RULE 110

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-42925 January 31, 1977
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RICARDO D. GALANO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, and
GREGORIO SANTOS, respondents.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Hugo Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr.
and Trial Attorney Blesila O. Quintillan for petitioner.
Juanito M. Romano for respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J:
The Court sets aside the respondent judge's orders dismissing the information for estafa against respondent
accused, since the offense charged clearly has not prescribed. The complaint filed with the Batangas court
which expressly alleged commission of the offense within the municipality and which pended for twelve years
(the accused having jumped bail and evaded rearrest for nine years) and which was eventually dismissed by
said court for lack of territorial jurisdiction as a result of the proof adduced before it properly interrupted and
tolled the prescription period. Respondent judge failed, in ruling otherwise, to apply the settled rule that the
jurisdiction of a court is determined in criminal cases by the allegations of the complaint or information and not
by the result of proof. The case is ordered remanded for determination with the utmost dispatch, since this
case has already been pending for fifteen years owing to respondent accused's deplorable tactics. The
undisputed factual background of the case is succinctly stated by then Acting Solicitor General, now Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals, Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., thus:
1. On October 2,1962, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed in the municipal court of
Batangas, Batangas (now City Court of Batangas City) against the accused-respondent
Gregorio Santos by complainant, Juanito Limbo, ...
2. Gregorio Santos was arrested to answer for the above charge, and upon his arrest, posted a
bail bond for his provisional liberty. The accused was thereafter arraigned and he pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Then, the case was heard on its merits. However, on September 16,
1964, the accused jumped bail. As a result, his bail bond was forfeited and the case against him
archived by the municipal court of Batangas, Batangas.
3. It was not until September 14, 1973, about nine years later, when the accused was re-
arrested, and the trial of the said case resumed.
4. On October 21, 1974, while the said case was pending trial, private respondent Gregorio
Santos filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the Batangas court did not have
territorial jurisdiction over the case, the evidence showing that the crime was committed in
Manila.
5. Finding the motion meritorious, the Batangas City Court issued an order dated November 5,
1974, dismissing the case against Gregorio Santos for lack of territorial jurisdiction over the
crime charged ...
6. On November 14, 1974, the complainant Juanito B. Limbo refiled the same case against
Gregorio Santos in the Fiscal's Office of Manila. A preliminary investigation was conducted. On
July 29, 1975, the corresponding information was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 22397, ...
7. On November 12, 1975 the accused Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss criminal Case
No. 22397 on the grounds of prescription and double jeopardy.
8. The prosecuting fiscal filed his opposition to said motion on December 2, 1975, to which the
accused filed a rejoinder on December 5, 1975.
9. On December 8, 1975, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, presided over by the
Honorable Ricardo D. Galano, issued an order dismissing Criminal Case No. 22397 on the
ground that the offense charged had already prescribed, ... The prosecution moved for the
reconsideration of said order but this was denied by the lower court by order of January 7, 1976.
...
 10. From the said Order of dismissal, the City Fiscal of Manila offenses provides: interposed an
appeal by certiorari to this Honorable Court on January 24, 1976. On March 3, 1976, this
honorable Court issued the Resolution of March 3, 1976 requiring the Solicitor General to file the
petition for review within fifteen days from receipt thereof ...
The People avers in the petition 1 that respondent judge "dismissing criminal Case No. 22397 despite the
provisions of Article l of the Revised Penal Code, which clearly indicate that the offense charged has not
prescribed" and "in not considering the prevailing jurisprudence indicating non-prescription of the offense
charged, and in holding that the case of People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494, does not apply to the case at bar."
The petition is patently meritorious and must be granted.
I. The offense of estafa for which respondent accused stands charged clearly has not prescribed.
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.— The period of prescription shall commence to
run from the day on which the discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or by their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information and shall commence
to run again when the proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted
or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. ...
The offense was committed on or about September 16, 1962 when respondent failed to account for and
instead misappropriated to his own use the sum of P8,704.00 representing the net proceeds (minus his
commission) of 272 booklets of sweepstakes tickets that had been entrusted to him be the complainant, who
promptly filed on October 2, 1962 plainly within the ten-year prescriptive period the criminal complaint against
respondent accused in the Municipal Court of Batangas, Batangas. The prescriptive period was thereupon
interrupted.
After his plea of not guilty and during the trial, respondent accused jumped bail in September, 1964 and
evaded rearrest for nine years until September, 1973 and the trial was resumed. When the Batangas court in
its Order of November 5, 1974 upon respondent's motion dismissed the complaint "for lack of jurisdiction"
since the evidence (of both prosecution and accused) showed that all elements of the crime were committed
in Manila (and not in Batangas), 2 the proceedings therein terminated without conviction or acquittal of
respondent accused and it was only then that the prescriptive period (which was interrupted during the
pendency of the case in the Batangas court) commenced to run again.
When the City Fiscal of Manila upon complainant's instance refiled on July 29, 1975 the same case against
respondent accused in the Manila court of first instance, (after having conducted a preliminary investigation),
it is clear that not even a year of the ten-year prescriptive period had been consumed.
Respondent accused intent on thwarting his prosecution filed anew a motion to dismiss the information on
grounds of prescription and double jeopardy. There is manifestly no jeopardy, because he was not acquitted
by the Batangas court which on the basis of the evidence could neither convict him because it was thereby
shown to have no jurisdiction over the offense.
But respondent judge gravely erred in sustaining the ground of prescription, ruling that there was no
interruption of the prescriptive period during the pendency of the case in the Batangas court because "(T)he
proceedings contemplated by Article 91 are proceedings which are valid and before a competent court. If they
are void from the beginning because the court has no territorial jurisdiction of the offense charged, it is as if no
proceedings were held thereat. If this is so, then the warrant or order of arrest as well as the bail given by the
accused for his provisional liberty is of no effect. Inevitably, there can be no jumping bail to speak of and there
are no proceedings to be interrupted."
This is plain error for "Settled is the rule ... that the jurisdiction of a court is determined in criminal cases by
the allegations of the complaint or information and not by the result of proof." 4
It follows clearly that the Batangas court was vested with lawful jurisdiction over the criminal complaint filed
with it which expressly alleged that the offense was committed "in the Municipality of Batangas, province of
Batangas" and that the proceedings therein were valid and before a competent court, (including the arrest
warrant, the grant of bail and forfeiture thereof upon the accused's jumping of bail), until the same court
issued its November. 1974 order dismissing the Case and declaring itself without territorial jurisdiction on the
basis of the evidence presented to it by both prosecution and the accused.
It follows just as clearly that the prescriptive period was interrupted and tolled during the 12-year pendency of
the proceedings before the Batangas Court (for nine years of which respondent accused had jumped bail and
evaded re-arrest).
II. Respondent judge gravely erred in dismissing the information on the ground of prescription and
disregarding the controlling case of People vs. Olarte. 5
In the second People vs. Olarte case, 6 the Court clarified precisely for the guidance of bench and bar that
the true doctrine is that the filing of the compliant in the municipal court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary investigation (where the offense charged is beyond its jurisdiction to try the case on the merits)
should, and does interrupt the period of prescription, as follows:
 Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription discloses that there are two lines of
decisions following differing criteria in determining whether prescription of crimes has been
interrupted. One line of precedents holds that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the
peace (or municipal judge) does interrupt the course of the prescriptive term: (People vs. Olarte,
L-131027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106, October 16,
1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590.) Another series of decisions declares that to
produce interruption the complaint or information must have been filed in the proper court that
has jurisdiction to try the case on its merits: People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29,
1960; People vs. Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this
Court has reexamined the question and after mature consideration has arrived at the conclusion
that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decision holding that the
filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on
its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription 'shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information' without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for
preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the
court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuation already represents the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is
unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are
not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. 7
Respondent judge in his dismissal order correctly cited the rationale for statutory prescriptions, inter alia, that
"the delay in instituting the proceedings not only causes expenses to the State, but exposes public justice to
peril, for it weakens oral evidence due to the lapse of the natural period of duration of memory if not to
anything, else. And it is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt and that statutes enforcing
that promptitude should be maintained, they being not merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the State
upon its subalterns, to exact vigilant activity and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be
obtained. 8
But respondent judge fell into grave error in not applying the controlling case of Olarte on his misconception
that there had been no valid complaint filed with a competent court in Batangas contrary to what has already
been held hereinabove that the express allegations of the complaint that the offense was committed in
Batangas vested the Batangas court with lawful jurisdiction until its dismissal order twelve years later for lack
of jurisdiction as a result of the proof presented before it during the tiral (and in not taking into account that the
delay was not at all due to the State but to respondent accused himself who jumped bail and escaped tile law
for nine [9] years and who apparently has made no effort all this time to make good the amount the to
complainant or any part thereof).
Since the record with transcript of the testimonial evidence in the Batangas court is complete (and shows that
the trial was continued on August 2, 1974 to September 10, 1974 while respondent accused was testifying on
the witness stand but that he instead filed his motion to dismiss of October 14, 1974 which granted by the
Batangas court for lack of territorial jurisdiction) and this case had already been pending for almost 15 years,
all the evidence already taken by the Batangas court as recorded in the minutes and transcript shall be
deemed reproduced upon remand of the case to the Manila court which is hereby ordered to receive only the
remaining evidence of the respondent accused and such rebuttal evidence as the parties may have and
thereafter resolve the case with the utmost dispatch.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge's dismissal orders of December 8, 1975 and January 7, 1976 are hereby
set aside, and the case is remanded to respondent judge or whoever presides Branch XIII of the Manila court
of first instance for continuation of the trial (with reproduction of the evidence in the Batangas city court in
Criminal Case No. 532 thereof, entitled "People vs. Gregorio Santos") in line with the directives in the
preceding paragraph. Respondent judge or the judge presiding his court is further ordered to report to this
Court the action taken hereon within a period of ninety (90) days from promulgation of this decision. In view of
the many years that the criminal case has been pending, this decision is declared immediately executory
upon promulgation.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Concepcion Jr.* and Martin, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 168662 February 19, 2008
SANRIO COMPANY LIMITED, petitioner,
vs.
EDGAR C. LIM, doing business as ORIGNAMURA TRADING, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 746602 and its resolution3 denying reconsideration.
Petitioner Sanrio Company Limited, a Japanese corporation, owns the copyright of various animated
characters such as "Hello Kitty," "Little Twin Stars," "My Melody," "Tuxedo Sam" and "Zashikibuta" among
others.4 While it is not engaged in business in the Philippines, its products are sold locally by its exclusive
distributor, Gift Gate Incorporated (GGI).5
As such exclusive distributor, GGI entered into licensing agreements with JC Lucas Creative Products, Inc.,
Paper Line Graphics, Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing Corporation.6 These local entities were allowed to
manufacture certain products (bearing petitioner's copyrighted animated characters) for the local market.
Sometime in 2001, due to the deluge of counterfeit Sanrio products, GGI asked IP Manila Associates (IPMA)
to conduct a market research. The research's objective was to identify those factories, department stores and
retail outlets manufacturing and/or selling fake Sanrio items.7 After conducting several test-buys in various
commercial areas, IPMA confirmed that respondent's Orignamura Trading in Tutuban Center, Manila was
selling imitations of petitioner's products.8
Consequently, on May 29, 2000, IPMA agents Lea A. Carmona and Arnel P. Dausan executed a joint affidavit
attesting to the aforementioned facts.9 IPMA forwarded the said affidavit to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of a search warrant in the office of the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.10
After conducting the requisite searching inquiry, the executive judge issued a search warrant on May 30,
2000.11 On the same day, agents of the NBI searched the premises of Orignamura Trading. As a result
thereof, they were able to seize various Sanrio products.12
On April 4, 2002, petitioner, through its attorney-in-fact Teodoro Y. Kalaw IV of the Quisumbing Torres law firm,
filed a complaint-affidavit13 with the Task-Force on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy (TAPP) of the Department
of Justice (DOJ) against respondent for violation of Section 217 (in relation to Sections 177 14 and 17815) of
the Intellectual Property Code (IPC) which states:
Section 217. Criminal Penalties. - 217.1. Any person infringing any right secured by provisions of Part
IV of this Act or aiding or abetting such infringement shall be guilty of a crime punishable by:
(a) Imprisonment of one (1) year to three (3) years plus a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000) to One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000) for the first offense.
(b) Imprisonment of three (3) years and one (1) day to six (6) years plus a fine ranging from One
hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) for the second
offense.
(c) Imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to nine (9) years plus a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) to One million five hundred thousand pesos (P1,500,000) for the
third and subsequent offenses.
(d) In all cases, subsidiary imprisonment in cases of insolvency.
217.2. In determining the number of years of imprisonment and the amount of fine, the court shall
consider the value of the infringing materials that the defendant has produced or manufactured and the
damage that the copyright owner has suffered by reason of infringement.
217.3. Any person who at the time when copyright subsists in a work has in his
possession an article which he knows, or ought to know, to be an infringing copy of the
work for the purpose of:
(a) Selling, letting for hire, or by way of trade offering or exposing for sale, or hire, the
article;
(b) Distributing the article for purpose of trade or any other purpose to an extent that will
prejudice the rights of the copyright of the owner in the work; or
(c) Trade exhibit of the article in public, shall be guilty of an offense and shall be liable on
conviction to imprisonment and fine as above mentioned. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent asserted in his counter-affidavit16 that he committed no violation of the provisions of the IPC
because he was only a retailer.17 Respondent neither reproduced nor manufactured any of petitioner's
copyrighted item; thus, he did not transgress the economic rights of petitioner.18 Moreover, he obtained his
merchandise from authorized manufacturers of petitioner's products.19
On September 25, 2002, the TAPP found that:
Evidence on record would show that respondent bought his merchandise from legitimate sources, as
shown by official receipts issued by JC Lucas Creative Products, Inc., Paper Line Graphics, Inc. and
Melawares Manufacturing Corporation. In fact, in her letter dated May 23, 2002, Ms. Ma. Angela S.
Garcia certified that JC Lucas Creative Products, Inc., Paper Line Graphics, Inc. and Melawares
Manufacturing Corporation are authorized to produce certain Sanrio products. While it appears that
some of the items seized during the search are not among those products
which [GGI] authorized these establishments to produce, the fact remains that respondent
bought these from the abovecited legitimate sources. At this juncture, it bears stressing
that respondent relied on the representations of these manufacturers and distributors that the
items they sold were genuine. As such, it is not incumbent upon respondent to verify from these
sources what items [GGI] only authorized them to produce. Thus, as far as respondent is
concerned, the items in his possession are not infringing copies of the
original [petitioner's] products. (emphasis supplied)20
Thus, in a resolution dated September 25, 2002, it dismissed the complaint due to insufficiency of
evidence.21
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.22 Hence, it filed a petition for review in the Office of
the Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ.23 In a resolution dated August 29, 2003,24 the Office of the Chief
State Prosecutor affirmed the TAPP resolution. The petition was dismissed for lack of reversible error.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. On May 3, 2005, the appellate court dismissed the
petition on the ground of prescription. It based its action on Act 3326 which states:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe
in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those
punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve
years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of
treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years; Provided, however, That all offenses against any law
or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall prescribe after five years.
Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same may not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
(emphasis supplied)
According to the CA, because no complaint was filed in court within two years after the commission of the
alleged violation, the offense had already prescribed.25
On the merits of the case, the CA concluded that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition for review.26 To be criminally liable for violation of Section 217.3 of the IPC, the
following requisites must be present:
1. possession of the infringing copy and
2. knowledge or suspicion that the copy is an infringement of the genuine article.
The CA agreed with the DOJ that petitioner failed to prove that respondent knew that the merchandise he sold
was counterfeit. Respondent, on the other hand, was able to show that he obtained these goods from
legitimate sources.27
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner now essentially avers that the CA erred in concluding that the alleged violations of the IPC had
prescribed. Recent jurisprudence holds that the pendency of a preliminary investigation suspends the running
of the prescriptive period.28 Moreover, the CA erred in finding that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the complaint. Respondent is liable for copyright infringement (even if he obtained his
merchandise from legitimate sources) because he sold counterfeit goods.29
Although we do not agree wholly with the CA, we deny the petition.
Filing Of The Complaint In the DOJ Tolled The Prescriptive Period
Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for violation of special laws starts on the day such
offense was committed and is interrupted by the institution of proceedings against respondent ( i.e., the
accused).
Petitioner in this instance filed its complaint-affidavit on April 4, 2002 or one year, ten months and four days
after the NBI searched respondent's premises and seized Sanrio merchandise therefrom. Although no
information was immediately filed in court, respondent's alleged violation had not yet prescribed.30
In the recent case of Brillantes v. Court of Appeals,31 we affirmed that the filing of the complaint for purposes
of preliminary investigation interrupts the period of prescription of criminal responsibility.32 Thus, the
prescriptive period for the prosecution of the alleged violation of the IPC was tolled by petitioner's timely filing
of the complaint-affidavit before the TAPP.
In The Absence Of Grave Abuse Of Discretion, The Factual Findings Of The DOJ In Preliminary
Investigations Will Not Be Disturbed
In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof.33 Probable cause is defined as such facts
and circumstances that will engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.34 Because a public prosecutor is the one
conducting a preliminary investigation, he determines the existence of probable cause.35 Consequently, the
decision to file a criminal information in court or to dismiss a complaint depends on his sound discretion.36
As a general rule, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. For this reason, courts generally do not interfere with the results of such proceedings. A
prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause justifying the filing
of a criminal information against the respondent.37 By way of exception, however, judicial review is allowed
where respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion.38 Otherwise stated, such review is appropriate only when the prosecutor has exercised his
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
patent and gross enough to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law.39
The prosecutors in this case consistently found that no probable cause existed against respondent for
violation of the IPC. They were in the best position to determine whether or not there was probable cause. We
find that they arrived at their findings after carefully evaluating the respective evidence of petitioner and
respondent. Their conclusion was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled "Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the
Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia C. Malolos."
The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and
89153 against petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered DISMISSED.3
Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an
aggregate amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos
(₱9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents,
enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance against private complainant before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.
Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the
Ground of Prejudicial Question" before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the
pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the suspension of the criminal
proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action respondent filed against private complainant with the
RTC of Valenzuela City. The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent
in connection with her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of ₱4,129,400.00 and RCBC
Check No. 423773 in the amount of ₱4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the amount of ₱8,604,000.00. The
estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint
filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were filed against
respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest" before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription.
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order dated 5 October 2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases were raffled to RTC,
Branch 218, Quezon City.
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City reversed the 5
October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000 with the Clerk of Court although
received by the Court itself only on 07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the
latest amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet
prescribed when the same was filed with the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint that started
the proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court
a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.4
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review5 on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.
In a resolution6 dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for appropriate action.
On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent and private complainant
to comment on the petition.
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon
City, thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP
Blg. 22 had already prescribed.
In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 imputed to [respondent] sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the
[respondent] was notified by the private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the
five (5) days grace period granted by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to Section
1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or
information against the petitioner before the proper court.
The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the petitioner having been
filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore,
clearly prescribed.
xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes7 the Supreme Court held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act
No. 3326, as amended, are ‘judicial proceedings’, which means the filing of the complaint or information with
the proper court. Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case
is actually filed in court and not on any date before that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as
amended.
While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court, considering that Section 2
of Act 3326, as amended, governs the computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special
laws, finds that the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes8 likewise applies to special laws, such as
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.9
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review.1âwphi1 According to the OSG, while it
admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23
November 1930, governs the period of prescription for violations of special laws, it is the institution of criminal
actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of
prescription of the offense charged.10 It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private
complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine laid down by this
Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.11 that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor is not the "judicial proceeding" that could have interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on
Zaldivia,12 the CA allegedly failed to consider the subsequent jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid ruling.
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases,13 the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a complaint with the
Fiscal’s Office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore
concluded that the filing of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still within
the allowable period of four years within which to file the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in
accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.
In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of the OSG should be
dismissed outright for its failure to comply with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified
true copy of the decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly
fatal to the cause of the petitioner.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutor’s Office
did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a
special law.
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on erroneous premises. She
claims that the cases relied upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code
and are therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)14 and Section 1, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.15 Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for
violation of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as
amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be made between offenses covered by municipal
ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP
Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997
interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.
We find merit in this petition.
Initially, we see that the respondent’s claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate original or
certified true copy of the 12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the
record. A perusal of the record reveals that attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy
of the CA decision. It was also observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken by
the Docket Division of the OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense
committed by respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish
Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall
Begin," as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more
than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but
not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with
the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of
proceedings against the guilty person.
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,16 this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of
Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al.17 when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s
Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.
Respondent’s contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of
merit. There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with
respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. 18 is not controlling
in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican,19 Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,20 Brillante v. CA,21 and Sanrio
Company Limited v. Lim,22 cases involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al.,23 the Court even ruled that investigations conducted
by the Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities
Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.
In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,24 which is in all fours with the instant case,
this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused
before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had
been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and
actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of
circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the
investigating agencies.
We follow the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter part of 1995" is the reckoning date of the
commencement of presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein
respondent was notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace
period granted by law elapsed.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases
reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a
civil case for accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on
the ground of "prejudicial question". The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City
Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so
ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she
predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings
only in 2000.
As laid down in Olarte,25 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of
delays that are not under his control. The only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the
offender is to file the requisite complaint.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file
the informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of
municipal ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.1 The referral-complaint of the police was received by
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information was filed
with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. 3
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion
was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent
judge. 4
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is
governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:
Sec. 1. Scope — This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offenses charged does
not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both,
irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising
therefrom. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan
Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided,
further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall
be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for
Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin
to Run," reading as follows:
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall
prescribe after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution
of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations
of law not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the
two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her
should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the
complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the
Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as
follows:
Sec. 1. How Instituted — For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special
cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the
complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite
preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or
a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases"
applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum in Francisco v.
Court of Appeals: 5
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this
Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the
conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding
that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of
the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try
the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing
of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court
for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is
unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are
not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before the
promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule
110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January
1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure
in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to
summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases
covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This
interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from
the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of
municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a
municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in
such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both
such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in
court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties agree that
this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to.
However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution
decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings
referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General
that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does
not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1
of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a
conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield
because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right. 7
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would have been
conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the
Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period.
By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty
cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed
seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules
beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion
of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its
alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with
Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have
interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was
done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the
ground of prescription. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and authorized
representative Norma Tan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio
City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES" Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
that the assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Order dated August 15,
2005 be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 be ordered reinstated and prosecuted
before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and
manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under
Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the
vehicle is illegally parked.1
According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San Fernando City, La Union, the facts
leading to the filing of the Informations are the following:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell
personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003,
the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and
carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624
owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left unattended at a Loading and
Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed with a
piece of metal is ₱26,250.00. The fines of ₱500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of ₱500.00 were
also not paid by the respondents herein.
In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo
Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City,
herein respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed the clamp on
the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then
considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered
immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing the clamp, respondents took and
carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell, its use and value which is ₱26,250.00. According to
complainants, the fine of ₱500.00 and the declamping fee of ₱500.00 were not paid by the respondents.2
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other. Petitioner Jadewell
filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an
Affidavit-Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of
whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003.3 A preliminary investigation took place on May 28,
2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and
four (4) of Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-respondents, respondent
Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp
restricting the wheel of his car since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was an
illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its
clamp so that he and his family could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp with
him, and he intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the Complaint he filed against Jadewell.4
In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, Acting City
Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the
petitioner. Regarding the case of Robbery against respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony of Robbery. The
elements of Robbery, specifically the intent to gain and force upon things are absent in the instant cases,
thereby negating the existence of the crime.
xxxx
We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the wheel clamps on the wheels of
the cars involved in these cases and their failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of
Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for violations of the provisions of
such ordinance. Certainly, they should not have put the law into their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the respondents, except Jeffrey
Walan or Joseph Walan (who has been dragged into this controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was still
the registered owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000 in both
cases and we hereby file the corresponding informations against them in Court.6
Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated
July 25, 2003, stating:
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with unity of action and concerted design, did then and there, with unity of action and concerted
design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forcibly dismantled [sic] and took [sic] an immobilizing clamp then
attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin
Ang which was earlier rendered immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell Personnel's for violation of the
Baguio City ordinance No. 003-2600 to the damage and prejudice of private complainant Jadewell Parking
System Corporation (Jadewell) which owns such clamp worth ₱26,250.00 and other consequential damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW,
San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003.7
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino
filed a January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation8 on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash
and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of
criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that charged an offense;
and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by
prescription of the crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1. x x x Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after two months."
4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was committed on May 7, 2003. 5. As
can be seen from the right hand corner of the Information, the latter was filed with this Honorable Court
on October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged commission of the offense charged.
Hence, criminal liability of the accused in this case, if any, was already extinguished by prescription
when the Information was filed.9
In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the
cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004
Order11 to argue among other points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period of prescription of
offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. While it may be true that the
Informations in these cases have been filed only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has, however,
filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well within the prescribed period.12
Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a Reply14 on April 1, 2004.
The respondent judge released a Resolution15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order granting
respondents' Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the ground [sic] for the
motion to quash, which is that the criminal action has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations of City Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No.
102342, July 3, 1992, En Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326
or "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL
ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO
RUN" (Ibid).
Petitioner then filed a Petition16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The
case was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 on the ground of prescription. Petitioners argued that the
respondent judge ruled erroneously saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses charged against the
private respondents was halted by the filing of the Complaint/Information in court and not when the Affidavit-
Complaints were filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:
x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with
the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states
that "the institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense
charged unless otherwise provided in special laws."17
Petitioner contended further that:
the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the
criminal information before this Honorable Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the
criminal action in these cases had prescribed.
xxxx
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, not by the old Rules on Summary Procedure. Considering that the offenses charged are
for violations of a City Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be commenced by informations. Thus, it was
only legally and procedurally proper for the petitioner to file its complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Baguio City as required by Section 11 of the new Rules on Summary Procedure, these criminal cases
"shall be commenced only by information." These criminal cases cannot be commenced in any other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the assailed Resolution does not
apply in this case. The offense charged in Zaldivia is a violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the
complaint should have been filed directly in court as required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary
Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are for violations of a city ordinance
and as aforestated, "shall be commenced only by information."18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor
stopped the running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged have not prescribed.
In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion.
They held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.20 (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes21 held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No.
3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings . Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the
Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period
commenced from the alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months
after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the
respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge Clarence
F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since cases of city
ordinance violations may only be commenced by the filing of an Information, then the two-month prescription
period may only be interrupted by the filing of Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000) against
the respondents in court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled in favor of the respondents
and upheld the respondent judge’s Order dated February 10, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial
Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.
Hence, this Petition.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor
on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents
Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763,
does not apply because respondents were charged with the violation of a city ordinance and not a municipal
ordinance. In any case, assuming arguendo that the prescriptive period is indeed two months, filing a
Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of two months. This is because
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in Manila and in other chartered cities, the Complaint shall be
filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.
In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not err in dismissing the cases
based on prescription. Also, respondents raise that the other grounds for dismissal they raised in their Motion
to Quash, namely, that the facts charged constituted no offense and that respondents were charged with
more than one offense, were sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also, respondents argue that
petitioner had no legal personality to assail the Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing the civil liability of the
case but the assailed Order and Resolution. This was contrary to the ruling in People v. Judge
Santiago23 which held that the private complainant may only appeal the civil aspect of the criminal offense
and not the crime itself.
In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the case on the ground of
prescription, since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only cited that ground. The Order dated February 10,
2004 merely stated but did not specify the grounds on which the cases were dismissed. Petitioner also
maintains that the proceedings contemplated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must include the preliminary
investigation proceedings before the National Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure25 and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition for Certiorari, "persons
aggrieved x x x may file a verified petition"26 before the court.
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules
governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is
the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and municipal
ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any
other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the parameters of prescription:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period
of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the
prescriptive period was interrupted.28 (Citation omitted)
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense
charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code reads:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the
same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
xxxx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either
by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such
cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451 reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. – A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, that
the criteria established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials. Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities or component cities. An
independent component city has a charter that proscribes its voters from voting for provincial elective officials.
It stands that all cities as defined by Congress are chartered cities. In cases as early as United States v.
Pascual Pacis,29 this Court recognized the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909,
otherwise known as the charter of Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct
when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts and
issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was
received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on
October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of
municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a
municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in
such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years
and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That
in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in
court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this
provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However,
the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to
conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on
the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings
referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General
that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does
not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1
of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a
conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield
because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right.30
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then files
the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent People v.
Pangilinan31 categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are
concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of
Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure
and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before
the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of
the Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the
Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation, the original charge of
Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to
file the Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the
discovery and commission of the offense before it prescribed within which to file the Information with the
Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had
already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of
the case against respondents. According to the Department of Justice – National Prosecutors Service Manual
for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as:
SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an offense,
subscribed by the prosecutor, and filed with the court. The information need not be placed under oath by the
prosecutor signing the same.
The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that –
a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;
b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof;
c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and
d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:
SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information is sufficient if it states that the
crime charged was committed or some of the ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the
jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place in which the crime was committed is an essential element
of the crime, e.g. in a prosecution for violation of the provision of the Election Code which punishes the
carrying of a deadly weapon in a "polling place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense charged, e.g., the
domicile in the offense of "violation of domicile."
Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:
SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted:
a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor; or with the Office of the
Ombudsman; or
b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, or even if the court where the complaint or information is filed
cannot try the case on its merits.
However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of prescription is
interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court.
xxxx
For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day of
the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted
only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).1âwphi1
Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of Justice’s Prosecution Staff and established
Regional State Prosecution Offices. These Regional State Prosecution Offices were assigned centers for
particular regions where the Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides that the area of responsibility of the
Region 1 Center located in San Fernando, La Union includes Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La
Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.
The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was designated to file the
Information within the two-month period provided for in Act No. 3326, as amended.1âwphi1
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of
the case against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances
and their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the
period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed
seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules
beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here
sought to be corrected.33
WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 139930 June 26, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MARIA CLARA LOBREGAT, JOSE ELEAZAR,
JR., JOSE CONCEPCION, ROLANDO P. DELA CUESTA, EMMANUEL M. ALMEDA, HERMENEGILDO C.
ZAYCO, NARCISO M. PINEDA, IÑAKI R. MENDEZONA, DANILO S. URSUA, TEODORO D. REGALA,
VICTOR P. LAZATIN, ELEAZAR B. REYES, EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, LEO J. PALMA, DOUGLAS LU YM,
SIGFREDO VELOSO and JAIME GANDIAGA, Respondents.
 DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case, which involves another attempt of the government to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired during the
Marcos era, resolves the issue of prescription.
The Facts and the Case
On April 25, 1977 respondents Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B. Reyes, Eduardo U. Escueta
and Leo J. Palma incorporated the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM)1 with an authorized capital stock
of ₱100 million divided into one million shares with a par value of ₱100 per share. The incorporators
subscribed to 200,000 shares worth ₱20 million and paid ₱5 million.
On September 26, 1978 UNICOM amended its capitalization by (1) increasing its authorized capital stock to
three million shares without par value; (2) converting the original subscription of 200,000 to one million shares
without par value and deemed fully paid for and non-assessable by applying the ₱5 million already paid; and
(3) waiving and abandoning the subscription receivables of ₱15 million.2
On August 29, 1979 the Board of Directors of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) composed of
respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L. Lobregat, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr.,
Jose C. Concepcion, Rolando P. Dela Cuesta, Emmanuel M. Almeda, Hermenegildo C. Zayco, Narciso M.
Pineda, Iñaki R. Mendezona, and Danilo S. Ursua approved Resolution 247-79 authorizing UCPB, the
Administrator of the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CII Fund), to invest not more than ₱500 million from
the fund in the equity of UNICOM for the benefit of the coconut farmers.3
On September 4, 1979 UNICOM increased its authorized capital stock to 10 million shares without par value.
The Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock stated that the incorporators held one million shares without par
value and that UCPB subscribed to 4 million shares worth ₱495 million.4
On September 18, 1979 a new set of UNICOM directors, composed of respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L. Lobregat, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose Concepcion, Emmanuel M.
Almeda, Iñaki R. Mendezona, Teodoro D. Regala, Douglas Lu Ym, Sigfredo Veloso, and Jaime Gandiaga,
approved another amendment to UNICOM’s capitalization. This increased its authorized capital stock to one
billion shares divided into 500 million Class "A" voting common shares, 400 million Class "B" voting common
shares, and 100 million Class "C" non-voting common shares, all with a par value of ₱1 per share. The paid-
up subscriptions of 5 million shares without par value (consisting of one million shares for the incorporators
and 4 million shares for UCPB) were then converted to 500 million Class "A" voting common shares at the
ratio of 100 Class "A" voting common shares for every one without par value share.5
About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a complaint for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 30196 against respondents, the 1979 members of the UCPB
board of directors, before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The OSG alleged that
UCPB’s investment in UNICOM was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government since
UNICOM had a capitalization of only ₱5 million and it had no track record of operation. In the process of
conversion to voting common shares, the government’s ₱495 million investment was reduced by ₱95 million
which was credited to UNICOM’s incorporators. The PCGG subsequently referred the complaint to the Office
of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-90-2810 in line with the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government,7 which disqualified the PCGG from conducting the preliminary investigation in the case.
About nine years later or on March 15, 1999 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) issued a
Memorandum,8 stating that although it found sufficient basis to indict respondents for violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. 3019, the action has already prescribed. Respondents amended UNICOM’s capitalization a third time
on September 18, 1979, giving the incorporators unwarranted benefits by increasing their 1 million shares to
100 million shares without cost to them. But, since UNICOM filed its Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles
of Incorporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on February 8, 1980, making public
respondents’ acts as board of directors, the period of prescription began to run at that time and ended on
February 8, 1990. Thus, the crime already prescribed when the OSG filed the complaint with the PCGG for
preliminary investigation on March 1, 1990.
In a Memorandum9 dated May 14, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman approved the OSP’s recommendation
for dismissal of the complaint. It additionally ruled that UCPB’s subscription to the shares of stock of UNICOM
on September 18, 1979 was the proper point at which the prescription of the action began to run since
respondents’ act of investing into UNICOM was consummated on that date. It could not be said that the
investment was a continuing act. The giving of undue benefit to the incorporators prescribed 10 years later on
September 18, 1989. Notably, when the crime was committed in 1979 the prescriptive period for it had not yet
been amended. The original provision of Section 11 of R.A. 3019 provided for prescription of 10 years. Thus,
the OSG filed its complaint out of time.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration on the Office of the Ombudsman’s action but the latter denied the
same;10 hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, the Court ordered the dismissal of the case against respondent Maria Clara L. Lobregat in view of
her death on January 2, 2004.11
The Issue Presented
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not respondents’ alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
already prescribed.
The Court’s Ruling
Preliminarily, the Court notes that what Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) filed in this case is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. But the remedy from an adverse resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman in a preliminary investigation is a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.12 Still, the Court
will treat this petition as one filed under Rule 65 since a reading of its contents reveals that petitioner imputes
grave abuse of discretion and reversible jurisdictional error to the Ombudsman for dismissing the complaint.
The Court has previously treated differently labeled actions as special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65
for acceptable reasons such as justice, equity, and fair play.13
As to the main issue, petitioner maintains that, although the charge against respondents was for violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, its prosecution relates to its efforts to recover the ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand Marcos and of his family and cronies. Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution provides that the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees is not barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
But the Court has already settled in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto14 that Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-
gotten wealth, not to criminal cases such as the complaint against respondents in OMB-0-90-2810. Thus, the
prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in
Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution may be barred by prescription.15
Notably, Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses committed under that law prescribes in 15
years. Prior to its amendment by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982, however, the
prescriptive period for offenses punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10 years.16 Since the acts complained
of were committed before the enactment of B.P. 195, the prescriptive period for such acts is 10 years as
provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.17
Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period should be computed in accordance with
Section 2 of Act 3326,18 which provides:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The above-mentioned section provides two rules for determining when the prescriptive period shall begin to
run: first, from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, if such commission is known; and second,
from its discovery, if not then known, and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.19
Petitioner points out that, assuming the offense charged is subject to prescription, the same began to run only
from the date it was discovered, namely, after the 1986 EDSA Revolution. Thus, the charge could be filed as
late as 1996.
In the prosecution of cases of behest loans, the Court reckoned the prescriptive period from the discovery of
such loans.1âwphi1 The reason for this is that the government, as aggrieved party, could not have known that
those loans existed when they were made. Both parties to such loans supposedly conspired to perpetrate
fraud against the government. They could only have been discovered after the 1986 EDSA Revolution when
the people ousted President Marcos from office. And, prior to that date, no person would have dared question
the legality or propriety of the loans.20
Those circumstances do not obtain in this case. For one thing, what is questioned here is not the grant of
behest loans that, by their nature, could be concealed from the public eye by the simple expedient of
suppressing their documentations. What is rather involved here is UCPB’s investment in UNICOM, which
corporation is allegedly owned by respondent Cojuangco, supposedly a Marcos crony. That investment does
not, however, appear to have been withheld from the curious or from those who were minded to know like
banks or competing businesses. Indeed, the OSG made no allegation that respondent members of the board
of directors of UCPB connived with UNICOM to suppress public knowledge of the investment.
Besides, the transaction left the confines of the UCPB and UNICOM board rooms when UNICOM applied with
the SEC, the publicly-accessible government clearing house for increases in corporate capitalization, to
accommodate UCPB’s investment. Changes in shareholdings are reflected in the General Information Sheets
that corporations have been mandated to submit annually to the SEC. These are available to anyone upon
request.
The OSG makes no allegation that the SEC denied public access to UCPB’s investment in UNICOM during
martial law at the President’s or anyone else’s instance. Indeed, no accusation of this kind has ever been
hurled at the SEC with reference to corporate transactions of whatever kind during martial law since even that
regime had a stake in keeping intact the integrity of the SEC as an instrumentality of investments in the
Philippines.
And, granted that the feint-hearted might not have the courage to question the UCPB investment into
UNICOM during martial law, the second element—that the action could not have been instituted during the
10-year period because of martial law—does not apply to this case. The last day for filing the action was, at
the latest, on February 8, 1990, about four years after martial law ended. Petitioner had known of the
investment it now questions for a sufficiently long time yet it let those four years of the remaining period of
prescription run its course before bringing the proper action.
Prescription of actions is a valued rule in all civilized states from the beginning of organized society. It is a rule
of fairness since, without it, the plaintiff can postpone the filing of his action to the point of depriving the
defendant, through the passage of time, of access to defense witnesses who would have died or left to live
elsewhere, or to documents that would have been discarded or could no longer be located. Moreover, the
memories of witnesses are eroded by time. There is an absolute need in the interest of fairness to bar actions
that have taken the plaintiffs too long to file in court.
Respondents claim that, in any event, the complaint against them failed to show probable cause. They point
out that, prior to the third amendment of UNICOM’s capitalization, the stated value of the one million shares
without par value, which belonged to its incorporators, was ₱5 million. When these shares were converted to
5 million shares with par value, the total par value of such shares remained at ₱5 million. But, the action
having prescribed, there is no point in discussing the existence of probable cause against the respondents for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Memorandum dated May 14, 1999 of the
Office of the Ombudsman that dismissed on the ground of prescription the subject charge of violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 against respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Jose R.
Eleazar, Jr., Jose C. Concepcion, Rolando P. Dela Cuesta, Emmanuel M. Almeda, Hermenegildo C. Zayco,
Narciso M. Pineda, Iñaki R. Mendezona, Danilo S. Ursua, Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B.
Reyes, Eduardo U. Escueta, Leo J. Palma, Douglas Lu Ym, Sigfredo Veloso, and Jaime Gandiaga.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164538 August 9, 2010
METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,
vs.
ROGELIO REYNADO and JOSE C. ADRANDEA,** Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"It is a hornbook doctrine in our criminal law that the criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a
compromise, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the government on its own
motion, even though complete reparation [has] been made of the damage suffered by the private offended
party. Since a criminal offense like estafa is committed against the State, the private offended party may not
waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission of the crime."1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the Court of
Appeals’ (CA’s) Decision2 dated October 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58548 and its further Resolution3 dated
July 12, 2004 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4
Factual Antecedents
On January 31, 1997, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company charged respondents before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code. In the affidavit5 of petitioner’s audit officer, Antonio Ivan S. Aguirre, it was alleged that
the special audit conducted on the cash and lending operations of its Port Area branch uncovered
anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated by respondents in connivance with client Universal Converter
Philippines, Inc. (Universal); that respondents were the only voting members of the branch’s credit committee
authorized to extend credit accommodation to clients up to ₱200,000.00; that through the so-called Bills
Purchase Transaction, Universal, which has a paid-up capital of only ₱125,000.00 and actual maintaining
balance of ₱5,000.00, was able to make withdrawals totaling ₱81,652,000.006 against uncleared regional
checks deposited in its account at petitioner’s Port Area branch; that, consequently, Universal was able to
utilize petitioner’s funds even before the seven-day clearing period for regional checks expired; that
Universal’s withdrawals against uncleared regional check deposits were without prior approval of petitioner’s
head office; that the uncleared checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account
Closed"; and, that respondents acted with fraud, deceit, and abuse of confidence.
In their defense, respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with Universal and claimed
that they only intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and increase its deposit accounts and daily
transactions.
Meanwhile, on February 26, 1997, petitioner and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement
Agreement7 whereby the latter acknowledged its indebtedness to the former in the total amount of
₱50,990,976.278 as of February 4, 1997 and undertook to pay the same in bi-monthly amortizations in the
sum of ₱300,000.00 starting January 15, 1997, covered by postdated checks, "plus balloon payment of the
remaining principal balance and interest and other charges, if any, on December 31, 2001."9
Findings of the Prosecutor
Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. Edad (Prosecutor Edad)
in her Resolution10 dated July 10, 1997 found petitioner’s evidence insufficient to hold respondents liable for
estafa. According to Prosecutor Edad:
The execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement puts complainant bank in estoppel to argue that the liability
is criminal. Since the agreement was made even before the filing of this case, the relations between the
parties [have] change[d], novation has set in and prevented the incipience of any criminal liability on the part
of respondents.11
Thus, Prosecutor Edad recommended the dismissal of the case:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, it is respectfully recommended that the case be dismissed.12
On December 9, 1997, petitioner appealed the Resolution of Prosecutor Edad to the Department of Justice
(DOJ) by means of a Petition for Review.13
Ruling of the Department of Justice
On June 22, 1998, the DOJ dismissed the petition ratiocinating that:
It is evident that your client based on the same transaction chose to file estafa only against its employees and
treat with kid gloves its big time client Universal who was the one who benefited from this transaction and
instead, agreed that it should be paid on installment basis.
To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification under the law which will
result in grave injustice against herein respondents. Thus, if your client agreed that no estafa was committed
in this transaction with Universal who was the principal player and beneficiary of this transaction[,] more so
with herein respondents whose liabilities are based only on conspiracy with Universal.
Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how respondents
misappropriated the ₱53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your client after its checks deposited with
Metrobank were dishonored. Moreover, fraud is not present considering that the Executive Committee and the
Credit Committee of Metrobank were duly notified of these transactions which they approved. Further, no
damage was caused to your client as it agreed [to] the settlement [with] Universal.14
A Motion for Reconsideration15 was filed by petitioner, but the same was denied on March 1, 2000 by then
Acting Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero.16
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari & Mandamus.17
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By Decision18 of October 21, 2002, the CA affirmed the twin resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. Citing
jurisprudence19 wherein we ruled that while novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may prevent the
rise of such liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court. 20 Hence,
according to the CA, "[j]ust as Universal cannot be held responsible under the bills purchase transactions on
account of novation, private respondents, who acted in complicity with the former, cannot be made liable [for]
the same transactions."21 The CA added that "[s]ince the dismissal of the complaint is founded on legal
ground, public respondents may not be compelled by mandamus to file an information in court."22
Incidentally, the CA totally ignored the Comment23 of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) where the
latter, despite being the statutory counsel of public respondent DOJ, agreed with petitioner that the DOJ erred
in dismissing the complaint. It alleged that where novation does not extinguish criminal liability for estafa
neither does restitution negate the offense already committed.24
Additionally, the OSG, in sharing the views of petitioner contended that failure to implead other responsible
individuals in the complaint does not warrant its dismissal, suggesting that the proper remedy is to cause their
inclusion in the information.25 This notwithstanding, however, the CA disposed of the petition as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED due course and, accordingly, DISMISSED. Consequently, the
resolutions dated June 22, 1998 and March 1, 2000 of the Secretary of Justice are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.26
Hence, this instant petition before the Court.
On November 8, 2004, we required27 respondents to file Comment, not a motion to dismiss, on the petition
within 10 days from notice. The OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment28 while
respondent Jose C. Adraneda (Adraneda) submitted his Comment29 on the petition. The Secretary of Justice
failed to file the required comment on the OSG’s Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment and
respondent Rogelio Reynado (Reynado) did not submit any. For which reason, we issued a show cause
order30 on July 19, 2006. Their persistent non-compliance with our directives constrained us to resolve that
they had waived the filing of comment and to impose a fine of ₱1,000.00 on Reynado. Upon submission of
the required memorandum by petitioner and Adraneda, the instant petition was submitted for resolution.
Issues
Petitioner presented the following main arguments for our consideration:
1. Novation and undertaking to pay the amount embezzled do not extinguish criminal liability.
2. It is the duty of the public prosecutor to implead all persons who appear criminally liable for the
offense charged.
Petitioner persistently insists that the execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement with Universal did not
absolve private respondents from criminal liability for estafa. Petitioner submits that the settlement affects only
the civil obligation of Universal but did not extinguish the criminal liability of the respondents. Petitioner thus
faults the CA in sustaining the DOJ which in turn affirmed the finding of Prosecutor Edad for committing
apparent error in the appreciation and the application of the law on novation. By petitioner’s claim,
citing Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tonda,31 the "negotiations pertain [to] and affect only the civil
aspect of the case but [do] not preclude prosecution for the offense already committed."32
In his Comment, Adraneda denies being a privy to the anomalous transactions and passes on the sole
responsibility to his co-respondent Reynado as the latter was able to conceal the pertinent documents being
the head of petitioner’s Port Area branch. Nonetheless, he contends that because of the Debt Settlement
Agreement, they cannot be held liable for estafa.
The OSG, for its part, instead of contesting the arguments of petitioner, even prayed before the CA to give
due course to the petition contending that DOJ indeed erred in dismissing the complaint for estafa.
Given the facts of the case, the basic issue presented before this Court is whether the execution of the Debt
Settlement Agreement precluded petitioner from holding respondents liable to stand trial for estafa under Art.
315 (1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.33
Our Ruling
We find the petition highly meritorious.
Novation not a mode of extinguishing
criminal liability for estafa; Criminal liability for estafa not affected by compromise or novation of contract.
Initially, it is best to emphasize that "novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code
for the extinguishment of criminal liability."34
In a catena of cases, it was ruled that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise or novation
of contract. In Firaza v. People35 and Recuerdo v. People,36 this Court ruled that in a crime of estafa,
reimbursement or belated payment to the offended party of the money swindled by the accused does not
extinguish the criminal liability of the latter. We also held in People v. Moreno37 and in People v.
Ladera38 that "criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a
public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion even though
complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the offended party." Similarly in the
case of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tonda39 cited by petitioner, we held that in a crime of
estafa, reimbursement of or compromise as to the amount misappropriated, after the commission of the
crime, affects only the civil liability of the offender, and not his criminal liability.
Thus, the doctrine that evolved from the aforecited cases is that a compromise or settlement entered into after
the commission of the crime does not extinguish accused’s liability for estafa. Neither will the same bar the
prosecution of said crime. Accordingly, in such a situation, as in this case, the complaint for estafa against
respondents should not be dismissed just because petitioner entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement with
Universal. Even the OSG arrived at the same conclusion:
Contrary to the conclusion of public respondent, the Debt Settlement Agreement entered into between
petitioner and Universal Converter Philippines extinguishes merely the civil aspect of the latter’s liability as a
corporate entity but not the criminal liability of the persons who actually committed the crime of estafa against
petitioner Metrobank. x x x40
Unfortunately for petitioner, the above observation of the OSG was wittingly glossed over in the body of the
assailed Decision of the CA.
Execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement did not prevent the incipience of criminal liability.
Even if the instant case is viewed from the standpoint of the law on contracts, the disposition absolving the
respondents from criminal liability because of novation is still erroneous.
Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, "contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs,
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature,
or by stipulation or by provision of law." The civil law principle of relativity of contracts provides that "contracts
can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is
aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof."41
In the case at bar, it is beyond cavil that respondents are not parties to the agreement. The intention of the
parties thereto not to include them is evident either in the onerous or in the beneficent provisions of said
agreement. They are not assigns or heirs of either of the parties. Not being parties to the agreement,
respondents cannot take refuge therefrom to bar their anticipated trial for the crime they committed. It may do
well for respondents to remember that the criminal action commenced by petitioner had its genesis from the
alleged fraud, unfaithfulness, and abuse of confidence perpetrated by them in relation to their positions as
responsible bank officers. It did not arise from a contractual dispute or matters strictly between petitioner and
Universal. This being so, respondents cannot rely on subject settlement agreement to preclude prosecution of
the offense already committed to the end of extinguishing their criminal liability or prevent the incipience of
any liability that may arise from the criminal offense. This only demonstrates that the execution of the
agreement between petitioner and Universal has no bearing on the innocence or guilt of the respondents.
Determination of the probable cause, a function belonging to the public prosecutor; judicial review allowed
where it has been clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion.
In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof.42 The Secretary of Justice, however, may
review or modify the resolution of the prosecutor.
"Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial."43 Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. By way of exception, however, judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly
established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion that is, when he has exercised his
discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law."44 Tested against these guidelines, we find that this case falls under the exception rather
than the general rule.
A close scrutiny of the substance of Prosecutor Edad’s Resolution dated July 10, 1997 readily reveals that
were it not for the Debt Settlement Agreement, there was indeed probable cause to indict respondents for the
crime charged. From her own assessment of the Complaint-Affidavit of petitioner’s auditor, her preliminary
finding is that "Ordinarily, the offense of estafa has been sufficiently established."45 Interestingly, she
suddenly changed tack and declared that the agreement altered the relation of the parties and that novation
had set in preventing the incipience of any criminal liability on respondents. In light of the jurisprudence herein
earlier discussed, the prosecutor should not have gone that far and executed an apparent somersault.
Compounding further the error, the DOJ in dismissing petitioner’s petition, ruled out estafa contrary to the
findings of the prosecutor. Pertinent portion of the ruling reads:
Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how respondents
misappropriated the ₱53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your client after its checks deposited with
Metrobank were dishonored. Moreover, fraud is not present considering that the Executive Committee and the
Credit Committee of Metrobank were duly notified of these transactions which they approved. Further, no
damage was caused to your client as it agreed [to] the settlement [with] Universal.46
The findings of the Secretary of Justice in sustaining the dismissal of the Complaint are matters of defense
best left to the trial court’s deliberation and contemplation after conducting the trial of the criminal case. To
emphasize, a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is "not
a part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence is not required, but only such as
may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof."47 A "finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged."48 So we held in Balangauan v. Court of Appeals:49
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of DOJ for affirming the dismissal of
the criminal complaints for estafa and/or qualified estafa are determinative of whether or not it committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In requiring "hard facts and solid
evidence" as the basis for a finding of probable cause to hold petitioners Bernyl and Katherene liable to stand
trial for the crime complained of, the DOJ disregards the definition of probable cause – that it is a reasonable
ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or
strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief; that is, the belief that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. While probable cause demands more than "bare
suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify conviction." Herein, the DOJ reasoned as if no
evidence was actually presented by respondent HSBC when in fact the records of the case were teeming; or
it discounted the value of such substantiation when in fact the evidence presented was adequate to excite in a
reasonable mind the probability that petitioners Bernyl and Katherene committed the crime/s complained of.
In so doing, the DOJ whimsically and capriciously exercised its discretion, amounting to grave abuse of
discretion, which rendered its resolutions amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari.
In the case at bar, as analyzed by the prosecutor, a prima facie case of estafa exists against respondents. As
perused by her, the facts as presented in the Complaint-Affidavit of the auditor are reasonable enough to
excite her belief that respondents are guilty of the crime complained of. In Andres v. Justice Secretary
Cuevas50 we had occasion to rule that the "presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary
in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits."51
Thus confronted with the issue on whether the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion in disposing of the case of petitioner, given the sufficiency of evidence on hand, we
do not hesitate to rule in the affirmative. We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise
when a lower court or tribunal violates and contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
Non-inclusion of officers of Universal not a ground for the dismissal of the complaint.
The DOJ in resolving to deny petitioner’s appeal from the resolution of the prosecutor gave another ground –
failure to implead the officers of Universal. It explained:
To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification under the law which will
result in grave injustice against herein respondents. Thus, if your client agreed that no estafa was committed
in this transaction with Universal who was the principal player and beneficiary of this transaction[,] more so
with herein respondents whose liabilities are based only on conspiracy with Universal.521avvphi1
The ratiocination of the Secretary of Justice conveys the idea that if the charge against respondents rests
upon the same evidence used to charge co-accused (officers of Universal) based on the latter’s conspiratorial
participation, the non-inclusion of said co-accused in the charge should benefit the respondents.
The reasoning of the DOJ is flawed.
Suffice it to say that it is indubitably within the discretion of the prosecutor to determine who must be charged
with what crime or for what offense. Public prosecutors, not the private complainant, are the ones obliged to
bring forth before the law those who have transgressed it.
Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court53 mandates that all criminal actions must be commenced either by
complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to be
responsible therefor. Thus the law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against
whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for the offense. The proper remedy under the
circumstances where persons who ought to be charged were not included in the complaint of the private
complainant is definitely not to dismiss the complaint but to include them in the information. As the OSG
correctly suggested, the proper remedy should have been the inclusion of certain employees of Universal who
were found to have been in cahoots with respondents in defrauding petitioner. The DOJ, therefore, cannot
seriously argue that because the officers of Universal were not indicted, respondents themselves should not
likewise be charged. Their non-inclusion cannot be perversely used to justify desistance by the public
prosecutor from prosecution of the criminal case just because not all of those who are probably guilty thereof
were charged.
Mandamus a proper remedy when resolution of public respondent is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Mandamus is a remedial measure for parties aggrieved. It shall issue when "any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station."54 The writ of mandamus is not available to control discretion neither
may it be issued to compel the exercise of discretion. Truly, it is a matter of discretion on the part of the
prosecutor to determine which persons appear responsible for the commission of a crime. However, the
moment he finds one to be so liable it becomes his inescapable duty to charge him therewith and to
prosecute him for the same. In such a situation, the rule loses its discretionary character and becomes
mandatory. Thus, where, as in this case, despite the sufficiency of the evidence before the prosecutor, he
refuses to file the corresponding information against the person responsible, he abuses his discretion. His act
is tantamount to a deliberate refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Secretary of Justice, on the other
hand, gravely abused his discretion when, despite the existence of sufficient evidence for the crime of estafa
as acknowledged by the investigating prosecutor, he completely ignored the latter’s finding and proceeded
with the questioned resolution anchored on purely evidentiary matters in utter disregard of the concept of
probable cause as pointed out in Balangauan. To be sure, findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject
to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.55 The present case calls for the application of
the exception. Given the facts of this case, petitioner has clearly established that the public prosecutor and
the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
58548 promulgated on October 21, 2002 affirming the Resolutions dated June 22, 1998 and March 1, 2000 of
the Secretary of Justice, and its Resolution dated July 12, 2004 denying reconsideration thereon are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The public prosecutor is ordered to file the necessary information for
estafa against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178607 December 5, 2012
DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as President and representative of UNLAD SHIPPING &
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDWIN SORONGON (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 214 of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City), SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELl GAZA and
MARKOS AVGOUSTIS, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[ 1] filed by Dante La. Jimenez (petitioner) to challenge the twin
resolutions of the Court of Appeals ( CA) dated November 23, 20062 and June 28, 20073 in CA-G.R. SP No.
96584, which dismissed the petitioner's petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration,
respectively.
The Factual Antecedents
The petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a local manning agency, while
Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and Markos Avgoustis (respondents) are some of the
listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), another local manning agency.
On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit4 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City against the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment. 5 The petitioner
alleged that the respondents falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSI’s articles of incorporation 6 to
secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA).
On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint counter-affidavit denying the
complaint-affidavit’s allegations.7 Respondents Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counter-affidavit.
In a May 4, 2004 resolution,8 the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for
syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment against the respondents. The City Prosecutor approved his
recommendation and filed the corresponding criminal information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaluyong City (docketed as Criminal Case No. MC04-8514 and raffled to Branch 212) presided by Judge
Rizalina T. Capco-Umali.
Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor reconsidered the May 4, 2004
resolution and filed a motion with the RTC to withdraw the information.9 The petitioner and respondents
Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their opposition10 and comment to the opposition, respectively.
In an August 1, 2005 resolution,11 the RTC denied the motion to withdraw information as it found the
existence of probable cause to hold the respondents for trial.12 Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest against the respondents.
On August 26, 2005, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and for
deferred enforcement of the warrants of arrest.13 In a September 2, 2005 order,14 the RTC denied the
omnibus motion, reiterating that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be
dismissed or not.
On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a
request to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest.15
On September 29, 2005, the petitioner filed his opposition with motion to expunge, contending that
respondent Alamil, being a fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any relief and that the RTC, in the
August 1, 2005 resolution, already found probable cause to hold the respondents for trial.16
In a September 30, 2005 order,17 the RTC denied respondent Alamil’s motion for being moot and academic;
it ruled that it had already found probable cause against the respondents in the August 1, 2005 resolution,
which it affirmed in the September 2, 2005 order.
On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of Judge Capco-
Umali, for being biased or partial.18 On October 25, 2005, the petitioner filed an opposition with a motion to
expunge, reiterating that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek relief from the RTC.19
In a January 4, 2006 order,20 Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself from the case and did not
resolve respondent Alamil’s motion for reconsideration and the petitioner’s motion to expunge. The case was
later re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.
The RTC Rulings
In its March 8, 2006 order,21 the RTC granted respondent Alamil’s motion for reconsideration. It treated
respondent Alamil’s motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. It
found: (1) no evidence on record to indicate that the respondents gave any false information to secure a
license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and (2) that respondent Alamil voluntarily
submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief. Thus, the RTC
dismissed the case, and set aside the earlier issued warrants of arrest.
On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable cause to
prosecute the respondents and that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the RTC.22
On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion for being a prohibited pleading since the
motion did not have the public prosecutor’s conformity.23
In its May 10, 2006 order,24 the RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, finding that the
petitioner merely reiterated arguments in issues that had been finally decided. The RTC ordered the motion
expunged from the records since the motion did not have the public prosecutor’s conformity.
On May 19, 2006, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal.25
On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitioner’s notice of appeal since the public
prosecutor did not authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case.26
On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion to expunge, claiming that, as the offended
party, he has the right to appeal the RTC order dismissing the case; the respondents’ fraudulent acts in
forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him.27
In its August 7, 2006 joint order,28 the RTC denied the petitioner’s notice of appeal since the petitioner filed it
without the conformity of the Solicitor General, who is mandated to represent the People of the Philippines in
criminal actions appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered the notice of appeal expunged from the records.
On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing
the RTC’s March 8, 2006, May 10, 2006, and August 7, 2006 orders.
The CA Ruling
In its November 23, 2006 resolution,29 the CA dismissed outright the petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for lack of
legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. It noted that only the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) has the legal personality to represent the People, under Section 35(1), Chapter
12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. It also held that the petitioner was not the real party in
interest to institute the case, him not being a victim of the crime charged to the respondents, but a mere
competitor in their recruitment business. The CA denied30 the motion for reconsideration31 that followed.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that he has a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since he is the
private complainant and a real party in interest who had been directly damaged and prejudiced by the
respondents’ illegal acts; respondent Alamil has no legal standing to seek any relief from the RTC since she is
a fugitive from justice.
The Case for the Respondents
The respondents32 submit that the petitioner lacks a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case
since the power to prosecute lies solely with the State, acting through a public prosecutor; the petitioner acted
independently and without the authority of a public prosecutor in the prosecution and appeal of the case.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing outright the
petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for certiorari for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People
of the Philippines.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case
It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest[,]"
"who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the
suit."33 Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the
case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved.34 By real interest is meant a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest.35 When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is
dismissible.36
Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall
be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor."37 In appeals of criminal cases before
the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. This section explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. . . . It shall have the following specific powers and
functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all
other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer
thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis added)
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in
criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several
cases38 and continues to be the controlling doctrine.
While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on
his own behalf39 (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in
the present case.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the main
issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause.
The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to
cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute
which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG.40
Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction
As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of
one's person to the jurisdiction of the court.41
Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal case, respondent Alamil
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of
reliefs other than an application for bail.42
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the CoUJt of Appeals dated November
23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CAG. R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 124391 July 5, 2000
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELMER YPARRAGUIRE y SEPE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
After his indictment1 and trial, accused-appellant appeals from his conviction for the crime of rape of a mental
retardate. 2 Pursuant to Republic Act No. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, rape is a crime against person
which may be prosecuted de oficio. However, considering that the alleged rape was committed in 1994, which
was prior to the effectivity of R.A. 8353, we apply the old law and treat rape as a private crime.
The facts as narrated by the trial court are:
"On March 24, 1994, at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening, while complainant Charmelita D. Ruina, an invalid
and mentally retarded, was on her bed at the store of her mother at the Public Market at Carrascal, Surigao
del Sur, where she and her mother lived, accused Elmer Yparraguirre alias "Lalo" entered her room, the door
of which was not locked because her mother went to the store of her elder sister. Upon getting inside, he
undressed himself and approached the Complainant who was apparently awake. He caressed her and
sucked her breasts. She shouted for help but nobody came to rescue her, perhaps because it was late
already in the evening and her voice was not loud enough to be heard at the distance as, in fact, it could be
heard at only about three to five meters away x x x. Accused told her to keep quiet and when she put up some
limpy resistance, he boxed her. He then removed her panty went on top of her and inserted his manhood into
her most private part. She felt pain. After raping her, he left her room. Soon her mother, Sanselas Leongas
Ruina, arrived. She reported to her the incident. The following morning, accused went back to the store and
apologized for what he did and promised not to do it again. But his plea would not mollify Sanselas. She took
the complainant to the Madrid (Surigao del Sur) District Hospital for physical examination. Dr. Carlo P.
Altrecha recorded the following findings in the Medical Certificate that he issued on March 26, 1994:
POLIO MYELITIS-MENTALLY RETARDED
PPE:
n ABRASION, AT THE LEVEL OF THE MID-CLAVICULAR AREA, BOTH, LEFT AND RIGHT.
n CONTUSION, BOTH BREAST, LEFT AND RIGHT.
n CONTUSION, AT THE LEVEL OF THE 8TH THORACIC RIB, ME-AXILLARY LINE, RIGHT.
GENITALIA:
n LABIA MAJORA: NO CONGESTION, NO HEMATOMA.
n LABIA MINORA: CONGESTED, SLIGHT SWOLLEN.
n VAGINAL ORIPICE: CONGESTED, SLIGHT SWOLLEN HYMEN NOT INTACT.
n VAGINAL SMEAR FOR THE PRESENCE OF SPERMATOZOA: NO SPERMATOZOA
SEEN."3
Appellant did not testify in court but instead relied on the lone testimony of his father, who alleged that the
complaint for rape was filed as a result of a "misunderstanding" between appellant and the mother of the
victim.
In this appeal, the basic issue raised by appellant is that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the
case because the complaint was signed and filed by the chief of police and not by the complainant.
Appellant’s contention has no merit. Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides in part:
"The offense of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. In case the
offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she could file the complaint and has no known parents,
grandparents or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf.
The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution for the above offenses,
independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so
upon grounds other than her minority. Where the offended party who is a minor fails to file the complaint, her
parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the same. The right to file the action granted to the parents,
grandparents or guardian shall be exclusive of all other persons and shall be exercised successively in the
order herein provided, except as stated in the immediately preceding paragraph."
Pursuant to the afore-quoted provision, the offended party can initiate a prosecution for rape even if she is a
minor, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority. Although the
victim in this case is no longer a minor, it is undisputed that she is a mental retardate and suffering from
physical deformity. No woman would come out in the open, inform the authorities of the injustice done to her,
make a statement of what had happened unless her purpose is to redress the wrong done against her honor.
Once the violation of the law becomes known through a direct original participation initiated by the victim, the
requirements of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to the effect that the offense of rape "shall not
be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents," are satisfied. Said
provision is not determinative of the jurisdiction of courts over the private offenses because the same is
governed by the Judiciary law, not the Revised Penal Code which deals with the definition of felonies and
their punishment. Stated differently, the complaint required in Article 344 is but a condition precedent to the
exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. Such condition was imposed
out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial.4 The complaint simply starts the prosecutory
proceeding but does not confer jurisdiction on the court to try the case5 because the overriding consideration
in determining whether the condition precedent in Article 344 has been complied with is the intent of the
aggrieved party to seek judicial redress for the affront committed.6
Article 344 was not enacted for the specific purpose of benefitting the accused. When it is said that the
requirement in Article 344 (that there should be a complaint of the offended party or her relatives) is
jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding. It is not the
complaint which confers jurisdiction in the court to try the case. The court’s jurisdiction is vested in it by the
Judiciary Law.7
Going now to the merits of the case, the gravamen of the crime of rape is the sexual congress of a woman by
force and without consent.8 These elements have been proven beyond reasonable doubt to concur in this
case. The evidence shows that appellant boxed the victim in the neck and slapped her on the face while she
was alone and lying in bed on that fateful night. When she shouted for help, appellant told her to keep quiet.
Appellant then began sucking her breasts and her vagina. Then he removed her panty and forcibly had
sexual intercourse with the mentally retarded victim causing pain in her private part. Her testimony in the oral
deposition confirms the statements she made in the vernacular in her affidavit earlier executed. Thus,
P – Unsa may imong guibuhat paghikita nimo niadtong tawo nga miduol kanimo.
T – Misinggit ako.
P – Unsay guibuhat niadtong tawo sa imong pagsinggit?
T – Iyang guitampa ang akong baba, dayon mipatong siya kanako.
P– Unsay sunod nga guibuhat niadtong tawo sa dihang mipatong na siya kanimo?
T– Iyang guidun-an ang akong tiyan, apan kay mikisikisi man ako iyang guisumbag ang akong kilid
dayon guihubo ang akong baro ug guisunod usab dayon ang akong pante.
P – Unsay sunod nga guibuhat niadtong tawo kanimo sa tapos niya paghubo sa imong baro ug imong
pante?
T – Iya akong gui-iyot senyor.
P – Unsay imong guibuhat sa dihang guiiyot sa tawo?
T – Misinggit ako senyor apan guipagngan ang akong baba busa mikisikisi ako apan guisumbag na
usab ug maoy nakapalipong kanako.9 (Italics supplied).
The victim’s narrations are corroborated by the medical findings of the physician who examined her and found
that her labia minora was "congested, slight swollen", and her hymen no longer intact. She also suffered
abrasions and contusions on both breasts and near her right armpit, which may have been caused by the
blows.
In rape, it is not essential that the force employed in accomplishing the crime be so great or of such character
or could not be resisted.10 Force in rape is relative, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties. In
the same manner, intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time
of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule.11 The victim was a mental retardate and
suffering from physical disability when appellant employed force by boxing and slapping her. And when she
shouted for help he intimidated her to keep her quiet. The fact that the victim did not offer a tenacious
resistance is immaterial considering her physical nature – she is an invalid and unable to rise from the bed
unassisted. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the
victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s advances because of fear for her life and
personal safety.12 Although the victim shouted for help, her voice could be heard only as far as three to five
meters away.13 This negates the contention of the father of appellant that the rape could not have been
committed because the locus criminis of the crime was only about fifteen meters away from the passengers’
terminal where there were people passing. In any case, it has been consistently ruled that rape can be
committed even in places where people congregate, in parks along the roadsides, in a house where there are
other occupants,14 in the same room where other members of the family are sleeping,15 and even in places
which to many would appear unlikely and high risk venues for its commission.16 For rape to be committed, it
is not necessary for the place to be ideal, or the weather to be fine for rapists bear no respect for locale and
time when they carry out their evil deed.17 1âwphi1
On the alleged misunderstanding that appellant had with the victim’s mother which allegedly prompted the
mother to file the rape case against him, suffice it to say that no mother would expose her own daughter to
embarrassment and humiliation as well as to the trouble, inconvenience, ridicule and scandal concomitant
with a public trial if such was not the truth and had not her intention been to bring the culprit to the folds of
justice. No mother, virtuous or not, will voluntarily and without compelling reasons put her own daughter to
shame and humiliation18 if she were not motivated by an honest desire to have her daughter’s transgressor
punished accordingly.19 Besides, it is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice,
especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment.20
In an apparent attempt to free himself from liability, appellant on the very same night after the assault, asked
forgiveness from the victim’s mother and promised that the same will never be repeated. Yet, no mother can
just let pass an indignity committed against one of her own blood. It is easy to forgive, but justice for her
would be no less than punishment. Moreover, a plea for forgiveness may be considered analogous to an
attempt to compromise, which offer of compromise by the appellant may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt pursuant to Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence.21
With respect to the monetary awards, the P50,000.00 "damages" granted by the trial court should be properly
denominated as moral damages, which is allowed even if there was no proof during the trial as basis
therefor.22 The mental and physical suffering of the victims’ injury is inherently concomitant with and
necessarily resulting from the odious crime which per se warrants the award of moral damages.23 In addition
thereto, the complainant is also entitled to a civil indemnity of P50,000.0024 which is outrightly awarded to
rape victims being in the category of actual or compensatory damages25 and because the rape herein is not
effectively qualified by any circumstance under which the death penalty is authorized by present amended
law.26
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape is AFFIRMED. Further, appellant is ORDERED TO PAY the complainant fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity in ADDITION to the fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) moral damages.
SO ORDERED
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH
EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be
followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a
decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the
couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born
on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation
de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent
initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January,
1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April,
1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil
Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated
a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted
to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent
for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by
the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent,
petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review,
the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints
for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil
and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua",
docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same
court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution
of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by
James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief
State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the
Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer
further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the
arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the
resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was
also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the
respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both
accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner
refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct
contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for
arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to
quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the
charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under
his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No.
87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid
petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has
long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional,
and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the
offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as
jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without
which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery
and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in
the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other
words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows
that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a
ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same
requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since
criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the
Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called
"private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of
such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action,
or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of
the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said
provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the
alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist
as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined
by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior
to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case.
We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without
the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when
precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be
commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and
with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered
and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours,
yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the
exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly
commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal
proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have
been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant
insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly
said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the
reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse
must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature,
the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed.
Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is
still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter
of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States
court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court
here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an
accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this
Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner,
had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse
at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for
lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent
initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows
to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing
spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law
on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one
would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In
applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code,
which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that
"the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even
though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void,
until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be
logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such
declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no
marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer
have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the
decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of
the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily
apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the
same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly
and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was
resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any
issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also
in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute
divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has
carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have
sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be
allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce
between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory
that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision
yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is
married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of
the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is
concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque
situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion
however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national
law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper
foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the
people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of
the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her
national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on
August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the
Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband
was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino
wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also
in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute
divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has
carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have
sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be
allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce
between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory
that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision
yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is
married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of
the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is
concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque
situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion
however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national
law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper
foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the
people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of
the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her
national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on
August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the
Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband
was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino
wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-47437 September 29, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GAMELO MARIANO y OBUSAN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Pedro A. Venida for accused-appellant.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, finding Gamelo Mariano y Obusan
guilty of the crime of rape committed upon a woman of unsound and feeble mind, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P 12.000.00 as moral
damages and to pay the costs.
Socorro Soria, a demented woman of 24 years, had been confined as a mental patient at the National Mental
Hospital in Mandaluyong, Manila, since February 26, 1971 up to May 3, 1974 when she was transferred to the
Don Susano J. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital in Pili, Camarines Sur for further treatment. On May 26, 1975,
her parents brought her home to Burabod Daet, Camarines Norte, to be treated by the appellant, known in the
locality as a faith healer or "spiritista"
In the afternoon of September 25, 1976, appellant went to the residence of the Sorias to treat Socorro. After
securing some "salompas" from Mrs. Maria Soria, mother of Socorro, he entered the room of his patient, and
locked the door.
Shortly after, Mrs. Soria, who was attending to her customers at the rice mill adjacent to her house, was
informed by her daughter-in-law Elizabeth Albino Soria, that the door of Socorro's room was locked. Mrs.
Soria proceeded to the room and when she noted that the door was indeed locked from inside, she and
Elizabeth peeped through a small aperture and saw the appellant on top of Socorro in the act of sexual
intercourse. Appellant had his pants off, while Socorro was naked from the waist down. Mrs. Soria
immediately clambered to the top shelf of the cabinet which served as the dividing wall between Socorro's
room and the sala, and stretching herself across the top of the cabinet, she reached out and grabbed the
appellant's hair. [This was demonstrated by Mrs. Soria during the ocular inspection conducted at the scene of
the incident]. Jolted by the sudden intrusion appellant stood up, with his penis still erect. He hastily put on his
clothes, opened the door of the room, and attempted to run, but his path was blocked by Elizabeth. When
Mrs. Soria confronted him, appellant expressed his willingness to be Socorro's husband and promise to
construct an annex to his house where he would keep Socorro as his wife.
Socorro was forthwith brought to the Camarines Norte Provincial Hospital, where she was examined by Dra.
Amelia Paguirigan. The latter's findings are as follows:
— Abrasions, over both lower part of mucosa of labia majora.
— Hymenal tear, 6 o'clock, 2 o'clock and 9 o'clock position.
—Vaginal intritus admits 1 finger loosely.
— Vaginal smear and emusion for sperm cells — negative
In his defense, appellant denied having had any sexual intercourse with Socorro at any time since he began
treating her sometime in July 1976. He declared that one week before September 25, 1976, he informed Mrs.
Soria that her daughter's mental illness was beyond his capacity to cure; that he recommended that Socorro
be referred to another faith healer from San Pablo; that despite his recommendation, Mrs. Soria on
September 25, 1976 had him fetched by her nephew to continue with the treatment of Socorro; that because
of Mrs. Soria's call, he went to the Soria's residence, but he entered Socorro's room only after he had asked
the permission of her mother; and that after performing the necessary treatment, he immediately proceeded
home.
On September 27, 1976, a verified complaint for rape, signed by Mrs. Maria Soria, was filed against appellant
before the Municipal Court of Daet, Camarines Norte. On the basis thereof, an information was filed before
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte.
We sustain the trial court's conclusion that "the evidence regarding the commission of the offense by the
appellant is overwhelming." No less than the victim's mother testified that she had caught appellant having
carnal intercourse with Socorro. Indeed, Mrs. Soria could not have given false testimony and thus expose her
daughter to public ridicule and disgrace, if she was not motivated by her maternal desire to vindicate her
daughter's honor.
The positive declaration of Mrs. Soria that her daughter was sexually abused by appellant finds corroboration
in the testimony, of the examining physician, Dr. Paguirigan, who found "hymenal tears at 6 o'clock, 2 o'clock
and 9 o'clock positions." These lacerations of the hymen constitute indubitable proof of penetration of the
male organ into the labia of the pudendum 1
That Socorro was a demented woman is not disputed by appellant, as the latter even admitted that Socorro's
mental illness was beyond his capability to cure. Moreover, Dra. Amelia Paguirigan described the victim as a
"known psychotic, violent type and resisting examination, talking nonsense, while Dr. Edgardo Bengzon of the
National Mental Hospital diagnosed her ailment as "schizophrenia chronic." [Exhibit B
It is settled in this jurisdiction that an accused who has carnal knowledge with a mentally retarded or
demented woman is guilty of rape 2 the reason being that she is incapable of giving rational consent to the
sexual intercourse. 3
Appellant further argues that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because the victim's
mother had no right or authority to file a complaint for rape inasmuch as the father was still living. He invokes
the following provisions of Rule 1 10 of the Rules of Court.
SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions.
xxx xxx xxx
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasPiviousness shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint Med by the offended party, or her parents, grandparents, or guardian,
nor in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the abovenamed persons, as
the case may be.
The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to institute the prosecution for the
above offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless she is
incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority. Where the offended
party who is a minor fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents or guardians, may file
the same. The right to file the action granted to the parents, grandparents or guardians shall be
exclusive of all other persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided."
[See third paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code].
While we agree with the appellant's contention that the trial court does not acquire jurisdiction if the complaint
charging an accused with any of the aforesaid private crimes is not filed by one of the persons indicated in
said section there is nothing in the context thereof to support the view that the mother cannot present the
complaint if the father is still living In People vs. Dela Cruz 4 , this Court resolved the same legal question in
this wise:
Appellant's contention is . . . based on a dubious technicality. If sustained, it might defeat the
ends of justice. It is not sanctioned by section 4 of Rule 110 nor by article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code whose provisions do not categorically specify that the father has the preferential
right to file the complaint for seduction, abduction, rape or abusos deshonestos It is noteworthy
that 'the father and mother jointly exercise parental authority over their legitimate children who
are not emancipated'. It is their duty to represent their emancipated children 'in all actions which
may redound to their benefit' [Arts. 311 and 316, Civil Code]. "
xxx xxx xxx
Under the circumstances the complaint filed by ther was a sufficient complhmee with article 344
and section 4 of Rule 110. It conferred jiwiction on the court to try the Mae [People vs. Pastores,
L-29800, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 498, 508; People vs. Bangalao 94 Phil. 354; U.S. vs.
Gariboso 25 Phil. 171]. The father's passivity should not preclude the mother from securing
redress for the outrage committed against her daughter.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with
costs against appellant Gamelo Obusan.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion Jr., and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., are on leave.

