G.R. No.

90482               August 5, 1991 1. To render a correct and faithful account of whatever amount of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through the SUGAR United States dollar accounts/deposits in different banks, domestic and
REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION, and REPUBLIC PLANTERS foreign, being held in agents and/or representatives.
BANK, petitioners, 2. To render a correct and faithful inventory of all the physical sugar
vs. stocks for crop year 1984-85 presently remaining in the warehouses of
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 15th Division, THE the different sugar mills all over the country.
HONORABLE CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her official capacity as 3. To deliver or remit to the Plaintiffs any and all United States dollar
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital accounts/deposits in various banks, domestic or foreign, held in the
Region, Branch 26, Manila, JORGE C. VICTORINO and JAIME K. name of Defendants, their subsidiaries, conducts (sic), agents and/or
DEL ROSARIO, in their official capacities as RTC Deputy Sheriffs representatives.
of Manila, ROGER Z. REYES, ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR., and 4. To deliver the entire remaining physical sugar stocks corresponding
EUTIQUIO M. FUDOLIN, respondents. to crop year 1984-85 presently remaining in the warehouses of the
different sugar mills all over the country in favor of Plaintiffs who were
Enrique V. Olmedo for Independent Sugar Farmers, Inc. unlawfully deprived of their possession and control by Defendants, to
Reyes, Treyes & Fudolin Law Firm for respondents. be applied and deducted from Defendant's liability to Plaintiffs for the
unaccounted sugar for crop year 1984-85.
DAVIDE, JR., J.: 5. To jointly and severally pay Plaintiffs-Producers all interests and
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of penalties imposed by Assignee-banks/creditors for accounts covered
Court, with prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of by unpaid sugar quedans for crop year 1984-85.
preliminary injunction, filed on 25 October 1989 by the Office of the 6. To jointly and severally pay Plaintiffs claims for moral, compensatory
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) in behalf of the Republic of and exemplary damages in such accounts to be determined in the
the Philippines "acting through the Sugar Regulatory Administration" course of the trial.
(SRA) and the Republic Planters Bank (RPB) seeking the review of the 7. To jointly and severally pay for the attorney's fees of twenty percent
13 October 1989 Decision of the Court of Appeals (15th Division) in (20%) based on the total amount that may be recovered.
CAGR No. 17188. 8. To jointly and severally pay for the costs and litigation expenses
incurred by the Plaintiffs.
The assailed decision1 dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Plaintiffs likewise pray that, in order to prevent grave and irreparable
Petitioners against herein public respondents Judge and deputy injury, this Honorable Court shall issue a writ of preliminary injunction
sheriffs and private respondents for the nullification of the Orders of enjoining and/or prohibiting the Defendants, their officers and/or agents
respondent Judge of 13 March 1989, 21 March 1989 and 27 March from transferring, releasing or in any manner disposing of all U.S.
1989 in Civil Case No. 86-35880 of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial dollar deposits/accounts held in the name of Defendants, its
Court of Manila on the following grounds: (a) the funds upon which the subsidiaries, conduits agents and/or representatives in the different
attorney's fees are sought to be executed now belong to the Republic banks, domestic and foreign, including the physical sugar
of the Philippines due to legal subrogation, (b) execution is not proper corresponding to crop year 1984-85 presently remaining in the
against the Republic which is not a party to the case, (c) the issuance warehouses of the different sugar mills all over the country after
of a writ of execution would violate the Constitution since according to requiring the Plaintiffs to post a bond that may be determined by the
it no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance to an Honorable Court to answer for the damages in the event judgment will
appropriations made by law, and (d) execution for attomey's fees is be rendered in Defendant's favor. Furthermore, Plaintiffs pray that a
unwarranted. Restraining Order be immediately issued for the purpose of enjoining
the Defendants from committing and/or proceeding with the foregoing
Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit acts, pending hearing of the application for a writ of preliminary
principally because injunction.
