Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 249 November 21, 1978

TOMAS ALCORIZA, complaint,
vs.
ATTY. ALBERTO LUMAKANG and ATTY. PABLO SALAZAR, respondents.

BARREDO, J.:

Administrative complaint for disciplinary action against Attys. Pablo Salazar and Alberto Lumakang.
Respondents were required to answer and after they filed their answers, the case was referred to the Solicitor
General for investigation and recommendation. The Solicitor General has submitted the following report:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Since the respondents were residents of Davao City, the case was, therefore,
referred in turn by this Office to the City Attorney of Davao City, for investigation and report. In a
letter dated March 14, 1957, City Attorneys A.L. Noel submitted the report of then special
counsel, now Fiscal Leo D. Medialdea, which he approved and adopted as his own, the original
of which, together with the original records of the case, is missing in our files due to the
retirement of the Solicitor then assigned to the case (Sol. Adolfo Brillantes), hence only a
duplicate original of said letter, together with a true copy of the original records of this case, is
hereto attached. For convenience, the said report is quoted as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After going over the records of the case together with the transcript of stenographic notes
marked as Annex 'A', it appears that the whole case emanated from the decision of the
Municipal Court of Davao City in Civil Case No. 1845 for sum of money, between one Juana V.
Antonio, et al., plaintiffs, vs. Tomas Alcoriza, defendant, ordering the defendant to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P251.50, plus the legal rate of interest beginning the date of the filing of the
complaint until the date of complete payment. The defendant is also ordered to pay an amount
equivalent to 25% of the amount due, in the concept of attorney's fees, and the legal cost of the
suit. It also appears in the decision that the trial was conducted in the absence of the defendant
and or his counsels despite the fact that they have been duly notified.

Atty. Alberto Lumakang, one of the respondents in Administrative Case No. 249, explains his
failure to appear in the trial of Civil Case No. 1845, wherein he appears as one of the attorneys
on record as follows:

Early in the morning as usual as I Used to, I reported to the office at 7:30
believing that Tomas Alcoriza would come to the office. I waited for him until
9:00. I know that the hearing of Judge Hofileña will be 9:00 and that as I said if
he will not appear in my office I will not appear for him as I would be going there
without any preparation, so that on that day though I was jittery I did not go to
the court. I stayed in the office waiting for Alcoriza.' (Transcript of the
stenographic notes. T.S.N. p. 28, Annex "A".)

It appears that the reason of Atty. Lumakang for his failure to appear in representation of his
client, Tomas Alcoriza, in the trial of his case on October 27, 1955, is not wholly laudable. The
undersigned believes that although Atty. Lumakang was not prepared to enter into trial on that
day, still he could do things to protect the interest of his client by appearing for him in court.
However, it is not considered that this inaction of Atty, Lumakang would constitute so serious a
ground as to warrant disciplinary action in view of the lack of interest which his client has shown
in the premises. Instead, Atty. Lumakang for his failure to appear should be reprimanded for his
inaction as it would tend to diminish trust and confidence which the public is supposed to
repose in the office of a lawyer. In order to be free from any complaint from his client he should
have appeared on October 27, 1955 primarily to protect the interest of his client and secondarily
to explain to the court the predicament he was in.

Respondent Pablo Salazar should be exonerated of charges preferred against him by Tomas
Alcoriza, because the records of civil Case No. 1845 show that Atty. Alberto Lumakang took
over from him the active handling of the case since August 20, 1955 until Ocotber 27, 1955,
date of rendition of judgment giving rise to this Administrative Case No. 249.
 The undersigned concur in toto with the foregoing report and r ecommendation, the same being
justified by the evidence adduced at the hearing.

RECOMMENDATION

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Atty. alberto
Lumakang be reprimanded as above-indicated and Atty. Pablo Salazar be exonerated of the
charges filed against him. (Pp. 59-61, Record.)

Required to comment on the foregoing report by Our resolution of September 2, 1964, Atty. Lumakang
explained that:

... The respondent asked Tomas Alcoriza why he did not go to the office or to the Court to
attend to the trial of his case, tomas Alcoriza merely answered that he is busy. The respondent
told Tomas Alcoriza that the Judge has become impatient because of the many postponement
so that an order was issued giving you last postponement and that if wyou will be absent again
on the day of the trial the Court will proceed to try the case ex parte. Tomas Alcoriza assured
the respondent that he will go to the office and he and the respondent will go to Court together
on the day of the trial, and in parting the respondent told Tomas Alcoriza that if you will not
come to the office on teh date of the trial then the respondent will not appear in Court as his
appearance would only be useless.

The respondent began to suspect that the defendant Tomas Alcoriza has already lost his
interest in the case aforesaid because of his refusal to attend to the trial every time the case is
called for hearing. This suspicion came true because on the date set for hearing of his case in
accordance with the provision of the order of last postponement, Tomas Alcoriza did not appear
at the office of the respondent neither to the Court. Such being the case it is the honest belief of
the respondent that a lawyer cannot be more interested in his client's case than the client
himself. So, on the day of the hearing the respondent did not go to the court any more because
there was nothing or no interest at all to be protected. The defendant, now complainant, having
lost interest or have showl lack of interest in his case in the Municipal Court, therefore, the
respondent has every reason not to go to the Court because the respondent could not be
expected to be more interested in the case than Tomas Alcoriza himself. The lack of interest or
loss of interest of Tomas Alcoriza in his case was shown in the findings of the City Fiscal of
Davao which findings was also adopted by the Solicitor General in his report and
recommendation, quote:

However, it is not considered that this inaction of Atty. Lumakang would

constitute so serious a ground as to warrant disciplinary action in view of the
lack of interst which his client has shown in the premises. (emphasis supplied).
(Pp. 64-65, Record.)

When the case was set for hearing, Atty. Lumakang waived oral argument, hence the case was deemed
submitted for decision.

We have reviewed the record and We find the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General to be in
order and amply justified by the circumstances on record.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is dismissed insofar as Atty. Pablo Salazar is concerned, and
Atty. Alberto Lumakang is hereby reprimanded and admonished to be more careful in attending to the cases of
his clients so as to avoid any similar incident as that complained of. Let this decision be entered in the
respective records of each of the respondents.

Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 381             February 10, 1968

EMILIO CAPULONG and CIRILA CAPULONG, petitioners,

vs.
MANUEL G. ALIÑO, respondent.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

          Respondent Manuel G. Aliño a member of the bar, is charged by his former clients, the spouses Emilio
and Cirila Capulong, with alleged "gross negligence tantamount to malpractice and betrayal of his clients' trust
and confidence."

          This allegation is based upon the admitted fact that, on August 21, 1957, respondent received from the
complainants, as their counsel in Civil Case No. 2248 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija — the
decision in which, adverse to said complainants, had been appealed by them to the Court of Appeals — the
sum of P298.00, for the specific purpose of applying the same to the payment of the "appellate" docket fees
(P24), appeal bond (P15), (printing of) the record on appeal (P150) and appellants' brief (P100), and that said
appeal was dismissed because of respondent's failure to pay the docket fee and to deposit the estimated cost
of printing of the record on appeal.