G.R. No. 179814, December 07, 2015 - WILFRED N.CHIOK, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND RUFINA CHUA, Respondents.; G.R. No. 180021 - RUFINA CHUA, Petitioner, v. WILFRED N. CHIOK,
AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (AS AN UNWILLING CO-PARTY PETITIONER), Respondent.:

G.R. No. 179814, December 07, 2015 - WILFRED N.CHIOK, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND RUFINA CHUA, Respondents.; G.R. No. 180021 - RUFINA CHUA, Petitioner, v. WILFRED N. CHIOK,
AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (AS AN UNWILLING CO-PARTY PETITIONER), Respondent.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179814, December 07, 2015
WILFRED N.CHIOK, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND RUFINA CHUA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 180021

RUFINA CHUA, Petitioner, v. WILFRED N. CHIOK, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (AS AN
UNWILLING CO-PARTY PETITIONER), Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
These are consolidated petitions 1 seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals (CA) July 19, 2007 Decision 2 and
October 3, 2007 Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23309. The CA reversed and set aside the December 3,
1998 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig-Branch 165, and acquitted petitioner Wilfred Chiok
(Chiok) of the crime of estafa in Criminal Case No. 109927, but ordered him to pay civil liability to Rufina
Chua in the total amount of P9,500,000.00, plus interests:
WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED DECEMBER 3, 1998 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and
accused WILFRED N. CHIOK is ACQUITTED for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, but he is ORDERED to pay complainant RUFINA CHUA the principal
amount of [P]9,500,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the tiling of this
case, which rate shall increase to 12% per annum from the finality of judgment.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis in original)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Chiok was charged with estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code, in an Information that reads:
That sometime in June, 1995 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from Rufina
Chua the amount of P9,563,900.00 for him to buy complainant shares of stocks, under the express
obligation on the part of the accused to deliver the documents thereon or to return the whole
amount if the purchase did not materialize, but the accused once in possession of the said amount,
far from complying will his obligation as aforesaid, with intent to defraud the complainant, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert lo his own
personal use and benefit the said amount of P9,563,900.00, and despite repeated demands failed
and relused and still fails and refuses to return the said amount or to account for the same, to the
damage and prejudice of the complainant Rufina Chua in the aforementioned amount of
P9,563,900.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Chiok pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued, with both parties presenting their
evidence in support of their respective claims and defenses.