(a) Under the compromise agreement petitioner (RPB) accepted the Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies, just and
designation/appointment as Trustee whose obligation is to pay; it equitable under the premises.
received benefits by way of trustee's fees; it may not question the right Before PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA could answer, a Compromise
of private respondents to attorney's fees; Agreement dated May 23, 1986 was submitted by the parties which the
(b) Petitioner (SRA) may not lawfully bring an action on behalf of the lower court approved and based on it, the Judgment dated June
Republic of the Philippines since under Section 13 of Executive Order 2,1986 (Annex "B", Petition, Id., pp. 22-36) was issued. A motion for
No. 18 dated 28 May 1986, which created it, it simply was to take over the issuance of writ of execution was filed (Annex "C", Petition, Id., pp,
the functions of the defunct PHILSUCOM; however, the latter was to 37-50). PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA filed their "Comment and
remain a judicial entity for three more years for the purpose of Opposition (To Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution)" (Annex D
prosecuting and defending suits against it; hence it is PHILSUCOM, Petition, Id., pp. 51- 62). A Reply was filed by the plaintiffs (Annex
being a party to the compromise agreement, which may properly "E", Id., pp. 63- 72) and a Rejoinder was also filed by the defendants
contest the right of private respondents to attomey's fees; (Annex "E", Petition, Id., pp. 73-78). The lower court issued the Order
(c) The petition should have been filed through the Office of the dated March 13, 1989 which dismissed the separate petitions for relief
Solicitor General OSG and not through the (OGCC); neither the latter from judgment filed by Franklin Fuentebella, George Lacson, Fernando
nor the (SRA) may lawfully represent the Government of the Ballesteros, and Antonio Lopez in one petition; Romeo Guanzon as
Philippines in any suit or proceeding such as the present petition for sugar producer and president of National Federation of Sugar Cane
administrative agencies may only perform such powers and functions Planters; PASSI (Iloilo) Sugar Central, Inc., represented by Romeo
as may be authorized by the laws which created or gave them Villavicencio; the Independent Sugar Planters represented by Corazon
existence; and Sagimalet (In a Motion for Intervention which substituted as a Petition
(d) The respondent judge did not commit any error of jurisdiction in for Relief from Judgment); and Zosimo Maravilla, Rosendo dela Rama
issuing the questioned orders; hence, the remedy should be appeal. and Bibiano Sabino (Annex "G", Petition, Id., pp. 79-98). This Order
The facts which gave rise to said petition are summarized by the Court dated March 13, 1989 (which as aforesaid, dismissed the petitions for
of Appeals as follows: relief from judgment) is the first of the orders now being assailed.
On May 16,1986, Republic Planters Bank (hereafter referred to as On March 21, 1989, the lower court issued the second of the assailed
RPB), Zosimo Maravilla, Rosendo de la Rama, Bibiano Sabino, orders which granted a second motion to resolve a pending motion for
Roberto Mascufiana and Ernesto Kramer "for themselves and in issuance of a writ of execution and allowed the issuance of an alias
representation of other sugar producers" filed a Complaint with the writ of execution in words, thus:
respondent court, RTC Branch 26, docketed as C.C. 86-35880 "For Let an alias writ of execution be issued for the final implementation of
Sum of Money and/or Delivery of Personal Property with Restraining the Judgment on Compromise Agreement, dated June 2, 1986, the
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction" against the Philippine Sugar only remaining provision of said judgment is the 10% attorney's fees of
Commission (PHILSUCOM) and the National Sugar Trading counsels for the plaintiffs (Paragraph 12 sub-section Annex "H",
Corporation (NASUTRA) with the prayer: Petition, Id., pp. 99-100).
