership and other
real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
Petitioner Magdalena T. Villasi (Villasi) engaged the services of
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title
respondent Fil-Garcia Construction,
or of good faith”. Here, petitioners have been in continuous, public
Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey condominium building. For
and adverse possession of the subject land for 31 years. Having
failure of Villasi to fully pay the contract price despite several
possessed the property for such period and in the character
demands, FGCI initiated a suit for collection of sum of money
required by law as sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive
before the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of FGCI. The CA, however,
prescription, petitioners have indeed acquired ownership over the
reversed the decision. FGCI filed a petition for review on certiorari,
subject property. Such right cannot be defeated by respondents’
but the same was denied. To enforce her right as prevailing party,
acts of declaring again the property for tax purposes in 1979 and
Villasi filed a Motion for Execution. A Writ of Execution was issued
obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in their name in 1998.
commanding the Sheriff to execute and make effective the Decision
of the Court of Appeals. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied
Petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents’ adverse
on a building. While the building was declared for taxation
possession since 1962. Civil interruption takes place with the
purposes in the name of FGCI, the lots in which it was erected were
service of judicial summons to the possessor and not by filing of a
registered in the names of the Spouses Filomeno Garcia and
mere Notice of Adverse Claim. In this case, while there was a
ErmelindaHalili-Garcia (Spouses Garcia). After the mandatory
Notice of Adverse Claim, such cannot take the place of the judicial
posting and publication of notice of sale on execution of real
summons required for under the law. Petitioners’ right as owner,
property were complied with, a public auction was scheduled. To
however, does not extend to Lot 2 because they failed to
forestall the sale on execution, the Spouses Garcia filed an Affidavit
substantiate their claim over the same by virtue of a deed of sale
of Third Party Claim and a Motion to Set Aside Notice of Sale on
from the original declared owner, Dinguinbayan. Under Article
Execution, claiming that they are the lawful owners of the property
434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to recover
which was erroneously levied upon by the sheriff. To persuade the
the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better
court a quo to grant their motion, the Spouses Garcia argued that
right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land
the building covered by the levy was mistakenly assessed by the
claimed; and second, his title thereto. In regard to the first
City Assessor in the name of FGCI. The motion was opposed by
requisite, in an accionreinvindicatoria, the person who claims that
Villasi who insisted that its ownership belongs to FGCI and not to
he has a better right to the property must first fix the identity of
the Spouses Garcia as shown by the tax declaration.
the land he is claiming by describing the location, area and
boundaries thereof. In this case, petitioners failed to identify Lot 2
The RTC issue an order directing the Sheriff to hold in abeyance
by providing evidence of the metes and bounds thereof, so that the
the conduct of the sale on execution. Villasi moved for
same may be compared with the technical description contained
reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
in OCT No. 1035. The testimony of Dinguinbayan’s son would not
suffice because said he merely stated the boundary owners as
ISSUE:
indicated in the 1966 and 1967 tax declarations of his mother.
Arturo Tayag claimed that he had the lots surveyed in the 1970s in
preparation for the consolidation of the two parcels.
11
Whether the building and the lot in which it was erected should be ownership of the building. There is no showing that the Garcianos
treated separate properties? were the owners of the building or that they had any proprietary
right over it. Ranged against respondents’ proof of possession of
RULING: the building since 1977, petitioner’s evidence pales in comparison
and leaves us totally unconvinced.
In Buduhan v. Pakurao, we underscored the significance of a tax In Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Felias, the court ruled that while the building
declaration as proof that a holder has claim of title, and, we gave is a conjugal property and therefore liable for the debts of the
weight to the demonstrable interest of the claimant holding a tax conjugal partnership, the lot on which the building was
receipt: constructed is a paraphernal property and could not be the subject
of levy and sale: x xx. In other words, when the lot was donated to
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are Felisa by her parents, as owners of the land on which the building
not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good was constructed, the lot became her paraphernal property. The
indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right donation transmitted to her the rights of a landowner over a
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual building constructed on it.
or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary Therefore, at the time of the levy and sale of the sheriff, Lot No. 107
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests did not belong to the conjugal partnership, but it was paraphernal
not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property of Felisa. As such, it was not answerable for the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all obligations of her husband which resulted in the judgment against
other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute him in favor of Caltex.
needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's The rule on accession is not an iron-clad dictum. On instances
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. where this Court was confronted with cases requiring judicial
Our perusal of the record shows that, as the party asserting their determination of the ownership of the building separate from the
title, the Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona fide lot, it never hesitated to disregard such rule. The case at bar is of
title to the building in question. Aside from their postulation that similar import. When there are factual and evidentiary evidence to
as title holders of the land, the law presumes them to be owners of prove that the building and the lot on which it stands are owned
the improvements built thereon, the by different persons, they shall be treated separately. As such, the
building or the lot, as the case may be, can be made liable to answer
Spouses Garcia were unable to adduce credible evidence to prove for the obligation of its respective owner.
their ownership of the property. In contrast, Villasi was able to
satisfactorily establish the ownership of FGCI thru the pieces of FEDERICO GEMINIANO, MARIA GEMINIANO, ERNESTO
evidence she appended to her opposition. Worthy to note is the GEMINIANO, ASUNCION GEMINIANO, LARRY GEMINIANO,
fact that the building in litigation was declared for taxation AND MARLYN GEMINIANO, Petitioners, -versus- COURT OF
purposes in the name of FGCI and not in the Spouses Garcias'. APPEALS, DOMINADOR NICOLAS, AND MARY A.
It likewise failed to escape our attention that FGCI is in actual NICOLAS, Respondents.
possession of the building and as the payment of taxes coupled
with actual possession of the land covered by tax declaration G.R. No. 120303, THIRD DIVISION, July 24, 1996, DAVIDE, JR, J.
strongly supports a claim of ownership. Quite significantly, all the
court processes in an earlier collection suit between FGCI and It has been said that while the right to let property is an incident
Villasi were served, thru the former's representative Filomeno of title and possession, a person may be a lessor and occupy
Garcia, at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, where the the position of a landlord to the tenant although he is not the
subject property is located. This circumstance is consistent with owner of the premises let. After all, ownership of the property is
the tax declaration in the name of FGCI. While it is a hornbook not being transferred, only the temporary use and enjoyment
doctrine that the accessory follows the principal, that is, the thereof.
ownership of the property gives the right by accession to
everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or It is undisputed that the private respondents came into
attached thereto, either naturally or artificially, such rule is not possession of a 126 square-meter portion of the said lot by virtue
without exception. of a contract of lease executed by the petitioners' mother in their
In cases where there is a clear and convincing evidence to prove favor. The juridical relation between the petitioners' mother as
that the principal and the accessory are not owned by one and the lessor, and the private respondents as lessees, is therefore well-
same person or entity, the presumption shall not be applied and established, and carries with it a recognition of the lessor's title.
the actual ownership shall be upheld. In a number of cases, we The private respondents, as lessees who had undisturbed
recognized the separate ownership of the land from the building possession for the entire term under the lease, are then
estopped to deny their landlord's title, or to assert a better title
and brushed aside the rule that accessory follows the principal.
not only in themselves, but also in some third person while they
remain in possession of the leased premises and until they
In Carbonilla v. Abiera, the court denied the claim of petitioner
surrender possession to the landlord. This estoppel applies even
that, as the owner of the land, he is likewise the owner of the
though the lessor had no title at the time the relation of lessor
building erected thereon, for his failure to present evidence to
and lessee was created, and may be asserted not only by the
buttress his position:
original lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title.
To set the record straight, while petitioner may have proven his FACTS:
ownership of the land, as there can be no other piece of evidence
more worthy of credence than a Torrens certificate of title, he A 314 square meter lot was originally owned by the petitioners'
failed to present any evidence to substantiate his claim of mother, Paulina Geminiano. On a 12- square-meter portion of that
ownership or right to the possession of the building. Like the CA,
lot stood the petitioners' unfinished bungalow, which the
we cannot accept the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
petitioners sold in 1978 to private respondents with an alleged
(Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership promise to sell to the latter that portion of the lot occupied by the
executed by the Garcianos as proof that petitioner acquired
12
house. Subsequently, the petitioners' mother executed a contract structure on the property as early as 1983. This ruling was
of lease over a 126 square-meter portion of the lot, including that affirmed by the RTC. Thus, the SC found no reason to depart
portion on which the house stood, in favor of the private from the conclusions of the trial courts. Respondents were
respondents for P40 per month for a period of seven years. The evidently prohibited by petitioners from building improvements
private respondents then introduced additional improvements on the land because the latter had every intention of selling it.
and registered the house in their names. After the expiration of the Hence, petitioners, as the owners of the land, have the right to
lease contract in 1985, however, the petitioners' mother refused appropriate what has been built on the property, without any
to accept the monthly rentals. Petitioners demanded private obligation to pay indemnity therefor; and that respondents have
respondents to vacate the premises and pay the rentals in arrears. no right to a refund of any improvement built therein, pursuant
Upon failure of the private respondents to heed the demand, the to Articles 449 and 450 of the Civil Code.
petitioners filed with the MTCC a complaint for unlawful detainer XXX
and damages. Pursuant to Article 452 of the Civil Code, a builder in bad faith is
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to confine the entitled to recoup the necessary expenses incurred for the
issues to: (1) whether there was an implied renewal of the lease preservation of the land. The CA correctly ruled that
(2) whether the lessees were builders in good faith and entitled to respondents in this case are similarly entitled to this
reimbursement of the value of the house and improvements; and reimbursement. However, being builders in bad faith, they do not
(3) the value of the house. have the right of retention over the premises.
The court resolved the second issue in the negative, holding that
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, which allow possessors in FACTS:
good faith to recover the value of improvements and retain the
premises until reimbursed, did not apply to lessees like the private Spouses Crispin and Teresa Aquino are the owners of a house and
respondents, because the latter knew that their occupation of the lot. Since 1981, this property has been occupied by Teresa’s sister,
premises would continue only during the life of the lease. Besides, Josefina Aguilar and her spouse Eusebio Aguilar. It appears from
the rights of the private respondents were specifically governed by the record that respondents stayed on the property with the
Article 1678, which allows reimbursement of up to one-half of the consent and approval of petitioners, who were then residing in the
value of the useful improvements, or removal of the improvements US. While respondents were in possession of the property, the
should the lessor refuse to reimburse. house previously constructed therein was demolished, and a
three-story building built in its place. Respondents occupied half
ISSUE: of the third floor of this new building for the next 20 years without
payment of rental.
Whether the private respondents are builders in good faith. (NO) In 2003, petitioners demanded the surrender of the property.
Respondents failed to heed this demand, prompting petitioners to
RULING: file a Complaint for ejectment against them. In their Answer with
Counterclaim, respondents claimed that they had contributed to
It has been said that while the right to let property is an incident the improvement of the property and the construction of the
of title and possession, a person may be a lessor and occupy the building, both in terms of money and management/supervision
position of a landlord to the tenant although he is not the owner of services.
the premises let. After all, ownership of the property is not being
transferred, only the temporary use and enjoyment thereof. The MeTC ruled in favor of petitioners, stating that they had the
right to enjoy possession of the property as the registered owners
It is undisputed that the private respondents came into possession thereof. The MeTC also declared that respondents were builders in
of a 126 square-meter portion of the said lot by virtue of a contract bad faith who were not entitled to recover their purported
of lease executed by the petitioners' mother in their favor. The expenses for the construction of the building. It emphasized that
juridical relation between the petitioners' mother as lessor, and their occupation of the property was by mere tolerance of
the private respondents as lessees, is therefore well-established, petitioners and, as such, could be terminated at any time. The RTC
and carries with it a recognition of the lessor's title. The private affirmed the MeTC’s Decision. The CA affirmed the conclusion of
respondents, as lessees who had undisturbed possession for the the lower courts that respondents could not be considered co-
entire term under the lease, are then estopped to deny their owners of the property or builders in good faith.
landlord's title, or to assert a better title not only in themselves,
but also in some third person while they remain in possession of Nevertheless, the CA declared that respondents should be
the leased premises and until they surrender possession to the reimbursed for the necessary and useful expenses they had
landlord. This estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title introduced on petitioners’ property, pursuant to Articles 1678 and
at the time the relation of lessor and lessee was created, and may 548 of the Civil
be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who Code.
succeed to his title. Being mere lessees, the private respondents
knew that their occupation of the premises would continue only ISSUE:
for the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as
possessors nor builders in good faith. Whether respondents should be reimbursed for the useful
expenses they had introduced on petitioners’ property. (NO)
SPOUSES CRISPIN AQUINO and TERESA V. AQUINO, Whether respondents should be reimbursed for the necessary
HEREIN REPRESENTED BY THEIR expenses they had introduced on petitioners’ property. (YES)
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, AMADOR D. LEDESMA, Petitioners, -
versus- SPOUSES EUSEBIO AGUILAR and JOSEFINA V. RULING:
AGUILAR, Respondents.
As builders in bad faith, respondents are not entitled to
G.R. No. 182754, FIRST DIVISION, June 29, 2015, SERENO, C.J. reimbursement of useful expenses.
Based on the findings of fact of the MeTC and the RTC, Based on the findings of fact of the MeTC and the RTC, petitioners
petitioners had already warned respondents not to build a had already warned respondents not to build a structure on the
13
property as early as 1983. This ruling was affirmed by the RTC. building on is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his
Thus, the SC found no reason to depart from the conclusions of the title.
trial courts. Respondents were evidently prohibited by petitioners Hence, such good faith, by law, passed on to Pariz’s successor,
from building improvements on the land because the latter had petitioner in this case. Further, “(w)here one derives title to
every intention of selling it. property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the
latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is
Hence, petitioners, as the owners of the land, have the right to evidence against the former.” And possession acquired in good
appropriate what has been built on the property, without any faith does not lose this character except in case and from the
obligation to pay indemnity therefor; and that respondents have moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not
no right to a refund of any improvement built therein, pursuant to unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.
Articles 449 and 450 of the Civil Code. The good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are
made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of suit for recovery of the property by the true owner.
another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right of
indemnity. Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has FACTS:
been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the
demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, The parties in this case are owners of adjoining lots in Parañaque,
in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense Metro Manila. It was discovered in a survey that a portion of a
of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the building of petitioner, which was presumably constructed by its
builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the predecessor-in-interest, encroached on a portion of the lot owned
proper rent. by private respondent.
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner Tecnogas Philippines Manufacturing Corporation (petitioner) is
is entitled to damages from the builder, planter or sower. the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Parañaque,
Metro Manila. The said land was purchased by from Pariz
Respondents may recover the necessary expenses Industries, Inc. in 1970, together with all the buildings and
incurred for the preservation of the property but without the improvements including the wall existing thereon. Private
right of retention. respondent Eduardo Uy (defendant) on the other hand is the
registered owner of a parcel of land which adjoins plaintiff’s land.
Pursuant to Article 452 of the Civil Code, a builder in bad faith is He purchased the same from a certain Enrile Antonio also in 1970.
entitled to recoup the necessary expenses incurred for the
preservation of the land. The CA correctly ruled that respondents In 1971, defendant purchased another lot also adjoining plaintiff’s
in this case are similarly entitled to this reimbursement. However, land from a certain Miguel
being builders in bad faith, they do not have the right of retention Rodriguez and the same was registered in defendant’s name.
over the premises. Portions of the buildings and wall bought by petitioner together
While the evidence before this Court does not establish the with the land from Pariz Industries are occupying a portion of
amount of necessary expenses incurred by respondents during defendant’s adjoining land. Upon learning of the encroachment or
their stay in the property, we note that even petitioners do not occupation by its buildings and wall of a portion of defendant’s
deny that such expenses were incurred. In fact, in a letter dated 15 land, petitioner offered to buy from defendant that particular
July 1983, petitioners acknowledged that respondents had spent portion of defendant’s land occupied by portions of its buildings
personal money for the maintenance of the property. Petitioners and wall, but defendant refused the offer.
even promised to reimburse them for those expenses. In this light,
we find it proper to order the remand of this case to the court a ISSUE:
quo for the purpose of determining the amount of necessary
expenses to be reimbursed to respondents. Whether petitioner can be considered a builder in bad faith
because it is 'presumed to know the metes and bounds of his
TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING property.' (NO)
CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF APPEALS RULING:
(FORMER SPECIAL SEVENTEENTH DIVISION) AND
EDUARDO UY, Respondents. There is no question that when petitioner purchased the land from
Pariz Industries, the buildings and other structures were already
G.R. No. 108894, THIRD DIVISION, February 10, 1997, in existence. The record is not clear as to who actually built those
PANGANIBAN, J. structures, but it may well be assumed that petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest, Pariz Industries, did so.
There is no question that when petitioner purchased the land
from Pariz Industries, the buildings and other structures were Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no
already in existence. The record is not clear as to who actually proof exists to show that the encroachment over a narrow, needle-
built those structures, but it may well be assumed that shaped portion of private respondent’s land was done in bad faith
petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Pariz Industries, did so. by the builder of the encroaching structures, the latter should be
Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no presumed to have built them in good faith. It is presumed that
proof exists to show that the encroachment over a narrow, possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which
needle-shaped portion of private respondent’s land was done in it was acquired, until the contrary is proved. Good faith consists in
bad faith by the builder of the encroaching structures, the latter the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his, and
should be presumed to have built them in good faith. It is his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title.
presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same
character in which it was acquired, until the contrary is proved. Hence, such good faith, by law, passed on to Pariz’s successor,
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is petitioner in this case. Further, “(w)here one derives title to
property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the
14
latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee is a
evidence against the former.” And possession acquired in good builder in good faith. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
faith does not lose this character except in case and from the
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware FACTS:
that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.
Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as
The good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are Lot 9, Phase II and located at Taculing Road, Pleasantville
made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit Subdivision, Bacolod City. Respondent Jardinico bought the rights
for recovery of the property by the true owner. Recall that the to the lot from Robillo in 1975. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant.
encroachment in the present case was caused by a very slight
deviation of the erected wall. It was an error which, in the context Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City on
of the attendant facts, was consistent with good faith. December 19, 1978 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106367 in his
name. It was then that he discovered that improvements had been
Consequently, the builder, if sued by the aggrieved landowner for introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had taken
recovery of possession, could have invoked the provisions of Art. possession thereof.
448 of the Civil Code. It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot
8 of the same subdivision from C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc.
The obvious benefit to the builder under this article is that, instead (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. Under the
of being outrightly ejected from the land, he can compel the Contract toSell on Installment, Kee could possess the lot even
landowner to make a choice between the two options: (1) to before the completion of all installment payments. After the
appropriate the building by paying the indemnity required by law, preparation of the lot plan and a copy thereof given to Kee, CTTEI
or (2) sell the land to the builder. The landowner cannot refuse to through its employee, Zenaida Octaviano, accompanied Kees wife,
exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the Donabelle Kee, to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately, the parcel of land
building to remove it from the land. pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee proceeded to
construct his residence, a store, an auto repair shop and other
The question, however, is whether the same benefit can be improvements on the lot.
invoked by petitioner who, as earlier stated, is not the builder of
the offending structures but possesses them as buyer. The SC After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico
answered such question in the affirmative. In the first place, there confronted him. The parties tried to reach an amicable settlement,
is no sufficient showing that petitioner was aware of the but failed. Jardinicos lawyer wrote Kee, demanding that the latter
encroachment at the time it acquired the property from Pariz remove all improvements and vacate Lot 9. When Kee refused to
Industries. Various factors in evidence adequately show vacate Lot 9, Jardinico filed with the Municipal
petitioner’s lack of awareness thereof. In any case, contrary proof Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Bacolod City (MTCC), a complaint
has not overthrown the presumption of good faith under Article for ejectment with damages against
527 of the Civil Code, as already stated, taken together with the Kee. Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner
disputable presumptions of the law on evidence. and CTTEI.
These presumptions state, under Section 3 (a) of Rule 131 of the The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was
Rules of Court, that the person is innocent of a crime or wrong; and attributable to CTTEI. However, the
under Section 3 (ff) of Rule 131, that the law has been obeyed. In MTCC found that petitioner had already rescinded its contract
fact, private respondent Eduardo Uy himself was unaware of such with Kee over Lot 8 for the latter’s failure to pay the installments
intrusion into his property until after 1971 when he hired a due, and that Kee had not contested the rescission. The MTCC
surveyor, following his purchase of another adjoining lot, to survey concluded that Kee no longer had any right over the lot subject of
all his newly acquired lots. Upon being apprised of the the contract between him and petitioner. Consequently, Kee must
encroachment, petitioner immediately offered to buy the area pay reasonable rentals for the use of Lot 9, and, furthermore, he
occupied by its building -- a species of conduct consistent with cannot claim reimbursement for the improvements he introduced
good faith. on said lot.
In the second place, upon delivery of the property by Pariz
Industries, as seller, to the petitioner, as buyer, the latter acquired On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Bacolod City (RTC)
ownership of the property. Consequently and as earlier discussed, ruled that petitioner and CTTEI were not at fault or were not
petitioner is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the seller in negligent, there being no preponderant evidence to show that they
regard to all rights of ownership over the immovable sold, directly participated in the delivery of Lot 9 to Kee. The Court of
including the right to compel the private respondent to exercise Appeals ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was
either of the two options provided under Article 448 of the Civil unaware of the "mix-up" when he began construction of the
Code. improvements on Lot 8.
ISSUES:
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Petitioner, -versus – COURT OF APPEALS, WILSON KEE, (I) Was Kee a builder in good faith? (YES)
C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. and ELDRED (II) What is the liability, if any, of petitioner and its agent, C.T.
JARDINICO, Respondents. Torres Enterprises, Inc.?
void and would not have operated to transfer any rights over the
To demonstrate Kees bad faith, petitioner points to Kees violation subject land to her name. Despite such awareness of the defect
of paragraphs 22 and 26 of the Contract of Sale on Installment. in their title to the subject land, respondents still proceeded in
constructing a three (3)-story building thereon. Indubitably, they
We disagree. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on should be deemed as builders in bad faith.
whether Kee was a builder in good faith, that is, on his state of On the other hand, petitioners knew of the defect in the
mind at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. These alleged execution of the Deed of Sale from the start, but nonetheless,
violations may give rise to petitioners cause of action against Kee still acquiesced to the construction of the three (3)-storey
under the said contract (contractual breach), but may not be bases building thereon. Hence, they should likewise be considered as
to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith. landowners in bad faith.
(II) Petitioner does not dispute the fact that CTTEI was its agent. FACTS:
But it contends that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was an
act which was clearly outside the scope of its authority, and Erlinda and her late husband Pedro Delos Santos (Pedro)
consequently, CTTEI alone should be liable. borrowed the amount of P100,000.00 from the former's sister,
Teresita, as evidenced by a Promissory Note dated April 8, 1998.
Petitioner’s contention is without merit. The rule is that the As security for the loan, Erlinda and Pedro mortgaged their
principal is responsible for the acts of the agent, done within the property situated at 2986 Gen. Del Pilar Street, Bangkal, Makati
scope of his authority, and should bear the damage caused to third City.
persons. On the other hand, the agent who exceeds his authority is
personally liable for the damage. CTTEI was acting within its After Pedro died, Erlinda ended up being unable to pay the loan,
authority as the sole real estate representative of petitioner when and as such, agreed to sell the subject land to Teresita for
it made the delivery to Kee. In acting within its scope of authority, P150,000.00, or for the amount of the loan plus an additional
it was, however, negligent. P50,000.00. On July 8, 1992, they executed a Deed of Sale and a
Pending resolution of the case before the Court of Appeals, Release of Mortgage.
Jardinico and Kee on July 24, 1987 entered into a deed of sale,
wherein the former sold Lot 9 to Kee. Jardinico and Kee did not Thereafter, respondents constructed a three (3)-storey building
inform the Court of Appeals of such deal. Obviously, the deed of worth P2,000,000.00 on the subject land. Despite the foregoing,
sale can have no effect on the liability of petitioner. As we have petitioners refused to acknowledge the sale, pointing out that
earlier stated, petitioner’s liability is grounded on the negligence since Pedro died in 1989, his signature in the Deed of Sale executed
of its agent. in 1992 was definitely forged. As such, respondents demanded
The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis each other, as builder in from petitioners the amounts of P150,000.00 representing the
good faith and owner in good faith, respectively, are regulated by consideration for the sale of the subject land and P2,000,000.00
law (i.e., Arts. 448, 546 and 548 of the Civil Code). It was error for representing the construction cost of the three (3)- story building,
the but to no avail. Thus, respondents filed the instant case.
Court of Appeals to make a "slight modification" in the application
of such law, on the ground of "equity". At any rate, as it stands now, In defense, petitioners denied any participation relative to the
Kee and Jardinico have amicably settled through their deed of sale spurious Deed of Sale, and instead, maintained that it was Teresita
their rights and obligations with regards to Lot 9. who fabricated the same and caused its registration before the
Register of Deeds of Makati City. They likewise asserted that
ERLINDA DINGLASAN DELOS SANTOS AND HER Erlinda and Pedro never sold the subject land to Teresita.
DAUGHTERS, NAMELY, VIRGINIA, AUREA, AND
BINGBING, ALL SURNAMED DELOS SANTOS, Petitioners, The RTC: (a) declared the Deed of Sale null and void and ordered
-versus – ALBERTO ABEJON AND THE ESTATE OF petitioners to pay respondents the following amounts: (1)
TERESITA DINGLASAN ABEJON, Respondents. P100,000.00 plus twelve percent (12%) per annum computed
G.R. No. 215820, FIRST DIVISION, March 20, 2017, PERLAS- from July 8, 1992 until fully paid representing the loan obligation
BERNABE, J.: plus legal interest; (2) P2,000,000.00 representing the
construction cost of the three (3)-storey building; and (3) another
The terms builder, planter, or sower in good faith as used in P100,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. The CA
reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, refers to one who, not affirmed the RTC ruling with modifications.
being the owner of the land, builds, plants, or sows on that land
believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the defect in ISSUE:
his title or mode of acquisition. "The essence of good faith lies
in an honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a Whether or not the CA correctly held that petitioners should be
superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another." held liable to respondents in the aggregate amount of
On the other hand, bad faith may only be attributed to a P2,200,000.00, consisting of the loan obligation of P100,000.00,
landowner when the act of building, planting, or sowing was the construction cost of the three (3)-storey building in the
done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part. amount of P2,000,000.00, and attorney's fees and costs of suit
In this case, it bears stressing that the execution of the Deed of amounting to P100,000.00.
Sale involving the subject land was done in 1992. However, and RULING:
as keenly pointed out by Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
during the deliberations of this case, Teresita was apprised of As correctly argued by petitioners, it is more accurate to apply the
Pedro's death as early as 1990 when she went on a vacation in rules on accession with respect to immovable property,
the Philippines. specifically with regard to builders, planters, and sowers, as this
case involves a situation where the landowner (petitioners) is
As such, she knew all along that the aforesaid Deed of Sale different from the owner of the improvement built therein, i.e., the
which contained a signature purportedly belonging to Pedro, three (3)-storey building (respondents). Thus, there is a need to
who died in 1989, or three (3) years prior to its execution - was
16
determine whether petitioners as landowners on the one hand, cannot be compelled to purchase the subject land. Rather, they can
and respondents on the other, are in good faith or bad faith. only be obliged to pay petitioners reasonable rent. Thus, following
prevailing jurisprudence, the instant case is remanded to the court
The terms builder, planter, or sower in good faith as used in a quo for the purpose of determining matters necessary for the
reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, refers to one who, not proper application of Articles 448 and 453, in relation to Articles
being the owner of the land, builds, plants, or sows on that land 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.
believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the defect in his
title or mode of acquisition. "The essence of good faith lies in an BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, -versus –
honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior VICENTE VICTOR C. SANCHEZ, HEIRS OF KENNETH
claim, and absence of intention to overreach another." NEREO SANCHEZ, represented by FELISA GARCIA YAP,
and HEIRS OF IMELDA C. VDA. DE SANCHEZ, represented
On the other hand, bad faith may only be attributed to a landowner by VICENTE VICTOR C. SANCHEZ, Respondents.
when the act of building, planting, or sowing was done with his
knowledge and without opposition on his part. G.R. No. 179518, THIRD DIVISION, November 19, 2014, VELASCO,
J.:
In this case, it bears stressing that the execution of the Deed of Sale Article 453 of the Civil Code relevantly states:
involving the subject land was done in 1992. However, and as “Article 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the
keenly pointed out by Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa during person who built, planted or sowed on the land of another, but
the deliberations of this case, Teresita was apprised of Pedro's also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and
death as early as 1990 when she went on a vacation in the the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good
Philippines. faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the
As such, she knew all along that the aforesaid Deed of Sale which landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and
contained a signature purportedly belonging to Pedro, who died in without opposition on his part.”
1989, or three (3) years prior to its execution - was void and would The second paragraph of the provision clearly reads that a
not have operated to transfer any rights over the subject land to landowner is considered in bad faith if he does not oppose the
her name. Despite such awareness of the defect in their title to the unauthorized construction thereon despite knowledge of the
subject land, respondents still proceeded in constructing a three same. It does not, however, state what form such opposition
(3)- story building thereon. Indubitably, they should be deemed as should take. The fact of the matter is that the Sanchezes did take
builders in bad faith. action to oppose the construction on their property by writing the
HLURB and the City Building Official of Quezon City. As a result,
the HLURB issued two (2) Cease and Desist Orders and several
On the other hand, petitioners knew of the defect in the execution
directives against Garcia/TSEI which, however, were left
of the Deed of Sale from the start, but nonetheless, still acquiesced
unheeded. In addition, the Sanchezes could not be faulted for
to the construction of the three (3)-storey building thereon. Hence,
not having been able to enjoin the sale of the townhouses by
they should likewise be considered as landowners in bad faith.