According to the Prosecution, petitioner Rufina Chua (Chua) met Chiok in mid-1989, during which he offered
to be her investment adviser. Convinced by Chiok's representations and the fact that he is Chinese, Chua
made an initial investment of P200,000.00, allegedly to buy Meralco and PLDT shares. She rolled over the
original investment and profits, and this went on until 1994. For each of their transactions, Chua claimed she
was not given any document evidencing every stock transaction and that she only relied on the assurances of
Chiok. In mid-1995, she accepted his proposal to buy shares in bulk in the amount of P9,563,900.00. Chua
alleged that she deposited P7,100,000.00 to Chiok's Far East Bank, Annapolis account on June 9, 1995 and
delivered to him P2,463,900.00 in cash later that same date at the Han Court Restaurant in Annapolis,
Greenhills. As proof, she presented a deposit slip dated June 9, 1995 of Chiok's Far Bast Bank Annapolis
account. There was no receipt or memorandum for the cash delivery. 7
Chua narrated that she became suspicious when Chiok later on avoided her calls and when he failed to show
any document of the sale. He reassured her by giving her two interbank checks, Check No. 02030693 dated
July 11, 1995 for P7,963,900.00 and Check No. 02030694 dated August 15, 1995 in the amount of
P1,600,000.00 (interbank checks). The interbank checks were given with the request to deposit the first check
only after 60-75 days to enable him to generate funds from the sale of a property in I long Kong. Both
interbank checks were ultimately dishonored upon presentment for payment due to garnishment and
insufficiency of funds. Despite Chua's pleas, Chiok did not return her money. Hence, she referred the matter
to her counsel who wrote a demand letter dated October 25, 1995. Chiok sent her a letter-reply dated
November 16, 1995 stating that the money was Chua's investment in their unregistered partnership, and was
duly invested with Yu Que Ngo. In the end, Chua decided to file her complaint-affidavit against him in the
Pasig Prosecutor's Office.8

In his defense, Chiok denied that he enticed Chua to invest in the stock market, or offered her the prospect of
buying shares of stocks in bulk. Chiok maintained that from the time he met her in 1991 and until 1995, he
previously only had dollar transactions with Chua. It was in 1995 when both of them decided to form an
unregistered partnership. He admitted that the P7,963,900.00 she gave him before she left for the United
States was her investment in this unregistered partnership. Chua allegedly instructed him to invest according
to his best judgment and asked him to issue a check in her name for her peace of mind. Chiok denied having
received the P2,463,900.00 in cash from her. 9

On cross-examination, however, Chiok admitted receiving "P7.9" million in June 1995 and "P1.6" million
earlier.10 He testified that exercising his best judgment, he invested P8,000,000.00 with Yu Que Ngo, a
businesswoman engaged in the manufacture of machine bolts and screws under the name and style of Capri
Manufacturing Company.11 Chiok narrated that Chua only panicked when she learned that he was swindled
by one Gonzalo Nuguid, who supplied him with dollars. 12 It was then that she immediately demanded the
return of her investment. To reassure Chua, Chiok informed her that lie had invested the money with Yu Que
Ngo and offered to give Yu Que Ngo's checks to replace his previously issued interbank checks. 13 Chua
agreed, but instead of returning his checks, she retained them along with the checks of Yu Que Ngo. Chua
rejected Yu Que Ngo's offer to settle her obligation with land and machineries, insisting on recovering the
"whole amount plus interest, litigation expenses plus attorney's fees." 14 After the case was filed, Chiok and Yu
Que Ngo met with Chua, accompanied by their lawyers, in an effort to amicably settle Chua's demand for the
return of her funds. Chua demanded more than P30,000,000.00, but Chiok and Yu Que Ngo requested for a
lower amount because the original claim was only P9,500,000.00. Chua did not grant their request. 15

In a Decision16 dated December 3, 1998, the RTC convicted Chiok of the crime of estafa (RTC conviction). Its
dispositive portion reads:
In View Of All The Foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused Wilfred N. Chiok guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer
imprisonment of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum and to pay the costs.

The accused is ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P9,563,900.00 with interest
at the legal rate to be computed from the date of demand - October 25, 1995 until fully paid.

For want of evidence, the Court cannot award the alleged actual damages.

SO ORDERED.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The prosecution filed a Motion for Cancellation of Bail 18 pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure on February 1, 1999, the same day the judgment was promulgated. 19 On February 15,
1999, Chiok filed a Motion for Reconsideration 20 of the RTC conviction.

The RTC, in an omnibus order21 dated May 28, 1999 (omnibus order), denied Chiok's motion for
reconsideration, and also cancelled his bail pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. The RTC held that the circumstances of the accused indicated the probability of flight if released
on bail and/or that there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, he may commit another crime.
Thus:
WHEREFORE, the bail of the accused is cancelled. The accused is given five (5) days from receipt
of this order within which to surrender before this Court otherwise, his arrest will be ordered.
 SO ORDERED.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On June 18, 1999, Chiok filed a Notice of Appeal 23 on the RTC conviction and omnibus order, docketed as
CA-G.R. CR No. 23309 (the appeal case) and rallied to the CA Fifteenth Division. On June 19, 1999, Chiok
also filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Injunction against the omnibus order, 24 which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 53340 (bail case) and raffled
to the CA Thirteenth Division.

Meanwhile, the RTC issued an order of arrest 25 on June 25, 1999 (order of arrest) pursuant to the omnibus
order. The order of arrest was returned to the trial court by the Makati Police Station on July 25, 1999 on the
ground that Chiok could not be located at his last given address. 26

The Bail Case

On July 27, 1999, the CA issued a TRO on the implementation of the omnibus order until further orders. 27 On
September 20, 1999, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction 28 enjoining the arrest of Chiok. The CA
ruled that Chiok should not be deprived of liberty pending the resolution of his appeal because the offense for
which he was convicted is a non-capital offense, and that the probability of flight during the pendency of his
appeal is merely conjectural.29 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Chua filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated November 16, 1999.

On November 3, 1999, the OSG representing the People of the Philippines, and Chua, filed separate petitions
for certiorari before us seeking review of the CA Resolutions dated September 20, 1999 and November 16,
1999.30 We granted the OSG's and Chua's petitions and reversed the CA's injunction on the arrest of
Chiok.31 Our decisions (SC bail decisions) became final on December 6, 2006 and June 20, 2007,
respectively.

The Appeal Case

On September 21, 1999, the CA Thirteenth Division dismissed the appeal of Chiok finding him to have
jumped bail when the order of arrest was returned unserved. 32 The CA considered his appeal abandoned,
dismissing it pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. However, on February
29, 2000, the CA reinstated Chiok's appeal when it learned of the issuance of the TRO and injunction in the
bail case on September 20, 1999 or a day prior to the appeal's dismissal. 33

Proceedings before the CA ensued. Chiok filed his Appellant's Brief 34 dated August 28, 2003 while the OSG
filed its Appellee's Brief 35 dated December 23, 2003. Chiok submitted his Reply Brief 36 dated April 14, 2004
while the OSG and Chua replied through their Rejoinder Briefs 37 dated October 6, 2004.

On July 19, 2007, the CA in a Special Division of Five (Former-Fourth Division) rendered a Decision reversing
and setting aside the Decision dated December 3, 1998 of the trial court, and acquitted Chiok for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt (CA acquittal).

The CA found that the RTC conviction did not contain findings of fact on the prosecution's evidence but
merely recited the evidence of the prosecution as if such evidence was already proof of the ultimate facts
constituting estafa. Instead of relying on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, the trial court relied on the
weakness of the defense. It found that Chua's testimony, which was the sole evidence of the prosecution, was
inconsistent and improbable. Specifically, it was irregular that Chua was not able to produce any single receipt
or documentary evidence of all the alleged stock dealings which spanned for a long period of six years with
Chiok—the purpose of which was to prove that he misappropriated the amount contrary to her instructions of
investing it to blue chip stocks. More importantly, the acceptance by Chua of the checks issued by Yu Que
Ngo ratified his application of the funds based on the instructions to invest it. Simply put, the prosecution was
not able to prove the element of misappropriation (i.e., deviation from Chua's instructions). As to the civil
aspect, the CA found Chiok liable to Chua for the amount of P9,500,000.00, 38 the amount he admitted on
record.

The OSG did not file a motion for reconsideration on the ground of double jeopardy. Chua, on the other hand,
filed a motion for reconsideration39 on August 8, 2007. Chiok also filed his own motion for
reconsideration,40 on the civil liability imposed on him.

In a Resolution41 dated October 3, 2007, the CA denied Chua's motion for reconsideration and its supplement
on the ground that acquittal is immediately final and the re-examination of the record of the case would violate
the guarantee against double jeopardy. It also denied the motions tor reconsideration of both parties on the
civil aspect of the case.

Hence, these consolidated petitions questioning the CA acquittal by way of a petition for certiorari and
mandamus, and the civil aspect of the case by way of appeal by certiorari.
Issues

The consolidated petitions raise the following issues:

I. Whether or not Chua has a legal personality to file and prosecute this petition.

II. Whether or not the case is an exception to the rule on finality of acquittal and the doctrine of
double jeopardy.

III.Whether or not Chiok is civilly liable to Chua.

Discussion

I. Chua lacks the legal personality to file this petition.

Chua argues that her petition should be allowed because the circumstances of this case warrant leniency on
her lack of personality to assail the criminal aspect of the CA acquittal. She argues that "the OSG did not take
any action to comment on the position of Chua [and] that this case belongs to the realm of exceptions to the
doctrine of double jeopardy." 42

We disagree with Chua.

Chua lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision because it is only the OSG, on
behalf of the State, which can bring actions in criminal proceedings before this Court and the CA.

In Villareal v. Aliga,43 we upheld the doctrine that it is only the OSG, as representative of the State, which may
question the acquittal of the accused via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, viz:
x x x The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court
and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35 (I), Chapter 12,
Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent
the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have
specific powers and functions to represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court
and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG is the law office of the
Government.

To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him
can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private
complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil
liability of the accused is concerned. In a catena of cases, this view has been time and again
espoused and maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v. Gadiane, it was categorically slated that if
the criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal
aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability
of the private complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect
of the case. The same determination was also arrived at by the Court in Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company v. Veridiano II. In the recent case of Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, the Court again
upheld this guiding principle.

xxx

Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the
State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil
liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal,
an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State
through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the
Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.
(Emphasis supplied)
The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal
action is the State and not the private complainant. 44 The interest of the private complainant or the private
offended party is limited only to the civil liability. 45 In the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is
limited to that of a witness for the prosecution such that when a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or
if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State
through the Solicitor General.46 The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal, but may
only do so as to the civil aspect of the case. 47

Although there are instances when we adopt a liberal view and give due course to a petition filed by an
offended party, we direct the OSG to file its comment. 48 When through its comment, the OSG takes a position
similar to the private complainant's, we hold that the OSG ratifies and adopts the private complainant's
petition as its own.49 However, when the OSG in its comment neither prays that the petition be granted nor
expressly ratifies and adopts the petition as its own, we hesitate in disregarding, and uphold instead, the rule
on personality or legal standing. 50

In this case, the OSG neither appealed the judgment of acquittal of the CA nor gave its conformity to Chua's
special civil action for certiorari and mandamus. In its Comment 51 dated March 27, 2008, the OSG is of the
view that Chua's petition will place Chiok in double jeopardy:
x x x Notably, while petitioner [Chua] imputes grave abuse of discretion on the Court of Appeals in
acquitting private respondent, a perusal of the allegations will reveal errors of judgment in the
appreciation of evidence, not error of jurisdiction. Verily, petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals abused its discretion when it pronounced that "we have also reviewed the evidence of the
accused in order to satisfy ourselves about the essential question of misappropriation or
conversion" and hold thereafter that "review now justifies us to pronounce that his version on the
matter was probably credible." Petitioner argues that a simple review of the evidence of respondent
accused readily leads to the conclusion that it is very far from being probably credible.

Clearly, the errors ascribed to the Court of Appeals are errors that go deeply into the appreciation
and assessment of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense during the trial.
Thus, the present petition smacks in the heart of the Court of [Appeals] appreciation of evidence x
x x.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In view of the contrary position of the OSG, we do not subscribe to Chua's view that the circumstances of this
case warrant the relaxation on the rule. Even if we do relax this procedural rule, we find that the merits of the
case still calls for the dismissal of Chua's petition.

II. The appeal from the judgment of acquittal will place Chiok in double jeopardy.

The 1987 Constitution, as well as its predecessors, guarantees the right of the accused against double
jeopardy.53 Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for double jeopardy
to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3)
the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the
case was dismissed without his express consent.54

In order to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our rules on criminal proceedings require that a judgment
of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately
executory upon its promulgation. 55 This is referred to as the "finality-of-acquittal" rule. The rationale for the
rule was explained in People v. Velasco:56
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into
"the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought
in unequal contest with the State, x x x." Thus, Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying
idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is
that the State with sill its resources and power should not be allowed to make repealed attempts to
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled
to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy
underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount
 importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful
conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty,
is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's
liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection lo insure that
the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a
subsequent proceeding.

Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in
a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for society's awareness of the heavy
personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the
willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in
enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal
finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he
fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to
oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the
accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a
second trial would be unfair. (Citations omitted, Emphasis supplied)

There were cases, however, where we recognized certain exceptions to the rule against double jeopardy and
its resultant doctrine of finality-of-acquittal.

In Galman v. Sandiganbayan,57 we remanded a judgment of acquittal to a trial court due to a finding of

mistrial. In declaring the trial before the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator Benigno Simeon
"Ninoy" Aquino, Jr., which resulted in the acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, we found that "the
prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased
[Tanodbayan] under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian
[p]resident to assure the carrying out of his instructions." 58 We considered the acquittal as void, and held that
no double jeopardy attached.

In People v. Uy,59 we held that by way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner
that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the
assailed judgment void.

Chua assails the acquittal of Chiok on two grounds. First, the first jeopardy did not attach because the CA did
not have jurisdiction over the appeal; Chiok having lost his right to appeal when the CA found him to have
jumped bail. Second assuming that the first jeopardy attached, the circumstances of this case is an exception
to the rule on double jeopardy.

A. The CA had jurisdiction to entertain Chiok's appeal.

Chua claims that the SC bail decisions set aside as bereft of any factual or legal basis the CA resolutions in
the bail case which enjoined the cancellation of bail of Chiok and his warrant of arrest by the trial court. The
logical and legal consequence of the nullification of the CA resolutions is to automatically revive the CA's
Resolution dated September 21, 1999 dismissing the appeal of Chiok. Accordingly, the CA had no jurisdiction
to entertain the appeal of Chiok and the proceedings therein are null and void.

We find no merit in Chua's claims.

At the outset, the CA validly acquired jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal. Chiok filed his Notice of Appeal on June
18, 1999 at the time when the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure was still in effect. Section 6, Rule 120 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly provides that the right to appeal is not automatically forfeited
when an accused fails to appear during the promulgation of judgment. 60 Upon perfection of Chiok's Notice of
Appeal and the subsequent denial of the prosecution's Motion to Deny Due Course to the Notice of Appeal by
the RTC in its Order61 dated July 15, 1999, the CA completely acquired jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal.

After acquiring jurisdiction over the appeal, the CA took cognizance of the unserved order of arrest. Exercising
jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal, the CA in its Resolution dated September 21, 1999 dismissed his appeal in
accordance with Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment, or failure to prosecute. - The appellate court may,
upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if
the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the
 appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.

The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

The aforecited section gives the CA the authority to dismiss an appeal for abandonment if the accused
escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the
appeal. This authority to dismiss an appeal is, nevertheless, discretionary. 62 When an accused jumps bail
during the pendency of his appeal, the appellate court may exercise its discretion whether to proceed with the
appeal or dismiss it outright.63 In several cases, we still proceeded to acquit an accused who remained at
large during the pendency of the appeal.64

In this case, the CA exercised this discretion when it found that Chiok jumped bail because the order of arrest
was not served. Subsequently, when Chiok moved for its reconsideration, the CA again exercised its
discretion, this time to entertain the appeal. Notably, neither the prosecution nor Chua attributed any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court when it reinstated the appeal via a Resolution dated
February 29, 2000. This resolution, which effectively replaces the original resolution dismissing the appeal,
has already attained finality.

Thus, contrary to the claim of Chua, the SC bail decisions which set aside the CA resolutions enjoining
Chiok's arrest did not automatically revive the CA resolution dismissing the appeal; the dismissal being a
discretionary act on the part of the appellate court. Consequently, we reject the claim of Chua that the first
jeopardy did not attach because the whole proceedings before the CA, and the CA acquittal, are null and void.

B. Exceptions to the rate on finality-of-acquittal and double jeopardy doctrine do not apply.

Chua next asserts that certain exceptions to the rule on double jeopardy are present in this case. Particularly,
she submits that: (1) the appellate court's proceeding is a sham or mock proceeding; (2) the People through
the OSG, was deprived of the opportunity to be heard and its "day in court"; and (3) the result is a null and
void judgment of acquittal. Chua cites the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan65 to bolster her assertions.

Chua claims that the "trial in both the bouncing checks cases and this estafa case, is a sham insofar as they
have resulted in acquittals." 66 Chua anchors her claim on the report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C.
Panganiban that there were unauthorized tamperings in the evidence in the bouncing checks cases 67 (BP 22
case) she filed against Chiok, and that a TSN in the same BP 22 case, where Chiok allegedly made an
implied admission of guilt, has been secretly removed from the record.

We do not see any exception to the rule on double jeopardy in this case.

The factual milieu in Galman v. Sandiganbayan68 is starkly different from this case. In Galman, we concluded
that there was a mock or sham trial because of the overwhelming evidence of collusion and undue pressures
made by former President Marcos on the prosecution and the Justices who tried and decided the case, which
prevented the prosecution from fully ventilating its position and offering all evidence. We recognized the
intensity and gravity of the pressure exerted by the highest official in the land that resulted to a miscarriage of
justice.

In this case, Chua presents a report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban showing irregularities in the
BP 22 case against Chiok, including the loss of a TSN containing an alleged offer of settlement by Chiok
equivalent to his implied admission of guilt. We, however, do not see the same evils presented
in Galman when the alleged anomalies pointed out by Chua were in a different case and when the main basis
of the acquittal is not on the credibility of the physical evidence but of the testimony of Chua herself.
Moreover, it is apparent from the CA acquittal that the appellate court considered Chiok's offer of settlement in
arriving at the decision, having included it in its statement of facts. In essence, Chua is asking us to nullify the
CA acquittal because in her opinion, if the appellate court considered these pieces of evidence, it would have
convicted Chiok. These are purported errors of judgment or those involving misappreciation of evidence
which cannot be raised and be reviewed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

We are also not convinced that the State was deprived of due process in presenting its case. The OSG, in
fact, actively participated in prosecuting the case before the CA. It was able to file an Appellee's Brief 69 dated
December 23, 2003, as well as its Rejoinder Brief 70 dated October 6, 2004. As Chua even admits in her
petition, the OSG was able to present its case before the appellate court as when "[t]he OSG's position in this
case on the merits is clear in the submissions it has filed, as most eloquently expressed in the Rejoinder
Brief..."71 Certainly, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed where both parties had the opportunity to
present their case and even required them to submit memoranda from which its decision is based, as in this
case.72

Although we do not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous
acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the appellate court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. 73 Chua failed
to do so.

III. Chiok is civilly liable to Chua in the amount of P9,563,900.00.

Chiok claims thai the Joint Decision74 dated November 27, 2000 in the BP 22 case docketed as Criminal
Case No. 44739 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) San Juan, Manila - Branch 58, which absolved Chiok
from civil liability, is res judicata on this case. On the other hand, Chua. claims that the CA erred when it
ordered Chiok to pay only the amount of P9,500,000.00 when it was shown by evidence that the amount
should be P9,563,900.00.

We rule that Chiok is liable For the amount of P9,563,900.00.

In Castillo v. Salvador75 and several cases before it, we ruled that if the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt, the accused is not automatically exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only. In this regard, preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the
evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 76

While the CA acquitted Chiok on the ground that the prosecution's evidence on his alleged misappropriation
of Chua's money did not meet the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, we hold that the monetary
transaction between Chua and Chiok was proven by preponderance of evidence.

Chua presented in evidence a bank deposit slip dated June 9, 1995 to Chiok's Far East Bank, Annapolis
account in the amount of P7,100,000.00. She also testified that she delivered to him in cash the amount of
P2,463,900.00. Chiok's admission that he issued the interbank checks in the total amount of P9,563,900.00 to
Chua, albeit claiming that it was "for safekeeping purposes only" and to assure her that she will be paid back
her investment, corroborates Chua's evidence. In any event, as found by the appellate court, Chiok admitted
that he received from Chua the amount of "P7.9" million in June 1995 and for "P1.6" million at an earlier time.
It is on this basis that the CA found Chiok civilly liable in the amount of P9,500,000.00 only.

However, we find that during the direct and cross-examination of Chiok on September 15, 1997 and October
13, 1997, the reference to "P9.5" million is the amount in issue, which is the whole of P9,563,900.00:
TSN September 15, 1907 (direct examination of Wilfred Chiok)

ATTY ESPIRITU[:] Mr. Witness. The amount here you are being charged in the information is
P9,563,900.00 covered by I lie two (2) checks Exhibits "C" and "D" of the prosecution. x x x 77

TSN Octobcr 13, 1997 (cross examination of Wilfred Chiok)

PROSECUTOR RASA[:] Do you know how much Mrs. Chua is claiming from you [which is
the] subject matter of this case of estafa?

WITNKSK[:] Yes, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR RASA[:] How much?

WITNESS[:] More or less 9.5.

PROSECUTOR RASA[:] In peso or in dollar?

WITNESS[:] In Peso.

PROSECUTOR RASA[:] 9.5 Million what?

WITNESS[:] Million Peso, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR RASA[:] You admit that you received 9.5 Million from Mrs. Chua?
 WITNESS[:] I admitted that, ma'am.78 (Italics supplied)

Accordingly, the amount admitted should be P9,563,900.00.

There is also no merit in Chiok's claim that his absolution from civil liability in the BP 22 case involving the
same transaction bars civil liability in this estafa case under the doctrine of res judicata in the concept of
"conclusiveness of judgment."

The doctrine of res judicata under the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" is found in paragraph (c) of
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under this doctrine, a final judgment or decree on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits on points and matters determined in the former suit. 79 Stated differently, facts and issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if
the latter suit may involve a different cause of action. 80 This principle of res judicata bars the re-litigation of
particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of
action.81

In Rodriguez v. Ponferrada,82 we explained that a civil action in a BP 22 case is not a bar to a civil action
in estafa case. In rejecting the theory of petitioner therein that the civil action arising from the criminal case for
violation of BP 22 precludes the institution of the corresponding civil action in the criminal case
for estafa pending before the RTC, we ruled that Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the
institution of a civil action in the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22, without need of election by the
offended party. There is no forum shopping because both remedies are simultaneously available to the
offended party. We explained that while every such act of issuing a bouncing check involves only one civil
liability for the offended party who has sustained only a single injury, this single civil liability can be the subject
of both civil actions in the estafa case and the BP 22 case. However, there may only be one recovery of the
single civil liability.

We affirmed this in Rimando v. Aldaba,83 where we were confronted with the similar issue of whether an
accused's civil liability in the estafa case must be upheld despite acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in
BP 22 cases. We held that both estafa and BP 22 cases can proceed to their final adjudication-both as to their
criminal and civil aspects—subject only to the prohibition on double recovery.

Since the Rules itself allows for both remedies to be simultaneously availed of by the offended party, the
doctrine of res judicata finds no application here.

Moreover, the principle of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment presupposes that facts
and issues were actually and directly resolved in a previous case. 84 However, the records show that in the BP
22 case, the facts and issues proving the transaction were not actually and directly resolved in the
decision, viz:
The court is not persuaded.

First, what the law requires is a notice of dishonor of the check to be given to the accused after its
dishonor. There is no showing dial this requirement was complied by the prosecution. Second, the
drawer must be given at least 5 banking days from such notice of dishonor within which to pay the
holder thereof the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of
such check. Indeed, there was no notice of dishonor established to have been furnished the
accused and therefore there is more reason that the accused was not given the requisite 5-banking
day to make good aforesaid cheeks. The 5-day notice serves to mitigate the harshness of the law
in its application by giving the drawer an opportunity to make good the bum check. And, it cannot
be said that accused was ever given that opportunity simply because the prosecution failed to
prove that accused was notified of the dishonor of the checks in suit.

x x x

Even assuming without admitting but only for the sake of argument that accused was notified of the
dishonor of the checks in suit by the demand letter adverted to above, still the prosecution cause
must fail because there are more reasons not to believe than to believe the theory of the
prosecution as compared with that of the defense as will be explained hereunder.

x x x

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the court hereby absolves the accused
 from criminal as well as civil liability and orders these cases DISMISSED for lack of evidence to
support the charges levelled against him.

Costs de officio.

No other pronouncements.

SO ORDERED.85ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The basis or Chiok's acquittal therein is the prosecution's failure to show that a notice of dishonor was first
given to Chiok. The discussion that the prosecution's version is incredible was merely secondary, and was not
necessary, for accused's acquittal. There were no findings of fact on the transaction which gives rise to the
civil liability.

In light of these, we reject Chiok's claim that res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment bars
Chua from recovering any civil claims.

Following this Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,86 the foregoing amount of P9,563,900.00 shall earn
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from October 25, 1995, the date of Chua's
extrajudicial demand, until the date of finality of this judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from such finality of judgment until its satisfaction.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 179814 and the special civil action for certiorari
and mandamus in G.R. No. 180021 are DENIED. The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 180021
is GRANTED. The Assailed Decision dated July 19, 2007 and the Resolution dated October 3, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Wilfred Chiok is ordered to pay Rufina Chua
the principal amount of P9,563,900.00, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from
October 25, 1995 until the date of finality of this judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until its satisfaction.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.c

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175602 February 13, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ, Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, in
Quezon City. On January 20, 2005, after trial, the RTC convicted them as charged, prescribed on each of
them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered them to pay to the heirs of each victim
₱93,000.00 _as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification that each of the
accused pay to the heirs of each victim ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus costs of suit.
The two accused then came to the Court on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin Valdez filed a motion to
withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal closed and
terminated.1
On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez, finding him
guilty of three counts of homicide, instead of three counts of murder, and meting on him for each count of
homicide the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum,2 to wit:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18, 2006 is MODIFIED by finding
PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing him to
suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, Moises
Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a selfexplanatory letter3 dated March 12, 2012, where
he pleaded for the application to him of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 on the ground that the
judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused. The letter reads as follows:
HON. MIDAS MARQUEZ
Court Administrator
Office of the Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Manila

SUBJECT: Re. Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of Rules of Court, Request for.

Your honor,

The undersigned most respectfully requesting through your Honorable office, assistance on the
subject mentioned above.

I, Edwin and Eduardo, both surnamed Valdez were both charged before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 86, Quezon City for the entitled Crime of Murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-90718 to Q-
0090720, which convicted us to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for each of the three (3)
offense.

Then after the decision of the RTC Branch 86, the same was appealed to the Court of Appeals with
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00876 and again on July 18, 2006 the Honorable Court of appeals Ninth
Division issued a Decision AFFIRMED the questioned Decision with MODIFICATION.

Only my Co-principal Accused EDUARDO V. VALDEZ enterposed appealed (sic) the Affirmatory
Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals to the Highest Tribunal with G.R. Nos. 175602. On my
part, I decided to withdraw my appeal, because I believe that there is no more hope for me, but I
was wrong when I read the Decision of the First Division of the Supreme Court, dated January 18,
2012 signed by the Chief Justice Honorable Renato C. Corona and finally I found hope.

And now I come to your Honorable Office through this letter to seek help and assistance that the
Decision of the Supreme Court to my Brother Eduardo V. Valdez may also benefitted (sic) the
undersigned through Section 11 (a) , Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

"(a) An Appeal taken by the one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the Appellate Court is favorable and applicable to the
latter: x x x"

Favorable Humanitarian consideration on this matter.

Thank you very much and more power, God Bless.

Respectfully yours

EDWIN V. VALDEZ

Through a comment filed on September 25, 2012,4 the Solicitor General interposed no opposition to the plea
for the reduction of Edwin’s sentences for being in full accord with the Rules of Court and pertinent
jurisprudence.
We grant the plea for reduction of Edwin’s sentences.
The final judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 downgraded the crimes committed by Eduardo from
three counts of murder to three counts of homicide, and consequently prescribed lighter penalties in the form
of indeterminate sentences. As a result, Eduardo would serve only an indeterminate sentence of 10 years
of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, under which he can qualify for
parole in due course by virtue of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, instead of suffering the indivisible penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Court rationalized the result as follows:
x x x The records show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary to the established facts and
circumstances showing that he and Edwin, then armed with short firearms, had gone to the jai
alai betting station of Moises to confront Jonathan Rubio, the teller of the betting booth then busily
attending to bettors inside the booth; that because the accused were calling to Rubio to come out of
the booth, Moises approached to pacify them, but one of them threatened Moises; Gusto mo unahin
na kita?; that immediately after Moises replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired several shots at Moises,
causing him to fall to the ground; that PO2 Valdez continued firing at the fallen Moises; that Ferdinand
(another victim) rushed to aid Moises, his brother, but Edwin shot Ferdinand in the head, spilling his
brains; that somebody shouted to Joselito (the third victim) to run; that Edwin also shot Joselito twice
in the back; and that Joselito fell on a burger machine. The shots fired at the three victims were
apparently fired from short distances.
The testimonial accounts of the State’s witnesses entirely jibed with the physical evidence. Specifically, the
medico-legal evidence showed that Ferdinand had a gunshot wound in the head; that two gunshot wounds
entered Joselito’s back and the right side of his neck; and that Moises suffered a gunshot wound in the head
and four gunshot wounds in the chest. Also, Dr. Wilfredo Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal Office opined that the
presence of marginal abrasions at the points of entry indicated that the gunshot wounds were inflicted at close
range. Given that physical evidence was of the highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than all
witnesses put together, the congruence between the testimonial recollections and the physical evidence
rendered the findings adverse to PO2 Valdez and Edwin conclusive.
Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit the felony. Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct
because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts. Herein, both lower courts deduced the
conspiracy between the accused from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killings. We are
satisfied that their deduction was warranted.
Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal responsibility for the fatal shooting by
Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused were convincingly shown to have acted in concert to
achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in
concert was manifest not only from their going together to the betting station on board a single
motorcycle, but also from their joint attack that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing successive shots at
Moises and immediately followed by Edwin’s shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after the other. It
was also significant that they fled together on board the same motorcycle as soon as they had
achieved their common purpose.
To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither did he
have to know the exact part performed by his co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts.
Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy between PO2 Valdez and Edwin was properly inferred
and proved through their acts that were indicative of their common purpose and community of
interest.
And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three homicides,
instead of three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently alleging the attendance of
treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of any of the crimes against
persons which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending party arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. It encompasses a wide variety of actions and
attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime committed. Corollarily, the defense
against the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied and dependent on each
particular instance. Such variety generates the actual need for the state to specifically aver the factual
circumstances or particular acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for
the crime in the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to defend himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. In People v. Dimaano, the Court elaborated:
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or
the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements
of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime
in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable
him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. [emphasis supplied]
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused "with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did x x x assault, attack and employ
personal violence upon" the victims "by then and there shooting them with a gun, hitting [them]" on
various parts of their bodies "which were the direct and immediate cause of their deaths" did not
sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the
killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him
with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially
ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of
the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could
serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment,
for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short,
the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder
were missing from the informations.
x x x. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature
and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. This requirement
accords with the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts
stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which
he must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice, x
x x.
xxxx
x x x. There being no circumstances modifying criminal liability, the penalty is applied in its medium period
(ie., 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence is taken from prision mayor, and the maximum from the medium
period of reclusion temporal. Hence, the Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of 10 years
of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count of
homicide.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18, 2006 is MODIFIED by finding
PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing
him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to
17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand
Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00
as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)
On his part, Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the downgrading of the crimes
committed (and the resultant lighter penalties) despite the finality of his convictions for three counts of murder
due to his withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of the crimes committed would definitely be favorable to
him. Worth pointing out is that to deny to him the benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities would be
highly unfair, considering that this Court had found the two accused to have acted in concert in their deadly
assault against the victims, warranting their equal liabiliy under the principle of conspiracy.
We grant Edwin’s plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which relevantly provides:
Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – (a) An appeal taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate
court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
xxxx
In this connection, the Court has pronounced in Lim v. Court of Appeals6 that the benefits of this provision
extended to all the accused, regardless of whether they appealed or not, to wit:
As earlier stated, both petitioner and the OSG laterally argue that in the event of Guingguing’s acquittal,
petitioner should likewise be acquitted, based on Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, which states:
SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.-
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except
insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Private respondent however, contends that said provision is not applicable to petitioner inasmuch as he
appealed from his conviction, and the provision states that a favorable judgment shall be applicable only to
those who did not appeal.
A literal interpretation of the phrase "did not appeal," as espoused by private respondent, will not give justice
to the purpose of the provision.
It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as to defeat its reason, i.e., to
benefit an accused who did not join in the appeal of his co-accused in case where the appellate judgment is
favorable. In fact, several cases rendered by the Court applied the foregoing provision without regard as to
the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a coaccused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him.
In People v. Artellero, the Court extended the acquittal of Rodriguez’s co-accused to him despite the
withdrawal of his appeal, applying the Rule 122, Section 11(a), and considering that the evidence against both
are inextricably linked, to wit:
Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the well-established rule is that an appeal
in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by
the parties. The records show that Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to financial reasons. However,
Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "an appeal taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellant court is
favorable and applicable to the latter." As we have elucidated, the evidence against and the conviction of both
appellant and Rodriguez are inextricably linked. Hence, appellant’s acquittal, which is favorable and
applicable to Rodriguez, should benefit the latter.
In People v. Arondain, the Court found accused Arondain guilty only of homicide.1âwphi1 Such verdict was
applied to his co-accused, Jose Precioso, who was previously found guilty by the trial court of robbery with
homicide, despite the fact that Precioso appealed but failed to file an appellant’s brief. The Court also
modified Precioso’s civil liability although the additional monetary award imposed on Arondain was not
extended to Precioso since it was not favorable to him and he did not pursue the appeal before the Court.
In People v. De Lara, Eduardo Villas, together with several coaccused, were found by the trial court guilty of
forcible abduction. During pendency of the review before the Court, Villas withdrew his appeal, hence his
conviction became final and executory. Thereafter, the Court found Villas’ co-accused guilty only of grave
coercion. Applying Rule 122, Section 11(a), the Court also found Villas guilty of the lesser offense of grave
coercion since it is beneficial to him.
In People v. Escaño, the Court granted a motion filed by accused Julian Deen Escaño, praying that the
Court’s Decision dated January 28, 2000, acquitting his co-accused Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez in
Criminal Case No. 95-936 for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, be
applied to him. Escaño originally filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court but later withdrew the same.
In the foregoing cases, all the accused appealed from their judgments of conviction but for one reason or
another, the conviction became final and executory. Nevertheless, the Court still applied to them the favorable
judgment in favor of their co-accused. The Court notes that the Decision dated September 30, 2005 in G.R.
No. 128959 stated, "'the verdict of guilt with respect to Lim [herein petitioner] had already become final and
executory." In any event, the Court cannot see why a different treatment should be given to petitioner, given
that the judgment is favorable to him and considering further that the Court's finding in its Decision dated
September 30, 2005 specifically stated that "the publication of the subject advertisement by petitioner and Lim
cannot be deemed by this Court to have been done with actual malice."7
ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the plea of EDWIN VALDEZ for the application to him of the judgment
promulgated on January 18, 2012 finding P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ guilty of three counts of homicide, and
sentencing him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum
to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand
Sayson, the late Moises Sayson, Jr., and the late Joselito Sayson the amounts of₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages for each count.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