          In his answer, respondent alleged that complainants had authorized him to exercise his judgment and
discretion in determining whether or not he should prosecute the appeal, and to regard said sum of P298.00 as
compensation for his services in connection with said case, should he consider it advisable to desist from said
appeal.

          After due hearing, the Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija — who, having been deputized therefor by the
Solicitor General, received the evidence for both parties — considered respondent's uncorroborated testimony,
in support of his answer, unworthy of credence and found the charge against him duly proven, and,
accordingly, recommended disciplinary action against respondent. Concurring in this finding and
recommendation, the Solicitor General filed the corresponding complaint charging respondent with "deceit,
malpractice or gross misconduct in office as a lawyer," in that, owing to his "negligence and gross bad faith . . .
in unduly and knowingly failing to remit to the Court of Appeals the docket fee and the estimated cost of printing
the record on appeal," said Court dismissed the aforementioned appeal.

          In his answer to this charge respondent reiterated substantially his aforementioned defense and
expressed "his intention of introducing additional evidence." Accordingly, this Court referred the matter to its
Legal Officer for reception of said evidence, but, eventually respondent introduced one.

          The evidence on record fully confirms the finding of guilt made by the Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija
and the Solicitor General and their conclusion to the effect that respondent's uncorroborated testimony is
unworthy of credence. Indeed, had complainants authorized him to decide whether or not to prosecute their
appeal or desist therefrom, and, in the latter alternative, to keep the P298.00 in question as his fees,
respondent would have retrieved the receipt issued by him for said sum, stating specifically that it would be
used for docket fees, the record on appeal, the appeal bond and the (printing) of their brief. Moreover, if his
failure to pay said docket fees and to deposit the estimated cost of printing of the record on appeal was due to
his decision — pursuant to the aforementioned authority he had allegedly been given — to desist from
prosecuting the appeal and to apply the money to the payment of his professional fees, why is it that he filed a
motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal in consequence of
said failure, thereby securing, in effect, an extension of over five (5) months, to make said payment and
deposit, which, eventually, he did not make?

          After all, the foregoing acts and omissions of respondent herein dovetail with his subsequent behaviour.
Thus, when, prior to the commencement of this administrative proceedings, complainants' counsel contacted
respondent and advised him to settle the matter with them, respondent said he would do so, but actually did
nothing about it. Hence, the complaint herein was filed. So too, in view of the allegation in respondent's answer,
to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General, to the effect that he (respondent) had "the intention of introducing
additional evidence" before this Court, the same designated its Legal Officer for the reception of said evidence.
Yet, after securing four (4) postponements of the date set by said officer for this purpose, respondent did not
introduce any additional evidence in his favor. Similarly, when the present case was set for oral argument
before this Court, respondent moved for the postponement of the date set therefor. And, having been given ten
(10) days to submit a memorandum in lieu of oral argument, respondent filed no memorandum in his favor.

     
 Apart from suggesting a misappropriation of funds held by him in trust for his clients and a breach of
such trust, the foregoing acts and omissions indicate the high degree of irresponsibility of respondent herein
and his unworthiness to continue as a member of the legal profession.

   Respondent Manuel G. Aliño is, accordingly, disbarred. His name is ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys and his certificate of Membership of the Philippine Bar, which he is directed to surrender to the Clerk
of Court, within ten (10) days after this judgment has become final, hereby revoked. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
 FIRST DIVISION

February 1, 2017

A.C. No. 5819

HEIRS OF SIXTO L. TAN, SR., represented by RECTO A. TAN, Complainants

vs.
ATTY. NESTOR B. BELTRAN, Respondent

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint against respondent, Atty. Nestor B. Beltran. His derelictions
allegedly consisted of his belated filing of an appeal in a criminal case and failure to relay a court directive for
the payment of docket fees in a civil case to his clients - complainants Heirs of Sixto L. Tan, Sr. represented by
Recto A. Tan. The latter also accused him of unduly receiving ₱200,000 as payment for legal services.

FACTS OF THE CASE

After agreeing to pay attorney's fees of ₱200,000, complainants engaged the services of respondent counsel
for the filing of cases to recover their commercial properties valued at approximately ₱30 million.

On July 2001, complainants filed a criminal action for falsification of public documents and use of falsified
documents against Spouses Melanio and Nancy Fernando and Sixto Tan, Jr. Docketed as LS. No. 2001-
037,  this case was dismissed by the provincial prosecutor of Albay.
1

Respondent was notified of the order of dismissal on 18 October 2001.  On 6 November 2001, he filed an
2

appeal via a Petition for Review before the Secretary of the Department of Justice (SOJ). It was, however, filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period to perfect an appeal.  Consequently, in his Resolution promulgated on
3

5 March 2002,  the SOJ dismissed the belated Petition for Review. Respondent no longer filed a motion for
4

reconsideration to remedy the ruling.

On 11 September 2001, complainants instituted a related civil suit to annul the sale of their commercial
properties before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2001-0329.  After5

being given ₱7,000 by his clients, respondent tasked his secretary to pay the docket fees computed at ₱1,722.

Unfortunately, the Clerk of Court erred in the assessment of the docket fees. To correct the error, the RTC
required the payment of additional docket fees through an Order dated 20 May 2002,  which respondent
6

received on 29 May 2002.  However, two weeks earlier, on 13 May 2002, he had moved to withdraw as counsel
7

with the conformity of his clients.  No separate copy of the Order dated 20 May 2002 was sent to any of the
8

complainants. 9

The balance of the docket fees remained unpaid. Subsequently, the RTC dismissed the civil case, citing the
nonpayment of docket fees as one of its bases. 10

Aggrieved by their defeat, complainants wrote this Court a letter-complaint  asking that disciplinary actions be
11

meted out to respondent. They likewise contended that he had unduly received ₱200,000 as attorney's fees,
despite his failure to render effective legal services for them.

Respondent claimed  that he could no longer move for the reconsideration of the SOJ's dismissal of his belated
12

Petition for Review as he had only learned of the dismissal after the period to file a motion for reconsideration
had lapsed. He argued that while he prepared the Petition for Review, his clients themselves, through Nilo Tan
and Recto Tan, signed and filed the same. Thus, he imputed to complainants the belated filing of the appeal.

As for the dismissal of the civil action for nonpayment of docket fees, respondent disclaimed any fault on his
part, since he had already withdrawn as counsel in that case. 1âwphi1

Anent his receipt of ₱200,000 as attorney's fees, respondent denied collecting that amount. He only admitted
that he had received ₱30,000 to cover expenses for "the preparation of the complaints, docket fee, affidavits,
and other papers needed for the filing of the said cases."  He did not deny his receipt of ₱7,000 for fees and
13

other sundry expenses, of which ₱l,722 had already been paid to the Clerk of Court for docket fees. In any
event, Atty. Beltran argued that ₱200,000 as attorney's fees was inadequate, considering that the property
under dispute was worth ₱30 million.
FINDINGS OF THE IBP

In a Resolution dated 12 March 2003,  this Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
14

Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP, in a Report dated 24 July 2006,  found respondent guilty of neglect
15

in handling the criminal case and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months. The
gist of the report reads: 16

The Respondent admits that the Petition for Review in this case was not filed. This key detail leads the
Commissioner to conclude that the Respondent was negligent in failing to seasonably file the Petition for
Review in LS. No. 2001-037.