Garcia and TSEI to the intervenors Sps. Caminas, Maniwang,
Tulagan, and Marquez who bought their townhouse units during
In this relation, Article 453 of the Civil Code provides that where
the same period that the Sanchezes were demanding the full
both the landowner and the builder, planter, or sower acted in bad payment of the subject lot and were exercising their right of
faith, they shall be treated as if both of them were in good faith, extrajudicial rescission of the Agreement. As the intervenors
viz.: asserted having bought the townhouse units in early 1989, it can
“Article 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the be seen that the preselling was done almost immediately after
person who built, planted or sowed on the land of another, but also the Sanchezes and Garcia/TSEI agreed on the terms of the sale
on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the of the subject lot, or shortly after Garcia and TSEI had taken over
other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith. the property and demolished the old house built thereon.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner The Court agrees with both the RTC and the CA that Garcia
whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without and/or TSEI are builders in bad faith. They knew for a fact that
opposition on his part.” the property still belonged to the Sanchezes and yet proceeded
Whenever both the landowner and the builder/planter/sower are to build the townhouses not just without the authority of the
in good faith (or in bad faith, pursuant to the afore-cited landowners, but also against their will.
provision), the landowner is given two (2) options under Article
448 of the Civil Code, namely: (a) he may appropriate the FACTS:
improvements for himself after reimbursing the buyer (the builder
in good faith) the necessary and useful expenses under Articles Vicente Victor C. Sanchez (Vicente), Kenneth Nereo Sanchez and
546 and 548 of the Civil Code; or (b) he may sell the land to the Imelda C. V da. De Sanchez owned a parcel of land located at No.
buyer, unless its value is considerably more than that of the 10 Panay Avenue, Quezon City. On October 10, 1988, Jesus V.
improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay reasonable rent. Garcia (Garcia), doing business under the name TransAmerican
Sales and Exposition, Inc. (TSEI), wrote a letter to Vicente offering
Applying the aforesaid rule in this case, under the first option, to buy the Subject Property for One Million Eight Hundred
petitioner may appropriate for themselves the three (3)-storey Thousand Pesos. The offer was good for only seven (7) days. The
building on the subject land after payment of the indemnity period elapsed with the parties failing to come to an agreement.
provided for in Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code, as applied
in existing jurisprudence. Under this option, respondents would Sometime in the third week of October 1988, Felisa Yap (Yap), the
have a right of retention over the three (3)-storey building as well widow of Kenneth Nereo Sanchez, and Garcia had a meeting at the
as the subject land until petitioners complete the reimbursement. Quezon City Sports Club wherein the parties agreed to the sale of
Under the second option, petitioners may sell the subject land to the subject property. Yap turned over to Garcia the original
respondents at a price equivalent to the current market value owner’s copy of TCT 156254, the copy of the filed Application for
thereof. However, if the value of the subject land is considerably Restitution of Title to the property, and copies of all receipts for
more than the value of the three (3)-storey building, respondents
17
the payment of real estate taxes on the property, while Garcia paid The records reveal that on January 31, 1989, TSEI sold to Tulagan
Yap 50,000 as earnest money. a 52-square meter portion of TCT 156254 and the townhouse unit
that was going to be built upon it for the amount of ₱800,000 as
Afterwards, Yap required the occupants of the subject property to evidenced by a Conditional Deed of Sale of even date. Then,
vacate the same. Immediately after it was vacated, Garcia, without Maniwang bought a unit from TSEI for ₱700,000 through an
Yap’s knowledge and consent, took possession of the lot and Absolute Deed of Sale dated February 22, 1989. Later, Marquez
installed his own caretaker thereon with strict instructions not to purchased a townhouse unit from TSEI for ₱800,000 in a Contract
allow anyone to enter the property. Yap later learned that Garcia to Sell dated March 13, 1989. Afterwards, TSEI sold to Caminas a
had also demolished the house on the property and advertised the townhouse unit for ₱650,000 through an Absolute Deed of Sale
construction and sale of "Trans American Townhouse V" thereon. dated March 21, 1989. Thereafter, VTCI bought three (3)
The foregoing developments notwithstanding and despite townhouses from TSEI for ₱700,000 each. Notably, except for the
numerous demands, Garcia failed to pay the balance of the Absolute Deeds of Sale executed between TSEI and VTCI, all the
purchase price as agreed upon. Then, on December 5, 1988, Yap other intervenors’ contracts conveying townhouses in their favor
was informed that the checks representing the purchase price of identified their purchased lots as covered by TCT 156254 (the title
the subject property were ready but that Vicente must pick up his of the Sanchezes).
checks personally. On December 8, 1988, Vicente came to Manila
from Laguna and proceeded to Garcia’s office to get the checks. Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) entered into a Loan
Agreement dated May 22, 1989 with TSEI secured by a Real Estate
However, out of the six (6) checks that were presented to them, Mortgage over TCT 156254.FEBTC later merged with the Bank of
four (4) of them were post-dated, further delaying their overdue the Philippine Islands (BPI) with the latter as the surviving bank.
payment. Garcia purportedly explained to FEBTC that the parties were still
Subsequently, the first four (4) checks were deposited with no in the process of transferring the title. Afterwards, Garcia
issue. However, the last two (2) checks, amounting to ₱400,000 submitted a copy of TCT 383697 in TSEI’s name. Upon default,
each, were dishonored for the reason of "DAIF" or drawn against FEBTC (now BPI) foreclosed the subject lot and had the
insufficient funds. Thus, Yap wrote a letter dated December 26, Foreclosure Certificate of Sale annotated on TCT 383697.
1988 to Garcia informing him that the two (2) checks were
dishonored and asking that the checks be replaced within five (5) The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Sanchezes as plaintiffs.
days from receipt of the letter. Such request was left unheeded. Upon appeal by the intervenors appellants, the CA rendered, on
November 6, 2006, the assailed Decision affirming the RTC
On January 10, 1989, Yap informed Garcia in a letter that she and Decision with modifications.
Vicente were rescinding the Agreement while demanding the
return of the original owner’s copy of TCT 156254. This prompted ISSUES:
Garcia to offer two (2) manager’s checks in the aggregate amount (I) Whether the Sanchezes are guilty of negligence. (NO)
of ₱300,000 which Yap flatly refused, reiterating the rescission of (II) Whether the Sanchezes acted in bad faith. (NO)
their Agreement and demanding for the return of all documents (III) Whether the intervenors (Sps. Caminas, Maniwang. Tulagan
entrusted to Garcia. and Marquez) are purchasers in good faith. (NO)
On August 21, 1989, Yap filed a formal complaint with the Office of (II) Article 453 of the Civil Code relevantly states:
the City Building Official of Quezon City. Thereafter, on February “Article 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the
15, 1990, Yap and Vicente, in his own behalf and representing the person who built, planted or sowed on the land of another, but also
heirs of Imelda C.Vda. De Sanchez, filed before the Regional Trial on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the
Court (RTC) in Quezon City, Branch 89 a Complaint dated February other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.
14, 1990 for the rescission of contract, restitution and damages It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner
with prayer for TRO/preliminary injunction against TSEI and whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without
Garcia. opposition on his part.”
18
The second paragraph of the provision clearly reads that a Thus, the townhouses were not fully finished and completed. Yet
landowner is considered in bad faith if he does not oppose the on December 27, l989 (date of notarization), VTCI entered into
unauthorized construction thereon despite knowledge of the three (3) Deeds of Absolute sale over three (3) townhouses on
same. It does not, however, state what form such opposition three (3) lots covered by TCT 383697 and despite the non-
should take. The fact of the matter is that the Sanchezes did take completion of the townhouses, it still fully paid the uniform price
action to oppose the construction on their property by writing the of ₱700,000 for the townhouse on each of the 3 lots. Thirdly, with
HLURB and the City the CDO and the warnings to the public and prospective buyers
Building Official of Quezon City. As a result, the HLURB issued two published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on April 16, 1989 and in
(2) Cease and Desist Orders and several directives against the Manila Bulletin on April 19, 2014, VTCI should have been
Garcia/TSEI which, however, were left unheeded. In addition, the aware of the irregularities in the proposed sale of townhouses.
Sanchezes could not be faulted for not having been able to enjoin
the sale of the townhouses by Garcia and TSEI to the intervenors Fourthly, VTCI should have inquired with the said HLURB if Garcia
Sps. Caminas, Maniwang, Tulagan, and Marquez who bought their and TSEI have a permit to sell the townhouses. Fifthly, a buyer of a
townhouse units during the same period that the Sanchezes were townhouse will ordinarily visit the project site and look at and
demanding the full payment of the subject lot and were exercising investigate the lot, the title and the townhouses being sold. If it
their right of extrajudicial rescission of the Agreement. As the inspected the site of the construction project, it would have known
intervenors asserted having bought the townhouse units in early from the other purchasers that the project has no permit from the
1989, it can be seen that the preselling was done almost HLURB and that construction has been stopped because of the
immediately after the Sanchezes and Garcia/TSEI agreed on the CDO.
terms of the sale of the subject lot, or shortly after Garcia and TSEI
had taken over the property and demolished the old house built Even as the intervenors have been found to be in bad faith, BPI, the
thereon. The Court agrees with both the RTC and the CA that successor of FEBTC, cannot be considered a mortgagee in good
Garcia and/or TSEI are builders in bad faith. They knew for a fact faith, considering the glaring anomalies in the loan transaction
that the property still belonged to the Sanchezes and yet between TSEI and FEBTC. when Garcia gave TCT 156254 to FEBTC
proceeded to build the townhouses not just without the authority for the processing of a loan secured by a mortgage, it indubitably
of the landowners, but also against their will. showed that Garcia/TSEI did not yet own the subject property as
said title was in the name of the Sanchezes. considering that
(III) Firstly, they admitted that they executed either contracts of Garcia/TSEI were already selling the townhouse units to the public
sale or contracts to sell indicating that the lot is covered by TCT as early as January 1989, FEBTC was also remiss in not requiring
No. 156254 registered under the name of the respondent Garcia/TSEI to submit a written approval from the HLURB for the
Sanchezes. While the established rule is that persons dealing with mortgage of the subject property where the townhouse units were
property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required being constructed. FEBTC was again negligent in not scrutinizing
to go beyond what appears on the face of the title, intervenors the TCT 383697 considering that the title has the purported
cannot seek haven from such doctrine as the title of the lot does issuance date of June 9, 1988 way before the December Agreement
not pertain to the vendor (Garcia or TSEI) they dealt with. was executed and when the loan was negotiated. FEBTC released
portions of the loan proceeds in April even before it approved the
Secondly, the intervenors know, based on the contract of sale or loan secured by a real estate mortgage on May 22, 1989. And more
contract to sell, that the property is registered under TCT No. anomalous is the fact that FEBTC had TCT 383697 verified for its
156254 in the name of the Sanchezes. As such, they should have veracity and genuineness way after it approved the loan to
insisted that they talk to the Sanchezes before executing said Garcia/TSEI. The general rule that a mortgagee need not look
conveyances. beyond the title does not apply to banks and other financial
institutions as greater care and due diligence are required of them.
Thirdly, the intervenors should have been suspicious of the
explanation of Garcia that TCT No. 383697, reflecting TSEI as the FLORENTINO, TROADIO AND PEDRO, ALL SURNAMED
owner of the property, has been burned and that he is in the OCHOA, PETITIONERS, VS. MAURO APETA AND
process of reconstituting the title. Before signing the contract of APOLONIA ALMAZAN, RESPONDENTS.
sale or contract to sell, they should have asked Garcia where the
reconstitution case has been filed or is pending and proceeded to G.R. No. 146259, FIRST DIVISION, September 13, 2007,
verify with the said court the status of the reconstitution. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Fourthly, the intervenors knew that they were buying a Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is
townhouse over a subdivision lot from TSEI and Garcia. Such being not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition
the case, they should have verified with the HLURB whether said any flaw which invalidates it. The landowner can make a
project is registered with said housing agency and if a license to choice - either by appropriating the building by paying the
sell has been issued to TSEI or Garcia. Had they made such an proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of
inquiry, they would have known that instead of a permit for the the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule
project and a license to sell the property, a cease and desist order that accords with the principle of accession that the accessory
was issued by the HLURB precisely to enjoin TSEI and Garcia from follows the principal and not the other way around. He must
selling said property to the public. As compared to the other choose only one.
purchasers, the Deeds of Absolute Sale of intervenor VTCI cited
TCT 383697 in the name of VTCI and not TCT 156254. Respondents, as owners of Lot No. 1580, may choose
Nevertheless, the Court finds that respondent VTCI is a purchaser between appropriating as their own the houses and
in bad faith for the following reasons: apartment building constructed thereon by petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest bypaying the proper indemnity or
Firstly, respondent VTCI has not shown that it verified with the RD value; or obliging petitioners to pay the price of Lot No. 1580
if the alleged TCT 383697 of respondent TSEI is valid and genuine. which is not more than that of the improvements.
Secondly, Garcia and TSEI stopped the construction of the
FACTS:
townhouses on March 30, l989 pursuant to the CDO of the HLURB.
19
The trial judge commissioned Engr. Romulo Unciano of the Bureau For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on
of Lands to conduct a resurvey of the property. The result of the alluvion to their case, the above-mentioned requisites must be
resurvey shows that the lot was registered in the name of present. However, they admit that the accretion was formed
Margarita Almada, respondents’ predecessor-in-interest; and that by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials
the lot covered by TCT No. T-40624 is not Lot No. 1580, but Lot No. on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River
1581 registered in the name of Servillano Ochoa, petitioners’ bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the
predecessorin- interest. This lot has been occupied by Isidro accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials
Jasmin. was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the
waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan
River.
The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. CA
affirmed the judgment of the RTC. Petitioners filed a motion for
It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the
reconsideration, but it was denied.
accretion was man-made or artificial. In Republic v. CA, this
Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be due
ISSUE:
to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This
excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by
Whether or not petitioners are builders in good faith when they
human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the
built their houses and apartment building on Lot No. 1580. (YES)
exclusive work of nature.
RULING:
FACTS:
Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical
Sometime in 1979, private respondents Salasalan and Rabaya
meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other
leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from one
things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of
Antonio Nazareno, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. In the
design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. It
latter part of 1982, private respondents allegedly stopped paying
implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of
rentals. As a result, petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The
MTC of CDO.
essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one’s
right, ignorance of a superior claim and absence of intention to
A decision was rendered against private respondents, which
overreach another.
decision was affirmed by the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Before he
died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of
Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not
Lands of the Survey plan with a view of perfecting his title over the
aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
accretion are being claimed by him. Before the approved survey
flaw which invalidates it. The landowner can make a choice -
plan could be released to the applicant, however, it was protested
either by appropriating the building by paying the proper
by private respondents before the Bureau of Land.
indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords
Upon investigating of the RD of Bureau of Land, it was
with the principle of accession that the accessory follows the
recommended that Survey Plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno
principal and not the other way around. He must choose only one.
who denied the motion, Respondent Director of Land then ordered
him to vacate the portion adjudicated to private respondent be
Respondents, as owners of Lot No. 1580, may choose between
placed in possession thereof. Upon the denial of the late Antonio
appropriating as their own the houses and apartment building
Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners Desamparado
constructed thereon by petitioners and their predecessors-
Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before
ininterest by paying the proper indemnity or value; or obliging
the RTC for annulment of the following: order of investigation by
petitioners to pay the price of Lot No.
respondent Gillera, report and recommendation by respondent
1580 which is not more than that of the improvements.
Labis, decision by respondent Hilario, order by respondent Ignacio
DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO AND LETICIA affirming the decision of respondent Hilario and order of
NAZARENO TAPIA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF execution by respondent Palad.
APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS.
LEO RABAYA, AVELINO LABIS, HON. ROBERTO G. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust
HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO M. GILLERA AND administrative remedies which resulted in the finality of the
HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., IN THEIR OFFICIAL administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands, On Appeal, the CA
AND/OR PRIVATE CAPACITIES, RESPONDENTS. affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint.
G.R. No. 98045, SECOND DIVISION, June 26, 1996, ROMERO, J. ISSUE:
20
Whether or not there was accretion. (NO) northeastern boundary to be Manila Bay. Private
respondents' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front
RULING: the Manila Bay and not any of the two rivers whose
torrential action, private respondents insist, is to account for
Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an the accretion on their land.
accretion to his titled property, applying Art. 457 of the Civil Code If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or
which provides: To the owner of lands adjoining the banks of river both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effect been deposited on either or both of the eastern and western
of the current of the water. boundaries of private respondents' own tract of land, not on the
In the case of Meneses v. CA, this Court held that accretion, as a northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay.
mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion,
requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of
deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters
of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes FACTS:
place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea coast). These are
called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, filed an application for
owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon,
accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately 17 hectares.
waters. Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Emiliano
For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries
alluvion to their case, the abovementioned requisites must be covering 25 hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga,
present. However, they admit that the accretion was formed by Bataan. Initially, such application was denied by the Director of
the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on Fisheries on the ground that the property formed part of the public
portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding domain.
their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the
accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials Sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual flied an
was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of land,
waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-
River. 175181 and said to have an area of 146,611 square meters. Pascual
In Hilario v. City of Manila, this Court held that the word "current" claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, situated in
indicates the participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original
of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners' submission not Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is bounded on the eastern side by
having met the first and second requirements of the rules on the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on
alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner. the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as
the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay
It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in
accretion was man-made or artificial. In an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as
Republic v. CA, this Court ruled that the requirement that the the riparian owner.
deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the
deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating that
alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed
sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of
In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the
dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to Philippines.
its sawmill operations. Even if this Court were to take into
consideration petitioners' submission that the accretion site was ISSUE:
the result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting in the
dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the Whether or not the land sought to be registered is accretion
Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land, the same formed by the action of the two rivers of Talisay and Bulacan. (NO)
would still be part of the public domain.
RULING:
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, PETITIONER, VS.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND HEIRS OF Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457,
SINFOROSO PASCUAL, RESPONDENTS. requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the
accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2)
G.R. No. 68166, FIRST DIVISION, February 12, 1997, that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3)
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J. that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article the bank of the river.
457, requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that
the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and Private respondents' claim of ownership over the disputed
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters property under the principle of accretion, is misplaced.
of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes
place is adjacent to the bank of the river. First, the title of private respondents' own tract of land reveals
Private respondents' claim of ownership over the disputed its northeastern boundary to be
property under the principle of accretion, is misplaced. First, the Manila Bay. Private respondents' land, therefore, used to
title of private respondents' own tract of land reveals its adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of the two
21
rivers whose torrential action, private respondents insist, is to Therefore, there is merit to the contention of the petitioners
account for the accretion on their land. that Hilario mortgaged the disputed property to the Rural
Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed Bank of Cardona in his capacity as a mere co-owner
land; (b) private respondents' own tract of land; (c) the Manila thereof. Clearly, the said transaction did not divest them of
Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. Private respondents' title to the property at the time of the institution of the
own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of Complaint for quieting of title.
their land on the northern side lies now the disputed land where
before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. FACTS:
If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both Leon Robles owned and occupied the land situated in Kay Taga,
of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been Lagundi, Morong, Rizal openly and adversely. He also declared the
deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries same in his name for taxation purposes and paid the
of private respondents' own tract of land, not on the northern corresponding taxes thereon. When Leon died, his son Silvino
portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly Robles inherited the land, who took possession of the land,
lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that declared it in his name for taxation purposes, and paid the taxes
the alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's land thereon. Upon the death of Silvino, his widow Maria de la Cruz and
which is adjacent to the river bank. his children inherited the property. They took adverse possession
of said property, and paid taxes thereon. The task of cultivating the
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that private respondents' land was assigned to petitioner Lucio Robles, who planted trees
own tract of land adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila Bay is obviously and other crops. He also built a nipa hut on the land. The
not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind of petitioners entrusted the payment of the land taxes to their co-heir
body of water the Manila Bay is. and half-brother, Hilario Robles.
Thereafter, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on of land in the name of Silvino Robles was canceled and transferred
a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay to Exequiel Ballena, father of Andrea Robles, who is the wife of
which adjoined private respindents' own tract of land on the Hilario Robles. Thereafter, Exequiel secured a loan from the
northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of the Antipolo Rural Bank, using the tax declaration as security. The tax
Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. declaration was transferred to the name of Antipolo Rural Bank
and later on, was transferred to the name of Hilario Robles and his
Applicant Pascual has not presented proofs to convince the Court wife.
that the land he has applied for registration is the result of the
settling down on his registered land of soil, earth or other deposits Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cadona Rural Bank, Inc.,
so as to be rightfully be considered as an accretion [caused by the using the tax declaration as security. Andrea Robles testified
action of the two rivers]. Said Art. 457 finds no applicability where without contradiction that somebody else, not her husband Hilario
the accretion must have been caused by action of the bay." Robles, signed the loan papers because Hilario was working in
Marinduque at that time.
LUCIO ROBLES, EMETERIA ROBLES, ALUDIA ROBLES
and EMILIO ROBLES, petitioners, - versus - COURT OF For failure to pay the mortgage debt, foreclosure proceedings were
APPEALS, Spouses VIRGILIO SANTOS and BABY RUTH had and Rural Bank emerged as the highest bidder. The spouses
CRUZ, RURAL BANK OF CARDONA, Inc., HILARIO Robles failed to redeem the property and so the tax declaration
ROBLES, ALBERTO PALAD JR. in his capacity as Director was transferred in the name of Rural Bank. Rural Bank sold the
of Lands, and JOSE MAULEON in his capacity as District same to the Spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos.
Land Officer of the Bureau of Lands, respondents.
Petitioner discovered the mortgage and attempted to redeem the
G.R. No. 123509, THIRD DIVISION, March 14, 2000, PANGANIBAN, property, but was unsuccessful. Spouses Santos took possession of
J. the property in question and was able to secure Free Patent No. IV-
1-010021 in their names.
An action to quiet title is a common-law remedy for the removal
of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property. The petitioners filed a complaint against Spouses Virgilio and Ruth
It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an Santos, as well as the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc. before the RTC.
equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the The petitioners contended that they had been in possession of the
subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance land since 1942, and alleged, among other matters, that it was only
or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title in 1987 that they came to know of the foreclosure of the real estate
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its mortgage (REM) constituted thereon by their half-brother, Hilario
prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. The failure Robles, in favor of Rural Bank; and that they likewise learned upon
to show the indubitable title of Exequiel to the property in further inquiry, that the latter had already sold the same parcel of
question is vital to the resolution of the present Petition. It was land in favor of the spouses Santos.
from him that Hilario had allegedly derived his title thereto as
owner, an allegation which thereby enabled him to mortgage it The RTC ruled that the REM allegedly executed by Hilario is not
to the Rural Bank of Cardona. The occupation and the valid because his signature in the mortgage deed was forged. The
possession thereof by the petitioners and their predecessors-in- foreclosure proceedings therein were likewise not valid.
interest until 1962 was not disputed, and Exequiel's acquisition Therefore, the Bank did not acquire any right arising out of the
of the said property by prescription was not alleged. Thus, the foreclosure proceedings. The Bank could not have transferred any
deed of conveyance purportedly evidencing the transfer of right to the spouses Santos. Consequently, the issuance of a free
ownership and possession from the heirs of Silvino to patent title to the Spouses Santos is not valid, because at that time,
Exequiel should have been presented as the best proof of the property subject of this case was already private land. Thus,
that transfer. However, no such document was presented.
the Bureau of Lands has no jurisdiction to dispose of the same.
22
The CA reversed the RTC, ruling that petitioners no longer had any other co-owner; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and
title to the subject property at the time they instituted the convincing.
complaint for quieting of title.
In the present case, Hilario did not have possession of the subject
ISSUE: property; neither did he exclude the petitioners from the use and
the enjoyment thereof, as they had indisputably shared in its fruits.
1. Whether the petitioners have the appropriate title that will Likewise, his act of entering into a mortgage contract with the
entitle them to avail themselves of the remedy of quieting of title. bank cannot be construed to be a repudiation of the co-ownership.
(YES) As absolute owner of his undivided interest in the land, he had the
2. Whether the Real Estate Mortgage is valid. (NO) right to alienate his share, as he in fact did. Neither should his
payment of land taxes in his name, as agreed upon by the co-
RULING: owners, be construed as a repudiation of the co-ownership. The
assertion that the declaration of ownership was tantamount to
Quieting of Title repudiation was belied by the continued occupation and
possession of the disputed property by the petitioners as owners.
An action to quiet title is a common-law remedy for the removal of
any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property. It is Validity of the Real Estate Mortgage
essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the In a real estate mortgage contract, it is essential that the mortgagor
subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or be the absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged; otherwise,
proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must the mortgage is void. In the present case, it is apparent that
be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie Hilario Robles was not the absolute owner of the entire
appearance of validity or legal efficacy. subject property, and that the Rural
Bank of Cardona, Inc., in not fully ascertaining his title
The CA failed to consider irregularities in the transactions thereto, failed to observe due diligence and, as such, was a
involving the disputed property. First, while it was declared in the mortgagee in bad faith.
name of Exequiel, there was no instrument or deed of conveyance
evidencing its transfer from the heirs of Silvino to him. This fact is Considering that Hilario can be deemed to have mortgaged the
important, considering that the petitioners are alleging continued disputed property not as absolute owner but only as a co-owner,
possession of the property. Second, Exequiel was the father-in law he can be adjudged to have disposed to the Rural Bank of Cardona,
of Hilario, to whom petitioners had entrusted the payment of the Inc., only his undivided share therein. The said bank, being the
land taxes. Third, considering that the subject property had been immediate predecessor of the Santos spouses, was a
mortgaged by Exequiel to the Rural Bank of Antipolo, and that it mortgagee in bad faith. Thus, justice and equity mandate
was foreclosed and in fact declared in the bank's name, why was the entitlement of the Santos spouses, who merely stepped
he able to sell it to Spouses Robles? into the shoes of the bank, only to what legally pertains to
the latter — Hilario's share in the disputed property.
Lastly, inasmuch as it was an unregistered parcel of land, the Rural
Bank of Cardona, Inc., did not observe due diligence in determining ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET AL., petitioners, - versus
Hilario's title thereto. - COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO AVILES, respondents.
The failure to show the indubitable title of Exequiel to the property
in question is vital to the resolution of the present Petition. It was G.R. No. 95748, THIRD DIVISION, November 21, 1996,
from him that Hilario had allegedly derived his title thereto as PANGANIBAN, J.
owner, an allegation which thereby enabled him to mortgage it to An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be
the Rural Bank of Cardona. The occupation and the possession brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute. In
thereof by the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest until this case, the facts presented unmistakably constitute a
1962 was not disputed, and Exequiel's acquisition of the said clear case of boundary dispute, which is not cognizable in
property by prescription was not alleged. Thus, the deed of a special civil action to quiet title.
conveyance purportedly evidencing the transfer of
ownership and possession from the heirs of Silvino to Thus, petitioners have wholly misapprehended the import of the
Exequiel should have been presented as the best proof of foregoing rule by claiming that respondent Court erred in holding
that transfer. However, no such document was presented. that there was "no evidence of any muniment of title, proceeding,
Therefore, there is merit to the contention of the petitioners written contract," and that there were, as a matter of fact, two
that Hilario mortgaged the disputed property to the Rural such contracts: (i) the Agreement of Partition; and (ii) the Deed
Bank of Cardona in his capacity as a mere co-owner of Sale. However, these documents in no way constitute a
thereof. cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. Rather,
Clearly, the said transaction did not divest them of title to the uncertainty arises from the parties' failure to situate and
the property at the time of the institution of the Complaint fix the boundary between their respective properties.
for quieting of title.
FACTS:
Contrary to the disquisition of the CA, Hilario effected no clear and
evident repudiation of the coownership. The petitioners filed an action for quieting of title before the RTC,
It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by averring that they are the actual possessors of a parcel of land
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear situated in Malawa, Lingayen, Pangasinan. This property is the
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may share of their father, Eduardo Aviles (the brother of Camilo Aviles),
prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must in the estate of their [Eduardo and Camilo’s] deceased parents,
concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of Ireneo Aviles and Anastacia Salazar. Since 1957, Eduardo Aviles
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) was in actual possession of the property. In fact, he mortgaged the
such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the same with the Rural Bank and the PNB. When the property was
23
inspected, Eduardo, in the presence of the boundary owners, However, these documents in no way constitute a cloud or
namely, Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles, and Juana and Apolonio cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the
Joaquin, pointed to the inspector the existing earthen dikes as the uncertainty arises from the parties' failure to situate and fix
boundary limits of the property, and nobody objected. When the the boundary between their respective properties.
real estate mortgage (REM) was foreclosed, the property was sold
at public auction, but the same was redeemed by petitioners’ Corollarily, and equally as clear, the construction of the bamboo
mother, Anastacia Vda. de Aviles. The land was subsequently fence enclosing the disputed property and the moving of earthen
transferred and declared in Anastacia’s name. Camilo Aviles dikes are not the "clouds" or "doubts" which can be removed in an
asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property action for quieting of title.
by constructing a bamboo fence thereon and moving the earthen
dikes, thereby disturbing the peaceful possession of the JENESTOR B. CALDITO and MARIA FILOMENA T.
petitioners over said portion. Camilo admitted the Agreement of CALDITO, Petitioners - versus - ISAGANI V. OBANDO and
Partition executed by him and his brothers, Anastacio and GEREON V. OBANDO, Respondents
Eduardo. In accordance therewith, the respective areas allotted to
the siblings was agreed and measured before the execution of the G.R. No. 181596, THIRD DIVISION, January 30, 2017, REYES, J.
agreement, but Camilo was not present when the measurement Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are
was made. Camilo agreed to have a smaller area when his brother not conclusive evidence of ownership, as in the instant case,
Eduardo asked him for a bigger share, because the latter has they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for
several children to support. no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that
is not in his actual or constructive possession. They constitute
The RTC ordered the dismissal of the complaint for lack of basis evidence of great weight in support of the claim of title of
and merits. The CA affirmed the RTC, reasoning that a special civil ownership by prescription when considered with the actual
action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a possession of the property by the applicant.
boundary dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted an
ejectment suit instead. Petitioners assert that private respondent Indeed, the respondents' presentation of the tax
is occupying the disputed lot because he claimed it to be part of his declarations and tax receipts which all are of ancient era
share in the partitioned property of his parents, whereas indicates possession in the concept of an owner by the
petitioners are claiming the said lot as part and parcel of the land respondents and their predecessors-in-interests.
allotted to Eduardo Aviles, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest.
Granting without admitting that Felipe's possession of Lot No.
They contend that they have been occupying the aforesaid land as
1633 cannot be tacked with the respondents' possession, the
heirs of Eduardo Aviles in open, actual, continuous, peaceful,
latter's possession can be tacked with that of Paterno. Thus,
public and adverse possession against the whole world. Further,
from 1961 to the time of the filing of the quieting of title by
they argue that, if indeed the disputed lot belonged to private
the petitioners in 2003, the respondents have been in
respondent, why then did it take him almost 26 long years to assert
possession of the entire Lot No. 1633 in the concept of an
his ownership; why did he not assert his ownership over the
owner for almost 42 years. This period of time is sufficient
property when Eduardo Aviles was still alive; and why did he not
to vest extraordinary acquisitive prescription over the
take any action when the mortgage over the disputed property property on the respondents. As such, it is immaterial now
was foreclosed? whether the respondents possessed the property in good faith
or not.
ISSUE:
From the foregoing disquisitions, it is clear that the
petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or
Whether the complaint for quieting of title instituted by the ownership over the subject parcel of land. Except for their
petitioners is the proper remedy. (NO) claim that they merely purchased the same from the Spouses
Ballesteros, the petitioners presented no other justification to
RULING: disprove the ownership of the respondents. Since the Spouses
Ballesteros had no right to sell the subject parcel of land, the
An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be petitioners cannot be deemed to have been the lawful owners of
brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute. In the same.
this case, the facts presented unmistakably constitute a
clear case of boundary dispute, which is not cognizable in FACTS:
a special civil action to quiet title.