EN BANC
G.R. No. 148965 February 26, 2002
JOSE "JINGGOY" E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application to a particular party may be unconstitutional. This is
the submission of the petitioner who invokes the equal protection clause of the Constitution in his bid to be
excluded from the charge of plunder filed against him by the respondent Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then
President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and
members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the
Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution1 finding probable cause warranting
the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President and the other
respondents therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and
among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the case
was assigned to respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused was set on
July 10, 2001 and no bail for petitioner’s provisional liberty was fixed.
On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the Amended Information on the ground
that the Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense.
Respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused. On its
basis, petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion"2 alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists
to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal
gambling and not in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2)
he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information
and be discharged from custody. In the alternative, petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an
amount to be fixed by respondent court.3
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Motion To Fix Bail On
Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In
The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To Him."4
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Strike Out So-Called ‘Entry of Appearance,’ To Direct
Ombudsman To Explain Why He Attributes Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve Pending Incidents."5
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s "Motion to Quash and
Suspend" and "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion."6 Petitioner’s alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing
after arraignment of all accused. The court held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for lack of merit the following: (1)
MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND dated April 24, 2001 filed by accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada; (2)
MOTION TO QUASH dated June 7, 2001 filed by accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada; and (3) MOTION TO
QUASH (Re: Amended Information dated 18 April 2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by accused Edward S.
Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, his
VERY URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION, praying that he be: (1) dropped from the information for plunder for
want of probable cause and (2) discharged from custody immediately which is based on the same grounds
mentioned in this MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND is hereby DENIED. Let his alternative prayer in said
OMNIBUS MOTION that he be allowed to post bail be SET for hearing together with the petition for bail of
accused Edward S. Serapio scheduled for July 10, 2001, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon after the arraignment
of all the accused."7
The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent court
denied the motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea prompting
respondent court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.8
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:
"1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to petitioner, and
denying him the equal protection of the laws;
2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient standards;
3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with
which and with whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is
personal, not vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due process;
4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the information which
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle of proportionality."9
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim.
I.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and denies him
the equal protection of the laws.10
The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law, has
been settled in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.11 We take off from the Amended Information which
charged petitioner, together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Charlie "Atong"
Ang, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and others, with the crime of plunder as follows:
"AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman, hereby
accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. "ASIONG
SALONGA" AND a.k.a "JOSE VELARDE", together with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of
Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659,
committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS
FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal
acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with
co-accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ ANG, Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of
the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
Province of Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-
accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK
MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE
OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION
ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN
 PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED
FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE
BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK
UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,
KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY
THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS
AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS
ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001"12
Petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally perched on the
premise that the Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which cannot constitute
plunder. He then assails the denial of his right to bail.
Petitioner’s premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will show that it is
divided into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Joseph E. Estrada with the crime
of plunder together with petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda
Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in general terms how the accused conspired in
committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the
predicate acts constitutive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state the
names of the accused who committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information which is of "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the
aggregate amount of ₱545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or
any form of pecuniary benefit x x x." In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy with former President
Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to ₱545
million. Contrary to petitioner’s posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal
gambling "on several instances." The phrase "on several instances" means the petitioner committed
the predicate act in series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the
commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase "several instances" is to indulge in a twisted, nay,
"pretzel" interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words "combination" or "series" as they appear
in R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,13 we held that where these two terms are to be taken in
their popular, not technical, meaning, the word "series" is synonymous with the clause "on several instances."
"Series" refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The
word "combination" contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate acts in any of said
items. Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder
committed by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioner’s stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4, 2001 finding probable
cause to charge him with plunder together with the other accused, he was alleged to have received only the
sum of P2 million, which amount is way below the minimum of P50 million required under R.A. No. 7080. The
submission is not borne out by the April 4, 2001 Resolution of the Ombudsman, recommending the filing of
charges against petitioner and his co-accused, which in pertinent part reads:
"x x x xxx xxx
Respondent Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to have also
surreptitious collection of protection money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is gleaned from the
statements of Gov. Singson himself and the fact that Mayor Estrada, on at least two occasions, turned over
to a certain Emma Lim, an emissary of the respondent governor, jueteng haul totalling P2 million, i.e., P1
million in January, 2000 and another P1 million in February, 2000. An alleged "listahan" of jueteng recipients
listed him as one "Jingle Bell," as affirmed by Singson [TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI]."14
Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made the finding that P2 million was
delivered to petitioner as "jueteng haul" on "at least two occasions." The P2 million is, therefore, not the
entire sum with which petitioner is specifically charged. This is further confirmed by the conclusion of the
Ombudsman that:
"x x x xxx xxx
It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio and
Yolanda Ricaforte, demanded and received, as bribe money, the aggregate sum of P545 million from jueteng
collections of the operators thereof, channeled thru Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, in exchange for protection
from arrest or interference by law enforcers; x x x."15
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to establish any
probable cause against him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has found probable cause
against the petitioner for which reason it issued a warrant of arrest against him. Petitioner then underwent
arraignment and is now on trial. The time to assail the finding of probable cause by the Ombudsman has long
passed. The issue cannot be resurrected in this petition.
II.
Next, petitioner contends that "the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete standards to guide
the courts in dealing with accused alleged to have contributed to the offense."16 Thus, he posits the following
questions:
"For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at least ten criminal acts, what penalty do we impose
on one who is clearly involved in only one such criminal act? Is it reclusion perpetua? Or should it be a lesser
penalty? What if another accused is shown to have participated in three of the ten specifications, what would
be the penalty imposable, compared to one who may have been involved in five or seven of the
specifications? The law does not provide the standard or specify the penalties and the courts are left to
guess. In other words, the courts are called to say what the law is rather than to apply what the lawmaker is
supposed to have intended."17
Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression that: (1) he is charged
with only one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused named in sub-paragraphs
(b) to (d) of the Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought to be different from reclusion
perpetua to death. R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on an accused similarly
situated as he is. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the second paragraph of the Amended Information
charges him to have conspired with former President Estrada in committing the crime of plunder. His alleged
participation consists in the commission of the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information. If these allegations are proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different
from that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the other. The imposable
penalty is provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, viz:
"Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d)
hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of
the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated
with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise
be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by
the court."
III.
Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for "sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged
offenses and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected –
contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious – results in the denial of substantive due
process."18
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only with the predicate act in
sub-paragraph (a) but also with the other predicate acts in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) & (d) because he is
indicted as a principal and as co-conspirator of the former President. This is purportedly clear from the first
and second paragraphs of the Amended Information.19
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information vis-à-vis the
provisions of R.A. No. 7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-accused with the
crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph describes in general
how plunder was committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to
(d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in particular the co-
conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said
four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-
paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those
who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with
the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b)
alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in
Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators
of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle
Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which
became part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts
fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former
President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act
that the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with
John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name "Jose Velarde" at the Equitable-
PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No.
7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the
latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the
Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to
(d) conspired with each other to enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light
of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with
the former President as related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-
paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly
committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in
conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4
billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the
predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in four,
separate Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the
mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of
the Marcos regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his
alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and
magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former President to acquire illegal wealth.20 They
also found that under the then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised
Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions, different time and different
personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate case and the
over-all conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of
multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases
were filed against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan.21 R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-
Plunder Law22 was enacted precisely to address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory
Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz:
"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason,
punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the public
eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and
which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not
involve simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute
plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-described
crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a
safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to
those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting influence of power."
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore,
different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their
different criminal acts have a commonality—to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each
accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused
agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco
excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and
receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and
kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former
President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves
two structures: (1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the
"hub") dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain"
conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between
manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.23
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a "wheel" conspiracy. The hub
is former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the
common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge against the petitioner on the ground that the
allegation of conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general. The fear is even expressed that it could
serve as a net to ensnare the innocent. Their dissents appear to be inspired by American law and
jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in American criminal law and in
common law. Under Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general rule,
conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a
penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition. In
contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement or conspiracy itself is the gravamen of the
offense.24 The essence of conspiracy is the combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to
accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or
unlawful means.25 Its elements are: agreement to accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with one or more
overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying
substantive offense.26
A study of the United States Code ought to be instructive. It principally punishes two (2) crimes of
conspiracy27 – conspiracy to commit any offense or to defraud the United States, and conspiracy to impede
or injure officer. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States is penalized under 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 371,28 as follows:
"Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States. If two or more persons conspire
either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof
in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons to any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the
punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor."
Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:
"Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or more persons in any State, Territory, Possession,
or District conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any
office, trust or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to
induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave the place, where his duties as an officer are
required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the
duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest,
interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties, each of such persons shall be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than six years, or both."
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States;
and (2) conspiracy to defraud the United States or any agency thereof. The conspiracy to "commit any
offense against the United States" refers to an act made a crime by federal laws.29 It refers to an act
punished by statute.30 Undoubtedly, Section 371 runs the whole gamut of U.S. Federal laws, whether
criminal or regulatory.31 These laws cover criminal offenses such as perjury, white slave traffic,
racketeering, gambling, arson, murder, theft, bank robbery, etc. and also include customs violations,
counterfeiting of currency, copyright violations, mail fraud, lotteries, violations of antitrust laws and laws
governing interstate commerce and other areas of federal regulation.32 Section 371 penalizes the
conspiracy to commit any of these substantive offenses. The offense of conspiracy is generally
separate and distinct from the substantive offense,33 hence, the court rulings that acquittal on the
substantive count does not foreclose prosecution and conviction for related conspiracy.34
The conspiracy to "defraud the government" refers primarily to cheating the United States out of property or
money. It also covers interference with or obstruction of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or
trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.35 It comprehends defrauding the United States in any
manner whatever, whether the fraud be declared criminal or not.36
The basic difference in the concept of conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the American case law
on how conspiracy should be alleged will reveal that it is not necessary for the indictment to include
particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes, in stating the manner and means of effecting
the object of the conspiracy. Such specificity of detail falls within the scope of a bill of particulars.37 An
indictment for conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the agreement; (2) the offense-object toward
which the agreement was directed; and (3) the overt acts performed in furtherance of the agreement. 38 To
allege that the defendants conspired is, at least, to state that they agreed to do the matters which are set forth
as the substance of their conspiracy. To allege a conspiracy is to allege an agreement.39 The gist of the
crime of conspiracy is unlawful agreement, and where conspiracy is charged, it is not necessary to
set out the criminal object with as great a certainty as is required in cases where such object is
charged as a substantive offense.40
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how Philippine courts and American
courts deal with cases challenging Informations alleging conspiracy on the ground that they lack
particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes. In our jurisdiction, as aforestated, conspiracy
can be alleged in the Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as constitutive
of the crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in
the Information charging the offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. It requires that the information for this crime must contain the following averments:
"Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information."
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused, designate the offense given
by statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the
approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be made
in order to meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its name given by
statute or by reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.41 The information must also
state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances.42 The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable
a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment.43 No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly
allege the elements of the crime charged.44 Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information.45 What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by
reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes.46 The requirement of alleging the elements
of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to
enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.47
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said
crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. For example, the crime of "conspiracy to commit
treason" is committed when, in time of war, two or more persons come to an agreement to levy war against
the Government or to adhere to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and decide to commit it. 48 The
elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender owes allegiance to the Government of the Philippines; (2) that
there is a war in which the Philippines is involved; (3) that the offender and other person or persons come to
an agreement to: (a) levy war against the government, or (b) adhere to the enemies, to give them aid and
comfort; and (4) that the offender and other person or persons decide to carry out the agreement. These
elements must be alleged in the information.
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a
crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less
necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the
offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused
in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation
in the crime.49 The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for
the acts of others,50 for the act of one is the act of all.51 In People v. Quitlong,52 we ruled on
how conspiracy as the mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:
"x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can
properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or
more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if
not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation,
however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another
or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his
own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where
conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of
secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others (People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442).
Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his
acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the
details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the
common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the
conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity
required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of
facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much
certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his
acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an
indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of
the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute,
contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the
conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S.
842-844).
xxx xxx xxx
x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or
impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the
accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity
of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the
absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in
conspiracy," must aptly appear in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting
conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of
design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its
derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy
must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his
plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be
required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not
necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
xxx xxx x x x."
Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in
the commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word "conspire," or its
derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc;53 or (2) by allegations of basic facts
constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended,
and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment
based on the same facts.54
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence
that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts
indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to
commit the felony and actually pursue it.55 A statement of this evidence is not necessary in the information.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in general terms how the
accused committed the crime of plunder. It used the words "in connivance/conspiracy with his co-
accused." Following the ruling in Quitlong, these words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused
with the former President in committing the crime of plunder.
V.
We now come to petitioner’s plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of the instant petition
before this Court, petitioner filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Second Motion for Bail for
Medical Reasons." Petitioner prayed that he be allowed to post bail due to his serious medical condition
which is life-threatening to him if he goes back to his place of detention.1âwphi1 The motion was opposed by
respondent Ombudsman to which petitioner replied.
For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on
the motion for bail. Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, a cardiologist of the Makati Medical Center, testified as sole
witness for petitioner.
On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court an "Urgent Motion for Early/Immediate
Resolution of Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations." Petitioner
reiterated the motion for bail he earlier filed with respondent Sandiganbayan.56
On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the motion to respondent Sandiganbayan for resolution
and requiring said court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of December 21, 2001.
On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its Report. Attached to the Report was its Resolution
dated December 20, 2001 denying petitioner’s motion for bail for "lack of factual basis." 57 Basing its finding
on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the Sandiganbayan found that petitioner "failed to submit sufficient
evidence to convince the court that the medical condition of the accused requires that he be confined at home
and for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail."58
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong, to wit:
"Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable . –
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution."59
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which reads:
"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of whether
or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail
hearings wherein both the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present their
respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt.60
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary hearing that
should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based its Resolution of
December 20, 2001 involved the reception of medical evidence only and which evidence was given in
September 2001, five months ago. The records do not show that evidence on petitioner’s guilt was presented
before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to determine if the
evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015 - JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE
THIRD DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.:

G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015 - JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE
THIRD DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-
TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
 DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the “petition for certiorari with prayers (a) for the Court En Banc to act on the petition; (b) to
expedite the proceedings and to set the case for oral arguments; and (c) to issue a temporary restraining
order to the respondents from holding a pre-trial and further proceedings in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-
0238”1 filed by petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) challenging the July 11, 2014 resolutions 2 of the
Sandiganbayan.
I.

THE ANTECEDENTS

On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information 3 for plunder against Enrile, Jessica Lucila
Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the Sandiganbayan.

The Information reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

x x x x

In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Court’s jurisdiction,
above-named accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G.
REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both public officers, committing the offense in
relation to their respective offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES,
RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a combination or series of overt criminal acts, as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and
others, kickbacks or commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or
after the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a
percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or through
REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government
organizations which became the recipients and/or target implementors of ENRILE’S PDAF
projects, which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling
NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;

(b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority,
relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for lack
of evidence on record to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for bail ),4 and (2) a supplemental
opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of Information,5 on June 10, 2014, and June 16,
2014, respectively. The Sandiganbayan heard both motions on June 20, 2014.

On June 24, 2014, the prosecution filed a consolidated opposition to both motions.

On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motions and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest
on the plunder case against the accused. 6redarclaw

On July 8, 2014, Enrile received a notice of hearing7 informing him that his arraignment would be held before
the Sandiganbayan’s Third Division on July 11, 2014.

On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars 8 before the Sandiganbayan. On the same date, he
filed a motion for deferment of arraignment9 since he was to undergo medical examination at the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH).

On July 11, 2014, Enrile was brought to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the Sandiganbayan’s order and
his motion for bill of particulars was called for hearing. Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), Enrile’s
counsel, argued the motion orally. Thereafter, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice (PJ) Amparo Cabotaje-Tang
(Cabotaje-Tang), declared a “10-minute recess” to deliberate on the motion.

When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Court’s denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of
particulars essentially on the following grounds:

(1) the details that Enrile desires are “substantial reiterations” of the arguments he raised in his
supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
information; and

(2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.

Atty. Mendoza asked for time to file a motion for reconsideration, stating that he would orally move to
reconsider the Sandiganbayan’s denial if he would not be given time to seek a reconsideration. The
Sandiganbayan then directed Atty. Mendoza to immediately proceed with his motion for reconsideration.

Atty. Mendoza thus orally presented his arguments for the reconsideration of the denial of Enrile’s motion for
bill of particulars. The Sandiganbayan again declared a recess to deliberate on the motion. After five (5)
minutes, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion for
reconsideration.10redarclaw

The Sandiganbayan reduced its rulings into writing on Enrile’s written and oral motions. The pertinent portion
of this ruling reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx

In today’s consideration of accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion for Bill of Particulars, the Court
heard the parties on oral arguments in relation thereto. Thereafter, it declared a ten-minute recess
to deliberate thereon. After deliberating on the said motion as well as the arguments of the parties,
the Court resolves to DENY as it hereby DENIES the same motion for bill of particulars for the
following reasons: (1) the details desired in paragraphs 2 to 5 of the said motion are substantially
reiterations of the arguments raised by accused Enrile in his Supplemental Opposition to Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest and for Dismissal of Information dated June 16, 2014 x x x.

The Court already upheld the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging accused
Enrile, among other persons, with the crime of plunder in its Resolution dated July 3, 2014. It finds
no cogent reasons to reconsider the said ruling.

Moreover, the “desired details” that accused Enrile would like the prosecution to provide are
evidentiary in nature, which need not be alleged in the Information. They are best ventilated during
the trial of the case.

Counsel for accused Juan Ponce Enrile orally sought a reconsideration of the denial of his motion
for bill of particulars which was opposed by the prosecution. The Court then declared another ten-
minute recess to deliberate on the said motion for reconsideration. After deliberation thereon, the
Court likewise resolved to DENY as it hereby DENIES accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s motion for
reconsideration there being no new or substantial grounds raised to warrant the grant thereof.

ACCORDINGLY, the scheduled arraignment of accused Juan Ponce Enrile shall now proceed as
previously scheduled.

SO ORDERED.11

Atty. Mendoza subsequently moved for the deferment of Enrile’s arraignment. The Sandiganbayan responded
by directing the doctors present to determine whether he was physically fit to be arraigned. After he was
declared fit, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with Enrile’s arraignment. Enrile entered a “no plea,” prompting
the Sandiganbayan to enter a “not guilty” plea on his behalf.
II.

THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of particulars despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of
the Information filed against him. Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what his specific participation in the crime of plunder had
been. He posits that the Information should have stated the details of the particular acts that allegedly
constituted the imputed series or combination of overt acts that led to the charge of plunder. Enrile essentially
reiterates the “details desired” that he sought in his motion for bill of particulars, as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Allegations of Information Details Desired
“x x x accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a a. Who among the accused acquired the alleged “ill-
Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED
then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY
public officers, committing the offense in relation FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
to their respective offices, conspiring with one (Php172,834,500.00)”? One of them, two of them or all
another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, of them? Kindly specify.
RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE
ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-
gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00)
through a combination or series of overt acts, x x
x.”

b. The allegation “through a combination or series of

overt criminal acts” is a conclusion of fact or of law.
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the
“combination”? What are the particular overt acts which
constitute the “series”? Who committed those acts?

x x x by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES a. What was “repeatedly” received? If sums of money,
and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and the particular amount. If on several occasions and in
others, kickbacks or commissions under the different amounts, specify the amount on each occasion
following circumstances: before, during and/or and the corresponding date of receipt.
after the project identification, NAPOLES gave,
and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a
percentage of the cost of a project to be funded
from ENRILE’S Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S
endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the
appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’
non-government organizations which became the
recipients and/or target implementers of
ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly-funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus
enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF
proceeds for her personal gain;

b. Name the specific person(s) who delivered the

amount of Php172,834,500.00 and the specific
person(s) who received the amount; or if not in lump
sum, the various amounts totaling Php172,834,500.00.
x x x Specify particularly the person who delivered the
amount, Napoles or Lim or De Asis, and who particularly
are “the others.”

c. To whom was the money given? To Enrile or Reyes?

State the amount given on each occasion,
the date when and the place where the amount was
given.

d. x x x Describe each project allegedly identified, how,

 and by whom was the project identified, the nature of
each project, where it is located and the cost of each
project.

e. For each of the years 2004-2010, under what

law or official document is a portion of the “Priority
Development Assistance Fund” identified as that of a
member of Congress, in this instance, as ENRILE’s, to
be found? In what amount for each year is ENRILE’s
Priority Development Assistance Fund? When, and to
whom, did Enrile endorse the projects in favor of
“Napoles non-government organizations which became
the recipients and/or target implementers of ENRILE’s
PDAF projects?” Name Napoles non-government
organizations which became the recipients and/or target
implementers of ENRILE’s PDAF projects. Who
paid Napoles, from whom did Napoles collect the fund
for the projects which turned out to be ghosts or
fictitious? Who authorized the payments for each
project?

f. x x x what COA audits or field investigations were

conducted which validated the findings that each of
Enrile’s PDAF projects in the years 2004-2010 were
ghosts or spurious projects?

x x x by taking undue advantage, on several a. Provide the details of how Enrile took undue
occasions of their official positions, authority, advantage, on several occasions, of his official
relationships, connections, and influence to positions, authority, relationships, connections, and
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to influence to unjustly enrich himself at the expense and
the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and
and the Republic of the Philippines. the Republic of the Philippines. Was this because
he received any money from the government? From
whom and for what reason did he receive any money or
property from the government through which he
“unjustly enriched himself”? State the details from whom
each amount was received, the place and the time.

Enrile posits that his ‘desired details’ are not evidentiary in nature; they are material facts that should be
clearly alleged in the Information so that he may be fully informed of the charges against him and be prepared
to meet the issues at the trial.

Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for bill of particulars are cited in a context different from his
opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. He maintains that the resolution of the probable cause issue
was interlocutory and did “not bar the submission of the same issue in subsequent proceedings especially in
the context of a different proceeding.”

Enrile thus prays that: “(a) the Court en banc act on the present petition; (b) by way of an interim measure, the
Court issue a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Sandiganbayan from holding the pre-trial and
subsequent proceedings against him in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 during the pendency of the
present petition; (c) the Court expedite the proceedings and set the case for oral arguments; and (d) at the
conclusion of the proceedings, the Court annul and set aside the Sandiganbayan’s July 11, 2014 resolution
and his arraignment.”

A. The People’s Comment

In its Comment,12 the People of the Philippines 13 counters that the Sandiganbayan did not exercise its
discretionary power in an arbitrary or despotic manner. Even assuming that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of
Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars was erroneous, the error did not amount to lack or excess or jurisdiction. It
further maintains that the assailed Sandiganbayan rulings were arrived at based on the procedures
prescribed under Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan.

The People also argues that the Information already contained the ultimate facts; matters of evidence do not
need to be averred.

B. Enrile’s Reply

In his Reply, Enrile essentially claims that the right to move for a bill of particulars is “ancillary to and in
implementation” of an accused’s rights to due process, to be heard, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. He maintains that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of his motion for bill of
particulars is not “a mere denial of a procedural right under the Rules of Court, but of rights vested in an
accused under the Constitution to ensure fairness in the trial of the offense charged.” Enrile also adds that
there could only be a fair trial if he could properly plead to the Information and prepare for trial.

Enrile further argues that the People’s Comment did not dispute the relevance of the details sought in the
motion for bill of particulars. He likewise claims that the “desired details” could not be found in the bundle of
documents marked by the prosecution during the preliminary conference. Finally, Enrile maintains that his
motion for bill of particulars was not dilatory.
III.

THE COURT’S RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to partially GRANT the petition under the terms outlined below.

A. The constitutional right of the accused to be informed

Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. 14 This right has long been established in English law, and is
the same right expressly guaranteed in our 1987 Constitution. This right requires that the offense charged be
stated with clarity and with certainty to inform the accused of the crime he is facing in sufficient detail to
enable him to prepare his defense. 15redarclaw

In the 1904 case of United States v. Karelsen,16 the Court explained the purpose of informing an accused in
writing of the charges against him from the perspective of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The object of this written accusation was – First. To furnish the accused with such a description of
the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to
inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.) In order
that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is
made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstances necessary to
constitute the crime charged. x x x.17 [Emphasis supplied.]

The objective, in short, is to describe the act with sufficient certainty to fully appraise the accused of the
nature of the charge against him and to avoid possible surprises that may lead to injustice. Otherwise, the
accused would be left speculating on why he has been charged at all. 18redarclaw

In People v. Hon. Mencias, et al.,19 the Court further explained that a person’s constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him signifies that an accused should be given the
necessary data on why he is the subject of a criminal proceeding. The Court added that the act or conduct
imputed to a person must be described with sufficient particularity to enable the accused to defend himself
properly.

The general grant and recognition of a protected right emanates from Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty, and
property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government,
unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice x x x; and to secure to all
persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. 20redarclaw

Separately from Section 1, Article III is the specific and direct underlying root of the right to information in
criminal proceedings – Section 14(1), Article III – which provides that “No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.” Thus, no doubt exists that the right to be informed of the cause
of the accusation in a criminal case has deep constitutional roots that, rather than being cavalierly
disregarded, should be carefully protected.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division),21 the Court, in sustaining the
Sandiganbayan’s grant of the motion for bill of particulars of Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., held that “the facile
verbosity with which the legal counsel for the government flaunted the accusation of excesses against the
Marcoses in general terms must be soonest refurbished by a bill of particulars, so that respondent can
properly prepare an intelligent responsive pleading and so that trial in this case will proceed as expeditiously
as possible.”22 The Court additionally stated that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This Court has been liberal in giving the lower courts the widest latitude of discretion in setting
aside default orders justified under the right to due process principle. Plain justice demands and
the law requires no less that defendants must know what the complaint against them is all about.

x x x In the interest of justice, we need to dispel the impression in the individual respondents' minds
that they are being railroaded out of their rights and properties without due process of law. 23

B. Procedural Sufficiency of the Information

An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, signed by the prosecutor and
filed with the court.24 The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in implementing the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, specifically require certain
matters to be stated in the Information for its sufficiency. The requirement aims to enable the accused to
properly prepare for his defense since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts
constituting the offense charged.25redarclaw

To be considered as sufficient and valid, an information must state the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.26redarclaw

If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute
penalizing it. The acts or omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
alleged must be stated in ordinary and concise language; they do not necessarily need to be in the language
of the statute, and should be in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is charged and what qualifying and aggravating circumstances are alleged, so that the court can
pronounce judgment.27 The Rules do not require the Information to exactly allege the date and place of the
commission of the offense, unless the date and the place are material ingredients or essential elements of the
offense, or are necessary for its identification.

B.1. Ultimate facts versus Evidentiary facts

An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense; the evidentiary and other details
(i.e., the facts supporting the ultimate facts) can be provided during the trial. 28redarclaw

Ultimate facts is defined as “those facts which the expected evidence will support. The term does not refer to
the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be
established.” It refers to the facts that the evidence will prove at the trial. 29redarclaw

Ultimate facts has also been defined as the principal, determinative, and constitutive facts on whose
existence the cause of action rests;30 they are also the essential and determining facts on which the court's
conclusion rests and without which the judgment would lack support in essential particulars. 31redarclaw

Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate facts; they are the
premises that lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion. 32They are facts supporting the existence of some other
alleged and unproven fact.33redarclaw

In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,34 the Court explained these two concepts in relation to a particular criminal
case, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is
analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil
cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the
primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant,
 while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts. x x
x.35 [Emphasis supplied.]

While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the Information, matters of
evidence – as distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the offense – do not need to be alleged.
Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily be alleged are to be determined based on the definition
and the essential elements of the specific crimes. 36redarclaw

C. Arraignment

The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires that the accused be arraigned so that he
may be fully informed as to why he was charged and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only
on showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence
against him.37 During arraignment, the accused is granted the opportunity to fully know the precise charge
that confronts him and made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature
of the crime imputed to him.38redarclaw

An arraignment thus ensures that an accused be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to him
in the Information and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed. 39 It is likewise at this stage of
the proceedings when the accused enters his plea, 40 or enters a plea of not guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. 41redarclaw

A concomitant component of this stage of the proceedings is that the Information should provide the accused
with fair notice of the accusations made against him, so that he will be able to make an intelligent plea and
prepare a defense.42Moreover, the Information must provide some means of ensuring that the crime for which
the accused is brought to trial is in fact one for which he was charged, rather than some alternative crime
seized upon by the prosecution in light of subsequently discovered evidence. 43Likewise, it must indicate just
what crime or crimes an accused is being tried for, in order to avoid subsequent attempts to retry him for the
same crime or crimes.44 In other words, the Information must permit the accused to prepare his defense,
ensure that he is prosecuted only on the basis of facts presented, enable him to plead jeopardy against a later
prosecution, and inform the court of the facts alleged so that it can determine the sufficiency of the charge.

Oftentimes, this is achieved when the Information alleges the material elements of the crime charged. If the
Information fails to comply with this basic standard, it would be quashed on the ground that it fails to charge
an offense.45Of course, an Information may be sufficient to withstand a motion to quash, and yet insufficiently
inform the accused of the specific details of the alleged offenses. In such instances, the Rules of Court allow
the accused to move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for
trial.46redarclaw

C.1. Bill of Particulars

In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or claims in an action , which an
accused may avail of by motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial. In
civil proceedings, a bill of particulars has been defined as a complementary procedural document consisting
of an amplification or more particularized outline of a pleading, and is in the nature of a more specific
allegation of the facts recited in the pleading. 47 The purpose of a motion for bill of particulars in civil cases is
to enable a party to prepare his responsive pleading properly.

In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details items or specific conduct not recited in the Information but
nonetheless pertain to or are included in the crime charged. Its purpose is to enable an accused: to know the
theory of the government’s case; 48 to prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his
acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same offense; and to compel the prosecution to
observe certain limitations in offering evidence. 49redarclaw

In criminal proceedings, the motion for a bill of particulars is governed by Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 9. Bill of particulars. - The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars
to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of
the complaint or information and the details desired.

The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the accused of
the crime charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be such that
persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what the Information means. 50redarclaw

The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, is to guard against
surprises during trial. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with the evidence of the
prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of particulars matters of evidence
relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the offense charged or how the people intend to
prove any item of factual information included in the bill of particulars. 51redarclaw

C.2. Origin of bill of particulars in criminal cases 52redarclaw

Even before the promulgation of the 1964 Rules of Court, when the applicable rules for criminal procedure
was still General Order No. 58,53 the Court had already recognized the need for a bill of particulars in criminal
cases. This recognition came despite the lack of any specific provision in General Order No. 58 setting out the
rules for a bill of particulars in criminal cases.

In U.S. v. Schneer,54 the issue presented was whether a bill of particulars was available in a criminal case for
estafa after the accused had already been arraigned. The Court essentially ruled that there was no specific
provision of law expressly authorizing the filing of specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases, and
held that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
We know of no provision either in General Orders, No. 58, or in the laws existing prior thereto
which requires the Government to furnish such a bill of particulars, and we accordingly hold that it
was not error on the part of the court below to refuse to do so.

In U.S. v. Cernias,55 however, the Court formally recognized the existence and applicability of a bill of
particulars in criminal cases. In this case, the prosecution filed an information charging Basilio Cernias with
several counts of brigandage before the Court of First Instance of Leyte. In overruling the accused’s objection,
the Court declared that the prosecution’s act of specifying certain acts done by the conspirators in the
Information “did no more than to furnish the defendant with a bill of particulars of the facts which it intended to
prove at the trial x x x.”56redarclaw

In sum, the Court essentially held that a detailed complaint or information is not objectionable, and that the
details it contains may be properly considered as specifications or bill of particulars. 57redarclaw

In People v. Abad Santos,58 the court first recognized a bill of particulars, as a right that the accused may ask
for from the court. In this case, the prosecution charged respondent Joseph Arcache with the crime of treason
before the People’s Court. The Information filed against the accused contained, in counts 2 and 3, the phrase
“and other similar equipment.”

The counsel for the accused verbally petitioned the People’s court to order the prosecution to “make more
specific [the] phrase ‘and other similar equipment,’” which request the People’s Court granted. The People of
the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari, but the Court dismissed this petition.

In upholding the order of the People’s Court, the Court ruled that “in the absence of specific provisions of law
prohibiting the filing of specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases, their submission may be
permitted, as they cannot prejudice any substantial rights of the accused. On the contrary, they will serve to
apprise the accused clearly of the charges filed against them, and thus enable them to prepare intelligently
whatever defense or defenses they might have. 59redarclaw

Notably, Abad Santos emphasized the importance of a bill of particulars in criminal cases, stating that “x x x
inasmuch as in criminal cases not only the liberty but even the life of the accused may be at stake, it is always
wise and proper that the accused should be fully apprised of the true charges against them, and thus avoid all
and any possible surprise, which might be detrimental to their rights and interests; and ambiguous phrases
should not, therefore, be permitted in criminal complaints or informations; and if any such phrase has been
included therein, on motion of the defense, before the commencement of the trial, the court should order
either its elimination as surplusage or the filing of the necessary specification, which is but an amendment in
mere matters of form.”60redarclaw

In these cited cases, the Courts did not rely on the Rules of Court to provide for a bill of particulars in criminal
cases. A specific provision granting the accused the right “to move for or demand a more definite statement or
a bill of particulars” was not incorporated as a formal rule until the 1964 Rules of Court, 61under its Section 6,
Rule 116. This initial provision later became Section 10 of Rule 116 under the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure62and Section 9 of Rule 116 under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended.63redarclaw

C.3. The Distinctive Role of a Bill of Particulars

When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a motion to
quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.

The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or information to
enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid Information, one that
presents all the elements of the crime charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the specifications that a bill
of particulars may supply are only formal amendments to the complaint or Information.

In Virata v. Sandiganbayan,64 the Court expounded on the purpose of a bill of particulars as

follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
It is the office or function, as well as the object or purpose, of a bill of particulars to amplify or limit a
pleading, specify more minutely and particularly a claim or defense set up and pleaded in general
terms, give information, not contained in the pleading, to the opposite party and the court as to the
precise nature, character, scope, and extent of the cause of action or defense relied on by the
pleader, and apprise the opposite party of the case which he has to meet, to the end that the proof
at the trial may be limited to the matters specified, and in order that surprise at, and needless
preparation for, the trial may be avoided, and that the opposite party may be aided in framing his
answering pleading and preparing for trial. It has also been stated that it is the function or purpose
of a bill of particulars to define, clarify, particularize, and limit or circumscribe the issues in the case,
to expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general function or purpose of a bill of particulars is to
prevent injustice or do justice in the case when that cannot be accomplished without the aid of
such a bill.65redarclaw

x x x x [Emphasis ours.]

Notably, the failure of the accused to move for the specification of the details desired deprives him of the right
to object to evidence that could be introduced and admitted under an Information of more or less general
terms but which sufficiently charges the accused with a definite crime. 66redarclaw

Although the application for the bill of particulars is one addressed to the sound discretion of the court 67 it
should nonetheless exercise its discretion within the context of the facts and the nature of the crime charged
in each case and the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him .
As articulated in the case of People v. Iannone:68
It is beyond cavil that a defendant has a basic and fundamental right to be informed of the charges
against him so that he will be able to prepare a defense. Hence the courts must exercise careful
surveillance to ensure that a defendant is not deprived of this right by an overzealous prosecutor
attempting to protect his case or his witnesses. Any effort to leave a defendant in ignorance of the
substance of the accusation until the time of trial must be firmly rebuffed. This is especially so
where the indictment itself provides a paucity of information. In such cases, the court must be
vigilant in safeguarding the defendant's rights to a bill of particulars and to effective discovery.
Should the prosecutor decide to use an indictment which, although technically sufficient, does not
adequately allow a defendant to properly prepare for trial, he may well run afoul of the defendant's
right to be informed of the accusations against him.

Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its granting 69 and order the
government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be resolved in favor of
granting the bill70 to give full meaning to the accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of disclosing certain overt acts through the
Information and withholding others subsequently discovered, all of which it intends to prove at the trial. This is
the type of surprise a bill of particulars is designed to avoid. 71The accused is entitled to the observance of all
the rules designated to bring about a fair verdict.

This becomes more relevant in the present case where the crime charged carries with it the severe penalty of
capital punishment and entails the commission of several predicate criminal acts involving a great number of
transactions spread over a considerable period of time.

C.4. Motion to Quash vs. Motion for Bill of Particulars

A bill of particulars presupposes a valid Information while a motion to quash is a jurisdictional defect on
account that the facts charged in the Information does not constitute an offense. 72redarclaw

Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his dissent, avers that the allegations in the information are not vague because
the Information needs only allege the ultimate facts constituting the offense for which the accused stands
charged, not the finer details of why and how the illegal acts alleged were committed. In support of his
position, Justice Carpio cited the cases of Miguel v. Sandiganbayan,73Go v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,74 and People v. Romualdez,75 among others, to support the superfluity of the details requested by
Enrile.

Justice Carpio’s reliance on these cases is misplaced for they involve the issue of quashal of an
information on the ground that the facts charge do not constitute an offense, rather than a request for bill of
particulars. That is, these cited cases involve the critical issue of the validity of an information, and not a
request for specificity with request to an offense charged in an information.

On the other hand, the cases of People v. Sanico,76People v. Banzuela,77Pielago v. People,78People v.

Rayon, Sr.,79People v. Subesa,80People v. Anguac,81 and Los Baños v. Pedro,82 which were likewise cited by
Justice Carpio, involve the issue that an Information only need to allege the ultimate facts, and not the
specificity of the allegations contained in the information as to allow the accused to prepare for trial and make
an intelligent plea.83redarclaw

Notably, in Miguel,84 to which Justice Carpio concurred, this Court mentioned that the proper remedy, if at all,
to a supposed ambiguity in an otherwise valid Information, is merely to move for a bill of particulars and not
for the quashal of an information which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged .85redarclaw

Clearly then, a bill of particulars does not presuppose an invalid information for it merely fills in the details on
an otherwise valid information to enable an accused to make an intelligent plea and prepare for his defense.

I stress, however, that the issue in the present case involves abuse of discretion for denying Enrile’s request
for a bill of particulars, and not a motion to quash.

If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to quash is in order. 86redarclaw

But if the information charges an offense and the averments are so vague that the accused cannot prepare to
plead or prepare for trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper remedy. 87redarclaw

Thus viewed, a motion to quash and a motion for a bill of particulars are distinct and separate remedies, the
latter presupposing an information sufficient in law to charge an offense. 88redarclaw

D. The Grave Abuse of Discretion Issue

The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the Information is filed.
As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed unless grave abuse of
discretion or a manifestly erroneous order amounting to grave abuse of discretion is shown. 89redarclaw

Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that amounts or is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law such as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.90 For the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical
exercise of power.

It will be recalled that the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars on two grounds,
namely:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the details sought were evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial; and

(2) his desired details were reiterations of the details he sought in his supplemental
opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
We shall separately examine these grounds in determining whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied Enrile’s motion for a bill of particulars and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
 Sandiganbayan Ground #1:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The details sought were evidentiary in nature

D.1. The Law of Plunder

A determination of whether the details that Enrile sought were evidentiary requires an examination of the
elements of the offense he is charged with, i.e., plunder under Republic Act No. 7080.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with
the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation
and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal
Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and
their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived
from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [Emphasis supplied.]

Based on this definition, the elements of plunder are:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates, or other
persons;

(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or

series of the following overt or criminal acts:

(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids

on the public treasury;

(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or
any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with
any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public
officer concerned;

(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of government-
owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;

(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or
any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in
any business enterprise or undertaking;

(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations

and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or

(f) by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or

influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,

(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired is at least P50,000,000.00. [Emphasis supplied.]
D.1.a. The Conspiracy Element and its Requested Details

Taking these elements into account, we hold that Enrile’s requested details on Who among the accused
acquired the alleged “ill-gotten wealth” are not proper subjects for a bill of particulars.

