Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Cases Rule 110
Cases Rule 110
TEEHANKEE, J:
The Court sets aside the respondent judge's orders dismissing the information for estafa against respondent
accused, since the offense charged clearly has not prescribed. The complaint filed with the Batangas court
which expressly alleged commission of the offense within the municipality and which pended for twelve years
(the accused having jumped bail and evaded rearrest for nine years) and which was eventually dismissed by
said court for lack of territorial jurisdiction as a result of the proof adduced before it properly interrupted and
tolled the prescription period. Respondent judge failed, in ruling otherwise, to apply the settled rule that the
jurisdiction of a court is determined in criminal cases by the allegations of the complaint or information and not
by the result of proof. The case is ordered remanded for determination with the utmost dispatch, since this
case has already been pending for fifteen years owing to respondent accused's deplorable tactics. The
undisputed factual background of the case is succinctly stated by then Acting Solicitor General, now Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals, Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., thus:
1. On October 2,1962, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed in the municipal court of
Batangas, Batangas (now City Court of Batangas City) against the accused-respondent
Gregorio Santos by complainant, Juanito Limbo, ...
2. Gregorio Santos was arrested to answer for the above charge, and upon his arrest, posted a
bail bond for his provisional liberty. The accused was thereafter arraigned and he pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Then, the case was heard on its merits. However, on September 16,
1964, the accused jumped bail. As a result, his bail bond was forfeited and the case against him
archived by the municipal court of Batangas, Batangas.
3. It was not until September 14, 1973, about nine years later, when the accused was re-
arrested, and the trial of the said case resumed.
4. On October 21, 1974, while the said case was pending trial, private respondent Gregorio
Santos filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the Batangas court did not have
territorial jurisdiction over the case, the evidence showing that the crime was committed in
Manila.
5. Finding the motion meritorious, the Batangas City Court issued an order dated November 5,
1974, dismissing the case against Gregorio Santos for lack of territorial jurisdiction over the
crime charged ...
6. On November 14, 1974, the complainant Juanito B. Limbo refiled the same case against
Gregorio Santos in the Fiscal's Office of Manila. A preliminary investigation was conducted. On
July 29, 1975, the corresponding information was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 22397, ...
7. On November 12, 1975 the accused Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss criminal Case
No. 22397 on the grounds of prescription and double jeopardy.
8. The prosecuting fiscal filed his opposition to said motion on December 2, 1975, to which the
accused filed a rejoinder on December 5, 1975.
9. On December 8, 1975, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, presided over by the
Honorable Ricardo D. Galano, issued an order dismissing Criminal Case No. 22397 on the
ground that the offense charged had already prescribed, ... The prosecution moved for the
reconsideration of said order but this was denied by the lower court by order of January 7, 1976.
...
10. From the said Order of dismissal, the City Fiscal of Manila offenses provides: interposed an
appeal by certiorari to this Honorable Court on January 24, 1976. On March 3, 1976, this
honorable Court issued the Resolution of March 3, 1976 requiring the Solicitor General to file the
petition for review within fifteen days from receipt thereof ...
The People avers in the petition 1 that respondent judge "dismissing criminal Case No. 22397 despite the
provisions of Article l of the Revised Penal Code, which clearly indicate that the offense charged has not
prescribed" and "in not considering the prevailing jurisprudence indicating non-prescription of the offense
charged, and in holding that the case of People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494, does not apply to the case at bar."
The petition is patently meritorious and must be granted.
I. The offense of estafa for which respondent accused stands charged clearly has not prescribed.
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.— The period of prescription shall commence to
run from the day on which the discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or by their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information and shall commence
to run again when the proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted
or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. ...
The offense was committed on or about September 16, 1962 when respondent failed to account for and
instead misappropriated to his own use the sum of P8,704.00 representing the net proceeds (minus his
commission) of 272 booklets of sweepstakes tickets that had been entrusted to him be the complainant, who
promptly filed on October 2, 1962 plainly within the ten-year prescriptive period the criminal complaint against
respondent accused in the Municipal Court of Batangas, Batangas. The prescriptive period was thereupon
interrupted.
After his plea of not guilty and during the trial, respondent accused jumped bail in September, 1964 and
evaded rearrest for nine years until September, 1973 and the trial was resumed. When the Batangas court in
its Order of November 5, 1974 upon respondent's motion dismissed the complaint "for lack of jurisdiction"
since the evidence (of both prosecution and accused) showed that all elements of the crime were committed
in Manila (and not in Batangas), 2 the proceedings therein terminated without conviction or acquittal of
respondent accused and it was only then that the prescriptive period (which was interrupted during the
pendency of the case in the Batangas court) commenced to run again.
When the City Fiscal of Manila upon complainant's instance refiled on July 29, 1975 the same case against
respondent accused in the Manila court of first instance, (after having conducted a preliminary investigation),
it is clear that not even a year of the ten-year prescriptive period had been consumed.
Respondent accused intent on thwarting his prosecution filed anew a motion to dismiss the information on
grounds of prescription and double jeopardy. There is manifestly no jeopardy, because he was not acquitted
by the Batangas court which on the basis of the evidence could neither convict him because it was thereby
shown to have no jurisdiction over the offense.
But respondent judge gravely erred in sustaining the ground of prescription, ruling that there was no
interruption of the prescriptive period during the pendency of the case in the Batangas court because "(T)he
proceedings contemplated by Article 91 are proceedings which are valid and before a competent court. If they
are void from the beginning because the court has no territorial jurisdiction of the offense charged, it is as if no
proceedings were held thereat. If this is so, then the warrant or order of arrest as well as the bail given by the
accused for his provisional liberty is of no effect. Inevitably, there can be no jumping bail to speak of and there
are no proceedings to be interrupted."
This is plain error for "Settled is the rule ... that the jurisdiction of a court is determined in criminal cases by
the allegations of the complaint or information and not by the result of proof." 4
It follows clearly that the Batangas court was vested with lawful jurisdiction over the criminal complaint filed
with it which expressly alleged that the offense was committed "in the Municipality of Batangas, province of
Batangas" and that the proceedings therein were valid and before a competent court, (including the arrest
warrant, the grant of bail and forfeiture thereof upon the accused's jumping of bail), until the same court
issued its November. 1974 order dismissing the Case and declaring itself without territorial jurisdiction on the
basis of the evidence presented to it by both prosecution and the accused.
It follows just as clearly that the prescriptive period was interrupted and tolled during the 12-year pendency of
the proceedings before the Batangas Court (for nine years of which respondent accused had jumped bail and
evaded re-arrest).
II. Respondent judge gravely erred in dismissing the information on the ground of prescription and
disregarding the controlling case of People vs. Olarte. 5
In the second People vs. Olarte case, 6 the Court clarified precisely for the guidance of bench and bar that
the true doctrine is that the filing of the compliant in the municipal court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary investigation (where the offense charged is beyond its jurisdiction to try the case on the merits)
should, and does interrupt the period of prescription, as follows:
Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription discloses that there are two lines of
decisions following differing criteria in determining whether prescription of crimes has been
interrupted. One line of precedents holds that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the
peace (or municipal judge) does interrupt the course of the prescriptive term: (People vs. Olarte,
L-131027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106, October 16,
1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590.) Another series of decisions declares that to
produce interruption the complaint or information must have been filed in the proper court that
has jurisdiction to try the case on its merits: People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29,
1960; People vs. Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this
Court has reexamined the question and after mature consideration has arrived at the conclusion
that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decision holding that the
filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on
its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription 'shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information' without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for
preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the
court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuation already represents the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is
unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are
not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. 7
Respondent judge in his dismissal order correctly cited the rationale for statutory prescriptions, inter alia, that
"the delay in instituting the proceedings not only causes expenses to the State, but exposes public justice to
peril, for it weakens oral evidence due to the lapse of the natural period of duration of memory if not to
anything, else. And it is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt and that statutes enforcing
that promptitude should be maintained, they being not merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the State
upon its subalterns, to exact vigilant activity and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be
obtained. 8
But respondent judge fell into grave error in not applying the controlling case of Olarte on his misconception
that there had been no valid complaint filed with a competent court in Batangas contrary to what has already
been held hereinabove that the express allegations of the complaint that the offense was committed in
Batangas vested the Batangas court with lawful jurisdiction until its dismissal order twelve years later for lack
of jurisdiction as a result of the proof presented before it during the tiral (and in not taking into account that the
delay was not at all due to the State but to respondent accused himself who jumped bail and escaped tile law
for nine [9] years and who apparently has made no effort all this time to make good the amount the to
complainant or any part thereof).
Since the record with transcript of the testimonial evidence in the Batangas court is complete (and shows that
the trial was continued on August 2, 1974 to September 10, 1974 while respondent accused was testifying on
the witness stand but that he instead filed his motion to dismiss of October 14, 1974 which granted by the
Batangas court for lack of territorial jurisdiction) and this case had already been pending for almost 15 years,
all the evidence already taken by the Batangas court as recorded in the minutes and transcript shall be
deemed reproduced upon remand of the case to the Manila court which is hereby ordered to receive only the
remaining evidence of the respondent accused and such rebuttal evidence as the parties may have and
thereafter resolve the case with the utmost dispatch.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge's dismissal orders of December 8, 1975 and January 7, 1976 are hereby
set aside, and the case is remanded to respondent judge or whoever presides Branch XIII of the Manila court
of first instance for continuation of the trial (with reproduction of the evidence in the Batangas city court in
Criminal Case No. 532 thereof, entitled "People vs. Gregorio Santos") in line with the directives in the
preceding paragraph. Respondent judge or the judge presiding his court is further ordered to report to this
Court the action taken hereon within a period of ninety (90) days from promulgation of this decision. In view of
the many years that the criminal case has been pending, this decision is declared immediately executory
upon promulgation.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Concepcion Jr.* and Martin, JJ., concur.
CRUZ, J.:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of
municipal ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.1 The referral-complaint of the police was received by
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information was filed
with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. 3
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion
was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent
judge. 4
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is
governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:
Sec. 1. Scope — This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offenses charged does
not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both,
irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising
therefrom. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan
Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided,
further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall
be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for
Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin
to Run," reading as follows:
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall
prescribe after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution
of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations
of law not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the
two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her
should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the
complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the
Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as
follows:
Sec. 1. How Instituted — For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special
cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the
complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite
preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or
a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases"
applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum in Francisco v.
Court of Appeals: 5
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this
Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the
conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding
that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of
the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try
the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing
of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court
for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is
unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are
not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before the
promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule
110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January
1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure
in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to
summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases
covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This
interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from
the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of
municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a
municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in
such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both
such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in
court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties agree that
this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to.
However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution
decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings
referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General
that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does
not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1
of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a
conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield
because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right. 7
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would have been
conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the
Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period.
By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty
cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed
seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules
beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion
of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its
alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with
Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have
interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was
done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the
ground of prescription. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be
followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a
decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the
couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born
on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation
de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent
initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January,
1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April,
1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil
Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated
a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted
to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent
for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by
the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent,
petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review,
the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints
for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil
and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua",
docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same
court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution
of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by
James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief
State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the
Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer
further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the
arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the
resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was
also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the
respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both
accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner
refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct
contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for
arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to
quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the
charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under
his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No.
87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid
petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has
long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional,
and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the
offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as
jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without
which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery
and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in
the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other
words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows
that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a
ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same
requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since
criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the
Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called
"private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of
such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action,
or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of
the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said
provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the
alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist
as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined
by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior
to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case.
We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without
the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when
precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be
commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and
with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered
and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours,
yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the
exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly
commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal
proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have
been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant
insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly
said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the
reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse
must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature,
the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed.
Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is
still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter
of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States
court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court
here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an
accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this
Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner,
had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse
at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for
lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent
initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows
to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing
spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law
on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one
would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In
applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code,
which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that
"the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even
though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void,
until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be
logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such
declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no
marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer
have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the
decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of
the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily
apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the
same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly
and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was
resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any
issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also
in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute
divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has
carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have
sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be
allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce
between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory
that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision
yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is
married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of
the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is
concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque
situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion
however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national
law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper
foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the
people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of
the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her
national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on
August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the
Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband
was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino
wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, finding Gamelo Mariano y Obusan
guilty of the crime of rape committed upon a woman of unsound and feeble mind, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P 12.000.00 as moral
damages and to pay the costs.
Socorro Soria, a demented woman of 24 years, had been confined as a mental patient at the National Mental
Hospital in Mandaluyong, Manila, since February 26, 1971 up to May 3, 1974 when she was transferred to the
Don Susano J. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital in Pili, Camarines Sur for further treatment. On May 26, 1975,
her parents brought her home to Burabod Daet, Camarines Norte, to be treated by the appellant, known in the
locality as a faith healer or "spiritista"
In the afternoon of September 25, 1976, appellant went to the residence of the Sorias to treat Socorro. After
securing some "salompas" from Mrs. Maria Soria, mother of Socorro, he entered the room of his patient, and
locked the door.
Shortly after, Mrs. Soria, who was attending to her customers at the rice mill adjacent to her house, was
informed by her daughter-in-law Elizabeth Albino Soria, that the door of Socorro's room was locked. Mrs.
Soria proceeded to the room and when she noted that the door was indeed locked from inside, she and
Elizabeth peeped through a small aperture and saw the appellant on top of Socorro in the act of sexual
intercourse. Appellant had his pants off, while Socorro was naked from the waist down. Mrs. Soria
immediately clambered to the top shelf of the cabinet which served as the dividing wall between Socorro's
room and the sala, and stretching herself across the top of the cabinet, she reached out and grabbed the
appellant's hair. [This was demonstrated by Mrs. Soria during the ocular inspection conducted at the scene of
the incident]. Jolted by the sudden intrusion appellant stood up, with his penis still erect. He hastily put on his
clothes, opened the door of the room, and attempted to run, but his path was blocked by Elizabeth. When
Mrs. Soria confronted him, appellant expressed his willingness to be Socorro's husband and promise to
construct an annex to his house where he would keep Socorro as his wife.
Socorro was forthwith brought to the Camarines Norte Provincial Hospital, where she was examined by Dra.
Amelia Paguirigan. The latter's findings are as follows:
— Abrasions, over both lower part of mucosa of labia majora.
— Hymenal tear, 6 o'clock, 2 o'clock and 9 o'clock position.
—Vaginal intritus admits 1 finger loosely.
— Vaginal smear and emusion for sperm cells — negative
In his defense, appellant denied having had any sexual intercourse with Socorro at any time since he began
treating her sometime in July 1976. He declared that one week before September 25, 1976, he informed Mrs.
Soria that her daughter's mental illness was beyond his capacity to cure; that he recommended that Socorro
be referred to another faith healer from San Pablo; that despite his recommendation, Mrs. Soria on
September 25, 1976 had him fetched by her nephew to continue with the treatment of Socorro; that because
of Mrs. Soria's call, he went to the Soria's residence, but he entered Socorro's room only after he had asked
the permission of her mother; and that after performing the necessary treatment, he immediately proceeded
home.
On September 27, 1976, a verified complaint for rape, signed by Mrs. Maria Soria, was filed against appellant
before the Municipal Court of Daet, Camarines Norte. On the basis thereof, an information was filed before
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte.
We sustain the trial court's conclusion that "the evidence regarding the commission of the offense by the
appellant is overwhelming." No less than the victim's mother testified that she had caught appellant having
carnal intercourse with Socorro. Indeed, Mrs. Soria could not have given false testimony and thus expose her
daughter to public ridicule and disgrace, if she was not motivated by her maternal desire to vindicate her
daughter's honor.
The positive declaration of Mrs. Soria that her daughter was sexually abused by appellant finds corroboration
in the testimony, of the examining physician, Dr. Paguirigan, who found "hymenal tears at 6 o'clock, 2 o'clock
and 9 o'clock positions." These lacerations of the hymen constitute indubitable proof of penetration of the
male organ into the labia of the pudendum 1
That Socorro was a demented woman is not disputed by appellant, as the latter even admitted that Socorro's
mental illness was beyond his capability to cure. Moreover, Dra. Amelia Paguirigan described the victim as a
"known psychotic, violent type and resisting examination, talking nonsense, while Dr. Edgardo Bengzon of the
National Mental Hospital diagnosed her ailment as "schizophrenia chronic." [Exhibit B
It is settled in this jurisdiction that an accused who has carnal knowledge with a mentally retarded or
demented woman is guilty of rape 2 the reason being that she is incapable of giving rational consent to the
sexual intercourse. 3
Appellant further argues that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because the victim's
mother had no right or authority to file a complaint for rape inasmuch as the father was still living. He invokes
the following provisions of Rule 1 10 of the Rules of Court.
SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions.
xxx xxx xxx
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasPiviousness shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint Med by the offended party, or her parents, grandparents, or guardian,
nor in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the abovenamed persons, as
the case may be.
The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to institute the prosecution for the
above offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless she is
incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority. Where the offended
party who is a minor fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents or guardians, may file
the same. The right to file the action granted to the parents, grandparents or guardians shall be
exclusive of all other persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided."
[See third paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code].
While we agree with the appellant's contention that the trial court does not acquire jurisdiction if the complaint
charging an accused with any of the aforesaid private crimes is not filed by one of the persons indicated in
said section there is nothing in the context thereof to support the view that the mother cannot present the
complaint if the father is still living In People vs. Dela Cruz 4 , this Court resolved the same legal question in
this wise:
Appellant's contention is . . . based on a dubious technicality. If sustained, it might defeat the
ends of justice. It is not sanctioned by section 4 of Rule 110 nor by article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code whose provisions do not categorically specify that the father has the preferential
right to file the complaint for seduction, abduction, rape or abusos deshonestos It is noteworthy
that 'the father and mother jointly exercise parental authority over their legitimate children who
are not emancipated'. It is their duty to represent their emancipated children 'in all actions which
may redound to their benefit' [Arts. 311 and 316, Civil Code]. "
xxx xxx xxx
Under the circumstances the complaint filed by ther was a sufficient complhmee with article 344
and section 4 of Rule 110. It conferred jiwiction on the court to try the Mae [People vs. Pastores,
L-29800, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 498, 508; People vs. Bangalao 94 Phil. 354; U.S. vs.
Gariboso 25 Phil. 171]. The father's passivity should not preclude the mother from securing
redress for the outrage committed against her daughter.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with
costs against appellant Gamelo Obusan.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion Jr., and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., are on leave.
G.R. No. 179814, December 07, 2015 - WILFRED N.CHIOK, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND RUFINA CHUA, Respondents.; G.R. No. 180021 - RUFINA CHUA, Petitioner, v. WILFRED N. CHIOK,
AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (AS AN UNWILLING CO-PARTY PETITIONER), Respondent.:
G.R. No. 179814, December 07, 2015 - WILFRED N.CHIOK, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND RUFINA CHUA, Respondents.; G.R. No. 180021 - RUFINA CHUA, Petitioner, v. WILFRED N. CHIOK,
AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (AS AN UNWILLING CO-PARTY PETITIONER), Respondent.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179814, December 07, 2015
WILFRED N.CHIOK, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND RUFINA CHUA, Respondents.
RUFINA CHUA, Petitioner, v. WILFRED N. CHIOK, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (AS AN
UNWILLING CO-PARTY PETITIONER), Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
These are consolidated petitions 1 seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals (CA) July 19, 2007 Decision 2 and
October 3, 2007 Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23309. The CA reversed and set aside the December 3,
1998 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig-Branch 165, and acquitted petitioner Wilfred Chiok
(Chiok) of the crime of estafa in Criminal Case No. 109927, but ordered him to pay civil liability to Rufina
Chua in the total amount of P9,500,000.00, plus interests:
WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED DECEMBER 3, 1998 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and
accused WILFRED N. CHIOK is ACQUITTED for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, but he is ORDERED to pay complainant RUFINA CHUA the principal
amount of [P]9,500,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the tiling of this
case, which rate shall increase to 12% per annum from the finality of judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Chiok was charged with estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code, in an Information that reads:
That sometime in June, 1995 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from Rufina
Chua the amount of P9,563,900.00 for him to buy complainant shares of stocks, under the express
obligation on the part of the accused to deliver the documents thereon or to return the whole
amount if the purchase did not materialize, but the accused once in possession of the said amount,
far from complying will his obligation as aforesaid, with intent to defraud the complainant, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert lo his own
personal use and benefit the said amount of P9,563,900.00, and despite repeated demands failed
and relused and still fails and refuses to return the said amount or to account for the same, to the
damage and prejudice of the complainant Rufina Chua in the aforementioned amount of
P9,563,900.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Chiok pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued, with both parties presenting their
evidence in support of their respective claims and defenses.