As early as 1921, Lot No. 1633 (subject property) was declared for
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any taxation purposes in the name of
cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real Felipe Obado. After Felipe's death, Paterno Obado, whom Felipe
property. In fine, to avail of the remedy of quieting of title, a treated like his own son, subsequently occupied Lot No. 1633 and
plaintiff must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, continued to pay the realty taxes of the same.
encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud,
doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in Sometime in 1995, Antonio Ballesteros executed an Affidavit of
real property. Thus, petitioners have wholly misapprehended the Ownership narrating his claim over the subject parcel of land. In
import of the foregoing rule by claiming that the CA erred in his Affidavit, Antonio claimed that Lot No. 1633 was co-owned by
holding that there was no evidence of any muniment of title, Felipe with his five siblings, namely: Eladia, Estanislao, Maria,
proceeding, written contract, and that there were, as a matter of Severino, and Tomasa, all surnamed Obado. Thereafter, Spouses
fact, two such contracts: (i) the Agreement of Partition executed Antonio and Elena Ballesteros sold the subject parcel of land to the
by private respondent and his brothers (including the petitioners' petitioners for the sum of P70,000.000 evidenced by a Deed of
father and predecessor-in interest), in which their respective Absolute Sale. Thereafter, the petitioners declared the subject lot
shares in the inherited property were agreed upon; and (ii) the for taxation purposes and paid the realty taxes thereon. In 2002,
Deed of Sale evidencing the redemption by petitioner Anastacia the petitioners attempted to build a house on the subject parcel of
Vda. de Aviles of the subject property in a foreclosure sale. land, but the respondents prevented them from completing the
24
same. The respondents then filed a complaint before the barangay legal heirs. Moreover, no other piece of evidence was ever
but no amicable settlement was reached between the parties. presented to prove that Lot No. 1633 was ever subdivided. In fact,
Hence, the petitioners instituted a complaint for quieting of the petitioners admitted that the subject lot has always been
ownership against the respondents before the RTC, as well as an declared for taxation purposes in the name of Felipe, and that the
injunctive writ to prevent the respondents from interfering with Spouses Ballesteros or the siblings of Felipe have never declared
the construction of their house. the same for taxation purposes in their names.
While the petitioner’s submitted official receipts and tax
For their part, the respondents averred that the Spouses declarations to prove payment of taxes, nowhere in the evidence
Ballesteros were not the owners and possessors of the subject was it shown that Spouses Ballesteros declared the subject parcel
parcel of land. They maintained that Lot No. 1633 was inherited by of land in their name for taxation purposes or paid taxes due
their father, Paterno, from its original owner Felipe, and they have thereon. True, a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove
been paying the real property taxes for the entire property. They ownership. Nonetheless, it may serve as sufficient basis for
asserted that the petitioners are buyers in bad faith since their inferring possession. Be that as it may, the rights of the
family had been in possession of the entire Lot No. 1633 since respondents as owners of Lot No. 1633 were never alienated from
1969 and had been in open, peaceful and uninterrupted them despite the sale of the subject parcel of land by the Spouses
possession of the whole property up to the present or for more Ballesteros to the petitioners nor does the fact that the petitioners
than 30 years in the concept of an owner. succeeded in paying the real property taxes of the subject parcel of
land. Besides, it seems that the petitioners knew of the fact that
The RTC upheld the validity of the sale between the petitioners they did not have a title to the subject parcel of land and could not,
and the Spouses Ballesteros and dismissed the respondents' claim therefore, have validly registered the same, because of the
of ownership over Lot No. 1633. respondents' possession of the entire property.
The CA reversed the RTC decision ruling that for a party seeking to The respondents also presented the following pieces of evidence:
quiet their ownership of the portion in litigation, the petitioners (1) old certified photocopies of declarations of real property and
have miserably failed to prove the title of their immediate original copy of tax receipts x x x in the name of Felipe x x x; (2)
predecessors-in-interest, the Spouses' Ballesteros. Except for the original copy of tax receipts x x x in the name of the respondents'
Affidavit of Ownership executed by Antonio, there is, in fact, no father Paterno x x x; (3) original copy of tax receipt x x x in the
evidence on record to support the claim that the subject parcel name of Isagani x x x; (4) original copy of the Certification issued
was, indeed, co-owned by Felipe and his siblings. by the Municipal Treasurer of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte that Lot No.
1633 covered by Tax Declaration No. 03- 001-00271 declared in
ISSUE: the name of Felipe is not delinquent in the payment of realty taxes.
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are
Whether the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the not conclusive evidence of ownership, as in the instant case, they
subject parcel of land. (NO) are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one
in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not
RULING: in his actual or constructive possession. They constitute evidence
of great weight in support of the claim of title of ownership by
In this case, the petitioners' cause of action relates to an action to prescription when considered with the actual possession of the
quiet title which has two indispensable requisites, namely: (1) the property by the applicant.
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; find (2) the deed, Indeed, the respondents' presentation of the tax
claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on declarations and tax receipts which all are of ancient era
his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite indicates possession in the concept of an owner by the
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. respondents and their predecessors-in-interests. The tax
declarations in the name of Paterno take on great significance
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the because the respondents can tack their claim of ownership to that
petitioners' cause of action must necessarily fail in view of of their father. It is worthy to note that the respondents' father
the absence of the first requisite since the petitioners were Paterno to whom they inherited the entire Lot No. 1633 paid the
not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the taxes due under his name; and subsequently, the respondents paid
subject parcel of land. the taxes due after the death of Paterno. Granting without
The petitioners' claim of legal title over the subject parcel of admitting that Felipe's possession of Lot No. 1633 cannot be
land by virtue of the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Ownership tacked with the respondents' possession, the latter's possession
issued by Antonio cannot stand because they failed to can be tacked with that of Paterno.
prove the title of their immediate predecessors-in-interest,
the Spouses Ballesteros. The Court cannot give full credence to Thus, from 1961 to the time of the filing of the quieting of
Antonio's Affidavit of Ownership for he simply made general and title by the petitioners in 2003, the respondents have been
self-serving statements therein which were favorable to him, and in possession of the entire Lot No. 1633 in the concept of
which were not supported with documentary evidence, with no an owner for almost 42 years. This period of time is
specifics as to when their predecessors-in-interest acquired the sufficient to vest extraordinary acquisitive prescription
subject parcel of land. Moreover, Antonio was not even called to over the property on the respondents. As such, it is immaterial
the witness stand to testify on the contents of his Affidavit of now whether the respondents possessed the property in good
Ownership, thus, making the affidavit hearsay evidence and its faith or not.
probative value questionable.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it is clear that the
The RTC’s reliance on the Affidavit of Ownership executed by petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or
Antonio that the entire Lot No. 1633 was co-owned by Felipe and ownership over the subject parcel of land. Except for their
his siblings is misplaced, considering that nothing on record claim that they merely purchased the same from the Spouses
shows the relationship between Felipe and his supposed Ballesteros, the petitioners presented no other justification to
25
disprove the ownership of the respondents. Since the Spouses name in the tax declaration signifying that she is the owner of the
Ballesteros had no right to sell the subject parcel of land, the house constructed on the subject lot, tax declarations are not
petitioners cannot be deemed to have been the lawful owners of evidence of ownership but merely issued to the declarant for
the same. purposes of payment of taxes; that she cannot be considered as an
indispensable party in a suit for recovery of possession against
REY CASTIGADOR CATEDRILLA, PETITIONER, VS. MARIO respondents; that Mildred should have intervened and proved that
AND MARGIE LAURON, she is an indispensable party because the records showed that she
RESPONDENTS. was not in actual possession of the subject lot. CA reversed. The CA
[G.R. No. 179011, THIRD DIVISION, APRIL 15, 2013, PERALTA, J.] found that petitioner's co-heirs to the subject lot should have been
impleaded as co-plaintiffs in the ejectment case against
In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in respondents, since without their presence, the trial court could not
interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of petitioner.
the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, Hence, this petition.
any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties.
Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who ISSUE:
filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an
indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not Whether or not petitioner can file the action without impleading
indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for his co-owners.
a complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without their
participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for RULING:
the benefit of all co-owners.
Yes. Petitioner can file the action for ejectment without impleading
FACTS: his co-owners. In Wee v. De Castro, wherein petitioner therein
Petitioner Rey Castigador Catedrilla filed with the Municipal Trial argued that the respondent cannot maintain an action for
Court (MTC) of Lambunao, Iloilo a Complaint for ejectment against ejectment against him, without joining all his co-owners, we ruled
the spouses Mario and Margie Lauron. The case arose from a in this wise:
parcel of land, alleging that Lorenza Lizada is the owner of a parcel Article 487 of the New Civil Code is explicit on this point:
of land known as Lot 183, located in Mabini Street, Lambunao, “ART.487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
Iloilo. Lilia was succeeded by her heirs, her husband Maximo and ejectment.
their children, one of whom is herein petitioner; that petitioner This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of
filed the complaint as a co-owner of Lot No. 5; that sometime in possession, i.e., forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion
1980, respondents Mario and Margie Lauron, through the interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and
tolerance of the heirs of Lilia, constructed a residential building of recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). As explained by
strong materials on the northwest portion of Lot No. 5 covering an the renowned civilest, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino: A co-owner
area of one hundred square meters; that the heirs of Lilia made may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the
various demands for respondents to vacate the premises and even other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be
exerted earnest efforts to compromise with them but the same was instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the
unavailing; and that petitioner reiterated the demand on plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not
respondents to vacate the subject lot but respondents continued for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.”
to unlawfully withhold such possession. Respondents claimed that In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties
petitioner had no cause of action against them, since they are not in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and
the owners of the residential building standing on petitioner's lot, the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action,
but Mildred Kascher (Mildred), Mildred had already paid any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties.
P10,000.00 as downpayment for the subject lot to Teresito Therefore, only one of the co- owners, namely the co-owner who
Castigador; that there were several instances that the heirs of Lilia filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an
offered the subject Lot 183 for sale to respondents and Mildred indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not
and demanded payment, however, the latter was only interested indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a
in asking money without any intention of delivering or registering complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without their
the subject lot; that in 1998, Maximo, petitioner's father, and participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the
respondent Margie entered into an amicable settlement before the benefit of all co-owners.
Barangay Lupon of Poblacion Ilawod, Lambunao, Iloilo wherein
Maximo offered the subject lot to the spouses Alfons and Mildred In this case, although petitioner alone filed the complaint for
Kascher in the amount of P90,000.00 with the agreement that all unlawful detainer, he stated in the complaint that he is one of the
documents related to the transfer of the subject lot to Maximo and heirs of the late Lilia Castigador, his mother, who inherited the
his children be prepared by Maximo, but the latter failed to subject lot, from her parents. Petitioner did not claim exclusive
comply; and that the amicable settlement should have the force ownership of the subject lot, but he filed the complaint for the
and effect of a final judgment of a court, hence, the instant suit is purpose of recovering its possession which would redound to the
barred by prior judgment. Respondents counterclaimed for benefit of the co-owners.
damages.
The MTC rendered its Decision in favor of the plaintiff. RTC Since petitioner recognized the existence of a co-ownership, he, as
affirmed but deleted the attorney's fees, since the MTC decision a co- owner, can bring the action without the necessity of joining
merely ordered the payment of attorney's fees without any basis. all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs.
The RTC found that petitioner, being one of the co-owners of the
subject lot, is the proper party in interest to prosecute against any SPOUSES MANUEL AND SALVACION DEL CAMPO,
intruder thereon. It found that the amicable settlement signed and PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS
executed by the representatives of the registered owner of the OF JOSE REGALADO, SR., RESPONDENTS.
premises before the Lupon is not binding and unenforceable
between the parties. It further ruled that even if Mildred has her
26
[G.R. No. 108228, SECOND DIVISION, FEBRUARY 01, 2001, object of the sale did not even exceed the ideal shares held by the
QUISUMBING, J.] former in the co-ownership. As a matter of fact, the deed of sale
executed between the parties expressly stipulated that the portion
We have ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells the of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be taken from Salome’s 4/16
whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but undivided interest in said lot, which the latter could validly
not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. transfer in whole or in part even without the consent of the other
Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of co-owners. Salome’s right to sell part of her undivided interest in
the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-
of said co-owner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co- settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-
owner of the property. indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and substitute another person in its enjoyment. Since Salome’s
FACTS: clear intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot
The Bornales were the original co-owners of Lot 162. The lot was 162, in our view no valid objection can be made against it and the
divided in aliquot shares among the 8 co-owners as follows: sale can be given effect to the full extent.
1. Salome – 4/16
2. Consorcia – 4/16 We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot
3. Alfredo -2/16 rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property
4. Maria – 2/16 prior to partition among all the co-owners. However, this should
5. Jose – 1/16 not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case
6. Quirico – 1/16 a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to
7. Rosalia – 1/16 him. Since the co-owner/vendor’s undivided interest could
8. Julita – 1/16 properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties,
what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same
Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for P200.00 to rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent
Soledad Daynolo. Thereafter, Soledad immediately took to the consideration given under their transaction. In other words,
possession of the land and built a house thereon. the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and
acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in
A few years later, Soledad and husband, Simplicio, mortgaged the common. Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of
subject portion of Lot 162 as security for a P4000 debt to Jose the year 1940 when the sale was made in her favor. It follows that
Regalado Sr. This was evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage. Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not have sold the entire Lot
162 to Jose Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948 because at that time,
Three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162 (Salome, Consorcia, and the ideal shares held by the three co-owners/vendors were
Alfredo) sold portions of the said lot to Jose Regalado, Sr. Simplicio, equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided property less the aliquot
heir of Soledad, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the share previously sold by Salome to Soledad. Based on the principle
mortgaged portion of Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr, who in turn that "no one can give what he does not have," Salome, Consorcia
executed a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in favor of Soledad’s and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares pertaining to Soledad
heirs. On the same date, the said heirs sold the redeemed portion since a co-owner cannot alienate more than his share in the co-
of Lot 162 for P1,500 to herein petitioners (Spouses Del Campo). ownership. We have ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells
Meanwhile, Jose Regalado caused the reconstitution of OCT No. the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share
18047. The Reconstituted OCT initially reflected the shares of the but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the
original co- owners in Lot 162. However, the title was transferred sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale
later to Jose Regalado Sr. who subdivided the entire property into of the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights
smaller lots, each covered by a respective title in his name. of said co-owner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-
owner of the property.
In 1987, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this
complaint for "repartition, resurvey and reconveyance" against In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162
the heirs of the now deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners to the extent of the shares which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo
claimed that they owned an area of 1,544 square meters located could validly convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and
within Lot 162-C-6 which was erroneously included in TCT No. could validly transfer her share to petitioners in 1951. The logical
14566 in the name of Regalado. Petitioners alleged that they effect on the second disposition is to substitute petitioners in the
occupied the disputed area as residential dwelling ever since they rights of Soledad as co-owner of the land. Needless to say, these
purchased the property from the rights are preserved notwithstanding the issuance of TCT No.
Distajos way back in 1951. They also declared the land for taxation 14566 in Regalado’s name in 1977.
purposes and paid the corresponding taxes.
EXTRAORDINARY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
ISSUE: PETITIONER, VS. HERMINIA F. SAMSONBICO AND ELY B.
FLESTADO, RESPONDENTS.
Whether or not the sale made by Salome in favor of Soledad be [G.R. No. 191091, FIRST DIVISION, OCTOBER 13, 2014, PEREZ, J.]
valid, notwithstanding that it is a physical portion of the undivided A co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a
co-owned property. co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners.
However, this should not signify that the vendee does not
RULING: acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of
the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/
Yes. The sale made by Salome in favor of Soledad be valid, vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object of the
notwithstanding that it is a physical portion of the undivided co- contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains
owned property. by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had
There can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by Salome as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration
and Soledad could be legally recognized in its entirety since the given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps
27
Apolonio Ballesteros (Apolonio) and Maria Membrebe (Maria) As borne by the records, respondents were able to convincingly
were husband and wife. They begot two (2) children, namely, Juan establish their co- ownership over one-half of the subject property.
M. Ballesteros (Juan), who married Leonarda Tambongco Herminia has successfully established her successional rights over
(Leonarda) and Irenea Ballesteros (Irenea), who married Santiago the subject property through her clear testimony and admitted by
Samson (Santiago). the opposing counsel. In a contract of sale, it is essential that the
seller is the owner of the property he is selling. Under Article 1458
During his lifetime, Apolonio owned a parcel of land consisting of of the Civil Code, the principal obligation of a seller is to transfer
29,748 square meters situated at the ownership of the property sold. Also, Article 1459 of the Civil
Barangay Pantok, Binangonan, Rizal. When Apolonio and Maria Code provides that the thing must be licit and the vendor must
died, the property was inherited by have a right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is
Juan and Irenea. When the latter died, the heirs of Juan and Irenea delivered. The execution by appellants Ballesteros of the Deed of
became co- owners of the property. Absolute Sale over the subject property which they do not
On 16 April 2002, the heirs of Juan, without the consent of exclusively own but is admittedly co-owned by them together with
respondents, the heirs of Irenea executed in favor of petitioner the respondents, was valid only to the extent of the former’s
EDC a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject property for undivided one-half share thereof, as they had no title or interest to
P2,974,800.00. transfer the other one-half portion which pertains to the
Prior to the sale, respondents claimed that they learned that the respondents without the latter’s consent. It is an established
property had been the subject of a contract to sell between the principle that no one can give what one does not have – nemo dat
heirs of Juan and EDC. On 7 March 2000, respondents wrote to EDC quod non habet.
informing it of the existence of coownership over the subject Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to
property. EDC wrote back that it will look into the matter and sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can
asked respondents to further establish the basis of their claims. transfer legally. Thus, since appellant EDC’s rights over the subject
EDC was able to cause the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale property originated from sellers-appellants Ballesteros, said
with the Office of the Provincial corporation merely stepped into the shoes of its sellers and cannot
Assessor Rizal and transfer the tax declaration over the subject have a better right than what its sellers have. Indeed, a spring
property in its name. This prompted respondents to file the cannot rise higher than its source. Moreover, EDC was given an
Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Reconveyance of ample opportunity to be heard through counsel. The essence of
Possession with due process is the right to be heard. Due process is satisfied when
Damages. the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy. Thus, when the
In its Answer, EDC alleged that it is a buyer in good faith and for party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities
value of the subject property because it was of the honest belief to be heard and air his side, but it is by his own fault or choice he
that the heirs of Juan are the only heirs of the late Apolonio. On the squanders these chances, then his cry for due process must fail.
other hand, the heirs of Juan asserted that respondents were Having established respondents’ co-ownership rights over the
aware of and were parties to the contract to sell entered into by subject property, we find no error in the appellate court’s ruling
them and EDC. The heirs of Juan claimed that respondents sustaining the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale but only with
received their share in the down payment made by EDC but they respect to the rights of the heirs of Juan over one-half of the
were both unpaid of the balance on the cost of the land. property.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents. EDC appealed to the Court Article 493 of the Civil Code recognizes the absolute right of a co-
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals partially granted the appeal. The owner to freely dispose of his pro indiviso share as well as the
Court of Appeals ruled that respondents were able to establish fruits and other benefits arising from that share, independently of
their co-ownership over one-half of the subject property. The the other co-owners, thus:
appellate court pointed out that the heirs of “Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
Juan categorically admitted in their Answer, as well as during the of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
hearing the existence of coownership. alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person
in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s finding that the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
heirs of Juan, as co-owners, could only alienate or convey to EDC owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
their one-half portion of the subject property which may be him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.” In
allotted to them in the division upon the termination of the co- Spouses Del Campo v. Court of Appeals, we had the occasion to
ownership. Thus, the sale will affect only their share but not those expound the rights of a co-owner vis-à -vis the vendee, thus:
of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. However, “x x x Would the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an
the appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court that the undivided property held in common be valid? x x x
Deed of Absolute Sale is null and void. According to the appellate On the first issue, it seems plain to us that the trial court concluded
court, the same is valid with respect to the transfer of the rights of that petitioners could not have acquired ownership of the subject
the co-owners sellers heirs of Juan over the one-half portion of the land which originally formed part of Lot 162, on the ground that
subject property, thereby making EDC a co-owner thereof. their alleged right springs from a void sale transaction between
Aggrieved, EDC filed this present petition. Salome and Soledad. The mere fact that Salome purportedly
transferred a definite portion of the co-owned lot by metes and
ISSUE: bounds to Soledad, however, does not per se render the sale a
nullity. This much is evident under Article 493 of the Civil Code
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave error in and pertinent jurisprudence on the matter. More particularly in
ruling that the respondents are entitled to 1⁄2 of the Property. Lopez vs. Vda. De Cuaycong, et. al. which we find relevant, the
28
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bocobo, held that: ...The fact for the nullification of the sale of real property by respondent Jesus
that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portion Velez (Jesus) in favor of Lapinid; the recovery of possession and
of the hacienda does not render the sale void, for it is a well- ownership of the property; and the payment of damages.
established principle that the binding force of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. "Quando res non Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they, including Jesus,
valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest." (When a thing is of no are co-owners of several parcels of land including the disputed Lot.
force as I do it, it shall have as much force as it can have.)” Applying No. 4389 located at Cogon, Carcar, Cebu. Sometime in 1993,
this principle to the instant case, there can be no doubt that the Jesusfiled an action for partition of the parcels of land against the
transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad could be legally petitioners and other co-owners before
recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even Branch 21 of RTC Cebu City.
exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership. As On 13 August 2001, a judgment was rendered based on a
a matter of fact, the deed of sale executed between the parties compromise agreement signed by the parties wherein they agreed
expressly stipulated that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad that Jesus, Mariano and Vicente were jointly authorized to sell the
would be taken from Salome’s 4/16 undivided interest in said lot, said properties and receive the proceeds thereof and distribute
which the latter could validly transfer in whole or in part even them to all the co-owners. However, the agreement was later
without the consent of the other co-owners. Salome’s right to sell amended to exclude Jesus as an authorized seller. Petitioners
part of her undivided interest in the co-owned property is absolute inspected the property and discovered that Lapinid was occupying
in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has a specific portion of the 3000 square meters of Lot No. 4389 by
full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to virtue of a deed of sale executed by Jesus in favor of Lapinid. It was
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its pointed out by petitioners that as a consequence of what they
enjoyment. Since Salome’s clear intention was to sell merely part discovered, a forcible entry case was filed against Lapinid. The
of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can petitioners prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void
be made against it and the sale can be given effect to the full extent. arguing that the sale of a definite portion of a co-owned property
without notice to the other co-owners is without force and effect.
We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot Further, they prayed for payment of rental fees amounting to
rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property P1,000.00 per month from January 2004 or from the time of
prior to partition among all the co-owners. However, this should deprivation of property in addition to attorney’s fees and litigation
not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case expenses. Jesus admitted that there was a partition case between
a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him and the petitioners filed in 1993 involving several parcels of
him. Since the co-owner/vendor’s undivided interest could land including the contested Lot No. 4389. However, he insisted
properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, that as early as 6 November 1997, a motion was signed by the co-
what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same owners (including the petitioners) wherein Lot No. 4389 was
rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent agreed to be adjudicated to the co-owners belonging to the group
to the consideration given under their transaction. In other words, of Jesus and the other lots be divided to the other co-owners
the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and belonging to the group of Torres. When the motion was filed and
acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in signed by the parties on 6 November 1997, his rights as a majority
common. co-owner (73%) of Lot No. 4389 became consolidated. Jesus
averred that it was unnecessary to give notice of the sale as the lot
VICENTE TORRES, JR.,CARLOS VELEZ, AND THE HEIRS was already adjudicated in his favor.
OF MARIANO VELEZ, NAMELY: ANITA CHIONG VELEZ,
ROBERT OSCAR CHIONG VELEZ, SARAH JEAN CHIONG On his part, Lapinid admitted that a deed of sale was entered into
VELEZ AND TED CHIONG VELEZ, petitioners –versus- between him and Jesus pertaining to a parcel of land with an area
LORENZO LAPINID AND JESUS VELEZ, respondents. of 3000 square meters. However, he insisted on the validity of sale
since Jesus showed him several deeds of sale making him a
G.R. No. 187987, FIRST DIVISION, November 26, 2014, PEREZ J. majority owner of Lot No. 4389. He further denied that he acquired
Under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, a co-owner has an a specific and definite portion of the questioned property, citing as
absolute ownership of his undivided and proindiviso share in the evidence the deed of sale which does not mention any boundaries
co-owned property. He has the right to alienate, assign and or specific portion. He explained that Jesus permitted him to
mortgage it, even to the extent of substituting a third person in occupy a portion not exceeding 3000 square meters conditioned
its enjoyment provided that no personal rights will be affected. on the result of the partition of the co-owners.
In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned property in
favor of Lapinid, free from any opposition from the co-owners. Regarding the forcible entry case, Jesus and Lapinid admitted that
Lapinid, as a transferee, validly obtained the same rights of such case was filed but the same was already dismissed by the MTC
Jesus from the date of the execution of a valid sale. Absent any of Carcar, Cebu. In that decision, it was ruled that the buyers,
proof that the sale was not perfected, the validity of sale including Lapinid, were buyers in good faith since a proof of
subsists. ownership was shown to them by Jesus before buying the
In essence, Lapinid steps into the shoes of Jesus as co-owner property. The trial court dismissed the complaint of petitioners
of an ideal and proportionate share in the property held in and nullifies the site assignment made by Jesus Velez in the Deed
common. Thus, from the perfection of contract on 9 November of Sale of Lorenzo Lapinid’s portion, the exact location of which
1997, Lapinid eventually became a co-owner of the property.
still has to be determined either by agreement of the co-owners or
Even assuming that the petitioners are correct in their allegation
by the Court in proper proceedings. Aggrieved, petitioners filed
that the disposition in favor of Lapinid before partition was a
their partial motion for reconsideration which was denied.
concrete or definite portion, the validity of sale still prevails.
Thereafter, they filed a notice of appeal.
FACTS:
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. It
validated the sale and ruled that the compromise agreement did
Vicente Torres, Jr. (Vicente), Mariano Velez (Mariano) and Carlos
not affect the validity of the sale previously executed by Jesus and
Velez (Petitioners) filed a Complaint before RTC Cebu City praying
29
Lapinid. It likewise dismissed the claim for rental payments, petitioners, -versus- PANGASINAN SAVINGS AND LOAN
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of the petitioners. BANK, INC. and SPOUSES EDDIE V. MANUEL and
MILAGROS C. BALLESTEROS, substituted by her heirs:
Upon appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioners echo the GEMMA C. MANUEL-PEREZ, ANGELO JOHNDREW
same arguments posited before the lower courts. MANUEL, and RESSY C. MANUEL, respondents.
ISSUE: G.R. No. 215038, FIRST DIVISION, October 17, 2016, PERLAS-
BERNABE, J.
Whether Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a portion of the
property he co-owns in favor of another person. (YES) The effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion, which may be allotted
RULING: to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
The petition is denied. Consequently, the validity of the subject REM and the
subsequent foreclosure proceedings therefor conducted in favor
Admittedly, Jesus sold an area of land to Lapinid on 9 November of respondent bank should be limited only to the portion which
1997. To simplify, the question now is whether Jesus, as a co- may be allotted to it, as Susana's successor-in-interest, in the
owner, can validly sell a portion of the property he co-owns in event of partition, thereby making it a co-owner with petitioners
favor of another person. The Court answers in the affirmative. pending partition.
Even assuming that the petitioners are correct in their allegation 1) Whether the REM was void. (YES)
that the disposition in favor of Lapinid before partition was a 2) Whether the Sps. Manuel were purchasers in good faith. (NO)
concrete or definite portion, the validity of sale still prevails. In a 3) What rights were transmitted to the Sps. Manuel.
catena of decisions, the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that no
individual can claim title to a definite or concrete portion before RULING:
partition of co-owned property. Each co-owner only possesses a
right to sell or alienate his ideal share after partition. However, in 1) The REM is void as to the share of Roque but valid with respect
case he disposes his share before partition, such disposition does to the portion, which may be allotted to respondent bank as
not make the sale or alienation null and void. What will be affected Susan’s successor-in-interest in the event of partition.
on the sale is only his proportionate share, subject to the results of
the partition. The co-owners who did not give their consent to the At the time the REM was constituted, Roque was already deceased.
sale stand to be unaffected by the alienation. Upon his death, the conjugal partnership between him and Susana
was dissolved pursuant to Article 126 (1) of the Family Code, and
NORMA C. MAGSANO, ISIDRO C. MAGSANO, RICARDO C. an implied ordinary co-ownership arose among Susana and the
MAGSANO, ROQUE C. MAGSANO, JR., NIDA M. CAGUIAT, other heirs of Roque with respect to his share in the assets of the
PERLITA MAGSANO, and SALVADOR C. MAGSANO, conjugal partnership pending liquidation. The ensuing implied
30
ordinary co-ownership is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code, owners who did not consent to the mortgage, i.e., petitioners, in
to wit: trust for the latter pending partition.
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may VILMA QUINTOS, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute FIDEL I. QUINTOS, JR.; FLORENCIA I. DANCEL,
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FLOVY I. DANCEL; and
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with CATALINO L. IBARRA, petitioners, -versus- PELAGIA I.
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion NICOLAS, NOLI L. IBARRA, SANTIAGO L. IBARRA, PEDRO
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the L. IBARRA, DAVID L. IBARRA, GILBERTO L. IBARRA,
termination of the co-ownership. HEIRS OF AUGUSTO L. IBARRA, namely CONCHITA R.
IBARRA, APOLONIO IBARRA, and NARCISO IBARRA, and
Thus, although Susana is a co-owner with her children with the spouses RECTO CANDELARIO and ROSEMARIE
respect to Roque's share in the conjugal partnership, she could not CANDELARIO, respondents.
yet assert or claim title to any specific portion thereof without an
actual partition of the property being first done either by G.R. No. 210252, THIRD DIVISION, June 16, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J.
agreement or by judicial decree. While she herself as co-owner had
the right to mortgage or even sell her undivided interest in the For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable
subject property, she could not mortgage or otherwise dispose of requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant
the same in its entirety without the consent of the other co- has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property
owners. Consequently, the validity of the subject REM and the subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
subsequent foreclosure proceedings therefor conducted in favor proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title must be
of respondent bank should be limited only to the portion which shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
may be allotted to it, as Susana's successor-in-interest, in the event appearance of validity or efficacy. The first requisite was not
of partition, thereby making it a co-owner with petitioners complied with. Petitioners’ alleged open, continuous, exclusive,
pending partition. and uninterrupted possession of the subject property is belied
by the fact that respondents, in 2005, entered into a Contract of
Lease with the Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot
2) The Sps. Manuel were purchasers in bad faith. While the rule is
without any objection from the petitioners. Petitioners’ inability to
that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on
offer evidence tending to prove that Bienvenido and Escolastica
the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law
Ibarra transferred the ownership over the property in favor of
will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine
petitioners is likewise fatal to the latter’s claim.
the condition of the property, where the land sold is in the
possession of a person other than the vendor, as in this case, the
FACTS:
purchaser must go beyond the certificate of title and make
inquiries concerning the actual possessor. The failure of a
Petitioners and respondents are siblings. Their parents,
prospective buyer to take such precautionary steps would mean
Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of the subject
negligence on his part and would thereby preclude him from
property. By 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica had already
claiming or invoking the rights of a "purchaser in good faith."
passed away, leaving to their 10 children ownership over the
subject property. Subsequently, sometime in 2002, respondents
Here, petitioners were in possession of the subject property when
brought an action for partition against petitioners. It was
Sps. Manuel bought the same on (and even up to the filing of the
dismissed for the failure of the parties to attend the scheduled
amended complaint before the RTC). However, Sps. Manuel did not
hearings. It was not appealed and thus became final.
inspect the property and inquire into the nature of petitioners'
possession and/or the extent of their possessory rights as a
Thereafter, respondents instead resorted to executing a Deed of
measure of precaution which may reasonably be required of a
Adjudication to transfer the property in favor of the 10 siblings.
prudent man in a similar situation, Sps. Manuel, therefore, failed to
TCT No. 318717 was then canceled and TCT No. 390484 was
exercise the diligence required in protecting their rights.
issued in its place by the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac in the names
of the 10 heirs of the Ibarra spouses.