The allegation of the Information that the accused and Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, “conspiring with one another
and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis x x x ” expressly charges
conspiracy.
The law on plunder provides that it is committed by “a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance
with x x x.” The term “connivance” suggests an agreement or consent to commit an unlawful act or deed with
another; to connive is to cooperate or take part secretly with another. 91 It implies both knowledge and assent
that may either be active or passive. 92redarclaw

Since the crime of plunder may be done in connivance or in conspiracy with other persons, and the
Information filed clearly alleged that Enrile and Jessica Lucila Reyes conspired with one another and with
Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, then it is unnecessary to specify, as an
essential element of the offense, whether the ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00 had
been acquired by one, by two or by all of the accused. In the crime of plunder, the amount of ill-gotten wealth
acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is immaterial for as long as the total amount amassed, acquired or
accumulated is at least P50 million.

We point out that conspiracy in the present case is not charged as a crime by itself but only as the mode of
committing the crime. Thus, there is no absolute necessity of reciting its particulars in the Information because
conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged.

It is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following manner:
(1) by use of the word “conspire,” or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude; or (2)
by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding
would know what is intended, and with such precision as the nature of the crime charged will admit, to enable
the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. 93redarclaw

Our ruling on this point in People v. Quitlong94 is particularly instructive:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the
details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving
the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the
conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity
required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement
of the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as
much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of
common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may
plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. x x x 95

D.1.b. The Requested Details of Enrile’s PDAF

We similarly rule that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought under the
questions –
For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law or official document is a portion of the “Priority
Development Assistance Fund” identified as that of a member of Congress, in this instance, as
ENRILE’s, to be found? In what amount for each year is ENRILE’s Priority Development
Assistance Fund?

and

x x x what COA audits or field investigations were conducted which validated the findings that each
of Enrile’s PDAF projects in the years 2004-2010 were ghosts or spurious projects?

These matters will simply establish and support the ultimate fact that Enrile’s PDAF was used to fund fictitious
or nonexistent projects. Whether a discretionary fund (in the form of PDAF) had indeed been made available
to Enrile as a member of the Philippine Congress and in what amounts are evidentiary matters that do not
need to be reflected with particularity in the Information, and may be passed upon at the full-blown trial on the
merits of the case.

D.1.b(i) The yearly PDAF Allocations

Specifically, we believe that the exact amounts of Enrile’s yearly PDAF allocations, if any, from 2004 to 2010
need not be pleaded with specific particularity to enable him to properly plead and prepare for his defense. In
fact, Enrile may be in a better position to know these details than the prosecution and thus cannot claim that
he would be taken by surprise during trial by the omission in the Information of his annual PDAF allocations.

Thus, whether the amounts of Enrile’s PDAF allocations have been specified or not, Enrile has been
sufficiently informed that he stands charged of endorsing Napoles’ non-government organizations to
implement spurious or fictitious projects, in exchange for a percentage of his PDAF.

D.1.b(ii) The details of the COA Audits

The details of the “COA audits or field investigations” only support the ultimate fact that the projects
implemented by Napoles’ NGOs, and funded by Enrile’s PDAF, were nonexisting or fictitious. Thus, they are
evidentiary in nature and do not need to be spelled out with particularity in the Information.

To require more details on these matters from the prosecution would amount to asking for evidentiary
information that the latter intends to present at the trial; it would be a compulsion on the prosecution to
disclose in advance of the trial the evidence it will use in proving the charges alleged in the indictment.

D.1.c. Other Sources of Kickbacks and Commissions

We also deny Enrile’s plea for details on who “the others” were (aside from Napoles, Lim and De Asis) from
whom he allegedly received kickbacks and commissions. These other persons do not stand charged of
conspiring with Enrile and need not therefore be stated with particularly, either as specific individuals or as
John Does. The Court cannot second-guess the prosecution’s reason for not divulging the identity of these
“others” who may potentially be witnesses for the prosecution.

What the Constitution guarantees the accused is simply the right to meet and examine the prosecution
witnesses. The prosecution has the prerogative to call witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information, subject to the defense’s right to cross-examine them. 96 Making these “others” known would in
fact be equivalent to the prosecution’s premature disclosure of its evidence. We stress, to the point of
repetition, that a bill of particulars is not meant to compel the prosecution to prematurely disclose evidentiary
matters supporting its case.

D.2. The Overt Acts constituting the “Combination” or “Series” under the Plunder Law

We hold that Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought under the following questions –
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the “combination”? What are the particular overt
acts which constitute the “series”? Who committed those acts? [Emphasis ours.]

D.2.a. Reason for Requirement for Particulars of Overt Acts

Plunder is the crime committed by public officers when they amass wealth involving at least P50 million by
means of a combination or series of overt acts. 97 Under these terms, it is not sufficient to simply allege that
the amount of ill-gotten wealth amassed amounted to at least P50 million; the manner of amassing the ill-
gotten wealth – whether through a combination or series of overt acts under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 –
is an important element that must be alleged.

When the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it refers to at least two (2) acts falling
under different categories listed in Section 1, paragraph (d) of R.A. No. 7080 [for example, raids on the public
treasury under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to
the National Government under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (3)].

On the other hand, to constitute a “series” there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under
the same category of enumeration found in Section 1, paragraph (d) [for example, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph
(1)].98redarclaw

With respect to paragraph (a) of the Information –

[(i.e., by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and
others, kickbacks or commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after
the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of
the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in
consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the appropriate
government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government organizations which became the recipients
and/or target implementers of ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly funded projects turned out to
be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her
personal gain x x x)] –
we hold that the prosecution employed a generalized or shotgun approach in alleging the criminal overt acts
allegedly committed by Enrile. This approach rendered the allegations of the paragraph uncertain to the point
of ambiguity for purposes of enabling Enrile to respond and prepare for his defense . These points are
explained in greater detail below.

The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase “combination or series of overt or criminal acts.” Hence, even
if the accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at least P50 million, a person cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of plunder if this resulted from a single criminal act. This interpretation of the Plunder Law is very clear
from the congressional deliberations. 99redarclaw

Considering that without a number of overt or criminal acts, there can be no crime of plunder, the various
overt acts that constitute the “combination” and “series” the Information alleged, are material facts that should
not only be alleged, but must be stated with sufficient definiteness so that the accused would know what he is
specifically charged of and why he stands charged, so that he could properly defend himself against the
charge.

Thus, the several (i.e., at least 2) acts which are indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy must not
be generally stated; they should be stated with enough particularity for Enrile (and his co-accused) to be able
to prepare the corresponding refuting evidence to meet these alleged overt acts.

It is insufficient, too, to merely allege that a set of acts had been repeatedly done (although this may
constitute a series if averred with sufficient definiteness), and aver that these acts resulted in the
accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00, as in this case. The
Information should reflect with particularity the predicate acts that underlie the crime of plunder, based on the
enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080.

A reading of the Information filed against Enrile in the present case shows that the prosecution made little or
no effort to particularize the transactions that would constitute the required series or combination of overt acts .

In fact, it clustered under paragraph (a) of the Information its recital of the manner Enrile and his co-accused
allegedly operated, thus describing its general view of the series or combination of overt criminal acts that
constituted the crime of plunder.

Without any specification of the basic transactions where kickbacks or commissions amounting to at least
P172,834,500.00 had been allegedly received, Enrile’s preparation for trial is obviously hampered. This defect
is not cured by mere reference to the prosecution’s attachment, as Enrile already stated in his Reply that the
“desired details” could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution, which documents
are not integral parts of the Information. Hence, the prosecution does not discharge its burden of informing
Enrile what these overt acts were by simply pointing to these documents.

In providing the particulars of the overt acts that constitute the “combination” or “series” of transactions
constituting plunder, it stands to reason that the amounts involved, or at their ball park figures, should be
stated; these transactions are not necessarily uniform in amount, and cannot simply collectively be described
as amounting to P172,834,500.00 without hampering Enrile’s right to respond after receiving the right
information.

To stress, this final sum is not a general ball park figure but a very specific sum based on a number of
different acts and hence must have a breakdown. Providing this breakdown reinforces the required specificity
in describing the different overt acts.

Negatively stated, unless Enrile is given the particulars and is later given the chance to object to unalleged
details, he stands to be surprised at the trial at the same time that the prosecution is given the opportunity to
play fast and loose with its evidence to satisfy the more than P50 Million requirement of law.

D.2.b. Approximate Dates of Commissions or Kickbacks

Enrile should likewise know the approximate dates, at least, of the receipt of the kickbacks and commissions,
so that he could prepare the necessary pieces of evidence, documentary or otherwise, to disprove the
allegations against him. We point out that the period covered by the indictment extends from “2004 to 2010 or
thereabout,” of which, we again stress that different overt acts constituting of the elements of Plunder took
place during this period.

Undoubtedly, the length of time involved – six years – will pose difficulties to Enrile in the preparation of his
defense and will render him susceptible to surprises. Enrile should not be left guessing and speculating which
one/s from among the numerous transactions involving his discretionary PDAF funds from 2004 to 2010, are
covered by the indictment.

D.2.c. The Projects Funded and NGOs Involved

Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying the project that Enrile allegedly funded coupled with the name of
Napoles’ NGO (e.g., Pangkabuhayan Foundation, Inc.), to sufficiently inform Enrile of the particular
transactions referred to.100redarclaw

Be it remembered that the core of the indictment is:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(1) the funding of nonexisting projects using Enrile’s PDAF;

(2) Enrile’s endorsement of Napoles’ NGOs to the government agencies to implement these projects; and

(3) Enrile’s receipt of kickbacks or commissions in exchange for his endorsement.

Under the elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed by Enrile and his co-accused, the project
identification was what started the totality of acts constituting plunder: only after a project has been identified
could Enrile have endorsed Napoles’ NGO to the appropriate government agency that, in turn, would
implement the supposed project using Enrile’s PDAF. Note that without the project identification, no
justification existed to release Enrile’s PDAF to Napoles’ allegedly bogus NGO.

In these lights, the “identified project” and “Napoles’ NGO” are material facts that should be clearly and
definitely stated in the Information to allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense evidence on the specific
transaction pointed to. The omission of these details will necessarily leave Enrile guessing on what
transaction/s he will have to defend against, since he may have funded other projects with his PDAF.
Specification will also allow him to object to evidence not referred to or covered by the Information’s ultimate
facts.

D.2.d. The Government Agencies Serving as Conduits

The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed Napoles’ NGOs are also material facts that must be
specified, since they served a necessary role in the crime charged – the alleged conduits between Enrile and
Napoles’ NGOs. They were indispensable participants in the elaborate scheme alleged to have been
committed.

The particular person/s in each government agency who facilitated the transactions, need not anymore be
named in the Information, as these are already evidentiary matters. The identification of the particular agency
vis-à-vis Napoles’ NGO and the identified project, will already inform Enrile of the transaction referred to.

In Tantuico v. Republic,101 the Republic filed a case for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and
damages before the Sandiganbayan against former President Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Benjamin
Romualdez, and Francisco Tantuico, Jr. Tantuico filed a motion for bill of particulars essentially alleging that
the complaint was couched in general terms and did not have the particulars that would inform him of the
alleged factual and legal bases. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion on the ground that the particulars
sought are evidentiary in nature. Tantuico moved to reconsider this decision, but the Sandiganbayan again
denied his motion.

The Court overturned the Sandiganbayan’s ruling and directed the prosecution to prepare and file a bill of
particulars. Significantly, the Court held that the particulars prayed for, such as: names of persons, names of
corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the particular
transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would
support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature . The Court explained
that those particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint so that
the defendant may be fairly informed of the claims made against him and be prepared to meet the issues at
the trial.

To be sure, the differences between ultimate and evidentiary matters are not easy to distinguish.
While Tantuico was a civil case and did not involve the crime of plunder, the Court’s ruling nonetheless serves
as a useful guide in the determination of what matters are indispensable and what matters may be omitted in
the Information, in relation with the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.

In the present case, the particulars on the:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

 (1) projects involved;

(2) Napoles’ participating NGOs; and

(3) the government agency involved in each transaction

will undoubtedly provide Enrile with sufficient data to know the specific transactions involved, and thus enable
him to prepare adequately and intelligently whatever defense or defenses he may have.

We reiterate that the purpose of a bill of particular is to clarify allegations in the Information that are indefinite,
vague, or are conclusions of law to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial, not simply to
inform him of the crime of which he stands accused. Verily, an accused cannot intelligently respond to the
charge laid if the allegations are incomplete or are unclear to him.

We are aware that in a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the
criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Section 4 of R.A. No.
7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt
a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth. 102redarclaw

The term “overall unlawful scheme” indicates a general plan of action or method that the principal accused
and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve their common criminal goal. In the
alternative, if no overall scheme can be found or where the schemes or methods used by the multiple
accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common criminal
goal.103redarclaw

Lest Section 4 be misunderstood as allowing the prosecution to allege that a set of acts has
been repeatedly done (thereby showing a ‘pattern’ of overt criminal acts), as has been done in the present
case, we point out that this section does not dispense with the requirement of stating the essential or material
facts of each component or predicate act of plunder; it merely prescribes a rule of procedure for the
prosecution of plunder.

In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,104 we construed this procedural rule to mean that [w]hat the prosecution
needed to prove beyond reasonable doubt was only the number of acts sufficient to form a combination or
series that would constitute a pattern involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There was no need to
prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten
wealth.105redarclaw

If, for example, the accused is charged in the Information of malversing public funds on twenty different (20)
occasions, the prosecution does not need to prove all 20 transactions; it suffices if a number of these acts of
malversation can be proven with moral certainty, provided only that the series or combination of transaction
would amount to at least P50,000,000.00. Nonetheless, each of the twenty transactions should be averred
with particularity, more so if the circumstances surrounding each transaction are not the same . This is the only
way that the accused can properly prepare for his defense during trial.

D.3. Paragraph (b) of the Information

As his last requested point, Enrile wants the prosecution to provide the details of the allegation under
paragraph (b) of the Information (i.e., x x x by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official
position, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and
to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines ) in the following
manner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Provide the details of how Enrile took undue advantage, on several occasions, of his official
positions, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines. Was this because he received any money from the government? From whom and for
what reason did he receive any money or property from the government through which he “unjustly
enriched himself”? State the details from whom each amount was received, the place and the time.

Our ruling on Enrile’s desired details – specifically, the particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the
“combination” and “series” charged in the Information; a breakdown of the amounts of the kickbacks and
commissions allegedly received, stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at; a brief
description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks and commissions were received;
the approximate dates of receipt of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from the identified projects; the
name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged “recipients and/or target
implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects;” and the government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed
Napoles’ NGOs – renders it unnecessary to require the prosecution to submit further particulars on the
allegations contained under paragraph (b) of the Information.

Simply put, the particular overt acts alleged to constitute the combination or series required by the crime of
plunder, coupled with a specification of the other non-evidentiary details stated above, already answer the
question of how Enrile took undue advantage of his position, authority, relationships, connections and
influence as Senator to unjustly enrich himself.

We also point out that the PDAF is a discretionary fund intended solely for public purposes. Since the
Information stated that Enrile, as “Philippine Senator,” committed the offense “in relation to his office,” by
“repeatedly receiving kickbacks or commissions” from Napoles and/or her representatives through projects
funded by his (Enrile’s) PDAF, then it already alleged how undue advantage had been taken and how the
Filipino people and the Republic had been prejudiced. These points are fairly deducible from the allegations in
the Information as supplemented by the required particulars.

E. The Grave Abuse of Discretion

In the light of all these considerations, we hold that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s motion for a
bill of particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be itemized or specified are all evidentiary – without
any explanation supporting this conclusion – constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

As discussed above, some of the desired details are material facts that must be alleged to enable the
petitioner to properly plead and prepare his defense. The Sandiganbayan should have diligently sifted through
each detail sought to be specified, and made the necessary determination of whether each detail was an
ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly after Enrile stated in his Reply that the “desired details” could not be
found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution. We cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning
ignorance of the presence of these desired details; neither can we put on him the burden of unearthing from
these voluminous documents what the desired details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely
made available by the Rules to enable an accused to positively respond and make an intelligent defense.

Justice Carpio’s reference to the voluminous 144-page Ombudsman’s resolution (which found probable cause
to indict the petitioner and his co-accused not only of the crime of plunder, but also for violations of several
counts of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act) to justify his argument that Enrile was already aware of the
details he seeks in his motion for a bill of particulars, all the more strengthens our conclusive position that the
Information for plunder filed against Enrile was ambiguous and glaringly insufficient to enable him to make a
proper plea and to prepare for trial. We reiterate, to the point of being repetitive, that the purpose of the bill of
particulars in criminal cases is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or information to enable
the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial.

Moreover, a resolution arising from a preliminary investigation does not amount to nor does it serve the
purpose of a bill of particulars.

A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by surprise by restricting the scope of the
proof;106it limits the evidence to be presented by the parties to the matters alleged in the Information as
supplemented by the bill. It is for this reason that the failure of an accused to move for a bill of particulars
deprives him of the right to object to evidence which could be lawfully introduced and admitted under an
information of more or less general terms which sufficiently charges the defendants with a definite crime.

The record on preliminary investigation, in comparison, serves as the written account of the inquisitorial
process when the fiscal determined the existence of prima facie evidence to indict a person for a particular
crime. The record of the preliminary investigation, as a general rule, does not even form part of the records of
the case.107 These features of the record of investigation are significantly different from the bill of particulars
that serves as basis, together with the Information, in specifying the overt acts constituting the offense that the
accused pleaded to during arraignment.

Notably, plunder is a crime composed of several predicate criminal acts. To prove plunder, the prosecution
must weave a web out of the six ways of illegally amassing wealth and show how the various acts reveal a
combination or series of means or schemes that reveal a pattern of criminality. The interrelationship of the
separate acts must be shown and be established as a scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth amounting to at
least P50 million.

Plunder thus involves intricate predicate criminal acts and numerous transactions and schemes that span a
period of time. Naturally, in its prosecution, the State possesses an “effective flexibility” of proving a predicate
criminal act or transaction, not originally contemplated in the Information, but is otherwise included in the
broad statutory definition, in light of subsequently discovered evidence. The unwarranted use of the flexibility
is what the bill of particulars guards against.

Justice Carpio further argues that the ponencia transformed the nature of an action from an accusation in
writing charging a person with an offense to an initiatory pleading alleging a cause of action.

We see nothing wrong with such treatment, for a motion for a bill of particulars in criminal cases is designed
to achieve the same purpose as the motion for a bill of particulars in civil cases. In fact, certainty, to a
reasonable extent, is an essential attribute of all pleadings, both civil and criminal, and is more especially
needed in the latter where conviction is followed by penal consequences. 108redarclaw

Thus, even if the Information employs the statutory words does not mean that it is unnecessary to allege such
facts in connection with the commission of the offense as will certainly put the accused on full notice of what
he is called upon to defend, and establish such a record as will effectually bar a subsequent prosecution for
that identical offense.109redarclaw

Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of capital punishment; for this reason, more process
is due, not less. When a person’s life interest – protected by the life, liberty, and property language recognized
in the due process clause – is at stake in the proceeding, all measures must be taken to ensure the protection
of those fundamental rights.

As we emphasized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,110 “the administration of justice is not a matter of

guesswork. The name of the game is fair play, not foul play. We cannot allow a legal skirmish where, from the
start, one of the protagonists enters the arena with one arm tied to his back.”

Finally, we find no significance in Justice Carpio’s argument that Atty. Estelito Mendoza did not previously find
vague the Information for plunder filed against President Joseph Estrada in 2001.

Under the amended Information111 against Estrada, et al., each overt act that constituted the series or
combination and corresponding to the predicate acts under Section 1(d) had been averred with sufficient
particularity so that there was no doubt what particular transaction was referred to.

We point out that unlike in the Information against Enrile, the following matters had been averred with
sufficient definiteness, viz: the predicate acts that constitute the crime of plunder; the breakdown of how the
alleged amount of P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, had been arrived at; the participants involved in each
transaction; and the specific sources of the illegal wealth amassed.

At any rate, that Atty. Mendoza did not previously question the indictment of President Estrada via a motion
for bill of particulars does not ipso facto mean that the present Information for plunder filed against Enrile is
not vague and ambiguous.
Sandiganbayan Ground #2:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

That Enrile’s cited grounds are reiterations of the grounds previously raised

Enrile does not deny that the arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of
arrest and for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of particulars were identical. He argues,
however, that the mere reiteration of these grounds should not be a ground for the denial of his motion for bill
of particulars, since “the context in which those questions were raised was entirely different.”

While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion for bill of particulars involved the right of an
accused to due process, the enumeration of the details desired in Enrile’s supplemental opposition to
issuance of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of particulars are
different viewed particularly from the prism of their respective objectives.

In the former, Enrile took the position that the Information did not state a crime for which he can be convicted;
thus, the Information is void; he alleged a defect of substance. In the latter, he already impliedly admits that
the Information sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and lacking in details that would allow him to
properly plead and prepare his defense; he essentially alleged here a defect of form.

Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its failure to state the nature and cause of
the accusation against Enrile; while the details desired in the latter (the motion for bill of particulars) are
required to be specified in sufficient detail because the allegations in the Information are vague, indefinite, or
in the form of conclusions and will not allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense unless specifications are
made.

That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in the Information does not preclude the
accused from requesting for more specific details of the various acts or omissions he is alleged to have
committed. The request for details is precisely the function of a bill of particulars.

Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating the cause and the crime an accused is
charged, the allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to properly plead and prepare
for trial.

We likewise find no complete congruence between the grounds invoked and the details sought by Enrile in his
motion for bill of particulars, and the grounds invoked in opposing the warrant for his arrest issued, so that the
Sandiganbayan’s action in one would bar Enrile from essentially invoking the same grounds.

The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.112 Simply put, the judge determines whether the necessity exists to place the accused under
immediate custody to avoid frustrating the ends of justice.

On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure grants the accused the remedy of a bill of
particulars to better inform himself of the specifics or particulars concerning facts or matters that had not been
averred in the Information with the necessary clarity for purposes of his defense.

Its purpose is to better acquaint the accused of the specific acts and/or omissions in relation with the crime
charged, to limit the matters and the evidence that the prosecution may otherwise be allowed to use against
him under a more or less general averment, and to meet the charges head on and timely object to evidence
whose inadmissibility may otherwise be deemed waived.

Based on these considerations, the question of whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest
against an accused, is separate and distinct from the issue of whether the allegations in the Information have
been worded with sufficient definiteness to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare his defense.
While the grounds cited for each may seemingly be the same, they are submitted for different purposes and
should be appreciated from different perspectives, so that the insufficiency of these grounds for one does not
necessarily translate to insufficiency for the other. Thus, the resolution of the issue of probable cause should
not bar Enrile from seeking a more detailed averment of the allegations in the Information.

The Sandiganbayan grossly missed these legal points and thus gravely abused its discretion: it used wrong
and completely inapplicable considerations to support its conclusion.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

a. We PARTIALLY GRANT the present petition for certiorari, and SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayan’s
resolutions dated July 11, 2014, which denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars and his motion for
reconsideration of this denial.

b. We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days
from finality of this Decision, with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars containing the facts sought that
we herein rule to be material and necessary. The bill of particulars shall specifically contain the
following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination or series of overt criminal acts”
charged in the Information.

2. A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or commissions” allegedly received, stating how
the amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.

3. A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks or commissions were received.

4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or thereabout,” of the alleged kickbacks and
commissions from the identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution should state the year
when the kickbacks and transactions from the identified projects were received.

5. The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged “recipients
and/or target implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects.”
 6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’ NGOs. The particular
person/s in each government agency who facilitated the transactions need not be named as a
particular.

All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.cr

EN BANC
G.R. No. 139297 February 23, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
vs.
RENATO @ BONG TORRECAMPO y LEYTE and RENE TORRECAMPO y LEYTE, appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
JOVITO CASPILLO1 was found stabbed and decapitated in his rented room. For his death, brothers
RENATO alias "Bong" and RENE TORRECAMPO Y LEYTE were charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Las Piñas2 with murder in an Information3 alleging:
That on or about the 11th day of November 1994, in the Municipality of Las Piñas, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
with one, NORA TORRECAMPO Y LEYTE whose present whereabouts still unknown and all of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength and/or with evident
premeditation did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab in the different
part(s) of his body and even cut off his head with a bladed weapon, one JOVITO GASPILLO, thereby inflicting
upon him serious and mortal wounds, which directly caused the death of said JOVITO GASPILLO.
The evidence adduced in the trial shows that Jovito was a tenant of the Escosio family at No. 66 Laong
Street, Barangay Almanza Uno, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. He shared a room with his brother Randy and first
cousins Nora and Karen Torrecampo. The Escosios occupied the other room of the house.
Prosecution witness Erlinda Escosio testified that on November 11, 1994 at about 10:30 in the morning, she
was seated at the door of their room removing lice from the hair of her daughter when she saw Nora and
appellant Renato pass by. They were followed shortly after by another man later identified as appellant Rene
Torrecampo. All three (3) went to the room of Jovito. A while later, Erlinda heard a weepy Nora pleading to get
into Jovito’s room where the loud noise of the radio could be heard. Some minutes after, she saw Nora and
appellant Renato come out of the room. Appellant Renato dragged Nora to the direction of Sampaguita
Compound. Appellant Rene left the room after them. He was carrying a bag.
Erlinda continued that after the departure of appellants and Nora, she walked to the toilet and noticed blood at
the door of Jovito. Curious, she peeped inside and was shocked by the sight of a body drenched in blood with
its head severed from the neck. It was Jovito. Terrified, she called for her neighbors and the barangay tanods.
People milled to the crime scene until the authorities arrived. She felt that appellants were the culprits. She
explained that the main door is the only way in and out of the house. Either way, one would have to pass by
their room to get to Jovito’s. On subject date and time, she only saw appellants and Nora go in and come out
of the scene of the crime. At the police station, she identified both appellants.
Cherry Francisco, a neighbor who lives in front of the house of the Escosios and approximately ten (10)
meters from the room of Jovito, also gave her testimony. According to her, at about 10:00 A.M. on November
11, 1994, she was eating breakfast with her family when she heard noises coming from the room of Jovito.
She went out to investigate and noticed Nora beating at the door crying out, "Bakit ninyo siya pinatay?" The
door was suddenly opened and someone grabbed Nora by the hair and pulled her inside the room. She later
identified the person as appellant Rene. Moments thereafter, appellant Renato came out of the room dragging
Nora with him. Trailing them was appellant Rene, whose hands and clothes were drenched with blood.
However, as appellant Renato and Nora walked to the direction of Sampaguita Compound, appellant Rene
went off to Laong Almanza carrying a long bag. Without delay, Cherry rushed to the house of neighbor Buena
to recount what she had just witnessed. Buena called for the authorities. Cherry returned to her house. From
there, she saw Erlinda emotionally telling people that crowded the crime scene about finding her tenant Jovito
dead with his head cut off. Eventually, the authorities arrived and investigated the incident.
Melvin Tupaz identified the body of his cousin Jovito. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyut, a medico-legal expert of the
National Bureau of Investigation, conducted the autopsy and disclosed the cause of death as "multiple stab
and hack (sic) wounds."4
Randy Caspillo, the younger brother of Jovito, testified on the expenses incurred by the family as a result of
his brother’s death. He claimed a total of ₱35,014.00 in expenses but was only able to account for
₱13,250.00 in receipts. As a result of the sudden demise of his brother, he said he suffered moral shock,
mental anguish and wounded feelings.
Appellant Rene Torrecampo testified in his defense. He averred that on November 11, 1994 at 7:00 A.M., he
left for work and arrived at LFS Engineering an hour later as indicated in the office logbook. He claimed that
he found out about Jovito’s death only at 10:00 A.M. during his coffee break when his brother’s (appellant
Renato) wife telephoned them about it. According to him, they left for Laong immediately after getting
permission from their employer Lamberto Samonte. They arrived there at 11:00 that same morning after
taking a tricycle to Casimiro, then a passenger jeep to Pillar Village. Right away, he looked for his sister
Karen, who was then living with Jovito. He found her unconscious at her friend Lolita Montinel’s place so he
brought her to Parañaque Community Hospital on board a white police service Fiera. When Karen regained
consciousness and asked about the incident, she merely cried. The doctor advised the police that she was
just scared and needed some rest. On their way home, appellant Rene and Karen stopped by the latter’s
place primarily to find out what happened to Jovito and incidentally to get some of her things. The room was a
mess and Jovito was nowhere to be found. While there they overheard Roger Escosio saying, "Ang tigas-
tigas ng ulo nila, matagal ko nang pinapaalis ayaw nilang umalis."
Appellant Rene added that at work the next day he read in Abante that his brother Renato was being tagged
as the principal suspect in the killing. Hence, he and his brother immediately requested their employer
Lamberto Samonte to accompany them to the Las Piñas Police Station to surrender. The police took them to
the Office of then Municipal Mayor Ben Casimiro where they were presented to the media. An investigation
ensued. Appellants were detained and ultimately charged for the murder of Jovito.
Appellant Renato Torrecampo basically related a similar story. His account only differed on what he did upon
arrival at Laong on the date of the incident. He claimed that he went straight home to take care of his sick
child and stayed there with his wife the rest of the day. He was about to leave for work the next morning when
he read in the newspaper that he was the prime suspect in the killing of Jovito. Together with his brother, he
asked their employer to escort him to the police station to clear his name. However, they were detained
instead and threatened into admitting the commission of the crime. They insisted that they had no knowledge
thereof and explained that they were at their place of work when it happened. The police did not believe them.
Forthwith, they were charged with murder.
The defense likewise offered in evidence the testimonies of SPO1 Benjamin Javier, Edgardo Gremio and
SPO4 Esmeraldo Lucena. SPO1 Javier of the Las Piñas Police Criminal Investigation Division was assigned
to investigate the death of Jovito. He said that he found the dead body of Jovito in his small rented room,
which was adjacent to the room of the owner of the two (2)-bedroom house. The rooms were separated by a
plywood wall. He said that Jovito’s room was facing the house of one Cherry Francisco. He placed the time of
death at 10:30 A.M. based on his interview of Erlinda Escosio. He took down the statement of Erlinda on
November 12, 1994. He believed her story and submitted a report on his findings.
Edgardo Gremio and SPO4 Esmeraldo Lucena gave corroborative testimonies. Gremio testified that he is a
member of the Barangay Police Force in Laong Street, Barangay Almanza Uno, Las Piñas. He claimed that at
about 10:30 A.M. on November 11, 1994, he was informed of a killing in his area. He passed for his neighbor
SPO4 Lucena, then still asleep, before going to the crime scene. SPO4 Lucena said that people crowded the
place of the incident when they got there. He went inside the house, which he insisted had three (3) rooms.
He maintained that the first room was occupied by the owner of the house, the second by a driver he did not
know and the third by the victim Jovito. He saw the dead body and told everyone not to touch anything until
the police investigator arrived. He then called for fellow policemen whom he accompanied to the scene.
On the basis of circumstantial evidence, the court a quo found Renato and Rene Torrecampo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced them to death. It likewise ordered them to solidarily pay the heirs
of the victim Jovito Caspillo ₱100,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of life; ₱35,014.00 in actual damages for
the wake, funeral and burial expenses; and, the costs of the suit.5 Hence, this automatic review pursuant to
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.6
In convicting appellants, the trial court relied on the following circumstances: (a) at about 9:00 A.M. on
November 11, 1994, Erlinda saw Jovito very much alive; (b) after an hour, Erlinda saw appellant Renato and
his sister Nora pass by, followed shortly by appellant Rene; (c) Erlinda heard a commotion inside the room of
Jovito and after a few minutes saw appellants emerging from the room with Nora in tow; (d) Cherry heard a
loud banging from the room of Jovito so she went outside and saw Nora frantically pounding at the door, then
Nora was pulled inside the room; (e) after thirty (30) minutes, Cherry witnessed a seemingly weak Nora being
assisted by appellant Renato coming out of the room; and, (f) Cherry likewise observed appellant Rene
leaving the room with his hands and clothes covered with blood.
Circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for purposes of conviction must have the following elements: (a) there
is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and, (c) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.7 The
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
In the instant case, the circumstances enumerated by the trial court establish an unbroken chain of events
showing the complicity of appellants and no other in the killing of victim Jovito Caspillo. Indeed, the case of
the prosecution is woven principally around the testimonies of witnesses Erlinda Escosio and Cherry
Francisco whose testimonies were sufficiently tested and found credible on the crucible of cross-examination.
Notably, as correctly observed by the court a quo, appellants failed to demonstrate ill motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses to testify against them. Absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for the
witnesses to prevaricate, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies
are worthy of full faith and credit.8
In their Brief, appellants contend that the decision of the trial court is not supported and contrary to the
evidence adduced during trial.9 We reject this contention.
First. Appellants submit that the trial court should have completely rejected both oral and written accounts of
prosecution witness Erlinda Escosio considering that her in-court testimony is contrary to her sworn
statement. Specifically, they call attention to Erlinda’s narration in court that she saw appellant Rene stabbing
the victim while appellant Renato was slicing off his head. We are not impressed. The records show that on
cross-examination, Erlinda was able to explain the alleged inconsistency:10
Q : Do you affirm the truth and veracity of the statement you have issued before SPO1 Benjamin Javier
as stated in your salaysay?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : You stated previously that you saw the actual incident while peeping through the hole in the wall,
did you not?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : How come in your statement you never mentioned that you peeped through the hole? You stayed
outside while taking out the lice from the head of your daughter?
A : I was scared and confused that I failed to narrate the details.
Clearly, reference is made on what Erlinda did not mention in her sworn statement. This is not an
inconsistency but merely an incompleteness of narration. Sworn statements, being taken ex parte, are almost
always incomplete and often inaccurate for various reasons, sometimes from partial suggestion or for want of
suggestion and inquiries.11 There is no rule of evidence to the effect that omission of certain particulars in a
sworn statement would estop an affiant from making an elaboration thereof or from correcting inaccuracies
during the trial.12
The trial court did not err in giving credence to Erlinda’s testimony in court as it is consistent with her sworn
statement on all other matters and is corroborated on material points by the testimony of Cherry Francisco.
Repeatedly, this Court has ruled that the testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in
other parts, depending on the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the
case.13 Moreover, the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light
of the declarant’s demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent
position to discriminate between truth and falsehood.14
Second. Appellants assail the testimonies of Erlinda and Cherry on the commission of the crime at 10:00 A.M.
on November 11, 1994. They insist that they had just left their place of work and only arrived at the crime
scene an hour later.
We are not convinced. To merit belief, alibi and denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-
culpability. The records reveal that appellants’ employer only substantiated their claim that they left LFS
Engineering at 10:00 A.M. on that ill-fated day. No clear and convincing evidence was adduced to establish
that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Indeed, they
admitted leaving LFS Engineering to go to the locus criminis though they claimed to have arrived there only at
11:00 A.M. Their testimony cannot prevail over the positive identification of Erlinda and Cherry, who are
disinterested witnesses.
Also dubious is their asseveration on what they did upon arrival at the crime scene. Appellant Rene professed
that he looked for his sister Karen whereas appellant Renato averred that he went home to attend to a sick
child. They obviously deviated from their purpose – to find out what really happened to their cousin
Jovito.15 We note that they did not present anyone to corroborate their stories.
Third. Appellants likewise impugn the testimony of prosecution witness Cherry Francisco. They claim that
SPO1 Benjamin Javier merely supplied the name of appellant Rene Torrecampo as the person who pulled
Nora into Jovito’s room during the incident in view of the admission of Cherry during trial that she did not
know appellant Rene.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, this attempt to discredit the testimony of Cherry is misleading.
Admittedly, she testified that she only saw appellant Rene for the first time on November 11, 1994. But she
was certain that it was appellant Rene who pulled Nora inside Jovito’s room when she was made to identify
him in court on March 23, 1995.16
Appellants likewise try to discredit the testimony of Cherry that she heard the commotion in the room of Jovito
given the blaring sound of the radio, and that she witnessed the circumstances of the crime at a distance of
ten (10) meters. The contention is misleading. The records show that Cherry heard some disturbance from
the room of Jovito, which made her go out of her house. She never claimed that it was the blare of the radio
that caused her to investigate outside.17 It was Erlinda who testified about the sound of the radio.
As to the distance of her house from the room of Jovito, the Court finds reliable the testimony of Cherry on
cross-examination that her house was directly in line with the room of Jovito and that there was nothing to
obstruct her view thereof except the not so tall trees.18 It is settled that when conditions of visibility are
favorable, and when the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the
malefactor should normally be accepted.19
Appellants further denigrate Cherry’s assertion that one of them left the crime scene with blood spattered all
over his clothes and body. They aver that whoever committed the killing could have washed away the
bloodstains before leaving the victim’s room as suggested by the pail of blood-tainted water found in Jovito’s
room.
It may be in keeping with human experience for anyone including appellants to wash the blood away from
their clothes and body after committing a crime. However, it is also natural for them to act with haste so they
could immediately leave the crime scene and avoid suspicion. It is thus not incredible that the hurried and
haphazard attempt to remove the bloodstains left the herein appellants with some traces of blood still visible
to the naked eyes of witnesses Erlinda and Cherry.
Fourth. In a further effort to impair the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants impute on SPO1
Benjamin Javier the "orchestration" of the written statements and oral testimonies of Erlinda and Cherry to get
recognition for arresting appellants and solving the crime. This is mere conjecture that deserves scant
consideration. Needless to state, the court in criminal prosecution is always guided by evidence that is
tangible, verifiable and in harmony with the usual course of human experience and not by mere surmises.20
Fifth. Appellants also assail the denial by the trial court of their motion for an ocular inspection of the crime
scene. They suggest that had it been granted, the accuracy or inexactitude of the description by SPO1 Javier
could have been established. We agree with the Solicitor General that the ocular inspection would have been
an exercise in futility for the reason that the house had then long been renovated. On March 2, 1995, when
Erlinda Escosio testified, there were already three (3) rooms in the house. The renovation was made on
February 1995, a month prior to her testimony;21 thus, explaining the testimony of SPO1 Javier that the
house of the Escosios consisted of two (2) rooms on November 11, 1994.
We now come to the crime committed by the appellants. The Information alleged the circumstances of "taking
advantage of superior strength and/or evident premeditation," and charged the crime of murder. The
circumstances that qualify the killing to murder must be proved indubitably as the killing itself. The prosecution
failed to prove these circumstances.
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor. This assumes a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and
selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The evidence does not show that
appellants took advantage of their number in order to overpower the victim. The evidence against appellants
is merely circumstantial.
Nor was evident premeditation proved. There is no proof in the instant case of (a) the time when appellants
determined to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that they clung to their determination to
commit the crime; and, (c) the lapse of sufficient period of time between the determination and the execution
of the crime, to allow appellants to reflect upon the consequences of their act. Hence, this circumstance
cannot likewise be appreciated.
The Solicitor General submits that treachery should be appreciated against the appellants as Jovito was
asleep when killed. He contends that while treachery was not alleged in the Information, it could be
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. We do not agree. Erlinda testified that Jovito was asleep
prior to the arrival of appellants but she did not say that he was still sleeping when the attack commenced.
Even assuming that treachery was proved, it could not be considered a generic aggravating circumstance.
Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
Sec. 8. Designation of the Offense. – The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense
given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances
and for the court to pronounce judgment.
Clearly, under the aforesaid provisions, aggravating circumstances, whether qualifying or generic, must be
alleged in the information before they can be considered by the court. These new provisions apply even if the
crime was committed prior to their effectivity since they are favorable to the accused, as in this case.
Appellants cannot invoke the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For voluntary surrender to be
considered, it must be shown that: (1) the offender was not actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a
person in authority or to an agent of that person; and, (3) his surrender was voluntary.22 The records disclose
that appellants voluntarily presented themselves to the Las Piñas Police Department "to clear their
name."23 We have ruled time and again that the act of a suspect in going to the police station only "to clear
his name" does not show intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities.24
Prescinding from these premises, appellants can only be convicted of the crime of homicide. The penalty for
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Corollarily, Article 64 (1) provides
that when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty prescribed by law shall be
imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty to be imposed
on appellants should be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum
shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor, the range of which is six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.
We now review the damages awarded by the trial court. The civil indemnity ex delicto given in the amount of
₱100,000.00 must be reduced to ₱50,000.00 in line with recent jurisprudence. In addition, moral damages
must be awarded in the amount of ₱50,000.00 in view of the testimony of Randy Caspillo about his "surprise"
and "hurt" as a result of the sudden death of his brother.25
The actual damages awarded in the amount of ₱35,014.00 representing wake, funeral and burial expenses
cannot be sustained. The receipts submitted by witness Randy Caspillo only prove expenses in the amount of
₱13,250.00. Nonetheless, temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 can be awarded. This is in
keeping with recent jurisprudence to the effect that when actual damages established by receipts during trial
amount to less than ₱25,000.00, which in this case is only ₱13,250.00, an award of temperate damages for
P25,000.00 is justified.26
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court finding appellants RENATO and RENE TORRECAMPO
guilty of murder and imposing upon them the penalty of death is MODIFIED; they are instead found guilty of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Jovito Caspillo
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, and to pay
the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
April 5, 2016
G.R. No. 202124
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
IRENEO JUGUETA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 03252. The CA affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca,
Quezon, finding accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Double Murder
in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya,
Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with a caliber.22 firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with
said firearm Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old, who suffered the following:

"Gunshot wound -

Point of Entry – lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the level of the
umbilicus, directed upward toward the left upper abdomen."

and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age, who suffered the following:

"Gunshot wound -

Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter

Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"

which directly caused their instant death.