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully prayed of Correspondingly, on that same date March 21, 1989, RTC Mala
this Honorable Court that, after due hearing and trial, judgment be Deputy Sheriff Jaime K. del Rosario issued a "Notice of Delivery of
rendered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants ordering them to Money" asking the RPB to "pay in cash the 10% of P45,293,552.60 to
do the following: Attys. Roger Reyes, Ernesto Treyes, Jr. and Eutiquio Fudolin, Jr. ...
immediately upon receipt of this notice" (Annex "I", Petition, Id., p. a banking institution, even assuming that it is government-controlled, to
101). initiate suits for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines." p.171,
And on March 27, 1989, the third of the questioned orders was issued Rollo). They further argued that petitioners have no legal personality to
by the lower court, in response to the "Ex-Parte Motion to Require initiate the instant petition for (a) SRA is not a party in the case before
Officers of Trustee Republic Planters Bank to Deliver Amount Subject the trial court; the only reason why it became involved was because of
of Alias Writ of Execution", requiring the officers of the RPB named the contempt proceedings initiated by private respondents against
therein to "appear before the Court on March 29,1989 at 10:30 in the SRA's Arsenio Yulo, Carlos Ledesma and Bibiano Sabino for issuing
morning to explain why they should not be cited for contempt of court Sugar Orders No. 9 and 14; and that neither can it be presumed that
for defying ... the alias writ of execution." (Annex "J", Petition, Id. pp. SRA had substituted defendants PHILSUCOM and the NASUTRA in
102-103). the case as both continue to legally exist for the purpose of
The instant petition was filed in this court on March 29, 1989, ... prosecuting and defending suits in liquidation of its affairs; both did not
Parenthetically, it may also be added that, as stated in paragraph 15 of file any petition for relief from judgment questioning the validity of the
the instant petition, the producers and producer organizations who filed judgment of the trial court approving the compromise agreement; and
various petitions for relief from the judgment based on the compromise that, moreover, RPB was a signatory to the Compromise Agreement
agreement have appealed to the Court of Appeals the Order of 13 as a Trustee and, as such, it regarded itself as only a nominal party
March 1989 denying their petitions.2 and in a series of pleadings it recognized the final and executory
In the instant petition petitioners limit their grounds to only two errors nature of the decision approving the compromise agreement.
allegedly committed by respondent Court of Appeals, namely: (a) it As to the second assigned error, private respondents pointed out that
erred in holding that neither the OGCC nor the SRA can represent the the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals did not rule in C.A.-G.R. No.
Government of the Philippines in the action before it and (b) it deviated 11046 that Civil Case No. 86-35880 before the trial court was not a
from the decision of the Ninth Division of said court in CAGR SP No. class suit, and whether or not it was a class suit was not an issue
11046 (Kramer, et al. vs. Hon. Doroteo, Cañeba, et al. promulgated on therein.
16 March 1987), which declared that there was no valid class suit and On 15 January 1990 petitioners filed a motion for leave to file
the controversial compromise agreement did not extend to the 40,000 consolidated reply, which We granted in the resolution of 18 January
unnamed sugar producers.3 1990.9
In the resolution of 26 October 1989 We required respondents to On 18 January 1990 petitioners filed a Manifestation and
comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order Motion10 "wherein they informed the Court that despite the temporary
directing respondent Judge to desist and refrain from further restraining order issued on 26 October 1989, respondent Judge, to
proceeding in Civil Case No. 86-35880, entitled Republic Planters whom the Order was addressed, continued to hear the case,
Bank, et al. vs. Philippine Sugar Commission, et al.4 particularly on the whereabouts of 177,087.14 piculs of sugar for the
On 23 November 1989 petitioners filed a manifestation informing this crop year 1984-1985 allegedly stored in the different warehouses
Court that at 9:30 a.m. on 26 October 1989, private respondents, throughout the country".