Furthermore, the claim that one is an innocent purchaser for value
is a matter of defense. Hence, while petitioners alleged that Sps.
Respondents sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property in
Manuel were purchasers in bad faith, the rule is that he who
favor of their co-respondents, the spouses Recto and Rosemarie
asserts the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value has the
Candelario. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the
burden of proving the same, and this onus probandi cannot be
spouses and an Agreement of Subdivision was purportedly
discharged by mere invocation of the legal presumption of good
executed by them and petitioners. TCT No. 434304 was issued in
faith.
the name of the Candelarios, covering the 7/10 portion.
3) The fact that respondent bank succeeded in consolidating
Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages
ownership over the subject property in its name did not terminate
against respondents wherein they alleged that upon distribution
the existing co-ownership between it and petitioners. In case of
of their parents’ properties, they received the subject property and
foreclosure, a sale would result in the transmission of title to the
the house constructed thereon as their share. They averred that
buyer, which is feasible only if the seller can be in a position to
they have been in adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted
convey ownership of the things sold. Here, Sps. Manuel merely
possession of the property for over four decades and are, thus,
stepped into the shoes of respondent bank and acquired only the
entitled to equitable title thereto. They also denied any
rights and obligations appertaining thereto.
participation in the execution of the Deed of Adjudication and the
Agreement of Subdivision. During pre-trial, the respondents
Thus, while they have been issued a certificate of title over the
admitted having filed an action for partition, and that petitioners
entire property, they shall: (a) only acquire what validly pertains
did not participate in the Deed of Adjudication that served as the
to respondent bank as successor-in-interest of Susana in the event
basis for the issuance of TCT No. 390484, and that the Agreement
of partition; and (b) hold the shares therein pertaining to the co-
31
of Subdivision that led to the issuance of TCT No. 434304 in favor There is res judicata when the following requisites are present: (1)
of spouses Candelario was falsified. the formal judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
The trial court, however, dismissed the petition. The court did not consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the
find merit in the allegations that the petitioners have acquired title parties at the trial of the case; (3) it must have been rendered by a
over the property through acquisitive prescription and noted that court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
there was no document evidencing that their parents bequeathed and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions,
to them the subject property. identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
On appeal, the petitioners added that the partition should no
longer be allowed since it is already barred by res judicata, The respondents have admitted that their previous petition for
respondents having already filed a case for partition that was partition has been dismissed and has attained finality. The subject
dismissed with finality. The appellate court affirmed the trial property of said case and in the present controversy are one and
court’s ruling. As to the partition, CA ruled that it shall be in the same, and that in both cases, respondents raise the same action
accordance to the subdivision plan as prepared. for partition. And lastly, although respondent spouses Candelario
were not party-litigants in the earlier case for partition, there is
ISSUE: identity of parties not only when the parties in the case are the
same, but also between those in privity with them, such as
1. Whether the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the between their successors-in-interest. Under Section 3 of Rule 17 of
property. (NO) the Rules of Court, the dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute
2. Whether the respondents’ counterclaim for partition is already has the effect of adjudication on the merits, and is necessarily
barred by res judicata. (NO) understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action,
3. Whether the CA was correct in approving the subdivision unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. Petitioners
agreement as basis for the partition of the property. (YES) claim that the order did not state it to be without prejudice and
thus, must be treated as dismissal on the merits.
RULING: However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the
Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for
1. No, the petitioners were not able to prove their ownership. partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites of ownership of shares yet. Under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, no co-
must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding common, insofar as his share is concerned.
claimed to be casting cloud on the title must be shown to be in fact It can be gleaned that the law generally does not favor the
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of retention of co-ownership as a property relation, and is interested
validity or efficacy. instead in ascertaining the co-owners’ specific shares so as to
prevent the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in limbo.
The first requisite was not complied with. The Court stressed that Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the
this issue is substantially a factual issue that improper to delve into right granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the
Petitioners’ alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of
uninterrupted possession of the subject property is belied by the procedural rules. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the
fact that respondents, in 2005, entered into a Contract of Lease principle that a substantive law cannot be amended by a
with the Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot without procedural rule.
any objection from the petitioners. The Court held that that Art. 494 is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3
of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal
Petitioners’ inability to offer evidence tending to prove that for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with
Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra transferred the ownership over prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without prejudice.
the property in favor of petitioners is likewise fatal to the latter’s
claim. On the contrary, Escolastica Ibarra executed a Deed of Sale 3. Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in approving the proposal
covering half of the subject property in favor of all her 10 children, partition submitted by spouses Candelario. Art. 496 provides that
not in favor of petitioners alone. partition shall either be by agreement of the parties or in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In this case, the Agreement of
The Court ruled that all 10 siblings inherited the subject property Subdivision allegedly executed by spouses Candelario and
and after the respondents sold their aliquot share to the spouses petitioners cannot serve as basis for partition, for, as stated in the
Candelario, petitioners and the spouses became co-owners of the pre-trial order, respondents admitted that the agreement was a
same. falsity and that petitioners never took part in preparing the same.
2. No, respondents’ counterclaim for partition is not barred by res The "agreement" was crafted without any consultation
judicata. whatsoever or any attempt to arrive at mutually acceptable terms
with petitioners. It, therefore, lacked the essential requisite of
The doctrine of res judicata provides that the judgment in a first consent.
case is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, between the
parties and those privy with them, not only as to every matter HEIRS OF QUIRICO SERASPI AND PURIFICACION R.
which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or SERASPI, Petitioners, -versus- COURT OF APPEALS AND
demand, but as to any other admissible matter which must have SIMEON RECASA, Respondents.
been offered for that purpose and all matters that could have been
adjudged in that case. G.R. No. 135602, SECOND DIVISION, April 28, 2000, MENDOZA, J.
32
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be under Art. 714 of the Civil Code, the ownership of a piece of land
ordinary or extraordinary, depending on whether the property is cannot be acquired by occupation. Nor can he base his ownership
possessed in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by on succession for the property was not part of those distributed to
law. the heirs of the third marriage, to which private respondent
Neither can private respondent claim good faith in his favor. belongs. It must be remembered that in the partition of the
Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from intestate estate of Marcelino Recasa, the properties were divided
whom the possessor received the thing was its owner but could into three parts, each part being reserved for each group of heirs
not transmit the ownership thereof. Private respondent entered belonging to one of the three marriages Marcelino entered into.
the property without the consent of the previous owner. Since the contested parcels of land were adjudicated to the heirs
of the first and second marriages, it follows that private
For all intents and purposes, he is a mere usurper. respondent, as heir of the third marriage, has no right over the
parcels of land. While, as heir to the intestate estate of his father,
FACTS: private respondent was co-owner of all of his father's properties,
such co-ownership rights were effectively dissolved by the
Marcelino Recasa was the owner of two parcels of land. During his partition agreed upon by the heirs of Marcelino Recasa.
lifetime, Marcelino contracted three (3) marriages. At the time of
his death in 1943, he had fifteen (15) children from his three Neither can private respondent claim good faith in his favor. Good
marriages. In 1948, his intestate estate was partitioned into three faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom
parts by his heirs, each part corresponding to the share of the heirs the possessor received the thing was its owner but could not
in each marriage. transmit the ownership thereof. Private respondent entered the
property without the consent of the previous owner. For all intents
In the same year, Patronicio Recasa, representing the heirs of the and purposes, he is a mere usurper.
first marriage, sold the share of the heirs in the estate to
Dominador Recasa, an heir of the second marriage. On June 15, DOMINGO R. CATAPUSAN, MINELIO R. CATAPUSAN, and
1950, Dominador, representing the heirs of the second marriage, FILOMENO R. CATAPUSAN, Petitioners, -versus- THE
in turn sold the share of the heirs to Quirico and Purificacion COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE CATAPUSAN, JR.,
Seraspi whose heirs are the present petitioners. Included in this CIPRIANO CATAPUSAN, GREGORIA CATAPUSAN,
sale was the property sold by Patronicio to Dominador. SEGUNDA BAUTISTA, CATAPUSAN, NICANOR T.
CATAPUSAN, NARCISA T. CATAPUSAN, GREGORIO T.
In 1958, the Seraspis obtained a loan from the Kalibo Rural Bank, CATAPUSAN, BENIGNO T. CATAPUSAN, REYNALDO T.
Inc. (KRBI) on the security of the lands in question to finance CATAPUSAN, CATALINA T. CATAPUSAN, GERTRUDES,
improvements on the lands. However, they failed to pay the loan CATAPUSAN and FLORA DIAZ CATAPUSAN,
for which reason the mortgage was foreclosed and the lands were Respondents.
sold to KRBI as the highest bidder. Subsequently, the lands were
sold by KRBI to Manuel Rata, brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi. It G.R. No. 109262, THIRD DIVISION, November 21, 1996,
appears that Rara, as owner of the property, allowed Quirico FRANCISCO, J.
Seraspi to administer the property. In 1974, private respondent
Simeon Recasa, Marcelino's child by his third wife, taking Although tax declarations and receipts are not direct proofs of
advantage of the illness of Quirico Seraspi, who had been ownership, yet when accompanied by proof of actual possession
paralyzed due to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in question for the required period, they become strong evidence to support
and took possession thereof. the claim of ownership thru acquisitive prescription. The
In 1983, the Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel Rata and possession contemplated as foundation for prescriptive right
afterwards filed a complaint against Simeon Recasa for recovery must be one under claim of title or adverse to or in concept of
of possession of the lands. The trial court ruled in favor of the owner.
Seraspis, stating that they had acquired the property through a Possession by tolerance, as in the case of petitioners, is not the
sale and acquisitive prescription. However, on appeal, the Court of kind of possession that may lead to title by prescription. It is the
Appeals reversed on the ground that the action of the Seraspis was respondents' open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted
barred by the statute of limitations. Hence, this petition filed by possession far beyond the year extraordinary period for
Quirico Seraspi who, in the meantime, had passed away and was acquisitive prescription, coupled with the tax declarations of their
thus substituted by his heirs. predecessors-in-interest that constitutes a superior weight of
evidence that clinched their claim.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Whether Simeon Recasa acquired ownership of the properties in
question through acquisitive prescription. (NO) Bonifacio Catapusan was first married to Narcissa Tanjuatco, the
only surviving heir of Dominga Piguing. 2 They had four (4)
RULING: children namely, Felix, Vicente, Benicio and Loreto. Narcissa died
in
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be 1910. In 1927, Bonifacio married Paula Reyes and out of their
ordinary or extraordinary, depending on whether the property is wedlock petitioners Domingo, Minelio and Filomeno Catapusan
possessed in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. were born. Bonifacio died in 1940. Felix, Vicente and Benicio,
Bonifacio's sons from the first marriage, died before the institution
In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire possession of this case, survived by their respective widows and children,
of the property through any of the modes recognized by the Civil respondents herein.
Code, to wit: (1) occupation, (2) intellectual creation, (3) law, (4)
donation, (5) succession, (6) tradition in consequence of certain The petitioners filed on June 11, 1974, an action for partition of the
contracts, and (7) prescription. Private respondent could not have Wawa lot, which they allegedly co-own with their half-brothers
acquired ownership over the property through occupation since, and half-sisters. Petitioners contend that the said lot belongs to
33
their father Bonifacio and should therefore be partitioned among thereupon became co-owners of the property. When David
the heirs of the first and second marriages. In support thereof, they Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included his
presented the tax declarations of the Wawa lot's four (4) adjacent undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria,
lot owners. These four tax declarations state that each of them passed on to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the
bounds on one side the Wawa lot declared in the name of law on succession.
Bonifacio. Stated differently, the petitioner's proof of Bonifacio's
ownership of the Wawa lot are the tax declarations of the adjoining FACTS:
lot owners which noted that they each border on one side the
Wawa lot declared in the name of Bonifacio. During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first
with Angel Burdeos and the second, following the latter's death,
After trial, the lower court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the with Canuto Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macaria was
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC. survived by her son Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by her
daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela Lozada of the first marriage
ISSUE: and her children of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales,
Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales. Socorro
Whether Bonifacio had title to the Wawa lot. (NO) Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, some time
after Macaria's death, died intestate without an issue.
RULING: In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos,
namely, his widow Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and children
In this case, petitioners' evidence of their father's (Bonifacio) Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold to petitioner Zosima Verdad (their
ownership of the Wawa lot are the tax declarations of the adjacent interest on) the disputed lot supposedly for the price of
lot owners and the testimonies of some witnesses who merely saw P55,460.00. In a duly notarized deed of sale, dated 14 November
Bonifacio working on the lot. On the other hand, respondents 1982, it would appear, however, that the lot was sold for only
presented tax declarations which indicated that the same lot is P23,000.00. Petitioner explained that the second deed was
owned by their predecessors-in-interest, the children of the first intended merely to save on the tax on capital gains.
marriage, evidence which carry more weight as they constitute Socorro discovered the sale on 30 March 1987 while she was at the
proof of respondents' ownership of the land in their possession. City Treasurer's Office. On 31 March 1987, she sought the
The statement in the neighboring lot owners' tax declarations is intervention of the Lupong Tagapayapa of Barangay 9, Princess
not a conclusive proof that Bonifacio owned the surrounded lot. Urduja, for the redemption of the property. She tendered the sum
of P23,000.00 to Zosima. The latter refused to accept the amount
In fact, petitioners cannot show any tax receipts or declarations of for being much less than the lot's current value of P80,000.00. No
their ownership over the same lot. Although tax declarations and settlement having been reached before the Lupong Tagapayapa,
receipts are not direct proofs of ownership, yet when accompanied private respondents, on 16 October 1987, initiated against
by proof of actual possession for the required period, they become petitioner an action for "Legal Redemption with Preliminary
strong evidence to support the claim of ownership thru acquisitive Injunction" before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.
prescription. The possession contemplated as foundation for The trial court ruled that private respondents' right to redeem the
prescriptive right must be one under claim of title or adverse to or property had already lapsed. The CA, however, reversed the trial
in concept of owner. Possession by tolerance, as in the case of court.
petitioners, is not the kind of possession that may lead to title by
prescription. It is the respondents' open, continuous, adverse and ISSUE:
uninterrupted possession far beyond the year extraordinary
period for acquisitive prescription, coupled with the tax Whether Socorro can redeem the property. (YES)
declarations of their predecessors-in-interest that constitutes a
superior weight of evidence that clinched their claim. Moreover, RULING:
petitioners bare and unsubstantiated allegation that respondents' It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a
tax declarations were fraudulently issued is insufficient to sustain mere relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-
the imputation of fraud considering that good faith is always law; however, Socorro's right to the property is not because she
presumed. Besides, respondents' tax declarations are deemed rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria's estate but that she is a
regularly issued. Being an action involving property, the legal heir of her husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a
petitioners must rely on the strength of their own title and not on share in his mother's inheritance. David Rosales, incontrovertibly,
the weakness of the respondents' claim. survived his mother's death. When Macaria died on 08 March 1956
her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David
ZOSIMA VERDAD, Petitioner, -versus- THE HON. COURT Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the property. When
OF APPEALS, SOCORRO C. ROSALES, AURORA David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included
ROSALES, NAPOLEON ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria,
FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA ROSALES AND VIRGINIA passed on to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the
ROSALES, Respondents. law on succession.
G.R. No. 109972, FIRST DIVISION, April 29, 1996, VITUG, J.
It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs
mere relative by affinity), is not an to petitioner, a right of redemption arose in favor of private
intestate heir of her parents-in-law; however, Socorro's right to respondents. We hold that the right of redemption was timely
the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in exercised by private respondents.
Macaria's estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband,
David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his mother's ANDREA TABUSO AND RENATO BISMORTE, Petitioners, -
inheritance. versus- COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HEIRS OF
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother's death. ESTEBAN ABAD REPRESENTED BY NEMESIO ABAD AND
When Macaria died on 08 March 1956 her estate passed on to ANA ABAD PAGHUBASAN, Respondents.
her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who
34
G.R. No. 108558, THIRD DIVISION, June 21, 2001, PANGANIBAN, J. "c) The land in question is tenanted by one Valentin Poblete in
accordance with a lease contract executed by defendant Nemesio
It must be stressed "that possession and ownership are distinct Abad, one of the heirs and co-owners of the land.
legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one
person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not The trial court concluded that there was abundant proof of private
prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. respondents' ownership of the lot in question as against the scanty
Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is evidence offered by petitioners. The trial court likewise gave
the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. xxx. On the other credit to the testimony of Atty. Jose Gonzales, private respondents'
hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the counsel who had been presented by petitioners as their own
enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and witness. He testified that the land in question, which was adjacent
physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may to the land he himself possessed, had been in the possession of
be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an Esteban Abad's heirs, herein private respondents. The trial court
owner and possession of a holder. Possessors in the concept of also took note of the various tax declarations covering the
owners may be the owners themselves or those who claim to be property, indicating that it was owned by private respondents.
so. On the other hand, those who possess as mere holders
acknowledge in another a superior right which he believes to be The Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the trial court.
ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong."
In this case, the evidence shows that the occupation of the ISSUE:
property by petitioners is not in the concept of owners, because
their stay is merely tolerated. This finding is bolstered by the fact Whether private respondents are the owners of the land. (YES)
that Petitioner Andrea Tabuso is the daughter of Marcelo
Tabuso, who was merely allowed by the previous owner, RULING:
Esteban Abad, to construct a small house on the lot. As held in
Caniza v. Court of Appeals, "an owner's act of allowing another We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that for a period
to occupy his house, rent-free, does not create a permanent and of more than 60 years, private respondents have been able to
indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor." establish that they are the owners of the lot; and that for said
period, they have been in open, continuous and uninterrupted
FACTS:
possession of the same.
"This case involves declaration of ownership filed before the While Atty. Gonzales was private respondents' counsel, he was
Regional Trial Court of Naval, Leyte, in Biliran, Leyte, of an
presented by petitioners themselves. Having done so, they are
unregistered parcel of land at Antipolo, Naval, Leyte with an area bound by his testimony, even if it is hostile.
of 3,267 square meters.
The only substantial argument of petitioners supporting their
"The plaintiffs' evidence consists of the following:
claim of ownership is their construction of a small house (barong-
"a) A tax declaration No. 3705 in the name of Ignacio Montes for barong) on the property, as acknowledged in private respondents'
the year 1912. However, the land taxes thereon for the years 1944 Notice to Vacate.
to 1947 were paid only in 1981.
Obviously, the claim of private respondents that they are the
"b) Plaintiff Andrea Tabuso claims to be the owner as successor in owners of the land is supported by the above letter, in which they
interest (granddaughter) of one Andrea Elaba, daughter of Maria were asking petitioners to vacate the property. Moreover,
Montes and Borja Elaba, Maria Montes appears to be a sister of considering its size, which is 11,927 square meters as found by the
Ignacio Montes, in whose name the tax declaration for the court-appointed commissioner, the fact that petitioners' house
property in question was issued for the year 1912. is only a barong-barong or make-shift shanty lends support
"c) The property in question has been in the possession of the to private respondents' claim that the former's presence on
defendants (heirs of Esteban Abad), although the house standing the property was merely tolerated.
thereon appears to have been constructed by Marcelo Tabuso,
father of plaintiff Andrea Tabuso. It must be stressed "that possession and ownership are distinct
legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one
"On the other hand, evidence for the defendants tends to establish person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not
the following: prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others.
"a) The land in question originally owned by Maria Montes was Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the
donated to Isabel Elaba through an ancient document executed on right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. xxx. On the other hand,
September 24, 1923. Isabel in turn sold the land to Esteban Abad possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of
on May 5, 1948. a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically
occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one
"b) The original tax declaration in the name of Ignacio Montes was of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession
superseded by Tax Declaration Nos. 6422 and 1450 both in the of a holder. Possessors in the concept of owners may be the owners
name of Isabel Elaba; Declaration No. 1450 for the year 1948 was themselves or those who claim to be so. On the other hand, those
superseded by Tax Declaration No. 6959 for 1960 in the name of who possess as mere holders acknowledge in another a superior
Esteban Abad; and the latter was superseded in 1969 by Tax right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be
Declaration No. 1661 in the name of Esteban Abad. In 1974 a new right or wrong."
tax declaration No. 19 was issued in the name of Esteban Abad
with Nemesio Abad and his co-heirs as administrators. The last tax In this case, the evidence shows that the occupation of the
declaration No. 22 for 1982 was in the name of Esteban Abad. property by petitioners is not in the concept of owners, because
their stay is merely tolerated. This finding is bolstered by the fact
that Petitioner Andrea Tabuso is the daughter of Marcelo Tabuso,
who was merely allowed by the previous owner, Esteban Abad, to
35
construct a small house on the lot. As held in Caniza v. Court of Isican personally went to the properties and verbally demanded
Appeals, "an owner's act of allowing another to occupy his house, that petitioners vacate the premises and remove their structures
rent-free, does not create a permanent and indefeasible right of thereon; that the petitioners begged and promised to buy the said
possession in the latter's favor." properties for ?3,500.00 per square meter; that she gave
petitioners time to produce the said amount, but they reneged on
Lastly, the claim of petitioners that private respondents are not in their promise to buy them; that petitioners refused to vacate the
actual possession of the land is unsubstantiated. Besides, it is not subject properties despite several demands; that the petitioners
necessary that the latter actually stay on the property in order to knew full well that the subject premises they were occupying were
prove ownership of the same. As found by both the trial and the titled properties but they insisted on unlawfully holding the same;
appellate courts, since the acquisition of the subject property by and that she was unlawfully dispossessed and displaced from the
private respondents, they had religiously paid the taxes due subject properties due to petitioners' illegal occupation.
thereon. Further, one of the co-owners executed a lease contract
over it in favor of a tenant. These acts are clearly consistent with On the other hand, petitioners countered that the titles of
ownership. Crisologo were products of Civil Registration Case No. 1, Record
211, which were declared void by the Supreme Court in Republic
PAUL P. GABRIEL, JR., IRENEO C. CALWAG, THOMAS L. v. Marcos, and reiterated in Republic v. Marcos; that the said case
TINGGA-AN, AND THE HEIRS OF JULIET B. PULKERA, was later enacted into law, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1271,
Petitioners, -versus- CARMELING CRISOLOGO, entitled "An Act Nullifying Decrees of Registration and
Respondent. Certificates of Title within the Baguio Townsite Reservation
Case No.1, GLRO Record No. 211, pursuant to Act No. 931, as
GR No. 204626, THIRD DIVISION, Jun 09, 2014, MENDOZA, J. amended, but Considering as Valid Certain Titles of Lands that
are Alienable and Disposable Under Certain Conditions and For
Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion publiciana is Other Purposes" which took effect on December 22, 1977; that
an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of Crisologo failed to comply with the conditions provided in Section
possession of realty independently of title. It refers to an 1 of P.D. No. 1271 for the validation of said titles, hence, the titles
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the were void; that petitioners had been in open, actual, exclusive,
accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding notorious, uninterrupted, and continuous possession of the
of possession of the realty. subject land, in good faith; and that Crisologo was never in prior
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession and had no valid title over the subject land.
possession only, not ownership. When parties, however, raise
the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon the issue to The MTCC ruled that Crisologo was the registered owner of the
determine who between the parties has the right to possess the subject parcels of land, who, as such, had declared these properties
property. This adjudication, nonetheless, is not a final and for taxation purposes since 1969 and regularly paid the realty
binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the taxes thereon. It stated that with Crisologo being the owner,
purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of petitioners were illegally occupying the land.
ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not The RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the MTCC. It was
a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the of the view that petitioners' assertion of the TCTs' invalidity was
property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the not a collateral attack. It cited the rulings in Republic v. Marcos,
issue of ownership. In her complaint, Crisologo prayed that she and Republic v. Marcos, which perpetually prohibited the
be declared in prior actual possession of the properties in reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, LRC Rec. No. 211, and,
dispute and that petitioners vacate the same and demolish their therefore, the registration of parcels of lands. For said reason, the
houses therein. She alleged, among others, that she was the
titles of Crisologo were products of illegal proceedings nullified by
registered owner of the subject parcels of land and that
this Court. She also failed to comply with the conditions set forth
petitioners unlawfully entered her properties by stealth, force
in P.D. No. 1271.
and without her prior consent and knowledge. Clearly, she
CA rendered the assailed decision, setting aside the RTC decision
primarily wanted to recover possession of the subject parcels of
and reinstating that of the MTCC.
land from petitioners. Hence, the case is an accion publiciana.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Whether respondent Crisologo has a better right of possession
Records show that Carmeling Crisologo (Crisologo), represented
over the subject parcels of land. (YES)
by her attorney-in-fact, Pedro Isican (Isican), filed her complaint
for Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership with Damages
RULING:
against Juliet B. Pulkera, Paul P. Gabriel, Ireneo C. Calwag, and
Thomas L. Tingga-an (petitioners) before the MTCC.
Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion publiciana is
an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
Crisologo alleged, among others, that she was the registered
possession of realty independently of title. It refers to an ejectment
owner of two parcels of land with a total area of approximately
suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the
2,000 square meters, described in, and covered by, two (2)
cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of
certificates of title Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-13935
the realty. The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to
and T-13936; that the properties were covered by an Assessment
recover possession only, not ownership.
of Real Property; that the payments of realty taxes on the said
properties were updated; that sometime in 2006, she discovered
When parties, however, raise the issue of ownership, the court
that petitioners unlawfully entered, occupied her properties by
may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has
stealth, by force and without her prior consent and knowledge,
the right to possess the property. This adjudication, nonetheless,
and constructed their houses thereon; that upon discovery of their
is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership;
illegal occupation, her daughter, Atty. Carmelita Crisologo, and
it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession,
36
where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of who is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this provision,
possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being be restored thereto by the means established by law. Article 538
provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties settles only the question of possession, and possession is
involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not different from ownership. Ownership in this case should be
conclusive on the issue of ownership. established in one of the ways provided by law.
To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who
In her complaint, Crisologo prayed that she be declared in prior between the claimants has proven acquisitive prescription.
actual possession of the properties in dispute and that petitioners Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary
vacate the same and demolish their houses therein. She alleged, prescription through possession for ten years.
among others, that she was the registered owner of the subject
parcels of land and that petitioners unlawfully entered her In this case, being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed
properties by stealth, force and without her prior consent and through his tax receipt that she had been in possession of the
knowledge. land for more than ten years since 1932. When her father died
in 1930, she continued to reside there with her mother. When
Clearly, she primarily wanted to recover possession of the subject she got married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside
parcels of land from petitioners. the disputed lot for their livelihood.
Hence, the case is an accion publiciana. Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the
Although Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 invalidated decrees of petitioners' father claimed the land. But by then, her possession,
registration and certificates of title within the Baguio Townsite which was in the concept of owner -- public, peaceful, and
Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, the nullity, however, uninterrupted – had already ripened into ownership.
is not that sweeping. The said provision expressly states that "all Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise, declared and
certificates of titles issued on or before July 31, 1973 shall be paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and
considered valid and the lands covered by them shall be declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof
deemed to have been conveyed in fee simple to the registered of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim
owners" upon 1) showing proof that the land covered by the for ownership through prescription.
subject title is not within any government, public or quasi-public
FACTS:
reservation, forest, military or otherwise, as certified by
appropriating government agencies; and 2) compliance by the title
The Petition herein refers to a parcel of land situated in Barangay
holder with the payment to the Republic of the Philippines of the
Bangad, Binangonan, Province of
correct assessed value of the land within the required period.
Rizal, having an area of 1,728 square meters and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 26-0027.
In the case at bench, the records show that the subject parcels of
land were registered on August 24, Prior to 1954, the land was originally declared for taxation
1967. purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of
[respondent] and married to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in
The respondent's certificates of title give her the better right to 1930.
possess the subject parcels of land. It is settled that a Torrens [Petitioners] were the daughters of Margarito Mendoza. On the
title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso
person in whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently
with respect to the ownership of the land described therein. It is declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Margarito and
also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of Sinforoso are brothers. [Respondent] is the present occupant of
ownership of the property, including possession. Thus, in the land. Earlier, on October 15, 1975, [respondent] and Miguel
Arambulo v. Gungab, this Court declared that the "age-old rule is Mendoza, another brother of [petitioners], during the cadastral
that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to survey had a dispute on [the] ownership of the land.
possession thereof."
The court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of [petitioners.
The records show that TCT No. T-13935 and TCT No. T-13936 bear
the name of Carmeling P. Crisologo, as the registered owner. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court because the
Petitioners do not dispute the fact that she has a Torrens title over genuineness and the due execution of the affidavit allegedly signed
the subject parcels of land. by the respondent and her mother had not been sufficiently
The respondent's Torrens certificates of title are immune from a established.
collateral attack. The petitioners defendants' attack on the validity
of respondents-plaintiffs' title, by claiming that fraud attended its The notary public or anyone else who had witnessed the execution
acquisition, is a collateral attack on the title. It is an attack of the affidavit was not presented.
incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the No expert testimony or competent witness ever attested to the
properties in an "accion publiciana," not in a direct action genuineness of the questioned signatures.
whose main objective is to impugn the validity of the Moreover, the appellate court held that the probative value of
judgment granting the title. As the lawful possessor, the petitioners’ tax receipts and declarations paled in comparison
respondent has the right to eject the petitioners. with respondent’s proof of ownership of the disputed parcel.
Actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by
FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA AND RUPERTA respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a better title under Article
MENDOZA LIRIO, Petitioners, -versus- 538 of the Civil Code.
HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE, Respondent.
ISSUE:
G.R. No. 137944, THIRD DIVISION ,April 06, 2000, PANGANIBAN,
J. Whether CA erred in holding that respondent has been in actual
The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is merely and physical possession, coupled with xxx exclusive and
disputable; it prevails until the contrary is proven. That is, one continuous possession of the land since 1985, which are evidence
37
of the best kind of circumstance proving the claim of the title of Given this premise that casino chips are considered to have
ownership and enjoys the presumption of preferred possessor. been exchanged with their corresponding representative value,
(NO) it is with more reason that this Court should require petitioner to
prove convincingly and persuasively that the chips it confiscated
RULING: from Ludwin and Deoven were indeed stolen from it; if so, any
Tom, Dick or Harry in possession of genuine casino chips is
The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is merely presumed to have paid for their representative value in
disputable; it prevails until the contrary is proven. That is, one who exchange therefor. If petitioner cannot prove its loss, then Article
is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this provision, be 559 cannot apply; the presumption that the chips were
restored thereto by the means established by law. Article 538 exchanged for value remains.
settles only the question of possession, and possession is different
from ownership. Ownership in this case should be established in FACTS:
one of the ways provided by law.