According to the Prosecution, petitioner Rufina Chua (Chua) met Chiok in mid-1989, during which he offered
to be her investment adviser. Convinced by Chiok's representations and the fact that he is Chinese, Chua
made an initial investment of P200,000.00, allegedly to buy Meralco and PLDT shares. She rolled over the
original investment and profits, and this went on until 1994. For each of their transactions, Chua claimed she
was not given any document evidencing every stock transaction and that she only relied on the assurances of
Chiok. In mid-1995, she accepted his proposal to buy shares in bulk in the amount of P9,563,900.00. Chua
alleged that she deposited P7,100,000.00 to Chiok's Far East Bank, Annapolis account on June 9, 1995 and
delivered to him P2,463,900.00 in cash later that same date at the Han Court Restaurant in Annapolis,
Greenhills. As proof, she presented a deposit slip dated June 9, 1995 of Chiok's Far Bast Bank Annapolis
account. There was no receipt or memorandum for the cash delivery. 7
Chua narrated that she became suspicious when Chiok later on avoided her calls and when he failed to show
any document of the sale. He reassured her by giving her two interbank checks, Check No. 02030693 dated
July 11, 1995 for P7,963,900.00 and Check No. 02030694 dated August 15, 1995 in the amount of
P1,600,000.00 (interbank checks). The interbank checks were given with the request to deposit the first check
only after 60-75 days to enable him to generate funds from the sale of a property in I long Kong. Both
interbank checks were ultimately dishonored upon presentment for payment due to garnishment and
insufficiency of funds. Despite Chua's pleas, Chiok did not return her money. Hence, she referred the matter
to her counsel who wrote a demand letter dated October 25, 1995. Chiok sent her a letter-reply dated
November 16, 1995 stating that the money was Chua's investment in their unregistered partnership, and was
duly invested with Yu Que Ngo. In the end, Chua decided to file her complaint-affidavit against him in the
Pasig Prosecutor's Office.8
In his defense, Chiok denied that he enticed Chua to invest in the stock market, or offered her the prospect of
buying shares of stocks in bulk. Chiok maintained that from the time he met her in 1991 and until 1995, he
previously only had dollar transactions with Chua. It was in 1995 when both of them decided to form an
unregistered partnership. He admitted that the P7,963,900.00 she gave him before she left for the United
States was her investment in this unregistered partnership. Chua allegedly instructed him to invest according
to his best judgment and asked him to issue a check in her name for her peace of mind. Chiok denied having
received the P2,463,900.00 in cash from her. 9
On cross-examination, however, Chiok admitted receiving "P7.9" million in June 1995 and "P1.6" million
earlier.10 He testified that exercising his best judgment, he invested P8,000,000.00 with Yu Que Ngo, a
businesswoman engaged in the manufacture of machine bolts and screws under the name and style of Capri
Manufacturing Company.11 Chiok narrated that Chua only panicked when she learned that he was swindled
by one Gonzalo Nuguid, who supplied him with dollars. 12 It was then that she immediately demanded the
return of her investment. To reassure Chua, Chiok informed her that lie had invested the money with Yu Que
Ngo and offered to give Yu Que Ngo's checks to replace his previously issued interbank checks. 13 Chua
agreed, but instead of returning his checks, she retained them along with the checks of Yu Que Ngo. Chua
rejected Yu Que Ngo's offer to settle her obligation with land and machineries, insisting on recovering the
"whole amount plus interest, litigation expenses plus attorney's fees." 14 After the case was filed, Chiok and Yu
Que Ngo met with Chua, accompanied by their lawyers, in an effort to amicably settle Chua's demand for the
return of her funds. Chua demanded more than P30,000,000.00, but Chiok and Yu Que Ngo requested for a
lower amount because the original claim was only P9,500,000.00. Chua did not grant their request. 15
In a Decision16 dated December 3, 1998, the RTC convicted Chiok of the crime of estafa (RTC conviction). Its
dispositive portion reads:
In View Of All The Foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused Wilfred N. Chiok guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer
imprisonment of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum and to pay the costs.
The accused is ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P9,563,900.00 with interest
at the legal rate to be computed from the date of demand - October 25, 1995 until fully paid.
For want of evidence, the Court cannot award the alleged actual damages.
SO ORDERED.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The prosecution filed a Motion for Cancellation of Bail 18 pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure on February 1, 1999, the same day the judgment was promulgated. 19 On February 15,
1999, Chiok filed a Motion for Reconsideration 20 of the RTC conviction.
The RTC, in an omnibus order21 dated May 28, 1999 (omnibus order), denied Chiok's motion for
reconsideration, and also cancelled his bail pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. The RTC held that the circumstances of the accused indicated the probability of flight if released
on bail and/or that there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, he may commit another crime.
Thus:
WHEREFORE, the bail of the accused is cancelled. The accused is given five (5) days from receipt
of this order within which to surrender before this Court otherwise, his arrest will be ordered.
SO ORDERED.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On June 18, 1999, Chiok filed a Notice of Appeal 23 on the RTC conviction and omnibus order, docketed as
CA-G.R. CR No. 23309 (the appeal case) and rallied to the CA Fifteenth Division. On June 19, 1999, Chiok
also filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Injunction against the omnibus order, 24 which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 53340 (bail case) and raffled
to the CA Thirteenth Division.
Meanwhile, the RTC issued an order of arrest 25 on June 25, 1999 (order of arrest) pursuant to the omnibus
order. The order of arrest was returned to the trial court by the Makati Police Station on July 25, 1999 on the
ground that Chiok could not be located at his last given address. 26
On July 27, 1999, the CA issued a TRO on the implementation of the omnibus order until further orders. 27 On
September 20, 1999, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction 28 enjoining the arrest of Chiok. The CA
ruled that Chiok should not be deprived of liberty pending the resolution of his appeal because the offense for
which he was convicted is a non-capital offense, and that the probability of flight during the pendency of his
appeal is merely conjectural.29 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Chua filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated November 16, 1999.
On November 3, 1999, the OSG representing the People of the Philippines, and Chua, filed separate petitions
for certiorari before us seeking review of the CA Resolutions dated September 20, 1999 and November 16,
1999.30 We granted the OSG's and Chua's petitions and reversed the CA's injunction on the arrest of
Chiok.31 Our decisions (SC bail decisions) became final on December 6, 2006 and June 20, 2007,
respectively.
On September 21, 1999, the CA Thirteenth Division dismissed the appeal of Chiok finding him to have
jumped bail when the order of arrest was returned unserved. 32 The CA considered his appeal abandoned,
dismissing it pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. However, on February
29, 2000, the CA reinstated Chiok's appeal when it learned of the issuance of the TRO and injunction in the
bail case on September 20, 1999 or a day prior to the appeal's dismissal. 33
Proceedings before the CA ensued. Chiok filed his Appellant's Brief 34 dated August 28, 2003 while the OSG
filed its Appellee's Brief 35 dated December 23, 2003. Chiok submitted his Reply Brief 36 dated April 14, 2004
while the OSG and Chua replied through their Rejoinder Briefs 37 dated October 6, 2004.
On July 19, 2007, the CA in a Special Division of Five (Former-Fourth Division) rendered a Decision reversing
and setting aside the Decision dated December 3, 1998 of the trial court, and acquitted Chiok for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt (CA acquittal).
The CA found that the RTC conviction did not contain findings of fact on the prosecution's evidence but
merely recited the evidence of the prosecution as if such evidence was already proof of the ultimate facts
constituting estafa. Instead of relying on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, the trial court relied on the
weakness of the defense. It found that Chua's testimony, which was the sole evidence of the prosecution, was
inconsistent and improbable. Specifically, it was irregular that Chua was not able to produce any single receipt
or documentary evidence of all the alleged stock dealings which spanned for a long period of six years with
Chiok—the purpose of which was to prove that he misappropriated the amount contrary to her instructions of
investing it to blue chip stocks. More importantly, the acceptance by Chua of the checks issued by Yu Que
Ngo ratified his application of the funds based on the instructions to invest it. Simply put, the prosecution was
not able to prove the element of misappropriation (i.e., deviation from Chua's instructions). As to the civil
aspect, the CA found Chiok liable to Chua for the amount of P9,500,000.00, 38 the amount he admitted on
record.
The OSG did not file a motion for reconsideration on the ground of double jeopardy. Chua, on the other hand,
filed a motion for reconsideration39 on August 8, 2007. Chiok also filed his own motion for
reconsideration,40 on the civil liability imposed on him.
In a Resolution41 dated October 3, 2007, the CA denied Chua's motion for reconsideration and its supplement
on the ground that acquittal is immediately final and the re-examination of the record of the case would violate
the guarantee against double jeopardy. It also denied the motions tor reconsideration of both parties on the
civil aspect of the case.
Hence, these consolidated petitions questioning the CA acquittal by way of a petition for certiorari and
mandamus, and the civil aspect of the case by way of appeal by certiorari.
Issues
II. Whether or not the case is an exception to the rule on finality of acquittal and the doctrine of
double jeopardy.
Discussion
Chua argues that her petition should be allowed because the circumstances of this case warrant leniency on
her lack of personality to assail the criminal aspect of the CA acquittal. She argues that "the OSG did not take
any action to comment on the position of Chua [and] that this case belongs to the realm of exceptions to the
doctrine of double jeopardy." 42
Chua lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision because it is only the OSG, on
behalf of the State, which can bring actions in criminal proceedings before this Court and the CA.
In Villareal v. Aliga,43 we upheld the doctrine that it is only the OSG, as representative of the State, which may
question the acquittal of the accused via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, viz:
x x x The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court
and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35 (I), Chapter 12,
Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent
the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have
specific powers and functions to represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court
and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG is the law office of the
Government.
To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him
can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private
complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil
liability of the accused is concerned. In a catena of cases, this view has been time and again
espoused and maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v. Gadiane, it was categorically slated that if
the criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal
aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability
of the private complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect
of the case. The same determination was also arrived at by the Court in Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company v. Veridiano II. In the recent case of Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, the Court again
upheld this guiding principle.
xxx
Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the
State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil
liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal,
an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State
through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the
Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.
(Emphasis supplied)
The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal
action is the State and not the private complainant. 44 The interest of the private complainant or the private
offended party is limited only to the civil liability. 45 In the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is
limited to that of a witness for the prosecution such that when a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or
if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State
through the Solicitor General.46 The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal, but may
only do so as to the civil aspect of the case. 47
Although there are instances when we adopt a liberal view and give due course to a petition filed by an
offended party, we direct the OSG to file its comment. 48 When through its comment, the OSG takes a position
similar to the private complainant's, we hold that the OSG ratifies and adopts the private complainant's
petition as its own.49 However, when the OSG in its comment neither prays that the petition be granted nor
expressly ratifies and adopts the petition as its own, we hesitate in disregarding, and uphold instead, the rule
on personality or legal standing. 50
In this case, the OSG neither appealed the judgment of acquittal of the CA nor gave its conformity to Chua's
special civil action for certiorari and mandamus. In its Comment 51 dated March 27, 2008, the OSG is of the
view that Chua's petition will place Chiok in double jeopardy:
x x x Notably, while petitioner [Chua] imputes grave abuse of discretion on the Court of Appeals in
acquitting private respondent, a perusal of the allegations will reveal errors of judgment in the
appreciation of evidence, not error of jurisdiction. Verily, petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals abused its discretion when it pronounced that "we have also reviewed the evidence of the
accused in order to satisfy ourselves about the essential question of misappropriation or
conversion" and hold thereafter that "review now justifies us to pronounce that his version on the
matter was probably credible." Petitioner argues that a simple review of the evidence of respondent
accused readily leads to the conclusion that it is very far from being probably credible.
Clearly, the errors ascribed to the Court of Appeals are errors that go deeply into the appreciation
and assessment of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense during the trial.
Thus, the present petition smacks in the heart of the Court of [Appeals] appreciation of evidence x
x x.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In view of the contrary position of the OSG, we do not subscribe to Chua's view that the circumstances of this
case warrant the relaxation on the rule. Even if we do relax this procedural rule, we find that the merits of the
case still calls for the dismissal of Chua's petition.
II. The appeal from the judgment of acquittal will place Chiok in double jeopardy.
The 1987 Constitution, as well as its predecessors, guarantees the right of the accused against double
jeopardy.53 Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for double jeopardy
to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3)
the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the
case was dismissed without his express consent.54
In order to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our rules on criminal proceedings require that a judgment
of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately
executory upon its promulgation. 55 This is referred to as the "finality-of-acquittal" rule. The rationale for the
rule was explained in People v. Velasco:56
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into
"the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought
in unequal contest with the State, x x x." Thus, Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying
idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is
that the State with sill its resources and power should not be allowed to make repealed attempts to
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled
to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy
underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount
importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful
conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty,
is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's
liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection lo insure that
the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a
subsequent proceeding.
Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in
a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for society's awareness of the heavy
personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the
willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in
enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal
finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he
fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to
oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the
accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a
second trial would be unfair. (Citations omitted, Emphasis supplied)
There were cases, however, where we recognized certain exceptions to the rule against double jeopardy and
its resultant doctrine of finality-of-acquittal.
In People v. Uy,59 we held that by way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner
that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the
assailed judgment void.
Chua assails the acquittal of Chiok on two grounds. First, the first jeopardy did not attach because the CA did
not have jurisdiction over the appeal; Chiok having lost his right to appeal when the CA found him to have
jumped bail. Second assuming that the first jeopardy attached, the circumstances of this case is an exception
to the rule on double jeopardy.
Chua claims that the SC bail decisions set aside as bereft of any factual or legal basis the CA resolutions in
the bail case which enjoined the cancellation of bail of Chiok and his warrant of arrest by the trial court. The
logical and legal consequence of the nullification of the CA resolutions is to automatically revive the CA's
Resolution dated September 21, 1999 dismissing the appeal of Chiok. Accordingly, the CA had no jurisdiction
to entertain the appeal of Chiok and the proceedings therein are null and void.
At the outset, the CA validly acquired jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal. Chiok filed his Notice of Appeal on June
18, 1999 at the time when the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure was still in effect. Section 6, Rule 120 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly provides that the right to appeal is not automatically forfeited
when an accused fails to appear during the promulgation of judgment. 60 Upon perfection of Chiok's Notice of
Appeal and the subsequent denial of the prosecution's Motion to Deny Due Course to the Notice of Appeal by
the RTC in its Order61 dated July 15, 1999, the CA completely acquired jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal.
After acquiring jurisdiction over the appeal, the CA took cognizance of the unserved order of arrest. Exercising
jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal, the CA in its Resolution dated September 21, 1999 dismissed his appeal in
accordance with Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment, or failure to prosecute. - The appellate court may,
upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if
the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the
appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
The aforecited section gives the CA the authority to dismiss an appeal for abandonment if the accused
escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the
appeal. This authority to dismiss an appeal is, nevertheless, discretionary. 62 When an accused jumps bail
during the pendency of his appeal, the appellate court may exercise its discretion whether to proceed with the
appeal or dismiss it outright.63 In several cases, we still proceeded to acquit an accused who remained at
large during the pendency of the appeal.64
In this case, the CA exercised this discretion when it found that Chiok jumped bail because the order of arrest
was not served. Subsequently, when Chiok moved for its reconsideration, the CA again exercised its
discretion, this time to entertain the appeal. Notably, neither the prosecution nor Chua attributed any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court when it reinstated the appeal via a Resolution dated
February 29, 2000. This resolution, which effectively replaces the original resolution dismissing the appeal,
has already attained finality.
Thus, contrary to the claim of Chua, the SC bail decisions which set aside the CA resolutions enjoining
Chiok's arrest did not automatically revive the CA resolution dismissing the appeal; the dismissal being a
discretionary act on the part of the appellate court. Consequently, we reject the claim of Chua that the first
jeopardy did not attach because the whole proceedings before the CA, and the CA acquittal, are null and void.
B. Exceptions to the rate on finality-of-acquittal and double jeopardy doctrine do not apply.
Chua next asserts that certain exceptions to the rule on double jeopardy are present in this case. Particularly,
she submits that: (1) the appellate court's proceeding is a sham or mock proceeding; (2) the People through
the OSG, was deprived of the opportunity to be heard and its "day in court"; and (3) the result is a null and
void judgment of acquittal. Chua cites the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan65 to bolster her assertions.
Chua claims that the "trial in both the bouncing checks cases and this estafa case, is a sham insofar as they
have resulted in acquittals." 66 Chua anchors her claim on the report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C.
Panganiban that there were unauthorized tamperings in the evidence in the bouncing checks cases 67 (BP 22
case) she filed against Chiok, and that a TSN in the same BP 22 case, where Chiok allegedly made an
implied admission of guilt, has been secretly removed from the record.
We do not see any exception to the rule on double jeopardy in this case.
The factual milieu in Galman v. Sandiganbayan68 is starkly different from this case. In Galman, we concluded
that there was a mock or sham trial because of the overwhelming evidence of collusion and undue pressures
made by former President Marcos on the prosecution and the Justices who tried and decided the case, which
prevented the prosecution from fully ventilating its position and offering all evidence. We recognized the
intensity and gravity of the pressure exerted by the highest official in the land that resulted to a miscarriage of
justice.
In this case, Chua presents a report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban showing irregularities in the
BP 22 case against Chiok, including the loss of a TSN containing an alleged offer of settlement by Chiok
equivalent to his implied admission of guilt. We, however, do not see the same evils presented
in Galman when the alleged anomalies pointed out by Chua were in a different case and when the main basis
of the acquittal is not on the credibility of the physical evidence but of the testimony of Chua herself.
Moreover, it is apparent from the CA acquittal that the appellate court considered Chiok's offer of settlement in
arriving at the decision, having included it in its statement of facts. In essence, Chua is asking us to nullify the
CA acquittal because in her opinion, if the appellate court considered these pieces of evidence, it would have
convicted Chiok. These are purported errors of judgment or those involving misappreciation of evidence
which cannot be raised and be reviewed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
We are also not convinced that the State was deprived of due process in presenting its case. The OSG, in
fact, actively participated in prosecuting the case before the CA. It was able to file an Appellee's Brief 69 dated
December 23, 2003, as well as its Rejoinder Brief 70 dated October 6, 2004. As Chua even admits in her
petition, the OSG was able to present its case before the appellate court as when "[t]he OSG's position in this
case on the merits is clear in the submissions it has filed, as most eloquently expressed in the Rejoinder
Brief..."71 Certainly, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed where both parties had the opportunity to
present their case and even required them to submit memoranda from which its decision is based, as in this
case.72
Although we do not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous
acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the appellate court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. 73 Chua failed
to do so.
Chiok claims thai the Joint Decision74 dated November 27, 2000 in the BP 22 case docketed as Criminal
Case No. 44739 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) San Juan, Manila - Branch 58, which absolved Chiok
from civil liability, is res judicata on this case. On the other hand, Chua. claims that the CA erred when it
ordered Chiok to pay only the amount of P9,500,000.00 when it was shown by evidence that the amount
should be P9,563,900.00.
In Castillo v. Salvador75 and several cases before it, we ruled that if the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt, the accused is not automatically exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only. In this regard, preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the
evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 76
While the CA acquitted Chiok on the ground that the prosecution's evidence on his alleged misappropriation
of Chua's money did not meet the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, we hold that the monetary
transaction between Chua and Chiok was proven by preponderance of evidence.
Chua presented in evidence a bank deposit slip dated June 9, 1995 to Chiok's Far East Bank, Annapolis
account in the amount of P7,100,000.00. She also testified that she delivered to him in cash the amount of
P2,463,900.00. Chiok's admission that he issued the interbank checks in the total amount of P9,563,900.00 to
Chua, albeit claiming that it was "for safekeeping purposes only" and to assure her that she will be paid back
her investment, corroborates Chua's evidence. In any event, as found by the appellate court, Chiok admitted
that he received from Chua the amount of "P7.9" million in June 1995 and for "P1.6" million at an earlier time.
It is on this basis that the CA found Chiok civilly liable in the amount of P9,500,000.00 only.
However, we find that during the direct and cross-examination of Chiok on September 15, 1997 and October
13, 1997, the reference to "P9.5" million is the amount in issue, which is the whole of P9,563,900.00:
TSN September 15, 1907 (direct examination of Wilfred Chiok)
ATTY ESPIRITU[:] Mr. Witness. The amount here you are being charged in the information is
P9,563,900.00 covered by I lie two (2) checks Exhibits "C" and "D" of the prosecution. x x x 77
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] Do you know how much Mrs. Chua is claiming from you [which is
the] subject matter of this case of estafa?
WITNESS[:] In Peso.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] You admit that you received 9.5 Million from Mrs. Chua?
WITNESS[:] I admitted that, ma'am.78 (Italics supplied)
There is also no merit in Chiok's claim that his absolution from civil liability in the BP 22 case involving the
same transaction bars civil liability in this estafa case under the doctrine of res judicata in the concept of
"conclusiveness of judgment."
The doctrine of res judicata under the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" is found in paragraph (c) of
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under this doctrine, a final judgment or decree on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits on points and matters determined in the former suit. 79 Stated differently, facts and issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if
the latter suit may involve a different cause of action. 80 This principle of res judicata bars the re-litigation of
particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of
action.81
In Rodriguez v. Ponferrada,82 we explained that a civil action in a BP 22 case is not a bar to a civil action
in estafa case. In rejecting the theory of petitioner therein that the civil action arising from the criminal case for
violation of BP 22 precludes the institution of the corresponding civil action in the criminal case
for estafa pending before the RTC, we ruled that Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the
institution of a civil action in the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22, without need of election by the
offended party. There is no forum shopping because both remedies are simultaneously available to the
offended party. We explained that while every such act of issuing a bouncing check involves only one civil
liability for the offended party who has sustained only a single injury, this single civil liability can be the subject
of both civil actions in the estafa case and the BP 22 case. However, there may only be one recovery of the
single civil liability.
We affirmed this in Rimando v. Aldaba,83 where we were confronted with the similar issue of whether an
accused's civil liability in the estafa case must be upheld despite acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in
BP 22 cases. We held that both estafa and BP 22 cases can proceed to their final adjudication-both as to their
criminal and civil aspects—subject only to the prohibition on double recovery.
Since the Rules itself allows for both remedies to be simultaneously availed of by the offended party, the
doctrine of res judicata finds no application here.
Moreover, the principle of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment presupposes that facts
and issues were actually and directly resolved in a previous case. 84 However, the records show that in the BP
22 case, the facts and issues proving the transaction were not actually and directly resolved in the
decision, viz:
The court is not persuaded.