The Respondent's bare defense is that he allegedly left the filing of this petition to the Complainants, who filed
it out of time. Even assuming this is true, the Respondent cannot disclaim negligence, being the lawyer and
knowing that the case related to the Complainants' claims on properties the Respondent himself states are
worth about PHP30 million. xxx.

Some of the Respondent's pleadings instead focus to the Motion for Reconsideration regarding the late Petition
for Review's dismissal, which the Respondent explains by stating that the Complainants informed him of this
when the period to file a Motion for Reconsideration had already lapsed. Even assuming this is true, it is
irrelevant since it is clear that the Petition for Review itself was not seasonably filed. x x x. (Emphasis in the
original)

With respect to dismissal of the civil case, the Investigating Commissioner cleared respondent of any liability.
The former gave credence to the fact that by the time respondent received the directive of the RTC requiring
the payment of the balance of the docket fees, the latter had already filed his withdrawal from the case.

Finally, as regards the factual claim of complainants that they paid respondent attorney's fees amounting to
₱200,000, the Investigating Commissioner determined that their allegation was unfounded, as none of them
produced receipts evidencing payment. At most, what the Investigating Commissioner found was that
respondent only admitted to receiving ₱30,000 for expenses, aside from ₱5,278.  The former recommended
17

that respondent be ordered to restitute these sums to complainants.

In its Resolution dated 1 February 2007,  the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to fully dismiss the
18

administrative case against respondent without any explanation. Neither party has filed a motion for
reconsideration or petition for review thereafter.
19

ISSUES OF THE CASE

l. Whether respondent neglected legal matters entrusted to him when he belatedly filed an appeal before the
SOJ, resulting in the dismissal of LS. No. 2001-03 7

II. Whether respondent is guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and other ethical
standards for failing to inform complainants of the RTC Order to pay the balance of the docket fees in Civil
Case No. 2001-0329

III. Whether respondent unduly received ₱200,000 as attorney's fees

RULING OF THE COURT

We set aside the unsubstantiated recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. Its resolutions are only
recommendatory and always subject to this Court’s review. 20

Respondent filed a belated appeal

before the SOJ.

In Reontoy v. Ibadlit,  we ruled that failure of the counsel to appeal within the prescribed period constitutes
21

negligence and malpractice. The Court elucidated that per Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable."

In the case at bar, respondent similarly admits that he failed to timely file the Petition for Review before the
SOJ. As a result of his delayed action, his clients lost the criminal case. Straightforwardly, this Court sanctions
him for belatedly filing an appeal.
The excuse forwarded by respondent - that he delegated the filing of the Petition for Review to complainants -
will not exculpate him from administrative liability. As correctly explained by the Investigating Commissioner of
the IBP, respondent cannot disclaim negligence, since he was the lawyer tasked to pursue the legal remedies
available to his clients.

Lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure. A client who deals with
counsel has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence, but also a
wholehearted fealty to the client's cause.  Thus, we find that passing the blame to persons not trained in
22

remedial law is not just wrong; it is reflective of the want of care on the part of lawyers handling the legal
matters entrusted to them by their clients. 23

After surveying related jurisprudence,  the Investigating Commissioner recommended the suspension of
24

respondent from the practice of law for three months given his infraction of filing a belated appeal before the
SOJ. Yet, without explanation, the Board of Goven1ors resolved to ignore the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.

Accordingly, this Court will not adopt an unsubstantiated resolution of the Board of Governors, especially when
jurisprudence shows that we have penalized lawyers for filing belated motions and pleadings. In the resolution
of this Court in Reontoy,  we suspended the counsel therein from the practice of law for two months, given that
25

his belated filing of an appeal caused his client to lose the case. In Fernandez v. Novero, Jr.,  we likewise
26

suspended the respondent counsel for a month after he filed a motion for reconsideration outside the
reglementary period. In Barbuco v. Beltran,  this Court imposed a six-month suspension on the lawyer, who
27

had belatedly filed a pleading, among other derelictions. We stressed in that case that the failure to file a brief
within the reglementary period certainly constituted inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay of 43 days
resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.

Respondent failed to inform

complainants of the RTC Order
requiring the payment of full docket
fees.

Respondent argues that he was no longer bound to inform complainants of the RTC Order requiring the
payment of full docket fees, given that he had already moved to withdraw as counsel with the conformity of the
latter. We find that argument unjustified.

Mercado v. Commission on Higher Education  is instructive on the effect of the withdrawal of counsel with the
28

conformity of the client:

As a rule, the withdrawal of a counsel from a case made with the written conformity of the client takes effect
once the same is filed with the court. The leading case of Arambulo v. Court of Appeals laid out the rule that, in
general, such kind of a withdrawal does not require any further action or approval from the court in order to be
effective. In contrast, the norm with respect to withdrawals of counsels without the written conformity of the
client is that they only take effect after their approval by the court.

The rule that the withdrawal of a counsel with the written conformity of the client is immediately effective once
filed in court, however, is not absolute. When the counsel's impending withdrawal with the written conformity of
the client would leave the latter with no legal representation in the case, it is an accepted practice for courts
to order the deferment of the effectivity of such withdrawal until such time that it becomes certain that
service of court processes and other papers to the party-client would not thereby be compromised - either by
the due substitution of the withdrawing counsel in the case or by the express assurance of the party-client that
he now undertakes to himself receive serviceable processes and other papers. Adoption by courts of such a
practice in that particular context, while neither mandatory nor sanctioned by a specific provision of the Rules of
Court, is nevertheless justified as part of their inherent power to see to it that the potency of judicial processes
and judgment are preserved. (Emphasis in the original)

On 29 May 2002, when respondent herein received the RTC Order dated 20 May 2002, complainants still had
no new counsel on record. Therefore, Atty. Beltran should have acted with prudence by informing his previous
clients that he had received the directive of the court requiring the payment of docket fees. After all, lawyers are
officers of the court. Like the court itself, respondent is an instrument for advancing the ends of justice and his
cooperation with the court is due whenever justice may be imperiled if cooperation is withheld. 29

The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts.  In this case, we consider the fact that not only did respondent file a belated appeal before
30

the SOJ, but he also failed to act with prudence by failing to inform complainants of the RTC Order dated 20
May 2002.

However, we cannot put the blame solely on Atty. Beltran for the nonpayment of the docket fees in the civil
case. Although not discussed by the Investigating Commissioner, the records reveal that even if complainants'
new counsel learned about the ruling on 30 May 2002, the former still failed to pay the additional docket fees. 31
Taking into consideration the attendant circumstances herein vis-à-vis the aforementioned administrative cases
decided by this Court, we deem it proper to impose on Atty. Beltran a two-month suspension from the practice
of law for belatedly filing an appeal before the SOJ. We also admonish him to exercise greater care and
diligence in the performance of his duty to administer justice.