An operation was launched by Legenda Hotel and Casino (owned
To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who and operated by Subic Bay Legend Resorts and Casino, Inc.) to
between the claimants has proven acquisitive prescription. zero-in on Ludwin. Legenda admitted in its brief that its
surveillance staff paid close attention to Ludwin simply because it
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary was "unusual" for a Filipino to play using dollar denominated
prescription through possession for ten years. Being the sole heir chips.
of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt that she
had been in possession of the land for more than ten years since After Ludwin and his brother Deoven were accosted by the
1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued to reside there Legenda’s internal security, they were separately interrogated
with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband about the source of the chips they brought. The ultimatum was to
engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood. confess that the chips were given by a certain employee, Michael
Cabrera, or they would not be released from questioning. Finally,
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the the brothers succumbed to Legenda's instruction to execute a joint
petitioners' father claimed the land. But by then, her possession, statement implicating Cabrera.
which was in the concept of owner -- public, peaceful, and
uninterrupted -- had already ripened into ownership. However, the brothers recanted their statement and another
Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise, declared and brother, Bernard, filed an action for recovery of sum of money with
paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and damages against petitioner. Bernard alleged that the Legenda
declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof casino chips worth US$6,000.00, belonged to him; that petitioner
of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for illegally confiscated his casino chips equivalent to US$5,900.00;
ownership through prescription. and that petitioner refused and continues to refuse to return the
same to him despite demand.
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the
subject land, did not acquire ownership. It is settled that Petitioner's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim essentially
ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled alleged that respondent had no cause of action since the
with the element of hostility toward the true owner, occupation confiscated casino chips were stolen from it, and thus it has the
and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or right to retain them.
adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that
their possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although The trial court rendered its Decision, ordering the defendant to
their father and brother arguably acquired ownership through return to plaintiff the casino chips. According to the trial court, the
extraordinary prescription because of their adverse possession for onus fell on defendant to prove that the casino chips were stolen.
thirty-two years (1953-1985), this supposed ownership cannot The proof adduced however, is wanting.
extend to the entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion
that they actually farmed. On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court’s Decision. CA held that,
applying Article 559 of the Civil Code, respondent had the legal
We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their ownership presumption of title to or ownership of the casino chips. This
of the disputed land was established before the trial court through conclusion springs from Bernard's admission that the chips
the series of tax declarations and receipts issued in the name of represented payment by a Chinese customer for services he
Margarito Mendoza. Such documents prove that the holder has a rendered to the latter in his car shop. The CA added that since
claim of title over the property. Aside from manifesting a sincere respondent became the owner of the chips, he could very well have
desire to obtain title thereto, they announce the holder's adverse given them to Ludwin and Deoven, who likewise held them as
claim against the state and other interested parties. "possessors in good faith and for value" and with "presumptive
title" derived from the respondent.
However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie ISSUES
proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes
have been paid. Whether or not CA erred in ruling that the evidence is not
sufficient to rebut the legal presumption that a person in
SUBIC BAY LEGEND RESORTS AND CASINOS, INC., possession of personal property is the lawful owner of the same?
Petitioner, vs. BERNARD C. FERNANDEZ, Respondent. (NO)
(G.R. No. 193426, SECOND DIVISION, September 29, 2014, DEL RULING
CASTILLO, J.)
Indeed, for purposes of this proceeding, there appears to be no
evidence on record - other than mere allegations and suppositions
38
- that Cabrera stole the casino chips in question; such conclusion days from the time the Decision becomes final and executory.
came unilaterally from petitioner. Thus, there should be no basis Should defendant Legaspi Towers 200, Inc. choose not to
to suppose that the casino chips found in Ludwin's and Deoven's appropriate after proper indemnity, the parties shall agree upon
possession were stolen; petitioner acted arbitrarily in confiscating the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the Court shall
the same without basis. fix the terms thereof.
Though casino chips do not constitute legal tender, there is no law When the case was elevated, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
which prohibits their use or trade outside of the casino which of Makati City. CA held that while
issues them. In any case, it is not unusual – nor is it unlikely – that Concession 4 is indeed a nuisance, Lemans has been declared a
respondent could be paid by his Chinese client at the former's car builder in good faith, and noted that Legaspi Towers failed to
shop with the casino chips in question; said transaction, if not contest this declaration. Since Concession 4 was built in good faith,
common, is nonetheless not unlawful. These chips are paid for it cannot be demolished. Hence, LEMANS and Legaspi Towers filed
anyway; petitioner would not have parted with the same if their separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari with the Court.
corresponding representative equivalent - in legal tender,
goodwill, or otherwise – was not received by it in return or ISSUE:
exchange. Given this premise, it is with more reason that this Court
should require petitioner to prove convincingly and persuasively Whether Article 448 of the Civil Code and the Court’s ruling in
that the chips it confiscated from Ludwin and Deoven were indeed Depra v. Dumlao are applicable to the parties' situation? (NO)
stolen from it; if so, any Tom, Dick or Harry in possession of
genuine casino chips is presumed to have paid for their RULING:
representative value in exchange therefor. If petitioner cannot
prove its loss, then Article 559 cannot apply; the presumption that Significantly, the parties are no longer questioning the past rulings
the chips were exchanged for value remains. regarding Legaspi Towers' ownership of the air space above
Concession 3 which is the air space above the condominium
LEVISTAE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, INC., Petitioner vs. building itself.
LEGASPI TOWERS 200, INC., and VIVAN Y. LOCSIN and
PITONG MARCORDE, Respondents x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The ruling of this Court in Depra v. Dumlao extensively cited by
---x both parties pertains to the application of Articles 448 and 546 of
ENGR. NELSON Q. IRASGA, in his capacity as Municipal the Civil Code.
Building Official of Makati, Metro
Manila and HON. JOSE P. DE JESUS, in his capacity as Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
Secretary of the Dept. sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate
(G.R. No. 199353, FIRST DIVISION, APRIL 4, 2018, LEONARDO-DE as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
CASTRO, J.) indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the
one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
In the case at bar, however, the land belongs to a condominium who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter
corporation, wherein the builder, as a unit owner, is already in a cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more
co-ownership with other unit owners as members or than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
stockholders of the condominium corporation, whose legal reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
relationship is governed by a special law, the Condominium Act. appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
are therefore inapplicable in cases
covered by the Condominium Act where the owner of the land Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor;
and the builder are already bound by specific legislation on the but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he
subject property (the Condominium Act), and by contract (the has been reimbursed therefor.
Master Deed and the By-Laws of the condominium corporation).
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good
FACTS: faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated
him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount
Legaspi Towers is a condominium building located at Paseo de of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing
Roxas, Makati City. Lemans bought Concession 3 and decided to may have acquired by reason thereof.
build another unit ("Concession 4") on the roof deck of Concession
3. Despite Legaspi Corporation's notice that the construction of Firstly, it is recognized in jurisprudence that, as a general rule,
Concession 4 was illegal, Lemans refused to stop its construction. Article 448 on builders in good faith does not apply where there is
a contractual relation between the parties. Moreover, in several
When Legaspi Corporation forbade the entry of Lemans' cases, the Court has explained that the raison d'etre for Article 448
construction materials to be used in Concession 4 in the of the Civil Code is to prevent the impracticability of creating a
condominium, Lemans filed a Complaint with the RTC, praying state of forced co-ownership. In accord with the principle of
that a writ of mandatory injunction be issued to allow the accession, the landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option
completion of the construction of Concession 4. RTC issued the and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the
writ prayed for by Lemans. land.
RTC, in its Order, then found the application of Article 448 of the In the case at bar, however, the land belongs to a condominium
Civil Code and the ruling in the Depra vs. Dumlao to be proper. corporation, wherein the builder, as a unit owner, is already in a
Afterwards, RTC rendered the Assailed Decision, ordering Legaspi co-ownership with other unit owners as members or stockholders
Towers to exercise its option to appropriate the additional of the condominium corporation, whose legal relationship is
structure constructed on top of the penthouse within sixty [60] governed by a special law, the Condominium Act.
39
easement purposes. Similar to petitioner, respondents have no seen standing on the subject rice land." Moreover, the nearby
right or title over it precisely because it is public land. Likewise, landowner was able to construct a bridge to connect a property to
the Court has repeatedly held that squatters have no possessory the public road. Hence, "[t]he way through the irrigation canal
rights over the land intruded upon. The length of time that they would . . . appear to be the shortest and easiest way to reach the
may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are barangay road."
deemed to have entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature
of their possession is presumed to have retained the same ISSUE:
character throughout their occupancy.
Whether Alicia Reyes is entitled to the easement of right of way.
(2) As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a (NO)
case with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone, the Court holds that
both the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and the local RULING:
government of Las Piñas City, may file an action depending on the
purpose sought to be achieved. The former shall be responsible in Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code provide the requisites of an
case of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter may easement of right of way. Based on these provisions, the following
also bring an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic requisites need to be established before a person becomes entitled
Act No. 7279 (otherwise known as the Urban Development and to demand the compulsory easement of right of way:
Housing Act of 1992). Under R.A. 7279, all LGUs are mandated to
evict and demolish persons or entities occupying danger areas 1. An immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to
such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, other persons, and is without adequate outlet to a public highway;
shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, 2. Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounded
roads, parks, and playgrounds. immovable;
3. The isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner's acts; and
ALICIA B. REYES, Petitioner, - versus -. SPOUSES 4. The proposed easement of right of way is established at the
VALENTIN RAMOS, FRANCISCO S. AND ANATALIA, point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as
Respondents. consistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
G.R. No. 194488, SECOND DIVISION, February 11, 2015, LEONEN,
J. There is an adequate exit to a public highway. This court explained
in Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos that the convenience of the dominant
This court explained in Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos that the estate's owner is not the basis for granting an easement of right of
convenience of the dominant estate's owner is not the basis for way, especially if the owner's needs may be satisfied without
granting an easement of right of way, especially if the owner's imposing the easement.
needs may be satisfied without imposing the easement. Based on the Ocular Inspection Report, petitioner's property had
The outlet referred to in the Ocular Inspection Report may be another outlet to the highway. In between her property and the
longer and more inconvenient to petitioner because she will highway or road, however, is an irrigation canal, which can be
have to traverse other properties and construct a bridge over the traversed by constructing a bridge, similar to what was done by
irrigation canal before she can reach the road. However, these the owners of the nearby properties.
reasons will not justify the imposition of an easement on
respondents' property because her convenience is not the There is, therefore, no need to utilize respondents' property to
gauge in determining whether to impose an easement of right of serve petitioner's needs. Another adequate exit exists. Petitioner
way over another's property. can use this outlet to access the public roads.
FACTS: The outlet referred to in the Ocular Inspection Report may be
longer and more inconvenient to petitioner because she will have
Petitioner Alicia B. Reyes, through Dolores B. Cinco, filed a to traverse other properties and construct a bridge over the
Complaint for easement of right of way against respondents, irrigation canal before she can reach the road. However, these
Spouses Francisco S. Valentin and Anatalia Ramos. Alicia alleged reasons will not justify the imposition of an easement on
that she was the owner of a parcel of land which used to be a respondents' property because her convenience is not the gauge
portion of Lot No. 3-B and was surrounded by estates belonging to in determining whether to impose an easement of right of way
other persons. Petitioner further alleged that respondent’s over another's property. Petitioner also failed to satisfy the
property was the only adequate outlet from her property to the requirement of "least prejudicial to the servient estate. Article 650
highway. of the Civil Code provides that in determining the existence of an
easement of right of way, the requirement of "least prejudice] to
In their Answer, respondents contended that the isolation of the servient estate" trumps "distance [between] the dominant
petitioner's property was due to her mother's own act of estate [and the] public highway." "Distance" is considered only
subdividing the property among her children without regard to insofar as it is consistent to the requirement of "least prejudice."
the pendency of an agrarian case between her and her tenants. The
property chosen by petitioner as easement was also the most This court had already affirmed the preferred status of the
burdensome for respondents. requirement of "least prejudice" over distance of the dominant
estate to the public highway. Petitioner would have permanent
The Branch Clerk of Court conducted an ocular inspection. The structures — such as the garage, garden, and grotto already
trial court dismissed the complaint. The trial court found that installed on respondent's property — destroyed to accommodate
petitioner's proposed right of way was not the least onerous to the her preferred location for the right of way. The cost of having to
servient estate of respondents. The trial court noted the existence destroy these structures, coupled with the fact that there is an
of an irrigation canal that limited access to the public road. available outlet that can be utilized for the right of way, negates a
However, the trial court pointed out that "[o]ther than the existing claim that respondents' property is the point least prejudicial to
irrigation canal, no permanent improvements/structures can be the servient estate. The trial court found that there is still no
41
necessity for an easement of right of way because petitioner's The CA affirmed the granting of the right of way. However, the CA
property is among the lots that are presently being tenanted by remanded the case to the RTC for lack of justification on the
Dominador and Filomena Ramos' children. Petitioner is yet to use amount of indemnity. Established during the remand proceedings
her property. The Complaint for easement was found to have been was the fair market value of respondent's property which was
filed merely "for future purposes." The aspect of necessity may not pegged by the Municipal Assessor's Office of Cainta at P1,620.00
be specifically included in the requisites for the grant of per square meter. In terms of the extent of the easement, the
compulsory easement under the Civil Code. However, this goes parties disagree. Petitioners insisted that the right of way pertains
into the question of "least prejudice." An easement of right of way only to Road Lot 15 where the fence separating their property
imposes a burden on a property and limits the property owner's from respondent's subdivision, which was supposed to be
use of that property. The limitation imposed on a property owner's removed to grant them access thereto, is located. On the other
rights is aggravated by an apparent lack of necessity for which his hand, it was respondent's contention that the right of way covers
or her property will be burdened. the whole stretch from petitioners' property all the way to its
subdivision's gate leading to Marcos Highway. Petitioners further
DEMETRIA DE GUZMAN, AS SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS question the amount of indemnity, they contend that if the
OLGA C. BARBASO AND NOLI G. CEMENTTNA; * LOLITA indemnity is equivalent to the fair market value of the property, it
A. DE GUZMAN; ESTHER G.MILAN; BANAAG A. DE is already equivalent to appropriation.
GUZMAN; AMOR G. APOLO, AS SUBSTITUTED BY HIS
HEIRS ALBERTO T. APOLO, MARK APOLO AND GEORGE ISSUES:
APOLO; * HERMINIO A. DE GUZMAN; LEONOR G.
VTVENCIO; NORMA A. DE GUZMAN; AND JOSEFINA G. 1. Whether the extent of the easement covers only Lot 15. (NO)
HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, - versus - FBLINVEST 2. Whether the indemnity should be equivalent to the fair market
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. value of the property. (YES)
G.R. No. 191710, SECOND DIVISION, January 14, 2015, DEL RULING:
CASTILLO, J.
1. The right of way granted to petitioners covers the network of
It is the needs of the dominant estate which ultimately roads within respondent's subdivision and not merely Road Lot
determines the width of the passage. Article 651 of the Civil 15. It is not difficult to conclude therefrom that what was intended
Code provides: The width of the easement of right of way shall to serve as petitioners' right of way consisted of the road network
be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate within respondent's subdivision and not merely of Road Lot 15. As
and may accordingly be changed from time to time. may be recalled, the RTC then in resolving the complaint for
To the Court's mind, the 10- meter width of the affected road lots easement of right of way was confronted with the contentious
is unnecessary and inordinate for the intended use of the issue as to which between the two routes from petitioners'
easement. At most, a 3-meter wide right of way can already property, i.e., the one passing through respondent's subdivision
sufficiently meet petitioners' need for vehicular access. It would leading to Marcos Highway or the one passing through another
thus be unfair to assess indemnity based on the 10-meter road property leading to Sumulong Highway, is the more adequate and
width when a three-meter width can already sufficiently answer less prejudicial route pursuant to the requirement of the law. Thus,
the needs of the dominant estate. when it made the following comparison and eventually concluded
Therefore, bearing in mind Article 651, the Court finds proper a that the route passing through respondent's subdivision is the
road width of 3 meters in computing the proper indemnity. more adequate and the less prejudicial way, what it obviously had
in mind was the road network in respondent's subdivision since
FACTS:
the measurement thereof in meters corresponds with that
mentioned by the RTC.
Petitioners De Guzman et al, are co-owners of a parcel of land. The
property is enclosed and surrounded by other real properties Besides and logically speaking, if petitioners would indemnify
belonging to various owners. One of its adjoining properties is respondent only for Road Lot 15, it follows then that said
Filinvest Home Subdivision Phase IV-A (respondent) which, particular road lot should be the only road lot for which they shall
coming from petitioners' property, has a potential direct access to be allowed access. They cannot be allowed access to the other road
Marcos highway either by foot or vehicle. As such, petitioners filed lots leading to and from the highway as they are not willing to pay
Complaint for Easement of Right of Way. indemnity for it. In such a case, the purpose of the right of way, that
is, for petitioners to have access to the highway, would thus be
Respondent alleged in its Answer that petitioners have access to defeated.
Sumulong Highway through another property adjoining the
latter's property. In fact, the distance from petitioners' property to 2. Per the case of Woodridge School, Inc. v. ARB Construction,
Sumulong Highway using the said other property is only 1,500 the Court said: In the case of a legal easement, Article 649 of the
meters or shorter as compared to the 2,500- meter distance Civil Code prescribes the parameters by which the proper
between petitioners' property and Marcos Highway using indemnity may be fixed. Since the intention of petitioners is to
respondent's subdivision. establish a permanent passage, the second paragraph of Article
649 of the Civil Code particularly applies:
The RTC granted the right of way. According to the RTC, the Art. 649 xxx Should this easement be established in such a manner
adverted route by respondent is unfeasible and unavailing that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant
whereas if petitioners would pass through the respondent's road estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall
lot particularly Lot 15 access to the Marcos Highway is readily consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the
available to petitioners' property. Only a fence (located at Lot 15) damage caused to the servient estate. The Civil Code categorically
separates the Filinvest Subdivision and the petitioners' property provides for the measure by which the proper indemnity may be
which could be removed x x x anytime. The RTC granted an computed: value of the land occupied plus the amount of the
indemnity in favor of respondent in the amount of 400,000. damage caused to the servient estate. Settled is the rule in
statutory construction that 'when the law is clear, the function of
42
the courts is simple application.' Thus, to award indemnity using 2. There is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
factors different from [those] given by the law is a complete 3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the
disregard of these clear statutory provisions and is evidently dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and
arbitrary. 4. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where
HOWEVER, the Court, however, deems it necessary to modify the the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
width of the easement which would serve as basis in fixing the be the shortest (Art. 650).
value of the land as part of the proper indemnity. It is the needs All the above requisites are present in this case. As regards the
of the dominant estate which ultimately determines the first requisite, there is no dispute that the respondent's property
width of the passage. Article 651 of the Civil Code provides: The was surrounded by other immovables owned by different
width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is individuals, including Spouses Williams. The second requisite of
sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate and may payment of indemnity was also complied with by the respondent
accordingly be changed from time to time. when he wrote Spouses Williams on January 27, 2004, formally
asking them to provide him with a right of way, for which he was
The right of way constituting the easement in this case consists of in willing to pay a reasonable value or to swap a portion of his
existing and developed network of roads. This means that in their property. Anent the third requisite, the isolation of the dominant
construction, the needs of the dominant estate were not taken into estate was not due to the respondent's own acts. As to the fourth
consideration precisely because they were constructed prior to requisite, the Court finds that the right of way sought by the
the grant of the right of way. During the remand proceedings, it respondent is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate
was established that the width of the affected roads is 10 meters. and it is the shortest distance to the national highway
Multiplied by the distance of 2,350 meters, the total area to be This is evident in the Sketch Plan showing that the requested
indemnified is 23,500 square meters and at a price of P1,620.00 right of way was alongside the perimeter of Spouses Williams'
property
per square meter, petitioners must pay respondent the whopping
amount of P38,070,000.00 for the value of the land.
FACTS:
Under the circumstances, the Court finds it rather iniquitous to
Respondent Rainero A. Zerda (Zerda) was the owner of a parcel of
compute the proper indemnity based on the 10-meter width of the
land (dominant estate).
existing roads. To stress, it is the needs of the dominant estate
Immediately behind the dominant estate was Lot a swampy
which determines the width of the passage. And per their
mangrove area. On both sides were properties belonging to
complaint, petitioners were simply asking for adequate vehicular
different owners. In front was Lot No. 1201-A owned by
and other similar access to the highway. To the Court's mind, the
petitioner-spouses Larry and Rosarita Williams (Spouses
10- meter width of the affected road lots is unnecessary and
Williams), where the national highway ran along.
inordinate for the intended use of the easement. At most, a 3-meter
wide right of way can already sufficiently meet petitioners' need
On July 28, 2004, Zerda filed a complaint against Spouses Williams
for vehicular access. It would thus be unfair to assess indemnity
for easement of right of way Zerda alleged that on January 27,
based on the 10-meter road width when a three-meter width can
2004, Zerda wrote to Spouses Williams formally asking them to
already sufficiently answer the needs of the dominant estate.
provide him with right of way, for which he was willing to pay its
Therefore, bearing in mind Article 651, the Court finds proper a
reasonable value or to swap a portion of his property, but Spouses
road width of 3 meters in computing the proper indemnity. Thus,
Williams refused. Spouses Williams countered that the complaint
multiplying the road length of 2,350 meters by a road width of 3
should be dismissed because Zerda failed to establish the
meters, the total area to be indemnified is 7,050 square meters. At
requisites for the existence of right of way. They claimed that
a value of P1,620.00 per square meter, the total value of the land
sometime in May 2003, they were in negotiation with Agripino
to form part of the indemnity amounts to P11,421,000.00.
Sierra (Sierra), the former owner of the dominant estate, for its
In easement of right of way, there is no alienation of the land
sale to them but the sale did not materialize due to the
occupied. Payment of the value of the land for permanent use of
intervention of Zerda. Spouses Williams further averred that they
the easement does not mean an alienation of the land occupied. In
undertook visible development projects on their property as early
fact under the law and unlike in purchase of a property, should the
as May 2003 that the isolation of the dominant estate was Zerda's
right of way no longer be necessary because the owner of the
fault; and that his requested right of way would cause great
dominant estate has joined it to another abutting on a public
damage and prejudice to them.
highway, and the servient estate demands that the easement be
extinguished, the value of the property received by the servient
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Williams. It found that the
estate by way of indemnity shall be returned in full to the
isolation of Zerda's lot was due to his own acts because when he
dominant estate. This only reinforces the concept that the
bought the said property, he was aware that Spouses Williams had
payment of indemnity is merely for the use of the right of way and
already started introducing improvements on their own property.
not for its alienation.
It stated that Spouses Williams were able to prove that while they
SPOUSES LARRY AND ROSARITA WILLIAMS, Petitioners, were in negotiation with Sierra for the purchase of the dominant
- versus - RAINERO A. ZERDA, estate,Zerda intervened and bought the land himself, knowing full
Respondent. well that the land was surrounded by other immovables.
ISSUE:
G.R. No. 207146, SECOND DIVISION, March 15, 2017, MENDOZA, J.
The conferment of the legal easement of right of way is governed Whether Zerda is entitled to an easement of right of way. (YES)
by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code. In summary, an
entitlement to the easement of right of way requires that the RULING:
following requisites must be met.
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and The conferment of the legal easement of right of way is governed
has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code. In summary, an
43
property of Yolanda's father which would mean destroying the damage should be chosen. But if these two circumstances do not
sari sari store made of strong materials. xxx concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least
damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.
FLORCERFIDA STA. MARIA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF And if the conditions of the various tenements are the same, all the
APPEALS, and SPOUSES ARSENIO and ROSLYNN adjoining owners should be cited and experts utilized to determine
FAJARDO, respondents where the easement shall be established (Tolentino, ibid., pp. 108-
109, citing Casals Colldecarrera).
G.R. No. 127549, FIRST DIVISION, January 28, 1998, DAVIDE, JR., J.
In the case at bar, the ocular inspection disclosed that there are
Under Article 650 of the Civil Code, the easement of right of way three options open to the plaintiffs-appellees as a route to reach
shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient the national road xxx
estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be Among the three (3) possible servient estates, it is clear that
the shortest. Where there are several tenements surrounding defendants-appellants' property would afford the shortest
the dominant estate, and the easement may be established on distance from plaintiffs-appellees' property to the provincial road.
any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause Moreover, it is the least prejudicial since as found by the lower
the least damage should be chosen. The conditions of "least court, "(i)t appears that there would be no significant structures to
damage" and "shortest distance" are both established in one be injured in the defendants' property and the right-of-way to be
tenement — petitioners' property. constructed thereon would be the shortest of all the alternative
routes pointed to by the defendants" (p. 4, RTC, Decision; p. 223,
FACTS: ibid.). xxx
Plaintiff-respondent spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the
registered owners of a piece of land entirely surrounded by pieces Under Article 650 of the Civil Code, the easement of right of way
of lots belonging to different owners, one of them are herein shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
petitioners, spouses Raquel and Cesar Sta. Maria and Florcerfida estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance
Sta. Maria. fromthe dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
Plaintiff-respondent spouses Fajardo filed before the Regional Where there are several tenements surrounding the dominant
Trial Court a complaint against petitioners for the establishment estate, and the easement may be established on any of them, the
of an easement of right of way passing through eitherof the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage
alternative defendants' (petitioners) properties which are directly should be chosen. The conditions of "least damage" and "shortest
abutting the provincial road. They further allege that it is the only distance" are both established in one tenement — petitioners'
convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the provincial property.
road; and that despite plaintiff-respondents' request for a right of
way and referral of the dispute to the barangay officials, As to the "daang tao" at the back of private respondents' property,
petitioners refused to grant them an easement. Petitioners in their it must be stressed that under Article 651 the width of the
answer alleged that the granting of the easement in favor of easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the
plaintiff-respondent spouses would cause them great damage and needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed
inconvenience; and that there is another access route from from time to time. Therefore, the needs of the dominant estate
plaintiff-respondents' property to the main road. determine the width of the easement. The needs of private
respondents' property could hardly be served by this "daang tao"
The trial court in a decision ruled in favor of plaintiff-respondents, located at the back and which is bordered by a fishpond. Xxx
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition.
CRESENCIA CRISTOBAL, ROBERTO MAKIMKIM,
ISSUE: DAMASOMAKIMKIM, SPOUSES SALVADOR HERMALINO
and PONCIANAMAKIMKIM, MILAGROS MAKIMKIM,
Whether or not the lower courts erred in ruling in favor of REMEDIOS MAKIMKIM, SPOUSES FRANCISCO
plaintiff-respondents. (NO) ESTANISLAO and FLORDELIZA MAKIMKIM, ERLINDA
MAKIMKIM, JOSEMAKIMKIM and GINA MAKIMKIM,
RULING: Petitioners, V. COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR LEDESMA,
All told, the findings of fact of both courts satisfied the following INC., SPOUSES JESUS C.PACIONE and LERMA B.
requirements for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude PACIONE, R e s p o n d e n t s
of right of way under the Civil Code, to wit:
1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has G.R. No. 125339, FIRST DIVISION, June 22, 1998, BELLOSILLO, J.
no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1); An easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property
3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the rights of the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or
dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and encumbrance on the servient estate. Thus, it is incumbent upon
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the the owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear and
servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the his claim for easement of right of way be granted.
shortest (Art. 650). xxx
Going now to the fourth requisite of "least prejudice" and "shortest FACTS:
distance," We agree with the lower court that this twin elements
have been complied with in establishing the easement of right of Cristobal owned a house and lot in Visayas Avenue Extension.
way on defendants-appellants' properties. It has been commented Ledesma on the other hand was the owner of the adjoining
upon that where there are several tenements surrounding the subdivision, which included the disputed lots 1 and 2. Lots 1 and 2
dominant estate, and the easement may be established on any of were originally a part of the private road. Upon the making of
them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least Visayas Avenue as a public road, Ledesma petitioned the exclusion
46
of the two disputed lots from the road. He was granted to do so. On May 18, 1989, Conrad L. Leviste filed with the Regional Trial
Upon the sale of the lots to a third person, it was discovered that Court, Daet, Camarines Norte, a complaint for collection of a sum
there were squatters on the land and that it was being used as a of money and foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Smelter
passageway by petitioners. This prompted the new owner to Corporation (PSC).
enclose the lot.
For failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court
ISSUE: declared PSC in default and allowed plaintiff Leviste to present
evidence ex-parte.
Whether or not the easement may be granted. When the decision became final and executory, the trial court
issued a writ of execution and respondent sheriff Eduardo R.
RULING: Moreno levied upon two (2) parcels of land covered TCT Nos. T-
13505 and T-13514 issued by the Registrar of Deeds in the name
The essential requisites for the compulsory right of way are of PSC. On April 24, 1990, the parcels of land were sold at public
as follows— auction in favor of Vines Realty Corporation (Vines Realty). On
1. The property is surrounded by estate of others and there is no April 25, 1990, the Clerk of Court, as ex-officio Provincial Sheriff,
adequate outlet to a public highway issued a Certificate of Sale, which Judge Luis D. Dictado, in his
2. It must be established at the point least prejudicial to the capacity as executive judge, approved.
servient estate and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the On June 23, 1992, Vines Realty moved for the issuance of a writ of
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the possession over said property. On June 25, 1992, the trial court
shortest granted the motion.
3. There must be payment of the proper indemnity On August 7, 1992, copy of the writ of possession was served on
4. The isolation should not be due to the proprietor’s own acts In petitioner as owner of the power lines standing on certain portions
consideration of the above, mere convenience for the dominant of the subject property. Later, on August 12, 1992, Vines Realty
estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up the filed an amended motion for an order of demolition and removal
compulsory right of way. of improvements on the subject land.
In the present case, the first element is clearly absent. As found by
the trial court and the Court of Among the improvements for removal were the power lines and
Appeals, an outlet already exist, which is a path walk located at the electric posts belonging to petitioner.
left side of petitioners' property and which is connected to a
private road about five hundred (500) meters long. The private ISSUE:
road, in turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street which is about 2.5 meters
wide and, finally, to Visayas Avenue. This outlet was determined Whether petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the power
by the court a quo to be sufficient for the needs of the dominants lines located in the land sold at public auction as a result of extra-
estate, hence petitioners have no cause to complain that they have judicial foreclosure of mortgage.
no adequate outlet to Visayas Avenue. Further, no evidence was
adduced by petitioners to prove that the easement they seek to RULING:
impose on private respondents' property is to be established at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. A court
For emphasis, Lot 1 is only 164 square meters and an improvident denies a party due process if it renders its orders without giving
imposition of the easement on the lot may unjustly deprive private such party an opportunity to present its evidence.
respondents of the optimum use and enjoyment of their property, We find that petitioner was denied due process. Petitioner could
considering that its already small area will be reduced further by have negated private respondent’s claims by showing the absence
the easement. Worse, it may even render the property useless for of legal or factual basis therefor if only the trial court in the
the purpose for which private respondents purchased the same. exercise of justice and equity reset the hearing instead of
An easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property proceeding with the trial and issuing an order of demolition on the
rights of the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or same day. It is incumbent upon the trial court to receive evidence
encumbrance on the servient estate. Thus, it is incumbent upon the on petitioner’s right over the property to be demolished.
owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing
evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his claim for Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the
easement of right of way be granted. Petitioners miserably failed taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
in this regard. expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said
power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the
CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
(CANORECO), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through
LUIS L. DICTADO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 39, Daet, expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way."
Camarines Norte, EDUARDO R. MORENO, LT. COL. RUFINO However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights,
CHAVEZ, CAPT. ALFREDO BORJA, except the easement. Vines Realty retains full ownership and it is
CONRAD C. LEVISTE and VINES REALTY CORPORATION, not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing
respondents. what it wants to do with the land, except those that would result
in contact with the wires.