First, what the law requires is a notice of dishonor of the check to be given to the accused after its
dishonor. There is no showing dial this requirement was complied by the prosecution. Second, the
drawer must be given at least 5 banking days from such notice of dishonor within which to pay the
holder thereof the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of
such check. Indeed, there was no notice of dishonor established to have been furnished the
accused and therefore there is more reason that the accused was not given the requisite 5-banking
day to make good aforesaid cheeks. The 5-day notice serves to mitigate the harshness of the law
in its application by giving the drawer an opportunity to make good the bum check. And, it cannot
be said that accused was ever given that opportunity simply because the prosecution failed to
prove that accused was notified of the dishonor of the checks in suit.
x x x
Even assuming without admitting but only for the sake of argument that accused was notified of the
dishonor of the checks in suit by the demand letter adverted to above, still the prosecution cause
must fail because there are more reasons not to believe than to believe the theory of the
prosecution as compared with that of the defense as will be explained hereunder.
x x x
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the court hereby absolves the accused
from criminal as well as civil liability and orders these cases DISMISSED for lack of evidence to
support the charges levelled against him.
Costs de officio.
No other pronouncements.
SO ORDERED.85ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The basis or Chiok's acquittal therein is the prosecution's failure to show that a notice of dishonor was first
given to Chiok. The discussion that the prosecution's version is incredible was merely secondary, and was not
necessary, for accused's acquittal. There were no findings of fact on the transaction which gives rise to the
civil liability.
In light of these, we reject Chiok's claim that res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment bars
Chua from recovering any civil claims.
Following this Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,86 the foregoing amount of P9,563,900.00 shall earn
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from October 25, 1995, the date of Chua's
extrajudicial demand, until the date of finality of this judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from such finality of judgment until its satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 179814 and the special civil action for certiorari
and mandamus in G.R. No. 180021 are DENIED. The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 180021
is GRANTED. The Assailed Decision dated July 19, 2007 and the Resolution dated October 3, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Wilfred Chiok is ordered to pay Rufina Chua
the principal amount of P9,563,900.00, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from
October 25, 1995 until the date of finality of this judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until its satisfaction.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.c
SUBJECT: Re. Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of Rules of Court, Request for.
Your honor,
The undersigned most respectfully requesting through your Honorable office, assistance on the
subject mentioned above.
I, Edwin and Eduardo, both surnamed Valdez were both charged before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 86, Quezon City for the entitled Crime of Murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-90718 to Q-
0090720, which convicted us to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for each of the three (3)
offense.
Then after the decision of the RTC Branch 86, the same was appealed to the Court of Appeals with
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00876 and again on July 18, 2006 the Honorable Court of appeals Ninth
Division issued a Decision AFFIRMED the questioned Decision with MODIFICATION.
Only my Co-principal Accused EDUARDO V. VALDEZ enterposed appealed (sic) the Affirmatory
Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals to the Highest Tribunal with G.R. Nos. 175602. On my
part, I decided to withdraw my appeal, because I believe that there is no more hope for me, but I
was wrong when I read the Decision of the First Division of the Supreme Court, dated January 18,
2012 signed by the Chief Justice Honorable Renato C. Corona and finally I found hope.
And now I come to your Honorable Office through this letter to seek help and assistance that the
Decision of the Supreme Court to my Brother Eduardo V. Valdez may also benefitted (sic) the
undersigned through Section 11 (a) , Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
"(a) An Appeal taken by the one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the Appellate Court is favorable and applicable to the
latter: x x x"
Respectfully yours
EDWIN V. VALDEZ
Through a comment filed on September 25, 2012,4 the Solicitor General interposed no opposition to the plea
for the reduction of Edwin’s sentences for being in full accord with the Rules of Court and pertinent
jurisprudence.
We grant the plea for reduction of Edwin’s sentences.
The final judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 downgraded the crimes committed by Eduardo from
three counts of murder to three counts of homicide, and consequently prescribed lighter penalties in the form
of indeterminate sentences. As a result, Eduardo would serve only an indeterminate sentence of 10 years
of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, under which he can qualify for
parole in due course by virtue of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, instead of suffering the indivisible penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Court rationalized the result as follows:
x x x The records show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary to the established facts and
circumstances showing that he and Edwin, then armed with short firearms, had gone to the jai
alai betting station of Moises to confront Jonathan Rubio, the teller of the betting booth then busily
attending to bettors inside the booth; that because the accused were calling to Rubio to come out of
the booth, Moises approached to pacify them, but one of them threatened Moises; Gusto mo unahin
na kita?; that immediately after Moises replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired several shots at Moises,
causing him to fall to the ground; that PO2 Valdez continued firing at the fallen Moises; that Ferdinand
(another victim) rushed to aid Moises, his brother, but Edwin shot Ferdinand in the head, spilling his
brains; that somebody shouted to Joselito (the third victim) to run; that Edwin also shot Joselito twice
in the back; and that Joselito fell on a burger machine. The shots fired at the three victims were
apparently fired from short distances.
The testimonial accounts of the State’s witnesses entirely jibed with the physical evidence. Specifically, the
medico-legal evidence showed that Ferdinand had a gunshot wound in the head; that two gunshot wounds
entered Joselito’s back and the right side of his neck; and that Moises suffered a gunshot wound in the head
and four gunshot wounds in the chest. Also, Dr. Wilfredo Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal Office opined that the
presence of marginal abrasions at the points of entry indicated that the gunshot wounds were inflicted at close
range. Given that physical evidence was of the highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than all
witnesses put together, the congruence between the testimonial recollections and the physical evidence
rendered the findings adverse to PO2 Valdez and Edwin conclusive.
Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit the felony. Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct
because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts. Herein, both lower courts deduced the
conspiracy between the accused from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killings. We are
satisfied that their deduction was warranted.
Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal responsibility for the fatal shooting by
Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused were convincingly shown to have acted in concert to
achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in
concert was manifest not only from their going together to the betting station on board a single
motorcycle, but also from their joint attack that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing successive shots at
Moises and immediately followed by Edwin’s shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after the other. It
was also significant that they fled together on board the same motorcycle as soon as they had
achieved their common purpose.
To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither did he
have to know the exact part performed by his co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts.
Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy between PO2 Valdez and Edwin was properly inferred
and proved through their acts that were indicative of their common purpose and community of
interest.
And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three homicides,
instead of three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently alleging the attendance of
treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of any of the crimes against
persons which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending party arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. It encompasses a wide variety of actions and
attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime committed. Corollarily, the defense
against the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied and dependent on each
particular instance. Such variety generates the actual need for the state to specifically aver the factual
circumstances or particular acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for
the crime in the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to defend himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. In People v. Dimaano, the Court elaborated:
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or
the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements
of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime
in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable
him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. [emphasis supplied]
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused "with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did x x x assault, attack and employ
personal violence upon" the victims "by then and there shooting them with a gun, hitting [them]" on
various parts of their bodies "which were the direct and immediate cause of their deaths" did not
sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the
killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him
with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially
ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of
the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could
serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment,
for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short,
the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder
were missing from the informations.
x x x. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature
and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. This requirement
accords with the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts
stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which
he must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice, x
x x.
xxxx
x x x. There being no circumstances modifying criminal liability, the penalty is applied in its medium period
(ie., 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence is taken from prision mayor, and the maximum from the medium
period of reclusion temporal. Hence, the Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of 10 years
of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count of
homicide.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18, 2006 is MODIFIED by finding
PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing
him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to
17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand
Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00
as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)
On his part, Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the downgrading of the crimes
committed (and the resultant lighter penalties) despite the finality of his convictions for three counts of murder
due to his withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of the crimes committed would definitely be favorable to
him. Worth pointing out is that to deny to him the benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities would be
highly unfair, considering that this Court had found the two accused to have acted in concert in their deadly
assault against the victims, warranting their equal liabiliy under the principle of conspiracy.
We grant Edwin’s plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which relevantly provides:
Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – (a) An appeal taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate
court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
xxxx
In this connection, the Court has pronounced in Lim v. Court of Appeals6 that the benefits of this provision
extended to all the accused, regardless of whether they appealed or not, to wit:
As earlier stated, both petitioner and the OSG laterally argue that in the event of Guingguing’s acquittal,
petitioner should likewise be acquitted, based on Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, which states:
SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.-
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except
insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Private respondent however, contends that said provision is not applicable to petitioner inasmuch as he
appealed from his conviction, and the provision states that a favorable judgment shall be applicable only to
those who did not appeal.
A literal interpretation of the phrase "did not appeal," as espoused by private respondent, will not give justice
to the purpose of the provision.
It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as to defeat its reason, i.e., to
benefit an accused who did not join in the appeal of his co-accused in case where the appellate judgment is
favorable. In fact, several cases rendered by the Court applied the foregoing provision without regard as to
the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a coaccused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him.
In People v. Artellero, the Court extended the acquittal of Rodriguez’s co-accused to him despite the
withdrawal of his appeal, applying the Rule 122, Section 11(a), and considering that the evidence against both
are inextricably linked, to wit:
Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the well-established rule is that an appeal
in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by
the parties. The records show that Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to financial reasons. However,
Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "an appeal taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellant court is
favorable and applicable to the latter." As we have elucidated, the evidence against and the conviction of both
appellant and Rodriguez are inextricably linked. Hence, appellant’s acquittal, which is favorable and
applicable to Rodriguez, should benefit the latter.
In People v. Arondain, the Court found accused Arondain guilty only of homicide.1âwphi1 Such verdict was
applied to his co-accused, Jose Precioso, who was previously found guilty by the trial court of robbery with
homicide, despite the fact that Precioso appealed but failed to file an appellant’s brief. The Court also
modified Precioso’s civil liability although the additional monetary award imposed on Arondain was not
extended to Precioso since it was not favorable to him and he did not pursue the appeal before the Court.
In People v. De Lara, Eduardo Villas, together with several coaccused, were found by the trial court guilty of
forcible abduction. During pendency of the review before the Court, Villas withdrew his appeal, hence his
conviction became final and executory. Thereafter, the Court found Villas’ co-accused guilty only of grave
coercion. Applying Rule 122, Section 11(a), the Court also found Villas guilty of the lesser offense of grave
coercion since it is beneficial to him.
In People v. Escaño, the Court granted a motion filed by accused Julian Deen Escaño, praying that the
Court’s Decision dated January 28, 2000, acquitting his co-accused Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez in
Criminal Case No. 95-936 for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, be
applied to him. Escaño originally filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court but later withdrew the same.
In the foregoing cases, all the accused appealed from their judgments of conviction but for one reason or
another, the conviction became final and executory. Nevertheless, the Court still applied to them the favorable
judgment in favor of their co-accused. The Court notes that the Decision dated September 30, 2005 in G.R.
No. 128959 stated, "'the verdict of guilt with respect to Lim [herein petitioner] had already become final and
executory." In any event, the Court cannot see why a different treatment should be given to petitioner, given
that the judgment is favorable to him and considering further that the Court's finding in its Decision dated
September 30, 2005 specifically stated that "the publication of the subject advertisement by petitioner and Lim
cannot be deemed by this Court to have been done with actual malice."7
ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the plea of EDWIN VALDEZ for the application to him of the judgment
promulgated on January 18, 2012 finding P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ guilty of three counts of homicide, and
sentencing him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum
to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand
Sayson, the late Moises Sayson, Jr., and the late Joselito Sayson the amounts of₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages for each count.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148965 February 26, 2002
JOSE "JINGGOY" E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application to a particular party may be unconstitutional. This is
the submission of the petitioner who invokes the equal protection clause of the Constitution in his bid to be
excluded from the charge of plunder filed against him by the respondent Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then
President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and
members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the
Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution1 finding probable cause warranting
the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President and the other
respondents therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and
among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the case
was assigned to respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused was set on
July 10, 2001 and no bail for petitioner’s provisional liberty was fixed.
On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the Amended Information on the ground
that the Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense.
Respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused. On its
basis, petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion"2 alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists
to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal
gambling and not in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2)
he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information
and be discharged from custody. In the alternative, petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an
amount to be fixed by respondent court.3
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Motion To Fix Bail On
Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In
The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To Him."4
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Strike Out So-Called ‘Entry of Appearance,’ To Direct
Ombudsman To Explain Why He Attributes Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve Pending Incidents."5
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s "Motion to Quash and
Suspend" and "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion."6 Petitioner’s alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing
after arraignment of all accused. The court held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for lack of merit the following: (1)
MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND dated April 24, 2001 filed by accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada; (2)
MOTION TO QUASH dated June 7, 2001 filed by accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada; and (3) MOTION TO
QUASH (Re: Amended Information dated 18 April 2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by accused Edward S.
Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, his
VERY URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION, praying that he be: (1) dropped from the information for plunder for
want of probable cause and (2) discharged from custody immediately which is based on the same grounds
mentioned in this MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND is hereby DENIED. Let his alternative prayer in said
OMNIBUS MOTION that he be allowed to post bail be SET for hearing together with the petition for bail of
accused Edward S. Serapio scheduled for July 10, 2001, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon after the arraignment
of all the accused."7
The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent court
denied the motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea prompting
respondent court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.8
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:
"1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to petitioner, and
denying him the equal protection of the laws;
2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient standards;
3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with
which and with whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is
personal, not vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due process;
4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the information which
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle of proportionality."9
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim.
I.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and denies him
the equal protection of the laws.10
The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law, has
been settled in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.11 We take off from the Amended Information which
charged petitioner, together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Charlie "Atong"
Ang, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and others, with the crime of plunder as follows:
"AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman, hereby
accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. "ASIONG
SALONGA" AND a.k.a "JOSE VELARDE", together with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of
Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659,
committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS
FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal
acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with
co-accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ ANG, Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of
the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
Province of Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-
accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK
MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE
OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION
ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED
FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE
BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK
UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,
KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY
THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS
AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS
ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001"12
Petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally perched on the
premise that the Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which cannot constitute
plunder. He then assails the denial of his right to bail.
Petitioner’s premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will show that it is
divided into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Joseph E. Estrada with the crime
of plunder together with petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda
Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in general terms how the accused conspired in
committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the
predicate acts constitutive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state the
names of the accused who committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information which is of "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the
aggregate amount of ₱545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or
any form of pecuniary benefit x x x." In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy with former President
Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to ₱545
million. Contrary to petitioner’s posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal
gambling "on several instances." The phrase "on several instances" means the petitioner committed
the predicate act in series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the
commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase "several instances" is to indulge in a twisted, nay,
"pretzel" interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words "combination" or "series" as they appear
in R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,13 we held that where these two terms are to be taken in
their popular, not technical, meaning, the word "series" is synonymous with the clause "on several instances."
"Series" refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The
word "combination" contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate acts in any of said
items. Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder
committed by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioner’s stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4, 2001 finding probable
cause to charge him with plunder together with the other accused, he was alleged to have received only the
sum of P2 million, which amount is way below the minimum of P50 million required under R.A. No. 7080. The
submission is not borne out by the April 4, 2001 Resolution of the Ombudsman, recommending the filing of
charges against petitioner and his co-accused, which in pertinent part reads:
"x x x xxx xxx
Respondent Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to have also
surreptitious collection of protection money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is gleaned from the
statements of Gov. Singson himself and the fact that Mayor Estrada, on at least two occasions, turned over
to a certain Emma Lim, an emissary of the respondent governor, jueteng haul totalling P2 million, i.e., P1
million in January, 2000 and another P1 million in February, 2000. An alleged "listahan" of jueteng recipients
listed him as one "Jingle Bell," as affirmed by Singson [TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI]."14
Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made the finding that P2 million was
delivered to petitioner as "jueteng haul" on "at least two occasions." The P2 million is, therefore, not the
entire sum with which petitioner is specifically charged. This is further confirmed by the conclusion of the
Ombudsman that:
"x x x xxx xxx
It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio and
Yolanda Ricaforte, demanded and received, as bribe money, the aggregate sum of P545 million from jueteng
collections of the operators thereof, channeled thru Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, in exchange for protection
from arrest or interference by law enforcers; x x x."15
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to establish any
probable cause against him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has found probable cause
against the petitioner for which reason it issued a warrant of arrest against him. Petitioner then underwent
arraignment and is now on trial. The time to assail the finding of probable cause by the Ombudsman has long
passed. The issue cannot be resurrected in this petition.
II.
Next, petitioner contends that "the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete standards to guide
the courts in dealing with accused alleged to have contributed to the offense."16 Thus, he posits the following
questions:
"For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at least ten criminal acts, what penalty do we impose
on one who is clearly involved in only one such criminal act? Is it reclusion perpetua? Or should it be a lesser
penalty? What if another accused is shown to have participated in three of the ten specifications, what would
be the penalty imposable, compared to one who may have been involved in five or seven of the
specifications? The law does not provide the standard or specify the penalties and the courts are left to
guess. In other words, the courts are called to say what the law is rather than to apply what the lawmaker is
supposed to have intended."17
Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression that: (1) he is charged
with only one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused named in sub-paragraphs
(b) to (d) of the Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought to be different from reclusion
perpetua to death. R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on an accused similarly
situated as he is. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the second paragraph of the Amended Information
charges him to have conspired with former President Estrada in committing the crime of plunder. His alleged
participation consists in the commission of the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information. If these allegations are proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different
from that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the other. The imposable
penalty is provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, viz:
"Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d)
hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of
the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated
with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise
be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by
the court."
III.
Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for "sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged
offenses and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected –
contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious – results in the denial of substantive due
process."18
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only with the predicate act in
sub-paragraph (a) but also with the other predicate acts in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) & (d) because he is
indicted as a principal and as co-conspirator of the former President. This is purportedly clear from the first
and second paragraphs of the Amended Information.19
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information vis-à-vis the
provisions of R.A. No. 7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-accused with the
crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph describes in general
how plunder was committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to
(d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in particular the co-
conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said
four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-
paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those
who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with
the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b)
alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in
Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators
of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle
Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which
became part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts
fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former
President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act
that the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with
John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name "Jose Velarde" at the Equitable-
PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No.
7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the
latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the
Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to
(d) conspired with each other to enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light
of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with
the former President as related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-
paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly
committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in
conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4
billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the
predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in four,
separate Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the
mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of
the Marcos regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his
alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and
magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former President to acquire illegal wealth.20 They
also found that under the then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised
Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions, different time and different
personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate case and the
over-all conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of
multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases
were filed against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan.21 R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-
Plunder Law22 was enacted precisely to address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory
Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz:
"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason,
punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the public
eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and
which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not
involve simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute
plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-described
crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a
safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to
those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting influence of power."
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore,
different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their
different criminal acts have a commonality—to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each
accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused
agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco
excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and
receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and
kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former
President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves
two structures: (1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the
"hub") dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain"
conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between
manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.23
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a "wheel" conspiracy. The hub
is former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the
common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge against the petitioner on the ground that the
allegation of conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general. The fear is even expressed that it could
serve as a net to ensnare the innocent. Their dissents appear to be inspired by American law and
jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in American criminal law and in
common law. Under Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general rule,
conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a
penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition. In
contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement or conspiracy itself is the gravamen of the
offense.24 The essence of conspiracy is the combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to
accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or
unlawful means.25 Its elements are: agreement to accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with one or more
overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying
substantive offense.26
A study of the United States Code ought to be instructive. It principally punishes two (2) crimes of
conspiracy27 – conspiracy to commit any offense or to defraud the United States, and conspiracy to impede
or injure officer. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States is penalized under 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 371,28 as follows:
"Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States. If two or more persons conspire
either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof
in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons to any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the
punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor."
Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:
"Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or more persons in any State, Territory, Possession,
or District conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any
office, trust or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to
induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave the place, where his duties as an officer are
required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the
duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest,
interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties, each of such persons shall be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than six years, or both."
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States;
and (2) conspiracy to defraud the United States or any agency thereof. The conspiracy to "commit any
offense against the United States" refers to an act made a crime by federal laws.29 It refers to an act
punished by statute.30 Undoubtedly, Section 371 runs the whole gamut of U.S. Federal laws, whether
criminal or regulatory.31 These laws cover criminal offenses such as perjury, white slave traffic,
racketeering, gambling, arson, murder, theft, bank robbery, etc. and also include customs violations,
counterfeiting of currency, copyright violations, mail fraud, lotteries, violations of antitrust laws and laws
governing interstate commerce and other areas of federal regulation.32 Section 371 penalizes the
conspiracy to commit any of these substantive offenses. The offense of conspiracy is generally
separate and distinct from the substantive offense,33 hence, the court rulings that acquittal on the
substantive count does not foreclose prosecution and conviction for related conspiracy.34
The conspiracy to "defraud the government" refers primarily to cheating the United States out of property or
money. It also covers interference with or obstruction of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or
trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.35 It comprehends defrauding the United States in any
manner whatever, whether the fraud be declared criminal or not.36
The basic difference in the concept of conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the American case law
on how conspiracy should be alleged will reveal that it is not necessary for the indictment to include
particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes, in stating the manner and means of effecting
the object of the conspiracy. Such specificity of detail falls within the scope of a bill of particulars.37 An
indictment for conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the agreement; (2) the offense-object toward
which the agreement was directed; and (3) the overt acts performed in furtherance of the agreement. 38 To
allege that the defendants conspired is, at least, to state that they agreed to do the matters which are set forth
as the substance of their conspiracy. To allege a conspiracy is to allege an agreement.39 The gist of the
crime of conspiracy is unlawful agreement, and where conspiracy is charged, it is not necessary to
set out the criminal object with as great a certainty as is required in cases where such object is
charged as a substantive offense.40
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how Philippine courts and American
courts deal with cases challenging Informations alleging conspiracy on the ground that they lack
particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes. In our jurisdiction, as aforestated, conspiracy
can be alleged in the Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as constitutive
of the crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in
the Information charging the offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. It requires that the information for this crime must contain the following averments:
"Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information."