accompanied by respondents sheriff and a squad of police Special In the resolution of 30 January 1990 11 We required respondent judge to
Action Force, swooped upon RPB's Bacolod Branch and divested a show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for
teller of money from her booth allegedly because the branch manager failure to comply with the resolution of 26 October 1989 ordering her to
had instructed the bank personnel to close the bank vault while the refrain from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 86-35880 and to
enforcement of the court order was being verified - with the head office answer why she should not be cited for contempt of court for such
in Manila; the amount taken was P179,955.31; these acts were failure, within ten (10) days from notice.
allegedly done by virtue of, among others, the orders dated October 24 On 8 March 1990 petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply to the
and 25, 1989 of respondent judge ordering the implementation of an Comment with Motion to Dismiss filed by private respondents and the
alias Writ of Execution dated 21 March 1989 and the Writ of Execution Comment of the Solicitor General.12
dated 21 March 1986; and claiming that what was enforced was an On 5 April 1990 private respondents filed a Rejoinder to the
expired writ.5 Consolidated Reply.13
In Our resolution of 5 December 1989 respondents were required to On 16 April 1990 respondent judge, through the OSG, filed her
comment on this manifestation.6 Compliance as required by the Resolution of 30 January 1990. 14 She
After motions for extension of time to file their Comments on the claims that she did not defy the temporary restraining order issued by
petition, separately filed by the private respondents and the Solicitor this Court on 26 October 1989 because the petitioners sought for the
General for the public respondents, were granted, the former ultimately issuance of the temporary restraining order to stop the enforcement of
filed their Comment on 20 December 1989. 7 The Solicitor General filed the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA GR No. 17188
his Comment on 4 January 1990.8 dated October 13, 1989; hence, the temporary restraining order that
In his Comment the Solicitor General maintains that the SRA has no this Court issued "actually orders herein respondent judge to desist
legal personality to file the instant petition in the name of the Republic from enforcing the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in
of the Philippines for under its charter, Executive Order No. 18, the CAGR No. 17188 which is the subject of the instant petition for review".
SRA is not vested with legal capacity to sue. He further argues that the Consequently, she stresses, her 15 December 1989 order was not
SRA was not a party to the court-approved compromise agreement in issued in defiance of the restraining resolution; said order pertains
Civil Case No. 8635880 which provided for the questioned 10% exclusively to the whereabouts of the 177,087.14 piculs of physical
attorney's fees; PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA, which were parties sugar for the crop year 1984-1985 and did not in any way attempt to
thereto, did not file any action to annul the compromise agreement; enforce the questioned decisions of the court a quo and the Court of
that while Executive Order No. 18 abolished the PHILSUCOM, the Appeals to the prejudice of petitioner's right to appeal.
latter's juridical personality was to continue for three (3) years, during In Our resolution of 15 May 1990 15 We resolved to consider the
which period it may prosecute and defend suits against it; and that, comments of respondents as Answers to the petition, give due course
finally, even if SRA has the capacity to sue, it cannot still bring any to the petition, require the parties to submit their respective
action on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines as this can be done memoranda within thirty days from notice, and to note the compliance
only by the Office of the Solicitor General per Section 1 of P.D. No. of respondent judge.
478. Petitioners filed their memorandum on 28 June 1990. 16 Private
The Solicitor General likewise stresses that the interest of the national respondents sent theirs by registered mail on 22 August 1990 which
government in this case is confined only to the amount remaining in this Court actually received on 8 September 1990. 17 We shall now take
RPB subject to legal subrogation; the judgment on the compromise up the assigned errors.
agreement had long become final and executory; and that no I.
reversible error was committed by respondent judge and respondent The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner Sugar Regulatory
Court of Appeals. Administration may not lawfully bring an action on behalf of the
Private respondents assert that the SRA and RPB do not have the Republic of the Philippines and that the Office of the Government
legal authority to sue for and in behalf of the Republic of the Corporate Counsel does not have the authority to represent said
Philippines. In respect to the former, their conclusion is supported by petitioner in this case.