G.R. No. 109338, FIRST DIVISION, November 20, 2000, PARDO, J.
The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not gratis.
The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the Considering the nature and effect of the installation power lines,
purview of the power of eminent domain. the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period
deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. For these
FACTS: reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just compensation,
which must be neither more nor less than the money equivalent of
the property.
47
BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs.HON. TIRSO D.C. Accordingly, the petitioner has to demolish the house to make way
VELASCO in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the for the easement.
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, JULIO N.
SEBASTIAN and SHIRLEY LORILLA, respondents. COSTABELLA CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus- COURT
OF APPEALS, KATIPUNAN LUMBER CO., INC., AURORA
G.R. No. 130845, SECOND DIVISION, November 27, 2000, BUSTOS LOPEZ, MANUEL S. SATORRE, JR., JOSEFA C.
QUISUMBING, J. REVILLES, FELIX TIUKINHOY, JR., PERFECTA L.
CHUANGCO, and CESAR T. ESPINA,Respondents.
A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public
use or for private interest and becomes a continuing property G.R. No. 80511, SECOND DIVISION, January 25, 1991, SARMIENTO,
right unless its removal is provided for in a title of conveyance or J.
the sign of the easement is removed before the execution of the
conveyance; Under Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of
the dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way
FACTS: only after he has established the existence of four requisites, to
wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva bought a parcel of land in QC from and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after
Pacific Banking Corporation which it acquired from the spouses payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due
Maximo and Justina Gabriel. When he bought it, there was a small to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is
house on its southeastern portion. It occupies one meter of two at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. Additionally, the
meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted burden of proving the existence of the foregoing pre-requisites
to Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of the private respondents, lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
in a contract of easement of right of way. Amongst others, the
contract provides that the easement’s purpose is to have an outlet Here, there is absent any showing that the private respondents
to Tandang Sora which is the nearest public road and the least had established the existence of the four requisites mandated
burdensome (Espinolas’s property being the dominant estate and by law. For one, they failed to prove that there is no adequate
Gabriel spouses’s as the servient estate.) It was also provided in outlet from their respective properties to a public highway.
the contract that the easement “shall be binding to the successors, Further, the private respondents failed to indicate in their
assigns without prejudice in cases of sale of subject property that complaint or even to manifest during the trial of the case that
will warrant the circumstances.” they were willing to indemnify fully the petitioner for the right of
way to be established over its property. Neither have the private
The private respondents were able to acquire a writ of demolition respondents been able to show that the isolation of their
on the house obstructing the easement against the Spouses property was not due to their personal or their predecessors-in-
Gabriel. The petitioner filed a third party claim with prayer to interest's own acts. Finally, the private respondents failed to
quash the writ saying that he was not made a party to the civil case allege, much more introduce any evidence, that the passageway
and that the writ of demolition should not prosper since the they seek to be re-opened is at a point least prejudicial to the
easement which is meant to protect was not annotated in the petitioner.
petitioner’s title. CA ruled in favor of the private respondents
FACTS:
saying that the easement exists even though it was not annotated
in the torrens title because servitudes are inseparable from the
estate to which they actively or passively belong. And that It is admitted that the petitioner owns the real estate properties
Villanueva is bound by the contact of easement, not only as a designated as Lots Nos. 5122 and 5124 of the Opon Cadastre,
voluntary easement but as a legal easement. situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had
constructed a resort and hotel. The private respondents, on the
ISSUE: other hand, are the owners of adjoining properties more
particularly known as Lots Nos. 5123-A and 5123-C of the Opon
Whether or not the easement on the property binds petitioner? Cadastre.
RULING: Before the petitioner began the construction of its beach hotel, the
private respondents, in going to and from their respective
YES. A legal easement is mandated by law, and continues to exists properties and the provincial road, passed through a passageway
unless its removal is provided for in a title of conveyance or the which traversed the petitioner's property. In 1981, the petitioner
sign of the easement is removed before the execution of the closed the aforementioned passageway when it began the
conveyance conformably with Art 647 in accordance with Article construction of its hotel, but nonetheless opened another route
617 of the Civil Code. Essential requisites for an easement to be across its property through which the private respondents, as in
compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other the past, were allowed to pass. (Later, or sometime in August,
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) 1982, when it undertook the construction of the second phase of
proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to its beach hotel, the petitioner fenced its property thus closing even
acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way the alternative passageway and preventing the private
claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) respondents from traversing any part of it.)
to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. As a direct consequence of these closures, an action for injunction
with damages was filed against the petitioner by the private
The existence of the easement has been established by the lower respondents on September 2, 1982 before the then Court of First
courts and the same has become conclusive to the SC. The small Instance of Cebu.
house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement
obstructs the entry of private respondent’s cement mixer and After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision on March 15, 1984
motor vehicle (no mention of what kind.) finding that the private respondents had acquired a vested right
48
over the passageway in controversy based on its long existence confirmed by the appellate court, "there is another outlet for the
and its continued use and enjoyment not only by the private plaintiffs (private respondents) to the main road." Thus, the
respondents, but also by the community at large. The petitioner in respondent Court of Appeals likewise admitted that "legally the
so closing the said passageway, had accordingly violated the old road could be closed." Yet, it ordered the re- opening of the old
private respondents' vested right. passageway on the ground that "the existing outlet (the other
outlet) is inconvenient to the plaintiff."
In its decision, the respondent Appellate Court held as without
basis the trial court's finding that the private respondents had On this score, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals lost sight of
acquired a vested right over the passageway in question by virtue the fact that the convenience of the dominant estate has never
of prescription. The appellate court pointed out that an easement been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. To be
of right of way is a discontinuous one which, under Article 622 of sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is
the New Civil Code, may only be acquired by virtue of a title and "adequacy." Hence, when there is already an existing adequate
not by prescription. That notwithstanding, the appellate court outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even if the
went on to rule that ". . . in the interest of justice and in the exercise said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to
by this Court of its equity jurisdiction, there is no reason for Us in open up another servitude is entirely unjustified. For to justify the
not treating the easement here sought by appellees Katipunan imposition of an easement or right of way, "there must be a real,
Lumber Co., Inc. and Perfecta Guangco as one that is not dependent not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it."
upon the claims of the parties but a compulsory one that is legally
demandable by the owner of the dominant estate from the owner Further, the private respondents failed to indicate in their
of the servient estate." Thus the appellate court: (1) granted the complaint or even to manifest during the trial of the case that they
private respondents the right to an easement of way on the were willing to indemnify fully the petitioner for the right of way
petitioner's property using the passageway in question, unless the to be established over its property. Neither have the private
petitioner should provide another passageway equally accessible respondents been able to show that the isolation of their property
and convenient as the one it closed; (2) remanded the case to the was not due to their personal or their predecessors-in-interest's
trial court for the determination of the just and proper indemnity own acts.
to be paid to the petitioner by the private respondents for the said
easement; and (3) set aside the trial court's award of actual Finally, the private respondents failed to allege, much more
damages and attorney's fees. introduce any evidence, that the passageway they seek to be re-
opened is at a point least prejudicial to the petitioner. Considering
ISSUE: that the petitioner operates a hotel and beach resort in its
property, it must undeniably maintain a strict standard of security
Whether or not the decision of the respondent appellate court is within its premises. Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and
grossly erroneous and not in accord with the provisions of Articles safety of its clients and patrons would be compromised. That
649 and 650 of the Civil Code on easements and the prevailing indubitably will doom the petitioner's business. It is therefore of
jurisprudence on the matter. (YES) great importance that the claimed light of way over the petitioner's
property be located at a point least prejudicial to its business.
RULING:
Hence, the Private respondents' properties cannot be said to be
It is already well-established that an easement of right of way, as isolated, for which a compulsory easement is demandable. Insofar
is involved here, is discontinuous and as such cannot be acquired therefore as the Appellate Court declared the case to be proper as
by prescription. Insofar therefore as the appellate court adhered a controversy for a compulsory right of way, this Court is
to the foregoing precepts, it stood correct. Unfortunately, after constrained to hold that it was in error.
making the correct pronouncement, the respondent Appellate
Court did not order the reversal of the trial court's decision and As also earlier indicated, there must be a real necessity therefor,
the dismissal of the complaint after holding that no easement had and not mere convenience for the dominant estate. Hence, if there
been validly constituted over the petitioner's property. Instead, is an existing outlet, otherwise adequate, to the highway, the
the Appellate Court went on to commit a reversible error by "dominant" estate cannot demand a right of way, although the
considering the passageway in issue as a compulsory easement same may not be convenient. Of course, the question of when a
which the private respondents, as owners of the "dominant" particular passage may be said to be "adequate" depends on the
estate, may demand from the petitioner the latter being the owner circumstances of each case. Manresa, however, says: "In truth, not
of the "servient" estate. only the estate which absolutely does not possess it should be
considered in this condition, but also that which does not have one
Under Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of the sufficiently safe or serviceable; an estate bordering a public road
dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way only through an inaccessible slope or precipice, is in fact isolated for all
after he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the effects of the easement requested by its owner. On the other
the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is hand, an estate which for any reason has necessarily lost its access
without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of to a public road during certain periods of the year is in the same
the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the condition. . . . There are some who propound the query as to
proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point whether the fact that a river flows between the estate and the
least prejudicial to the servient estate. public road should be considered as having the effect of isolating
the estate. . . . If the river may be crossed conveniently at all times
Additionally, the burden of proving the existence of the foregoing without the least danger, it cannot be said that the estate is
pre-requisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate. Here, isolated; in any other case, the answer is in the affirmative."
there is absent any showing that the private respondents had The isolation of the dominant estate is also dependent on the
established the existence of the four requisites mandated by law. particular need of the dominant owner, and the estate itself need
For one, they failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from not be totally landlocked. What is important to consider is whether
their respective properties to a public highway. On the contrary, as or not a right of way is necessary to fill a reasonable need therefor
alleged by the petitioner in its answer to the complaint, and by the owner. Thus, as Manresa had pointed out, if the passageway
49
consists of an "inaccessible slope or precipice," it is as if there is no Tomas Encarnacion, on the East by Mamerto Magsino and on the
passageway, that is, one that can sufficiently fulfill the dominant West by Felipe de Sagun. In other words, the servient estate stands
owner's necessities, although by the existence of that passageway between the dominant estate and the national road.
the property cannot be truly said that the property is isolated. So
also, while an existing right of way may have proved adequate at Prior to 1960, when the servient estate was not yet enclosed with
the start, the dominant owner's need may have changed since a concrete fence, persons going to the national highway just
then, for which Article 651 of the Code allows adjustments as to crossed the servient estate at no particular point. However, in
width. 1960 when private respondents constructed a fence around the
servient estate, a roadpath measuring 25 meters long and about
But while a right of way is legally demandable, the owner of the a meter wide was constituted to provide access to the highway.
dominant estate is not at liberty to impose one based on arbitrary One-half meter width of the path was taken from the servient
choice. Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established upon estate and the other one-half meter portion was taken from
two criteria: (1) at the point least prejudicial to the servient state; another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No compensation was
and (2) where the distance to a public highway may be the asked and non was given for the portions constituting the
shortest. According, however, to one commentator, "least pathway.
prejudice" prevails over "shortest distance." Yet, each case must be
weighed according to its individual merits, and judged according It was also about that time that petitioner started his plant nursery
to the sound discretion of the court. "The court," says Tolentino, "is business on his land where he also had his abode. He would use
not bound to establish what is the shortest; a longer way may be said pathway as passage to the highway for his family and for his
established to avoid injury to the servient tenement, such as when customers.
there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work
roundabout way, or to secure the interest of the dominant owner, flourished and with that, it became more and more difficult for
such as when the shortest distance would place the way on a petitioner to haul the plants and garden soil to and from the
dangerous decline." nursery and the highway with the use of pushcarts. In January,
1984, petitioner was able to buy an owner-type jeep which he
TOMAS ENCARNACION, Petitioner, -versus- THE could use for transporting his plants. However, that jeep could not
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE INTESTATE pass through the roadpath and so he approached the servient
ESTATE OF THE LATE EUSEBIO DE SAGUN and THE estate owners (Aniceta Vda. de Sagun and Elena Romero Vda. de
HEIRS OF THE LATE ANICETA MAGSINO VIUDA DE Sagun) and requested that they sell to him one and one-half (1
SAGUN,* Respondents. 1/2) meters of their property to be added to the existing pathway
so as to allow passage for his jeepney. To his utter consternation,
G.R. No. 77628, THIRD DIVISION, March 11, 1991, FERNAN, C.J. his request was turned down by the two widows and further
attempts at negotiation proved futile. Petitioner then instituted an
Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the action before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 6
easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the (Tanauan) to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of
needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed way over an additional width of at least two (2) meters over the
from time to time." This is taken to mean that under the law, it is De Saguns' 405-square-meter parcel of land.
the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine
the width of the passage. And these needs may vary from time On December 2, 1985, the lower court rendered judgment
to time. When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, dismissing petitioner's complaint.
he and his family could easily make do with a few pushcarts to On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
tow the plants to the national highway. But the business grew court on January 28, 1987 and rejected petitioner's claim for an
and with it the need for the use of modern means of conveyance additional easement. In sustaining the trial court, the Court of
or transport. Manual hauling of plants and garden soil and use Appeals opined that the necessity interposed by petitioner was not
of pushcarts have become extremely cumbersome and compelling enough to justify interference with the property rights
physically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the of private respondents.
highway, exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft simply
because it could not pass through the improvised pathway, is The Appellate Court took into consideration the presence of a
sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can dried river bed only eighty (80) meters away from the dominant
only be counter-productive for all the people concerned.
estate and conjectured that petitioner might have actually driven
Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to
his jeep through the river bed in order to get to the highway, and
accommodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and
that the only reason why he wanted a wider easement through the
necessary aspect of the plant nursery business.
De Sagun's estate was that it was more convenient for his business
and family needs.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the
late Aniceta Magsino Viuda de Sagun are the owners of two
Whether or no petitioner has sufficiently established his claim for
adjacent estates situated in Buco, Talisay, Batangas. ** Petitioner
an additional easement of right of way, contrary to the conclusions
owns the dominant estate which has an area of 2,590 square
of the courts a quo. (YES)
meters and bounded on the North by Eusebio de Sagun and
Mamerto Magsino, on the south by Taal Lake, on the East by Felino RULING:
Matienzo and on the West by Pedro Matienzo. Private respondents
co-own the 405-square-meter servient estate which is bounded on
While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters from the
the North by the National Highway (Laurel-Talisay Highway), on
dominant tenement, that access is grossly inadequate. Generally,
the South by
the right of way may be demanded: (1) when there is absolutely
no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it
is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the
50
present case, the river bed route is traversed by a semi-concrete cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other
bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from the highway. For the immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate
jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump four outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way
(4) to five (5) meters up. Moreover, during the rainy season, the through the neigboring estates, after payment of the proper
river bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be used indemnity. Should this easement be established in such a
at certain times of the year. With the inherent disadvantages of the manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the
river bed which make passage difficult, if not impossible, it is if dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the
there were no outlet at all. indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the
Where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for
With the non-availability of the dried river bed as an alternative the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the
route to the highway, we transfer our attention to the existing gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a
pathway which straddles the adjoining properties of the De Sagun permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of
heirs and Mamerto Magsino. The courts below have taken against the damage caused by such encumbrance.
petitioner his candid admission in open court that he needed a This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the
wider pathway for the convenience of his business and family. immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.
(TSN, August 2, 1985, pp. 24-26). We cannot begrudge petitioner The construction of a wall between the 2 lots leaving only a small
for wanting that which is convenient. But certainly that should not passageway between them is an act imputable to the private
detract from the more pressing consideration that there is a real respondents which precludes them from asserting a right of way.
and compelling need for such servitude in his favor. The opening of the new gate would definitely be very convenient
Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the to the private respondents but mere convenience is not enough
to serve as basis for the assertion of a right of way.
easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the
It was therefore inaccurate for the lower court to state that the
needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed
private respondents have shown a clear right to justify the
from time to time." This is taken to mean that under the law, it is
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction when the facts and
the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine
circumstances of the case do not warrant it.
the width of the passage. And these needs may vary from time to
time. When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he
FACTS:
and his family could easily make do with a few pushcarts to tow
the plants to the national highway. But the business grew and with
The petitioners are co-owners of lots contiguous to each other
it the need for the use of modern means of conveyance or
situated in the Sitio of Kangkong, District of Balintawak, Quezon
transport. Manual hauling of plants and garden soil and use of
City.
pushcarts have become extremely cumbersome and physically
taxing. To force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway,
The private respondents are also co-owners of lots which are
exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft simply because it
adjacent to the lots owned by the petitioners. Lot 272-B has an
could not pass through the improvised pathway, is sheer
area of 1,427 sq. m. which was later subdivided into two lots where
pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can only be
Lot 272-A was assigned to Chua Lee and Chua Bun Tong pursuant
counter-productive for all the people concerned. Petitioner should
to a memorandum agreement executed by and between them.
not be denied a passageway wide enough to accommodate his
They are also owners of another lot at the upper portion of Lot
jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant
272-B with an area of 914 sq. m.
nursery business.
By virtue of an agreement entered into between the owners of the
We are well aware that an additional one and one-half (1 1/2)
contiguous lots and the members of the Quezon City Industrial
meters in the width of the pathway will reduce the servient estate
Estates Association (QCIEA), a right of way was granted over
to only about 342.5 square meters. But petitioner has expressed
Howmart Road which is a private road traversing the contiguous
willingness to exchange an equivalent portion of his land to
lots owned by the petitioners, among others, in favor of the QCIEA
compensate private respondents for their loss. Perhaps, it would
members. In return for its use, QCIEA paid compensation to the
be well for respondents to take the offer of petitioner seriously.
petitioners for this right of way. The private respondents are bona
But unless and until that option is considered, the law decrees that
fide members of the QCIEA.
petitioner must indemnify the owners of the servient estate
including Mamerto Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter
In order to have access to Howmart Road, there is a gate in private
was taken to constitute the original path several years ago. Since
respondents' 914 sq. m. lot fronting Howmart Road and another
the easement to be established in favor of petitioner is of a
gate in Lot 272-A. As a result of the subdivision of Lot 272, the
continuous and permanent nature, the indemnity shall consist of
private respondents opened a new gate in Lot 272-B also fronting
the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage
Howmart Road which is now the gate in question.
caused to the servient estate pursuant to Article 649 of the Civil
Code.
On October 5, 1989, under the instructions of Maxima Dionisio,
certain persons commenced the digging of four holes in a parallel
ADRIANA DIONISIO, ET AL., Petitioners, -versus- JUDGE
line and afterwards put up steel posts wielded to a steel plate in
RODOLFO ORTIZ OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
front of the newly constructed gate of private respondents amidst
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 89 AND PABLO TAN GONZAGA,
the latter's protestations.The petitioners claim that the
et al., Respondents.
surreptitiously constructed gate opened directly into the house of
Maxima Dionisio, exposing them to air and noise pollution arising
G.R. No. 95738, THIRD DIVISION, December 10, 1991, GUTIERREZ,
from the respondents' delivery trucks and service vehicles.
JR., J.
Article 649 of Civil Code justifies petitioners' claim, to wit: Art. On November 7, 1989, the private respondents instituted a civil
649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may action for damages against the petitioners. The complaint sought
51
the immediate issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right
ordering the petitioner to remove the barricade erected by them may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other
in front of the iron gate. immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate
outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way
On January 8, 1990, respondent Judge Ortiz issued an Order through the neigboring estates, after payment of the proper
granting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. indemnity.
The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use
of Appeals assailing the Order of may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate,
Judge Ortiz. Fifteen days later, the petitioners removed the establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of
barricade in front of the gate of the private respondents after they the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage
failed to obtain a temporary restraining order (TRO) from the caused to the servient estate.
Court of Appeals enjoining the lower court from implementing its
order. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the
that the issue has already become moot and academic since the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the
petitioners have already complied with the Order of the lower gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a
court. permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the
damage caused by such encumbrance.
ISSUE: This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the
immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.
Whether or not the private respondents have an easement of right
of way over Howmart Road. (NO) The construction of a wall between the 2 lots leaving only a small
RULING: passageway between them is an act imputable to the private
respondents which precludes them from asserting a right of way.
There is no question that a right of way was granted in favor of the The opening of the new gate would definitely be very convenient
private respondents over Howmart Road but the records disclose to the private respondents but mere convenience is not enough to
that such right of way expired in December, 1988. The continued serve as basis for the assertion of a right of way.
use of the easement enjoyed by QCIEAincluding the private
respondents is by the mere tolerance of the owners pending the It was therefore inaccurate for the lower court to state that the
renegotiation of the terms and conditions of said right of way. private respondents have shown a clear right to justify the
This is precisely shown by the two letters to the QCIEA requesting issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction when the facts and
for an increase in compensation for the use of Howmart Road. circumstances of the case do not warrant it. The respondent Court,
Absent an agreement of the parties as to the consideration, among however, dismissed the petition on the ground that the issue was
others, no contract of easement of right of way has been validly already moot and academic upon the petitioners' compliance with
entered into by the petitioners and QCIEA (see Robleza v. Court of the Order of the respondent Judge.
Appeals, (74 SCRA 354 [1989]). Thus, the private respondents'
claim of an easement of right of way over Howmart Road has no The Court of Appeals has the power to recallor lift the writ of
legal or factual basis. preliminary mandatory injunction so issued if it finds that the
party is not so entitled. However, in dismissing the petition the
Not having any right, the private respondents are not entitled to court, in effect affirmed the lower court's finding that the private
the injunctive relief granted by the lower court. respondents were indeed entitled to the writ of preliminary
injunction. But as we have earlier found, the private respondents
We have held in several cases that in order to be entitled to an are not entitled to the injunctive relief considering that they have
injunctive writ, one must show an unquestionable right over the no clear right over Howmart Road.
premises and that such right has been violated.
HELEN CALIMOSO, MARILYN P. CALIMOSO AND LIBY P.
The party applying for preliminary injunction must show that (a) CALIMOSO, Petitioners, -versus- AXEL D. ROULLO,
the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and Respondent.
substantial; (b) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;
and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to G.R. No. 198594, SECOND DIVISION, January 25, 2016, BRION, J.
prevent serious damage.
Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right-
In the case at bar, the private respondents have not shown that of-way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where
writ. the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest. Under this guideline, whenever there are
The records show that there are two (2) gates through which the several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the right-
private respondents may pass to have direct access to EDSA: (1) of-way must be established on the tenement where the distance
the northern gate which opens directly to EDSA; and (2) the to the public road or highway is shortest and where the least
southern gate along Howmart Road. The records also disclose that damage would be caused. If these two criteria (shortest distance
the petitioners and the other lot owners previously prohibited and and least damage) do not concur in a single tenement, we have
prevented members of QCIEA from opening new gates. The claim held in the past that the least prejudice criterion must prevail
that they were forced to open a new gate by reason of the over the shortest distance criterion.
subdivision of Lot 272 where a wall was constructed between
these 2 lots is untenable. The private respondents cannot assert a FACTS:
right of way when by their own or voluntary act, they themselves
have caused the isolation of their property from the access road. In his Complaint for Easement of Right of Way, the respondent
Article 649 of Civil Code justifies petitioners' claim, to wit: mainly alleged: that he is the owner of Lot 1462-C-1 situated in
52
Brgy. Sambag, Jaro, Iloilo City; that his lot is isolated by several and ask for a right-of-way on the property of a certain Mr. Basa in
surrounding estates, including Lot 1454-B-25 owned by order to reach the Fajardo Subdivision Road.
petitioners Helen, Marilyn, and Liby, all surnamed Calimoso; that Among the right-of-way alternatives, the CA adopted the first
he needs a right-of-way in order to have access to a public road; option, i.e., passing through the petitioner's lot, because it offered
and that the shortest and most convenient access to the nearest the shortest distance (from the respondent's lot) to the Fajardo
public road, i.e., Fajardo Subdivision Road, passes through the Subdivision Road and the right-of-way would only affect the "nipa
petitioners' lot. hut" standing on the petitioners' property.
The petitioners objected to the establishment of the easement Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right-
because it would cause substantial damage to the 2 houses already of-way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the
standing on their property. They alleged that the respondent has servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
other right-of-way alternatives, such as the existing wooden distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
bridge over Sipac Creek bounding the respondent's lot on the shortest. Under this guideline, whenever there are several
northeast; that the bridge, if made concrete, could provide ingress tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the right-of-way
or egress to the Fajardo Subdivision Road. must be established on the tenement where the distance to the
public road or highway is shortest and where the least damage
In a decision dated September 29, 2003, the RTC granted the would be caused. If these two criteria (shortest distance and least
respondent's complaint and ordered damage) do not concur in a single tenement, we have held in the
the petitioners to provide the respondent an easement of right-of- past that the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the
way "measuring 14 meters in length and 3 meters in width (42 shortest distance criterion.
square meters, more or less) over Lot1454-B-25, specifically at the
portion adjoining the bank of Sipac Creek." The petitioners In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the
appealed the RTC's decision to the CA. petitioners' lot would cause the destruction of the wire fence and
a house on the petitioners' property. Although this right-of-way
The CA, in its assailed December 15, 2010 decision, affirmed in toto has the shortest distance to a public road, it is not the least
the RTC's decision and held that all the requisites for the prejudicial considering the destruction pointed out, and that an
establishment of a legal or compulsory easement of right-of-way option to traverse two vacant lots without causing any damage,
were present in the respondent's case: first, that the subject lot is albeit longer, is available.
indeed surrounded by estates owned by different individuals and
the respondent has no access to any existing public road; second, We have held that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is
that the respondent has offered to compensate the petitioners for not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory
the establishment of the right-of-way through the latter's easement;" that "a longer way may be adopted to avoid injury to
property; third, that the isolation of the subject lot was not caused the servient estate, such as when there are constructions or walls
by the respondent as he purchased the lot without any adequate which can be avoided by a roundabout way."
ingress or egress to a public highway; and, fourth and last, given
the available options for the right-of-way, the route that passes NATIVIDAD C. CRUZ AND BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ,
through the petitioners' lot requires the shortest distance to Petitioners, -versus- PANDACAN HIKER'S CLUB, INC.,
a public road and can be established at a point least REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, PRISCILA ILAO,
prejudicial to the petitioners' property. Respondent.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the CA's decision arguing G.R. No. 188213, THIRD DIVISION, January 11, 2016, PERLATA, J.
that, while the establishment of the easement through their lot
provided for the shortest route, the adjudged right-of-way would A nuisance is classified in two ways: (1) according to the object
cause severe damage not only to the nipa hut situated at the corner it affects; or (2) according to its susceptibility to summary
of the petitioners' lot, but also to the bedroom portion of the other abatement.
concrete house that stood on the property. The CA, however, did As for a nuisance classified according to the object or objects
not consider the petitioners' arguments on the ground that the that it affects, a nuisance may either be:
matters alleged were not raised or proven before the trial court, (a) a public nuisance, i.e., one which “affects a community or
thus, it denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although
the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals
ISSUE: may be unequal” or (b) a private nuisance, or one “that is not
included in the foregoing definition” which, in jurisprudence, is
Whether the right-of-way passing through the petitioners' lot one which “violates only private rights and produces damages
satisfies the fourth requirement of being established at the point to but one or a few persons.”
least prejudicial to the servient estate. (NO)
A nuisance may also be classified as to whether it is susceptible
RULING: to a legal summary abatement, in which case, it may either be:
(a) a nuisance per se, when it affects the immediate safety of
Three options were then available to the respondent for the persons and property, which may be summarily abated under
demanded right-of-way: the first option is to traverse directly the undefined law of necessity; or, (b) a nuisance per accidens,
through the petitioners' property, which route has an approximate which “depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and
distance of 14 meters from the respondent's lot to the Fajardo its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without
due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether
Subdivision Road; the second option is to pass through two
such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance;” it may only be
vacant lots (Lots 1461-B-l and 1461-B-2) located on the southwest
so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose and may not
of the respondent's lot, which route has an approximate distance
be summarily abated without judicial intervention.
of 43 meters to another public highway, the Diversion Road; and
the third option is to construct a concrete bridge over Sipac Creek
FACTS:
53
ex gratia argumenti, that the basketball ring was a nuisance per se, allegedly protruding to the sidewalk. This prompted respondents
but without posing any immediate harm or threat that required to file a complaint for injunction before the Marikina City RTC on
instantaneous action, the destruction or abatement performed by March 12, 2001.
petitioners failed to observe the proper procedure for such an
action which puts the said act into legal question. In respondents’ injunction complaint, they alleged that (1)
petitioner’s letters made it appear that their fence was
JAIME S. PEREZ, both in his personal and official capacity encroaching on the sidewalk and directed them to remove it,
as Chief, Marikina Demolition Office, Petitioner, -versus- otherwise he would take the corresponding action; (2) petitioner’s
SPOUSES FORTUNITO L. MADRONA and YOLANDA B. threat of action would be damaging and adverse to respondents
PANTE, Respondents. and appears real, earnest and imminent; (3) the removal of their
fence, which would include the main gate, would certainly expose
G.R. No. 184478, FIRST DIVISION, March 21, 2012, VILLARAMA, the premises and its occupants to intruders or third persons; (4)
JR., J. petitioner has no legal authority to demolish structures in private
properties and the laws he cited in his letters do not give him any
If petitioner indeed found respondents’ fence to have authority to do so; (5) respondents enjoy the legal presumption of
encroached on the sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish the rightful possession of every inch of their property; (6) if petitioner
same summarily after respondents failed to heed his request to accuses them of erroneous possession, he should so prove only
remove it. Instead, he should go to court and prove respondents’ through the proper forum which is the courts; (7) their fence is
supposed violations in the construction of the concrete fence. beside the sidewalk and the land on which it stands has never been
Indeed, unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated the subject of acquisition either by negotiation or expropriation
summarily without judicial intervention. from the government; (8) petitioner’s intended act of demolition
even in the guise of a road right of way has no factual or legal basis
Our ruling in Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, since there is no existing infrastructure project of the national
Inc., on the need for judicial intervention when the nuisance is government or Marikina City government; and (9) petitioner’s
not a nuisance per se, is well worth mentioning. In said case, we letter and his intended act of demolition are malicious, unfounded,
ruled: meant only to harass respondents in gross violation of their rights
and in excess and outside the scope of his authority, thereby
Respondents cannot seek cover under the general welfare rendering him accountable both in his personal and official
clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial capacity.
proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and
Respondents likewise sought the issuance of a temporary
may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity
restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction to
(Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of
enjoin petitioner and all persons acting under him from doing any
copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its
act of demolition on their property and that after trial, the
nature, it cannot be said to be injurious to rights of property, of
injunction be made permanent. They also prayed for moral and
health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention. On July 27, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of
respondents. The RTC held that respondents, being lawful owners
FACTS: of the subject property, are entitled to the peaceful and open
possession of every inch of their property and petitioner’s threat
Respondent-spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda B. Pante are to demolish the concrete fence around their property is
registered owners of a residential property located in Lot 22, Block tantamount to a violation of their rights as property owners who
5, France Street corner Italy Street, Greenheights Subdivision, are entitled to protection under the Constitution and laws. The
Phase II, Marikina City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title RTC also ruled that there is no showing that respondents’ fence is
No. 169365 of the Registry of Deeds of Marikina. In 1989, a nuisance per se and presents an immediate danger to the
respondents built their house thereon and enclosed it with a community’s welfare, nor is there basis for petitioner’s claim that
concrete fence and steel gate. the fence has encroached on the sidewalk as to justify its summary
demolition.