Complainants failed to prove that

respondent received ₱200,000 as
attorney's fees.

In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of

evidence.  Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior
32

to or has greater weight than that of the other. 33

Complainants have the burden to discharge that required quantum of proof.  Here, as accurately assessed by
34

the Investigating Commissioner, the records do not bear any receipt proving Atty. Beltran's collection of
₱200,000 as attorney's fees.

Complainants venture to argue that these sums were paid to respondent without receipts. However, that bare
argument has no other supporting evidence - object, documentary, or testimonial. Even during the hearing of
this case before the IBP, when confronted with particular questions regarding the sums paid to respondent,
complainants could not answer when and where they gave installment payments to Atty. Beltran. 35

General allegations will not meet the evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence.  Hence, we adopt the
36

factual finding of the Investigating Commissioner that complainants failed to prove their claim of payment to
respondent of ₱200,000 as attorney's fees.

As a final point, the Court must clarify that the resolution of this case should not include a directive for the
return of the ₱35,278 as the Investigating Commissioner recommended.

The Investigating Commissioner did not explain the recommendation for the restitution of that sum. Moreover,
complainants do not contest that respondent received this sum for fees and other sundry expenses. Neither do
the records show that they demanded the return of this amount from respondent. In consideration of these
facts, the proper corrective action is to order the accounting of the full sum of ₱35,278.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nestor B. Beltran is SUSPENDED FOR TWO
MONTHS from the practice of law with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely. He is ADMONISHED to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties. He
is also ORDERED TO ACCOUNT for the ₱35,278 he received from his clients, with the obligation to return the
entire amount, or so much thereof remaining, to complainants.

This Decision shall take effect immediately upon receipt by Atty. Nestor B. Beltran of a copy of this Decision.
He shall inform this Court and the Office of the Bar Confidant in writing of the date he received a copy of this
Decision. Copies of this Decision shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent's personal record, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Office of the Court Administrator is
directed to circulate copies of this Decision to all courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice
 EN BANC
A.C. No. 5408, February 07, 2017
ANITA SANTOS MURRAY, Complainant, v. ATTY. FELICITO J. CERVANTES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

We sustain, with modification, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVI-
2004-4811 and Resolution No. XVIII-2008-711.2

Resolution No. XVI-2004-481 modified the Board of Governors' Resolution No. XV-2002-599. 3 The latter ruled
that respondent Atty. Felicito J. Cervantes must be reprimanded and ordered to return to complainant Anita
Santos Murray the sum of P80,000.00. 4 Resolution No. XVI-2004-481 modified this with the penalty of one (1)-
year suspension from the practice of law, with an additional three (3)-month suspension for every month (or
fraction) that respondent is unable to deliver to complainant the sum of P80,000.00. 5 Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-711 denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. 6

On February 2, 2001, complainant filed before this Court a Complaint 7 charging respondent with violating
Canon 188 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complainant alleged that sometime in June 2000, she sought the services of a lawyer to assist in the
naturalization (that is, acquisition of Philippine citizenship) of her son, Peter Murray, a British national.
Respondent was later introduced to her. On June 14, 2000, she and respondent agreed on the latter's services,
with complainant handing respondent the sum of P80,000.00 as acceptance fee. 9

About three (3) months passed without respondent doing "anything substantial." 10 Thus, on September 11,
2000, complainant wrote respondent to inform him that she was terminating his services. She explained:

I am not satisfied with the way things are going regarding my petition. I am expecting that you keep me abreast
of your activities but I am left in the dark as to what have you done so far. You do not show up on our
scheduled appointments nor do you call me up to let me know why you cannot come. You stood me up twice
already which shows that you are not even interested in my case.

....

Since I already paid the P80,000.00 acceptance fee in full, I expect to get a refund of the same from you. 11

As respondent failed to return the P80,000.00 acceptance fee, complainant instituted the Complaint in this
case. She also instituted criminal proceedings against respondent for violation of Article 315(1)(b) 12 of the
Revised Penal Code.13

This case was subsequently referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its investigation, report, and
recommendation.14

After the proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Investigating Commissioner Demaree J.B.
Raval (Commissioner Raval) furnished a Report 15 dated September 9, 2002 recommending that respondent be
reprimanded and required to return the sum of P80,000.00 to complainant. In its Resolution No. XV-2002-
599,16 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted Commissioner Raval's
recommendations.

Respondent filed before this Court a Motion for Leave to Admit Additional Evidence with Motion to
Dismiss.17 He asserted that he never required complainant to immediately pay him P80,000.00 as acceptance
fee.18 This Motion was forwarded to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines 19 and was treated as respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration.20 For her part, complainant filed several manifestations and motions asking that a
heavier penalty be imposed on respondent.21

Acting on the pending incidents of the case, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa (Commissioner
Funa) furnished a Report 22 recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1)
year, with an additional three (3)-month suspension for every month (or fraction) that respondent fails to deliver
to complainant the sum of P80,000.00.

Commissioner Funa justified the penalty of suspension by emphasizing that, in a hearing conducted by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines on August 18, 2004, respondent was "orally directed" to return the P80,000.00
not later than the end of August 2004.23 Respondent acceded to this; however, he failed to return the
P80,000.00.24
In its Resolution No. XVI-2004-481,25 the Board of Governors adopted Commissioner Puna's recommendation.

The Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVIII-2008-711 later denied respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration.26

It is evident from the records that respondent failed to deliver on the services that he committed to complainant
despite receiving the amount of P80,000.00 as acceptance fee. Although respondent asserted that he did not
actively solicit this amount from complainant, it remains, as Commissioner Funa underscored, that respondent
accepted this amount as consideration for his services. 27 Moreover, following complainant's engagement of his
services, respondent failed to communicate with complainant or update her on the progress of the services that
he was supposed to render. Not only did he fail in taking his own initiative to communicate; he also failed to
respond to complainant's queries and requests for updates.

Respondent's failure to timely and diligently deliver on his professional undertaking justifies the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines' conclusion that he must restitute complainant the amount of P80,000.00.

Luna v. Galarrita28 has explained the parameters for ordering restitution in disciplinary proceedings:

In Ronquillo v. Atty. Cezar, the parties entered a Deed of Assignment after which respondent received
P937,500.00 from complainant as partial payment for the townhouse and lot. However, respondent did not turn
over this amount to developer Crown Asia, and no copy of the Contract to Sell was given to complainant. This
court suspended Atty. Cezar from the practice of law for three (3) years, but did not grant complainant's prayer
for the return of the P937,500.00.

Ronquillo held that "[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather
investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its officers." Thus, disciplinary proceedings are limited to a
determination of "whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar."

Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule excluding civil liability determination from disciplinary proceedings
"remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature — for instance, when the claim
involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement." This court has thus ordered in administrative proceedings
the return of amounts representing legal fees.