That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for
the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.

Contrary to law.2

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was charged
with Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality
of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with short
firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot
with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the
commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which
would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the
accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and
Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils and who are minors, were not hit.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At said proceedings, one
Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement stating that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain
"Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm while
the other two had no participation in the shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger San Miguel was
not present at the crime scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found
no prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.4 Thus, upon motion of the prosecution,
the case for Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial
proceeded only as to appellant.5
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes
Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto, namely,
Mary Grace and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr. Taguinod noted that the trajectory of the bullet
wounds showed that the victims were at a higher location than the shooter, but she could not tell what kind of
ammunitions were used.6
Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of June 6, 2002, as
his entire family lay down on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut was
suddenly stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo (fences) remained. With the covering of the wall gone,
the three (3) men responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto clearly saw their faces which were
illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto identified the 3 men as appellant,
Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.
The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The men then uttered,
"Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon." Norberto pleaded with them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin,
matanda na ako at marami akong anak. Anong kasalanan ko sa inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy, a
gunshot was fired, and Norberto immediately threw his body over his children and wife in an attempt to
protect them from being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the direction where his
family huddled together in their hut.7
When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2) young daughters
were wounded. His wife went out of their house to ask for help from neighbors, while he and his older
daughter carried the two (2) wounded children out to the street. His daughter Mary Grace died on the way to
the hospital, while Claudine expired at the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to revive her.8
In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto replied that he
had a previous altercation with appellant who was angered by the fact that he (Norberto) filed a case against
appellant's two other brothers for molesting his daughter.9
On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense. Appellant's testimony,
along with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he
(appellant) was just watching TV at the house of Isidro San Miguel, where he had been living for several
years, at the time the shooting incident occurred. However, he and the other witnesses admitted that said
house was a mere five-minute walk away from the crime scene.10
Finding appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of Norberto, the trial
court ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant, together with two other assailants, conspired
to shoot and kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was then convicted of Double Murder in Criminal Case No.
7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Double Murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her
heirs in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Claudine
Divina and accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00.
In addition, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in the amount of
Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7702-G, reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article
51 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO
(2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as
maximum for each of the offended parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann
Divina. Further, accused is ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30, 2012, the CA
rendered a Decision affirming appellant's conviction for the crimes charged.13
Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July 30, 2012, the Court
issued a Resolution14 notifying the parties that they may submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Both
parties manifested that they will no longer submit supplemental briefs since they had exhaustively discussed
their positions before the CA.15
The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, such
as his failure to state from the beginning that all three assailants had guns, and to categorically identify
appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill Norberto’s children.
The appeal is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings
are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court will not recalibrate and re-examine evidence
that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.16
The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant
acted in concert with two other individuals, all three of them carrying firearms and simultaneously firing at
Norberto and his family, killing his two young daughters. Norberto clearly saw all of the three assailants with
their firearms as there is illumination coming from a lamp inside their house that had been laid bare after its
walling was stripped off, to wit:
Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at the same time, do you have light in
your house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of light was there?
A: A gas lamp.
Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?
A: In the middle of our house.
xxxx
Q: when did they fire a shot?
A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.
Q: How many gunshots did you hear?
A: Only one.
Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A firearm?
A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)
xxxx
Q: After the first shot, was there any second shot?
A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest daughters were hit.
xxxx
Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time?
A: All of them.
Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were
having one firearm each?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And they fired shots at the same time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that night?
A: To the place where we were.
Q: When those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was your position then?
A: I ordered my children to lie down.
Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children to lie down?
A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body and ordering them to line (sic)
down face down)
Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house?
A: Less than five minutes, sir.
Q: After they fired their shots, they left your house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see what happened to them?
A: Yes, sir, they were hit.
x x x17
Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's daughters
because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's family. Conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the commission of a crime and decide to commit it.
Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary as
long as their concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is the
act of all.18 Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto together,
each with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the bullet
particularly fired from appellant's firearm that killed the children.
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not
parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. 19 The
presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a
killing as murder.20 The trial court correctly ruled that appellant is liable for murder because treachery
attended the killing of Norberto’s two children, thus:
x x x Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down side by side about to
sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack was
stripped off by [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and Gilberto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores]. They
ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them having
hit and killed his two (2) daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his children were at very
tender ages. Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 years old and 3 ½ years old
respectively. In this case, the victims were defenseless and manifestly overpowered by armed assailants
when they were gunned down. There was clear showing that the attack was made suddenly and
unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and unable to defend themselves. Norberto and his wife and
his children could have already been asleep at that time of the night. x x x 21

Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. As held in People v.
Fallorina,22 the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without
the slightest provocation on his part. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected
to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.
As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code
states that a felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In Esqueda v. People,23 the Court held:
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either consummated
physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or attempted homicide or
frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by
evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the
nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) the
words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.

In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant as shown by the
use of firearms, the words uttered24during, as well as the manner of, the commission of the crime. The Court
thus quotes with approval the trial court’s finding that appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.:
In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder first by suddenly
stripping off the wall of their house, followed by successive firing at the intended victims when Norberto Divina
refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If only there were good in aiming their target, not only
Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but surely all the rest of the family would surely have died. Hence,
perpetrators were liable for Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted
Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as [appellant] Ireneo
Jugueta was the only one charged in this case, he alone is liable for the crime committed.25

Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state from the very
beginning that all three assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant’s firearm
that killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put a dent on said witness's credibility. An
examination of Norberto's testimony would show that there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled
in People v. Cabtalan,26 "[m]inor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect
the credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the
crime."27 Both the trial court and the CA found Norberto's candid and straightforward testimony to be worthy
of belief and this Court sees no reason why it should not conform to the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v.
People28 that:
Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear showing that
the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that would justify altering or
revising such findings and evaluation. This is because the trial court's determination proceeds from its
first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under
grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility
and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor x x x.29
The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding or exceptional
circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-standing principle. There is no cogent reason to overturn
the trial court's ruling that the prosecution evidence, particularly the testimony of Norberto Divina identifying
appellant as one of the assailants, is worthy of belief. Thus, the prosecution evidence established beyond any
reasonable doubt that appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime.
However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court to identify the
crimes for which appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of the
terms "Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting appellant, and yet imposing penalties
which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to penalize appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder
and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder.
The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show that
appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was
not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is
also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case
No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only one offense.
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective.
The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division,
Mindanao Station, et al.,30 thus:
The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the
necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The
State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-
compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters
his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.

However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of
the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides
that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint
or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs
(a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and
proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense.31
Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos.
7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven
during trial.
Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida,32 the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as defined in Article
4833 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in the
conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two
kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as a complex crime proper, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results
in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a
number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes.34

Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in firing
successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill
not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of
shots at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not
only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because
as held in People v. Nelmida,35 "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms,
aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give
rise to a complex crime."36
Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling as an
ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and
7702-G contain sufficient allegations to that effect, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:
That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the
attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.37
Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:
x x x the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby
commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of
execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous
desistance of the accused x x x38
In People v. Agcanas,39 the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is
aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to
another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere." Dwelling
aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter
has not given provocation therefor.40 The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of
appellant violated the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein, without
provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance.
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties imposed on
appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of murder. 41 However,
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be
imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility
for parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for each count
is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder.
Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards criminal
cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal cases,
there are three kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary
damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or temperate damages in some instances.
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in the
amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is
equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.42 This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC
which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be increased by the
Court when appropriate.43 Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and
the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or
intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period
not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a
sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in
addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim
a sum of money as restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum
amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although
the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can
be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it.44
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in
nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals45 expounded on the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as
physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in
nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no
proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity
being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered
by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 46 and
Article 222047 of the Civil Code. x x x.

Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages awarded for
mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong."48 They may also be considered and
allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as
result of his or her assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the reasonableness of the force
used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress."49
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he
award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante;
and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted."50
Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222051 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages
that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of
the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so
long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.52
Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, thus:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are
separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as
a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the
rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not
always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the
award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as
a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, 53 the theory being that there should be
compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant – associated with
such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult
or fraud or gross fraud54 – that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used
to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous
conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like
him from similar conduct in the future.55
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings,
each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an
award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether
ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the
award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It
would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying
nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal,
rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 56
The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure57 requires aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information. It is in order not to
trample on the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the alleged offense that he or
she has committed. A criminal complaint or information should basically contain the elements of the crime, as
well as its qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to effectively determine the proper
penalty it should impose. This, however, is not similar in the recovery of civil liability. In the civil aspect, the
presence of an aggravating circumstance, even if not alleged in the information but proven during trial would
entitle the victim to an award of exemplary damages.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to the presence of
an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when
exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the
award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio,58 the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with
perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People
v. Cristobal,59 the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and
wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. In People v. Cañada,60 People
v. Neverio61 and People v. Layco, Sr.,62 the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to
serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at ₱30,000.00,63 despite the lack of any
aggravating circumstance. The Court finds it proper to increase the amount to ₱50,000.00 in order to deter
similar conduct.
If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because of the provisions
of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing jurisprudence64 sets the amount of ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first consider the penalty
imposed by law. Under RA 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes,
Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC
and special penal laws were amended to impose the death penalty under certain circumstances.65 Under the
same law, the following crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general,66 mutiny on the high
seas,67 and simple rape.68 For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death: qualified piracy;69 qualified bribery under certain
circumstances;70 parricide;71 murder;72 infanticide, except when committed by the mother of the child for the
purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for the same
purpose;73 kidnapping and serious illegal detention under certain circumstances;74 robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons under certain circumstances;75 destructive arson, except when death
results as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under the article;76 attempted or
frustrated rape, when a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion thereof; plunder; 77 and carnapping,
when the driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission
of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.78 Finally, RA 7659 imposes the death penalty on the following
crimes:
(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or present.
(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii) when the victim is killed or dies
as a consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is raped, subjected to torture or dehumanizing
acts.
(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under
Article 320, death results.
(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or homicide is
committed; (ii) when committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: (1) when the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the
parent of the victim; (2) when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities; (3)
when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives
within the third degree of consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a religious or a child below seven years
old; (5) when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) disease; (6) when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when by reason or on the occasion
of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.
From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) indivisible penalties or single
indivisible penalty, all of them must be taken in relation to Article 63 of the RPC, which provides:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules
shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater
penalty shall be applied.
2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the
lesser penalty shall be applied.
 3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts
shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for
the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of
such compensation. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 63)
Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the court has the duty
to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in crimes where the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court can impose either reclusion perpetua or death,
depending on the mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.
But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,
the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties
of the RPC.79
As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua.
Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in People v.
Salome80 and People v. Quiachon,81 is "the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of
its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender."82
When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the death penalty were it not for
RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor,83 that the award of civil indemnity
for the crime of rape when punishable by death should be ₱75,000.00 We reasoned that "[t]his is not only a
reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also
an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity." 84 Such
reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA 7659. The amount was later increased to
₱100,000.00.85
In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa,86 ₱50,000.00 was
awarded as moral damages without need of pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is recognized that
the victim's injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se
the award of moral damages.87 Subsequently, the amount was increased to ₱75,000.00 in People v.
Soriano88 and P100,000.00 in People v. Gambao.89
Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the imposable
penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be used as the basis for
awarding damages and not the actual penalty imposed.1avvphi1
Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary aggravating
circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, the latest jurisprudence90 pegs the amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱100,0000.00 as
moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary aggravating circumstances
present, the amount of ₱100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and moral
damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary damages shall
be fixed at ₱100,000.00. "[T]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and
the financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of
heinous crimes x x x."91
When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being
no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the number of
qualifying aggravating circumstances present.
When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the offender caused
several crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single design, the amount of civil indemnity and moral
damages will depend on the penalty and the number of victims. For each of the victims, the heirs should be
properly compensated. If it is multiple murder without any ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a
qualifying aggravating circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein
the maximum penalty shall be imposed,92 then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC, the
following doctrines are noteworthy:
In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog,93 this Court ruled that special complex crime, or more properly,
a composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v. Barros,94 explained that composite crimes
are "neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised
Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies
[compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex
crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal
possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although
composed of two or more offenses."95
In People v. De Leon,96 we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide
perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the
taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result
obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in
the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with
homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely,
robbery with homicide, must be consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is
other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the
homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the
occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the
robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the
occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed
by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of
robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes
murder, parricide, and infanticide.97

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in its
generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on
occasion of the rape.98 Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior
strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the
prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant
is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of
treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People
v. Macabales:99

Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating circumstance
of treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to
crimes against property. However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized
treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered
helpless by appellants in defending himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers before
he was stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them.
In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating
circumstance.

Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the
Revised Penal Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised
Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the actual
commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder but, as
generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be imposed.100

Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it cannot be imposed due
to RA 9346 and what is actually imposed is the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and moral
damages will be ₱100,000.00 each, and another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the
heinousness of the crime and to set an example. If there is another composite crime included in a special
complex crime and the penalty imposed is death, an additional ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00
moral damages and ₱100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each composite crime committed.
For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide101 wherein three (3) people died as a consequence of the
crime, the heirs of the victims shall be entitled to the award of damages as discussed earlier. This is true,
however, only if those who were killed were the victims of the robbery or mere bystanders and not when those
who died were the perpetrators or robbers themselves because the crime of robbery with homicide may still
be committed even if one of the robbers dies.102 This is also applicable in robbery with rape where there is
more than one victim of rape.
In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage in which the crime
was committed and proven during the trial. Article 6 of the RPC provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as those which are
frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment
are present; and it is frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is death but reduced
to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded
will each be ₱100,000.00 and another ₱100,000.00 for exemplary damages or when the circumstances of the
crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the civil indemnity and moral damages should be
₱75,000.00 each, as well as exemplary damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00. If, however, the crime proven
is in its frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be
₱50,000.00, and an award of ₱25,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱25,000.00 moral damages when the crime
proven is in its attempted stage. The difference in the amounts awarded for the stages is mainly due to the
disparity in the outcome of the crime committed, in the same way that the imposable penalty varies for each
stage of the crime. The said amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of felonies in
their frustrated or attempted stages shall be the bases when the crimes committed constitute complex crime
under Article 48 of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder with attempted murder, the amount of civil
indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is ₱100,000.00 each, while in the attempted murder, the
civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is ₱25,000.00 each.
In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several victims (except the
robbers) sustained injuries, they shall likewise be indemnified. It must be remembered that in a special
complex crime, unlike in a complex crime, the component crimes have no attempted or frustrated stages
because the intention of the offender/s is to commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process of
committing the said crime, another crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a robbery with
homicide, other victims sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still robbery with
homicide as the injuries become part of the crime, "Homicide", in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, is understood in its generic sense and now forms part of the essential element of robbery,103 which
is the use of violence or the use of force upon anything. Hence, the nature and severity of the injuries
sustained by the victims must still be determined for the purpose of awarding civil indemnity and damages. If
a victim suffered mortal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the victim should
be awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages equivalent to the damages awarded in
a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries that are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages should likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded in an
attempted stage.
In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, like
homicide, death under tumultuous affray, reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, the civil indemnity
awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be ₱50,000.00 and ₱50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary
damages being awarded. However, an award of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages in a crime of homicide shall
be added if there is an aggravating circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the
information.
Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases. The award of
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and
funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.104 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages
may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the
exact amount was not proved.105 In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as
temperate damages to ₱50,000.00.
In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed were further made
atrocious by the fact that the victims are innocent, defenseless minors – one is a mere 3½-year-old toddler,
and the other a 13-year-old girl. The increase in the amount of awards for damages is befitting to show not
only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over such crimes and wastage of lives.
In summary:
I. For those crimes106 like, Murder,107 Parricide,108 Serious Intentional
Mutilation,109 Infanticide,110 and other crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of
indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
 a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages111 – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted:112
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or sexual
abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages will depend on the penalty,
extent of violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the penalty consists of
indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
 a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed. In other
complex crimes where death does not result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil
indemnity, moral and exemplary damages depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty
imposed, as the case may be.
IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide,113 Robbery with Rape,114 Robbery with
Intentional Mutilation,115 Robbery with
Arson,116 Rape with Homicide,117 Kidnapping with Murder,118 Carnapping with Homicide119 or
Carnapping with Rape,120 Highway Robbery with Homicide,121 Qualified Piracy,122 Arson with
Homicide,123 Hazing with Death, Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation124 and other crimes with death, injuries,
and sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the
penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua although death did not occur.
1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds125 and could have died if not for a timely
medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.
2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a timely
medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
In Robbery with Physical Injuries,126 the amount of damages shall likewise be dependent on
the nature/severity of the wounds sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.
 The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s or
perpetrator/s are themselves killed or injured in the incident.1âwphi1
Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that for every
additional rape committed, whether against the same victim or other victims, the victims shall be
entitled to the same damages unless the other crimes of rape are treated as separate crimes, in
which case, the damages awarded to simple rape/qualified rape shall apply.
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, i.e.,
Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the
offender,127 Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and Unintentional
Abortion, etc.:
1.1 Where the crime was consummated:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where there are no
stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous affray:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱30,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱20,000.00
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged in the
Information,128 in addition to the above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral
damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages for consummated; ₱30,000.00
for frustrated; and ₱20,000.00 for attempted, shall be awarded.
VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and death occurs in
the course of the rebellion, the heirs of those who died are entitled to the following:129
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00130
B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the rebellion and could have
died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is
presented in court, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded.
To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity is
P3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount cannot be changed,
increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present
circumstance warrants it.131
Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the ordinary aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the following damages:
(1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each of the two children who died; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages
for each of the two victims; (3) another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the two victims; and
(4) temperate damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for each of the two deceased. For the four (4) counts of
Attempted Murder, appellant should pay ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and
₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the four victims. In addition, the civil indemnity, moral
damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.132
Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the charges against Gilberto
Estores and Roger San Miguel who had been identified by Norberto Divina as the companions of appellant on
the night the shooting occurred. Norberto had been very straightforward and unwavering in his identification of
Estores and San Miguel as the two other people who fired the gunshots at his family. More significantly, as
noted by the prosecutor, the testimonies of Estores and San Miguel, who insisted they were not at the crime
scene, tended to conflict with the sworn statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which was the basis for the Provincial
Prosecutor's ruling that he finds no probable cause against the two. Danilo Fajarillo's sworn statement said
that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it
was only appellant who was carrying a firearm and the two other people with him had no participation in the
shooting incident. Said circumstances bolster the credibility of Norberto Divina's testimony that Estores and
San Miguel may have been involved in the killing of his two young daughters.
After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy because the
same only attaches if the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached before the second;
(2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the
first. In turn, a first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or
convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 133 In this case, the
case against Estores and San Miguel was dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus, there can be no
double jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be served by reinvestigating the real participation, if any, of
Estores and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine Divina.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 30,
2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of murder defined under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and hereby sentences him to suffer
two (2) terms of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole under R.A. 9346. He
is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina the following amounts for
each of the two victims: (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; (c)
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of attempted murder defined and penalized under
Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder. He is ORDERED to
PAY moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages of PS0,000.00 to each of the four victims, namely, Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth
Divina and Judy Ann Divina.
(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil
indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages.
(4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of Justice, be FURNISHED a
copy of this Decision. The Prosecutor General is DIRECTED to immediately conduct
a REINVESTIGATION on the possible criminal liability of Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel
regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice for his
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 151785 December 10, 2007
SUSAN FRONDA-BAGGAO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, assailing the Decision1 dated August 29, 2001 and Resolution dated January 15, 2002 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58270.
The facts are:
Sometime in 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor of Abra filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued,
same province, four separate Informations for illegal recruitment against Susan Fronda-Baggao, petitioner,
and Lawrence Lee, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 744, 745, 746 and 749.
Petitioner eluded arrest for more than a decade; hence, the cases against her were archived. On July 25,
1999, petitioner was finally arrested.2
On July 26, 1999, the prosecutor filed with the trial court a motion to amend the Informations. He prayed that
the four separate Informations for illegal recruitment be amended so that there would only be one Information
for illegal recruitment in large scale. On the same day, the trial court denied the motion for lack of merit.
On August 6, 1999, the prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order dated January 26, 2000, the
trial court granted the motion and admitted the Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, thus:
Accordingly, the Order dated July 26, 1999 denying the motion to amend Information is hereby set
aside and the Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale is hereby admitted in substitution of the
other four Informations.
Moreover, considering that illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in a large scale shall
be considered an offense involving economic sabotage, let this case be forwarded to RTC, Branch 2, a
Special Criminal Court.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the trial court in its Order dated March 21,
2000.
On April 11, 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
58270.
In its Decision dated August 29, 2001, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. Likewise, in its Resolution
dated January 15, 2002, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue for our resolution is whether the four Informations for illegal recruitment could be amended and
lumped into one Information for illegal recruitment in large scale.
Petitioner contends that (a) Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure refers to an
amendment of one Information only, not four, which cannot be joined in only one Information; and that (b) the
amendment of the four Informations for illegal recruitment into a single Information for a graver offense
violates her substantial rights.
Respondent, on the other hand, prays that the petition be denied for lack of merit.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or
in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the
plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be
done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in
double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
(Emphasis ours)
Simply stated, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be
made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a
substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.3
Following the above provisions and considering that petitioner has not yet entered her plea, the four
Informations could still be amended.
Petitioner also contends that the above Rule refers to an amendment of one Information only, not four or
multiple Informations which cannot be joined into only one Information.
We disagree.
A careful scrutiny of the above Rule shows that although it uses the singular word complaint or information,
it does not mean that two or more complaints or Informations cannot be amended into only one Information.
Surely, such could not have been intended by this Court. Otherwise, there can be an absurd situation
whereby two or more complaints or Informations could no longer be amended into one or more Informations.
On this point, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court is relevant, thus:
SEC. 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
In fact, in Galvez v. Court of Appeals,4 before the accused were arraigned, this Court allowed the amendment
of three original Informations for homicide and frustrated homicide into four Informations for murder, frustrated
murder and illegal possession of firearms.
Petitioner contends that the amendment of the four Informations for illegal recruitment into a single
Information for illegal recruitment in large scale violates her substantial rights as this would deprive her of the
right to bail which she already availed of. Such contention is misplaced. Obviously, petitioner relies on Section
14 of the same Rule 110 which provides that "after the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused." As stated earlier, petitioner has not yet been arraigned. Hence, she cannot invoke the said
provision.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 58270 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Ynares-Santiago*, Corona, Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165751. April 12, 2005
DATU GUIMID P. MATALAM, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure assailing the
resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26381, admitting the Amended Information2 and
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration,3 dated 12 January 2004 and 03 November 2004,
respectively.
An information dated 15 November 2004 was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Datu Guimid
Matalam, Habib A. Bajunaid, Ansari M. Lawi, Muslimin Unga and Naimah Unte with violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, for their alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary
claims of Kasan I. Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon, Esmael A. Ebrahim, Annabelle Zailon, Pendatun Mambatawan,
Hyria Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil. The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That from the period January 1998 to June 1999, in Cotabato City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused ARMM Vice-Governor and Regional Secretary, DAR, DATU GUIMID MATALAM, a high
ranking public official, HABIB A. BAJUNAID, ANSARI M. LAWI, MUSLIMIN UNGA and NAIMAH UNTE, all
low-ranking public officials, committing the offense while in the performance of their official duties and taking
advantage of their public position, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did there and
then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, cause undue injury to several employees of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, cotabato City, thru evident bad faith in the performance of their official duties to wit: by
illegally and unjustifiably refusing to pay the monetary claims of the complaining DAR employees namely:
KASAN I. AYUNAN, ABDUL E. ZAILON, ESMAEL A. EBRAHIM, ANNABELLE ZAILON, PENDATUN
MAMBATAWAN, HYRIA MASTURA and FAIZAL I. HADIL, for the period of January 1998 to June 1999
amounting to P1,606,788.50 as contained in Civil Service Resolutions Nos. 982027 and 990415 in the nature
of unpaid salaries during the period when they have been illegally terminated, including salary differentials
and other benefits.4
On 14 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.
Per order of the court, a reinvestigation of the case was conducted where petitioner filed his Counter-
Affidavit.5
After the reinvestigation, the public prosecutor filed a "Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid Matalam"6 to which petitioner filed a
Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to the Motion to Admit the Alleged Amended Information Against the
Accused Guimid P. Matalam.7 Thereafter, the public prosecutor filed his Reply8 to which petitioner filed a
Rejoinder.
The Amended Information reads:
That on December 16, 1997 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in cotabato City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused a public officer being then the ARMM Vice-
Governor and Regional Secretary DAR, committing the offense while in the performance of his official duties
and thru evident bad faith and manifest partiality did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, cause
undue injury by illegally dismissing from the service complaining DAR-Maguindanao employees, cotabato
City, namely: Kasan I. Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon, Annabelle Zailon, Pendatum Mambatawan, Hyria Mastura
and Faizal I. Hadil, to their damage and prejudice amounting to P1,606,788.50 by way of unpaid salaries
during the period when they have been illegally terminated including salary differentials and other benefits.9
In his Motion to Dismiss, petitioner alleged that the amended information charges an entirely new cause of
action. The corpus delicti of the amended information is no longer his alleged refusal to pay the backwages
ordered by the Civil Service Commission, but the alleged willful, unlawful and illegal dismissal from the
service of the complaining witnesses. He insists that the amended information charging a separate and
entirely different offense cannot be admitted because there would be a serious violation of due process of law.
He claims he is entitled to a preliminary investigation since he was not informed that he is being charged for
the alleged dismissal of the complaining witnesses and that he was not given the opportunity to explain.
On 12 January 2004, the Sandiganbayan granted the Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid P. Matalam. It admitted the Amended
Information charging solely petitioner for Violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The court a quo ruled:
What seems to be more crucial here is, whether the amendments made are not prejudicial to the rights of the
accused and are considered as a matter of form only, so that, if the Amended Information is admitted, there
would be no need to require the Public Prosecutor to conduct another preliminary investigation in the
observance of the rights of the accused to due process. On the other hand, if the amendment would be
substantial, necessarily, another preliminary investigation should be accorded to the accused. Distinction of
the two is thus imperative.
...
The Amended Information charges essentially the same offense as that charged in the original Information
which is a Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Theoretically, therefore, the amendment is a matter of form
only.
Interestingly, however, the change in the recital of cause of action in the Amended Information is very much
noticeable. As correctly pointed out by accused Matalam, the corpus delicti in the original Information was the
alleged willful and confederated refusal of the accused to pay the backwages of the complaining witnesses.
The corpus delicti in the Amended Information is now altered into the alleged illegal dismissal of the
complainants from their service by accused Matalam. Certainly, the two causes of action differ differently from
each other.
Following the aforementioned principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the amendments seem to be
substantial considering that the main defense of all the accused in the original information – the lack of a
corresponding appropriation for the payment of the monetary claims of the complaining witnesses – would
not, in itself alone, stands [sic] as a defense for accused Matalam in the Amended Information anymore. In
the same manner, the evidence that accused Matalam would have to present in the original Information, had it
not been found to be without prima facie evidence, will not be equally available to bail him out in the Amended
Information anymore. And further, although the nature of the offense charged has not changed, the theory of
the case as against accused Matalam is now deemed to have been changed because the cause of action
now varies and therefore, he would have to formulate another defense again.
However, after making a meticulous and independent assessment on the evidence obtaining on record, this
Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the Public Prosecutor that the real and exact issue in
this case is actually the alleged illegal dismissal of the complaining witnesses. The issue of non-payment of
their backwages is merely incidental because had it not been for the alleged illegal dismissal, their demand
for monetary claims should have not arisen. Put in another perspective, the surrounding circumstances that
brought about the issue of the alleged illegal dismissal were actually the ones that spewed the issue of unpaid
backwages.
Furthermore, as correctly observed by the Public Prosecutor, the change in the recital of the cause of action
does not conceivably come as a surprise to the accused. In fact, in his counter-affidavit submitted before the
Public Prosecutor, accused Matalam already took the occasion to elaborate his version on the surrounding
circumstances that brought about the alleged illegal dismissal of the complaining witnesses. And these chain
of circumstances, actually, were the very preceding circumstances as to why the complaining witnesses had
suffered their alleged injury. The need for another preliminary investigation is therefore not necessary.
Given the foregoing factual milieu, the rights of accused Matalam are not, after all, in any way prejudiced
because an inquiry to the allegations in the original cause of action would certainly and necessarily elicit
substantially the same facts to the inquiry of the allegations in the new cause of action contained in the
Amended Information.
To remand this case again to the Public Prosecutor would certainly be a waste of time considering that
accused, in his counter-affidavit, had already explained extensively his defense on the new allegations
contained in the Amended Information sought to be admitted. And definitely, his projected defense would be
the same assuming that another preliminary investigation be conducted and that he would be required to
submit another counter-affidavit again.10
On 11 February 2004, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 which the prosecution opposed.12 On
03 November 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion.13 It explained:
While it is true that accused-movant’s defense in the original information could not by itself stand alone as his
defense to the amended one, however, the same would still be available for the latter because although the
two questioned causes of action literally varied, they are nonetheless interrelated with each other. The
essential ingredients of the amended information are actually identical with those constituting the original,
such that, the inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would
reveal. And since these two causes of action had emanated from the same set of factual settings, the
evidence that accused-movant might have under the original information would still be available and
applicable to the amended one.
Be it noted that the private complainants lodged their complaint due to the alleged injury they suffered as a
consequence of the alleged refusal of the accused-movant to pay them of their backwages. And notably,
based on the affidavit that the accused-movant had submitted, his defense to this was due to the lack of funds
appropriated for the said purpose. But why was there no appropriation? Because, allegedly, the private
complainants were illegally dismissed from their service and as a result thereof, their names were
subsequently stricken off from the roster of employees in the government agency where they were connected.
Culled from these factual settings, the root cause of the alleged injury suffered by the private complainants
would therefore be their alleged illegal dismissal from the service. Otherwise, their names would not have
been stricken off from the roster of employees in the agency which they were connected with and the
appropriation for the payment of their salaries would have been continuously made.
Thus, from the foregoing, although there was a change in the recital of the cause of action (from non-payment
of backwages into illegal dismissal), the amendment of the information did not however affect or alter the
nature of the offense that was originally charged. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution
since this remained to be a violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 on account of the alleged injury caused to the
private complainants. And even if the prosecution’s theory would now be premised on the new cause of action
(illegal dismissal), this would not however cause surprise to the accused-movant nor would require him to
undergo a material change or modification in his defense because in presenting his defense, he still has to
commence from the very same set of factual settings that preceded the original cause of action. And
evidently, this is the reason why in the affidavit he submitted during the reinvestigation, his discussions therein
consisted not only of his defense to the original information but also included an extensive discussion
regarding his defense to the amended one.
This being so, the outright admission of the amended information even without affording the accused-movant
a new preliminary investigation did not amount to a violation of his rights. To afford him another process of
preliminary investigation would no longer serve him and this court any better considering that he had already
explained in the said affidavit his defense to the amended information. Otherwise, if he is allowed to submit
another one, he is likely to elaborate again the very same arguments that he had already invoked in his
previous affidavit.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 12 January 2004 and 03 November 2004
admitting the Amended Information charging a new offense without conducting a preliminary investigation
were issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
From the arguments raised by petitioner, the issue boils down to whether or not petitioner was deprived of
due process of law when the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Information without conducting another
or new preliminary investigation. Firstly, petitioner maintains that a new preliminary investigation should have
been ordered because the corpus delicti in the Amended Information is the termination of services of the
complaining witnesses, while the corpus delicti in the Original Information is the alleged refusal to pay the
backwages of the complaining witnesses. In other words, there being a new and distinct offense, he should
be entitled to a new preliminary investigation. Secondly, he contends he was denied due process when the
Sandiganbayan ruled that if "he were allowed to submit another counter-affidavit, he is likely to elaborate
again the very same argument that he had invoked in his previous affidavit" considering that he would have
pointed out certain facts not contained in his counter-affidavit. He added that despite the finding of the
Sandiganbayan that "the theory of the case against him changed because the cause of action varies, and that
he would have to formulate another defense," the Sandiganbayan did not remand the case to the public
prosecutor for preliminary investigation because it was a waste of time since he had already explained
extensively in his counter-affidavit his defense on the new allegations contained in the Amended Information.
Thirdly, he asserts he was not given the opportunity to show that he did not act with manifest partiality and
evident bad faith in the dismissal of the seven employees inasmuch as there are other factors and
circumstances that would support his posture.
In its Comment, respondent People of the Philippines, thru the Office of the Special Prosecutor, stated that
the admission of the Amended Information without another preliminary investigation would not violate
petitioner’s right to due process on the ground that the amendment is merely formal, and to require another
preliminary investigation would not be in obedience to, but in disregard of, the prime purpose for which a
preliminary investigation is ordained by law and jurisprudence. It maintains that petitioner acted with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality in illegally terminating the complainants from service.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner filed his Reply.14
The initial question to be resolved is what kind of amendment was made in the Information?
Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice
to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes
any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice
to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and
copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
Before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may
be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with
leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial
amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.15
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of
the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.16
The following have been held to be merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the
range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not
charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations
which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the
form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial
right of the accused;17 (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the
information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something
which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the
crime charged.18
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment has been said to be whether a defense
under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any
evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other.
An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not
affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.19
In the case at bar, the amendment was indeed substantial. The recital of facts constituting the offense
charged was definitely altered. In the original information, the prohibited act allegedly committed by petitioner
was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of the private complainants, while in the
amended information, it is the illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants. However, it
cannot be denied that the alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay monetary claims is related to, and
arose from, the alleged illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants.
According to Retired Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, before the plea is taken, the information
may be amended in substance and/or form, without leave of court; but if amended in substance, the accused
is entitled to another preliminary investigation, unless the amended charge is related to or is included in the
original charge.20
Thus, the rule is: Before or after a plea, a substantial amendment in an information entitles an accused to
another preliminary investigation. However, if the amended information contains a charge related to or is
included in the original information, a new preliminary investigation is not required.
The Sandiganbayan and the public prosecutor maintain that petitioner is not entitled to a new preliminary
investigation because the charges in the original information and amended information are related and the
latter has already presented his defense on the amended charge. Further, remanding the case to the Public
Prosecutor for another preliminary investigation would be a waste of time considering that petitioner had
already explained extensively his defense on the new allegations contained in the Amended Information, that
is, the accused already elaborated his version on the surrounding circumstances that brought about the
alleged dismissal of the complaining witnesses. It added that the change in the recital of the cause of action
will not come as a surprise to the accused because the causes of action, though different, are nonetheless
interrelated, and that the rights of the accused will not be prejudiced since the inquiry to the allegations in the
original information will certainly and necessarily elicit substantially the same facts to the inquiry of the
allegations in the Amended Information.
On the other hand, petitioner insists he should be given a new preliminary investigation because he was not,
among other things, given the opportunity to show that he did not act with manifest partiality and evident bad
faith in the dismissal of the private complainants.
While it is true that the charges in the original and amended informations are related, i.e., an inquiry into one
would have elicited substantially, if not precisely, the same facts that an inquiry into the other would have
brought into light,21 this fact should not necessarily deprive an accused to his right to a new preliminary
investigation. As above-stated, the rule is that a new preliminary investigation is needed if there is a
substantial amendment. The exception, i.e., charge is related or included in the original information, should
not be applied automatically. The circumstances in every case must be taken into consideration before the
accused is deprived of another preliminary investigation.
The following indispensable elements must be established to constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act
No. 3019, as amended:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or private persons charged in
conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official duty in relation to his
public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the government or any private party, or gave any party any unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference to such parties.22
The third element of the offense states that the public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence in committing the prohibited act. Admittedly, the alleged illegal dismissal
contained in the amended charge gave rise to the original charge of failure to pay the monetary claims of
private complainants. It cannot be disputed that petitioner already discussed circumstances surrounding the
termination of services of the private complainants in his counter-affidavit. However, we find nothing therein
that would show that he had already touched the issue of evident bad faith or manifest partiality. As can be
gathered from the counter-affidavit, there were arguments tending to counter the presence of evident bad
faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence, but the same refer to the allegation of failure to pay
the monetary claims and not to the alleged illegal dismissal. Although one allegation stemmed from the other,
the court a quo and the public prosecutor cannot say the element of evident bad faith, manifest partiality or
gross inexcusable negligence is the same in both. This being an element of the offense charged, petitioner
should be given the opportunity to thoroughly adduce evidence on the matter.
If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation for the amended charge, his right will definitely
be prejudiced because he will be denied his right to present evidence to show or rebut evidence regarding the
element of evident bad faith and manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He will be denied due process.
A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive
right accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation would be to
deprive them of the full measure of their right to due process.23
Our rulings in the cases of People v. Magpale24 and Lava v. Gonzales25 where no new preliminary
investigation was given because the charges in the amended informations were related to, or included in, the
original charges cannot apply in the case at bar. The factual milieu in those cases is different from the case
before us.
In Magpale, the accused was charged with violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code for illegal
possession of iron brand, and making or ordering the making thereof. In the notices sent to the accused in
connection with the preliminary investigation of the complaint, the accused was informed not of one but of
both. He was given the chance, and was placed on guard, to defend himself for both charges. Moreover, the
right of the accused to have another preliminary investigation was waived when he went forward with the trial.
In Lava, the accused was charged with Complex Rebellion but the charge was later amended to Simple
Rebellion. This court held that a new preliminary investigation was not necessary there being no change in
the nature of the crime charged, and that accused failed to ask for a reinvestigation upon learning of the
amended information.
In the case of petitioner herein, although the charge remained the same (Violation of Section 3(e), Rep. Act
No. 3019, as amended), the prohibited act allegedly committed changed, that is, failure to pay monetary
claims to illegal dismissal, and he was not given the opportunity to submit his evidence on the absence or
presence of evident bad faith and manifest partiality as to the illegal dismissal. Petitioner has not waived his
right to a new preliminary investigation and, instead, is asking for one.
It is settled that the preliminary investigation proper, i.e., the determination of whether there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be subjected to the expense,
rigors and embarrassment of trial, is the function of the prosecution.26
Our ruling in this case does not in any way divest the public prosecutor of its duty under the Rules. This Court
is not determining if petitioner should or should not be brought to trial. What we are looking into is whether or
not petitioner was given all the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the amended charge.
Accordingly, finding that petitioner was not given the chance to fully present his evidence on the amended
information which contained a substantial amendment, a new preliminary investigation is in order.
As to statement of the court a quo that the conduct of another preliminary investigation would be merely a
waste of time, it must be emphasized that though the conduct thereof will hold back the progress of the case,
the same is necessary in order that the accused may be afforded his right to a preliminary investigation. The
right of the accused to a preliminary investigation should never be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of
expediency.
Finally, as to petitioner’s prayer that the Amended Information be quashed and dismissed, the same cannot
be ordered. The absence27 or incompleteness28 of a preliminary investigation does not warrant the quashal
or dismissal of the information. Neither does it affect the court’s jurisdiction over the case or impair the validity
of the information or otherwise render it defective. The court shall hold in abeyance the proceedings on such
information and order the remand of the case for preliminary investigation or completion thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Respondent court’s resolutions dated 12
January 2004 and 03 November 2004 in Criminal Case No. 26381 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Respondent court is directed to order the Office of the Ombudsman to forthwith conduct a preliminary
investigation of the charge embodied in the Amended Information filed against petitioner. It is further directed
to suspend the proceedings in the said case pending termination of the preliminary investigation, and
thereafter to take such action on petitioner’s case as may be warranted by the results of said preliminary
investigation.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 171271 August 31, 2006
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA, Appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of murder in an amended Information 1 that
reads:
That on or about the 12th of February, 2001, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation, treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab Evelyn Kho y Sua on the different parts of her body with the use of a
deadly weapon, thereby inflicting upon said Evelyn Kho y Sua stab wounds, which directly caused her death;
that the act was committed inside the dwelling of Evelyn Kho y Sua and with insult or in disregard of the
respect due to the offended party on account of his (sic) rank, age or sex.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are as follows:
Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho since 1998. The latter worked as the
managing partner of the Lawyer’s Advocate Circle, a law firm operated as a sole proprietorship, and located
at 2302 Atlanta Center, 31 Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Juan, M.M. Accused was initially paid P6,000.00 a
month as wages, aside from boarding, food, overtime and extra pay, which he received when he did extra
driving and other work for Atty. Sua-Kho’s family.
On February 12, 2001, at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening, the accused drove Atty. Sua Kho to her
condominium unit at 1702 Platinum 2000, Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Jun M.M. After handing his
employer’s bag to Marissa Hiso, the housemaid, accused proceeded to the kitchen where he drank a glass of
water. Also in the condominium unit were Atty. Sua-Kho’s three year old daughter Issa and her nanny, Nelie
Maglasang. After talking and playing with her daughter for a few minutes, Atty. Sua-Kho emerged from the
bedroom to talk with the accused. Shortly thereafter, Marrisa heard her employer screaming, and she saw the
accused stabbing her with their kitchen knife. She tried to stop the accused, shouting "Kuya Bert!", but the
latter continued to stab Atty. Sua-Kho. Meanwhile, Nelie also heard her employer’s screams, and locked
herself with Issa in the master’s bathroom. When she peeped-out from her hiding place, she saw Marissa,
whom she signaled to go downstairs for help. The latter did so, and sought help from the security guard.
Nellie, meanwhile called Atty. Sua-Kho’s father, Marcelino Sua, and husband, Daniel Kho, on the bedroom
phone.
When Marcelino Sua arrived, he saw Marissa and a security guard in front of the condominium unit. When
they entered, they saw the bloodied and unmoving body of Atty. Sua-Kho sprawled on the floor. Marcelino
then brought his daughter to the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital, where doctors tried to revive her, but
failed. The accused, meanwhile, fled, using the victim’s car. He was arrested soon afterwards in Calapan,
Mindoro, while on his way to his home province.
Upon examination of the victim’s body, Dr. Edgardo Rodriguez Vida found that she suffered eighteen (18) stab
wounds and three (3) incise wounds aside from other minor injuries. The stab wounds on her chest were
considered fatal as they affected both lungs, the main blood vessel of the heart and the heart itself. There
were four stab wounds on the heart, one on the right lung and four on the left lung. According to the doctor,
the wounds could have been caused by a sharp single-bladed object and that the incise wounds found on the
left forearm, right wrist and left leg could have been inflicted while Atty. Sua-Kho tried to parry the blows.
Marian Aquino, legal secretary of the Lawyer’s Advocate Circle, where the victim worked, related that prior to
the killing of Atty. Sua-Kho, the accused had confided to her about his grudges against the victim, such as
being given spoiled food, that his meals were being measured, that he worked long hours of the day and
served many bosses. On February 11, 2001, accused spent the day at her boarding house where he told her
he could no longer take the way Atty. Sua-Kho treated him. Later he said "nadedemonyo na ako" and that he
would finish Atty. Sua-Kho. He would hit her at the back, very deep, and he would make sure that she would
die. Then he would go to the province, his territory, where he could not be followed.
Atty. Joel Baguio, an associate at the Lawyer’s Advocate Circle, also testified that before the killing, the
accused told him of his grudges against Atty. Sua-Kho, like his being scolded for being late, and being called
a thief, a killer, and ex-convict and other bad names. On February 12, 2001, the accused also told him not to
get too close, as he might get involved in what was going to happen.
The accused, on the other hand, raised the defense of self-defense. Atty. Sua-Kho, he testified, didn’t want
her husband to know that she had been taking trips with a company guest, a certain Phillip Robinson, to
Puerto Azul and Daranak Falls in Tanay. She warned the accused that something bad would happen to him if
her husband would learn about it. In the evening of February 12, 2001, Atty. Sua-Kho urged accused to go to
her father’s house, because her husband Daniel Kho would be arriving. As she and the accused argued about
Phillip Robinson, the former got a knife and stabbed him with it, catching him on the wrist. Accused managed
to wrest control of the knife, and with it, stabbed Atty. Sua-Kho three or four times. After he stabbed her he
was shocked and left the place using the victim’s car. He fled to Mindoro where he allegedly surrendered to
the police. 2
On March 26, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused, Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the severe
penalty of death by lethal injection with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.
On the civil liability of the accused, he is ordered to pay the legal heirs of the victim actual, moral, nominal,
exemplary and temperate damages in the respective sums of P298,202.25, P50,000.00, P200,000.00,
P200,000.00 and P50,000.00. He is also ordered to pay the victim’s heirs P50,000.00 for the loss of the
victim’s life, all with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6 percent per annum from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 3
The case was elevated to this Court because the penalty imposed was death. However, pursuant to our ruling
in People v. Mateo, 4 the case was transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals. 5
On October 21, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS, in that, the accused-appellant, having been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder, is hereby sentenced to Death. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the following:
(1) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P298,202.25 as actual damages; and
(4) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
The awards of temperate and nominal damages are hereby DELETED.
Since the imposition of the death penalty in this case was affirmed, this Decision and the complete records of
this case are hereby ordered TRANSMITTED to the Supreme Court on automatic review, immediately upon
the promulgation of this Decision.
SO ORDERED. 6
The Court of Appeals disregarded appellant’s claim of self defense for lack of evidence and for being
incredible considering the number and location of wounds sustained by the victim and his flight from the crime
scene. It also noted that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime as there were no particulars as
to how the killing began or executed.
However, the appellate court found that evident premeditation was adequately established which qualified the
killing to murder. Likewise, it appreciated abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance.
As regards the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to the rank, sex and age of the victim, the
Court of Appeals noted that these circumstances were included as amendments to the information after the
presentation by the prosecution of its evidence. As such, the same should not be allowed because it will
prejudice the rights of the appellant.
In a Resolution dated March 7, 2006, we required both parties to file supplemental briefs. The Office of the
Solicitor General manifested that it will no longer be filing a supplemental brief. On the other hand, appellant
insisted on his theory of self defense and prayed for his acquittal.
We agree with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that appellant’s claim of self-defense is
self-serving hence should not be given credence. In Cabuslay v. People, 7 we ruled that:
One who invokes self defense admits responsibility for the killing. Accordingly, the burden of proof shifts to the
accused who must then prove the justifying circumstance. He must show by clear and convincing evidence
that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a stranger. With clear and convincing
evidence, all the following elements of self defense must be established: (1) unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person claiming self defense.
Appellant’s version of the stabbing incident does not inspire belief. His testimony that it was Atty. Sua-Kho
who attacked him is uncorroborated and improbable. Appellant’s alleged use of reasonable means to repel
the aggression is also untenable considering the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim which
demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend oneself. 8 We note that the victim
suffered 18 stab wounds which were all directed to her chest, heart and lungs. She also had incised wounds
which were inflicted while she was parrying the blows coming from the appellant. In fact, appellant testified
that Atty. Sua-Kho was running away from him but he still pursued her and inflicted the fatal wounds:
Q: According to you, Atty. launched at you and you covered and cut on your left hand and that was the time
you got the knife and what happened after that?
A: What I remember is that she went inside.
Q: So, she run (sic) away from you, is that what you are saying?
A: When I was hit and I was able to stab her, she ran towards the room.
Q: So she was trying to avoid [you] after she stabbed you the first time?
A: I do not know, what I know is that when I stabbed her, she went inside the room.
Q: What part of the body did you hit her the first time?
A: At the abdominal area, sir.
Q: After that initial wound, Atty. Kho run (sic) towards the room, is that correct?
A: What I remember, she run (sic), sir. 9
Moreover, appellant’s act of fleeing from the crime scene instead of reporting the incident to the police
authorities is contrary to his proclaimed innocence but highly indicative of guilt and negate his claim of self
defense. 10
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not present. Treachery
under paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate employment of
means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the intended victim might
raise. For treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution
which would ensure the safety of the offender from defensive and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the
victim no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) the means, method and manner of the execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the offender. 11 Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. 12
In the instant case, there is no proof on how the attack was commenced. Where no particulars are known as
to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim
began and developed, it can in no way be established from mere suppositions that the killing was perpetrated
by treachery. 13
We find however that evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength attended the killing.
Like any other circumstance that qualifies a killing as murder, evident premeditation must be established by
clear and positive evidence; 14 that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 15 The essence of premeditation is
that the execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and reflections upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. To be considered, the following
elements must be proven: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act
manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the
decision and the execution, to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 16
Prosecution witnesses Marian Aquino and Atty. Joel Baguio testified as to appellant’s state of mind and
predisposition to avenge the alleged maltreatment by the victim. Both witnesses testified on appellant’s ill-
plans against his employer the day prior to the crime. Absent evidence showing any reason or motive for the
witnesses to falsely testify against the appellant, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists
and their testimonies should be accorded full faith and credit. Thus, the lower courts correctly concluded that
evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime.
Appellant likewise took advantage of his superior strength to perpetuate the criminal act. He killed Atty. Sua-
Kho by overpowering her and driving the murder weapon into her body several times, despite her attempts to
parry the blows. He could not have executed the dastardly act without employing physical superiority over the
victim. In People v. Espina, 17 we have ruled that an attack by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed
and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the
weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.
We find, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the amendments in the information
regarding the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age or
sex. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, 18 provides that an amendment after the plea of the accused
is permitted only as to matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and such amendment is not
prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had
already been arraigned. 19
In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, 20 we had the occasion to distinguish between substantial and formal
amendments:
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of
the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the following have been held to be
merely formal amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the
court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense
different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the
prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has
or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused,
such as his right to invoke prescription.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is
whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the
amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might have would be equally
applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is
one of form and not of substance. 21
Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or
disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial,
amendment. These amendments do not have the effect of charging another offense different or distinct from
the charge of murder as contained in the original information. They relate only to the range of the penalty that
the court might impose in the event of conviction. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial
right of appellant. 22 Besides, appellant never objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on
account of rank, age or sex. 23 Without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived. 24
There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home. Appellant could have killed her elsewhere but
he decided to commit the crime at her home; thus we appreciate the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
However, it was not convincingly shown that appellant deliberately intended to offend or disregard the respect
due to rank, age, or sex of Atty. Sua-Kho. The motive for the murder was his grudge against the victim and
not because she was a lawyer and his employer. Neither did appellant took into consideration the age of Atty.
Sua-Kho and the fact that she is a woman when he killed her.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, 25 as amended by R.A. No. 7659, 26 prescribes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Considering the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation and the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, and taking advantage of superior strength
without any mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty would have been death. 27
However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty on June 24, 2006 28, the penalty that should be meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight
Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by
Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No.
7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as
they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of
the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Regarding damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest, in proper cases. 29
We affirm the monetary awards granted by the Court of Appeals but modify the amount of actual damages
and exemplary damages.
The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other
than the commission of the crime. Hence, based on recent jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity ex
delicto of P75,000.00 for the heirs Atty. Sua-Kho is in order.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or loss he
suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice and are aimed at repairing the wrong done. 30 To be
recoverable, actual and compensatory damages must be duly proved with reasonable degree of
certainty. 31 In the present case, the award of actual damages of P298,210.25 32 is correct, considering that
the said amount has been duly proven.
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in view of the violent
death of the victim and the resultant grief of her family.
Article 2230 of the Civil Code specifically states that exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, as in this case. Moreover, as an example and
deterrent to future similar transgressions, the Court finds that an award of P25,000.00 for exemplary damages
is proper.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01366, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga isfound GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
qualified by evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of
superior strength and dwelling, with no mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have
been death. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua without possibility of parole. The appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Atty. Evelyn
Sua-Kho, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P298,210.25 as actual damages; 50,000.00 as moral
damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; all with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 160451 February 9, 2007
EDUARDO G. RICARZE, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK (PCIBANK), Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 68492, and its Resolution2 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was employed as a collector-messenger by City Service Corporation, a
domestic corporation engaged in messengerial services. He was assigned to the main office of Caltex
Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati City. His primary task was to collect checks payable to Caltex and deliver
them to the cashier. He also delivered invoices to Caltex’s customers.3
On November 6, 1997, Caltex, through its Banking and Insurance Department Manager Ramon Romano,
filed a criminal complaint against petitioner before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City for estafa
through falsification of commercial documents. Romano alleged that, on October 16, 1997, while his
department was conducting a daily electronic report from Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank (PCIB)
Dela Rosa, Makati Branch, one of its depositary banks, it was discovered that unknown to the department, a
company check, Check No. 74001 dated October 13, 1997 in the amount of ₱5,790,570.25 payable to Dante
R. Gutierrez, had been cleared through PCIB on October 15, 1997. An investigation also revealed that two
other checks (Check Nos. 73999 and 74000) were also missing and that in Check No. 74001, his signature
and that of another signatory, Victor S. Goquinco, were forgeries. Another check, Check No. 72922 dated
September 15, 1997 in the amount of ₱1,790,757.25 likewise payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, was also cleared
through the same bank on September 24, 1997; this check was likewise not issued by Caltex, and the
signatures appearing thereon had also been forged. Upon verification, it was uncovered that Check Nos.
74001 and 72922 were deposited at the Banco de Oro’s SM Makati Branch under Savings Account No. S/A
2004-0047245-7, in the name of a regular customer of Caltex, Dante R. Gutierrez.
Gutierrez, however, disowned the savings account as well as his signatures on the dorsal portions thereof. He
also denied having withdrawn any amount from said savings account. Further investigation revealed that said
savings account had actually been opened by petitioner; the forged checks were deposited and endorsed by
him under Gutierrez’s name. A bank teller from the Banco de Oro, Winnie P. Donable Dela Cruz, positively
identified petitioner as the person who opened the savings account using Gutierrez’s name.4
In the meantime, the PCIB credited the amount of ₱581,229.00 to Caltex on March 29, 1998. However, the
City Prosecutor of Makati City was not informed of this development. After the requisite preliminary
investigation, the City Prosecutor filed two (2) Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents on June 29, 1998 against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch
63. The Informations are worded as follows:
Criminal Case No. 98-1611
That on or about the 24th day of September 1997 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a private individual, with intent to
defraud and intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of Caltex Philippines, Inc. through its duly
authorized officers/representatives, and by means of falsification of commercial document, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Caltex Phils., Inc., in the following manner, to wit: said accused,
having obtained possession of PCIBank check no. 72922 dated September 15, 1997 payable to Dante R.
Gutierrez, in the amount of Php1,790,757.50 with intent to defraud or cause damage to complainant Caltex
Phils., Inc., willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affixed or caused to be affixed signatures purporting to be
those of Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco, Caltex authorized officers/signatories, and of payee Dante R.
Gutierrez, causing it to appear that Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco have participated in the issuance
of PCIBank check no. 72922 and that Dante R. Gutierrez had endorsed it, when in truth and in fact, as said
accused well knew, such was not the case, since said check previously stolen from Payables Section of
CALTEX, was neither duly signed by Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco nor endorsed by Dante R.
Gutierrez, after the check, a commercial document, was falsified in the manner above set forth, the said
accused purporting himself to be the payee, Dante R. Gutierrez, deposited the check with Banco De Oro
under Account No. 2004-0047245-7, thereby appropriating the proceeds of the falsified but cleared check, to
the damage and prejudice of complainant herein represented by Ramon Romano, in the amount of
Php1,790,757.50.
Criminal Case No. 98-1612
That on or about the 15th day of October 1997 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a private individual, with intent to defraud
and intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of Caltex Philippines, Inc. through its duly authorized
officers/representatives, and by means of falsification of commercial document, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Caltex Phils., Inc., in the following manner, to wit: said accused, having
obtained possession of PCIBank check no. 74001 dated October 13, 1997 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, in
the amount of Php5,790,570.25 with intent to defraud or cause damage to complainant Caltex Phils., Inc.,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affixed or caused to be affixed signatures purporting to be those of Ramon
Romano and Victor Goquingco, Caltex authorized officers/signatories, and of payee Dante R. Gutierrez,
causing it to appear that Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco have participated in the issuance of PCIBank
check no. 74001 and that Dante R. Gutierrez had endorsed it, when in truth and in fact, as said accused well
knew, such was not the case, since said check previously stolen from Payables Section of CALTEX, was
neither duly signed by Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco nor endorsed by Dante R. Gutierrez, after the
check, a commercial document, was falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused purporting
himself to be the payee, Dante R. Gutierrez, deposited the check with Banco De Oro under Account No.
2004-0047245-7, thereby appropriating the proceeds of the falsified but cleared check, to the damage and
prejudice of complainant herein represented by Ramon Romano, in the amount of Php5,790,570.25.5
Petitioner was arraigned on August 18, 1998, and pleaded not guilty to both charges.6 Pre-trial ensued and
the cases were jointly tried. The prosecution presented its witnesses, after which the Siguion Reyna,
Montecillio and Ongsiako Law Offices (SRMO) as private prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of
Evidence.7 Petitioner opposed the pleading, contending that the private complainant was represented by the
ACCRA Law Offices and the Balgos and Perez Law Office during trial, and it was only after the prosecution
had rested its case that SRMO entered its appearance as private prosecutor representing the PCIB. Since the
ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices had not withdrawn their appearance, SRMO had no personality to
appear as private prosecutor. Under the Informations, the private complainant is Caltex and not PCIB; hence,
the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO should be stricken from the records.
Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the private complainant to
PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced. He pointed out, however, that the Informations can no longer
be amended because he had already been arraigned under the original Informations.8 He insisted that the
amendments of the Informations to substitute PCIB as the offended party for Caltex would place him in
double jeopardy.
PCIB, through SRMO, opposed the motion. It contended that the PCIB had re-credited the amount to Caltex
to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as
private complainant. Consequently, the PCIB is entitled to receive any civil indemnity which the trial court
would adjudge against the accused. Moreover, the re-credited amount was brought out on cross-examination
by Ramon Romano who testified for the Prosecution. PCIB pointed out that petitioner had marked in evidence
the letter of the ACCRA Law Office to PCIBank dated October 10, 1997 and the credit memo sent by PCIB to
Caltex.9
Petitioner filed a Motion to Expunge the Opposition of SRMO.10 In his Rejoinder, he averred that the
substitution of PCIB as private complainant cannot be made by mere oral motion; the Information must be
amended to allege that the private complainant was PCIB and not Caltex after the preliminary investigation of
the appropriate complaint of PCIB before the Makati City Prosecutor.
In response, the PCIB, through SRMO, averred that as provided in Section 2, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the erroneous designation of the name of the offended party is a mere formal defect
which can be cured by inserting the name of the offended party in the Information. To support its claim, PCIB
cited the ruling of this Court in Sayson v. People.11
On July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of the private prosecutor for the substitution
of PCIB as private complainant for Caltex. It however denied petitioner’s motion to have the formal offer of
evidence of SRMO expunged from the record.12 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC
denied on November 14, 2001.13
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Urgent Application for
Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals (CA,) praying for the annulment of the RTC’s Orders
of July 18, 2001 and November 14, 2001. The petitioner averred that:
I