In 1999, respondents received the following letter dated May 25,
1999 from petitioner Jaime S. Perez, Chief of the Marikina Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On March 31, 2008,
Demolition Office alleging that their structure violated several the appellate court rendered the assailed decision affirming the
ordinances and consequently advised to demolish their RTC decision. Hence, this petition.
construction.
ISSUE:
As response, respondent Madrona sent petitioner a three-page
letter dated June 8, 1999 stating that the May 25, 1999 letter (1) Whether the structure is a nuisance per se which may be abated
contained an accusation libelous in nature as it is condemning him summarily without judicial intervention. (NO)
and his property without due process; (2) has no basis and
RULING:
authority since there is no court order authorizing him to demolish
their structure; (3) cited legal bases which do not expressly give
If petitioner indeed found respondents’ fence to have encroached
petitioner authority to demolish; and (4) contained a false
on the sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish the same summarily
accusation since their fence did not in fact extend to the sidewalk.
after respondents failed to heed his request to remove it. Instead,
he should go to court and prove respondents’ supposed violations
On February 28, 2001, petitioner sent another letter with the same
in the construction of the concrete fence. Indeed, unless a thing is
contents as the May 25, 1999 letter but this time giving
respondents ten days from receipt thereof to remove the structure a nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial
intervention. Our ruling in Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.
55
v. JAC Liner, Inc., on the need for judicial intervention when the deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and
nuisance is not a nuisance per se, is well worth mentioning. In said effect.”
case, we ruled:
On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died. Upon learning of the
Respondents cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause existence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed with the
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial RTC an action for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which Deeds of Donations and Accounting seeking the annulment of said
affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be four deeds of donation. Respondents allege that the documents are
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code
(Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that
copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its these are donations mortis causa. Petitioners contend that
nature, it cannot be said to be injurious to rights of property, of Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the
health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per preparation of the instruments.
accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary The RTC rendered a partial judgment in favor of respondent. It
abatement without judicial intervention. ruled that the donations are donations mortis causa and therefore
the four deeds in question executed failed to comply with the
Respondents’ fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not requisites of Article 806 of the Civil Code on solemnities of wills
injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was built and testaments. Petitioners insist that the donations are inter
primarily to secure the property of respondents and prevent vivos donations as these were made by the late Conchita
intruders from entering it. And as correctly pointed out by Cabatingan "in consideration of the love and affection of the
respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If petitioner believes that donor" for the donee, and there is nothing in the deeds which
respondents’ fence indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be indicate that the donations were made in consideration of
so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. Not being a Cabatingan's death
nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidents, its summary
abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted. ISSUE:
lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated be Donation on July 12, 1972 conveying his share of the property in
transferrred to the donee or independently of, and not by reason favor of his 14 grandchildren. The said donation was not
of her death, she would have not expressed such proviso in the registered.
subject deeds. Considering that the disputed donations are
donations mortis causa, the same partake of the nature of Thus, when Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect on October 21,
testamentary provisions and as such, said deeds must be executed 1972, the landholdings of the spouses Gonzales were placed under
in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and Operation Land Transfer by virtue of said decree, and private
testaments under Articles respondents were accordingly issued the corresponding
805 and 806 of the Civil Code. Certificates of Land Transfer and Emancipation Patents. Lilia
Gonzales filed an application for retention with the then Ministry
IGNACIO GONZALES, LILIA R. GONZALES, GUSTAVO R. of Agrarian Reform, requesting that their property be excluded
GONZALES, WIGBERTO R. GONZALES, GILDA from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
GONZALES-SALUTA, FERNANDO RAMIREZ, OCTAVIO
RAMIREZ, JR., IGNACIO RAMIREZ, ESMIRNA RAMIREZ, On September 3, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin Leong issued an
MERCEDES GONZALES-FAVIZ, JAIME GONZALES, order declaring that the subject landholdings covered by the deed
FEDERICO GONZALES, ROSARIO GONZALES, PATRICIA of donation are exempt from Operation Land Transfer, and
GONZALES, DANIEL GONZALES, ALDO GONZALES, cancelling the Certificates of Land Transfer issued in favor of
CLAUDIA GONZALES and AMANDA GONZALES, private respondents. As the donation had been duly accepted by
Petitioners, - versus - HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, the donees who were already of legal age on the date of the
ESTANISLAO SALVADOR, MATEO SALVADOR, ALBERTO donation and by the legal guardians of the donees who were still
SARMIENTO, MAXIMO ESGUERRA, MAMERTO ANTONIO, minors at that time, and the donor having known of said
VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN, ANGEL FAJARDO, ABAD DELA acceptance, the donation had therefore been perfected in
CRUZ, PEDRO FAJARDO, JUANITO DE LARA, ELIGIO DE accordance with the law, and the donees had acquired a valid title
GUZMAN, SALVADOR MARTINEZ, EDUARDO DELA CRUZ, to the portion donated on the date the instrument was executed.
JOSE MATIAS, SOLEDAD ESTRELLA, ROMAN GUINGON,
CIRILO SALVADOR, CATALINA DE LA CRUZ, BERNARDO The Court of Appeals reversed the action of the DAR and upheld
ESGUERRA, JR., GLORIA CABANA, PAQUITO CHAVEZ, the certificates of land transfer and emancipation patents.
RENATO GARCIA, FRANCISCO PASCUAL, WALDO
SALVADOR, MARIO SALVADOR, PEDRO GARCIA, ALBINO ISSUE:
SALVADOR, ANTONIO DE GUZMAN, AMBROCIO
SALVADOR, TERESITA CAPATE, EDUARDO TALENS, Whether the property subject of the deed of donation which was
BENIGNO CARAIG, ERNESTO BERNABE, SERGIO not registered when P.D. No. 27 took effect, should be excluded
CARLOS, SIMEON BALINGAY, ANTONIO NANGEL, from the Operation Land Transfer.
TEOFILO BINUYA and WILFREDO DELA CRUZ,
Respondents. RULING:
G.R. No. 110335, THIRD DIVISION, June 18, 2001, MELO, J. Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that "in order that
As between the parties to a donation of an immovable property,
the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a
all that is required is for said donation to be contained in a public
public document, specifying therein the property donated and the
document. Registration is not necessary for it to be considered
value of the charges which the donee must satisfy." Corollarily,
valid and effective. However, in order to bind third persons, the
Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that "the titles of
donation must be registered in the Registry of Property (now
ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are
Registry of Land Titles and Deeds). Although the non-
not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of property shall
registration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the
not prejudice third persons."
necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third
persons are affected, as in the case at bar. The donation
executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grandchildren, From the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that as between
although in writing and duly notarized, has not been registered the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is
in accordance with law. required is for said donation to be contained in a public document.
Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and
For this reason, it shall not be binding upon private respondents effective. However, in order to bind third persons, the donation
who did not participate in said deed or had no actual knowledge must be registered in the Registry of Property (now Registry of
thereof. Land Titles and Deeds). Although the non-registration of a deed of
donation shall not affect its validity, the necessity of registration
FACTS: comes into play when the rights of third persons are affected, as in
the case at bar.
Spouses Ignacio Gonzales and Marina Gonzales were the
registered owners of two parcels of agricultural Land situated at Further, it is an entrenched doctrine in our jurisdiction that
Barrio Fortaleza, Cabanatuan City. Herein petitioners are the registration in a public registry creates constructive notice to the
successors-in-interest or the children and grandchildren of said whole world. It is undisputed in this case that the donation
Gonzales spouses. On the other hand, private respondents are the executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grandchildren,
farmers and tenants of said spouses who have been cultivating the although in writing and duly notarized, has not been registered in
parcels of land even before World War II either personally or accordance with law. For this reason, it shall not be binding upon
through their predecessors-in-interest. private respondents who did not participate in said deed or had no
actual knowledge thereof. Hence, while the deed of donation is
On May 7, 1969, Marina Gonzales died intestate and appointed as valid between the donor and the donees, such deed, however, did
administratrix of her estate was petitioner Lilia Gonzales. Prior to not bind the tenants-farmers who were not parties to the donation.
the partition of said estate, Ignacio Gonzales executed a Deed of
57
From the foregoing, the ineluctable conclusion drawn is that the damages against Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma, Teresita Palma,
unregistered deed of donation cannot operate to exclude the District Supervisor Buendia and the BPS before the RTC. The trial
subject land from the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer of court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
P.D. No. 27, which took effect on October 21, 1972. Accordingly, the
Certificates of Land Transfer and the The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
Emancipation Patents respectively issued to private respondents declared the donation null and void on the grounds that the
over the land in question cannot be cancelled. It may, therefore, be donation was not properly accepted and the condition imposed on
said that private respondents became owners of the subject land. the donation was violated. Hence, the present case
The conclusion of the appellate court that the land subject of the ISSUE:
donation is covered by Operation
Land Transfer was affirmed. The findings of fact made by the Court 1. Whether donation is null and void due to an invalid acceptance
of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court even by the donee.
if contrary to these of the trial court nor the administrative agency, 2. Whether the donation is null and void due to an alleged violation
so long as such findings are supported by the records or based on of a condition in the donation.
substantial evidence. While the foregoing doctrine is not absolute,
petitioners have not sufficiently proved that the findings RULING:
complained of are totally devoid of support in the records, or that
they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of 1. The Court of Appeals erred in declaring the donation null and
discretion. void for the reason that the acceptance was not allegedly done in
accordance with Articles 745[6] and 749[7] of the New Civil Code.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus - LEON An onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a
SILIM and ILDEFONSA MANGUBAT, Respondents. reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of
donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is
G.R. No. 140487, FIRST DIVISION, April 2, 2001, KAPUNAN, J. equal to or more than the thing donated.
Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides:
In this case, the written acceptance of the donation having been Art. 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by
considered by the trial court in arriving at its decision, there is the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the
the presumption that this exhibit was properly offered and provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which
admitted by the court. exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
With regard to the respondents' submission that the done ‘The donation involved in the present controversy is one which is
violated the condition in the donation that the lot be exclusively onerous since there is a burden imposed upon the donee to build
used for school purposes only, the condition for the donation a school on the donated property. There was a valid acceptance
was not in any way violated when the lot donated was of the donation.
exchanged with another one.
Private respondents admit that in the offer of exhibits by the
FACTS: defendants in the trial court, an affidavit of acceptance and/or
confirmation of the donation, marked as Exhibit "8," was offered
On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Spouses Leon Silim and in evidence.
Ildefonsa Mangubat, donated a parcel of land in favor of the Bureau The written acceptance of the donation having been considered by
of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur the trial court in arriving at its decision, there is the presumption
(BPS). Respondents imposed the condition that the said property that this exhibit was properly offered and admitted by the court.
should "be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only." Moreover, this issue was never raised in the Court of Appeals.
This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District Nowhere in their brief did respondents question the validity of the
Supervisor of BPS. donation on the basis of the alleged defect in the acceptance
thereof. The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of
Through a fund raising campaign spearheaded by the Parent- a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly communicated
Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan, a school building to the donor.
was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong
Lipunan school building that was supposed to be allocated for the In the case at bar, a school building was immediately constructed
donated parcel of land in Barangay Kauswagan could not be after the donation was executed.
released since the government required that it be built upon a 1 Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school building
hectare parcel of land. To remedy this predicament, Assistant put up on the donated lot through the efforts of the Parents-
School Division Superintendent authorized District Supervisor Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan. It was when the
Buendia to officially transact for the exchange of the one-half (1/2) school building was being dismantled and transferred to the new
hectare old school site of Kauswagan Elementary School to a new site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a
and suitable location which would fit the specifications of the house on the donated property that respondents came to know of
government. The donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot. the Deed of Exchange. The actual knowledge by respondents of the
construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the legal
When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that Vice-Mayor requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be
Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated land, he communicated to the donor.
asked the latter why he was building a house on the property he
donated to BPS. Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied that he is 2. With regard to the respondents' submission that the done
already the owner of the said property. violated the condition in the donation that the lot be exclusively
used for school purposes only, the condition for the donation
Respondents filed a Complaint for Revocation and Cancellation of was not in any way violated when the lot donated was
Conditional Donation, Annulment of Deed of Exchange and exchanged with another one. The purpose for the donation
Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Property with remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school. The
58
exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the failure to comply with the Regional Trial Court's previous Orders
exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and and even with its own undertaking to facilitate the payment of just
enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the compensation to the Llamas Spouses.
bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the
construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not The Department of Public Works and Highways and the Llamas
be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot. Spouses filed a Joint Manifestation and Motion seeking to suspend
the Llamas Spouses' pending Motions. This Joint Motion stated
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the that the Department of Public Works and Highways and the
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS Llamas Spouses had an understanding that the resolution of the
(DPWH), Petitioner -versus- SPOUSES FRANCISCO R. latter's claims required the submission of: (1) certified true copies
LLAMAS and CARMELITA C. LLAMAS, Respondents of the TCTs covering the lots; and (2) certified true copies of the
tax declarations, tax clearances, and tax receipts over the lots. The
G.R. No. 194190, SECOND DIVISION, January 25, 2017, LEONEN, J. Department of Public Works and Highways manifested that the
non-payment of the Llamas Spouses' claims was due to their
To be considered a donation, an act of conveyance must continued failure to comply with their undertaking. The Regional
necessarily proceed freely from the donor's own, unrestrained Trial Court issued the Order directing the payment to the Llamas
volition. A donation cannot be forced: it cannot arise from Spouses of just compensation at ₱12,000.00 per square meter for
compulsion, be borne by a requirement, or otherwise be 41 square meters for the lot covered by TCT No. 217267. It denied
impelled by a mandate imposed upon the donor by forces that payment for areas covered by TCT No. 179165 and noted that
are external to him or her. Article 726 of the Civil Code reflects these were subdivision road lots, which the Llamas Spouses "no
this commonsensical wisdom when it specifically states that longer owned" and which "belong[ed] to the community for whom
conveyances made in view of a "demandable debt" cannot be they were made."
considered true or valid donations.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed Orders of
Respondents have not made any positive act enabling the City the Regional Trial Court and ordered the Department of Public
Government of Parafiaque to acquire dominion over the Works and Highways to pay the Llamas Spouses P12,000.00 per
disputed road lots. Therefore, they retain their private character square meter as just compensation for a total of 237 square meters
(albeit all parties acknowledge them to be subject to an across three (3) lots, inclusive of the portions excluded by the
easement of right of way). Accordingly, just compensation must Regional Trial Court.
be paid to respondents as the government takes the road lots in
the course of a road widening project. ISSUE:
FACTS: Whether or not just compensation must be paid to respondents
Francisco and Carmelita Llamas for the subdivision road lots
The DPWH initiated an action for expropriation for the widening covered by TCT No. 179165. (YES)
of Dr. A. Santos Ave. in what was then the Municipality of
Paranaque, Metro Manila. The Commissioners appointed by the RULING:
RTC in the expropriation case submitted a resolution
recommending that just compensation for the expropriated areas The Department of Public Works and Highways insists that the
be set to ₱12,000.00 per square meter. The Llamas Spouses filed road lots are not compensable since they have "already been
before the RTC a "Most Urgent and Respectful Motion for Leave to withdrawn from the commerce of man." It relies chiefly on this
be Allowed Intervention as Defendants- Court's 1991
Intervenors-Oppositors." They claimed that they were excluded Decision in White Plains Association, Inc. v. Legaspi, which
from the expropriation case despite having properties affected by pertained to "the widening of the Katipunan Road in the White
the road widening project. The Llamas Spouses filed their Answer- Plains Subdivision in Quezon City." It capitalizes on the statement
in- in the 1991 White Plains Decision that shows a compulsion for
Intervention. In it, they claimed that a total area of 298 square subdivision owners to set aside open spaces for public use, such as
meters was taken from them during the road widening project. roads, and for which they need not be compensated by
The Llamas Spouses filed a "Most Urgent Motion for the Issuance government.
of [a]n Order Directing the
Immediate Payment of 40% of Zonal Value of Expropriated Land Petitioner's reliance on the 1991 White Plains Decision is
and Improvements." The DPWH filed its Comment/Opposition. It misplaced. The same 1991 Decision was not the end of litigation
noted that, from its verification with the project engineer, only 41 relating to the widening of Katipunan Road. The 1998 White
square meters in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 179165 Plains Decision unequivocally repudiated the 1991 White Plains
was affected by the road widening project. Thus, it emphasized Decision's allusion to a compulsion on subdivision developers to
that the Llamas Spouses were entitled to just compensation only cede subdivision road lots to government, so much that it
to the extent of those 41 square meters. It added that the Llamas characterized such compulsion as an "illegal taking." It did away
Spouses failed to adduce evidence of any improvements on the with any preference for government's capacity to compel cession
affected area. It interposed no objection to the ₱12,000.00 per and, instead, emphasized the primacy of subdivision owners' and
square meter as valuation of just compensation. The RTC issued developers' freedom in retaining or disposing of spaces developed
the Order directing the payment of the value of the lots of the as roads.
defendants in the expropriation case. The lots subject of the
Llamas Spouses' intervention were not included in this Order. In insisting on a compulsion on subdivision owners and
developers to cede open spaces to government, the Department of
After years of not obtaining a favorable ruling, the Llamas Spouses Public Works and Highways references Presidential Decree No.
filed a "Motion for Issuance of an 957, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1216, otherwise
Order to Pay and/or Writ of Execution." In this Motion, the Llamas known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protective
Spouses faulted the DPWH for what was supposedly its deliberate Decree.
59
the expenses and payments in her behalf were purely gratuitous THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE
remained unsupported by records. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES
Esperanza’s refusal to pay back would likewise result in unjust FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners, -
enrichment, to the clear disadvantage of the respondents. "The versus- HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF
main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and
prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA
without just cause or consideration." While GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO,
Esperanza claims that her brother’s generosity was the respondents.
consideration for the respondents’ payment of her obligations, this
was not sufficiently established, that even the respondents G.R. No. 77425, SECOND DIVISION, June 19, 1991, REGALADO, J.
vehemently denied the allegation. In order to sufficiently
substantiate her claim that the money paid by the respondents When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for
was actually a donation, Esperanza should have also submitted in automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the
court a copy of their written contract evincing such agreement. rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should
Article 748 of the New Civil Code (NCC), which applies to apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306
donations of money, is explicit on this point as it reads: of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to
Art. 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are
writing. of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties
providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation,
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to
or of the document representing the right donated. the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought.
Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will
be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the
If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five
revocatory act.
thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made in
writing. Otherwise, the donation shall be void.
FACTS:
As the Court ruled in Moreño-Lentfer v. Wolff, a donation must
On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a
comply with the mandatory formal requirements set forth by law
complaint for nullification of deed of donation, rescission of
for its validity. When the subject of donation is purchase money,
contract and reconveyance of real property with damages against
Article
petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman Catholic
748 of the NCC is applicable. Accordingly, the donation of money
Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic
as well as its acceptance should be in writing. Otherwise, the
Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court. In their
donation is invalid for non-compliance with the formal requisites
complaint, private respondents alleged that on August 23, 1930,
prescribed by law.
the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now both
deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of therein
The respondents’ statement that they paid for Esperanza’s
defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel
obligations because they wanted to help her did not contradict an
of land, located at Kawit, Cavite, containing an area of 964 square
understanding for the return of the claimed amounts. Clearly, the
meters, more or less. The deed of donation allegedly provides that
aid then needed by Esperanza was for the immediate production
the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of
of the money that could pay for her obligations to the GSIS and
one hundred years from the execution of the deed of donation,
effect transfer of title, in order that her payments and interest over
otherwise a violation of such condition would render ipso facto
the property would not be forfeited. The help accorded by the
null and void the deed of donation and the property would revert
respondents corresponded to such need.
to the estate of the donors.
It did not follow that the respondents could no longer be allowed
to later demand the repayment. In disputing the claim against her,
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still
Esperanza imputed deceit upon the respondents and claimed that
within the prohibitive period to dispose of the property, petitioner
they misled her into their real intention behind the payment of her
Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration all
obligations and possession of TCT No. T-636804. Deceit, however,
properties within the province of Cavite owned by the Archdiocese
is a serious charge which must be proven by more than just bare
of Manila was allegedly transferred on April 26, 1962, executed a
allegations.
deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the donation in
Although the Court affirms the trial and appellate courts' ruling
favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in
that, first, there was no donation in this case and, second, the
consideration of the sum of P114,000. 00. As a consequence of the
respondents are entitled to a return of the amounts which they
sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 115990 was issued by the
spent for the subject property, it still cannot sustain the
Register of Deeds of Cavite on November 15, 1980 in the name of
respondents' plea for Esperanza's full conveyance of the subject
said petitioner spouses.
property. To impose the property's transfer to the respondents'
names would totally disregard Esperanza's interest and the
The trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the
payments which she made for the property's purchase. Thus, the
ground that the cause of action has prescribed. Respondent Court
principal amount to be returned to the respondents shall only
of Appeals, holding that the action has not yet prescribed,
pertain to the amounts that they actually paid or spent. The Court
rendered a decision in favor of private respondents.
finds no cogent reason to disturb the trial court's resolve to
require in its Decision dated December 15, 2009, around four
ISSUE:
years after the sums were paid for the subject property's
acquisition and renovation, the immediate return of the borrowed
Whether or not the cause of action of private respondents has
amounts.
already prescribed. (NO)
61
RULING:
Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action respondents may not be dismissed by reason of prescription, the
for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) same should be dismissed on the ground that private respondents
years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, have no cause of action against petitioners.
the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation
involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the The cause of action of private respondents is based on the alleged
property donated in case of violation of the condition therein, breach by petitioners of the resolutory condition in the deed of
hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary. donation that the property donated should not be sold within a
period of one hundred (100) years from the date of execution of
In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the the deed of donation. Said condition, in our opinion, constitutes an
rule that a judicial action for rescission of a contract is not undue restriction on the rights arising from ownership of
necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to public policy.
cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. It called
attention to the holding that there is nothing in the law that Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective
prohibits the parties from entering into an agreement that a transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee.
violation of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute
even without court intervention, and that it is not always owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose
necessary for the injured party to resort to court for rescission of certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be
the contract. It reiterated the doctrine that a judicial action is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public
proper only when there is absence of a special provision granting policy. The condition imposed in the deed of donation in the case
the power of cancellation. before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue
restriction on the right of the donee to dispose of the property
It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts donated, which right is an indispensable attribute of ownership.
involved therein, but we see no reason why the same should not Such a prohibition against alienation, in order to be valid, must not
apply to the donation in the present case. Article 732 of the Civil be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time.
Code provides that donations inter vivos shall be governed by the Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid
general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not policy may be considered applicable by analogy. Under the third
determined in Title III, Book III on donations. Now, said Title III paragraph of Article 494, a donor or testator may prohibit
does not have an explicit provision on the matter of a donation partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty (20) years.
with a resolutory condition and which is subject to an express Article 870, on its part, declares that the dispositions of the
provision that the same shall be considered ipso factorevoked testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than
upon the breach of said resolutory condition imposed in the deed twenty (20) years are void.
therefor, as is the case of the deed presently in question. The
suppletory application of the foregoing doctrinal rulings to the It is significant that the provisions therein regarding a testator also
present controversy is consequently justified. necessarily involve, in the main, the devolution of property by
gratuitous title hence, as is generally the case of donations, being
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for an act of liberality, the imposition of an unreasonable period of
automatic revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for prohibition to alienate the property should be deemed anathema
purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract to the basic and actual intent of either the donor or testator. For
already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for that reason, the regulatory arm of the law is or must be interposed
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to to prevent an unreasonable departure from the normative policy
determine whether or not the rescission was proper. When a deed expressed in the aforesaid Articles 494 and 870 of the Code.
of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic
revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules on In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of
contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and donation against the alienation of the property for an entire
not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an
authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, integral attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or
clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of
customs, public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said statutory
at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for provision, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. No
automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior reliance may accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph
judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the in the deed of donation. The net result is that, absent said
determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where proscription, the deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause
such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely of action for the nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth
declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory violative of the latter hence, for lack of cause of action, the case for
act. private respondents must fail.
On the foregoing ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals committed PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by
no error in holding that the cause of action of herein private GOVERNOR LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR.,
respondents has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a Petitioner,-versus- BODEGA GLASSWARE, represented by
written contract prescribes in ten (10) years. It is our view that its owner JOSEPH D. CABRAL, Respondent.
Article 764 was intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of G.R. No. 194199, THIRD DIVISION, March 22, 2017, JARDELEZA, J.
non-fulfillment or contravention of conditions specified in the
deed of donation if and when the parties have not agreed on the We explained in De Luna that Article 1306 of the Civil Code
automatic revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of the allows the parties "to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
contingency contemplated therein. That is not the situation in the and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are
case at bar. not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
62
policy." In contracts law, parties may agree to give one or both that of the thing donated x x x. " This Court found that the donation
of them the right to rescind a contract unilaterally. This is akin to in
an automatic revocation clause in an onerous donation. The De Luna was onerous as it required the donee to build a chapel, a
jurisprudence on automatic rescission in the field of contracts nursery, and a kindergarten. We then went on to explain that an
law therefore applies in an automatic revocation clause. onerous donation is governed by the law on contracts and not by
When CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it breached the the law on donations. It is within this context that this Court found
first and second conditions. Thus, as petitioner validly an automatic revocation clause as valid.
considered the donation revoked and CASTEA never contested
it, the property donated effectively reverted back to it as owner. We explained in De Luna that Article 1306 of the Civil Code allows
In demanding the return of the property, petitioner sources its the parties "to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
right of possession on its ownership. Under Article 428 of the conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
Civil Code, the owner has a right of action against the holder and contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
possessor of the thing in order to recover it. policy." In contracts law, parties may agree to give one or both of
them the right to rescind a contract unilaterally. This is akin to an
FACTS: automatic revocation clause in an onerous donation. The
jurisprudence on automatic rescission in the field of contracts law
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in therefore applies in an automatic revocation clause.
Peñafrancia, Naga City. On September 28, 1966, petitioner donated
around 600 square meters thereof to the Camarines Sur Teachers' Hence, in De Luna, we applied our rulings in University of the
Association, Inc. (CASTEA) through a Deed of Donation Inter Philippines v. De las Angeles and Angeles v. Calasanz where
Vivas. The Deed of Donation included an automatic revocation we held that an automatic rescission clause effectively rescinds the
clause. CASTEA accepted the donation. contract upon breach without need of any judicial declaration.
Later, CASTEA leased the property to Bodega. The Provincial Legal We, however, clarified that the other party may contest the
Officer requested Bodega to show any legal document as legal extrajudicial rescission in court in case of abuse or error by the
basis for his possession. Bodega failed to present any proof. rescinder. It is only in this case where a judicial resolution of the
Nevertheless, petitioner left Bodega undisturbed and merely issue becomes necessary.
tolerated its possession of the property. Few years after,
petitioner, thru a letter, demanded that Bodega vacate the Applying this to the automatic revocation clause, we ruled in De
property and surrender its peaceful possession. Bodega refused to Luna that:
comply with the demand.
It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for
Petitioner asserted that CASTEA violated the conditions in the purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract
Deed of Donation when it leased the property to Bodega. Thus, already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for
invoking the automatic revocation clause in the Deed of Donation, rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to
petitioner revoked, annulled and declared void the Deed of determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
Donation. CASTEA never challenged this revocation.
While the ruling in De Luna applied specifically to onerous
Petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against Bodega donations with an automatic revocation clause, we extended this
before the MTC Naga City. The MTC Naga City ruled in favor of the doctrine to apply to donations inter vivas in general in Roman
petitioner. Bodega appealed this Decision to the RTC Naga City Catholic Archbishop of Manila. We explained in this case that
which reversed it. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC Naga City Article 732 of the Civil Code states that the general provisions on
that the petitioner cannot demand that Bodega vacate the obligations and contracts shall govern donations inter vivas in all
property. The CA theorized that judicial intervention is necessary matters not determined in Title III, Book III on donations. Title III
to ascertain if the automatic revocation clause suffices to declare has no explicit provisions for instances where a donation has an
the donation revoked. automatic revocation clause. Thus, the rules in contracts law
regarding automatic rescission of contracts as well as the
ISSUE: jurisprudence explaining it find suppletory application. We then
reiterated in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila that where a
Whether or not the automatic revocation clause suffices to declare donation has an automatic revocation clause, the occurrence of the
the donation revoked (YES) condition agreed to by the parties as to cause the revocation, is
sufficient for a party to consider the donation revoked without
RULING: need of any judicial action. A judicial finding that the revocation is
proper is only necessary when the other party actually goes to
This Court has affirmed the validity of an automatic revocation court for the specific purpose of challenging the propriety of the
clause in donations in the case of De revocation. Nevertheless, even in such a case, "xxx the decision of
Luna v. Abrigo promulgated in 1990. We explained the nature of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not
automatic revocation clauses by first identifying the three in itself the revocatory act." We also explained in this case that in
categories of donation. In De Luna, we said that a donation may ascertaining the prescription of actions arising from an automatic
be simple, revocation clause in donations, the general provisions on
remuneratory or onerous. A donation is simple when the cause is prescription under the Civil Code apply. Article 764, which
the donor's pure liberality. It is provides for a four-year prescriptive period to file an action to
remuneratory when the donor "gives something to reward past or revoke the donation in case of breach of a condition, governs an
future services or because of future charges or burdens, when the instance where the deed of donation does not contain an
value of said services, burdens or charges is less than the value of automatic revocation clause.
the donation." A donation is onerous when it is "subject to
burdens, charges, or future services equal (or more) in value than In this case, the Deed of Donation identifies three conditions for
the donation: (1) that the property shall be used for "no other
63
The last clause of this paragraph states that "otherwise, this Later, Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning, transferring
donation shall be deemed automatically revoked x x x." We read and conveying to her son David her undivided one-half interest on
the final clause of this provision as an automatic revocation clause all the parcels of land subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial
which pertains to all three conditions of the donation. When Settlement. Helen executed another document, a Deed of
CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it breached the first and Quitclaim, confirming the earlier deed of quitclaim. David executed
second conditions. a Special Power of Attorney where he acknowledged that he
became the owner of the parcels of land subject of the Deed of
Thus, as petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and Quitclaim executed by Helen, and empowered Atty. Lolita G. Abela
CASTEA never contested it, the property donated effectively to sell or otherwise dispose of the lots.
reverted back to it as owner. In demanding the return of the
property, petitioner sources its right of possession on its The Government filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos
ownership. Under Article 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has a Bulacan a Petition for Escheat praying that one-half of David's
right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in interest in each of the subject parcels of land be forfeited in its
order to recover it. favor. The trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of
respondents.