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused, designate the offense given
by statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the
approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be made
in order to meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its name given by
statute or by reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.41 The information must also
state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances.42 The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable
a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment.43 No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly
allege the elements of the crime charged.44 Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information.45 What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by
reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes.46 The requirement of alleging the elements
of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to
enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.47
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said
crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. For example, the crime of "conspiracy to commit
treason" is committed when, in time of war, two or more persons come to an agreement to levy war against
the Government or to adhere to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and decide to commit it. 48 The
elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender owes allegiance to the Government of the Philippines; (2) that
there is a war in which the Philippines is involved; (3) that the offender and other person or persons come to
an agreement to: (a) levy war against the government, or (b) adhere to the enemies, to give them aid and
comfort; and (4) that the offender and other person or persons decide to carry out the agreement. These
elements must be alleged in the information.
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a
crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less
necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the
offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused
in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation
in the crime.49 The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for
the acts of others,50 for the act of one is the act of all.51 In People v. Quitlong,52 we ruled on
how conspiracy as the mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:
"x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can
properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or
more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if
not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation,
however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another
or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his
own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where
conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of
secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others (People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442).
Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his
acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the
details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the
common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the
conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity
required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of
facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much
certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his
acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an
indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of
the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute,
contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the
conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S.
842-844).
xxx xxx xxx
x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or
impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the
accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity
of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the
absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in
conspiracy," must aptly appear in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting
conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of
design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its
derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy
must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his
plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be
required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not
necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
xxx xxx x x x."
Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in
the commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word "conspire," or its
derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc;53 or (2) by allegations of basic facts
constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended,
and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment
based on the same facts.54
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence
that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts
indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to
commit the felony and actually pursue it.55 A statement of this evidence is not necessary in the information.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in general terms how the
accused committed the crime of plunder. It used the words "in connivance/conspiracy with his co-
accused." Following the ruling in Quitlong, these words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused
with the former President in committing the crime of plunder.
V.
We now come to petitioner’s plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of the instant petition
before this Court, petitioner filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Second Motion for Bail for
Medical Reasons." Petitioner prayed that he be allowed to post bail due to his serious medical condition
which is life-threatening to him if he goes back to his place of detention.1âwphi1 The motion was opposed by
respondent Ombudsman to which petitioner replied.
For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on
the motion for bail. Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, a cardiologist of the Makati Medical Center, testified as sole
witness for petitioner.
On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court an "Urgent Motion for Early/Immediate
Resolution of Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations." Petitioner
reiterated the motion for bail he earlier filed with respondent Sandiganbayan.56
On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the motion to respondent Sandiganbayan for resolution
and requiring said court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of December 21, 2001.
On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its Report. Attached to the Report was its Resolution
dated December 20, 2001 denying petitioner’s motion for bail for "lack of factual basis." 57 Basing its finding
on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the Sandiganbayan found that petitioner "failed to submit sufficient
evidence to convince the court that the medical condition of the accused requires that he be confined at home
and for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail."58
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong, to wit:
"Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable . –
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution."59
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which reads:
"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of whether
or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail
hearings wherein both the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present their
respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt.60
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary hearing that
should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based its Resolution of
December 20, 2001 involved the reception of medical evidence only and which evidence was given in
September 2001, five months ago. The records do not show that evidence on petitioner’s guilt was presented
before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to determine if the
evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015 - JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE
THIRD DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.:
G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015 - JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE
THIRD DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-
TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the “petition for certiorari with prayers (a) for the Court En Banc to act on the petition; (b) to
expedite the proceedings and to set the case for oral arguments; and (c) to issue a temporary restraining
order to the respondents from holding a pre-trial and further proceedings in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-
0238”1 filed by petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) challenging the July 11, 2014 resolutions 2 of the
Sandiganbayan.
I.
THE ANTECEDENTS
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information 3 for plunder against Enrile, Jessica Lucila
Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the Sandiganbayan.
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Court’s jurisdiction,
above-named accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G.
REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both public officers, committing the offense in
relation to their respective offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES,
RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a combination or series of overt criminal acts, as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and
others, kickbacks or commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or
after the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a
percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or through
REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government
organizations which became the recipients and/or target implementors of ENRILE’S PDAF
projects, which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling
NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;
(b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority,
relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for lack
of evidence on record to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for bail ),4 and (2) a supplemental
opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of Information,5 on June 10, 2014, and June 16,
2014, respectively. The Sandiganbayan heard both motions on June 20, 2014.
On June 24, 2014, the prosecution filed a consolidated opposition to both motions.
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motions and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest
on the plunder case against the accused. 6redarclaw
On July 8, 2014, Enrile received a notice of hearing7 informing him that his arraignment would be held before
the Sandiganbayan’s Third Division on July 11, 2014.
On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars 8 before the Sandiganbayan. On the same date, he
filed a motion for deferment of arraignment9 since he was to undergo medical examination at the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH).
On July 11, 2014, Enrile was brought to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the Sandiganbayan’s order and
his motion for bill of particulars was called for hearing. Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), Enrile’s
counsel, argued the motion orally. Thereafter, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice (PJ) Amparo Cabotaje-Tang
(Cabotaje-Tang), declared a “10-minute recess” to deliberate on the motion.
When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Court’s denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of
particulars essentially on the following grounds:
(1) the details that Enrile desires are “substantial reiterations” of the arguments he raised in his
supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
information; and
(2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.
Atty. Mendoza asked for time to file a motion for reconsideration, stating that he would orally move to
reconsider the Sandiganbayan’s denial if he would not be given time to seek a reconsideration. The
Sandiganbayan then directed Atty. Mendoza to immediately proceed with his motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Mendoza thus orally presented his arguments for the reconsideration of the denial of Enrile’s motion for
bill of particulars. The Sandiganbayan again declared a recess to deliberate on the motion. After five (5)
minutes, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion for
reconsideration.10redarclaw
The Sandiganbayan reduced its rulings into writing on Enrile’s written and oral motions. The pertinent portion
of this ruling reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
In today’s consideration of accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion for Bill of Particulars, the Court
heard the parties on oral arguments in relation thereto. Thereafter, it declared a ten-minute recess
to deliberate thereon. After deliberating on the said motion as well as the arguments of the parties,
the Court resolves to DENY as it hereby DENIES the same motion for bill of particulars for the
following reasons: (1) the details desired in paragraphs 2 to 5 of the said motion are substantially
reiterations of the arguments raised by accused Enrile in his Supplemental Opposition to Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest and for Dismissal of Information dated June 16, 2014 x x x.
The Court already upheld the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging accused
Enrile, among other persons, with the crime of plunder in its Resolution dated July 3, 2014. It finds
no cogent reasons to reconsider the said ruling.
Moreover, the “desired details” that accused Enrile would like the prosecution to provide are
evidentiary in nature, which need not be alleged in the Information. They are best ventilated during
the trial of the case.
Counsel for accused Juan Ponce Enrile orally sought a reconsideration of the denial of his motion
for bill of particulars which was opposed by the prosecution. The Court then declared another ten-
minute recess to deliberate on the said motion for reconsideration. After deliberation thereon, the
Court likewise resolved to DENY as it hereby DENIES accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s motion for
reconsideration there being no new or substantial grounds raised to warrant the grant thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the scheduled arraignment of accused Juan Ponce Enrile shall now proceed as
previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED.11
Atty. Mendoza subsequently moved for the deferment of Enrile’s arraignment. The Sandiganbayan responded
by directing the doctors present to determine whether he was physically fit to be arraigned. After he was
declared fit, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with Enrile’s arraignment. Enrile entered a “no plea,” prompting
the Sandiganbayan to enter a “not guilty” plea on his behalf.
II.
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of particulars despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of
the Information filed against him. Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what his specific participation in the crime of plunder had
been. He posits that the Information should have stated the details of the particular acts that allegedly
constituted the imputed series or combination of overt acts that led to the charge of plunder. Enrile essentially
reiterates the “details desired” that he sought in his motion for bill of particulars, as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Allegations of Information Details Desired
“x x x accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a a. Who among the accused acquired the alleged “ill-
Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED
then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY
public officers, committing the offense in relation FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
to their respective offices, conspiring with one (Php172,834,500.00)”? One of them, two of them or all
another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, of them? Kindly specify.
RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE
ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-
gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00)
through a combination or series of overt acts, x x
x.”
x x x by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES a. What was “repeatedly” received? If sums of money,
and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and the particular amount. If on several occasions and in
others, kickbacks or commissions under the different amounts, specify the amount on each occasion
following circumstances: before, during and/or and the corresponding date of receipt.
after the project identification, NAPOLES gave,
and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a
percentage of the cost of a project to be funded
from ENRILE’S Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S
endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the
appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’
non-government organizations which became the
recipients and/or target implementers of
ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly-funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus
enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF
proceeds for her personal gain;
x x x by taking undue advantage, on several a. Provide the details of how Enrile took undue
occasions of their official positions, authority, advantage, on several occasions, of his official
relationships, connections, and influence to positions, authority, relationships, connections, and
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to influence to unjustly enrich himself at the expense and
the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and
and the Republic of the Philippines. the Republic of the Philippines. Was this because
he received any money from the government? From
whom and for what reason did he receive any money or
property from the government through which he
“unjustly enriched himself”? State the details from whom
each amount was received, the place and the time.
Enrile posits that his ‘desired details’ are not evidentiary in nature; they are material facts that should be
clearly alleged in the Information so that he may be fully informed of the charges against him and be prepared
to meet the issues at the trial.
Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for bill of particulars are cited in a context different from his
opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. He maintains that the resolution of the probable cause issue
was interlocutory and did “not bar the submission of the same issue in subsequent proceedings especially in
the context of a different proceeding.”
Enrile thus prays that: “(a) the Court en banc act on the present petition; (b) by way of an interim measure, the
Court issue a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Sandiganbayan from holding the pre-trial and
subsequent proceedings against him in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 during the pendency of the
present petition; (c) the Court expedite the proceedings and set the case for oral arguments; and (d) at the
conclusion of the proceedings, the Court annul and set aside the Sandiganbayan’s July 11, 2014 resolution
and his arraignment.”
In its Comment,12 the People of the Philippines 13 counters that the Sandiganbayan did not exercise its
discretionary power in an arbitrary or despotic manner. Even assuming that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of
Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars was erroneous, the error did not amount to lack or excess or jurisdiction. It
further maintains that the assailed Sandiganbayan rulings were arrived at based on the procedures
prescribed under Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan.
The People also argues that the Information already contained the ultimate facts; matters of evidence do not
need to be averred.
B. Enrile’s Reply
In his Reply, Enrile essentially claims that the right to move for a bill of particulars is “ancillary to and in
implementation” of an accused’s rights to due process, to be heard, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. He maintains that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of his motion for bill of
particulars is not “a mere denial of a procedural right under the Rules of Court, but of rights vested in an
accused under the Constitution to ensure fairness in the trial of the offense charged.” Enrile also adds that
there could only be a fair trial if he could properly plead to the Information and prepare for trial.
Enrile further argues that the People’s Comment did not dispute the relevance of the details sought in the
motion for bill of particulars. He likewise claims that the “desired details” could not be found in the bundle of
documents marked by the prosecution during the preliminary conference. Finally, Enrile maintains that his
motion for bill of particulars was not dilatory.
III.
After due consideration, we resolve to partially GRANT the petition under the terms outlined below.
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. 14 This right has long been established in English law, and is
the same right expressly guaranteed in our 1987 Constitution. This right requires that the offense charged be
stated with clarity and with certainty to inform the accused of the crime he is facing in sufficient detail to
enable him to prepare his defense. 15redarclaw
In the 1904 case of United States v. Karelsen,16 the Court explained the purpose of informing an accused in
writing of the charges against him from the perspective of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The object of this written accusation was – First. To furnish the accused with such a description of
the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to
inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.) In order
that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is
made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstances necessary to
constitute the crime charged. x x x.17 [Emphasis supplied.]
The objective, in short, is to describe the act with sufficient certainty to fully appraise the accused of the
nature of the charge against him and to avoid possible surprises that may lead to injustice. Otherwise, the
accused would be left speculating on why he has been charged at all. 18redarclaw
In People v. Hon. Mencias, et al.,19 the Court further explained that a person’s constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him signifies that an accused should be given the
necessary data on why he is the subject of a criminal proceeding. The Court added that the act or conduct
imputed to a person must be described with sufficient particularity to enable the accused to defend himself
properly.
The general grant and recognition of a protected right emanates from Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty, and
property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government,
unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice x x x; and to secure to all
persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. 20redarclaw
Separately from Section 1, Article III is the specific and direct underlying root of the right to information in
criminal proceedings – Section 14(1), Article III – which provides that “No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.” Thus, no doubt exists that the right to be informed of the cause
of the accusation in a criminal case has deep constitutional roots that, rather than being cavalierly
disregarded, should be carefully protected.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division),21 the Court, in sustaining the
Sandiganbayan’s grant of the motion for bill of particulars of Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., held that “the facile
verbosity with which the legal counsel for the government flaunted the accusation of excesses against the
Marcoses in general terms must be soonest refurbished by a bill of particulars, so that respondent can
properly prepare an intelligent responsive pleading and so that trial in this case will proceed as expeditiously
as possible.”22 The Court additionally stated that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This Court has been liberal in giving the lower courts the widest latitude of discretion in setting
aside default orders justified under the right to due process principle. Plain justice demands and
the law requires no less that defendants must know what the complaint against them is all about.
x x x In the interest of justice, we need to dispel the impression in the individual respondents' minds
that they are being railroaded out of their rights and properties without due process of law. 23
An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, signed by the prosecutor and
filed with the court.24 The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in implementing the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, specifically require certain
matters to be stated in the Information for its sufficiency. The requirement aims to enable the accused to
properly prepare for his defense since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts
constituting the offense charged.25redarclaw
To be considered as sufficient and valid, an information must state the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.26redarclaw
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute
penalizing it. The acts or omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
alleged must be stated in ordinary and concise language; they do not necessarily need to be in the language
of the statute, and should be in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is charged and what qualifying and aggravating circumstances are alleged, so that the court can
pronounce judgment.27 The Rules do not require the Information to exactly allege the date and place of the
commission of the offense, unless the date and the place are material ingredients or essential elements of the
offense, or are necessary for its identification.
An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense; the evidentiary and other details
(i.e., the facts supporting the ultimate facts) can be provided during the trial. 28redarclaw
Ultimate facts is defined as “those facts which the expected evidence will support. The term does not refer to
the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be
established.” It refers to the facts that the evidence will prove at the trial. 29redarclaw
Ultimate facts has also been defined as the principal, determinative, and constitutive facts on whose
existence the cause of action rests;30 they are also the essential and determining facts on which the court's
conclusion rests and without which the judgment would lack support in essential particulars. 31redarclaw
Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate facts; they are the
premises that lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion. 32They are facts supporting the existence of some other
alleged and unproven fact.33redarclaw
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,34 the Court explained these two concepts in relation to a particular criminal
case, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is
analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil
cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the
primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant,
while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts. x x
x.35 [Emphasis supplied.]
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the Information, matters of
evidence – as distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the offense – do not need to be alleged.
Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily be alleged are to be determined based on the definition
and the essential elements of the specific crimes. 36redarclaw
C. Arraignment
The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires that the accused be arraigned so that he
may be fully informed as to why he was charged and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only
on showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence
against him.37 During arraignment, the accused is granted the opportunity to fully know the precise charge
that confronts him and made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature
of the crime imputed to him.38redarclaw
An arraignment thus ensures that an accused be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to him
in the Information and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed. 39 It is likewise at this stage of
the proceedings when the accused enters his plea, 40 or enters a plea of not guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. 41redarclaw
A concomitant component of this stage of the proceedings is that the Information should provide the accused
with fair notice of the accusations made against him, so that he will be able to make an intelligent plea and
prepare a defense.42Moreover, the Information must provide some means of ensuring that the crime for which
the accused is brought to trial is in fact one for which he was charged, rather than some alternative crime
seized upon by the prosecution in light of subsequently discovered evidence. 43Likewise, it must indicate just
what crime or crimes an accused is being tried for, in order to avoid subsequent attempts to retry him for the
same crime or crimes.44 In other words, the Information must permit the accused to prepare his defense,
ensure that he is prosecuted only on the basis of facts presented, enable him to plead jeopardy against a later
prosecution, and inform the court of the facts alleged so that it can determine the sufficiency of the charge.
Oftentimes, this is achieved when the Information alleges the material elements of the crime charged. If the
Information fails to comply with this basic standard, it would be quashed on the ground that it fails to charge
an offense.45Of course, an Information may be sufficient to withstand a motion to quash, and yet insufficiently
inform the accused of the specific details of the alleged offenses. In such instances, the Rules of Court allow
the accused to move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for
trial.46redarclaw
In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or claims in an action , which an
accused may avail of by motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial. In
civil proceedings, a bill of particulars has been defined as a complementary procedural document consisting
of an amplification or more particularized outline of a pleading, and is in the nature of a more specific
allegation of the facts recited in the pleading. 47 The purpose of a motion for bill of particulars in civil cases is
to enable a party to prepare his responsive pleading properly.
In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details items or specific conduct not recited in the Information but
nonetheless pertain to or are included in the crime charged. Its purpose is to enable an accused: to know the
theory of the government’s case; 48 to prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his
acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same offense; and to compel the prosecution to
observe certain limitations in offering evidence. 49redarclaw
In criminal proceedings, the motion for a bill of particulars is governed by Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 9. Bill of particulars. - The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars
to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of
the complaint or information and the details desired.
The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the accused of
the crime charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be such that
persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what the Information means. 50redarclaw
The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, is to guard against
surprises during trial. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with the evidence of the
prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of particulars matters of evidence
relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the offense charged or how the people intend to
prove any item of factual information included in the bill of particulars. 51redarclaw
Even before the promulgation of the 1964 Rules of Court, when the applicable rules for criminal procedure
was still General Order No. 58,53 the Court had already recognized the need for a bill of particulars in criminal
cases. This recognition came despite the lack of any specific provision in General Order No. 58 setting out the
rules for a bill of particulars in criminal cases.
In U.S. v. Schneer,54 the issue presented was whether a bill of particulars was available in a criminal case for
estafa after the accused had already been arraigned. The Court essentially ruled that there was no specific
provision of law expressly authorizing the filing of specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases, and
held that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
We know of no provision either in General Orders, No. 58, or in the laws existing prior thereto
which requires the Government to furnish such a bill of particulars, and we accordingly hold that it
was not error on the part of the court below to refuse to do so.
In U.S. v. Cernias,55 however, the Court formally recognized the existence and applicability of a bill of
particulars in criminal cases. In this case, the prosecution filed an information charging Basilio Cernias with
several counts of brigandage before the Court of First Instance of Leyte. In overruling the accused’s objection,
the Court declared that the prosecution’s act of specifying certain acts done by the conspirators in the
Information “did no more than to furnish the defendant with a bill of particulars of the facts which it intended to
prove at the trial x x x.”56redarclaw
In sum, the Court essentially held that a detailed complaint or information is not objectionable, and that the
details it contains may be properly considered as specifications or bill of particulars. 57redarclaw
In People v. Abad Santos,58 the court first recognized a bill of particulars, as a right that the accused may ask
for from the court. In this case, the prosecution charged respondent Joseph Arcache with the crime of treason
before the People’s Court. The Information filed against the accused contained, in counts 2 and 3, the phrase
“and other similar equipment.”
The counsel for the accused verbally petitioned the People’s court to order the prosecution to “make more
specific [the] phrase ‘and other similar equipment,’” which request the People’s Court granted. The People of
the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari, but the Court dismissed this petition.
In upholding the order of the People’s Court, the Court ruled that “in the absence of specific provisions of law
prohibiting the filing of specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases, their submission may be
permitted, as they cannot prejudice any substantial rights of the accused. On the contrary, they will serve to
apprise the accused clearly of the charges filed against them, and thus enable them to prepare intelligently
whatever defense or defenses they might have. 59redarclaw
Notably, Abad Santos emphasized the importance of a bill of particulars in criminal cases, stating that “x x x
inasmuch as in criminal cases not only the liberty but even the life of the accused may be at stake, it is always
wise and proper that the accused should be fully apprised of the true charges against them, and thus avoid all
and any possible surprise, which might be detrimental to their rights and interests; and ambiguous phrases
should not, therefore, be permitted in criminal complaints or informations; and if any such phrase has been
included therein, on motion of the defense, before the commencement of the trial, the court should order
either its elimination as surplusage or the filing of the necessary specification, which is but an amendment in
mere matters of form.”60redarclaw
In these cited cases, the Courts did not rely on the Rules of Court to provide for a bill of particulars in criminal
cases. A specific provision granting the accused the right “to move for or demand a more definite statement or
a bill of particulars” was not incorporated as a formal rule until the 1964 Rules of Court, 61under its Section 6,
Rule 116. This initial provision later became Section 10 of Rule 116 under the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure62and Section 9 of Rule 116 under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended.63redarclaw
When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a motion to
quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or information to
enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid Information, one that
presents all the elements of the crime charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the specifications that a bill
of particulars may supply are only formal amendments to the complaint or Information.
x x x x [Emphasis ours.]
Notably, the failure of the accused to move for the specification of the details desired deprives him of the right
to object to evidence that could be introduced and admitted under an Information of more or less general
terms but which sufficiently charges the accused with a definite crime. 66redarclaw
Although the application for the bill of particulars is one addressed to the sound discretion of the court 67 it
should nonetheless exercise its discretion within the context of the facts and the nature of the crime charged
in each case and the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him .
As articulated in the case of People v. Iannone:68
It is beyond cavil that a defendant has a basic and fundamental right to be informed of the charges
against him so that he will be able to prepare a defense. Hence the courts must exercise careful
surveillance to ensure that a defendant is not deprived of this right by an overzealous prosecutor
attempting to protect his case or his witnesses. Any effort to leave a defendant in ignorance of the
substance of the accusation until the time of trial must be firmly rebuffed. This is especially so
where the indictment itself provides a paucity of information. In such cases, the court must be
vigilant in safeguarding the defendant's rights to a bill of particulars and to effective discovery.
Should the prosecutor decide to use an indictment which, although technically sufficient, does not
adequately allow a defendant to properly prepare for trial, he may well run afoul of the defendant's
right to be informed of the accusations against him.
Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its granting 69 and order the
government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be resolved in favor of
granting the bill70 to give full meaning to the accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of disclosing certain overt acts through the
Information and withholding others subsequently discovered, all of which it intends to prove at the trial. This is
the type of surprise a bill of particulars is designed to avoid. 71The accused is entitled to the observance of all
the rules designated to bring about a fair verdict.
This becomes more relevant in the present case where the crime charged carries with it the severe penalty of
capital punishment and entails the commission of several predicate criminal acts involving a great number of
transactions spread over a considerable period of time.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his dissent, avers that the allegations in the information are not vague because
the Information needs only allege the ultimate facts constituting the offense for which the accused stands
charged, not the finer details of why and how the illegal acts alleged were committed. In support of his
position, Justice Carpio cited the cases of Miguel v. Sandiganbayan,73Go v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,74 and People v. Romualdez,75 among others, to support the superfluity of the details requested by
Enrile.
Justice Carpio’s reliance on these cases is misplaced for they involve the issue of quashal of an
information on the ground that the facts charge do not constitute an offense, rather than a request for bill of
particulars. That is, these cited cases involve the critical issue of the validity of an information, and not a
request for specificity with request to an offense charged in an information.
Notably, in Miguel,84 to which Justice Carpio concurred, this Court mentioned that the proper remedy, if at all,
to a supposed ambiguity in an otherwise valid Information, is merely to move for a bill of particulars and not
for the quashal of an information which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged .85redarclaw
Clearly then, a bill of particulars does not presuppose an invalid information for it merely fills in the details on
an otherwise valid information to enable an accused to make an intelligent plea and prepare for his defense.
I stress, however, that the issue in the present case involves abuse of discretion for denying Enrile’s request
for a bill of particulars, and not a motion to quash.
If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to quash is in order. 86redarclaw
But if the information charges an offense and the averments are so vague that the accused cannot prepare to
plead or prepare for trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper remedy. 87redarclaw
Thus viewed, a motion to quash and a motion for a bill of particulars are distinct and separate remedies, the
latter presupposing an information sufficient in law to charge an offense. 88redarclaw
The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the Information is filed.
As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed unless grave abuse of
discretion or a manifestly erroneous order amounting to grave abuse of discretion is shown. 89redarclaw
Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that amounts or is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law such as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.90 For the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical
exercise of power.
It will be recalled that the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars on two grounds,
namely:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the details sought were evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial; and
(2) his desired details were reiterations of the details he sought in his supplemental
opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
We shall separately examine these grounds in determining whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied Enrile’s motion for a bill of particulars and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
Sandiganbayan Ground #1:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The details sought were evidentiary in nature
A determination of whether the details that Enrile sought were evidentiary requires an examination of the
elements of the offense he is charged with, i.e., plunder under Republic Act No. 7080.
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or
any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with
any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public
officer concerned;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of government-
owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or
any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in
any business enterprise or undertaking;
(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired is at least P50,000,000.00. [Emphasis supplied.]
D.1.a. The Conspiracy Element and its Requested Details
Taking these elements into account, we hold that Enrile’s requested details on Who among the accused
acquired the alleged “ill-gotten wealth” are not proper subjects for a bill of particulars.
The allegation of the Information that the accused and Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, “conspiring with one another
and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis x x x ” expressly charges
conspiracy.
The law on plunder provides that it is committed by “a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance
with x x x.” The term “connivance” suggests an agreement or consent to commit an unlawful act or deed with
another; to connive is to cooperate or take part secretly with another. 91 It implies both knowledge and assent
that may either be active or passive. 92redarclaw
Since the crime of plunder may be done in connivance or in conspiracy with other persons, and the
Information filed clearly alleged that Enrile and Jessica Lucila Reyes conspired with one another and with
Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, then it is unnecessary to specify, as an
essential element of the offense, whether the ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00 had
been acquired by one, by two or by all of the accused. In the crime of plunder, the amount of ill-gotten wealth
acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is immaterial for as long as the total amount amassed, acquired or
accumulated is at least P50 million.
We point out that conspiracy in the present case is not charged as a crime by itself but only as the mode of
committing the crime. Thus, there is no absolute necessity of reciting its particulars in the Information because
conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged.
It is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following manner:
(1) by use of the word “conspire,” or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude; or (2)
by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding
would know what is intended, and with such precision as the nature of the crime charged will admit, to enable
the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. 93redarclaw
We similarly rule that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought under the
questions –
For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law or official document is a portion of the “Priority
Development Assistance Fund” identified as that of a member of Congress, in this instance, as
ENRILE’s, to be found? In what amount for each year is ENRILE’s Priority Development
Assistance Fund?
and
x x x what COA audits or field investigations were conducted which validated the findings that each
of Enrile’s PDAF projects in the years 2004-2010 were ghosts or spurious projects?
These matters will simply establish and support the ultimate fact that Enrile’s PDAF was used to fund fictitious
or nonexistent projects. Whether a discretionary fund (in the form of PDAF) had indeed been made available
to Enrile as a member of the Philippine Congress and in what amounts are evidentiary matters that do not
need to be reflected with particularity in the Information, and may be passed upon at the full-blown trial on the
merits of the case.
Specifically, we believe that the exact amounts of Enrile’s yearly PDAF allocations, if any, from 2004 to 2010
need not be pleaded with specific particularity to enable him to properly plead and prepare for his defense. In
fact, Enrile may be in a better position to know these details than the prosecution and thus cannot claim that
he would be taken by surprise during trial by the omission in the Information of his annual PDAF allocations.
Thus, whether the amounts of Enrile’s PDAF allocations have been specified or not, Enrile has been
sufficiently informed that he stands charged of endorsing Napoles’ non-government organizations to
implement spurious or fictitious projects, in exchange for a percentage of his PDAF.
The details of the “COA audits or field investigations” only support the ultimate fact that the projects
implemented by Napoles’ NGOs, and funded by Enrile’s PDAF, were nonexisting or fictitious. Thus, they are
evidentiary in nature and do not need to be spelled out with particularity in the Information.
To require more details on these matters from the prosecution would amount to asking for evidentiary
information that the latter intends to present at the trial; it would be a compulsion on the prosecution to
disclose in advance of the trial the evidence it will use in proving the charges alleged in the indictment.
We also deny Enrile’s plea for details on who “the others” were (aside from Napoles, Lim and De Asis) from
whom he allegedly received kickbacks and commissions. These other persons do not stand charged of
conspiring with Enrile and need not therefore be stated with particularly, either as specific individuals or as
John Does. The Court cannot second-guess the prosecution’s reason for not divulging the identity of these
“others” who may potentially be witnesses for the prosecution.
What the Constitution guarantees the accused is simply the right to meet and examine the prosecution
witnesses. The prosecution has the prerogative to call witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information, subject to the defense’s right to cross-examine them. 96 Making these “others” known would in
fact be equivalent to the prosecution’s premature disclosure of its evidence. We stress, to the point of
repetition, that a bill of particulars is not meant to compel the prosecution to prematurely disclose evidentiary
matters supporting its case.
D.2. The Overt Acts constituting the “Combination” or “Series” under the Plunder Law
We hold that Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought under the following questions –
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the “combination”? What are the particular overt
acts which constitute the “series”? Who committed those acts? [Emphasis ours.]
Plunder is the crime committed by public officers when they amass wealth involving at least P50 million by
means of a combination or series of overt acts. 97 Under these terms, it is not sufficient to simply allege that
the amount of ill-gotten wealth amassed amounted to at least P50 million; the manner of amassing the ill-
gotten wealth – whether through a combination or series of overt acts under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 –
is an important element that must be alleged.
When the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it refers to at least two (2) acts falling
under different categories listed in Section 1, paragraph (d) of R.A. No. 7080 [for example, raids on the public
treasury under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to
the National Government under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (3)].
On the other hand, to constitute a “series” there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under
the same category of enumeration found in Section 1, paragraph (d) [for example, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph
(1)].98redarclaw
The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase “combination or series of overt or criminal acts.” Hence, even
if the accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at least P50 million, a person cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of plunder if this resulted from a single criminal act. This interpretation of the Plunder Law is very clear
from the congressional deliberations. 99redarclaw
Considering that without a number of overt or criminal acts, there can be no crime of plunder, the various
overt acts that constitute the “combination” and “series” the Information alleged, are material facts that should
not only be alleged, but must be stated with sufficient definiteness so that the accused would know what he is
specifically charged of and why he stands charged, so that he could properly defend himself against the
charge.
Thus, the several (i.e., at least 2) acts which are indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy must not
be generally stated; they should be stated with enough particularity for Enrile (and his co-accused) to be able
to prepare the corresponding refuting evidence to meet these alleged overt acts.
It is insufficient, too, to merely allege that a set of acts had been repeatedly done (although this may
constitute a series if averred with sufficient definiteness), and aver that these acts resulted in the
accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00, as in this case. The
Information should reflect with particularity the predicate acts that underlie the crime of plunder, based on the
enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080.
A reading of the Information filed against Enrile in the present case shows that the prosecution made little or
no effort to particularize the transactions that would constitute the required series or combination of overt acts .
In fact, it clustered under paragraph (a) of the Information its recital of the manner Enrile and his co-accused
allegedly operated, thus describing its general view of the series or combination of overt criminal acts that
constituted the crime of plunder.
Without any specification of the basic transactions where kickbacks or commissions amounting to at least
P172,834,500.00 had been allegedly received, Enrile’s preparation for trial is obviously hampered. This defect
is not cured by mere reference to the prosecution’s attachment, as Enrile already stated in his Reply that the
“desired details” could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution, which documents
are not integral parts of the Information. Hence, the prosecution does not discharge its burden of informing
Enrile what these overt acts were by simply pointing to these documents.
In providing the particulars of the overt acts that constitute the “combination” or “series” of transactions
constituting plunder, it stands to reason that the amounts involved, or at their ball park figures, should be
stated; these transactions are not necessarily uniform in amount, and cannot simply collectively be described
as amounting to P172,834,500.00 without hampering Enrile’s right to respond after receiving the right
information.
To stress, this final sum is not a general ball park figure but a very specific sum based on a number of
different acts and hence must have a breakdown. Providing this breakdown reinforces the required specificity
in describing the different overt acts.
Negatively stated, unless Enrile is given the particulars and is later given the chance to object to unalleged
details, he stands to be surprised at the trial at the same time that the prosecution is given the opportunity to
play fast and loose with its evidence to satisfy the more than P50 Million requirement of law.
Enrile should likewise know the approximate dates, at least, of the receipt of the kickbacks and commissions,
so that he could prepare the necessary pieces of evidence, documentary or otherwise, to disprove the
allegations against him. We point out that the period covered by the indictment extends from “2004 to 2010 or
thereabout,” of which, we again stress that different overt acts constituting of the elements of Plunder took
place during this period.
Undoubtedly, the length of time involved – six years – will pose difficulties to Enrile in the preparation of his
defense and will render him susceptible to surprises. Enrile should not be left guessing and speculating which
one/s from among the numerous transactions involving his discretionary PDAF funds from 2004 to 2010, are
covered by the indictment.
Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying the project that Enrile allegedly funded coupled with the name of
Napoles’ NGO (e.g., Pangkabuhayan Foundation, Inc.), to sufficiently inform Enrile of the particular
transactions referred to.100redarclaw
(2) Enrile’s endorsement of Napoles’ NGOs to the government agencies to implement these projects; and
Under the elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed by Enrile and his co-accused, the project
identification was what started the totality of acts constituting plunder: only after a project has been identified
could Enrile have endorsed Napoles’ NGO to the appropriate government agency that, in turn, would
implement the supposed project using Enrile’s PDAF. Note that without the project identification, no
justification existed to release Enrile’s PDAF to Napoles’ allegedly bogus NGO.
In these lights, the “identified project” and “Napoles’ NGO” are material facts that should be clearly and
definitely stated in the Information to allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense evidence on the specific
transaction pointed to. The omission of these details will necessarily leave Enrile guessing on what
transaction/s he will have to defend against, since he may have funded other projects with his PDAF.
Specification will also allow him to object to evidence not referred to or covered by the Information’s ultimate
facts.
The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed Napoles’ NGOs are also material facts that must be
specified, since they served a necessary role in the crime charged – the alleged conduits between Enrile and
Napoles’ NGOs. They were indispensable participants in the elaborate scheme alleged to have been
committed.
The particular person/s in each government agency who facilitated the transactions, need not anymore be
named in the Information, as these are already evidentiary matters. The identification of the particular agency
vis-à-vis Napoles’ NGO and the identified project, will already inform Enrile of the transaction referred to.
In Tantuico v. Republic,101 the Republic filed a case for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and
damages before the Sandiganbayan against former President Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Benjamin
Romualdez, and Francisco Tantuico, Jr. Tantuico filed a motion for bill of particulars essentially alleging that
the complaint was couched in general terms and did not have the particulars that would inform him of the
alleged factual and legal bases. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion on the ground that the particulars
sought are evidentiary in nature. Tantuico moved to reconsider this decision, but the Sandiganbayan again
denied his motion.
The Court overturned the Sandiganbayan’s ruling and directed the prosecution to prepare and file a bill of
particulars. Significantly, the Court held that the particulars prayed for, such as: names of persons, names of
corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the particular
transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would
support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature . The Court explained
that those particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint so that
the defendant may be fairly informed of the claims made against him and be prepared to meet the issues at
the trial.
To be sure, the differences between ultimate and evidentiary matters are not easy to distinguish.
While Tantuico was a civil case and did not involve the crime of plunder, the Court’s ruling nonetheless serves
as a useful guide in the determination of what matters are indispensable and what matters may be omitted in
the Information, in relation with the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.
will undoubtedly provide Enrile with sufficient data to know the specific transactions involved, and thus enable
him to prepare adequately and intelligently whatever defense or defenses he may have.
We reiterate that the purpose of a bill of particular is to clarify allegations in the Information that are indefinite,
vague, or are conclusions of law to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial, not simply to
inform him of the crime of which he stands accused. Verily, an accused cannot intelligently respond to the
charge laid if the allegations are incomplete or are unclear to him.
We are aware that in a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the
criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Section 4 of R.A. No.
7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt
a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth. 102redarclaw
The term “overall unlawful scheme” indicates a general plan of action or method that the principal accused
and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve their common criminal goal. In the
alternative, if no overall scheme can be found or where the schemes or methods used by the multiple
accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common criminal
goal.103redarclaw
Lest Section 4 be misunderstood as allowing the prosecution to allege that a set of acts has
been repeatedly done (thereby showing a ‘pattern’ of overt criminal acts), as has been done in the present
case, we point out that this section does not dispense with the requirement of stating the essential or material
facts of each component or predicate act of plunder; it merely prescribes a rule of procedure for the
prosecution of plunder.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,104 we construed this procedural rule to mean that [w]hat the prosecution
needed to prove beyond reasonable doubt was only the number of acts sufficient to form a combination or
series that would constitute a pattern involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There was no need to
prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten
wealth.105redarclaw
If, for example, the accused is charged in the Information of malversing public funds on twenty different (20)
occasions, the prosecution does not need to prove all 20 transactions; it suffices if a number of these acts of
malversation can be proven with moral certainty, provided only that the series or combination of transaction
would amount to at least P50,000,000.00. Nonetheless, each of the twenty transactions should be averred
with particularity, more so if the circumstances surrounding each transaction are not the same . This is the only
way that the accused can properly prepare for his defense during trial.
As his last requested point, Enrile wants the prosecution to provide the details of the allegation under
paragraph (b) of the Information (i.e., x x x by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official
position, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and
to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines ) in the following
manner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Provide the details of how Enrile took undue advantage, on several occasions, of his official
positions, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines. Was this because he received any money from the government? From whom and for
what reason did he receive any money or property from the government through which he “unjustly
enriched himself”? State the details from whom each amount was received, the place and the time.
Our ruling on Enrile’s desired details – specifically, the particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the
“combination” and “series” charged in the Information; a breakdown of the amounts of the kickbacks and
commissions allegedly received, stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at; a brief
description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks and commissions were received;
the approximate dates of receipt of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from the identified projects; the
name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged “recipients and/or target
implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects;” and the government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed
Napoles’ NGOs – renders it unnecessary to require the prosecution to submit further particulars on the
allegations contained under paragraph (b) of the Information.
Simply put, the particular overt acts alleged to constitute the combination or series required by the crime of
plunder, coupled with a specification of the other non-evidentiary details stated above, already answer the
question of how Enrile took undue advantage of his position, authority, relationships, connections and
influence as Senator to unjustly enrich himself.
We also point out that the PDAF is a discretionary fund intended solely for public purposes. Since the
Information stated that Enrile, as “Philippine Senator,” committed the offense “in relation to his office,” by
“repeatedly receiving kickbacks or commissions” from Napoles and/or her representatives through projects
funded by his (Enrile’s) PDAF, then it already alleged how undue advantage had been taken and how the
Filipino people and the Republic had been prejudiced. These points are fairly deducible from the allegations in
the Information as supplemented by the required particulars.
In the light of all these considerations, we hold that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s motion for a
bill of particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be itemized or specified are all evidentiary – without
any explanation supporting this conclusion – constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
As discussed above, some of the desired details are material facts that must be alleged to enable the
petitioner to properly plead and prepare his defense. The Sandiganbayan should have diligently sifted through
each detail sought to be specified, and made the necessary determination of whether each detail was an
ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly after Enrile stated in his Reply that the “desired details” could not be
found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution. We cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning
ignorance of the presence of these desired details; neither can we put on him the burden of unearthing from
these voluminous documents what the desired details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely
made available by the Rules to enable an accused to positively respond and make an intelligent defense.
Justice Carpio’s reference to the voluminous 144-page Ombudsman’s resolution (which found probable cause
to indict the petitioner and his co-accused not only of the crime of plunder, but also for violations of several
counts of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act) to justify his argument that Enrile was already aware of the
details he seeks in his motion for a bill of particulars, all the more strengthens our conclusive position that the
Information for plunder filed against Enrile was ambiguous and glaringly insufficient to enable him to make a
proper plea and to prepare for trial. We reiterate, to the point of being repetitive, that the purpose of the bill of
particulars in criminal cases is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or information to enable
the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial.
Moreover, a resolution arising from a preliminary investigation does not amount to nor does it serve the
purpose of a bill of particulars.
A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by surprise by restricting the scope of the
proof;106it limits the evidence to be presented by the parties to the matters alleged in the Information as
supplemented by the bill. It is for this reason that the failure of an accused to move for a bill of particulars
deprives him of the right to object to evidence which could be lawfully introduced and admitted under an
information of more or less general terms which sufficiently charges the defendants with a definite crime.
The record on preliminary investigation, in comparison, serves as the written account of the inquisitorial
process when the fiscal determined the existence of prima facie evidence to indict a person for a particular
crime. The record of the preliminary investigation, as a general rule, does not even form part of the records of
the case.107 These features of the record of investigation are significantly different from the bill of particulars
that serves as basis, together with the Information, in specifying the overt acts constituting the offense that the
accused pleaded to during arraignment.
Notably, plunder is a crime composed of several predicate criminal acts. To prove plunder, the prosecution
must weave a web out of the six ways of illegally amassing wealth and show how the various acts reveal a
combination or series of means or schemes that reveal a pattern of criminality. The interrelationship of the
separate acts must be shown and be established as a scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth amounting to at
least P50 million.
Plunder thus involves intricate predicate criminal acts and numerous transactions and schemes that span a
period of time. Naturally, in its prosecution, the State possesses an “effective flexibility” of proving a predicate
criminal act or transaction, not originally contemplated in the Information, but is otherwise included in the
broad statutory definition, in light of subsequently discovered evidence. The unwarranted use of the flexibility
is what the bill of particulars guards against.
Justice Carpio further argues that the ponencia transformed the nature of an action from an accusation in
writing charging a person with an offense to an initiatory pleading alleging a cause of action.
We see nothing wrong with such treatment, for a motion for a bill of particulars in criminal cases is designed
to achieve the same purpose as the motion for a bill of particulars in civil cases. In fact, certainty, to a
reasonable extent, is an essential attribute of all pleadings, both civil and criminal, and is more especially
needed in the latter where conviction is followed by penal consequences. 108redarclaw
Thus, even if the Information employs the statutory words does not mean that it is unnecessary to allege such
facts in connection with the commission of the offense as will certainly put the accused on full notice of what
he is called upon to defend, and establish such a record as will effectually bar a subsequent prosecution for
that identical offense.109redarclaw
Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of capital punishment; for this reason, more process
is due, not less. When a person’s life interest – protected by the life, liberty, and property language recognized
in the due process clause – is at stake in the proceeding, all measures must be taken to ensure the protection
of those fundamental rights.
Finally, we find no significance in Justice Carpio’s argument that Atty. Estelito Mendoza did not previously find
vague the Information for plunder filed against President Joseph Estrada in 2001.
Under the amended Information111 against Estrada, et al., each overt act that constituted the series or
combination and corresponding to the predicate acts under Section 1(d) had been averred with sufficient
particularity so that there was no doubt what particular transaction was referred to.
We point out that unlike in the Information against Enrile, the following matters had been averred with
sufficient definiteness, viz: the predicate acts that constitute the crime of plunder; the breakdown of how the
alleged amount of P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, had been arrived at; the participants involved in each
transaction; and the specific sources of the illegal wealth amassed.
At any rate, that Atty. Mendoza did not previously question the indictment of President Estrada via a motion
for bill of particulars does not ipso facto mean that the present Information for plunder filed against Enrile is
not vague and ambiguous.
Sandiganbayan Ground #2:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That Enrile’s cited grounds are reiterations of the grounds previously raised
Enrile does not deny that the arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of
arrest and for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of particulars were identical. He argues,
however, that the mere reiteration of these grounds should not be a ground for the denial of his motion for bill
of particulars, since “the context in which those questions were raised was entirely different.”
While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion for bill of particulars involved the right of an
accused to due process, the enumeration of the details desired in Enrile’s supplemental opposition to
issuance of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of particulars are
different viewed particularly from the prism of their respective objectives.
In the former, Enrile took the position that the Information did not state a crime for which he can be convicted;
thus, the Information is void; he alleged a defect of substance. In the latter, he already impliedly admits that
the Information sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and lacking in details that would allow him to
properly plead and prepare his defense; he essentially alleged here a defect of form.
Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its failure to state the nature and cause of
the accusation against Enrile; while the details desired in the latter (the motion for bill of particulars) are
required to be specified in sufficient detail because the allegations in the Information are vague, indefinite, or
in the form of conclusions and will not allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense unless specifications are
made.
That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in the Information does not preclude the
accused from requesting for more specific details of the various acts or omissions he is alleged to have
committed. The request for details is precisely the function of a bill of particulars.
Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating the cause and the crime an accused is
charged, the allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to properly plead and prepare
for trial.
We likewise find no complete congruence between the grounds invoked and the details sought by Enrile in his
motion for bill of particulars, and the grounds invoked in opposing the warrant for his arrest issued, so that the
Sandiganbayan’s action in one would bar Enrile from essentially invoking the same grounds.
The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.112 Simply put, the judge determines whether the necessity exists to place the accused under
immediate custody to avoid frustrating the ends of justice.
On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure grants the accused the remedy of a bill of
particulars to better inform himself of the specifics or particulars concerning facts or matters that had not been
averred in the Information with the necessary clarity for purposes of his defense.
Its purpose is to better acquaint the accused of the specific acts and/or omissions in relation with the crime
charged, to limit the matters and the evidence that the prosecution may otherwise be allowed to use against
him under a more or less general averment, and to meet the charges head on and timely object to evidence
whose inadmissibility may otherwise be deemed waived.
Based on these considerations, the question of whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest
against an accused, is separate and distinct from the issue of whether the allegations in the Information have
been worded with sufficient definiteness to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare his defense.
While the grounds cited for each may seemingly be the same, they are submitted for different purposes and
should be appreciated from different perspectives, so that the insufficiency of these grounds for one does not
necessarily translate to insufficiency for the other. Thus, the resolution of the issue of probable cause should
not bar Enrile from seeking a more detailed averment of the allegations in the Information.
The Sandiganbayan grossly missed these legal points and thus gravely abused its discretion: it used wrong
and completely inapplicable considerations to support its conclusion.
a. We PARTIALLY GRANT the present petition for certiorari, and SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayan’s
resolutions dated July 11, 2014, which denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars and his motion for
reconsideration of this denial.
b. We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days
from finality of this Decision, with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars containing the facts sought that
we herein rule to be material and necessary. The bill of particulars shall specifically contain the
following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination or series of overt criminal acts”
charged in the Information.
2. A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or commissions” allegedly received, stating how
the amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.
3. A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks or commissions were received.
4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or thereabout,” of the alleged kickbacks and
commissions from the identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution should state the year
when the kickbacks and transactions from the identified projects were received.
5. The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged “recipients
and/or target implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects.”
6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’ NGOs. The particular
person/s in each government agency who facilitated the transactions need not be named as a
particular.
All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.cr
EN BANC
G.R. No. 139297 February 23, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
vs.
RENATO @ BONG TORRECAMPO y LEYTE and RENE TORRECAMPO y LEYTE, appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
JOVITO CASPILLO1 was found stabbed and decapitated in his rented room. For his death, brothers
RENATO alias "Bong" and RENE TORRECAMPO Y LEYTE were charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Las Piñas2 with murder in an Information3 alleging:
That on or about the 11th day of November 1994, in the Municipality of Las Piñas, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
with one, NORA TORRECAMPO Y LEYTE whose present whereabouts still unknown and all of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength and/or with evident
premeditation did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab in the different
part(s) of his body and even cut off his head with a bladed weapon, one JOVITO GASPILLO, thereby inflicting
upon him serious and mortal wounds, which directly caused the death of said JOVITO GASPILLO.
The evidence adduced in the trial shows that Jovito was a tenant of the Escosio family at No. 66 Laong
Street, Barangay Almanza Uno, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. He shared a room with his brother Randy and first
cousins Nora and Karen Torrecampo. The Escosios occupied the other room of the house.
Prosecution witness Erlinda Escosio testified that on November 11, 1994 at about 10:30 in the morning, she
was seated at the door of their room removing lice from the hair of her daughter when she saw Nora and
appellant Renato pass by. They were followed shortly after by another man later identified as appellant Rene
Torrecampo. All three (3) went to the room of Jovito. A while later, Erlinda heard a weepy Nora pleading to get
into Jovito’s room where the loud noise of the radio could be heard. Some minutes after, she saw Nora and
appellant Renato come out of the room. Appellant Renato dragged Nora to the direction of Sampaguita
Compound. Appellant Rene left the room after them. He was carrying a bag.
Erlinda continued that after the departure of appellants and Nora, she walked to the toilet and noticed blood at
the door of Jovito. Curious, she peeped inside and was shocked by the sight of a body drenched in blood with
its head severed from the neck. It was Jovito. Terrified, she called for her neighbors and the barangay tanods.
People milled to the crime scene until the authorities arrived. She felt that appellants were the culprits. She
explained that the main door is the only way in and out of the house. Either way, one would have to pass by
their room to get to Jovito’s. On subject date and time, she only saw appellants and Nora go in and come out
of the scene of the crime. At the police station, she identified both appellants.
Cherry Francisco, a neighbor who lives in front of the house of the Escosios and approximately ten (10)
meters from the room of Jovito, also gave her testimony. According to her, at about 10:00 A.M. on November
11, 1994, she was eating breakfast with her family when she heard noises coming from the room of Jovito.
She went out to investigate and noticed Nora beating at the door crying out, "Bakit ninyo siya pinatay?" The
door was suddenly opened and someone grabbed Nora by the hair and pulled her inside the room. She later
identified the person as appellant Rene. Moments thereafter, appellant Renato came out of the room dragging
Nora with him. Trailing them was appellant Rene, whose hands and clothes were drenched with blood.
However, as appellant Renato and Nora walked to the direction of Sampaguita Compound, appellant Rene
went off to Laong Almanza carrying a long bag. Without delay, Cherry rushed to the house of neighbor Buena
to recount what she had just witnessed. Buena called for the authorities. Cherry returned to her house. From
there, she saw Erlinda emotionally telling people that crowded the crime scene about finding her tenant Jovito
dead with his head cut off. Eventually, the authorities arrived and investigated the incident.
Melvin Tupaz identified the body of his cousin Jovito. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyut, a medico-legal expert of the
National Bureau of Investigation, conducted the autopsy and disclosed the cause of death as "multiple stab
and hack (sic) wounds."4
Randy Caspillo, the younger brother of Jovito, testified on the expenses incurred by the family as a result of
his brother’s death. He claimed a total of ₱35,014.00 in expenses but was only able to account for
₱13,250.00 in receipts. As a result of the sudden demise of his brother, he said he suffered moral shock,
mental anguish and wounded feelings.
Appellant Rene Torrecampo testified in his defense. He averred that on November 11, 1994 at 7:00 A.M., he
left for work and arrived at LFS Engineering an hour later as indicated in the office logbook. He claimed that
he found out about Jovito’s death only at 10:00 A.M. during his coffee break when his brother’s (appellant
Renato) wife telephoned them about it. According to him, they left for Laong immediately after getting
permission from their employer Lamberto Samonte. They arrived there at 11:00 that same morning after
taking a tricycle to Casimiro, then a passenger jeep to Pillar Village. Right away, he looked for his sister
Karen, who was then living with Jovito. He found her unconscious at her friend Lolita Montinel’s place so he
brought her to Parañaque Community Hospital on board a white police service Fiera. When Karen regained
consciousness and asked about the incident, she merely cried. The doctor advised the police that she was
just scared and needed some rest. On their way home, appellant Rene and Karen stopped by the latter’s
place primarily to find out what happened to Jovito and incidentally to get some of her things. The room was a
mess and Jovito was nowhere to be found. While there they overheard Roger Escosio saying, "Ang tigas-
tigas ng ulo nila, matagal ko nang pinapaalis ayaw nilang umalis."
Appellant Rene added that at work the next day he read in Abante that his brother Renato was being tagged
as the principal suspect in the killing. Hence, he and his brother immediately requested their employer
Lamberto Samonte to accompany them to the Las Piñas Police Station to surrender. The police took them to
the Office of then Municipal Mayor Ben Casimiro where they were presented to the media. An investigation
ensued. Appellants were detained and ultimately charged for the murder of Jovito.
Appellant Renato Torrecampo basically related a similar story. His account only differed on what he did upon
arrival at Laong on the date of the incident. He claimed that he went straight home to take care of his sick
child and stayed there with his wife the rest of the day. He was about to leave for work the next morning when
he read in the newspaper that he was the prime suspect in the killing of Jovito. Together with his brother, he
asked their employer to escort him to the police station to clear his name. However, they were detained
instead and threatened into admitting the commission of the crime. They insisted that they had no knowledge
thereof and explained that they were at their place of work when it happened. The police did not believe them.
Forthwith, they were charged with murder.
The defense likewise offered in evidence the testimonies of SPO1 Benjamin Javier, Edgardo Gremio and
SPO4 Esmeraldo Lucena. SPO1 Javier of the Las Piñas Police Criminal Investigation Division was assigned
to investigate the death of Jovito. He said that he found the dead body of Jovito in his small rented room,
which was adjacent to the room of the owner of the two (2)-bedroom house. The rooms were separated by a
plywood wall. He said that Jovito’s room was facing the house of one Cherry Francisco. He placed the time of
death at 10:30 A.M. based on his interview of Erlinda Escosio. He took down the statement of Erlinda on
November 12, 1994. He believed her story and submitted a report on his findings.
Edgardo Gremio and SPO4 Esmeraldo Lucena gave corroborative testimonies. Gremio testified that he is a
member of the Barangay Police Force in Laong Street, Barangay Almanza Uno, Las Piñas. He claimed that at
about 10:30 A.M. on November 11, 1994, he was informed of a killing in his area. He passed for his neighbor
SPO4 Lucena, then still asleep, before going to the crime scene. SPO4 Lucena said that people crowded the
place of the incident when they got there. He went inside the house, which he insisted had three (3) rooms.
He maintained that the first room was occupied by the owner of the house, the second by a driver he did not
know and the third by the victim Jovito. He saw the dead body and told everyone not to touch anything until
the police investigator arrived. He then called for fellow policemen whom he accompanied to the scene.
On the basis of circumstantial evidence, the court a quo found Renato and Rene Torrecampo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced them to death. It likewise ordered them to solidarily pay the heirs
of the victim Jovito Caspillo ₱100,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of life; ₱35,014.00 in actual damages for
the wake, funeral and burial expenses; and, the costs of the suit.5 Hence, this automatic review pursuant to
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.6
In convicting appellants, the trial court relied on the following circumstances: (a) at about 9:00 A.M. on
November 11, 1994, Erlinda saw Jovito very much alive; (b) after an hour, Erlinda saw appellant Renato and
his sister Nora pass by, followed shortly by appellant Rene; (c) Erlinda heard a commotion inside the room of
Jovito and after a few minutes saw appellants emerging from the room with Nora in tow; (d) Cherry heard a
loud banging from the room of Jovito so she went outside and saw Nora frantically pounding at the door, then
Nora was pulled inside the room; (e) after thirty (30) minutes, Cherry witnessed a seemingly weak Nora being
assisted by appellant Renato coming out of the room; and, (f) Cherry likewise observed appellant Rene
leaving the room with his hands and clothes covered with blood.
Circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for purposes of conviction must have the following elements: (a) there
is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and, (c) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.7 The
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
In the instant case, the circumstances enumerated by the trial court establish an unbroken chain of events
showing the complicity of appellants and no other in the killing of victim Jovito Caspillo. Indeed, the case of
the prosecution is woven principally around the testimonies of witnesses Erlinda Escosio and Cherry
Francisco whose testimonies were sufficiently tested and found credible on the crucible of cross-examination.
Notably, as correctly observed by the court a quo, appellants failed to demonstrate ill motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses to testify against them. Absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for the
witnesses to prevaricate, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies
are worthy of full faith and credit.8
In their Brief, appellants contend that the decision of the trial court is not supported and contrary to the
evidence adduced during trial.9 We reject this contention.
First. Appellants submit that the trial court should have completely rejected both oral and written accounts of
prosecution witness Erlinda Escosio considering that her in-court testimony is contrary to her sworn
statement. Specifically, they call attention to Erlinda’s narration in court that she saw appellant Rene stabbing
the victim while appellant Renato was slicing off his head. We are not impressed. The records show that on
cross-examination, Erlinda was able to explain the alleged inconsistency:10
Q : Do you affirm the truth and veracity of the statement you have issued before SPO1 Benjamin Javier
as stated in your salaysay?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : You stated previously that you saw the actual incident while peeping through the hole in the wall,
did you not?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : How come in your statement you never mentioned that you peeped through the hole? You stayed
outside while taking out the lice from the head of your daughter?
A : I was scared and confused that I failed to narrate the details.
Clearly, reference is made on what Erlinda did not mention in her sworn statement. This is not an
inconsistency but merely an incompleteness of narration. Sworn statements, being taken ex parte, are almost
always incomplete and often inaccurate for various reasons, sometimes from partial suggestion or for want of
suggestion and inquiries.11 There is no rule of evidence to the effect that omission of certain particulars in a
sworn statement would estop an affiant from making an elaboration thereof or from correcting inaccuracies
during the trial.12
The trial court did not err in giving credence to Erlinda’s testimony in court as it is consistent with her sworn
statement on all other matters and is corroborated on material points by the testimony of Cherry Francisco.
Repeatedly, this Court has ruled that the testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in
other parts, depending on the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the
case.13 Moreover, the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light
of the declarant’s demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent
position to discriminate between truth and falsehood.14
Second. Appellants assail the testimonies of Erlinda and Cherry on the commission of the crime at 10:00 A.M.
on November 11, 1994. They insist that they had just left their place of work and only arrived at the crime
scene an hour later.
We are not convinced. To merit belief, alibi and denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-
culpability. The records reveal that appellants’ employer only substantiated their claim that they left LFS
Engineering at 10:00 A.M. on that ill-fated day. No clear and convincing evidence was adduced to establish
that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Indeed, they
admitted leaving LFS Engineering to go to the locus criminis though they claimed to have arrived there only at
11:00 A.M. Their testimony cannot prevail over the positive identification of Erlinda and Cherry, who are
disinterested witnesses.
Also dubious is their asseveration on what they did upon arrival at the crime scene. Appellant Rene professed
that he looked for his sister Karen whereas appellant Renato averred that he went home to attend to a sick
child. They obviously deviated from their purpose – to find out what really happened to their cousin
Jovito.15 We note that they did not present anyone to corroborate their stories.
Third. Appellants likewise impugn the testimony of prosecution witness Cherry Francisco. They claim that
SPO1 Benjamin Javier merely supplied the name of appellant Rene Torrecampo as the person who pulled
Nora into Jovito’s room during the incident in view of the admission of Cherry during trial that she did not
know appellant Rene.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, this attempt to discredit the testimony of Cherry is misleading.
Admittedly, she testified that she only saw appellant Rene for the first time on November 11, 1994. But she
was certain that it was appellant Rene who pulled Nora inside Jovito’s room when she was made to identify
him in court on March 23, 1995.16
Appellants likewise try to discredit the testimony of Cherry that she heard the commotion in the room of Jovito
given the blaring sound of the radio, and that she witnessed the circumstances of the crime at a distance of
ten (10) meters. The contention is misleading. The records show that Cherry heard some disturbance from
the room of Jovito, which made her go out of her house. She never claimed that it was the blare of the radio
that caused her to investigate outside.17 It was Erlinda who testified about the sound of the radio.
As to the distance of her house from the room of Jovito, the Court finds reliable the testimony of Cherry on
cross-examination that her house was directly in line with the room of Jovito and that there was nothing to
obstruct her view thereof except the not so tall trees.18 It is settled that when conditions of visibility are
favorable, and when the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the
malefactor should normally be accepted.19
Appellants further denigrate Cherry’s assertion that one of them left the crime scene with blood spattered all
over his clothes and body. They aver that whoever committed the killing could have washed away the
bloodstains before leaving the victim’s room as suggested by the pail of blood-tainted water found in Jovito’s
room.
It may be in keeping with human experience for anyone including appellants to wash the blood away from
their clothes and body after committing a crime. However, it is also natural for them to act with haste so they
could immediately leave the crime scene and avoid suspicion. It is thus not incredible that the hurried and
haphazard attempt to remove the bloodstains left the herein appellants with some traces of blood still visible
to the naked eyes of witnesses Erlinda and Cherry.
Fourth. In a further effort to impair the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants impute on SPO1
Benjamin Javier the "orchestration" of the written statements and oral testimonies of Erlinda and Cherry to get
recognition for arresting appellants and solving the crime. This is mere conjecture that deserves scant
consideration. Needless to state, the court in criminal prosecution is always guided by evidence that is
tangible, verifiable and in harmony with the usual course of human experience and not by mere surmises.20
Fifth. Appellants also assail the denial by the trial court of their motion for an ocular inspection of the crime
scene. They suggest that had it been granted, the accuracy or inexactitude of the description by SPO1 Javier
could have been established. We agree with the Solicitor General that the ocular inspection would have been
an exercise in futility for the reason that the house had then long been renovated. On March 2, 1995, when
Erlinda Escosio testified, there were already three (3) rooms in the house. The renovation was made on
February 1995, a month prior to her testimony;21 thus, explaining the testimony of SPO1 Javier that the
house of the Escosios consisted of two (2) rooms on November 11, 1994.
We now come to the crime committed by the appellants. The Information alleged the circumstances of "taking
advantage of superior strength and/or evident premeditation," and charged the crime of murder. The
circumstances that qualify the killing to murder must be proved indubitably as the killing itself. The prosecution
failed to prove these circumstances.
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor. This assumes a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and
selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The evidence does not show that
appellants took advantage of their number in order to overpower the victim. The evidence against appellants
is merely circumstantial.
Nor was evident premeditation proved. There is no proof in the instant case of (a) the time when appellants
determined to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that they clung to their determination to
commit the crime; and, (c) the lapse of sufficient period of time between the determination and the execution
of the crime, to allow appellants to reflect upon the consequences of their act. Hence, this circumstance
cannot likewise be appreciated.
The Solicitor General submits that treachery should be appreciated against the appellants as Jovito was
asleep when killed. He contends that while treachery was not alleged in the Information, it could be
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. We do not agree. Erlinda testified that Jovito was asleep
prior to the arrival of appellants but she did not say that he was still sleeping when the attack commenced.
Even assuming that treachery was proved, it could not be considered a generic aggravating circumstance.
Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
Sec. 8. Designation of the Offense. – The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense
given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances
and for the court to pronounce judgment.
Clearly, under the aforesaid provisions, aggravating circumstances, whether qualifying or generic, must be
alleged in the information before they can be considered by the court. These new provisions apply even if the
crime was committed prior to their effectivity since they are favorable to the accused, as in this case.
Appellants cannot invoke the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For voluntary surrender to be
considered, it must be shown that: (1) the offender was not actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a
person in authority or to an agent of that person; and, (3) his surrender was voluntary.22 The records disclose
that appellants voluntarily presented themselves to the Las Piñas Police Department "to clear their
name."23 We have ruled time and again that the act of a suspect in going to the police station only "to clear
his name" does not show intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities.24
Prescinding from these premises, appellants can only be convicted of the crime of homicide. The penalty for
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Corollarily, Article 64 (1) provides
that when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty prescribed by law shall be
imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty to be imposed
on appellants should be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum
shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor, the range of which is six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.
We now review the damages awarded by the trial court. The civil indemnity ex delicto given in the amount of
₱100,000.00 must be reduced to ₱50,000.00 in line with recent jurisprudence. In addition, moral damages
must be awarded in the amount of ₱50,000.00 in view of the testimony of Randy Caspillo about his "surprise"
and "hurt" as a result of the sudden death of his brother.25
The actual damages awarded in the amount of ₱35,014.00 representing wake, funeral and burial expenses
cannot be sustained. The receipts submitted by witness Randy Caspillo only prove expenses in the amount of
₱13,250.00. Nonetheless, temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 can be awarded. This is in
keeping with recent jurisprudence to the effect that when actual damages established by receipts during trial
amount to less than ₱25,000.00, which in this case is only ₱13,250.00, an award of temperate damages for
P25,000.00 is justified.26
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court finding appellants RENATO and RENE TORRECAMPO
guilty of murder and imposing upon them the penalty of death is MODIFIED; they are instead found guilty of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Jovito Caspillo
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, and to pay
the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
April 5, 2016
G.R. No. 202124
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
IRENEO JUGUETA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 03252. The CA affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca,
Quezon, finding accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Double Murder
in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya,
Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with a caliber.22 firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with
said firearm Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old, who suffered the following:
"Gunshot wound -
Point of Entry – lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the level of the
umbilicus, directed upward toward the left upper abdomen."
and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age, who suffered the following:
"Gunshot wound -
Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter
That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for
the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.
Contrary to law.2
In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was charged
with Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality
of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with short
firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot
with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the
commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which
would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the
accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and
Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils and who are minors, were not hit.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At said proceedings, one
Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement stating that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain
"Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm while
the other two had no participation in the shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger San Miguel was
not present at the crime scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found
no prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.4 Thus, upon motion of the prosecution,
the case for Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial
proceeded only as to appellant.5
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes
Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto, namely,
Mary Grace and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr. Taguinod noted that the trajectory of the bullet
wounds showed that the victims were at a higher location than the shooter, but she could not tell what kind of
ammunitions were used.6
Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of June 6, 2002, as
his entire family lay down on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut was
suddenly stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo (fences) remained. With the covering of the wall gone,
the three (3) men responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto clearly saw their faces which were
illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto identified the 3 men as appellant,
Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.
The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The men then uttered,
"Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon." Norberto pleaded with them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin,
matanda na ako at marami akong anak. Anong kasalanan ko sa inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy, a
gunshot was fired, and Norberto immediately threw his body over his children and wife in an attempt to
protect them from being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the direction where his
family huddled together in their hut.7
When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2) young daughters
were wounded. His wife went out of their house to ask for help from neighbors, while he and his older
daughter carried the two (2) wounded children out to the street. His daughter Mary Grace died on the way to
the hospital, while Claudine expired at the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to revive her.8
In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto replied that he
had a previous altercation with appellant who was angered by the fact that he (Norberto) filed a case against
appellant's two other brothers for molesting his daughter.9
On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense. Appellant's testimony,
along with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he
(appellant) was just watching TV at the house of Isidro San Miguel, where he had been living for several
years, at the time the shooting incident occurred. However, he and the other witnesses admitted that said
house was a mere five-minute walk away from the crime scene.10
Finding appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of Norberto, the trial
court ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant, together with two other assailants, conspired
to shoot and kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was then convicted of Double Murder in Criminal Case No.
7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Double Murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her
heirs in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Claudine
Divina and accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00.
In addition, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in the amount of
Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7702-G, reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article
51 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO
(2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as
maximum for each of the offended parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann
Divina. Further, accused is ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30, 2012, the CA
rendered a Decision affirming appellant's conviction for the crimes charged.13
Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July 30, 2012, the Court
issued a Resolution14 notifying the parties that they may submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Both
parties manifested that they will no longer submit supplemental briefs since they had exhaustively discussed
their positions before the CA.15
The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, such
as his failure to state from the beginning that all three assailants had guns, and to categorically identify
appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill Norberto’s children.
The appeal is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings
are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court will not recalibrate and re-examine evidence
that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.16
The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant
acted in concert with two other individuals, all three of them carrying firearms and simultaneously firing at
Norberto and his family, killing his two young daughters. Norberto clearly saw all of the three assailants with
their firearms as there is illumination coming from a lamp inside their house that had been laid bare after its
walling was stripped off, to wit:
Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at the same time, do you have light in
your house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of light was there?
A: A gas lamp.
Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?
A: In the middle of our house.
xxxx
Q: when did they fire a shot?
A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.
Q: How many gunshots did you hear?
A: Only one.
Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A firearm?
A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)
xxxx
Q: After the first shot, was there any second shot?
A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest daughters were hit.
xxxx
Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time?
A: All of them.
Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were
having one firearm each?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And they fired shots at the same time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that night?
A: To the place where we were.
Q: When those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was your position then?
A: I ordered my children to lie down.
Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children to lie down?
A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body and ordering them to line (sic)
down face down)
Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house?
A: Less than five minutes, sir.
Q: After they fired their shots, they left your house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see what happened to them?
A: Yes, sir, they were hit.
x x x17
Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's daughters
because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's family. Conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the commission of a crime and decide to commit it.
Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary as
long as their concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is the
act of all.18 Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto together,
each with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the bullet
particularly fired from appellant's firearm that killed the children.
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not
parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. 19 The
presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a
killing as murder.20 The trial court correctly ruled that appellant is liable for murder because treachery
attended the killing of Norberto’s two children, thus:
x x x Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down side by side about to
sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack was
stripped off by [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and Gilberto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores]. They
ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them having
hit and killed his two (2) daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his children were at very
tender ages. Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 years old and 3 ½ years old
respectively. In this case, the victims were defenseless and manifestly overpowered by armed assailants
when they were gunned down. There was clear showing that the attack was made suddenly and
unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and unable to defend themselves. Norberto and his wife and
his children could have already been asleep at that time of the night. x x x 21
Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. As held in People v.
Fallorina,22 the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without
the slightest provocation on his part. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected
to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.
As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code
states that a felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In Esqueda v. People,23 the Court held:
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either consummated
physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or attempted homicide or
frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by
evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the
nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) the
words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.
In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant as shown by the
use of firearms, the words uttered24during, as well as the manner of, the commission of the crime. The Court
thus quotes with approval the trial court’s finding that appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.:
In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder first by suddenly
stripping off the wall of their house, followed by successive firing at the intended victims when Norberto Divina
refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If only there were good in aiming their target, not only
Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but surely all the rest of the family would surely have died. Hence,
perpetrators were liable for Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted
Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as [appellant] Ireneo
Jugueta was the only one charged in this case, he alone is liable for the crime committed.25
Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state from the very
beginning that all three assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant’s firearm
that killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put a dent on said witness's credibility. An
examination of Norberto's testimony would show that there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled
in People v. Cabtalan,26 "[m]inor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect
the credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the
crime."27 Both the trial court and the CA found Norberto's candid and straightforward testimony to be worthy
of belief and this Court sees no reason why it should not conform to the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v.
People28 that:
Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear showing that
the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that would justify altering or
revising such findings and evaluation. This is because the trial court's determination proceeds from its
first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under
grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility
and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor x x x.29
The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding or exceptional
circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-standing principle. There is no cogent reason to overturn
the trial court's ruling that the prosecution evidence, particularly the testimony of Norberto Divina identifying
appellant as one of the assailants, is worthy of belief. Thus, the prosecution evidence established beyond any
reasonable doubt that appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime.
However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court to identify the
crimes for which appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of the
terms "Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting appellant, and yet imposing penalties
which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to penalize appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder
and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder.
The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show that
appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was
not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is
also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case
No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only one offense.
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective.
The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division,
Mindanao Station, et al.,30 thus:
The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the
necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The
State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-
compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters
his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of
the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides
that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint
or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs
(a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and
proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense.31
Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos.
7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven
during trial.
Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida,32 the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as defined in Article
4833 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in the
conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two
kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as a complex crime proper, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results
in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a
number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes.34
Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in firing
successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill
not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of
shots at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not
only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because
as held in People v. Nelmida,35 "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms,
aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give
rise to a complex crime."36
Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling as an
ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and
7702-G contain sufficient allegations to that effect, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:
That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the
attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.37
Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:
x x x the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby
commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of
execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous
desistance of the accused x x x38
In People v. Agcanas,39 the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is
aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to
another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere." Dwelling
aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter
has not given provocation therefor.40 The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of
appellant violated the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein, without
provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance.
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties imposed on
appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of murder. 41 However,
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be
imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility
for parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for each count
is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder.
Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards criminal
cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal cases,
there are three kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary
damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or temperate damages in some instances.
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in the
amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is
equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.42 This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC
which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be increased by the
Court when appropriate.43 Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and
the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or
intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period
not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a
sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in
addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim
a sum of money as restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum
amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although
the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can
be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it.44
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in
nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals45 expounded on the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as
physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in
nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no
proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity
being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered
by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 46 and
Article 222047 of the Civil Code. x x x.
Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages awarded for
mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong."48 They may also be considered and
allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as
result of his or her assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the reasonableness of the force
used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress."49
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he
award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante;
and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted."50
Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222051 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages
that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of
the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so
long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.52
Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, thus:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are
separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as
a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the
rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not
always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the
award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as
a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, 53 the theory being that there should be
compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant – associated with
such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult
or fraud or gross fraud54 – that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used
to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous
conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like
him from similar conduct in the future.55
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings,
each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an
award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether
ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the
award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It
would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying
nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal,
rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 56
The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure57 requires aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information. It is in order not to
trample on the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the alleged offense that he or
she has committed. A criminal complaint or information should basically contain the elements of the crime, as
well as its qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to effectively determine the proper
penalty it should impose. This, however, is not similar in the recovery of civil liability. In the civil aspect, the
presence of an aggravating circumstance, even if not alleged in the information but proven during trial would
entitle the victim to an award of exemplary damages.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to the presence of
an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when
exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the
award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio,58 the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with
perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People
v. Cristobal,59 the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and
wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. In People v. Cañada,60 People
v. Neverio61 and People v. Layco, Sr.,62 the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to
serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at ₱30,000.00,63 despite the lack of any
aggravating circumstance. The Court finds it proper to increase the amount to ₱50,000.00 in order to deter
similar conduct.
If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because of the provisions
of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing jurisprudence64 sets the amount of ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first consider the penalty
imposed by law. Under RA 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes,
Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC
and special penal laws were amended to impose the death penalty under certain circumstances.65 Under the
same law, the following crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general,66 mutiny on the high
seas,67 and simple rape.68 For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death: qualified piracy;69 qualified bribery under certain
circumstances;70 parricide;71 murder;72 infanticide, except when committed by the mother of the child for the
purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for the same
purpose;73 kidnapping and serious illegal detention under certain circumstances;74 robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons under certain circumstances;75 destructive arson, except when death
results as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under the article;76 attempted or
frustrated rape, when a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion thereof; plunder; 77 and carnapping,
when the driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission
of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.78 Finally, RA 7659 imposes the death penalty on the following
crimes:
(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or present.
(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii) when the victim is killed or dies
as a consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is raped, subjected to torture or dehumanizing
acts.
(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under
Article 320, death results.
(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or homicide is
committed; (ii) when committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: (1) when the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the
parent of the victim; (2) when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities; (3)
when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives
within the third degree of consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a religious or a child below seven years
old; (5) when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) disease; (6) when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when by reason or on the occasion
of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.
From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) indivisible penalties or single
indivisible penalty, all of them must be taken in relation to Article 63 of the RPC, which provides:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules
shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater
penalty shall be applied.
2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the
lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts
shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for
the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of
such compensation. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 63)
Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the court has the duty
to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in crimes where the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court can impose either reclusion perpetua or death,
depending on the mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.
But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,
the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties
of the RPC.79
As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua.
Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in People v.
Salome80 and People v. Quiachon,81 is "the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of
its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender."82
When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the death penalty were it not for
RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor,83 that the award of civil indemnity
for the crime of rape when punishable by death should be ₱75,000.00 We reasoned that "[t]his is not only a
reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also
an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity." 84 Such
reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA 7659. The amount was later increased to
₱100,000.00.85
In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa,86 ₱50,000.00 was
awarded as moral damages without need of pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is recognized that
the victim's injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se
the award of moral damages.87 Subsequently, the amount was increased to ₱75,000.00 in People v.
Soriano88 and P100,000.00 in People v. Gambao.89
Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the imposable
penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be used as the basis for
awarding damages and not the actual penalty imposed.1avvphi1
Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary aggravating
circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, the latest jurisprudence90 pegs the amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱100,0000.00 as
moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary aggravating circumstances
present, the amount of ₱100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and moral
damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary damages shall
be fixed at ₱100,000.00. "[T]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and
the financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of
heinous crimes x x x."91
When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being
no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the number of
qualifying aggravating circumstances present.
When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the offender caused
several crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single design, the amount of civil indemnity and moral
damages will depend on the penalty and the number of victims. For each of the victims, the heirs should be
properly compensated. If it is multiple murder without any ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a
qualifying aggravating circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein
the maximum penalty shall be imposed,92 then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC, the
following doctrines are noteworthy:
In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog,93 this Court ruled that special complex crime, or more properly,
a composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v. Barros,94 explained that composite crimes
are "neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised
Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies
[compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex
crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal
possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although
composed of two or more offenses."95
In People v. De Leon,96 we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide
perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the
taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result
obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in
the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with
homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely,
robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is
other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the
homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the
occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the
robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the
occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed
by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of
robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes
murder, parricide, and infanticide.97
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in its
generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on
occasion of the rape.98 Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior
strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the
prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant
is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of
treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People
v. Macabales:99
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating circumstance
of treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to
crimes against property. However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized
treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered
helpless by appellants in defending himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers before
he was stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them.
In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating
circumstance.
Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the
Revised Penal Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised
Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the actual
commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder but, as
generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be imposed.100
Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it cannot be imposed due
to RA 9346 and what is actually imposed is the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and moral
damages will be ₱100,000.00 each, and another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the
heinousness of the crime and to set an example. If there is another composite crime included in a special
complex crime and the penalty imposed is death, an additional ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00
moral damages and ₱100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each composite crime committed.
For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide101 wherein three (3) people died as a consequence of the
crime, the heirs of the victims shall be entitled to the award of damages as discussed earlier. This is true,
however, only if those who were killed were the victims of the robbery or mere bystanders and not when those
who died were the perpetrators or robbers themselves because the crime of robbery with homicide may still
be committed even if one of the robbers dies.102 This is also applicable in robbery with rape where there is
more than one victim of rape.
In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage in which the crime
was committed and proven during the trial. Article 6 of the RPC provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as those which are
frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment
are present; and it is frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is death but reduced
to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded
will each be ₱100,000.00 and another ₱100,000.00 for exemplary damages or when the circumstances of the
crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the civil indemnity and moral damages should be
₱75,000.00 each, as well as exemplary damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00. If, however, the crime proven
is in its frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be
₱50,000.00, and an award of ₱25,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱25,000.00 moral damages when the crime
proven is in its attempted stage. The difference in the amounts awarded for the stages is mainly due to the
disparity in the outcome of the crime committed, in the same way that the imposable penalty varies for each
stage of the crime. The said amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of felonies in
their frustrated or attempted stages shall be the bases when the crimes committed constitute complex crime
under Article 48 of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder with attempted murder, the amount of civil
indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is ₱100,000.00 each, while in the attempted murder, the
civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is ₱25,000.00 each.
In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several victims (except the
robbers) sustained injuries, they shall likewise be indemnified. It must be remembered that in a special
complex crime, unlike in a complex crime, the component crimes have no attempted or frustrated stages
because the intention of the offender/s is to commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process of
committing the said crime, another crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a robbery with
homicide, other victims sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still robbery with
homicide as the injuries become part of the crime, "Homicide", in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, is understood in its generic sense and now forms part of the essential element of robbery,103 which
is the use of violence or the use of force upon anything. Hence, the nature and severity of the injuries
sustained by the victims must still be determined for the purpose of awarding civil indemnity and damages. If
a victim suffered mortal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the victim should
be awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages equivalent to the damages awarded in
a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries that are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages should likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded in an
attempted stage.
In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, like
homicide, death under tumultuous affray, reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, the civil indemnity
awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be ₱50,000.00 and ₱50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary
damages being awarded. However, an award of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages in a crime of homicide shall
be added if there is an aggravating circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the
information.
Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases. The award of
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and
funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.104 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages
may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the
exact amount was not proved.105 In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as
temperate damages to ₱50,000.00.
In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed were further made
atrocious by the fact that the victims are innocent, defenseless minors – one is a mere 3½-year-old toddler,
and the other a 13-year-old girl. The increase in the amount of awards for damages is befitting to show not
only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over such crimes and wastage of lives.
In summary:
I. For those crimes106 like, Murder,107 Parricide,108 Serious Intentional
Mutilation,109 Infanticide,110 and other crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of
indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages111 – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted:112
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or sexual
abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages will depend on the penalty,
extent of violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the penalty consists of
indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed. In other
complex crimes where death does not result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil
indemnity, moral and exemplary damages depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty
imposed, as the case may be.
IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide,113 Robbery with Rape,114 Robbery with
Intentional Mutilation,115 Robbery with
Arson,116 Rape with Homicide,117 Kidnapping with Murder,118 Carnapping with Homicide119 or
Carnapping with Rape,120 Highway Robbery with Homicide,121 Qualified Piracy,122 Arson with
Homicide,123 Hazing with Death, Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation124 and other crimes with death, injuries,
and sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the
penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua although death did not occur.
1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds125 and could have died if not for a timely
medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.
2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a timely
medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
In Robbery with Physical Injuries,126 the amount of damages shall likewise be dependent on
the nature/severity of the wounds sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.
The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s or
perpetrator/s are themselves killed or injured in the incident.1âwphi1
Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that for every
additional rape committed, whether against the same victim or other victims, the victims shall be
entitled to the same damages unless the other crimes of rape are treated as separate crimes, in
which case, the damages awarded to simple rape/qualified rape shall apply.
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, i.e.,
Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the
offender,127 Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and Unintentional
Abortion, etc.:
1.1 Where the crime was consummated:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where there are no
stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous affray:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱30,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱20,000.00
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged in the
Information,128 in addition to the above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral
damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages for consummated; ₱30,000.00
for frustrated; and ₱20,000.00 for attempted, shall be awarded.
VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and death occurs in
the course of the rebellion, the heirs of those who died are entitled to the following:129
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00130
B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the rebellion and could have
died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is
presented in court, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded.
To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity is
P3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount cannot be changed,
increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present
circumstance warrants it.131
Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the ordinary aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the following damages:
(1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each of the two children who died; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages
for each of the two victims; (3) another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the two victims; and
(4) temperate damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for each of the two deceased. For the four (4) counts of
Attempted Murder, appellant should pay ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and
₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the four victims. In addition, the civil indemnity, moral
damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.132
Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the charges against Gilberto
Estores and Roger San Miguel who had been identified by Norberto Divina as the companions of appellant on
the night the shooting occurred. Norberto had been very straightforward and unwavering in his identification of
Estores and San Miguel as the two other people who fired the gunshots at his family. More significantly, as
noted by the prosecutor, the testimonies of Estores and San Miguel, who insisted they were not at the crime
scene, tended to conflict with the sworn statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which was the basis for the Provincial
Prosecutor's ruling that he finds no probable cause against the two. Danilo Fajarillo's sworn statement said
that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it
was only appellant who was carrying a firearm and the two other people with him had no participation in the
shooting incident. Said circumstances bolster the credibility of Norberto Divina's testimony that Estores and
San Miguel may have been involved in the killing of his two young daughters.
After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy because the
same only attaches if the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached before the second;
(2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the
first. In turn, a first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or
convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 133 In this case, the
case against Estores and San Miguel was dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus, there can be no
double jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be served by reinvestigating the real participation, if any, of
Estores and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine Divina.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 30,
2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of murder defined under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and hereby sentences him to suffer
two (2) terms of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole under R.A. 9346. He
is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina the following amounts for
each of the two victims: (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; (c)
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of attempted murder defined and penalized under
Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder. He is ORDERED to
PAY moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages of PS0,000.00 to each of the four victims, namely, Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth
Divina and Judy Ann Divina.
(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil
indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages.
(4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of Justice, be FURNISHED a
copy of this Decision. The Prosecutor General is DIRECTED to immediately conduct
a REINVESTIGATION on the possible criminal liability of Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel
regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice for his
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
EN BANC
G.R. No. 171271 August 31, 2006
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA, Appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of murder in an amended Information 1 that
reads:
That on or about the 12th of February, 2001, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation, treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab Evelyn Kho y Sua on the different parts of her body with the use of a
deadly weapon, thereby inflicting upon said Evelyn Kho y Sua stab wounds, which directly caused her death;
that the act was committed inside the dwelling of Evelyn Kho y Sua and with insult or in disregard of the
respect due to the offended party on account of his (sic) rank, age or sex.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are as follows:
Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho since 1998. The latter worked as the
managing partner of the Lawyer’s Advocate Circle, a law firm operated as a sole proprietorship, and located
at 2302 Atlanta Center, 31 Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Juan, M.M. Accused was initially paid P6,000.00 a
month as wages, aside from boarding, food, overtime and extra pay, which he received when he did extra
driving and other work for Atty. Sua-Kho’s family.
On February 12, 2001, at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening, the accused drove Atty. Sua Kho to her
condominium unit at 1702 Platinum 2000, Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Jun M.M. After handing his
employer’s bag to Marissa Hiso, the housemaid, accused proceeded to the kitchen where he drank a glass of
water. Also in the condominium unit were Atty. Sua-Kho’s three year old daughter Issa and her nanny, Nelie
Maglasang. After talking and playing with her daughter for a few minutes, Atty. Sua-Kho emerged from the
bedroom to talk with the accused. Shortly thereafter, Marrisa heard her employer screaming, and she saw the
accused stabbing her with their kitchen knife. She tried to stop the accused, shouting "Kuya Bert!", but the
latter continued to stab Atty. Sua-Kho. Meanwhile, Nelie also heard her employer’s screams, and locked
herself with Issa in the master’s bathroom. When she peeped-out from her hiding place, she saw Marissa,
whom she signaled to go downstairs for help. The latter did so, and sought help from the security guard.
Nellie, meanwhile called Atty. Sua-Kho’s father, Marcelino Sua, and husband, Daniel Kho, on the bedroom
phone.
When Marcelino Sua arrived, he saw Marissa and a security guard in front of the condominium unit. When
they entered, they saw the bloodied and unmoving body of Atty. Sua-Kho sprawled on the floor. Marcelino
then brought his daughter to the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital, where doctors tried to revive her, but
failed. The accused, meanwhile, fled, using the victim’s car. He was arrested soon afterwards in Calapan,
Mindoro, while on his way to his home province.
Upon examination of the victim’s body, Dr. Edgardo Rodriguez Vida found that she suffered eighteen (18) stab
wounds and three (3) incise wounds aside from other minor injuries. The stab wounds on her chest were
considered fatal as they affected both lungs, the main blood vessel of the heart and the heart itself. There
were four stab wounds on the heart, one on the right lung and four on the left lung. According to the doctor,
the wounds could have been caused by a sharp single-bladed object and that the incise wounds found on the
left forearm, right wrist and left leg could have been inflicted while Atty. Sua-Kho tried to parry the blows.
Marian Aquino, legal secretary of the Lawyer’s Advocate Circle, where the victim worked, related that prior to
the killing of Atty. Sua-Kho, the accused had confided to her about his grudges against the victim, such as
being given spoiled food, that his meals were being measured, that he worked long hours of the day and
served many bosses. On February 11, 2001, accused spent the day at her boarding house where he told her
he could no longer take the way Atty. Sua-Kho treated him. Later he said "nadedemonyo na ako" and that he
would finish Atty. Sua-Kho. He would hit her at the back, very deep, and he would make sure that she would
die. Then he would go to the province, his territory, where he could not be followed.
Atty. Joel Baguio, an associate at the Lawyer’s Advocate Circle, also testified that before the killing, the
accused told him of his grudges against Atty. Sua-Kho, like his being scolded for being late, and being called
a thief, a killer, and ex-convict and other bad names. On February 12, 2001, the accused also told him not to
get too close, as he might get involved in what was going to happen.
The accused, on the other hand, raised the defense of self-defense. Atty. Sua-Kho, he testified, didn’t want
her husband to know that she had been taking trips with a company guest, a certain Phillip Robinson, to
Puerto Azul and Daranak Falls in Tanay. She warned the accused that something bad would happen to him if
her husband would learn about it. In the evening of February 12, 2001, Atty. Sua-Kho urged accused to go to
her father’s house, because her husband Daniel Kho would be arriving. As she and the accused argued about
Phillip Robinson, the former got a knife and stabbed him with it, catching him on the wrist. Accused managed
to wrest control of the knife, and with it, stabbed Atty. Sua-Kho three or four times. After he stabbed her he
was shocked and left the place using the victim’s car. He fled to Mindoro where he allegedly surrendered to
the police. 2
On March 26, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused, Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the severe
penalty of death by lethal injection with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.
On the civil liability of the accused, he is ordered to pay the legal heirs of the victim actual, moral, nominal,
exemplary and temperate damages in the respective sums of P298,202.25, P50,000.00, P200,000.00,
P200,000.00 and P50,000.00. He is also ordered to pay the victim’s heirs P50,000.00 for the loss of the
victim’s life, all with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6 percent per annum from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 3
The case was elevated to this Court because the penalty imposed was death. However, pursuant to our ruling
in People v. Mateo, 4 the case was transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals. 5
On October 21, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS, in that, the accused-appellant, having been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder, is hereby sentenced to Death. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the following:
(1) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P298,202.25 as actual damages; and
(4) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
The awards of temperate and nominal damages are hereby DELETED.
Since the imposition of the death penalty in this case was affirmed, this Decision and the complete records of
this case are hereby ordered TRANSMITTED to the Supreme Court on automatic review, immediately upon
the promulgation of this Decision.
SO ORDERED. 6
The Court of Appeals disregarded appellant’s claim of self defense for lack of evidence and for being
incredible considering the number and location of wounds sustained by the victim and his flight from the crime
scene. It also noted that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime as there were no particulars as
to how the killing began or executed.
However, the appellate court found that evident premeditation was adequately established which qualified the
killing to murder. Likewise, it appreciated abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance.
As regards the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to the rank, sex and age of the victim, the
Court of Appeals noted that these circumstances were included as amendments to the information after the
presentation by the prosecution of its evidence. As such, the same should not be allowed because it will
prejudice the rights of the appellant.
In a Resolution dated March 7, 2006, we required both parties to file supplemental briefs. The Office of the
Solicitor General manifested that it will no longer be filing a supplemental brief. On the other hand, appellant
insisted on his theory of self defense and prayed for his acquittal.
We agree with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that appellant’s claim of self-defense is
self-serving hence should not be given credence. In Cabuslay v. People, 7 we ruled that:
One who invokes self defense admits responsibility for the killing. Accordingly, the burden of proof shifts to the
accused who must then prove the justifying circumstance. He must show by clear and convincing evidence
that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a stranger. With clear and convincing
evidence, all the following elements of self defense must be established: (1) unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person claiming self defense.
Appellant’s version of the stabbing incident does not inspire belief. His testimony that it was Atty. Sua-Kho
who attacked him is uncorroborated and improbable. Appellant’s alleged use of reasonable means to repel
the aggression is also untenable considering the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim which
demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend oneself. 8 We note that the victim
suffered 18 stab wounds which were all directed to her chest, heart and lungs. She also had incised wounds
which were inflicted while she was parrying the blows coming from the appellant. In fact, appellant testified
that Atty. Sua-Kho was running away from him but he still pursued her and inflicted the fatal wounds:
Q: According to you, Atty. launched at you and you covered and cut on your left hand and that was the time
you got the knife and what happened after that?
A: What I remember is that she went inside.
Q: So, she run (sic) away from you, is that what you are saying?
A: When I was hit and I was able to stab her, she ran towards the room.
Q: So she was trying to avoid [you] after she stabbed you the first time?
A: I do not know, what I know is that when I stabbed her, she went inside the room.
Q: What part of the body did you hit her the first time?
A: At the abdominal area, sir.
Q: After that initial wound, Atty. Kho run (sic) towards the room, is that correct?
A: What I remember, she run (sic), sir. 9
Moreover, appellant’s act of fleeing from the crime scene instead of reporting the incident to the police
authorities is contrary to his proclaimed innocence but highly indicative of guilt and negate his claim of self
defense. 10
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not present. Treachery
under paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate employment of
means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the intended victim might
raise. For treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution
which would ensure the safety of the offender from defensive and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the
victim no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) the means, method and manner of the execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the offender. 11 Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. 12
In the instant case, there is no proof on how the attack was commenced. Where no particulars are known as
to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim
began and developed, it can in no way be established from mere suppositions that the killing was perpetrated
by treachery. 13
We find however that evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength attended the killing.
Like any other circumstance that qualifies a killing as murder, evident premeditation must be established by
clear and positive evidence; 14 that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 15 The essence of premeditation is
that the execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and reflections upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. To be considered, the following
elements must be proven: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act
manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the
decision and the execution, to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 16
Prosecution witnesses Marian Aquino and Atty. Joel Baguio testified as to appellant’s state of mind and
predisposition to avenge the alleged maltreatment by the victim. Both witnesses testified on appellant’s ill-
plans against his employer the day prior to the crime. Absent evidence showing any reason or motive for the
witnesses to falsely testify against the appellant, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists
and their testimonies should be accorded full faith and credit. Thus, the lower courts correctly concluded that
evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime.
Appellant likewise took advantage of his superior strength to perpetuate the criminal act. He killed Atty. Sua-
Kho by overpowering her and driving the murder weapon into her body several times, despite her attempts to
parry the blows. He could not have executed the dastardly act without employing physical superiority over the
victim. In People v. Espina, 17 we have ruled that an attack by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed
and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the
weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.
We find, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the amendments in the information
regarding the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age or
sex. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, 18 provides that an amendment after the plea of the accused
is permitted only as to matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and such amendment is not
prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had
already been arraigned. 19
In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, 20 we had the occasion to distinguish between substantial and formal
amendments:
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of
the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the following have been held to be
merely formal amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the
court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense
different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the
prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has
or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused,
such as his right to invoke prescription.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is
whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the
amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might have would be equally
applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is
one of form and not of substance. 21
Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or
disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial,
amendment. These amendments do not have the effect of charging another offense different or distinct from
the charge of murder as contained in the original information. They relate only to the range of the penalty that
the court might impose in the event of conviction. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial
right of appellant. 22 Besides, appellant never objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on
account of rank, age or sex. 23 Without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived. 24
There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home. Appellant could have killed her elsewhere but
he decided to commit the crime at her home; thus we appreciate the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
However, it was not convincingly shown that appellant deliberately intended to offend or disregard the respect
due to rank, age, or sex of Atty. Sua-Kho. The motive for the murder was his grudge against the victim and
not because she was a lawyer and his employer. Neither did appellant took into consideration the age of Atty.
Sua-Kho and the fact that she is a woman when he killed her.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, 25 as amended by R.A. No. 7659, 26 prescribes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Considering the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation and the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, and taking advantage of superior strength
without any mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty would have been death. 27
However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty on June 24, 2006 28, the penalty that should be meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight
Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by
Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No.
7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as
they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of
the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Regarding damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest, in proper cases. 29
We affirm the monetary awards granted by the Court of Appeals but modify the amount of actual damages
and exemplary damages.
The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other
than the commission of the crime. Hence, based on recent jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity ex
delicto of P75,000.00 for the heirs Atty. Sua-Kho is in order.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or loss he
suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice and are aimed at repairing the wrong done. 30 To be
recoverable, actual and compensatory damages must be duly proved with reasonable degree of
certainty. 31 In the present case, the award of actual damages of P298,210.25 32 is correct, considering that
the said amount has been duly proven.
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in view of the violent
death of the victim and the resultant grief of her family.
Article 2230 of the Civil Code specifically states that exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, as in this case. Moreover, as an example and
deterrent to future similar transgressions, the Court finds that an award of P25,000.00 for exemplary damages
is proper.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01366, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga isfound GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
qualified by evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of
superior strength and dwelling, with no mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have
been death. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua without possibility of parole. The appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Atty. Evelyn
Sua-Kho, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P298,210.25 as actual damages; 50,000.00 as moral
damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; all with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
II
According to petitioner, damage or injury to the offended party is an essential element of estafa. The
amendment of the Informations substituting the PCIBank for Caltex as the offended party would prejudice his
rights since he is deprived of a defense available before the amendment, and which would be unavailable if
the Informations are amended. Petitioner further insisted that the ruling in the Sayson case did not apply to
this case.
On November 5, 2002, the appellate court rendered judgment dismissing the petition. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition to annul the orders dated July 18, 2001 and November 14,
2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 98-1611 and 98-1612 is
hereby DENIED and consequently DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.15
The appellate court declared that when PCIB restored the amount of the checks to Caltex, it was subrogated
to the latter’s right against petitioner. It further declared that in offenses against property, the designation of
the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the
complaint or information can be properly identified. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in
People v. Ho16 and People v. Reyes.17
On October 17, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.18
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition which is anchored on the following grounds:
I. THE PEOPLE V. YU CHAI HO 53 PHILIPPINES 874 IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR
CONSIDERING THE PACTS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT.
II. LIKEWISE, THE CASE OF PEOPLE VS. REYES CA, 50 (2) OG 665, NOVEMBER 11, 1953 HAS
NO MATERIAL BEARING TO THE PRESENT CASE.
III. THE SUBSTITUTION OF PCIBANK WILL SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OF THE
PETITIONER HENCE, IT IS PROHIBITED BY SEC. 14 OF RULE 110.
IV. THERE IS NO VALID SUBROGATION BETWEEN CALTEX AND PCIBANK. ASSUMING THERE
IS, THE CIVIL CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED TO PROSECUTE.
V. THE TWIN INFORMATIONS UPON WHICH PETITIONER WAS INDICTED, ARRAIGNED, PRE-
TRIAL HELD AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TERMINATED THE PRESENTATION OF ITS EVIDENCE
IN CHIEF ARE DEFECTIVE AND VOID, HENCE THE DISMISSAL IS IN ORDER.
VI. PETITIONER TIMELY OBJECTED TO THE APPEARANCE OF PRIVATE PROSECUTOR FOR
PCIBANK.
VII. THE FINDINGS OF MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT SUPORTED BY THE RECORD NOR
EVIDENCE AND BASED ON MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS.
VIII. PETITIONER’S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DID NOT VIOLATE THE
OMNIBUS MOTION RULE UNDER SEC. 8, RULE 15 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.19
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner argues that the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complainant at this late stage of the trial is
prejudicial to his defense. He argues that the substitution is tantamount to a substantial amendment of the
Informations which is prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 5, Rule 11020 of the Revised Rules of Rules, all criminal actions covered by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor. Thus, even if
the felonies or delictual acts of the accused result in damage or injury to another, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly instituted, and the offended party has not
waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted the civil action prior to the
criminal action, the prosecution of the action (including the civil) remains under the control and supervision of
the public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is a public function. Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel,
who will act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and
inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove to be costly,
burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The
multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the
two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The
prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing
the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain
social order.21
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the
private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the
accused.22 Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. – The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of
this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
On the other hand, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during
the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes
any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice
to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and
copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
Thus, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information
may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with
leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial
amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.23
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of
the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.24 The following have been held to be mere
formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might
impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or
distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s
theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an
amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce
new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in
the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.25
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence
defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An
amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect
the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.26
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial amendment.
The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to
petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the same, and all such
evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the
substitution.
Petitioner next argues that in no way was PCIB subrogated to the rights of Caltex, considering that he has no
knowledge of the subrogation much less gave his consent to it. Alternatively, he posits that if subrogation was
proper, then the charges against him should be dismissed, the two Informations being "defective and void due
to false allegations."
Petitioner was charged of the crime of estafa complex with falsification document. In estafa one of the
essential elements "to prejudice of another" as mandated by article 315 of the Revise Penal Code.
The element of "to the prejudice of another" being as essential element of the felony should be clearly
indicated and charged in the information with TRUTH AND LEGAL PRECISION.
This is not so in the case of petitioner, the twin information filed against him alleged the felony committed " to
the damage and prejudice of Caltex." This allegation is UNTRUE and FALSE for there is no question that as
early as March 24, 1998 or THREE (3) LONG MONTHS before the twin information were filed on June 29,
1998, the prejudice party is already PCIBank since the latter Re-Credit the value of the checks to Caltex as
early as March 24, 1998. In effect, assuming there is valid subrogation as the subject decision concluded, the
subrogation took place an occurred on March 24, 1998 THREE (3) MONTHS before the twin information were
filed.
The phrase "to the prejudice to another" as element of the felony is limited to the person DEFRAUDED in the
very act of embezzlement. It should not be expanded to other persons which the loss may ultimately fall as a
result of a contract which contract herein petitioner is total stranger.
In this case, there is no question that the very act of commission of the offense of September 24, 1997 and
October 15, 1997 respectively, Caltex was the one defrauded by the act of the felony.
In the light of these facts, petitioner submits that the twin information are DEFECTIVE AND VOID due to the
FALSE ALLEGATIONS that the offense was committed to the prejudice of Caltex when it truth and in fact the
one prejudiced here was PCIBank.
The twin information being DEFECTIVE AND VOID, the same should be dismissed without prejudice to the
filing of another information which should state the offense was committed to the prejudice of PCIBank if it still
legally possible without prejudicing substantial and statutory rights of the petitioner.27
Petitioner’s argument on subrogation is misplaced. The Court agrees with respondent PCIB’s comment that
petitioner failed to make a distinction between legal and conventional subrogation. Subrogation is the transfer
of all the rights of the creditor to a third person, who substitutes him in all his rights.28 It may either be legal or
conventional. Legal subrogation is that which takes place without agreement but by operation of law because
of certain acts.29 Instances of legal subrogation are those provided in Article 130230 of the Civil Code.
Conventional subrogation, on the other hand, is that which takes place by agreement of the parties. 31 Thus,
petitioner’s acquiescence is not necessary for subrogation to take place because the instant case is one of
legal subrogation that occurs by operation of law, and without need of the debtor’s knowledge.
Contrary to petitioner’s asseverations, the case of People v. Yu Chai Ho32 relied upon by the appellate court
is in point. The Court declared –
We do not however, think that the fiscal erred in alleging that the commission of the crime resulted to the
prejudice of Wm. H. Anderson & Co. It is true that originally the International Banking Corporation was the
prejudiced party, but Wm. H. Anderson & Co. compensated it for its loss and thus became subrogated to all
its rights against the defendant (article 1839, Civil Code). Wm. H. Anderson & Co., therefore, stood exactly in
the shoes of the International Banking Corporation in relation to the defendant's acts, and the commission of
the crime resulted to the prejudice of the firm previously to the filing of the information in the case. The loss
suffered by the firm was the ultimate result of the defendant's unlawful acts, and we see no valid reason why
this fact should not be stated in the information; it stands to reason that, in the crime of estafa, the damage
resulting therefrom need not necessarily occur simultaneously with the acts constituting the other essential
elements of the crime.
Thus, being subrogated to the right of Caltex, PCIB, through counsel, has the right to intervene in the
proceedings, and under substantive laws is entitled to restitution of its properties or funds, reparation, or
indemnification.
Petitioner’s gripe that the charges against him should be dismissed because the allegations in both
Informations failed to name PCIB as true offended party does not hold water.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the
place wherein the offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same Rule provides:
Section. 12. Name of the offended party. –The complaint or information must state the name and surname of
the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or
nickname by which such person has been or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be
described under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property must be
described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed
is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be inserted in the
complaint or information and the record.
(c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or any name or
designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified, without need of averring that it is a
juridical person or that it is organized in accordance with law. (12a)
In Sayson v. People,33 the Court held that in case of offenses against property, the designation of the name
of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint
or information can be properly identified:
The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state the name and surname of the
person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed or any appellation or nickname
by which such person has been or is known and if there is no better way of Identifying him, he must be
described under a fictitious name (Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule 110, Section 12 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] In case of offenses against property, the designation of the name of
the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or
information can be properly identified. Thus, Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 11. Name of the offended party-
…
(a) In cases of offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property,
subject matter of the offense, must be described with such particularity as to properly Identify the
particular offense charged.
(b) If in the course of the trial, the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed is disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause the true name to be inserted
in the complaint or information or record.
…
In U.S. v. Kepner [1 Phil. 519 (1902)], this Court laid down the rule that when an offense shall have been
described in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to Identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the
person injured shall be deemed immaterial as the same is a mere formal defect which did not tend to
prejudice any substantial right of the defendant. Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which had a factual
backdrop similar to the instant case, where the defendant was charged with estafa for the misappropriation of
the proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed without authority, the erroneous allegation in the complaint to
the effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of the owner of the cheque, when in reality the bank which
cashed it was the one which suffered a loss, was held to be immaterial on the ground that the subject matter
of the estafa, the warrant, was described in the complaint with such particularity as to properly Identify the
particular offense charged. In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime against property under the Revised
Penal Code, since the check, which was the subject-matter of the offense, was described with such
particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of convicting the
accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended party was actually Mever Films and not
Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the information.
Lastly, on petitioner’s claim that he timely objected to the appearance of SRMO34 as private prosecutor for
PCIB, the Court agrees with the observation of the CA that contrary to his claim, petitioner did not question
the said entry of appearance even as the RTC acknowledged the same on October 8, 1999.35 Thus,
petitioner cannot feign ignorance or surprise of the incident, which are "all water under the bridge for [his]
failure to make a timely objection thereto."36
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
EN BANC
June 30, 1987
G.R. No. L-53373
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th
Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL,
RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by
the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review,
may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an
information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set for arraigment the accused
filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the
Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an
order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion
for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to
August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. 3
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused
in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the
Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further
orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition
be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ
and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in
the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. 7
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for
review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for
immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy
of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given
time to file an opposition thereto.10 On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the
arraigniment stating:
ORDER
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal premised on insufficiency of
evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion
wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the reason that the check
involved having been issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer can
only be civil and not criminal.
The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not
before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards
the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is
considered as without merit and therefore hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the
moming.
SO ORDERED. 11
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of
preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as
CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals
against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. 13 In a decision
of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23,
1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of
February 19, 1980. 15
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that said
decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to
proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the information filed not
valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the
obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition
required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss, within ten (10) days from
notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given due course, it
being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the comment and a separate
conunent to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the
Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of February
26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the petition.
Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that
respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon
the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not fonow that
presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The reason for placing the criminal
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by
private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power
vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to
the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the
jurisdiction of their office. 21 They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation
they become convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 22
It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence of a puma
facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's
discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel
the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence
relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has the Court any power to order the fiscal to
prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's
discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for
insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error. 26 The fiscal
may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either
that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash
of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the
offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither
an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal
prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly
administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an op pressive and vindictive
manner. 30
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to
the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe
elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or
opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the rase be
filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. 31
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. 32 When after the filing of
the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the
accused either voluntarily submited himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in
the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action
against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such
stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. 34 While it is true that
the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court
or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be
proper in the rase thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court, 35 The only qualification
is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of the
People to due process of law. 36a
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a
review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the
exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for
the proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the
directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to
handle the case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that there is
a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying
the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple.1âwphi1 The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done
and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his
opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the
prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the
accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for
the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution
of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and
void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn
over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the
Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the
case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge
on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable,
refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the
Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.