This court has also ordered restitution as concomitant relief in administrative proceedings when respondent's
civil liability was already established:

Although the Court renders this decision m an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical
responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court's silence about the respondent lawyer's legal
obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct
concerning the client's funds or property should be required to still litigate in another proceeding what the
administrative proceeding has already established as the respondent's liability. That has been the reason why
the Court has required restitution of the amount involved as a concomitant relief in the cited cases of Mortera v.
Pagatpatan, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, Small v. Banares.29 (Citations and emphases omitted)

It is proper, in the course of these disciplinary proceedings, that respondent be required to return to
complainant the amount of P80,000.00. This amount was delivered to respondent during complainant's
engagement of his professional services, or in the context of an attorney-client relationship. This is neither an
extraneous nor purely civil matter.

By the same failure to timely and diligently deliver on his professional undertaking (despite having received
fees for his services), as well as by his failure to keep complainant abreast of relevant developments in the
purposes for which his services were engaged, respondent falls short of the standards imposed by Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not
qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as
collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information. (Emphasis supplied)
Disciplinary sanctions more severe than those considered proper by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are
warranted.

We emphasize that, during the proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent
acknowledged his duty to compensate complainant for the amount of P80,000.00. He then made a commitment
to return that sum to her. To date, however, he has failed to deliver on the commitment made almost twelve
and a half years ago.

We clarify that the oral instruction given to respondent in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' August 18, 2004
hearing was not a juridically binding order. Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court sanctions and spells out the terms
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' involvement in cases involving the disbarment and/or discipline of
lawyers. The competence of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is only recommendatory. Under Article VIII,
Section 5(5)30 of the 1987 Constitution, only this Court has the power to actually rule on disciplinary cases of
lawyers, and to impose appropriate penalties.

Rule 139-B merely delegates investigatory functions to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. With the exercise
of its delegated investigatory power, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines refers proposed actions to this Court.
Recognizing the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' limited competence in disciplinary cases impels a
concomitant recognition that, pending favorable action by this Court on its recommendations, its determinations
and conclusions are only provisional. Therefore, rulings on disciplinary cases attain finality and are enforceable
only upon this Court's own determination that they must be imposed.

The oral instruction given to respondent in the August 18, 2004 hearing has, thus, not attained such a degree
of finality as would immutably require him to comply, such that failure to comply justifies additional or increased
penalties. Penalizing him for non-compliance is premature.

Nevertheless, respondent acknowledged his duty to compensate complainant for the amount of P80,000.00
and made his own commitment to make this compensation. 31 He may not have been bound by a juridical
instruction, but he was certainly bound by his own honor. That he has failed to adhere to his own freely
executed commitment after more than a decade speaks volumes of how he has miserably failed to live up to
the "high standard of ... morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing" 32 that is apropos to members of the legal
profession.

For this reason, we exact upon respondent a penalty more severe than that initially contemplated by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. Moreover, to impress upon respondent the urgency of
finally returning to complainant the amount he received, we impose on him an additional penalty corresponding
to the duration for which he fails to make restitution. We adopt the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors' position in Resolution No. XVI-2004-481 that an additional period of suspension must be imposed
on respondent for every month (or fraction) that he fails to pay in full the amount he owes complainant.
However, instead of a three (3)-month suspension for every month (or fraction) of non-payment or incomplete
payment, he is to be suspended for one (1) month for every such period of failure to make full payment.

This approach hopefully underscores the burden that respondent must justly carry. By automatically extending
his suspension should he not return the amount, we save complainant, the victim, from the additional costs of
having to find and retain another counsel to compel the return of what is due her. Counsels who have caused
harm on their clients must also suffer the costs of restitution.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Felicito J. Cervantes is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year
and six (6) months. He is ORDERED to restitute complainant Anita Santos Murray the sum of P80,000.00. For
every month (or fraction) the he fails to fully restitute complainant the sum of P80,000.00, respondent shall
suffer an additional suspension of one (1) month.

He is likewise WARNED that a repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to
respondent's personal record as attorney.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Reyes,
Perlas-Bernabe, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., on leave.
 EN BANC

November 7, 2017

A.C. No. 10532

REYNALDO A. CABUELLO (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY BEATRIZ CABUELLO

CABUTIN , Complainant
vs.
ATTY. EDITHA P. TALABOC, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

On October 12, 2010, complainant Reynaldo A. Cabuello filed an administrative complaint against respondent
Atty. Editha P. Talaboc with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Complainant engaged the services of respondent to represent his parents who were the.accused in Criminal
Cases Nos. CC-2007-1635 and CC-2007-1636, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Alejandro and Cecilia
Cabuello, which cases were pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33.
Alejandro and Cecilia Cabuello were charged with the crime of qualified theft of coconuts.

In his Complaint,  complainant stated that respondent, with postal address at No. 185 EDSA, Wack Wack,
1

Greenhills East, Mandaluyong City, neglected the criminal cases of his parents. Complainant alleged that he
paid for the legal services of respondent, but she did not attend any hearing. She also failed to file the
necessary complaint against the policemen (who arrested the accused) as agreed upon by them.

Complainant alleged that he paid for respondent's legal services as follows: (1) ₱20,000.00 for filing fee,
appearance fee and transportation expenses of respondent and her assistant, given on August 21, 2007; (2)
₱20,000.00 for respondent's acceptance fee, given on October 19, 2007; (3) ₱l0,000.00 for the motion and
affidavit of waiver, given on November 7, 2007; (4) ₱19,000.00, allegedly for the additional plane fare of
respondent and her assistant, as there was no longer any promotional fare, given on December 16, 2007; (5)
₱15,000.00 for the criminal case to be filed against the police officers who arrested the accused, given on
January 13, 2008 and July 16, 2008; (6) ₱8,500.00, allegedly for the fare of respondent and her assistant,
including taxi fare and food at the airport, given on February 4, 2008; (7) ₱2,500.00 for penalty, as they were
not able to use their plane tickets, given on February 4, 2008; and (8) ₱2,500.00 for payment of a motion, given
on April 18, 2008 (totaling ₱97,500.00.).

Complainant alleged that because respondent did not attend the hearings of the case, he was forced to go
back and forth from Manila to the province for 10 months to attend to the cases of his parents. Every time he
went home to the province, he spent ₱5,000.00 for his bus and plane fares and ₱l,000.00 for the van. He spent
a total amount of about ₱150,000.00 due to the negligence of respondent.

Unsatisfied with respondent's legal services, complainant sent respondent a demand letter  dated February 15,
2

2009 and a second demand letter  dated September 13, 2010, asking respondent to return the payments given
3

to her, but respondent disregarded his demand letters.

Complainant stated that he filed this complaint so the respondent will not repeat her negligence of duty toward
her client's case and for the return of the payments given to respondent, because she failed to fulfill her legal
obligation toward his parents as their lawyer.

On October 13, 2010, the IBP Director for Bar Discipline ordered respondent to file her Answer within 15 days
from notice. However, respondent failed to file her answer despite receipt of the order.  Hence, Investigating
4

Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez set the hearing of the case ex-parte on January 21, 2011.  On the said
5

date, only the complainant and his counsel appeared. As there was no showing that respondent received
notice of the said hearing, the same was cancelled and reset to March 4, 2011.  On March 4, 2011,
6

complainant and his counsel appeared, and respondent's representative, Marivic Alusitain, also appeared.
Respondent's representative manifested to the Commission that the respondent intended to file her Answer
and prayed for a period of seven days from the said date within which to do so, but respondent did not file an
Answer. The hearing was reset to April 1, 2011,  which was later cancelled, because complainant's counsel
7

was not feeling well and respondent's representative manifested that respondent was in Mindanao, attending to
the wake of her first cousin. Hence, the hearing was reset to April 15, 2011. On April 15, 2011, complainant and
his counsel appeared, while respondent and her representative were absent despite due notice. The parties
were given a period of 30 days from the said date within which to submit their respective verified position
papers. Complainant filed his position paper on May 16, 2011. Respondent did not file a position paper. 8

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

On July 25, 2011, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez submitted his Report and
Recommendation  on the administrative complaint, finding respondent guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of
9

the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of
law for six months.

The Investigating Commissioner stated that it is undisputed that complainant engaged the services of
respondent to represent complainant's parents, Alejandro and Cecilia Cabuello, in Criminal Cases Nos. CC-
2007- 1635 and CC-2007-1636, which were pending before the RTC of Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33.
Respondent was paid the following attorney's fees: (1) ₱20,000.00 for filing fee, appearance fee and
transportation expenses of respondent and her assistant, given on August 21, 2007; (2) ₱20,000.00 for
respondent's acceptance fee, given on October 19, 2007; (3) ₱l0,000.00 for the motion and affidavit of waiver,
given on November 7, 2007; (4) ₱l 9,000.00, allegedly for the additional plane fare of respondent and her
assistant, as there was no longer any promotional fare, given on December 16, 2007; (5) ₱15,000.00 for the
criminal case to be filed against the police, given on January 13, 2008; (6) ₱8,500.00 for the fare of respondent
and her assistant, including taxi fare and food at the airport, given on February 4, 2008; (7) ₱2,500.00 for
penalty, as they were not able to use their plane tickets, given on February 4, 2008; and (8) ₱2,500.00 for
payment of a motion, given on April 18, 2008.

The cases of complainant's parents were set for arraignment on July 27, 2007. On the said date, respondent
failed to appear. Hence, a counsel de oficio was assigned to assist complainant's parents. Thereafter, the
hearing was set on October 1 and 12, 2007.

On August 31, 2007, respondent filed a Motion to Transfer Dates of Hearing,  praying that the hearings set on
10

October 1, 2007 and on October 12, 2007 be cancelled and transferred to November 8 and 9, 2007 allegedly
for convenience, economic reason and to maximize efforts and results.

After the trial court granted the motion to transfer the hearing to November 8 and 9, 2007, respondent again
filed an Urgent Motion to Reset Hearing (Scheduled on November 8 and 9, 2007)  to January 18, 2008,
11

because respondent was allegedly suffering from severe and recurring back pains due to a vehicular accident
that occurred on September 7, 2007, and she submitted a medical certificate  therefor. Thus, the pre-trial was
12

reset to November 28 and 29, 2007,  which did not proceed, because respondent filed another motion to reset
13

the hearing to December 19 and 20, 2007.  Several postponements followed until June 19, 2008 when
14

respondent failed to appear because of peptic ulcer.  (In the Order  dated June 19, 2008, the trial court issued
15 16

a warrant of arrest for the apprehension of the accused). Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest with Apologia Cum Explanation,  and requested that the
17

hearing of the motion be set on July 25, 2008, but since the court would not be in session on the said date, the
hearing of the motion was set on July 31, 2008.  On the said date, respondent again failed to appear despite
18

due notice. This was followed by other settings until the pre-trial conference was set on September 25, 2008. 19

On the scheduled pre-trial conference on September 25, 2008, respondent again failed to appear despite due
notice. Hence, the trial court appointed Atty. Prescilla A. Salvacion of the Public Attorney's office (PAO) as
counsel for complainant's parents. Notwithstanding the appointment by the trial court of a counsel de
officio due to the repeated absences of the respondent, the latter still filed a Motion to Reset Hearing,  praying
20

that the hearings of the case for trial on the merits scheduled on November 27, 2008 and December 11, 2008
be reset to January 15, 2009 and February 19, 2009, which motion was denied by the trial court. 21

On December 11, 2008, before the prosecution presented its first witness, Atty. Salvacion manifested to the
trial court that respondent's secretary called up to inform her that respondent would still be appearing in the
said case and that she would be available on January 15, 2009. Thereafter, the respondent never
communicated with the complainant or his family. The demand letters sent by complainant to respondent for
the return of the payments made to her were just ignored.

Based on the foregoing facts, the Investigating Commissioner found that respondent violated Canons 17  and 22

18  of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that respondent be sanctioned with
23

suspension from the practice of law for six months.

On May 17, 2012, respondent filed a Motion to Re-open and to Set Conference and For (15) Days to File
Opposition/Position Paper,  praying that, in the interest of substantial justice, the case be re-opened and the
24

conference be set anew on May 31, 2013 and that respondent be given 15 days or until May 31, 2012 within
which to file her Opposition/Position Paper relative to the complaint. Respondent stated that she learned of the
filing of the complaint and was able to read the allegations therein when she arrived from the U.S.A. for medical
reasons as she had to be tested at the New York Hospital in New York, U.S.A. for the donation of her bone
marrow to her brother who was afflicted with cancer.
Complainant filed an Opposition  dated May 29, 2012, praying for the denial of respondent's motion, as it did
25

not state the period of her stay in the U.S.A. and no document was attached to support her excuse. Moreover,
during the mandatory conference dated March 4, 2011, respondent's representative manifested that
respondent intended to file an Answer, but she did not file an Answer or a Position Paper. Respondent's

representative also never mentioned that respondent was in the U.S.A., but she informed the Commission that
respondent was sick and could not appear before it.

Ruling of the IBP Board of Governors

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2013-234,  which adopted and
26

approved with modification the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, finding that
respondent violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and sanctioned respondent
with suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months and ordered her to return the amount received from
complainant with legal interest from the time the demand was made within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice.

On July 10, 2013, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration  of the IBP Resolution. Respondent
27

apologized for her failure to appear during the proceedings of this case, and reiterated that she was then in
New York, U.S.A., as she was being considered as a bone marrow donor for her brother who was afflicted with
cancer. She stated that complainant's allegation of payments made to her was not supported by evidence.

Respondent alleged that these are the true facts pertaining to this case:

a) Respondent admitted that she was engaged to represent the accused Spouses Cabuello in the criminal
cases for qualified theft. However, she said that at that time, she already intimated to Mr. Cabuello that she has
health problems so that in case she cannot attend the hearings, she may have to withdraw from the case,
although in terms of legwork or filing of pleadings and the like, her assistant Marivic Alusitain can assist them.

b) Thus, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion  dated August 16, 2007 in the second case for Qualified Theft,
28

which motion prayed for (1) the early resolution of accused's prayer for reduction of bail incorporated in
respondent's (as accused's counsel) Formal Entry of Appearance; (2) the remand of the custody of both the
accused, pending the proceedings of the case, from the provincial jail to the Calbiga Municipal Jail where they
were previously detained; and (3) the cancellation of the hearing of the case on August 1 7, 2007 and resetting
it on October 1, 2007 or October 12, 2007 at 8:30 a.m.

c) Respondent caused a request for reduction of the bail of the accused, and in an Order  dated August 9,
29

2007, the trial court gave notice that the request for reduction of bail from ₱24,000.00 and ₱30,000.00,
respectively, to ₱5,000.00 for both cases would be heard on August 1 7, 2007.

d) In the Order  dated September 21, 2007, the court stated that co-accused Cecilia Cabuello posted thru
30

Marivic Alusitain the amount of ₱22,000.00 as cash bail for both cases. In view thereof, co-accused Cecilia
Cabuello was ordered released from detention.

e) In one of the hearings of the case, both accused were indisposed due to medical reasons; hence, an order
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against them was issued. Thus, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration  of the said Order with an Affidavit of Waiver  so that the absence of the accused thereafter
31 32

may be excused.

f) During the subsequent hearings of the case, either the court or the respondent, who was afflicted with
several ailments, [reset the hearings] as evidenced by the orders of the court for the resetting of the case and
some of the medical certificates attached to the motion.

g) All the resetting of the hearings of the case that were filed by the respondent were with the knowledge and
conformity of her clients as well as complainant Reynaldo Cabuello.

h) Thus, respondent and Mr. Cabuello agreed, for economic reasons, that the Cabuellos would verify from the
court, days before a hearing is scheduled, if the hearing would push through so that there would be no need for
them to go to court in case a hearing is or would be cancelled.

i) For the February 6, 2008 hearing, respondent purchased a PAL ticket,  but she was informed by complainant
33

Reynaldo Cabuello the day before the hearing that the said February 6, 2008 hearing was cancelled due to the
retirement of the Presiding Judge of the court.

j) Because of the foregoing events and incidents, which have caused problems, stress and inconvenience as
well as expenses for all parties, both accused, thru complainant Reynaldo Cabuello, informed the respondent
that they will terminate her services and they will get a new lawyer to represent them. As far as respondent
knows, the accused were already represented by a new counsel of record in the case (per the trial court's
Order  dated February 5, 2009).
34
k) Thus, respondent filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused  (dated February 28, 2009), with
35

the conformity of the accused and duly received by the court. Corollary thereto, respondent surrendered to the
accused all the records of the case in her possession, as evidenced by the Acknowledgment  (dated February
36

28, 2009) of Ms. Cabuello.

l) In the same vein, for the purpose of peace, respondent offered to return to her clients, thru accused Cecilia
Cabuello, the payments made by the Cabuellos for the case, as evidenced by the document  dated February
37

28, 2009 (Annex "14"). 38

Moreover, respondent alleged that complainant's monetary claim has no basis, especially as respondent also
spent ₱22,000.00 for the bail of her clients, plus ₱l0,000.00 for the fare of Ms. Alusitain and ₱l 0,000.00 for
other expenses and court fees, including certified true copies of all the documents in court when she caused
the filing of the bail, and ₱5,000.00 for her PAL ticket for the hearing scheduled on February 6, 2008, which
was reset by the court because of the Presiding Judge's retirement. Respondent denied the other alleged
payments and stated that any money delivered by complainant to her assistant/staff was between them as the
same, if any, arose out of their agreement/arrangement, since she (respondent) never ordered complainant to
that effect.

Respondent also stated that she had already rendered her services in the case and had filed the Omnibus
Motion, Waiver and other pleadings; hence, based on quantum meruit, she may already be entitled to certain
fees.

Respondent asserted that she did not violate Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
considering the foregoing facts and evidence. She prayed that the IBP reconsider and set aside its Resolution
and that a new Order be issued dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.

On August 29, 2013, complainant filed his comment  to respondent's motion for reconsideration. He contended
39

that the motion should be denied on the following grounds: (a) respondent's version of the facts should not be
raised in a motion for reconsideration; (b) the attachments to the motion would show that respondent admitted
that there were payments made; (c) contrary to respondent's claim, the attachments would show that
respondent had been coordinating with complainant; and (d) the duty of a lawyer to his client to exert diligent
efforts should be until the termination of the client-lawyer relationship.

Complainant denied respondent's allegation that he took advantage of the fact that respondent was in the
U.S.A. at the time he filed the complaint, since he had no knowledge of the same. During the mandatory
conference held on March 4, 2011, respondent's representative, Marivic Alusitain, appeared and manifested
that respondent intended to file an Answer within a period of seven days. Respondent's representative
informed the Commission that respondent was sick and could not appear before it, but she never mentioned
that respondent was in the U.S.A. for any medical examination for bone marrow transplant. Respondent has
not substantiated her claim of being in the U.S.A. at that time.

Complainant also denied that respondent was the one who paid for the bail bond of his parents, since he had
the money and respondent's representative/secretary, Marivic Alusitain, only accompanied him. Marivic
Alusitain later advised him that the receipt should be under her name in order that they will be known in the
place as complainant's counsel. 40

Further, complainant stated that it was not true that Cecilia Cabuello received the documents and money from
respondent, because what she received from respondent were the documents pertaining to Civil Case No. 05-
203, which complainant and Cecilia Cabuello asked her to review or give an opinion on. Cecilia Cabuello
refused and never received the money because she knew that the money belonged to him (complainant) and
his siblings. Cecilia Cabuello remembered that respondent's secretary tricked her to sign a document that she
did not understand. Complainant attached to his Comment the letter  of Cecilia Cabuello, which stated that she
41

did not receive the money from respondent's representative/secretary, Marivic Alusitain, because she had no
right to get the money that belonged to her children.

Complainant contended that it is not true that respondent had an agreement with complainant's parents that
respondent may have to withdraw from the case because of health problems, but her assistant can assist them
in terms of legwork or filing of pleadings and the like, since respondent did not even present any written
agreement or contract to show the consent of the other party. Respondt;nt may have been able to present
pleadings that she had filed prior to the arraignment of his parents, but from the arraignment of the case until
respondent's withdrawal as counsel for the accused, respondent never appeared before the court, and it was
the counsel de oficio who assumed her duties in order not to delay the proceedings.

On March 21, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014-96,  which denied
42

respondent's motion for reconsideration, thus:

RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out
and taken into consideration. Further, the Board RESOLVED to AFFIRM, with modification, Resolution No. XX-
2013-234 dated March 20, 2013 and accordingly the penalty meted by Atty. Editha Talaboc increased from six
(6) months SUSPENSION from the practice of law to two (2) years. Moreover, she is hereby Ordered to Return
the amount received from Complainant with legal interest from the time the demand was made within thirty (30)
days from notice.

In a letter  dated July 15, 2014, the IBP Director for Bar Discipline informed the Chief Justice of the Supreme
43

Court of the trarismittal of the documents of this case to the Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

On September 12, 2014, respondent filed a motion for extension of 15 days to file a petition for review of the
Resolution of the Commission on Bar Discipline denying her motion for reconsideration, which motion was
granted by the Court in a Resolution  dated October 14, 2014.
44

In a Resolution  dated September 15, 2015, the Court considered respondent to have waived the filing of a
45

petition for review as she failed to file the petition within the extension granted by the Court, which expired on
September 27, 2014.