This right of possession prevails over Bodega's claim which is
anchored on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA. CASTEA's act of In the instant petition, the Government asserts that David, being
leasing the property to Bodega, in breach of the conditions stated an American citizen, could not validly acquire one-half interest in
in the Deed of Donation, is the very same act which caused the each of the subject parcels of land by way of the two deeds of
automatic revocation of the donation. Thus, it had no right, either quitclaim as they are in reality donations inter vivos. It reasons out
as an owner or as an authorized administrator of the property to that the elements of donation are present in the conveyance made
lease it to Bodega. While a lessor need not be the owner of the by Helen in favor of David: first, Helen consented to the execution
property leased, he or she must, at the very least, have the of the documents; second, the dispositions were made in public
authority to lease it out. None exists in this case. Bodega finds no documents; third, David manifested his acceptance of the donation
basis for its continued possession of the property. in the Special Power of Attorney he executed in favor of Atty. Lolita
G. Abela; fourth, the deeds were executed with the intention of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- benefiting David; and lastly, there was a resultant decrease in the
DAVID REY GUZMAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, assets or patrimony of Helen, being the donor.
LOLITA G. ABELA, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
BULACAN, MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH, Respondents. ISSUE:
G.R. No. 132964, SECOND DIVISION, February 18, 2000, Whether or not there was a valid donation (NO)
BELLOSILLO, J.
RULING:
Thus, in Santos v. Robledo we emphasized that when the deed
of donation is recorded in the registry of property the document There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the
that evidences the acceptance — if this has not been made in reduction of the patrimony of the donor;
the deed of gift — should also be recorded. And in one or both (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent
documents, as the case may be, the notification of the to do an act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a
acceptance as formally made to the donor or donors should be donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that
duly set forth. Where the deed of donation fails to show the the donation be made in a public document and that there should
acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance made be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of donation or in
in a separate instrument is either not given to the donor or else a separate public document. In cases where the acceptance is made
noted in the deed of donation, and in the separate acceptance, in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor should be
the donation is null and void. notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both
These requisites, definitely prescribed by law, have not been instruments.
complied with, and no proof of compliance appears in the record.
The two quitclaim deeds set out the conveyance of the parcels Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable property are
of land by Helen in favor of David but its acceptance by David present in the instant case. The transfer of the property by virtue
does not appear in the deeds, nor in the Special Power of of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen resulted in the
Attorney. Further, the records reveal no other instrument that reduction of her patrimony as donor and the consequent increase
evidences such acceptance and notice thereof to the donor in in the patrimony of David as donee. However, Helen's intention to
an authentic manner. Therefore, the provisions of the law not perform an act of liberality in favor of David was not sufficiently
having been complied with, there was no effective conveyance established. A perusal of the two (2) deeds of quitclaim reveals
of the parcels of land by way of donation inter vivos.
that Helen intended to convey to her son David certain parcels of
land located in the Philippines, and to re-affirm the quitclaim she
64
executed in 1981 which likewise declared a waiver and valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her
renunciation of her rights over the parcels of land. The language of share of the inheritance when she, together with David, executed
the deed of quitclaim is clear that Helen merely contemplated a a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman
waiver of her rights, title and interest over the lands in favor of on 29 December 1970. By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement,
David, and not a donation. That a donation was far from Helen's the parcels of land were registered in her and her son's name in
mind is further supported by her deposition which indicated that undivided equal share and for eleven years they possessed the
she was aware that a donation of the parcels of land was not lands in the concept of owner.
possible since Philippine law does not allow such an arrangement. Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides that “the acceptance or
She reasoned that if she really intended to donate something to repudiation of an inheritance, once made is irrevocable and cannot
David it would have been more convenient if she sold the property be impugned, except when it was made through any of the causes
and gave him the proceeds therefrom. It appears that foremost in that vitiate consent or when an unknown will appears.” Thus,
Helen's mind was the preservation of the Bulacan realty within the Helen cannot belatedly execute an instrument which has the effect
bloodline of Simeon from where they originated, over and above of revoking or impugning her previous acceptance of her one-half
the benefit that would accrue to David by reason of her share of the subject property from Simeon's estate.
renunciation. The element of animus donandi therefore was
missing. Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto
operate to convert the parcels of land into res nullius to be
Likewise, the two deeds of quitclaim executed by Helen may have escheated in favor of the Government. The repudiation being of no
been in the nature of a public document but they lack the essential effect whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to their private
element of acceptance in the proper form required by law to make owner, Helen, who, although being an American citizen, is
the donation valid. We find no merit in petitioner's argument that qualified by hereditary succession to own the property subject of
the Special Power of Attorney executed by David in favor of Atty. the litigation.
Lolita G. Abela manifests his implied acceptance of his mother's
alleged donation as a scrutiny of the document clearly evinces the SPS. AGRIPINO GESTOPA and ISABEL SILARIO GESTOPA,
absence thereof. The Special Power of Attorney merely Petitioners, -versus- COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDES
acknowledges that David owns the property referred to and that DANLAG y PILAPIL, Respondents.
he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name. There is no
intimation, expressly or impliedly, that David's acquisition of the G.R. No. 111904, SECOND DIVISION, October 5, 2000,
parcels of land is by virtue of Helen's possible donation to him and QUISUMBING, J.
we cannot look beyond the language of the document to make a
contrary construction as this would be inconsistent with the parol Note first that the granting clause shows that Diego donated the
evidence rule. properties out of love and affection for the donee. This is a mark
of a donation inter vivos. Second, the reservation of lifetime
Moreover, it is mandated that if an acceptance is made in a usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked
separate public writing the notice of the acceptance must be noted ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by the Court
not only in the document containing the acceptance, but also in the of Appeals, what was the need for such reservation if the donor
deed of donation. Commenting on Art. 633 of the Civil Code from and his spouse remained the owners of the properties? Third,
whence Art. 749 came, Manresa said: "If the acceptance does not the donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in
appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Solemn accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor
words are not necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the intention to intended to part with the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee
accept . . . . it is necessary that formal notice thereof be given to the accepted the donation. In the case of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78
donor, and the fact that due notice has been given must be noted SCRA 245 (1977), we said that an acceptance clause is a mark
in both instruments. Then and only then is the donation perfected. that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for
donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form
Thus, in Santos v. Robledo we emphasized that when the deed of of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during
the donors' lifetime.
donation is recorded in the registry of property the document that
evidences the acceptance — if this has not been made in the deed
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that
of gift — should also be recorded. And in one or both documents,
the right to dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. The
as the case may be, the notification of the acceptance as formally
donor's right to give consent was merely intended to protect his
made to the donor or donors should be duly set forth. Where the
usufructuary interests. In Alejandro, we ruled that a limitation on
deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal
the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership
notice of the acceptance made in a separate instrument is either had passed to the donees and donation was already effective
not given to the donor or else noted in the deed of donation, and in during the donors' lifetime.
the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.
FACTS:
These requisites, definitely prescribed by law, have not been
complied with, and no proof of compliance appears in the record. Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels
The two quitclaim deeds set out the conveyance of the parcels of of unregistered lands. They executed three deeds of donation
land by Helen in favor of David but its acceptance by David does mortis causa in favor of private respondent Mercedes Danlag-
not appear in the deeds, nor in the Special Power of Attorney. Pilapil. The first deed pertained to parcels 1 & 2; the second deed,
Further, the records reveal no other instrument that evidences to parcel 3 and the the last deed, to parcel 4. On January 16, 1973,
such acceptance and notice thereof to the donor in an authentic Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife executed a deed of
manner. Therefore, the provisions of the law not having been donation inter vivos covering the aforementioned parcels of land
complied with, there was no effective conveyance of the parcels of plus two other parcels, again in favor of private respondent
land by way of donation inter vivos. Mercedes. This contained two conditions, that (1) the Danlag
spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their
However, the inexistence of a donation does not render the lifetime, and that (2) the donee cannot sell or dispose of the land
repudiation made by Helen in favor of David valid. There is no
65
during the lifetime of the said spouses, without their prior consent xxx
and approval. That for the same purpose as hereinbefore stated, the Donor
further states that he has reserved for himself sufficient properties
Several years after, Diego and Catalina Danlag sold parcels 3 and 4 in full ownership or in usufruct enough for his maintenance of a
to herein petitioners, Mr. and Mrs. Agripino Gestopa. The Danlags decent livelihood in consonance with his standing in society. That
executed a deed of revocation recovering the six parcels of land the Donee hereby accepts the donation and expresses her thanks
subject of the aforecited deed of donation inter vivos. and gratitude for the kindness and generosity of the Donor."
Mercedes Pilapil filed with the RTC a petition against the Gestopas Note first that the granting clause shows that Diego donated the
and the Danlags, for quieting of title over the above parcels of land. properties out of love and affection for the donee. This is a mark of
She alleged that she was an illegitimate daughter of Diego Danlag; a donation inter vivos. Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct
that she lived and rendered incalculable beneficial services to indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership
Diego and his mother, Maura Danlag, when the latter was still alive. over the properties. As correctly posed by the Court of Appeals,
In recognition of the services she rendered, Diego executed a Deed what was the need for such reservation if the donor and his spouse
of Donation, conveying to her the six (6) parcels of land. She remained the owners of the properties? Third, the donor reserved
accepted the donation in the same instrument, and caused the sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his
transfer of the tax declarations to her name. Said donation inter standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with
vivos was coupled with conditions and, according to Mercedes, the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. In
since its perfection, she had complied with all of them; that she had the case of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1977), we said
not been guilty of any act of ingratitude; and that respondent Diego that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos.
had no legal basis in revoking the subject donation and then in Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations
selling the two parcels of land to the Gestopas. mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be
accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime.
In their opposition, the Gestopas and the Danlags averred that the
deed of donation was null and void because it was obtained by Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that
Mercedes through machinations and undue influence. Even the right to dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. The
assuming it was validly executed, the intention was for the donor's right to give consent was merely intended to protect his
donation to take effect upon the death of the donor. usufructuary interests. In Alejandro, we ruled that a limitation on
the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership
In finding for petitioners, the trial court observed that the had passed to the donees and donation was already effective
reservation clause in all the deeds of donation indicated that Diego during the donors' lifetime. The attending circumstances in the
Danlag did not make any donation; that Mercedes failed to rebut execution of the subject donation also demonstrated the real
the allegations of ingratitude she committed against Diego Danlag; intent of the donor to transfer the ownership over the subject
and that Mercedes committed fraud and machination in preparing properties upon its execution. Prior to the execution of donation
all the deeds of donation without explaining to Diego Danlag their inter vivos, the Danlag spouses already executed three donations
contents. The appellate court reversed the trial court. mortis causa. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the
Danlag spouses were aware of the difference between the two
ISSUE: donations. If they did not intend to donate inter vivos, they would
Whether or not the donation was inter vivos (YES) not again donate the four lots already donated mortis causa.
Petitioners' counter argument that this proposition was erroneous
RULING: because six years after, the spouses changed their intention with
the deed of revocation, is not only disingenious but also fallacious.
Petitioners assert that the donor did not only reserve the right to Petitioners cannot use the deed of revocation to show the spouses'
enjoy the fruits of the properties, but also prohibited the donee intent because its validity is one of the issues in this case.
from selling or disposing the land without the consent and
approval of the Danlag spouses. This implied that the donor still RODOLFO NOCEDA, Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF
had control and ownership over the donated properties. Hence, APPEALS and AURORA ARBIZO DIRECTO, Respondents.
the donation was post mortem.
G.R. No. 119730, THIRD DIVISION, September 2, 1999, GONZAGA-
Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis REYES, J.
causa is the determination of whether the donor intended to
transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of Art. 769 of the New Civil Code states that: "The action granted
the deed. In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in
deed's provisions must be read together. advance. This action prescribes within one year to be counted
from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was
The deed of donation dated January 16, 1973, in favor of Mercedes possible for him to bring the action." As expressly stated, the
contained the following: donor must file the action to revoke his donation within one year
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the from the time he had knowledge of the ingratitude of the donee.
Donor inspires in the Donee and as an act of liberality and Also, it must be shown that it was possible for the donor to
generosity, the Donor hereby gives, donates, transfer and conveys institute the said action within the same period. The concurrence
by way of donation unto the herein Donee, her heirs, assigns and of these two requisites must be shown by defendant Noceda in
successors, the above-described parcels of land; order to bar the present action. Defendant Noceda failed to do
so. He reckoned the one year prescriptive period from the
That it is the condition of this donation that the Donor shall occurrence of the usurpation of the property of plaintiff Directo
continue to enjoy all the fruits of the land during his lifetime and in the first week of September, 1985, and not from the time the
that of his spouse and that the donee cannot sell or otherwise, latter had the knowledge of the usurpation.
dispose of the lands without the prior consent and approval by the Moreover, defendant Noceda failed to prove that at the time
Donor and her spouse during their lifetime. plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it was
66
possible for plaintiff Directo to institute an action for revocation severance of the individual interest of each co-owner, vesting in
of her donation. each a sole estate in specific property and giving to each one a right
to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the
FACTS: other. And one way of effecting a partition of the decedent's estate
is by the heirs themselves extrajudicially.
Plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria
Arbizo, the daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively, of the The heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo namely Maria Arbizo, Aurora
decedent Celestino Arbizo, extrajudicially settled a parcel of land, A. Directo (private respondent) and Rodolfo Noceda (petitioner)
Lot 1121. Plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her share entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate on August 17,
to defendant Noceda, who is her nephew. However, on August 17, 1981 and agreed to adjudicate among themselves the property left
1981, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was by their predecessor-in-interest in the following manner: to
executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Rodolfo Noceda goes the northern one-fifth (1/5) portion
Three fifths of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff containing an area of 5,989 sq. meters; to Maria Arbizo goes the
Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-fifth each. Sometime middle three-fifths (3/5) portion; and To Aurora Arbizo goes the
in 1981, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the land southern one-fifth (1/5) portion.
donated to him by plaintiff Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced the In the survey plan submitted by Engineer Quejada during trial, the
portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding portions indicated by red lines and numbered alphabetically were
the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But in based on the percentage proportion in the extrajudicial settlement
1985, defendant Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by and the actual occupancy of each heir which resulted to these
plaintiff Directo, occupied the three huts and fenced the entire land divisions as follows: Lot A, the area is 12,957 sq.m., goes to Rodolfo
of plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff Directo A. Noceda (1/5); Lot B, 38,872 sq.m., to Maria Arbizo (3/5); and
demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the Lot C, 12,957 sq.m., to Aurora Directo (1/5).
latter refused. Hence, plaintiff Directo filed a complaint for the
recovery of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment Thus, the areas allotted to each heir are now specifically delineated
of donation, against defendant Noceda before the lower court. in the survey plan. There is no co-ownership where portion owned
is concretely determined and identifiable, though not technically
The Regional Trial Court of Zambales rendered a decision: described, or that said portions are still embraced in one and the
declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement- Partition dated August 17, same certificate of title does not make said portions less
1981, valid; Declaring the Deed of Donation, revoked; and ordering determinable or identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the
the defendant to vacate and reconvey that donated portion of Lot other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their
1121 to the plaintiff or her heirs or assigns. Rodolfo Nocedo respective owners. A partition legally made confers upon each heir
appealed to the respondent Court which affirmed the trial court. the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him.
one year prescriptive period from the occurrence of the reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further
usurpation of the property of plaintiff Directo in the first week of proceedings.
September, 1985, and not from the time the latter had the
knowledge of the usurpation. Moreover, defendant Noceda failed Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the same case,
to prove that at the time plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge of seeking the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale affecting the
his usurpation, it was possible for plaintiff Directo to institute an above property, on grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. It
action for revocation of her donation. was alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio to execute the donation
by taking undue advantage of the latter's physical weakness and
ELOY IMPERIAL, Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF APPEALS, mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of said property in favor
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY, CESAR of petitioner impaired the legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural
VILLALON, JR., TERESA VILLALON, ANTONIO VILLALON, brother and predecessor-in-interest. The RTC held the donation to
AUGUSTO VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON, RICARDO be inofficious and impairing the legitime of Victor, on the basis of
VILLALON and ESTHER VILLALON, Respondents. its finding that at the time of Leoncio's death, he left no property
other than the parcel of land which he had donated to petitioner.
G.R. No. 112483, THIRD DIVISION, October 8, 1999, GONZAGA- The trial court likewise held that the applicable prescriptive
REYES, J. period is 30 years under Article 1141 of the Civil Code, reckoned
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation from March 15, 1962, when the writ of execution of the
created by law must be brought within ten years from the time compromise judgment in Civil Case 1177 was issued, and that the
the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period original complaint having been filed in 1986, the action has not yet
applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required prescribed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair
the legitime of compulsory heirs. ISSUE:
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of
Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which involved the reduction Whether or not respondents still have the right to contest the
for inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recognized that donation for being inofficious (NO)
the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death
of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the RULING:
net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes
may be determined It took private respondents 24 years since Petitioner questions the right of private respondents to contest the
the death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The action, therefore, donation. Petitioner sources his argument from Article 772 of the
has long prescribed. Civil Code, thus: “Only those who at the time of the donor's death
have a right to the legitime and their heirs and successors in
FACTS: interest may ask for the reduction of inofficious donations . . . .” As
argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died, it was only Victor who
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a parcel of land, was entitled to question the donation. However, instead of filing
known as Lot 45. He sold the said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged an action to contest the donation, Victor asked to be substituted as
natural son, petitioner herein, who then acquired title over the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1177 and even moved for execution of the
land. compromise judgment therein.
Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the
contract's designation as one of "Absolute No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing
Sale", the transaction was in fact a donation. acts. It must be remembered that at the time of the substitution,
the judgment approving the compromise agreement has already
Barely two years after, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of been rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the
the said Deed of Absolute Sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 1177, on compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise
the ground that he was deceived by petitioner herein into signing agreement.
the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a
compromise agreement, under which terms: (1) Leoncio More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance
recognized the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the tacit repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act
land donated; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated on the part of the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code: “The
portion of the donated land, and to deposit the proceeds thereof in repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic
a bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. instrument, or by petition presented to the court having
jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate proceedings.”
Pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died, leaving
only two heirs — the herein petitioner, and an adopted son, Victor Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon
Imperial. Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the above- the latter's death, his act of moving for execution of the
mentioned case, and it was he who moved for execution of compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of
judgment. The motion for execution was duly granted. renunciation of his legitime. He was, therefore, not precluded or
estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction of the
Fifteen years thereafter, Victor died single and without issue, donation, under Article 772. Neither are Victor's heirs, upon his
survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon. Four years death, precluded from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly
hence, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children, recognized under Article 772, and also in Article 1053: “If the heir
Cesar and Teresa Villalon. should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance,
his right shall be transmitted to his heirs.”
Five years thereafter, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for
annulment of the donation. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the Having ascertained this action as one for reduction of an
ground of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise judgment. The inofficious donation, we cannot sustain the holding of both the trial
trial court granted the motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals court and the Court of Appeals that the applicable prescriptive
period is thirty years, under Article 1141 of the Civil Code, the
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sense of both courts being that this case is a "real action over an classification under the Revised Penal Code is therefore
immovable." unwarranted considering that illegal detention, threats and
coercion are considered as crimes against the person of the
Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against
not amount to a claim of title. In the recent case of Vizconde vs. personal liberty and security under the Revised Penal Code.
Court of Appeals, we declared that what is brought to collation is
not the donated property itself, but the value of the property at the FACTS:
time it was donated. The rationale for this is that the donation is a
real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land. On
hence, any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is April 26, 1984, he executed a deed entitled "Pagbibigay-Pala
for the account of the heir or donee. (Donacion InterVivos)" ceding one-half portion thereof to his niece
Helen
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of S. Doria. On July 26, 1984, another deed identically entitled was
an inofficious donation? The Civil purportedly executed by Pedro Calapine ceding unto Helen S.
Code specifies the following instances of reduction or revocation Doria the whole of the parcel of land, on the basis of which said
of donations: (1) four years, in cases of subsequent birth, original certificate was cancelled, and a new TCT was issued in her
appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; (2) four years, for name.
noncompliance with conditions of the donation; and (3) at any
time during the lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled to On March 25, 1988, Helen S. Doria sold, transferred and conveyed
support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or their unto the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte the subject parcel of
support. Interestingly, donations as in the instant case, the land, save the portion of 700 square meters on which the vendor's
reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of house had been erected, on the basis of which the transfer
legitime, are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for certificate was cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the
which reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription. vendees.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation Claiming that his signature to the deed of donation was a forgery
created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the and that she was unworthy of his liberality, Pedro Calapine
right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period brought suit against Helen S. Doria, and the Spouses Romulo and
applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required Sally Eduarte to revoke the donation made in favor of Helen S.
under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair Doria, and to declare null and void the deed of sale that she had
the legitime of compulsory heirs. executed in favor of the spouses Eduarte.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment, declaring
Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for the revocation of the Deed of Donation dated April 26, 1984; and
inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recognized that the voiding, setting aside and declaring of no force and effect the deed
cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the of absolute sale executed on March 25, 1988 by and between
donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate spouses Eduartes and Helen Doria, and the TCT issued under the
may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be name of spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte. Respondent Court of
determined. Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. It ruled that by
falsifying Pedro Calapine's signature, Helen Doria committed an
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to act of ingratitude which is a valid ground for revocation of the
initiate this case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed. donation made in her favor in accordance with Article 765 of the
Civil Code.
SPOUSES ROMULO AND SALLY EDUARTE, Petitioners, -
versus- ISSUE:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO
CALAPINE (substituted by ALEXANDER CALAPINE and Whether or not the revocation of the donation was proper (YES)
ARTEMIS CALAPINE), Respondents.
RULING:
G.R. No. 105944, THIRD DIVISION, February 9, 1996, FRANCISCO,
J. Anent the revocation of the first deed of donation, petitioners
submit that paragraph (1) of Article 765 of the Civil Code does not
Offense Against Donor. - All crimes which offend the donor show apply in this case because the acts of ingratitude referred to
ingratitude and are causes for revocation. There is no doubt, therein pertain to offenses committed by the donee against the
therefore, that the donee who commits adultery with the wife of person or property of the donor. Petitioners argue that as the
the donor, gives cause for revocation by reason of ingratitude. offense imputed to herein donee Helen Doria - falsification of a
The crimes against the person of the donor would include not public document – is neither a crime against the person nor
only homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal detention, property of the donor but is a crime against public interest under
threats, and coercion; those against honor include offenses the Revised Penal Code, the same is not a ground for revocation.
against chastity; and those against the property, include
robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc. In support of this contention, petitioners cite the following
[Manresa 175-176]. portions found in Tolentino's Commentaries and Jurisprudence on
Obviously, the first sentence was deleted by petitioners because the Civil Code: Offense against Donor - . . . The crimes against the
it totally controverts their contention. person of the donor would include not only homicide and physical
injuries, but also illegal detention, threats and coercion; and those
As noted in the aforecited opinion "all crimes which offend the against honor include offenses against chastity and those against
donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation." the property, include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson,
Petitioners' attempt to categorize the offenses according to their damages, etc. (5 Manresa 175-176).
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This assertion, however, deserves scant consideration. The full Private respondent donated to the City of Angeles 51 parcels of
text of the very same commentary cited by petitioners belies their land situated in City of Angeles, part of a bigger area also belonging
claim that falsification of the deed of donation is not an act of to private respondent. The amended deed provided, among others,
ingratitude, to wit: that:
Offense Against Donor. - All crimes which offend the donor show
ingratitude and are causes for revocation. There is no doubt, 2. The properties donated shall be devoted and utilized solely for
therefore, that the donee who commits adultery with the wife of the site of the Angeles City Sports
the donor, gives cause for revocation by reason of ingratitude. The Center pursuant to the plans to be submitted within six months by
crimes against the person of the donor would include not only the DONEE to the DONOR for the
homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal detention, threats, latter's approval
and coercion; those against honor include offenses against
chastity; and those against the property, include robbery, theft, 3. No commercial building, commercial complex, market or any
usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc. [Manresa 175-176]. other similar complex, mass or tenament (sic)
housing/building(s) shall be constructed in the properties
Obviously, the first sentence was deleted by petitioners because it donated nor shall cockfighting, be allowed in the premises.
totally controverts their contention. As noted in the aforecited xxx xxx xxx
opinion "all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and
are causes for revocation." Petitioners' attempt to categorize the 6. The properties donated shall constitute the entire open space
offenses according to their classification under the Revised Penal for DONOR's subdivision and all other lands or areas previously
Code is therefore unwarranted considering that illegal detention, reserved or designated
threats and coercion are considered as crimes against the person
of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes 8. Any substantial breach of the foregoing provisos shall entitle the
against personal liberty and security under the Revised Penal DONOR to revoke or rescind this Deed of Donation, and in such
Code. eventuality, the DONEE agrees to vacate and return the premises,
together with all improvements, to the DONOR peacefully without
Proceeding to the crucial issue that directly affects herein necessity of judicial action.
petitioners, it is reiterated that petitioners are buyers in good faith
of the donated property, and therefore, it was grave error to annul On July 19, 1988, petitioners started the construction of a drug
and set aside the deed of sale executed between petitioners and rehabilitation center on a portion of the donated land. Upon
donee Helen Doria. learning thereof, private respondent protested such action for
being violative of the terms and conditions of the amended deed.
When herein petitioners purchased the subject property from However, petitioners ignored the protest, maintaining that the
Helen Doria, the same was already covered by TCT No. T-23205 construction was not violative of the terms of the donation.
under the latter's name. And although Helen Doria's title was
fraudulently secured, such fact cannot prejudice the rights of Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
herein petitioners absent any showing that they had any against the petitioners, alleging breach of the conditions imposed
knowledge or participation in such irregularity. Thus, they cannot in the amended deed of donation and seeking the revocation of the
be obliged to look beyond the certificate of title which appeared to donation and damages.
be valid on its face and sans any annotation or notice of private
respondents' adverse claim. Contrary therefore to the conclusion In ruling for private respondent, the trial court first opined that
of respondent there is no inconsistency between the conditions imposed in the
Court, petitioners are purchasers in good faith and for value as Deeds of Donation and the provision of the Subdivision Ordinance
they bought the disputed property without notice that some other of the City of Angeles requiring subdivisions in Angeles City to
person has a right or interest in such property, and paid a full price reserve at least one (1) hectare in the subdivision as suitable sites
for the same at the time of the purchase or before they had notice known as open spaces for parks, playgrounds, playlots and/or
of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. other areas to be rededicated to public use. On the other hand, the
term "public use'" in the Subdivision Ordinance should not be
THE CITY OF ANGELES, Hon. ANTONIO ABAD SANTOS, in construed to include a Drug Rehabilitation Center as that would be
his capacity as MAYOR of Angeles City, and the contrary to the primary purpose of the Subdivision Ordinance
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF THE CITY OF requiring the setting aside of a portion known as "Open Space" for
ANGELES, Petitioners, -versus COURT OF APPEALS and park, playground and playlots, since these are intended primarily
TIMOG SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, for the benefit of the residents of the subdivision.
Respondents.
Thus, the RTC, enjoined the petitioners to perpetually cease and
G.R. No. 97882, THIRD DIVISION, August 28, 1996, PANGANIBAN, desist from constructing a Drug Rehabilitation Center or any other
J. building or improvement on the Donated Land, as well as declared
the amended Deed of Donation revoked and rescinded and
We hold that any condition may be imposed in the donation, so ordering defendants to peacefully vacate and return the Donated
long as the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, Land to plaintiff, together with all the improvements existing
public order or public policy. The contention of petitioners that thereon. The respondent Court affirmed the ruling of the trial
the donation should be unconditional because it is mandatory court.
has no basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not provide that the donation
the open space for parks and playgrounds should be ISSUE:
unconditional. To rule that it should be so is tantamount to
unlawfully expanding the provisions of the decree. Whether or not the revocation of the donation was proper (NO)
FACTS: RULING:
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Petitioners argue that since the private respondent is required by The private respondent contends that the building of said drug
law to donate the parks and playgrounds, it has no right to impose rehabilitation center is violative of the Amended Deed of Donation.
the condition in the Amended Deed of Donation that "the Therefore, under Article 764 of the New Civil Code and stipulation
properties donated shall be devoted and utilized solely for the site no. 8 of the amended deed, private respondent is empowered to
of the Angeles City Sports Center." revoke the donation when the done has failed to comply with any
of the conditions imposed in the deed.
It cannot prescribe any condition as to the use of the area donated
because the use of the open spaces is already governed by P.D. We disagree. Article 1412 of the Civil Code comes into play here. It
1216. In other words, the donation should be absolute. provides that if the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause
Consequently, the conditions in the amended deed which were consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules
allegedly violated are deemed not written. shall be observed: (1) When the fault is on the part of both
However, the general law on donations does not prohibit the contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by
imposition of conditions on a donation so long as the conditions virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's
are not illegal or impossible. undertaking x x x
Both petitioners and private respondents are in violation of P.D.
In regard to donations of open spaces, P.D. 1216 itself requires 957 as amended, for donating and accepting a donation of open
among other things that the recreational areas to be donated be space less than that required by law, and for agreeing to build and
based, as aforementioned, on a percentage (3.5% 7%, or 9%) of operate a sports complex on the non-buildable open space so
the total area of the subdivision depending on whether the donated; and petitioners, for constructing a drug rehabilitation
division is low —, medium —, or high density. center on the same non-buildable area.
It further declares that such open space devoted to parks, Moreover, since the condition to construct a sport complex on the
playgrounds and recreational areas are non-alienable public land donated land has previously been shown to be contrary to law,
and non-buildable. However, there is no prohibition in either P.D. therefore, stipulation no. 8 of the amended deed cannot be
957 or P.D. 1216 against imposing conditions on such donation. implemented because (1) no valid stipulation of the amended deed
had been breached, and (2) it is highly improbable that the decree
We hold that any condition may be imposed in the donation, so would have allowed the return of the donated land for open space
long as the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, under any circumstance, considering the non-alienable character
public order or public policy. The contention of petitioners that the of such open space, in the light of the second Whereas clause of
donation should be unconditional because it is mandatory has no P.D. 1216 which declares that . . . such open spaces, roads, alleys
basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not provide that the donation the open and sidewalks in residential subdivisions are for public use and
space for parks and playgrounds should be unconditional. To rule are, therefore, beyond the commerce of men.
that it should be so is tantamount to unlawfully expanding the
provisions of the decree. Further, as a matter of public policy, private respondent cannot be
allowed to evade its statutory obligation to donate the required
In the case at bar, one of the conditions imposed in the Amended open space through the expediency of invoking petitioners breach
Deed of Donation is that the done should build a sports complex of the aforesaid condition. There is therefore no legal basis
on the donated land. Since P.D. 1216 clearly requires that the 3.5% whatsoever to revoke the donation of the subject open space and
to 9% of the gross area allotted for parks and playgrounds is "non- to return the donated land to private respondent. The donated
buildable", then the obvious question arises whether or not such land should remain with the donee as the law clearly intended
condition was validly imposed and is binding on the donee. It is such open spaces to be perpetually part of the public domain, non-
clear that the "non-buildable" character applies only to the 3.5% alienable and permanently devoted to public use as such parks,
to 9% area set by law. If there is any excess land over and above playgrounds or recreation areas.
the 3.5% to 9% required by the decree, which is also used or
allocated for parks, playgrounds and recreational purposes, it is
obvious that such excess area is not covered by the non-
buildability restriction. In the instant case, if there be an excess,
then the donee would not be barred from developing and