almost the same arguments as that asserted by the Solicitor General. Executive Order No. 18, enacted on 28 May 1986 and which took
As regards the RPB, they maintain that it "is a government-controlled effect immediately, abolished the Philippine Sugar Commission
corporation engaged in the banking business with corporate powers (PHILSUCOM) and created the Sugar Regulatory Administration
vested in a Board of Directors," hence, it is "legally untenable for such (SRA) which shall be under the Office of the President. However,
under the third paragraph of Section 13 thereof, the PHILSUCOM was Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for appropriate legal
allowed to continue as a juridical entity for three (3) years for the action pursuant to P.D. No. 478. There is, however, no showing that
purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and the OSG withdrew its appearance for PHILSUCOM, NASUTRA or the
enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its SRA in the trial court. On the contrary, per its Manifestation dated 8
property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of February 1990, and filed with this Court on 12 February 1990, 24 it "has
continuing the functions for which it was established, under the retained its appearance" "on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
supervision of the SRA. to recover whatever amount may be owing to the National Treasury by
Section 3 of said Executive Order enumerates the powers and virtue of legal subrogation."
functions of the SRA; but it does not specifically include the power to Also on April 6,1988, SRA sent a letter 25 to OGCC to engage its legal
represent the Republic of the Philippines in suits filed by or against it, services to represent SRA as successor agency of the PHILSUCOM in
nor the power to sue and be sued although it has the power to "enter, the case pending before the trial court.
make and execute routinary contracts as may be necessary for or The OGCC, availing of P.D. No. 1415, the law creating it, particularly
incidental to the attainment of its purposes between any persons, Section 1 which, as quoted by it on page 16 of the Petition,26 reads:
firms, public or private, and the Government of the Philippines" and SECTION 1. The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel shall be
"[t]o do all such other things, transact such other businesses and the principal law office of all government-owned and controlled
perform such functions directly or indirectly incidental or conducive to corporations, including their subsidiaries except as may otherwise be
the attainment of the purposes of the Sugar Regulatory provided by their respective charters or authorized by the
Administration."18 President (Emphasis supplied).
Section 4 thereof provides for the governing board of the sent a letter to the Office of the President, "in essence, requesting for
Administration, known as the Sugar Board, which shall exercise "[a]ll authority for OGCC to represent SRA in the case before the trial court,"
the corporate powers" of the SRA. Its specific functions are This was favorably acted by Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig,
enumerated in Section 6; however, the enumeration does not include Jr.27
the power to represent the Republic of the Philippines, although among Indeed, under Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the
such functions is "[t]o enter into contracts, transactions, or Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) the Solicitor
undertakings of whatever nature which are necessary or incidental to General is the lawyer of the government, its agencies and
its functions and objectives with any natural or juridical persons and instrumentalities, and its officials or agents. Said Section reads as
with any foreign government institutions, private corporations, follows:
partnership or private individuals.19 SECTION 35. Functions and Organization. — The Office of the
It is apparent that its charter does not grant the SRA the power to Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
represent the Republic of the Philippines in suits filed by or against the agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
latter. litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such lawyers. When authorized by the President or head of the office
powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are concerned, it shall also represent government-owned and controlled
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. (Guerzon vs Court of corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law
Appeals, et al., 77707, August 8, 1988, 164 SCRA 182,189, citing office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring
Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. vs. SEC, 14 SCRA 620, and Sy vs. the services of lawyers. ... .
Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570.)20 This is similar to subsection (1) of Section 1 of P.D. No. 478.
The SRA no doubt, is an administrative agency or body. An In Republic, et al. vs. Partisala et al. (G.R. No. 61997, 15 November
administrative agency is defined as "[a] government body charged with 1982, 118 SCRA 370, 373), We ruled that only the Solicitor General
administering and implementing particular legislation. Examples are can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
workers' compensation commissions ... and the like. ... The term and that, henceforth, actions filed in the name of the Republic if not
'agency' includes any department, independent establishment, initiated by the Solicitor General will be summarily dismissed.
commission, administration, authority board or bureau ...21 However, in Secretary Oscar Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission, et
The power to represent the Republic of the Philippines in any suit by or al., G.R. No. 92561, 12 September 1990,28 We stated:
against it having been withheld from SRA, it following that the latter In the discharge of this task, the Solicitor General must see to it that
cannot institute the instant petition and the petition in C.A.-G.R. No. the best interest of the government is upheld within the limits set by
17188 on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. law. When confronted with a situation where one government office
This conclusion does not, however, mean that the SRA cannot sued takes an adverse position against another government agency, as in
and be sued. This power can be implied from its powers to make and this case, the Solicitor General should not refrain from performing his
execute routinary contracts as may be necessary for or incidental to duty as the lawyer of the government. It is incumbent upon him to
the attainment of its purposes between any persons, firms public or present to the court what he considers should legally uphold the best
private, and the Government of the Philippines and to do all such other interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's
things, transact such other businesses and perform such other position. In such an instance the government office adversely affected
functions directly or indirectly incidental or conducive to the attainment by the position taken by the Solicitor General, if it still believes in the
of the purposes of the SRA and the powers of its governing board to merit of its case, may appear in its own behalf through its legal
enter into contracts, transactions, or undertaking of whatever nature personnel or representative.
which are necessary or incidental to its functions and objectives with Consequently, the SRA need not be represented by the Office of the
any natural or juridical persons and with any foreign government Solicitor General. It may appear in its own behalf through its legal
institutions, private corporations, partnership or private individuals. personnel or representative.
The Court of Appeals also correctly ruled that the OGCC can represent The question that logically crops up then is: May it be represented by
neither the SRA nor the Republic of the Philippines. We do not, the OGCC? Respondents hold the negative view. Petitioners maintain
however, share the view that only the Office of the Solicitor General otherwise, for the reason that pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of
can represent the SRA. the OGCC (P.D. No. 1415), as they quoted, the Office of the President,
The entry of appearance by the OGCC for the SRA was precipitated by through the Executive Secretary, has authorized it to represent the
the sudden turn-about of the Office of the Solicitor General. Records SRA. The specific basis for such authority is the alleged portion of the
show that the OSG eventually represented the PHILSUCOM, exceptionary clause therein, reading "... or authorized by the
NASUTRA and SRA in the trial court. However, on 29 January 1988 it President."
filed a Manifestation dated January 27, 1988 informing the court that its The words or authorized by the President are not found in the law. We
appearance in the case "is limited to the issues relating only to the are not aware of any law, decree or executive order which amended
contempt proceedings against the public respondents and is not Section 1 of P.D. No. 1415 by inserting therein said words. Besides,
concerned with the other issues raised by various parties in their even granting for the sake of argument that such words are written into
petitions for relief".22 By reason thereof, the Chairman/Administrator of the law, such exception cannot confer upon the OGCC authority to
SRA, Mr. Arsenio Yulo, Jr., sent a letter 23 dated 6 April 1988 to the represent the SRA. The exception simply means that although the
Solicitor General, informing him that since the appearance of the OSG OGCC is the principal law office of all government-owned and
is limited and that it has taken a different position, SRA's only controlled corporations including their subsidiaries, the President may
alternative is to seek another representative and that much to its not allow it to act as lawyer for a specified government-owned or
regret, it is constrained to terminate OSG's services. He further controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof. It will be noted that
informed the Solicitor General that the case is being indorsed to the under Section 1 of P.D. No. 478 the President may authorize the OSG
to represent government-owned or controlled corporations. In short, does not constitute fraud, the named parties having contest over the
the exception limits, rather than expands, the authority of the OGCC. class suit.' By such statement, petitioners and their counsels admit
Thus, the so-called approval by the Executive Secretary of the request their lack of authority from the rest of the alleged 40,000 sugar
of OGCC to represent the SRA is based on an erroneous interpretation producers to file the class suit and enter into the compromise
of the law. agreement.
In any case, even if we grant that there was such an exception, as well Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court provides that in order that
construed in the manner urged by petitioners, it must be deemed, one or more may sue for the benefit of others as a class suit, it is
nevertheless, to have been repealed by the Administrative Code of necessary that 'the court shall make sure that the parties actually
1987. Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV thereof on the Office of before it are sufficiently numerous and representative so that all
the Government Corporate counsel does not contain the purported interests are fully protected. (Dimayuga, et al. vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No.
exception. It reads: L-1 0213, May 27, 1957).
SECTION 10. Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. —The For that matter, in the case below, therein plaintiffs Zosimo Maravilla,
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) shall act as the Rosendo dela Rama and Bibiano Sabino filed with the respondent
principal law office of all government-owned or controlled corporations, court a motion to partially annul decision and/or petition for relief
their subsidiaries, other corporate offsprings and government acquired against the said ten (10%) percent attorney's fees on the allegation
asset corporations and shall exercise control and supervision over all that they were deceived into signing the compromise agreement
legal departments or divisions maintained separately and such powers believing, as was agreed upon during the negotiations, that the ten
and functions as are now or may hereafter be provided by law. In the (10%) percent of whatever would be collected would go to a trust fund
exercise of such control or suspension, the Government Corporate for the benefit of the sugar farmers and producers and not as
Counsel shall promulgate rules and regulations to effectively attorney's fees. Also, petition, for relief was filed by thirteen other
implement the objectives of the Office. ... alleged sugar producers principally on the ground that the compromise
Since the SRA is neither a government-owned or controlled agreement entered into was without their express authority by way of
corporation nor a subsidiary thereof, OGCC does not have the Special Power of Attorney and that the class suit was unnecessary.
authority to represent it. As to who may represent it, Some of these sugar producers are the Association de Agricultores de
the Orbos case29 provides the answer. la Region Oesta de Batangas, Inc. (AAROB) with 742 members; the
The case of the RPB is, however, different. It is admitted to be a Samahang Mag-aasukal sa Kanluran Batangas (SABA) with 4,000
government-owned corporation. The OGCC can, therefore, legally members and Independent Sugar Farmers, Inc. with 200 members.
represent RPB in actions filed by or against it. Unfortunately, this issue Here is a situation, as pointed out by respondent NASUTRA and SRA,
was not categorically and expressly addressed by the Court of Appeals where petitioners in filing the class suit claim to represent 40,000 sugar
and has not been raised in the petition. Anyway, even if We have to producers all over the country and yet when some of these producers
rule that OGCC's appearance for the RPB in the petition before the filed petition for relief and interventions, petitioners 'disowned' them,
Court of Appeals in CAGR No. 17188 was proper, the result would be stating that the other sugar producers have no personality to intervene,
the same dismissal of the petition. As also correctly pointed out by the not having been named parties to the class suit.
Court of Appeals, having received benefits by way of trustee's fees, the It should not be overlooked that the said sugar producers, although not
RPB may not question the right of private respondents to attorney's named parties in the class suit, are the very alleged persons
fees; its only obligation under the judgment based on compromise was represented in the class suit. They certainly have interests in the
to pay the attorney's fees from out of the funds it held in trust. subject matter of the controversy; in the contents of the compromise
II. agreement.
The second assigned error is without merit. Petitioners have misread The filing of petitions for relief from judgment has not been prohibited
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAGR SP No. 11046 (Ernesto by B.P. 129. The remedy of petitions for relief from judgment is still
Kramer, et al. vs. Hon. Doroteo Caneba et al. promulgated on 16 available when a judgment is rendered by an inferior court in a case,
March 1987).30 The case was a petition for certiorari and mandamus and a party thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
with a prayer for preliminary injunction wherein petitioners principally negligence, has been unjustly deprived of a hearing therein, or has
prayed the Court to declare null and void the order of respondent judge been prevented from taking an appeal. Section 9, paragraph 2 of BP
of 16 December 1986 and to order him to issue the writ of execution of 129 placing the original exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals
the judgment of 2 June 1986, require respondent NASUTRA to to annul judgments of Regional Trial Courts has no relation to (sic) all
account and turn over to petitioners any and all sales proceeds of to the petition for relief provided for in Rule 38 because these two are
1984-1985 sugar from 2 June 1986 up to the present in favor of completely different remedies.
respondent Trustee Bank RPB for proper distribution to petitioners, The petitions for relief from judgment and interventions are still
issue an order requiring respondent Trustee Bank to distribute without pending action by respondent court.1âwphi1 In view thereof, it would
delay all the sales proceeds of the 1984-1985 sugar in its possession be premature for this Court to resolve the issue of estoppel on the part
in accordance with the judgment of respondent court, and issue a of the said sugar producers to question the pertinent portion of the
restraining order/preliminary injunction enjoining the SRA, its judgment of compromise, and fraud on the part of the counsels for
agents/representatives from implementing Sugar Order No. 9 dated 25 petitioners therein. (Emphasis supplied).
September 1986. Although in the body of the opinion a discussion was IV.
made on the matter of the sufficiency of representation to make Civil Having disposed of the main issues, We shall now consider the motion
Case No. 86-35880 a class suit, the resolution of the petition was not of petitioners of 16 January 1990 to hold in contempt respondent
in any way based thereon or influenced by it. As a matter of fact, the Judge Corona Ibay-Somera for violating/defying the Temporary
Court categorically stated that it was premature to rule on that issue Restraining Order issued by Us on 26 October 1989. They allegedly
because of the pendency of the petition for relief from judgment and "continued to hear the case particularly on the whereabouts of
interventions. The full disquisition of the Court of Appeals on this point 177,087.14 piculs of sugar for the crop year 1984-1985 allegedly
reads: stored in different warehouses throughout the country," and that she
x x x           x x x          x x x even further reset the hearing of the case on January 19, 1990
At the outset, let it be stated that the incidents which arose from the notwithstanding the cautionary manifestation filed by petitioners during
class suit before the respondent court are predominantly related to the the 15 December 1989 hearing that said continued hearing would be a
ten percent (10%) attorney's fees stipulated in the compromise violation of the TRO. In the resolution of 26 October 1989, this Court
agreement approved by the respondent court in its June 2, 1986 specifically ordered respondent Judge to desist and refrain from further
judgment in favor of petitioner's counsels Atty. Roger Z. Reyes, proceeding in Civil Case No. 86-35880, entitled Republic Planters
Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. and Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr. Bank, et al. vs. Philippine Sugar Commission, et al.
In the said class suit, only the five original plaintiffs and producers In her Compliance, respondent judge explained that the TRO in
Zosimo Maravilla, for himself and in representation of Rosendo dela question actually ordered her to desist from enforcing the Decision of
Rama, Roberto Mascurafia and Bibiano Sabino per Special Power of the respondent Court of Appeals in CAGR No. 17188, which is the
Attorney, and Ernesto Kramer represented by Atty. Roger Z. Reyes per subject of the instant petition, and that her "only honest motivation "in
Special Power of Attorney, have authorized said Attys. Reyes, Treyes, making the inquiry is to see to it that while the instant petition is
Jr. and Fudolin, Jr. to represent them as counsel. pending ... , whatever funds may be owing to the Republic of the
On page 18 of the instant petition, petitioners allege that there is no Philippines is duly preserved and protected."
necessity to secure Special Powers of Attorney from the unnamed We find the explanation to be satisfactory. No malice attended the
parties in a class suit, and the failure of petitioners' counsel to do so commission of the challenged act. We accord to respondent judge
good faith in her claimed desire to preserve and protect public funds.
Moreover, petitioners failed to show that the act in question caused
any injury or damage to their rights or interest.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., took no part.
 
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