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Erlinda Agapay v. Carlina Palang and Herminia Dela Cruz
Erlinda Agapay v. Carlina Palang and Herminia Dela Cruz
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with Carlina Palang on July 16, 1949. He
then left to Hawaii for work.
When he returned in the Philippines for good, he did not return to Carlina. He contracted
his second marriage with 19-year old Erlinda Agapay and this produced a son,
Kristopher Palang. Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land
which was followed by a house and lot but the latter was solely under Erlinda.
Miguel and Carlina executed a deed of donation regarding their conjugal property
consisting of six parcels of land to their only Child Herminia. However, Miguel and
Erlinda were still convicted of concubinage. Two years after, Miguel died.
Carlina and Heminia instituted the case at bar to recover the ownership and possession,
with damages against petitioner, the rice land and the house and lot purchased during
Erlina and Miguels cohabitation.
The trial court dismissed this complaint due to lack of evidence proving that the subject
properties pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel. It also went to
provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Kristopher. However, CA
reversed this ruling which resulted to this petition by Elinda.
Issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the validity of two deeds of
absolute sale covering the riceland and the house and lot, first in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda and the second, in favor of Erlinda alone.
Whether CA erred in not declaring Kristopher as Miguel illegitimate son and thus,
entitled to inherit from Miguel’s estate.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
The marriage contracted by Miguel and Erlinda was patently void because the earlier marriage
of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation. Art.
148 of the Family Code, which is the applicable provision for cases of cohabitation of a man and
a woman who are both legally capacitated, provides that properties acquired by both parties
through actual and joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Here, Erlinda failed to persuade the
Court that she actually contributed money to buy the subject rice land. The Court found it
unrealistic that at a young age, she will be able to contribute P3750 as her share in the
purchase price of subject property despite having being engaged in buy and sell and owning a
sari-sari store. Further, Erlinda’s claim that the rice land was bought 2 months prior to
cohabitation cannot prosper because proof of actual contribution is still required. The rice land
should revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and PR Carlina.
With respect to the house and lot, it was testified by Atty. Constantino Sagun thar Miguel
provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlind’s name alone be placed as
the vendee. This donation is void and inexistent because it was made between person guilty of
adultery or concubinage as provided under Art. 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Art. 87 of the
Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.
With regard to Kristopher Palang's status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel's
estate is here resolved in favor of respondent court's correct assessment that the trial court
erred in making pronouncements regarding Kristopher's heirship and filiation "inasmuch as
questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and
the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper
probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in
the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession."1