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRIEVEOUSLY (SIC) ERRED IN RENDERING ITS ORDER ISSUED

WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION BY ALLOWING THE SUBSTITUTION OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, AFTER THE
ACUSED WAS ALREADY ARRAIGNED AND PROSECUTION HAS ALREADY TERMINATED
PRESENTING ITS EVIDENCE THEREBY PATENTLY VIOLATING THE STRICT CONDITION
IMPOSED UPON BY RULE 110 SEC. 14 RULES ON CRIMINAL ROCEDURE.

II

AND AS A COROLLARY GROUND RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RENDERING AN ORDER RECOGNIZING THE
APPEARANCE OF A NEW PROSECUTOR WITHOUT WRITTEN OR EVEN ORAL WITHDRAWAL
OF THE COUNSEL ON RECORD.14

According to petitioner, damage or injury to the offended party is an essential element of estafa. The
amendment of the Informations substituting the PCIBank for Caltex as the offended party would prejudice his
rights since he is deprived of a defense available before the amendment, and which would be unavailable if
the Informations are amended. Petitioner further insisted that the ruling in the Sayson case did not apply to
this case.
On November 5, 2002, the appellate court rendered judgment dismissing the petition. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition to annul the orders dated July 18, 2001 and November 14,
2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 98-1611 and 98-1612 is
hereby DENIED and consequently DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.15
The appellate court declared that when PCIB restored the amount of the checks to Caltex, it was subrogated
to the latter’s right against petitioner. It further declared that in offenses against property, the designation of
the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the
complaint or information can be properly identified. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in
People v. Ho16 and People v. Reyes.17
On October 17, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.18
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition which is anchored on the following grounds:
I. THE PEOPLE V. YU CHAI HO 53 PHILIPPINES 874 IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR
CONSIDERING THE PACTS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT.
II. LIKEWISE, THE CASE OF PEOPLE VS. REYES CA, 50 (2) OG 665, NOVEMBER 11, 1953 HAS
NO MATERIAL BEARING TO THE PRESENT CASE.
III. THE SUBSTITUTION OF PCIBANK WILL SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OF THE
PETITIONER HENCE, IT IS PROHIBITED BY SEC. 14 OF RULE 110.
IV. THERE IS NO VALID SUBROGATION BETWEEN CALTEX AND PCIBANK. ASSUMING THERE
IS, THE CIVIL CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED TO PROSECUTE.
V. THE TWIN INFORMATIONS UPON WHICH PETITIONER WAS INDICTED, ARRAIGNED, PRE-
TRIAL HELD AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TERMINATED THE PRESENTATION OF ITS EVIDENCE
IN CHIEF ARE DEFECTIVE AND VOID, HENCE THE DISMISSAL IS IN ORDER.
VI. PETITIONER TIMELY OBJECTED TO THE APPEARANCE OF PRIVATE PROSECUTOR FOR
PCIBANK.
 VII. THE FINDINGS OF MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT SUPORTED BY THE RECORD NOR
EVIDENCE AND BASED ON MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS.
VIII. PETITIONER’S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DID NOT VIOLATE THE
OMNIBUS MOTION RULE UNDER SEC. 8, RULE 15 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.19
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner argues that the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complainant at this late stage of the trial is
prejudicial to his defense. He argues that the substitution is tantamount to a substantial amendment of the
Informations which is prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 5, Rule 11020 of the Revised Rules of Rules, all criminal actions covered by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor. Thus, even if
the felonies or delictual acts of the accused result in damage or injury to another, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly instituted, and the offended party has not
waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted the civil action prior to the
criminal action, the prosecution of the action (including the civil) remains under the control and supervision of
the public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is a public function. Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel,
who will act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and
inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove to be costly,
burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The
multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the
two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The
prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing
the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain
social order.21
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the
private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the
accused.22 Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. – The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of
this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
On the other hand, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during
the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes
any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice
to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and
copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
Thus, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information
may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with
leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial
amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.23
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of
the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.24 The following have been held to be mere
formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might
impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or
distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s
theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an
amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce
new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in
the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.25
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence
defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An
amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect
the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.26
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial amendment.
The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to
petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the same, and all such
evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the
substitution.
Petitioner next argues that in no way was PCIB subrogated to the rights of Caltex, considering that he has no
knowledge of the subrogation much less gave his consent to it. Alternatively, he posits that if subrogation was
proper, then the charges against him should be dismissed, the two Informations being "defective and void due
to false allegations."
Petitioner was charged of the crime of estafa complex with falsification document. In estafa one of the
essential elements "to prejudice of another" as mandated by article 315 of the Revise Penal Code.
The element of "to the prejudice of another" being as essential element of the felony should be clearly
indicated and charged in the information with TRUTH AND LEGAL PRECISION.
This is not so in the case of petitioner, the twin information filed against him alleged the felony committed " to
the damage and prejudice of Caltex." This allegation is UNTRUE and FALSE for there is no question that as
early as March 24, 1998 or THREE (3) LONG MONTHS before the twin information were filed on June 29,
1998, the prejudice party is already PCIBank since the latter Re-Credit the value of the checks to Caltex as
early as March 24, 1998. In effect, assuming there is valid subrogation as the subject decision concluded, the
subrogation took place an occurred on March 24, 1998 THREE (3) MONTHS before the twin information were
filed.
The phrase "to the prejudice to another" as element of the felony is limited to the person DEFRAUDED in the
very act of embezzlement. It should not be expanded to other persons which the loss may ultimately fall as a
result of a contract which contract herein petitioner is total stranger.
In this case, there is no question that the very act of commission of the offense of September 24, 1997 and
October 15, 1997 respectively, Caltex was the one defrauded by the act of the felony.
In the light of these facts, petitioner submits that the twin information are DEFECTIVE AND VOID due to the
FALSE ALLEGATIONS that the offense was committed to the prejudice of Caltex when it truth and in fact the
one prejudiced here was PCIBank.
The twin information being DEFECTIVE AND VOID, the same should be dismissed without prejudice to the
filing of another information which should state the offense was committed to the prejudice of PCIBank if it still
legally possible without prejudicing substantial and statutory rights of the petitioner.27
Petitioner’s argument on subrogation is misplaced. The Court agrees with respondent PCIB’s comment that
petitioner failed to make a distinction between legal and conventional subrogation. Subrogation is the transfer
of all the rights of the creditor to a third person, who substitutes him in all his rights.28 It may either be legal or
conventional. Legal subrogation is that which takes place without agreement but by operation of law because
of certain acts.29 Instances of legal subrogation are those provided in Article 130230 of the Civil Code.
Conventional subrogation, on the other hand, is that which takes place by agreement of the parties. 31 Thus,
petitioner’s acquiescence is not necessary for subrogation to take place because the instant case is one of
legal subrogation that occurs by operation of law, and without need of the debtor’s knowledge.
Contrary to petitioner’s asseverations, the case of People v. Yu Chai Ho32 relied upon by the appellate court
is in point. The Court declared –
We do not however, think that the fiscal erred in alleging that the commission of the crime resulted to the
prejudice of Wm. H. Anderson & Co. It is true that originally the International Banking Corporation was the
prejudiced party, but Wm. H. Anderson & Co. compensated it for its loss and thus became subrogated to all
its rights against the defendant (article 1839, Civil Code). Wm. H. Anderson & Co., therefore, stood exactly in
the shoes of the International Banking Corporation in relation to the defendant's acts, and the commission of
the crime resulted to the prejudice of the firm previously to the filing of the information in the case. The loss
suffered by the firm was the ultimate result of the defendant's unlawful acts, and we see no valid reason why
this fact should not be stated in the information; it stands to reason that, in the crime of estafa, the damage
resulting therefrom need not necessarily occur simultaneously with the acts constituting the other essential
elements of the crime.
Thus, being subrogated to the right of Caltex, PCIB, through counsel, has the right to intervene in the
proceedings, and under substantive laws is entitled to restitution of its properties or funds, reparation, or
indemnification.
Petitioner’s gripe that the charges against him should be dismissed because the allegations in both
Informations failed to name PCIB as true offended party does not hold water.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the
place wherein the offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same Rule provides:
Section. 12. Name of the offended party. –The complaint or information must state the name and surname of
the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or
nickname by which such person has been or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be
described under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property must be
described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed
is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be inserted in the
complaint or information and the record.
(c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or any name or
designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified, without need of averring that it is a
juridical person or that it is organized in accordance with law. (12a)
In Sayson v. People,33 the Court held that in case of offenses against property, the designation of the name
of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint
or information can be properly identified:
The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state the name and surname of the
person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed or any appellation or nickname
by which such person has been or is known and if there is no better way of Identifying him, he must be
described under a fictitious name (Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule 110, Section 12 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] In case of offenses against property, the designation of the name of
the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or
information can be properly identified. Thus, Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 11. Name of the offended party-
…
(a) In cases of offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property,
subject matter of the offense, must be described with such particularity as to properly Identify the
particular offense charged.
(b) If in the course of the trial, the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed is disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause the true name to be inserted
in the complaint or information or record.
…
In U.S. v. Kepner [1 Phil. 519 (1902)], this Court laid down the rule that when an offense shall have been
described in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to Identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the
person injured shall be deemed immaterial as the same is a mere formal defect which did not tend to
prejudice any substantial right of the defendant. Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which had a factual
backdrop similar to the instant case, where the defendant was charged with estafa for the misappropriation of
the proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed without authority, the erroneous allegation in the complaint to
the effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of the owner of the cheque, when in reality the bank which
cashed it was the one which suffered a loss, was held to be immaterial on the ground that the subject matter
of the estafa, the warrant, was described in the complaint with such particularity as to properly Identify the
particular offense charged. In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime against property under the Revised
Penal Code, since the check, which was the subject-matter of the offense, was described with such
particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of convicting the
accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended party was actually Mever Films and not
Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the information.
Lastly, on petitioner’s claim that he timely objected to the appearance of SRMO34 as private prosecutor for
PCIB, the Court agrees with the observation of the CA that contrary to his claim, petitioner did not question
the said entry of appearance even as the RTC acknowledged the same on October 8, 1999.35 Thus,
petitioner cannot feign ignorance or surprise of the incident, which are "all water under the bridge for [his]
failure to make a timely objection thereto."36
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

EN BANC
June 30, 1987
G.R. No. L-53373
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th
Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL,
RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by
the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review,
may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an
information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set for arraigment the accused
filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the
Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an
order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion
for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to
August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. 3
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused
in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the
Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further
orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition
be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ
and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in
the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. 7
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for
review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for
immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy
of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given
time to file an opposition thereto.10 On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the
arraigniment stating:
ORDER
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal premised on insufficiency of
evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion
wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the reason that the check
involved having been issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer can
only be civil and not criminal.
The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not
before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards
the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is
considered as without merit and therefore hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the
moming.
 SO ORDERED. 11
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of
preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as
CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals
against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. 13 In a decision
of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23,
1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of
February 19, 1980. 15
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that said
decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to
proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the information filed not
valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the
obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition
required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss, within ten (10) days from
notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given due course, it
being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the comment and a separate
conunent to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the
Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of February
26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the petition.
Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that
respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon
the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not fonow that
presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The reason for placing the criminal
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by
private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power
vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to
the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the
jurisdiction of their office. 21 They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation
they become convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 22
It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence of a puma
facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's
discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel
the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence
relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has the Court any power to order the fiscal to
prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's
discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for
insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error. 26 The fiscal
may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either
that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash
of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the
offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither
an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal
prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly
administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an op pressive and vindictive
manner. 30
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to
the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe
elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or
opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the rase be
filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. 31
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. 32 When after the filing of
the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the
accused either voluntarily submited himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in
the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action
against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such
stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. 34 While it is true that
the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court
or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be
proper in the rase thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court, 35 The only qualification
is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of the
People to due process of law. 36a
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a
review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the
exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for
the proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the
directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to
handle the case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that there is
a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying
the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple.1âwphi1 The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done
and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his
opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the
prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the
accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for
the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution
of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and
void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn
over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the
Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the
case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge
on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable,
refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the
Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 154629 October 5, 2005
SPO4 MARINO SOBERANO, SPO3 MAURO TORRES and SPO3 JOSE ESCALANTE, Petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In November 2000, the prominent public relations practitioner, Salvador "Bubby" Dacer, together with his
driver, Emmanuel Corbito, was abducted along Zobel Roxas St. in the City of Manila. Their charred remains,
consisting of burnt bones, metal dental plates and a ring, were later found in Barangay Buna Lejos, Indang,
Cavite. They were positively identified by their dentists and by forensic pathologists from the University of the
Philippines.1 Both victims were killed by strangulation.2
A preliminary investigation was conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ) through a panel of prosecutors
made up of State Prosecutor II Ruben B. Carretas, State Prosecutor Geronimo L. Sy and Prosecution
Attorney Juan Pedro C. Navera.
On 11 May 2001, an Information3 was filed by the panel of prosecutors with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
City of Manila.4 The following were charged with double murder:
Jimmy L. Lopez
Alex B. Diloy
William L. Lopez
(all detained)
SPO4 Marino Soberano
SPO3 Mauro Torres
SPO3 Jose Escalante
Crisostomo M. Purificacion
Digo De Pedro
Renato Malabanan
Jovencio Malabanan
Margarito Cueno
Rommel Rollan
(all under the custody of PNP-CIDG Camp Crame, Quezon City)
P/Supt. Glen Dumlao
P/C. Insp. Vicente Arnado
P/Insp. Roberto Langcauon
SPO4 Benjamin Taladua
SPO1 Rolando Lacasandile
P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva
SPO1 Mario Sarmiento
SPO1 William Reed
PO2 Thomas J. Sarmiento
SPO1 Ruperto A. Nemeno
John Does and James Does
(all at large)
The Information reads:
That on or about November 24, 2000 in Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, some of whom are public officers, being then members of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Force assigned at Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
(SPO4 Soberano, SPO3 Torres, SPO3 Escalante, P/Supt. Dumlao, P/C. Insp. Arnado, P/Insp. Langcauon,
SPO4 Taladua, SPO3 Villanueva, SPO1 Sarmiento, SPO1 Reed, PO3 Lacasandile, PO1 Sarmiento and
SPO1 Nemeno), with evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength, nighttime and remoteness
of the place and with deliberate intent to kill, conspiring, confabulating and confederating with one another, the
accused police officers using their offices in committing the offense, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously kill SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL CORBITO by strangulation, which was the
immediate cause of their death, and thereafter dispose of their body (sic) by incineration, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter’s respective heirs.
The case was raffled to RTC, Branch 41, Manila, presided by Judge Rodolfo A. Ponferrada.
On 23 May 2001, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information5 which was granted and the
Amended Information was admitted by the trial court.
The Amended Information6 reads:
That on or about November 24, 2000 in Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, some of whom are public officers, being then members of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Force assigned at Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
(SPO4 Soberano, SPO3 Torres, SPO3 Escalante, P/Supt. Dumlao, P/ C. Insp. Arnado, P/Insp. Langcauon,
SPO4 Taladua, SPO3 Villanueva, SPO1 Sarmiento, SPO1 Reed, PO3 Lacasandile, PO1 Sarmiento and
SPO1 Nemeno), abduct SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL CORBITO at the corner of
Osmeña Highway (formerly South Super Highway) and Zobel Roxas Street in Manila, and later
brought them to Indang, Cavite, and with evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength,
nighttime and remoteness of the place and with deliberate intent to kill, conspiring, confabulating and
confederating with one another, the accused police officers using their offices in committing the offense, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill said SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL
CORBITO by strangulation, which was the immediate cause of their death, and thereafter dispose of their
body by incineration, to the damage and prejudice of the latter’s respective heirs.
On 24 May 2001, Soberano, Escalante, Torres, Purificacion, Renato Malabanan, Jovencio Malabanan and
Rollan moved to quash the Information.
Accused P/Supt. Glen Dumlao was subsequently arrested. He later executed a sworn statement implicating
other police officers to the Dacer-Corbito double murder, specifically P/Supt. Michael Ray B. Aquino, P/Supt.
Cesar Mancao, PO3 Larry Ambre and a certain Rigor,7 all former members of the defunct Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF).
On 18 June 2001, one of the accused, P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asserting
that he was mistakenly identified as a participant in the double murder. He stressed that it was not him but a
certain "SPO3 Allan Cadenilla Villanueva" who was previously identified by several witnesses as one of the
culprits.8 This was granted by the trial court.
On 26 June 2001, in view of the sworn statement executed by Dumlao, the prosecution filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation9 which was granted by the trial court in its Order10 dated 04 July 2001. The prosecution was
ordered to terminate the reinvestigation and submit its findings within twenty (20) days. The arraignment was
set on 30 July 2001.
On 28 June 2001, the trial court denied the joint Motion to Quash the Information earlier filed by Soberano,
Escalante, Torres, Purificacion, Renato Malabanan, Jovencio Malabanan and Rollan.
On 02 August 2001, the National Bureau of Investigation filed a new complaint with the DOJ against a new
suspect in the same case, by the name of P/Sr. Supt. Teofilo Viña, who was also a member of the PAOCTF.
After the reinvestigation, the prosecution filed a Motion to Discharge dated 13 August 2001, praying that
P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva11 be discharged from the Information, and that he be immediately released from
detention. In its Order12 dated 16 August 2001, the trial court granted the motion.
A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information13 dated 17 September 2001 was filed by the
prosecution. The Amended Information ---
(1) discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Lopez and Glen Dumlao as they are now
witnesses for the State;
(2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva; and
(3) charged as additional accused P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao II and P/Sr. Supt.
Teofilo Viña.
Accused Soberano, Torres, Escalante, Purificacion, Renato and Jovencio Malabanan opposed the
Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information in an Opposition14 dated 28 September 2001. They
prayed that the Motion to Admit Amended Information and the discharge of accused Dumlao, Diloy and the
brothers Lopez be denied.
In its Order dated 01 October 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to Admit Amended Information. The
prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in an Order15 dated 24 October 2001.
On 16 November 2001, the prosecution moved in open court to inhibit Judge Ponferrada from hearing the
case. Acting on this motion, Judge Ponferrada, on 22 November 2001, ordered that the case be re-raffled.
The case was re-raffled to Branch 18, RTC, Manila, presided by Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio.
On 04 January 2002, the prosecution filed a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order before the Supreme Court praying that the Orders of then Judge Ponferrada
dated 01 and 24 October 2001 be annulled and set aside and that Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio of Branch 18
be restrained, in the meantime, from proceeding with the case in accordance with said orders. In a
Resolution16 dated 21 January 2002, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action.
On 04 April 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision,17 the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE
and the writ prayed for, accordingly GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated October 01, 2001 and October 24,
2001 which were issued by JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA in Criminal Case No. 01-191969, entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Jimmy Lopez, et al." are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
JUDGE PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR. or any person or persons acting in his stead, is/are hereby
ORDERED to ADMIT the Amended Information dated September 17, 2001 substituting SPO3 ALLAN
CADENILLA VILLANUEVA for P/Insp. DANILO VILLANUEVA as accused, and charging P/Senior Supt.
MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, P/Senior Supt. CEZAR MANCAO II and P/Senior Supt. TEOFILO VIÑA as
additional accused, and discharging or excluding only the accused JIMMY L. LOPEZ, WILLIAM L. LOPEZ
and ALEX B. DILOY and to CONTINUE with the proceedings therefrom with utmost deliberate dispatch.
Needless to state, the original information filed on May 11, 2001 stands insofar as P/Senior Supt. GLEN(N) G.
DUMLAO is concerned.18
Accused Soberano, Escalante and Torres moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision. In
a Resolution19 dated 12 August 2002, the motion was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order20 dated 28 August 2002
filed by Soberano, Torres and Escalante where they assign as errors the following:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE PONFERRADA GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE ADMISSION OF THE AMENDED INFORMATION.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPLYING SECTION 14 OF RULE 110 OF THE REVISED RULES ON
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (RRCP) IN ALLOWING THE DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED DILOY AND THE
LOPEZ BROTHERS.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION WAS TANTAMOUNT
TO A PRIOR LEAVE OF COURT AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 14 OF RULE 110 OF THE RRCP.
IV
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT APPLYING SECTION 17 OF RULE 119 OF THE RRCP IN THE
DISCHARGE OF THE ACCUSED.
V
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RESTRICTING THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 17 OF RULE 119 OF THE
RRCP TO A SITUATION WHERE THE ACCUSED HAS ALREADY BEEN ARAIGNED AND UNDERGOING
TRIAL.
Gathered from the above assignment of errors, the fundamental issue that must be resolved concerns the
duty of a trial court judge when confronted with a motion to admit amended information excluding some of the
accused named in the original information for utilization as witnesses for the State. The key lies in the correct
interpretation of two pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, i.e., Section 14 of Rule
110 on amendment of information and Section 17 of Rule 119 on the discharge of an accused as state
witness.
Section 14, Rule 110 states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during
the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes
any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice
to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and
copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
On the other hand, Section 17, Rule 119 provides:
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. – When two or more persons are jointly charged with
the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct
one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state
when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state
witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the
motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The trial court, in denying the prosecution’s motion to admit amended information discharging some accused,
ratiocinated that to admit said amended information would be violative of Section 17, Rule 119, thus:
After study, it appearing that the Amended Information not only includes new accused, namely, SPO3 Allen
Villanueva, P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao and P/Supt. Teofilo Viña but excludes or
discharges certain accused, namely, Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Diloy and Glenn Dumlao from
the original Information to be used as state witnesses, the Court is not inclined to grant the motion as it
believes and so holds that in the discharge of the accused to be state witnesses the provisions of Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be observed and/or complied with. Stated
otherwise, to grant the motion and admit the Amended Information outright would violate said section which is
quoted as follows. . . .21
The Court of Appeals held the contrary view. It reasoned that Section 14, Rule 110 is applicable in the instant
case and not Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
To begin with, it is undeniable, and it is necessary to point out, that Criminal Case No. 01-191969 has already
been filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila on May 11, 2001. The Motion to Admit was filed later or on
September 18, 2001.
While it is true that once the information is filed in court, the court acquires complete jurisdiction over it, We
are not unmindful of the well-settled ruling of the Supreme Court that the determination of who should be
criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one.
Section 14, Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
reads –
"Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during
the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
"However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes
any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice
to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and
copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
"If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial."
Applying the import of the afore-quoted Section 14, Rule 110, it appears that the Amended Information sought
to be admitted by the petitioner finds sufficient support therein, considering, firstly, that there has been no
arraignment yet. Secondly, when respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA granted the motion for
reinvestigation in the Order dated July 04, 2001, there was in effect a prior leave of court given to the State
Prosecutors of the Department of Justice to conduct the same, substantially complying with such requirement
under the second paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110. After all, a leave of court is defined a "permission
obtained from a court to take some action which, without such permission, would not be allowable: as, to sue
a receiver, to file an amended pleading, to plead several pleas."
In the case of People v. Montesa, Jr., the Supreme Court’s pertinent ruling, which We now reiterate, finds
application in the case at bench, i.e., where a judge grants a motion for reinvestigation [as in this case], he is
deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-
called new relevant and material evidence and to determine whether the information it has filed should stand,
and that the final disposition on the reinvestigation should be the sole and only valid basis for the judge’s final
action with respect to the reinvestigation.
Thus, in accord with the aforesaid Montesa, Jr. ruling, respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA’s
"sole and only basis" for the inclusion (or exclusion, for that matter) of the additional accused should be the
final disposition on the reinvestigation conducted by the State Prosecutors of the Department of Justices.
Consistent with the foregoing disquisition, We hold the opinion that Section 17, Rule 119 (Trial), . . . is not
applicable under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bench, although in the case of Guingona, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, We are mindful of the Supreme Court’s clarification that only when an information,
charging two (2) or more persons with a certain offense, has already been filed in court will Section 9, Rule
119 (Trial) of the Rules of Court [now 100% restated under Section 17, Rule 119 (Trial) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure] "come into play."
Section 17, Rule 119 (Trial), contemplates a situation wherein the Information is already filed, the accused is
already arraigned, undergoing trial and the prosecution has not rested its case.
Here, although the original Information has already been filed, the four (4) accused sought to be discharged
or excluded from the Amended Information have not been arraigned and no trial has been commenced. Thus,
the discharge or exclusion being sought by the petitioner may come under the purview of Republic Act No.
6981, a special law which the Department of Justice is called upon to enforce and implement. Considering
that the State Prosecutor’s disposition on the investigation in Criminal Case No. 01-191969 should be the
sole and only valid basis of respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA in considering whether the
Amended Information sought to be admitted should stand or not, it follows that the discharge/exclusion of the
four (4) accused under Republic Act No. 6981 must be directed by the Department of Justice, not by the
court a quo. Needless to say, Section 9, Rule 119 [of the Rules of Court] does not support the proposition
that the power to choose who shall be state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. It is not constitutionally
impermissible for Congress to enact Republic Act No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power
to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from
prosecution.22 (Emphasis in original)
The petitioners submit that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure on amendment of complaints. Instead, what should have been applied was
Section 17 of Rule 119 on the discharge of an accused as witness for the state. The petitioners further aver
that even if it is only a simple discharge under Section 14 of Rule 110, it is still necessary to seek prior leave
of court. The prosecution simply filed an Amended Information excluding Jimmy and William Lopez, Alex Diloy
and Glen Dumlao, without prior leave of court, and moved for its admission.23
The petitioners also argue that while the determination of who should be criminally charged is essentially an
executive function, the discharge of an accused when an Information had already been filed lies with the
court.24 Further, the petitioners assert that the Motion For Reinvestigation which was approved by the trial
court is not tantamount to a Motion For Leave to File an Amended Information as required under Section 14 of
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.25
In answer to all these, the prosecution contends that the admission of the Amended Information was not
violative of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, contrary to the opinion of the
trial court.26
The prosecution insists that Judge Ponferrada should have just required it to present evidence in support of
the discharge for had this procedure been followed, the fact of admission of the accused sought to be
discharged into the Witness Protection Program (WPP) would have come to light.27
The prosecution likewise professes that Section 14, Rule 110 should be applied, and not Section 17, Rule 119
for the following reasons: first, while the case was already filed in court, the accused therein have not yet
been arraigned; second, the trial court ordered the reinvestigation of the case; and third, new evidence dictate
the necessity to amend the Information to include new accused and to exclude other accused who will be
utilized as state witnesses.28
There can be no quarrel as to the fact that what is involved here is primary an amendment of an information
to exclude some accused and that the same is made before plea. Thus, at the very least, Section 14, Rule
110 is applicable which means that the amendment should be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with
notice to the offended party and with leave of court. What seems to complicate the situation is that the
exclusion of the accused is specifically sought for the purpose of discharging them as witnesses for the State.
The consequential question is, should the requirements for discharge of an accused as state witness as set
forth in Section 17, Rule 119 be made as additional requirements (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 and Section 17,
Rule 119) or should only one provision apply as ruled by the trial court and the Court of Appeals (i.e., Section
14, Rule 110 or Section 17, Rule 119)?
An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or one of the accused must be
made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court in
compliance with Section 14, Rule 110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion of
the accused. Thus, said provision applies in equal force when the exclusion is sought on the usual ground of
lack of probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the accused as state witness, as in this case, or on some
other ground.
At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the need for the prosecution to present
evidence and the sworn statement of each state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge do not yet
come into play. This is because, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the determination of who
should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one. 29 The
prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute
our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range
of discretion – the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.30 By virtue of the trial court having
granted the prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the authority of
the prosecutorial arm of the Government.31 Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the
prosecution is thus equipped with discretion -- wide and far reaching – regarding the disposition thereof.
The foregoing discussion is qualified by our decision in the seminal case of Crespo v. Mogul,32 wherein we
declared that:
. . . Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of
the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be
submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been
brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be
addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not
impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
Thus, as in almost all things, the prosecution’s discretion is not boundless or infinite. The prosecution must
satisfy for itself that an accused excluded from the information for purposes of utilizing him as state witness is
qualified therefor.
The situation is different in cases when an accused is retained in the information but his discharge as state
witness is sought thereafter by the prosecution before it rests its case, in which event, the procedural (in
addition to the substantive) requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 apply. Otherwise stated, when no
amendment to the information is involved as a by-product of reinvestigation and trial proceeds thereafter, the
discharge of the accused falls squarely and solely within the ambit of Section 17, Rule 119. It is fitting then to
re-state the rule in Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals33 that –
. . . [T]he decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in character. Only when an
information, charging two or more persons with a certain offense, has already been filed in court will Rule 119,
Section 934 of the Rules of Court, come into play. . . .
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is in a situation where the accused to be discharged is included in the
information that the prosecution must present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state
witness at a hearing in support of the discharge in order to convince the judge, upon whom discretion rests,
as to the propriety of discharging the accused as state witness.
Having thus ruled, it now behooves upon this Court to determine whether the Court of Appeals was correct in
admitting the amended information insofar as the discharge of JIMMY L. LOPEZ, WILLIAM LOPEZ and ALEX
B. DILOY is concerned.
It is undisputed that the motion to admit amended information seeking the exclusion of the above-named
accused (together with P/Sr. Supt. GLEN G. DUMLAO) was with notice to the offended party and was set for
hearing. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s grant of the prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation
operates as leave of court to amend the information, if the situation so warrants.
Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we agree with the Court of Appeals considering that we do not
perceive here any impairment of the substantial rights of all the accused or the right of the people to due
process.
As we have discussed earlier in this decision, the trial court is with discretion to grant or deny the amendment
of the information. In general, its discretion is hemmed in by the proscription against impairment of the
substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law. In this case, in denying the
motion to admit amended information, the trial court simply said that the same was violative of Section 17,
Rule 119 without stating the reasons therefor. And for this lapse, the trial court has indeed erred.
One final point. In the Decision of the Court of Appeals, it held that the discharge or exclusion of P/Sr. Supt.
Glen Dumlao from the Amended Information finds no legal basis under Republic Act No. 6981 35 for he is a
law enforcement officer. The original information, according to the Court of Appeals, should stand insofar as
Dumlao is concerned.
Section 3, Rep. Act No. 6981 provides:
SEC. 3. Admission into the Program. – Any person who has witnessed or has knowledge or information on
the commission of a crime and has testified or is testifying or about to testify before any judicial or quasi-
judicial body, or before any investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program:
Provided, That:
a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code,
or its equivalent under special laws;
b) his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
c) he or any member of his family within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity is subjected to
threats to his life or bodily injury or there is a likelihood that he will be killed, forced, intimidated, harassed or
corrupted to prevent him from testifying, or to testify falsely, or evasively, because or on account of his
testimony; and
d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying against other law enforcement officers. In
such a case, only the immediate members of his family may avail themselves of the protection provided for
under this Act.
If the Department, after examination of said applicant and other relevant facts, is convinced that the
requirements of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations have been complied with, it shall admit
said applicant to the Program, require said witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his knowledge or
information on the commission of the crime, and thereafter issue the proper certification. For purposes of this
Act, any such person admitted to the Program shall be known as the Witness.
It must be stressed that Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 6981 enumerates the requirements before a person may be
admitted to the WPP. It does not state that if an accused cannot be admitted to the WPP, he cannot be
discharged as a witness for the state. Admission to the WPP and being discharged as an accused are two
different things. Dumlao’s being a law enforcement officer and, thus, disqualified to be under the WPP, do not
in any way prohibit him to be discharged from the information.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 04 April
2002 and 12 August 2002, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION to include P/Sr.
Supt. GLEN G. DUMLAO as one of the accused excluded from the Amended Information dated 17
September 2001. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 203041 June 5, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MOISES CAOILE, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The accused-appellant challenges in this appeal the March 21, 2012 Decision1 promulgated by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03957, which affirmed with modification the judgment2 of conviction for two
counts of Rape rendered against him by Branch 32 of the Agoo, La Union Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Family Court Case Nos. A-496 and A-497.
Accused-appellant Moises Caoile (Caoile), in two separate Amended Informations filed before the RTC on
January 5, 2006, was charged with two separate counts of Rape of a Demented Person under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
FAMILY COURT CASE No. A-496
That on or about April 6, 2005, in the Municipality of Rosario, La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing the mental disability of the victim, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one AAA,3 a demented person with a
mental age of seven (7) years old against her will and, to her damage and prejudice.4
FAMILY COURT CASE No. A-497
That on or about May 12, 2005, in the Municipality of Rosario, La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing the mental disability of the victim, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one [AAA], a demented person with a
mental age of seven (7) years old against her will and, to her damage and prejudice.5
Caoile pleaded not guilty to both charges upon his arraignment6 for both cases on March 1, 2006. After the
completion of the pre-trial conference on March 8, 2006,7 joint trial on the merits ensued.
The antecedents of this case, which were succinctly summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
Evidence for the Prosecution
[AAA], the herein victim, was left in the care of her grandmother and auntie in Alipang, Rosario, La Union
when her mother left to work abroad when she was still young. One of their neighbors was the accused
whose daughter, Marivic, was the playmate of [AAA].
One day, the accused invited [AAA] to go to the bamboo trees in their place. Upon reaching thereat, the
accused directed [AAA] to lie down on the ground. [AAA] followed the instruction of the accused whom she
called uncle Moises. Thereafter, the accused removed [AAA]’s short pants and panty and inserted his penis
into her vagina. [AAA] felt pain but she did not do anything. After two minutes or so, the accused removed his
penis inside [AAA]’s vagina. [AAA] stood up and wore again her short pants and panty. Before the accused
allowed [AAA] to go home, the former gave the latter a medicine, which she described as a red capsule with
white casing, with the instruction of taking the same immediately upon reaching home. As instructed by her
uncle Moises, [AAA] took the medicine as soon as she got home.
Four (4) days thereafter, and while [AAA] was at the pumping well near their house, the accused invited her to
gather guavas at the mountain. [AAA] accepted her uncle Moises’s invitation. At the mountain, the accused
led [AAA] to lie down, and then he removed her short pant[s] and panty. Thereafter, the accused inserted his
penis inside the vagina of [AAA]. After the sexual intercourse, the accused and [AAA] gathered guavas, and
went home.
One day, while [AAA] was sleeping in their house, Marivic woke her up and invited her to play at their house.
At the accused’s house, and while [AAA] and Marivic were playing, the accused invited [AAA] to gather santol
fruits. [AAA] went with the accused, and once again the accused had carnal knowledge of her.
Sometime in April 2005, [AAA] heard her friend, [BBB], complaining to Lucio Bafalar, a Barangay Tanod, that
the accused mashed her breast. Upon hearing the story of [BBB], [AAA] blurted out that she, too, was abused
by the accused.
[CCC], [AAA]’s aunt, immediately went home to Rosario when she learned that her niece was raped by the
accused, and together with [AAA] and Barangay Captain Roming Bartolome they went to the Rosario Police
Station to report the incident. After executing their respective affidavits, [AAA] was examined by Dr. Claire
Maramat at San Fernando, La Union.
After examining [AAA] on June 21, 2005, Dr. Claire Maramat found out that [AAA]’s genitalia suffered a
multiple hymenal laceration which, at the time of the examination, was already healed, thus, possibly, it was
inflicted a week or months prior to the examination. According to Dr. Maramat, a multiple hymenal laceration
may be caused by several factors, such as trauma to the perineal area or penetration of a penis.
Dr. Maramat also took seminal fluid from the vagina, the cervix and the cervical canal of [AAA], and forwarded
the same to Dr. Brenda Rosuman, a pathologist at the Ilocos Training and Regional Medical Center (ITRMC),
for examination.
Dr. Rosuman testified that after examining the seminal fluids taken from [AAA], she found the presence of
spermatozoa, which means that [AAA] had sexual intercourse, and the predominance of coccobacilli,
meaning that [AAA] could be suffering from infection caused by hygiene or acquired through sexual
intercourse. She further testified that, according to some books, spermatozoa can live in the vaginal tract
within 17 days from sexual intercourse. She clarified, however, that in her medical experience, she rarely finds
spermatozoa in a specimen beyond three (3) days.
Claire Baliaga, a psychologist of the Philippine Mental Health Association, Baguio-Benguet Chapter, testified
that she conducted a psychological evaluation on [AAA] on August 10, 2007; that [AAA] obtained an overall
score performance of 55, which is classified within the mental retardation range; and that [AAA] has the
mental age of a seven-year, nine-month old child who is inadequate of sustaining mental processes and in
solving novel problems employing adoptive strategies.
Dr. Roderico V. Ramos, a psychiatrist of the ITRMC, testified that he evaluated the mental condition of [AAA],
that after psychiatric evaluation, [AAA] was given a diagnosis of moderate mental retardation; that a person
who is mentally retardate do not function the way his age required him to be; that [AAA] was eighteen (18)
years old at the time he examined her, but the mental functioning of her brain is around five (5) to six (6) years
old; and that [AAA] can only do what a five or six-year old child could do.
Dr. Ramos further testified that generally a mentally retardate cannot finish primary education. He, however,
explained that parents of mentally retardates begged the teachers to give passing marks to their
sons/daughters, and out of pity, they would be able to finish primary education.8
Evidence for the Defense
Accused Moises Caoile knew [AAA] because they were neighbors. [AAA] was, in fact, a playmate of his
children and a frequent visitor in their house. When accused and [AAA] became familiar with one another, the
latter would go to the former’s house even when the children were not there, and they would talk and tease
each other.
In the year 2005, the wife of the accused worked at the town proper of Rosario, La Union. The wife would
leave early in the morning, and returned home late at night. More often than not, the accused was left alone in
the house since all his children were attending school. It was during his so called alone moments that the
accused courted [AAA]. He gave her money, chocolates or candies. Time came when [AAA] would stay at the
accused’s house, from Monday to Sunday, with or without the children. Soon thereafter, accused and [AAA]
found themselves falling in love with one other. As lovers, they had their intimate moments, and their first
sexual intercourse happened on April 6, 2005 on the mountain. From then on, the accused and [AAA]
repeatedly had sexual intercourse, and most of which were initiated by [AAA], especially their sexual
intimacies in Agri Motel, Pangasinan.
During their relationship, [AAA] suggested that they [live] together as husband and wife. The accused refused
because he cannot leave his family.
The accused did not know that [AAA] was a demented person since she acted like a normal individual. In fact,
she went to a regular school and she finished her elementary education.
The accused did not force himself on [AAA]. [AAA] knew that he is a married man, but she, nonetheless,
loved him without reservation.
The defense moved that it be allowed to have [AAA] be evaluated by a psychiatrist of its own choice. As
prayed for the defense, [AAA] was evaluated by Dr. Lowell A. Rebucal of the Department of Psychiatry,
Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. In his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Rebucal concluded that
[AAA] is suffering from Mild Mental Retardation.9
Ruling of the RTC
On May 6, 2009, after weighing the respective evidence of the parties, the RTC rendered its Joint Decision
finding Caoile guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:
1. In FC Case No. A-496, accused Moises Caoile is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) and Article 266-B of
Republic Act No. 8353, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. In FC Case No. A-497, accused Moises Caoile is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) and Article 266-B of
Republic Act No. 8353, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
3. The accused is further ordered to indemnify the private complainant the amounts of ₱50,000.00 for
each count of rape as compensatory damages and ₱50,000.00 for each count of rape as moral
damages.10
Caoile elevated the RTC ruling to the Court of Appeals, claiming that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt by attacking the credibility of AAA and the methods used to determine her mental state.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated March 21, 2012, in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03957, the Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification the RTC decision. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Joint Decision dated May 6, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court
("RTC"), First Judicial Region, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, in Family Court Case Nos. A-496 and A-497,
entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Moises Caoile, Accused," finding appellant Moises Caoile
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape is AFFIRMED with modification in that aside from
civil indemnity and moral damages, appellant Moises Caoile is ORDERED to indemnify [AAA] exemplary
damages amounting to ₱30,000.00 for each count of rape.11 (Citation omitted.)
Issue
Caoile is now before this Court, on appeal,12 with the same lone assignment of error he posited before the
Court of Appeals,13 to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF TWO COUNTS OF RAPE.14
In essence, Caoile is attacking the credibility of AAA, and claims that she might not be a mental retardate at
all, having been able to give categorical and straightforward answers during her testimony. Moreover, Caoile
avers that it has not been shown that AAA underwent the proper clinical, laboratory, and psychometric tests to
arrive at the conclusion that she fell within the range of mental retardation. Caoile argues that while it is true
that his denial and sweetheart defenses are generally deemed weak and unavailing, his conviction should
nevertheless be founded on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and not on the flaws of his
defenses.15
This Court’s Ruling
Caoile was tried and convicted of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) in relation to Article 266-B,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Said provisions read:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
xxxx
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
xxxx
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
Validity of the Amended Informations
Taking a cue from the Court of Appeals, this Court would like, at the outset, to address the validity of the
Amended Informations vis-à-vis the crime Caoile was actually convicted of.
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides for two circumstances when
having carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is considered rape:
1. Paragraph 1(b): when the offended party is deprived of reason x x x; and
2. Paragraph 1(d): when the offended party is x x x demented.16
Caoile was charged in the Amended Informations with rape of a demented person under paragraph 1(d). The
term demented17 refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality,
characterized by marked decline from the individual’s former intellectual level and often by emotional apathy,
madness, or insanity.18 On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1(b) has been
interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. 19 Thus, AAA, who
was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is "deprived of
reason," and not one who is "demented."
The mistake, however, will not exonerate Caoile.1âwphi1 In the first place, he did not even raise this as an
objection. More importantly, none of his rights, particularly that of to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him,20 was violated. Although the Amended Informations stated that he was being
charged with the crime of rape of a demented person under paragraph 1(d), it also stated that his victim was
"a person with a mental age of seven (7) years old." Elucidating on the foregoing, this Court, in People v.
Valdez,21 held:
For a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or
the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements
of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his
defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.
Thus, the erroneous reference to paragraph 1(d) in the Amended Informations, did not cause material and
substantial harm to Caoile. Firstly, he simply ignored the error. Secondly, particular facts stated in the
Amended Informations were averments sufficient to inform Caoile of the nature of the charges against him.
Mental Condition of AAA
Caoile’s insistence, to escape liability, that AAA is not a mental retardate, cannot be accepted by this Court.
The fact that AAA was able to answer in a straightforward manner during her testimony cannot be used
against her. The capacity of a mental retardate to stand as a witness in court has already been settled by this
Court. In People v. Castillo,22 we said:
It bears emphasis that the competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have
been upheld by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capably and consistently.
Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainant’s accusations, it even lends greater credence to her
testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the
details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the accused. Moreover, it is
settled that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she
has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the exacting standard of credibility needed
to convict the accused. (Citations omitted.)
More importantly, AAA’s medical condition was verified not only by one expert, but three witnesses – a
psychologist and two psychiatrists, one of whom was even chosen by the defense and testified for the
defense. All three experts confirmed that AAA suffered from mental retardation. Caoile cannot, at this point,
properly impeach his own witness without violating established rules of evidence.
This Court further disagrees with Caoile’s claim that the experts "merely impressed that they conducted a
psychological evaluation on [AAA] in which she obtained a performance classified within the mental
retardation range."23 The experts’ findings on AAA’s mental condition were based on several tests and
examinations, including the Stanford-Binet Test,24 which Caoile, relying on this Court’s ruling in People v.
Cartuano, Jr., considered as one of the more reliable standardized tests.26 Besides, this Court has already
qualified the applicability of Cartuano in cases involving mentally deficient rape victims, to wit:
People v. Cartuano applies only to cases where there is a dearth of medical records to sustain a finding of
mental retardation. Indeed, the Court has clarified so in People v. Delos Santos, declaring that the records in
People v. Cartuano were wanting in clinical, laboratory, and psychometric support to sustain a finding that the
victim had been suffering from mental retardation. It is noted that in People v. Delos Santos, the Court upheld
the finding that the victim had been mentally retarded by an examining psychiatrist who had been able to
identify the tests administered to the victim and to sufficiently explain the results of the tests to the trial
court.27 (Citations omitted.)
Borrowing our words in People v. Butiong,28 "in direct contrast to People v. Cartuano, this case did not lack
clinical findings on the mentality of the victim." Here, the psychiatric evaluation report of Caoile’s own expert
witness is the final nail on the coffin of Caoile’s argument.
In addition, this Court will not contradict the RTC’s findings, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
absent any valid reason. The trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility is given great weight and is
even conclusive and binding upon this Court.29 In People v. Sapigao, Jr.,30 we explained in detail the
rationale for this practice:
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note
their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in determining the
truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. For,
indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness’
credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity and can take advantage of these aids. These cannot be
incorporated in the record so that all that the appellate court can see are the cold words of the witness
contained in transcript of testimonies with the risk that some of what the witness actually said may have been
lost in the process of transcribing. As correctly stated by an American court, "There is an inherent impossibility
of determining with any degree of accuracy what credit is justly due to a witness from merely reading the
words spoken by him, even if there were no doubt as to the identity of the words. However artful a corrupt
witness may be, there is generally, under the pressure of a skillful cross-examination, something in his
manner or bearing on the stand that betrays him, and thereby destroys the force of his testimony. Many of the
real tests of truth by which the artful witness is exposed in the very nature of things cannot be transcribed
upon the record, and hence they can never be considered by the appellate court."
Carnal Knowledge of a
Mental retardate amounts to Rape
Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. This is because a mentally deficient person is automatically considered
incapable of giving consent to a sexual act. Thus, what needs to be proven are the facts of sexual intercourse
between the accused and the victim, and the victim’s mental retardation.31
Verily, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish that AAA is a mental retardate. Anent the fact of
sexual congress, it is worthy to note that aside from the prosecution’s own testimonial and documentary
evidence, Caoile never denied being physically intimate with AAA. In fact, he has confirmed such fact, and
even claimed that he and AAA often had sex, they being sweethearts.
Sweetheart Defense
Unfortunately, such defense will not exculpate him from liability. Carnal knowledge of a female, even when
done without force or intimidation, is rape nonetheless, if it was done without her consent. To expound on
such concept, this Court, in People v. Butiong,32 said:
In rape committed by means of duress, the victim’s will is nullified or destroyed. Hence, the necessity of
proving real and constant resistance on the part of the woman to establish that the act was committed against
her will. On the other hand, in the rape of a woman deprived of reason or unconscious, the victim has no will.
The absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Such lack of will may exist not only when the victim
is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also when she is suffering some mental deficiency impairing
her reason or free will. In that case, it is not necessary that she should offer real opposition or constant
resistance to the sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge of a woman so weak in intellect as to be incapable of
legal consent constitutes rape. Where the offended woman was feeble-minded, sickly and almost an idiot,
sexual intercourse with her is rape. Her failure to offer resistance to the act did not mean consent for she was
incapable of giving any rational consent.
The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is enough. Cohabitation
with a feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape. Sexual intercourse with an insane woman was considered rape.
But a deafmute is not necessarily deprived of reason. This circumstances must be proven. Intercourse with a
deafmute is not rape of a woman deprived of reason, in the absence of proof that she is an imbecile. Viada
says that the rape under par. 2 may be committed when the offended woman is deprived of reason due to any
cause such as when she is asleep, or due to lethargy produced by sickness or narcotics administered to her
by the accused. x x x.
Consequently, the mere fact that Caoile had sexual intercourse with AAA, a mental retardate, makes him
liable for rape under the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Defense of Lack of knowledge of
AAA’s mental condition
Similarly, Caoile’s allegation that he did not know that AAA was mentally retarded will not suffice to overturn
his conviction.
The Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the rape of a mentally disabled person regardless of the
perpetrator’s awareness of his victim’s mental condition. However, the perpetrator’s knowledge of the victim’s
mental disability, at the time he committed the rape, qualifies the crime and makes it punishable by
death33 under Article 266-B, paragraph 10, to wit:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxxx
10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the
offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.
There is no sufficient evidence to establish the qualifying circumstance of knowledge by Caoile of AAA’s
mental disability. The trial court and the Court of Appeals which did not make any finding on the said
qualifying circumstance correctly convicted said accused of simple rape only.
This Court finds the award of damages as modified by the Court of Appeals in order.1âwphi1 Pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence,34 however, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on
all damages awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03957 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant MOISES CAOILE is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape in Family Court Case Nos. A-496 and A-497 under
subparagraph (b) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape. The award of civil indemnity and moral damages, both in the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00), and exemplary damages in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(₱30,000.00), all for each count of rape, are maintained, subject to interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of this judgment. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157472 September 28, 2007
SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by SSGT. Jose M.
Pacoy1 (petitioner) seeking to annul and set aside the Orders dated October 25, 2002 2 and December 18,
20023 issued by Presiding Judge Afable E. Cajigal (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac in Criminal Case No. 02-42.
On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner committed as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle
hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which caused his
instantaneous death.
With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank.4
On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to
the charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial conference and trial on October 8, 2002.5
However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order,6 likewise
dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in
view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public respondent
registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.
Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word "Homicide" and
instead wrote the word "Murder" in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The
accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide, with the
correction of the spelling of the victim’s name from "Escuita" to "Escueta."7
On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to be re-arraigned for
the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in double
jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his express consent, resulting in
the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the
public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.8
On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending the
Resolution of the Instant Motion9 on the ground of double jeopardy. Petitioner alleged that in the Information
for Homicide, he was validly indicted and arraigned before a competent court, and the case was terminated
without his express consent; that when the case for Homicide was terminated without his express consent,
the subsequent filing of the Information for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double jeopardy.
In an Order10 dated October 25, 2002,11 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. He ruled that a
claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double jeopardy and cannot be sustained unless
judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant in the former prosecution; that petitioner was
never acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the Information for Homicide was merely corrected/or
amended before trial commenced and did not terminate the same; that the Information for Homicide was
patently insufficient in substance, so no valid proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the allegation
of aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank," the crime of Homicide is qualified to Murder.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged
that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the
amendment of the charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and existing
jurisprudence.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent, which constitutes a ground to quash the information for murder; and
that to try him again for the same offense constitutes double jeopardy. Petitioner stated that contrary to
respondent judge's conclusion that disregard of rank qualifies the killing to Murder, it is a generic aggravating
circumstance which only serves to affect the imposition of the period of the penalty. Petitioner also argued
that the amendment and/or correction ordered by the respondent judge was substantial; and under Section
14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this cannot be done, since petitioner had already
been arraigned and he would be placed in double jeopardy.
In his Order dated December 18, 2002,12 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit and granted the
Motion for Reconsideration, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Inhibit is hereby DENIED while the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
Unless ordered otherwise by the Highest Court, the presiding judge shall continue hearing this case. Further,
the Order dated October 25, 2002 is reconsidered and the original information charging the crime of homicide
stands.13
In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code shows that "disregard of rank" is merely a generic mitigating 14 circumstance which
should not elevate the classification of the crime of homicide to murder.
On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari on the following grounds:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS
JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO
MURDER.
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN
DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION FOR MURDER.
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS
JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE
INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE WHICH WAS ALREADY TERMINATED.15
Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the charge of Homicide, the public
respondent ordered the amendment of the Information from Homicide to Murder because of the presence of
the aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank," which is in violation of Section 14, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; that the public respondent’s ruling that "disregard of rank" is a
qualifying aggravating circumstance which qualified the killing of 2Lt. Escueta to murder is erroneous since,
under paragraph 3, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, disregard of rank is only a generic aggravating
circumstance which serves to affect the penalty to be imposed upon the accused and does not qualify the
offense into a more serious crime; that even assuming that disregard of rank is a qualifying aggravating
circumstance, such is a substantial amendment which is not allowed after petitioner has entered his plea.
Petitioner next contends that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he denied the Motion
to Quash the Information for Murder, considering that the original Information for Homicide filed against him
was terminated without his express consent; thus, prosecuting him for the same offense would place him in
double jeopardy.
Petitioner further argues that although the respondent judge granted his Motion for Reconsideration, he did
not in fact grant the motion, since petitioner's prayer was for the respondent judge to grant the Motion to
Quash the Information for Murder on the ground of double jeopardy; that his Motion for Reconsideration did
not seek the reinstatement of the Information for Homicide upon the dismissal of the Information for Murder,
as he would again be placed in double jeopardy; thus, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in reinstating the Homicide case.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent judge's Order reinstating the Information to
Homicide after initially motu proprio ordering its amendment to Murder renders herein petition moot and
academic; that petitioner failed to establish the fourth element of double jeopardy, i.e., the defendant was
acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent;
that petitioner confuses amendment with substitution of Information; that the respondent judge's Order dated
September 12, 2002 mandated an amendment of the Information as provided under Section 14, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; and that amendments do not entail dismissal or termination of the
previous case.
Private respondent Col. Olimpio Escueta, father of the victim, filed his Comment alleging that no grave abuse
of discretion was committed by the respondent judge when he denied petitioner's Motion to Quash the
Amended Information, as petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy; that the proceedings under the first
Information for homicide has not yet commenced, and the case was not dismissed or terminated when the
Information was amended.
In his Reply, petitioner reiterates his contention that the amendment of the charge of Homicide to Murder after
his arraignment would place him in double jeopardy, considering that said amendment was without his
express consent; and that such amendment was tantamount to a termination of the charge of Homicide.
The parties filed their respective Memoranda.
Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is highly improper, for it violates the established policy
of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. However, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-
clad rule.16 A strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought
before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.17
In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the proper legal interpretation of the
provisions on amendment and substitution of information under the Rules of Court. It also involves the issue
of double jeopardy, one of the fundamental rights of the citizens under the Constitution which protects the
accused not against the peril of second punishment but against being tried for the same offense. These
important legal questions and in order to prevent further delay in the trial of the case warrant our relaxation of
the policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
amending the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge in the Information for
Homicide. The argument of petitioner --
Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already terminated without his express
consent, he cannot anymore be charged and arraigned for Murder which involve the same offense. The
petitioner argued that the termination of the information for Homicide without his express consent is
equivalent to his acquittal. Thus, to charge him again, this time for Murder, is tantamount to placing the
petitioner in Double Jeopardy.18
is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or substitution under Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to wit --
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice
to the rights of the accused.
xxx
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double
jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. - When it becomes manifest at any
time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot
be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not
be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to
answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.
First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under Section 14, Rule 110. For this
purpose, Teehankee v. Madayag19 is instructive, viz:
The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second
paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made before or
after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves
a substantial change from the original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of
information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and
the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation
is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial
amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the
accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy.
On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different
offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused
cannot claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14,
Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the
second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new
information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in
order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would
be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first,
or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said
to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is
alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily
included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting
the latter.20
In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal
amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined in Teehankee.
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only change
made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the
crossing out of word "Homicide" and its replacement by the word "Murder." There was no change in the recital
of facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments
in the amended Information for Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original
Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of
2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and
preamble from "Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal.21
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the accused has
already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of
whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a
defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint
or information.22 Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended Information are identical
with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of
the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that "disrespect on account of rank" qualified the crime to
murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance,23 we do not find that he committed any
grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded
not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was only formal and did not adversely affect
any substantial right of petitioner.
Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the charge from
Homicide to Murder; and subsequently, from Murder back to Homicide. Petitioner's claim that the respondent
judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the Amended Information for
Murder on the ground of double jeopardy is not meritorious.
Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds:
xxxx
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy may
prosper, to wit:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to
the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as in the first.24
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted
or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.25
It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case that bars further
prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof; or prosecution
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.26
Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case for homicide without his
express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced.
Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or unconditional dismissal which
terminates the case.27 And for the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of
acquittal.1âwphi1
The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial prosecutor to correct and amend
the Information but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense
as contemplated under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court -- which, for
convenience, we quote again --
If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy.
The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
and Section 19, Rule 119, which provides:
SEC. 19.- When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense - When it becomes manifest at any
time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot
be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not
be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to
answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.
Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense charged is wholly
different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not
charged in the information even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a
substitution of a new information charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not apply to a second
information, which involves the same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first information. In this connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.28
Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely ordered the
amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was the same
original information that was amended by merely crossing out the word "Homicide" and writing the word
"Murder," instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.
Anent the last issue, petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in ordering that
the original Information for Homicide stands after realizing that disregard of rank does not qualify the killing to
Murder. That ruling was again a violation of his right against double jeopardy, as he will be prosecuted anew
for a charge of Homicide, which has already been terminated earlier.
We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.
A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent judge granted petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that double jeopardy exists, but on his realization that
"disregard of rank" is a generic aggravating circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the victim to
murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating the original Information for Homicide. The requisite of
double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second is not present, considering that
petitioner was neither convicted nor acquitted; nor was the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.29
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent Judge.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: