V1 - 150. PEOPLE Vs BALDERA
V1 - 150. PEOPLE Vs BALDERA
506868732.docx
EN BANC
REYES, J.:
We are called upon to review the sentence of death passed upon the appellant Pedro Baldera,
who was found guilty of robbery in band with homicide and serious and less serious physical
injuries by the Court of First Instance of Batangas.
The evidence shows that at about 4 a.m. on December 23, 1947, a Casa Manila bus loaded with
passenger left Batangas, bound for Manila. On the highway in barrio Calansayan, municipality
of San Jose, same province, it was held up by a group of five or six armed men. One of these,
later identified as herein appellant Pedro Baldera, who was then armed with a .45 caliber pistol,
fired a shot, and this was followed by a hail of bullets coming from different directions. As a
result, several passengers, among them Jose Cabrera, Jose Pastor and Francisco Mendoza, were
wounded. After the firing had ceased, appellant got on the bus and, threatening the passengers
with his gun, took P90 from Jose Pastor and P34 from Ponciana Villena. Another passenger
named Francisco Mendoza was also relieved of his P3. Appellant then alighted and ordered the
bus to proceed, whereupon the driver headed for the municipal building of San Jose and there
reported the incident to the authorities. The wounded were taken to the hospital, where Jose
Cabrera died from his wounds on the following day. Jose Pastor, who was wounded in the left
leg, was cured in two months, while Francisco Mendoza's gunshot wound in the right shoulder
healed in 15 days.
For the above crime four persons were prosecuted and tried under an information charging
"robo en cuadrilla con homicidio y lesiones graves y lesiones menos graves." The case was
dismissed as to two of the accused due to insufficiency of evidence. But the other two, Pedro
Baldera and Miguel Blay, were, after trial, found guilty as charged and sentenced, the first to
capital punishment, and the second to life imprisonment, both to pay the corresponding
indemnity and proportionate costs.
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There is no dispute as to the perpetration of the crime. The only question is as to the
identification of this appellant as one of the authors thereof. On this point the evidence for the
prosecution shows that shortly after the commission of this crime, appellant was arrested in the
municipality of Batangas in connection with the theft of a radio, and as his features tallied with
the personal description of one of the highway men given to the chief of police by some of the
passengers of the held-up bus, he was also investigated in connection with the hold-up, and he
then made a confession, which was reduced to writing and later subscribed by him before the
justice of the peace, admitting his participation in the crime as the one who, armed with a
pistol, boarded the bus and though intimidation relieved Ponciana Villena of her money.
At the trial, Ponciana also identified appellant as the one who relieved her of her money at
gunpoint, saying that she had a good look at his face for she was watching him closely for fear
that he might fire at her. She also declared that when she was sent for by the chief of police to
identify appellant, the latter approached her as she came into the office of said officer and
asked her forgiveness. Two other passengers of the bus declared at the trial that appellant
resembles the one who stopped the bus and robbed its passengers.
Testifying in his own defense, appellant denies participation in the crime charged, declaring
that he passed the night in question in a house of prostitution in Batangas, where he was
employed by the prostitutes for drawing water. But this alibi is without corroboration and can
not stand up against the clear and positive testimony of Ponciano Villena, who has not shown
to have any motive for falsely testifying against him.
Counsel de oficio impugns the admissibility of appellant's confession on the ground that the
same was made on a promise to render him protection from his co-accused and also to utilize
him as a government witness. But appellant himself denied that such a promise was ever made
and the record shows that, when the confession was offered in evidence, it was objected to the
sole ground that "it was taken through force and intimidation," which, however, was not
proved. Moreover, this court has already held that "where one of several codefendants turns
state's evidence on a promise of immunity ... but later retracts and fails to keep his part of the
agreement, his confession made under such promise may then be used against him." (People
vs. Panaligan and Andulan, 43 Phil., 131.) In any event, even without the said confession, we
find that appellant's participation in the crime herein charged has been clearly and satisfactorily
proved.
Counsel also contends that the lower court erred in holding that the crime committed is
robbery in band, alleging that there was no sufficient proof that the perpetrators thereof
numbered more than three armed men. The fact, however, that there were more than three
armed men in the group that held up the bus appears in appellant's own confession and is also
established by the uncontradicted testimony of one of the government witnesses. And the
point is really not material because in the crime of robbery with homicide it is not essential that
the robbery be in band, although that circumstance may be taken into account as an
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aggravation in the imposition of the penalty. And even if it be not be taken into account as such
in this case, there would still remain the other aggravating circumstance that the robbery was
perpetrated by attacking a vehicle (art. 295, R. P. C.), which is not offset by any mitigating
circumstance.
The lower court did, however, err in appreciating against the accused the circumstance of
recidivism by reason of his previous conviction for theft, it appearing that crime was committed
on or about December 30, 1947 (Exhibit E) while the offense now charged took place seven
days before that date.
In conclusion, we find appellant guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious and
less serious physical injuries with two aggravating circumstances. But there being no sufficient
vote to impose the extreme penalty, appellant can be sentenced to life imprisonment only.
Wherefore, reducing appellant's sentence to life imprisonment but increasing the indemnity to
be paid by him to the heirs of the deceased Jose Cabrera to P6,000, the judgement below as so
modified is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuazon, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.