On July 4, 2016, the IBP Director for Bar Discipline referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Motion for
Substitution of Complainant Reynaldo Cabuello  filed by Ms. Beatriz C. Cabutin on July 1, 2016, which motion
46

informed the Court of complainant's death on March 27, 2016 and prayed that he be substituted by his sister,
Beatriz Cabuello Cabutin.

In a Resolution  dated November 8, 2016, the Court granted the motion for substitution and ordered the
47

substitution of Reynaldo A. Cabuello by Beatriz Cabuello Cabutin as complainant in this case.

Ruling of the Court

The Court agrees with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner and affirms Resolution No. XX-2013-234
and Resolution No. XXI-2014-96 of the IBP Board of Governors, but modifies the penalty imposed on the
respondent and the amount of money to be refunded by respondent to complainant.

The records show that as counsel of the complainant's parents, respondent was remiss in her duty toward
them by never appearing in the hearings of the criminal case, which contributed to the delay of the pre-trial of
the case for eleven months or almost a year until the trial court finally appointed a counsel de oficio for
respondent's clients so the pre-trial and trial on the merits could proceed. Respondent kept on filing a motion to
reset the scheduled pre-trial, including those dates of hearings requested by her, from the start until her
withdrawal as counsel. This is borne out by the Orders of the RTC having jurisdiction over the cases of
complainant's parents. The Order dated June 19, 2008 states:

It appears from the records that the arraignment of these cases was conducted on July 27, 2007 yet but no pre-
trail conference was conducted because Atty. Editha Talaboc, the counsel for both accused had filed a series
of postponements alleging every thinkable ground as reasons for her nonappearance.

Considering that sufficient time had already been granted by the Court to the accused, further considering that
in all of these scheduled hearings both accused were not present, issue a warrant of arrest for the
apprehension of accused Alejandro Cabuello and Cecilia Cabuello. 48

To the Order quoted above, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest
with Apologia cum Explanation  dated June 24, 2008. The trial court set the respondent's motion for hearing on
49

July 31, 2008. 50

In the Order  dated July 31, 2008, the trial court lifted the warrant for the arrest of the accused as they were
51

present in court. Respondent, however, was not available on that day, so the court re-scheduled the pre-trial
conference on August 28, 2008 and stated that if respondent would not appear on that day, the court will
appoint a counsel de oficio to assist the accused.

In an Order  dated August 21, 2008, the pre-trial conference was reset to September 25, 2008. On September
52

25, 2008, respondent was not present, so the court appointed Atty. Prescilla A. Salvacion of the PAO to
represent complainant's parents. 53

Thereafter, the hearing for the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution was scheduled on November
27, 2008 and December 11, 2008.  Respondent again filed a Motion to Reset Hearing,  alleging that she was
1âwphi1
54

not available during the scheduled hearings as she was committed to appear in other branches of the RTC in
Metro Manila, and praying that the trial of the cases be reset to January 15, 2009 and February 19, 2009.
The trial court denied the motion as it had already appointed Atty. Prescilla A. Salvacion to assist the accused
and she had already ably assisted the accused during the pre-trial conference of the case on September 25,
2008. 55

During the hearing of the presentation of evidence for the prosecution scheduled on December 11, 2008, Atty.
Prescilla A. Salvacion informed the court that respondent's secretary called up to inform her that respondent
will still be representing the accused in the case and that she is available on January 15, 2009. As reflected in
the transcript of stenographic notes, the Court replied, thus:

The Court: The Order of the Court is final. I have already appointed the PAO as the counsel de oficio of this
case, considering that Atty. Editha Talabo[c] just kept on promising that she will be coming to appear on this
case, but she never once [came] to this Court to appear. I will make an Order. 56

On March 13, 2009, respondent filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused. 57

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that respondent indeed violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thus:

Canon 17- A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

A member of the legal profession owes his/her client entire devotion to the latter's genuine interest, and warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his/her rights.  An attorney is expected to exert his/her best efforts and
58

ability to preserve his/her client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his/her client, likewise, serves
the ends of justice.  Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not
59

only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.
60

Camara v. Atty. Reyes  held: 61

Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare~ and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice
from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for
his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in
the outcome of the case. This is also the reason why this Court may investigate charges against lawyers
regardless of complainant's standing. 62

In regard to the refund sought for payments made to respondent alleged to be in the total amount of
₱97,500.00, complainant failed to present receipts or documents to evidence the same.

The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer's agreement between the client and the attorney,
which constitutes the law between the parties for as long as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy or public order.  In this case, there was no retainer's agreement between the parties to
63

be able to ascertain the attorney's fees agreed upon and received by respondent. In his Complaint,
complainant sought the return of acceptance fees in the amount of ₱20,000.00 for the criminal cases and
₱l5,000.00 for the case supposed to be filed against the police officers who arrested the accused. The Court
notes that in Annex "14"  of respondent's motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted to having received
64

the amount of ₱25,000.00 as attorney's fee/acceptance fee for the two criminal cases and ₱15,000.00 for the
case supposed to be filed with the fiscal's office plus ₱5,000.00 for expenses, and ₱5,000.00 representing the
refund of the PAL ticket rescheduled four times due to the cancellation and resetting of the court hearings,
totaling ₱50,000.00, which amount respondent offered to return to complainant's mother Cecilia
Cabuello.  Cecilia Cabuello, however, declined and denied receipt of such payment from respondent's
65

representative, Marivic Alusitain, because she had no right to receive the money that belonged to her children,
as stated in her letter (Annex "D-2")  attached to complainant's Opposition to Respondent's Motion for
66

Reconsideration.

Hence, in the absence of receipts or documentary evidence to substantiate the amount of ₱97,500.00 sought
to be recovered by complainant from respondent, complainant is entitled to a refund in the amount of
₱50,000.00, which had been admittedly received by respondent from the Cabuellos as payment for
attorney's/acceptance fees and other expenses including refund of a PAL ticket and which amount respondent
offered to return to Cecilia Cabuello.

The Court modifies the penalty of suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors on respondent from two
years to one year.  In Chang v. Hidalgo,  the Court stated that in several cases, it has imposed the penalty of
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67

one (1) year suspension from the practice of law for violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondent Atty. Editha P. Talaboc GUILTY of violating
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, respondent is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, which shall take effect immediately upon receipt of this Decision by the
respondent, and she is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely. Respondent is also DIRECTED to return to complainant Beatriz Cabuello Cabutin the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00), with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum, from the date of receipt of this Decision until fully paid.

Upon receipt of this Decision, respondent is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation informing this Court
that her suspension has started and to furnish a copy of the Manifestation to all courts and quasi-judicial bodies
where she has entered her appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts of the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

On official leave
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. *

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

On official leave
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO *

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

On official business
On official leave
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO *

Associate Justice ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE **

Associate Justice

On leave
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA ***

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA SAMUEL R. MARTIRES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice