G.R. No.

125799               August 21, 2003

DANILO CANSINO AND LINDA DE JESUS, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE, RTC OF KALOOCAN CITY, BR. 120
AND SPS. FRANCISCO E. CASTRO and ROSARIO B. CASTRO and,CESAR L.
CRUZ, SHERIFF IV, RTC KALOOKAN CITY, BR. 120, Respondents.

Having gone through the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), an appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and a petition
for certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA), this ejectment case is now before
this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

The case stemmed from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by respondent
spouses Francisco and Rosario Castro against Danilo Cansino, Linda de Jesus
and Elena Mesa1 before the Metropolitan Trial Court. The subject matter of the
controversy is a parcel of land located at Maligaya Park Subdivision, Kalookan
City. In their complaint, respondents alleged that petitioners, "by strategy and
stealth unlawfully constructed their respective houses inside plaintiffs(’)
(herein respondents) aforementioned parcel of land." 2 In their answer with
counterclaim, petitioners Cansino and de Jesus averred that their possession
was "premised upon the honest belief that the lot they were and are still
occupying was a public land;" that they "had been in possession of the subject
premises ever since 1977;" and that "the failure (of herein respondents) to
allege when possession of defendants (herein petitioners) started and taken
cognizance of by plaintiffs (herein respondents) created (sic) doubts" as to the
jurisdiction of the MeTC.3

The MeTC took cognizance of the case and treated the complaint as one for
ejectment under the Rules on Summary Procedure. It ordered the parties to
submit their respective affidavits and those of their witnesses along with their
other evidence. Thereafter, the MeTC in its decision dated August 12, 1994,
dismissed the complaint holding that in an ejectment case, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving prior physical possession of the property. Respondents failed
to discharge the burden.4

On appeal with the RTC of Kalookan City, Br. 120, the court, on January 11,
1995, affirmed in toto the decision of the MeTC. It held that respondents were
not able to present evidence of their actual possession of the property prior to
that of petitioners, while the latter were able to prove their possession of the
property since 1977.5

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration where they appended more

documentary evidence showing their ownership over the subject property, as
well as the ownership and possession of their predecessors-in-interest. On
March 14, 1995, the RTC reversed its previous decision. It ruled that
respondents were able to prove the ownership and possession of their
predecessors-in-interest, which dated back to 1964, way before the 1977
possession of petitioners. Moreover, it rejected the claim of petitioners that the
subject land is public property since it has been proven that the lot is titled
and the title has been transferred to respondents on January 29, 1993. The
title being incontrovertible after a year, petitioners can no longer assail it. The
court considered petitioners as intruders or squatters on the subject lot. 6

Thus, petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. They
assailed the right of the RTC to decide the issue of ownership without any fair
trial and the propriety of the action of the RTC in considering the documentary
evidence attached by respondents in their motion for reconsideration which
were not made part of the position paper they (respondents) previously
submitted.7

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioners
were unable to substantiate their possession of the property. Their "occupancy
is at best due to the tolerance of the registered owners, private respondent
spouses." Moreover, "since respondents had prior legal possession of the
property, they had in their favor priority of time that legally entitles them to
stay in the said property." 8 With regard to the action taken by the RTC in
considering the documentary evidence attached only in the motion for
reconsideration, the appellate court ruled that under Section 5, Rule 135 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the RTC has the inherent power to amend and
control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
justice.9

Petitioners brought the case at bar to this Court on a petition for review on
certiorari. They raise the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 5, RULE 135 OF THE REVISED RULES OF

COURT IS APPLICABLE IN A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHERE
DOCUMENTS IN THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ARE NOT TO BE
CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE TO PROVE SUPERVENING EVENTS.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE A CLEAR RIGHT TO

POSSESS THE SUBJECT LAND.10

Anent the first issue, Section 5, Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 5. Inherent powers of courts. – Every court shall have the power:

(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice;

The Court of Appeals upheld the RTC in reconsidering its prior decision on the
basis of new evidence attached to the motion for reconsideration on the ground
that it is the inherent right of the court to amend and control its processes. It
further ruled that procedural technicalities should not override substantial
justice.11

We disagree. It is true that the rules provide that courts have the inherent
power to amend their decisions to make them conformable to law and justice.
This prerogative, however, is not absolute. The rules do not contemplate
amendments that are substantial in nature. 12 They merely cover formal
changes or such that will not affect the crux of the decision, like the correction
of typographical or clerical errors. Courts will violate due process if they make
substantial amendments in their decisions without affording the other party
the right to contest the new evidence presented in a motion for
reconsideration.

Under Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party may file a motion for
reconsideration on the ground, among others, that "x x x, the evidence is
insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or the decision or final order is
contrary to law."13 It requires the motion to point out specifically the findings or
conclusions of the judgment or final order which are not supported by the
evidence or which are contrary to law, making specific reference to the
testimonial or documentary evidence presented or to the provisions of law
alleged to be violated.14

It is implicitly clear from Rule 37 that a motion for reconsideration cannot be

used as a vehicle to introduce new evidence. Petitioners correctly contend that
if respondents wanted to present further evidence, they should have filed a
motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. However, for newly
discovered evidence to warrant a new trial, (a) it must have been discovered
after trial, (b) it could not have been discovered or produced at the trial despite
reasonable diligence, (c) it must be material and not merely collateral,
cumulative, corroborative or purely for impeaching a witness, merely important
evidence being not enough, and (d) if presented, would probably alter the
result of the action.15

In the case at bar, respondents attached for the first time in their motion for
reconsideration, evidence to prove their ownership over the parcel of land
subject matter of this controversy. This cannot be countenanced. For one,
possession is the only issue in a case for unlawful detainer. 16 More importantly,
there is no justification for the delay in presenting said evidence. We note that
although it was respondents who filed an appeal to the RTC, they failed to
submit their memorandum as required by the said court. 17 It was only after the
RTC rendered an unfavorable decision that respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration and appended their new evidence. Piecemeal presentation of
evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.

But considering the totality of evidence, we still rule in favor of

petitioners.1âwphi1 Respondents appended to its motion for reconsideration
the following evidence: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-45212 issued on
August 16, 1972 in the name of the predecessors-in-interest of respondents,
Estrella Crisostomo and Azucena Bantug; 18 Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
262332 issued on January 29, 1993 in the name of respondent spouses
Francisco and Rosario Castro;19 Contract to Sell between Maligaya Park and
Leticia Flores and Estrella Crisostomo dated May 4, 1962; 20 Location Plan
showing the site of the contested parcel of land; 21 and Real Property Tax
Receipts for the years 198822 and 1993.23

The titles presented by respondents do not necessarily prove their right to

possession, especially since there is a separate case for the investigation of the
true status of the land formerly in the name of Biyaya Corporation from where
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest obtained their title. 24 Neither
will the contract to sell and the location plan prove possession. Lastly, the tax
receipts presented by respondents covered only the years 1988 and 1993. The
failure of respondents to present the receipts covering the years before 1988
and between 1988 and 1993, despite the claim that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had possession over the property during these years,
creates doubt as to the validity of their claim of prior possession.

It is fundamental that complainants in an ejectment case must allege and

prove that they had prior physical possession of the property before they were
unlawfully deprived thereof by defendants.25 Respondents, being the
complainants before the lower court, had the burden of proving their claim of
prior possession. They, however, failed to prove their claim.1âwphi1

In light of our resolution of the first issue which clears the question of prior
possession, it is unnecessary to discuss the second issue since petitioners’
argument touches on the ownership of the lot subject matter of this
controversy. As discussed, the case at bar is an ejectment case where the only
issue is prior possession of the lot. Any controversy with regard to ownership
should be ventilated in a separate action.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED. The

decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 50 and the
January 11, 1995 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City,
Branch 120 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167245             September 27, 2006

ELPIDIO S. UY, petitioner,
vs.
FIRST METRO INTEGRATED STEEL CORP. and HON. ANTONIO I. DE
CASTRO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 3, Manila, respondents.

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81046 dated August 27,
2004 dismissing petitioner Elpidio S. Uy's petition for certiorari and its
Resolution2 dated February 22, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration.

The facts show that on July 5, 1999, private respondent First Metro Integrated
Steel Corporation (FMISC) filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for
writ of preliminary attachment against Robert Juan Uy (Robert), Midland
Integrated Construction Company (MICC) and herein petitioner Elpidio Uy,
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
99-94408 and raffled to Branch 3.3

It is alleged that on June 3, 5 and 6, 1998, FMISC delivered to MICC, Robert

and petitioner deformed steel bars valued at P695,811.00. On June 9, 1998,
Robert allegedly delivered to FMISC Metrobank Check No. 042892 in the
amount of P695,811.00 issued by petitioner as payment. However, the check
was dishonored upon presentment and despite demands, MICC, Robert and
petitioner refused to pay, hence the complaint.

In their Answer with Counterclaim and Crossclaim, Robert and MICC alleged
that they are strangers to the contract between FMISC and petitioner; that
Robert merely referred petitioner to FMISC; that petitioner left his check in
Robert's office which was picked up by FMISC's collector; and that the
deformed steel bars were delivered to and received by petitioner's
representatives as certified to by Paul Eldrich V. Uy, petitioner's son. 4

Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim 5 claiming that he had no

business transaction with FMISC; that he issued the check in favor of FMISC
in the amount of P695,811,00 but since it was not intended as payment to
FMISC, he stopped the payment thereof.
Hearings were thereafter conducted for the reception of evidence of FMISC,
Robert and MICC. The initial reception of petitioner's evidence was set on
February 28, 20016 but it was cancelled because petitioner had influenza. The
hearing was reset to April 26, 2001 and May 10, 2001 7 but was again
cancelled and moved to October 25, 2001 and December 13, 2001.

During the October 25, 2001 hearing, petitioner was represented by Atty.
Lucas C. Carpio, Jr. who appeared as Atty. Molina's collaborating
counsel.8 The hearing was cancelled and rescheduled to December 13, 2001.
However, on December 10, 2001, Atty. Molina withdrew his appearance as
petitioner's counsel with the latter's consent. 9 On December 13, 2001, Atty.
Danilo Bañares entered his appearance and requested for a resetting on
February 14 and 28, 200210 which was granted by the trial court. On February
14, 2002, Atty. Bañares appeared but instead of presenting evidence for the
petitioner, he requested for a postponement and resetting of the hearing. 11

During the scheduled hearing on February 28, 2002, Atty. Bañares arrived
late. Upon motion of FMISC, the trial court ordered that petitioner's right to
present evidence is deemed waived and the parties were directed to file their
respective memorandum.12 The case was deemed submitted for decision on
November 18, 2002.13

Atty. Bañares withdrew his appearance on January 8, 2003 with petitioner's

conformity.14

On March 7, 2003, the trial court rendered judgment, 15 the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff ordering

defendant Elpidio Uy to pay the former:

a) the sum of P690,000 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from July
1998 until fully paid;

b) the sum of P110,000.00 as attorney's fees which is 16% of the principal

amount; and

c) the costs of suit.

Defendant Robert Uy's cross-claim is denied as it is now academic. The

counterclaims of both defendants herein against plaintiff and against each
other are denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.16
On April 4, 2003, petitioner received a copy of the Decision.

On April 21, 2003, petitioner through Atty. Lucas C. Carpio, Jr. filed a Motion
for New Trial17 on the ground of gross negligence of petitioner's counsel in
failing to attend the hearing for the reception of evidence, thus impairing his
rights to due process.

The trial court denied the motion for new trial in an Order 18 dated October 1,
2003.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
which dismissed the petition in its assailed Decision dated August 27, 2004. It
held that the trial court correctly denied the motion for new trial because it
was filed out of time and that a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy
for the denial of a motion for new trial.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this recourse on the
grounds that –

1. The Seventeenth (17th) Division of the Court of Appeals gravely erred in

denying due course to the Petition for Certiorari on technical grounds, that is,
for the purported failure of the Petitioner to file with the Court a Quo his
Motion for New Trial within the reglementary period to appeal and that the
only remedy for the denial of the latter motion is by appealing from the
Judgment or Final order and not through a Special Civil Action for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. 19

2. The former Seventeenth (17th) Division of the Court of Appeals gravely erred
in not finding that the Public Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he issued the
assailed Order dated October 1, 2003 denying Petitioner's Motion for New
Trial.20

A scrutiny of the records discloses that while the Motion for New Trial was
received by the trial court on April 28, 2003, the date on the Registry Receipt
attached to the Affidavit of Service 21 as well as that stamped on the
envelope22 which contained the copy of the motion, reveals that it was filed and
served by registered mail on April 21, 2003, a Monday, because April 19, 2003,
the last day for filing the same was a Saturday. Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules
of Court states in no uncertain terms that if the last day of the period thus
computed falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where
the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. Thus, the
motion was actually filed on time it having been filed on April 21, 2003, the
next working day, following the last day for filing which fell on a Saturday.
Section 9, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court which provides that the remedy to an
order denying a motion for new trial is to appeal the judgment or final order,
must be read in conjunction with Section 1, Rule 41 which provides that:

SEC. 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final

order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appeasable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the filing by the petitioner of a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals from the denial of the motion for new trial by the trial court is proper.

Notwthstanding the foregoing, we find that the trial court correctly denied
petitioner's motion for new trial.

Section 1, Rule 37 provides that a motion for new trial may be filed within the
period for taking an appeal based on the following grounds:

(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence

could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party
has probably been impaired in his rights; or

xxxx

Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence

could not have guarded against.23

In the instant case, we find the negligence of petitioner's counsel in failing to

attend the hearings for the reception of evidence inexcusable. The trial court
scheduled the hearing for the reception of petitioner's evidence seven times.
The initial hearing set on February 28, 2001 was cancelled because petitioner
allegedly had influenza. The hearings scheduled on April 26, 2001 and May 10,
2001 were cancelled and moved to October 25, 2001 and December 13, 2001.
Petitioner was represented by Atty. Carpio, Jr. as collaborating counsel during
the hearing on October 25, 2001 but no evidence was presented. Instead, the
hearing was cancelled. On December 13, 2001, Atty. Bañares, petitioner's new
counsel, appeared but he requested for a resetting. On February 14, 2002,
Atty. Bañares moved to postpone the hearing to February 28, 2002 as
previously scheduled. On February 28, 2002, Atty. Bañares arrived late.

Scrutiny of the records disclose that the hearings were postponed or cancelled
without any justification. However, the trial court accommodated the requests
for postponement or resetting in order to accord petitioner due process. Under
the circumstances, we find petitioner's counsel's failure to attend the seven
scheduled hearings without justifiable reason tantamount to inexcusable
neglect. As such, it cannot be a ground for new trial.

In addition, the Rule requires that motions for new trial founded on fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence must be accompanied by affidavits
of merits, i.e., affidavits showing the facts (not mere conclusions or opinions)
constituting the valid cause of action or defense which the movant may prove
in case a new trial is granted, because a new trial would serve no purpose and
would just waste the time of the court as well as the parties if the complaint is
after all groundless or the defense is nil or ineffective. 24

Under the Rules, the moving party must show that he has a meritorious
defense. The facts constituting the movant's good and substantial defense,
which he may prove if the petition were granted, must be shown in the affidavit
which should accompany the motion for a new trial. 25 We examined petitioner's
Affidavit of Merit and find that it did not contain clear statements of the facts
constituting a good and valid defense which he might prove if given the chance
to introduce evidence. The allegations that he has a "meritorious
defense"26 and a "good cause"27 are mere conclusions which did not provide the
court with any basis for determining the nature and merit of the case. An
affidavit of merit should state facts, and not mere opinion or conclusions of
law.28 Petitioner's motion for new trial and affidavit of merit did not mention
the evidence which he was prevented from introducing, nor did it allege that
such evidence would change the outcome of the case.

Petitioner's argument that his counsel's negligence was so gross that he was
deprived of due process fails to impress. Gross negligence is not one of the
grounds for a motion for a new trial. We cannot declare his counsel's
negligence as gross as to liberate him from the effects of his failure to present
countervailing evidence.29 In Air Philippines Corporation v. International
Business Aviation Services, Phils., Inc.,30 we did not consider as gross
negligence the counsel's resort to dilatory schemes, such as (1) the filing of at
least three motions to extend the filing of petitioner's Answer; (2) his
nonappearance during the scheduled pretrials; and (3) the failure to file
petitioner's pretrial Brief, even after the filing of several Motions to extend the
date for filing.
Besides, we find that petitioner's and his counsel's negligence are concurrent.
During the initial hearing for the reception of his evidence, petitioner was
absent allegedly due to influenza. During the succeeding scheduled hearings,
petitioner was absent but his lawyer, Atty. Molina, was present but did not
present any evidence. Instead, motions for postponement or resetting were
made. In one occasion, Atty. Molina was absent but Atty. Carpio, Jr. appeared
as collaborating counsel. Still, no evidence was presented but a resetting was
again requested.

On December 13, 2001, petitioner hired Atty. Bañares as his new counsel, and
the hearings were set on February 14 and 28, 2002. For petitioner, thus, to
feign and insist upon a lack of awareness of the progress of the case is to
unmask a penchant for the ludicrous. 31 When he hired the services of Atty.
Bañares, it is highly improbable that he was unaware of the stage of the
proceedings. In keeping with the normal cause of events, he should have made
the proper inquiries from his former counsel as to the status of the case.

Incidentally, we find it interesting that Atty. Lucas C. Carpio, Jr. who assisted
petitioner in the preparation of the motion for new trial, wherein he claimed
that his former counsel was grossly negligent in defending his case, was
petitioner's collaborating counsel and who appeared in his behalf during the
October 25, 2001 hearing but likewise presented no evidence for the petitioner.

Finally, petitioner's counsel's inexcusable neglect did not amount to

petitioner's deprivation of due process of law. The right to due process
safeguards the opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may
have in support of his claim or defense. In the instant case, petitioner was
given several opportunities to be heard and to submit evidence but he
squandered them. Indeed, from lethargy is misfortune born.32

Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a
result of the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify
as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-
opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new
counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not
been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on
the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to
securing new trials in the event of conviction, 33 or an adverse decision, as in
the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 182718             September 26, 2008

JULIO B. PURCON, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
MRM PHILIPPINES, INC. and MIGUEL L. RIVERA/MARITIME RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

A PETITION for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases
when there is no other available or adequate remedy. It may be availed of only
after a judgment, final order, or other proceeding was taken against petitioner
in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. 1

Before Us is a petition for relief from judgment 2 filed by Julio B. Purcon,

seeking to set aside Our July 16, 2007 Resolution, 3 which denied his petition
for review, as well as the October 9, 2007 Entry of Judgment. 4 He pleads for
the Court’s leniency on account of the negligence and inefficiency of his
counsel, which resulted in the late filing of the petition and in filing defective
pleadings within this Court.

The Antecedents

The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner for reimbursement of

medical expenses, sickness allowance and permanent disability benefits with
prayer for compensatory, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).

In his verified position paper, petitioner alleged that on January 28, 2002,
respondent MRM Philippines, Inc. hired him as a seaman on board the vessel
M/T SARABELLE 2. He signed a contract for three (3) months with a monthly
salary of $584.00. According to petitioner, his work involved a day-to-day
activity that required exertion of strenuous effort, and that he often worked
overtime due to the pressure of his work. His contract was extended for
another three (3) months. On the second week of June 2002, he felt an
excruciating pain in his left testicle. After being examined by a doctor at the
port of France, he was diagnosed with hernia. On June 26, 2002, he was
repatriated due to his ailment.

Upon petitioner’s return to the Philippines, he was examined by Dr. Alegre, the
company physician, who prescribed certain medication. On July 24, 2002, Dr.
Alegre declared that he was fit to resume work. When he reported to MRM
Philippines, Inc. hoping to be re-hired for another contract, he was told that
there was no vacancy for him.

On September 17, 2003, he consulted Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo, an internist-

cardiologist of Philippine Heart Center. On March 3, 2004, after a thorough
medical examination and evaluation, he was diagnosed with EPIDIDYMITIS,
LEFT; UPPER RESPIRATORY TRACT INFACTION WITH INPEDIMENT GRADE
XIV.

Respondents, on the other hand, countered that since petitioner’s ailment,

hernia, is not work-related, he is not entitled to disability benefit and related
claims. In fact, he was declared fit to resume work on July 23, 2002 by the
company-designated physician. Respondents likewise argued that his ailment
is not to be considered a permanent disability as this is easily correctable by
simple surgery. More importantly, petitioner signed a Quitclaim and Release
which was notarized.

On March 31, 2005, Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr. rendered its
decision5 dismissing the complaint for utter lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter
explained that petitioner was fit to resume work as a seafarer as of July 23,
2002 as his "hernia" was already cured or non-existent. In fact, petitioner was
ready to resume work. Unfortunately, he was not accommodated due to lack of
vacancy. The fact that he was not re-hired by respondent did not mean that he
was suffering from disability.

On May 5, 2005, complainant-appellant (petitioner) filed a memorandum of

appeal with the NLRC Third Division.

On September 30, 2005, the NLRC Third Division issued a resolution 6 as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
decision dated March 31, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.7
On December 20, 2005, the motion for reconsideration was dismissed for lack
of merit. On January 27, 2006, the NLRC resolution became final and
executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.

On March 2, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals (CA). However, on June 7,
2006, the CA dismissed the case due to formal infirmities. Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was denied. On September 29, 2006, the CA resolution
became final and executory.

On May 9, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the
June 7, 2006 and September 5, 2006 Resolutions of the CA, which dismissed
his petition for certiorari.

In Our Resolution8 dated July 16, 2007, We denied the petition for the
following reasons: (1) the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period of
fifteen (15) days fixed in Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended; (2) failure to pay on time docket
and other fees and deposit for costs in violation of Section 3, Rule 45, in
relation to Section 5(c) of Rule 56; and (3) insufficient or defective verification
under Section 4, Rule 7.

We likewise held that petitioner failed to sufficiently show that the CA

committed any reversible error in the challenged resolutions as to warrant the
exercise of this Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction. He was not able to
convince this Court why the actions of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the
CA, which have passed upon the same issue, should be reversed.
Consequently, on October 9, 2007, an Entry of Judgment was issued.

On May 6, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition for relief from judgment
interposing the following grounds:

I. The Honorable Labor Arbiter committed a GROSS MISTAKE when he based

his decision on the fit to work certification issued by the company-designated
physician and on the Quitclaim and Release executed by the complainant;

II. The Honorable Labor Arbiter further committed a GROSS MISTAKE when he
adopted the irrelevant jurisprudence cited by the respondents and by adopting
it in his decision;

III. The Honorable NLRC Third Division also committed a GROSS MISTAKE
when it affirms the ERRONEOUS decision of the Honorable Labor Arbiter;
IV. The factual findings of the Honorable Labor Arbiter, and the Honorable
NLRC Third Division, are not based on substantial evidence and that their
decisions are contrary to the applicable law and jurisprudence; and

V. The collaborating counsel of the petitioner committed a GROSS MISTAKE in

filing defective pleadings to the prejudice of the herein petitioner. 9

The threshold issue before Us is – Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief
from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from Our
resolution denying his petition for review?

We answer in the negative. A petition for relief from judgment is not an

available remedy in the Supreme Court.

First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order
is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in
any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must be
interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original cases
cognizable by the Supreme Court, thus:

Section 1. Original cases cognizable. – Only petitions for certiorari, prohibition,

mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings against
members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls may be filed originally in the Supreme
Court.

A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule 56 cases
originally cognizable by this Court.

In Dela Cruz v. Andres, 10 We reiterated Our pronouncement in Mesina v.

Meer,11 that a petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The Court explained that under
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed
within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or
other proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied with affidavits
showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and
the facts constituting petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the same
court which rendered the decision, viz.:

Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. –

When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is
thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same
case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set
aside.12 (Underscoring supplied)

Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to
Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts.

As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows
the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued the
order to hear the petition for relief. Under the old rule, a petition for relief from
the judgment or final order of Municipal Trial Courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, viz.:

Section 1. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment of inferior
court. – When a judgment is rendered by an inferior court on a case, and a
party thereto by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been
unjustly deprived of a hearing therein, or has been prevented from taking an
appeal, he may file a petition in the Court of First Instance of the province in
which the original judgment was rendered, praying that such judgment be set
aside and the case tried upon its merits.

Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from the judgment or
other proceeding thereof. – When a judgment order is entered, or any other
proceeding is taken against a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court
and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set
aside.

The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform

procedure for Municipal and Regional Trial Courts 13 and designation of
Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts as courts of record. 14

Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by
separate provisions of the Rules of Court.15 It may, from time to time, be
supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through
resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the
Revised Internal Rules of the CA16 allows the remedy of petition for relief in the
CA.

There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief
applicable in the CA or this Court. The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to
55, with the exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the Supreme Court,
identifies the remedies available before said Court such as annulment of
judgments or final orders or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration
(Rule 52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38
mentioned.
If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the
CA, with more reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme
Court. This Court entertains only questions of law. A petition for relief raises
questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which
are beyond the concerns of this Court.ALF-itc

Nevertheless, even if We delve into the merits of the petition, the same must
still be dismissed. The late filing of the petition for review does not amount to
excusable negligence. Petitioner’s lack of devotion in discharging his duty,
without demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,
cannot be a basis for judicial relief. For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to
prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must be
shown.

The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be
relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law
was due to his own negligence, or mistaken mode of procedure for that matter;
otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of
appeal which has already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence
or due to a mistake of procedure by counsel.

In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel is so palpable that it

amounts to gross negligence, this Court affords a party a second opportunity
to vindicate his right. But this opportunity is unavailing in the instant case,
especially since petitioner has squandered the various opportunities available
to him at the different stages of this case. Public interest demands an end to
every litigation and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained
finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the administration of justice.

Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to
be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law
was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise,
the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which
has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to
mistaken mode of procedure by counsel.17

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. NO. 140630 : August 12, 2004

YUSUKE FUKUZUMI, Petitioner, v. SANRITSU GREAT INTERNATIONAL

CORPORATION, TETSUJI MARUYAMA, AKIRA KUBOTA, YUKIO
MATSUZAKA, Respondent.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

of the Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 258,
dated August 5, 1999 in Civil Case No. 97-0237 denying the petition of Yusuke
Fukuzumi for relief from the Order 2 of the court dated June 2, 1999 denying
his notice of appeal of the decision of the trial court against him and
consequently dismissing his appeal.

The records show that on January 26, 1999, the trial court rendered
judgment3 in Civil Case No. 97-0237 in favor of the plaintiffs Sanritsu Great
International Corporation, Tetsuji Maruyama, Akira Kubota and Yukio
Matsuzaka, ordering defendant Yusuke Fukuzumi to pay to the plaintiffs sums
of money. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

in favor of plaintiff Sanritsu Great International Corporation and
against defendant YUSUKE FUKUZUMI who is hereby ordered to
pay said plaintiff the following, to wit:
 1. The amount of PhP90,000.00 representing two (2) month's
rental deposit;

2. The amount of PhP112,500.00 representing unused rental

payments for two-and-a-half (2 - - ) months;

3. The amount of PhP16,500.00 for the cost of the pressure pump

and overhead tank;

4. The amount of PhP8,000.00 as cost of hauling;

5. The amount of PhP137,148.15 as actual damages representing

plaintiffs' hotel bills at Traders Hotel and Mount Sea Resort Hotel
and Restaurant;

6. The amount of PhP50,000.00 as and way of attorney's fees;

andcralawlibrary

7. To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.4

The defendant received a copy of the decision on February 9, 1999 and on

February 23, 1999, filed his motion for reconsideration of the decision. On
April 27, 1999, the trial court issued an Order denying the defendant's motion.
The latter received a copy of the order on May 5, 1999. Instead of perfecting his
appeal on May 6, 1999, he filed his notice of appeal only on May 7, 1999, or
one day beyond the reglementary period therefor. The court issued an Order on
June 2, 1999 denying the defendant's notice of appeal. The defendant received
the court's order on June 10, 1999. On June 22, 1999, the defendant filed a
Verified Petition for Relief from the order of the trial court denying his notice of
appeal.

In his petition for relief, the petitioner averred that his counsel suffered a high
blood pressure on May 6, 1999 which impelled said counsel to rest for three
days, upon the advice of his doctor, thus, hindered him from filing the notice of
appeal on May 6, 1999. The petitioner appended to his petition a verified
Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Lakambini Cruz-Crespo dated June 18,
1999, viz:

medical certificate

To Whom It May Concern:

 This is to certify that I have seen and examined Atty. Jonathan
Polines, from Las Piñas on May 6, 1999 with the chief complaint
of headache of two days duration.

Impression: Essential hypertension, moderate.

The patient was advised to rest for at least 3 days (May 6-8, 1999).
He was given Nifedipine (Calcibloc).

(Sgd). MA. LAKAMBINI CRUZ-

CRESPO, M.D.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 18 th day of June

1999, affiant exhibited to me his CTC No. 18652403 issued at Las
Piñas City on August 7, 1998.

Doc. No. 3408

Page No. 1075
Book No. 1 (Sgd.) : : (Illegible) NOTARY PUBLIC
Series of 1999.5

On August 5, 1999, the trial court issued an Order denying the defendant's
petition on the ground that Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was not
applicable. The defendant's motion for reconsideration of the order was denied
by the court per its Order dated October 22, 1999.

The defendant, now the petitioner, filed his Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court alleging that:

(A) THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF

SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM
DENIAL OF APPEAL FILED PURSUANT TO SECTION 2, RULE 38
OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE
SINCE THE DENIAL OF THE APPEAL WAS BASED ON SECTION
3, RULE 41 IN RELATION TO SECTION 2, RULE 22 OF THE 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

(B) THE COURT A QUO HAS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE

ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
WHEN, IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM DENIAL
OF APPEAL, IT DID NOT RULE ON THE MERIT OF THE
GROUNDS RAISED THEREIN BUT, INSTEAD, SUBSTITUTED ITS
OWN SPECULATION BY SAYING THAT THE PETITION FOR
 RELIEF FROM DENIAL OF APPEAL IS ALLEGEDLY MORE OF AN
AFTERTHOUGHT.6

In his comment on the petition, the respondents averred that (a) the petitioner
cannot invoke Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which applies only to
negligence of a party and not of his counsel; (b) by his negligence, the
petitioner failed to avail of other remedies other than filing his petition for relief
from the June 22, 1999 Order of the trial court; and (c) the alleged high blood
pressure of the petitioner's counsel is merely an afterthought.

The petition is denied.

The remedy of a party whose notice of appeal is denied by the trial court,
although such notice is filed within the period therefor, is to file a motion for
reconsideration of such order and, if the court denies such motion, to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. If the party is
prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing his
notice of appeal within the reglementary period therefor, his remedy is to file a
petition for relief, in the same case, from the order of the trial court denying
his notice of appeal. This is provided in Section 2, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which reads:

SEC. 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal. - When a judgment

or final order is rendered by any court in a case, and a party
thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has
been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same case praying that the appeal be given
due course.

Such party is not entitled to relief under Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court if he was not prevented from filing his notice of appeal by fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Such relief will not be granted to a
party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss
of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of
procedure for that matter; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount
to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of
inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of procedure by counsel. 7

If the petition for relief is denied by the trial court, the remedy of the petitioner
is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which reads:

SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a

judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of
 a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion

seeking relief from judgment;

(c) An interlocutory order;

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate civil action
under Rule 65. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

The petitioner's failure to file his notice of appeal within the period therefor is
far from excusable. It, rather, shows negligence no less. The medical certificate
issued to his counsel shows that he was examined by Dr. Lakambini Cruz-
Crespo on May 6, 1999 and was advised to rest for three days from May 6,
1999 or until May 8, 1999. The petitioner would like the trial court and this
Court to believe that his counsel was unable to file the notice of appeal on or
before May 6, 1999 because he was even advised to take a rest for three days.
But his counsel was able, well enough, to prepare and file the notice of appeal
on May 7, 1999 when he was supposed to be resting. The petitioner even failed
to allege in his notice of appeal that the same was filed one day late because
his counsel was suffering from high blood pressure on May 6, 1999. It was
only after the petitioner received the order of the trial court denying his notice
of appeal and filed his petition for relief on June 22, 1999 did he allege that his
counsel was suffering from high blood pressure on May 6, 1999. It was only on
June 18, 1999 that the petitioner secured a medical certificate from Dr.
Crespo.

Thus, we are not convinced by the petitioner's claim that his counsel was
suffering from high blood pressure on May 6, 1999, which prevented him from
filing said notice of appeal on said date. Said allegation is a mere afterthought
to cover up his and his own counsel's collective negligence. It is settled that
clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel. 8

It bears stressing that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well and
failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment or
resolution final and executory.9 After all, the right to appeal is not a natural
right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. 10

While we have ruled that delay in the filing of a notice of appeal does not
justify the dismissal of the appeal, however, the petitioner has not shown any
exceptional circumstances justifying a reversal of the assailed order of the trial
court and the reinstatement of his appeal.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 200104, June 19, 2019

ILUMINADA C. BERNARDO, PETITIONER, v. ANA MARIE B. SORIANO,

RESPONDENT.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45

of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Iluminada C. Bernardo (Bernardo)
against respondent Ana Marie B. Soriano (Soriano), assailing the
Decision2 dated August 11, 2011 (assailed Decision) and Resolution 3 dated
January 6, 2012 (assailed Resolution) rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 118506.

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

The facts of the case are simple and straightforward. As narrated by the CA in
its assailed Decision, and as culled from the records of the instant case, the
essential facts and antecedent proceedings of the case are as follows:cralawred

[Bernardo] filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus 4 praying that

Evangeline Lawas, Head Social Worker of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development in Mandaluyong City, be ordered to
produce the person of her minor granddaughter, Stephanie
Verniese B. Soriano [(Stephanie),] before the [Regional Trial Court
of Mandaluyong City, Branch 209 (RTC). The case, entitled "In the
Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of Stephanie Verniese
Soriano through her Grandmother, Iluminada C. Bernardo v.
Evangeline Lawas, In Her Capacity as Head Social Worker,
Department of Social Welfare and Development, Nayon ng
Kabataan, Acacia Lane, Welfareville Compound, Mandaluyong
City," was docketed as SP Proc. No. MC09-4159]. According to
[Bernardo], Stephanie was being deprived and restrained of her
liberty while under the custody of the DSWD, and despite demand
by [Bernardo], the DSWD refused to release the minor under
[Bernardo's] custody and care.

The [RTC] issued an Order dated 23 October 2009 stating therein

that considering [Bernardo's] failure to prove that the DSWD's
custody over the minor is illegal, the Petition filed was ordered to
be converted into a case for custody.

[Soriano], the surviving parent of Stephanie, for her part, filed a

Complaint-in-Intervention5 seeking to be granted custody of her
child, and thus, the battle for the permanent custody of Stephanie
between [Bernardo] and [Soriano] ensued.

The [RTC, through Presiding Judge Monique A. Quisumbing-

lgnacio (Quisumbing), in its] Decision 6 dated 05 August 2010,
[issued a judgment and] upheld [Soriano's] right to parental
custody and parental authority but ruled that, in the meantime,
it will be for the best interest of the minor to stay with [Bernardo]
for the school year 2009-2010 while studying at Notre Dame of
Greater Manila. Thus, the [RTC] granted temporary custody of the
minor to [Bernardo].

[Bernardo] filed a Motion for Reconsideration 7 alleging therein

that [Soriano] is unfit to take care of her child, who, allegedly,
verbally maltreats Stephanie, among others. x x x
On 31 August 2010, the [RTC issued an Order8denying]
[Bernardo's] Motion for Reconsideration. [On the very same
day, Soriano timely filed through registered mail her
Comment (With Motion for Partial Reconsideration) 9 dated
August 27, 2010. In sum, Soriano asserted that the custody of
Stephanie should be granted in her favor immediately and not
only after school year 2009-2010.]

[The RTC's denial of Bernardo's Motion for Reconsideration on

August 31, 2010] prompted [Bernardo] to file a Notice of
Appeal10on 08 September 2010. However, the [RTC], through
the first assailed Order11dated 09 September 2010 ruling
therein that the assailed 05 August 2010 Decision and the 31
August 2010 Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration have
not yet attained finality, and thus, may not be the subject of an
appeal. [Hence, the Notice of Appeal of Bernardo was denied
due course.] The [RTC] ratiocinated that [Soriano], who received a
copy of the 05 August 2010 Decision on 13 August 2010, timely
filed her Comment (with Motion for Partial Reconsideration) [dated]
27 August 2010. The dispositive portion of the said Order
states:cralawred

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Notice of

Appeal dated 7 September 2010 is hereby DENIED
DUE COURSE.

[Bernardo] is ORDERED to file her comment on the

Comment (With Motion for Partial Reconsideration)
dated 27 August 2010 within five (5) days from receipt
hereof.

SO ORDERED.

Accordingly, the [RTC] rendered the second assailed Order 12 dated

22 October 2010 granting [Soriano's] partial reconsideration and
allowing the latter to take custody of her minor child immediately.
The dispositive portion reads:cralawred

WHEREFORE, plaintiff-intervenor Ana Marie Bernardo

Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 27
August 2010 is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Ana
Marie Bernardo Soriano is hereby ALLOWED TO TAKE
IMMEDIATE CUSTODY of the minor, STEPHANIE
VERNIESE SORIANO from her grandmother,
ILUMINADA C. BERNARDO.
 SO ORDERED.

[Bernardo] filed her Motion for Reconsideration13 [dated November

22, 2010,] seeking a reconsideration of the [RTC's] 09 September
2010 and 22 October 2010 Orders. However, it was denied
through the third assailed Order 14 dated 31 January 2011. [Thus,
on March 15, 2011, Bernardo filed a Petition
for Certiorari  (Certiorari Petition) under Rule 65 of the Rules of
15

Court, seeking the annulment and setting aside, on the ground of

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the RTC's Orders denying due course to Bernardo's
Notice of Appeal.]16

chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary

The Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision, the CA denied Bernardo's Certiorari Petition.

In sum, the CA held that because Soriano seasonably filed her own Motion for
Partial Reconsideration of the RTC's Decision dated August 5, 2010, the said
Decision of the RTC is not an appealable judgment despite the denial of
Bernardo's Motion for Reconsideration. The CA believed that Bernardo's Notice
of Appeal was premature owing to the pendency of Soriano's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration:cralawred

At a quick glance, it will seem that the Order dated 31 August

2010 denying [Bernardo's] Motion for Reconsideration, on the
issue of permanent custody, left nothing else for the court to do.
However, it must be emphasized that the said Order was issued
before the court a quo received [Soriano's] Comment (With Motion
for Partial Reconsideration) which was filed via registered mail on
the very same day, 31 August 2010. As with [Bernardo], [Soriano]
had an equal right to file a motion for reconsideration of the
[RTC's] Decision within the proper reglementary period. x x x 17

chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary

The RTC's Decision cannot yet be considered a judgment that may be appealed
due to the filing of Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration because, as
explained by the CA:cralawred

x x x Unlike a 'final judgment or order, which is

appealable, as above pointed out, an 'interlocutory
order may not be questioned on appeal except only
 as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken
from the final judgment rendered in the case. x x x

Simply stated a final order contemplates one in which there is

nothing more for the court to do in order to resolve the case. x x x

Thus, when the said Comment (With Motion for Partial

Reconsideration) was filed, there remains something left for the
court to do; to thresh out the issue of whether or not to reverse the
temporary custody given to [Bernardo].18

chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary

In other words, the CA held that despite the RTC's Decision being a judgment
on the merits of the case and despite the RTC having already disposed
Bernardo's Motion for Reconsideration of such Decision, the pendency of
Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration warranted the treatment of the
RTC's Decision as an interlocutory order and not a final judgment that can be
appealed, as there was still something left for the RTC to do, which was to
decide the Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

On September 2, 2011, Bernardo filed a Motion for Reconsideration 19 dated

August 31, 2011. The CA denied the same in the assailed Resolution.

Hence, the instant appeal.

Soriano filed her Comment20 dated June 6, 2012, to which Bernardo

responded to with her Reply21 dated October 22, 2012.

Issue

Stripped to its core, the sole issue to be decided by the Court in the instant
case is whether the CA erred in denying Bernardo's Certiorari Petition, holding
that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when the latter denied
Bernardo's Notice of Appeal due course due to the pendency of Soriano's
Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

The Court's Ruling

The Court resolves to deny the instant Petition.

According to Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken

from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
Further, according to Section 2(a) of the same Rule, the appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party.

In connection with the foregoing, Section 5 of the same Rule states that the
notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the appeal, specify the judgment
or final order or part thereof appealed from, specify the court to which the
appeal is being taken, and state the material dates showing the timeliness of
the appeal.

With respect to the period for filing the notice of appeal, the appeal shall be
taken within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.22 When a motion for new trial or
reconsideration was filed by the party, which was subsequently denied by the
court, there is a fresh period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the notice
of appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial
or motion for reconsideration.23

A party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon

the filing of the notice of appeal in due time. 24

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, it is not disputed that the RTC
rendered its Decision dated August 5, 2010, which resolved the merits of the
Custody case, upholding Soriano's right to parental custody and parental
authority, albeit ruling that it will be for the best interest of the child to stay
with Bernardo first for the school year 2009-2010 while studying at Notre
Dame of Greater Manila.

An appealable judgment or final order refers to one that adjudicates the

parties' contention and determines their rights and liabilities as regards each
other,25 disposing the whole subject matter of the case.26

The subject RTC Decision, having delved into the merits of the Custody case
and having fully disposed of the respective issues and causes of action raised
by the parties, was undoubtedly a judgment on the merits and not a mere
interlocutory order. The RTC's Decision did not merely rule on incidental
matters; it decided on the subject matter of the case, i.e., the custody of
Stephanie.

Being an appealable judgment on the merits, Bernardo had the right to appeal
under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court the RTC's Decision by filing a notice of
appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTC's Order dated August 31, 2010
denying Bernardo's timely-filed Motion for Reconsideration. This was exactly
what Bernardo did. She timely filed a Notice of Appeal, containing all the
required contents of a notice of appeal under Section 5, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court and paid the corresponding appeal fees on September 8, 2010.

Assuming of course that the notice of appeal satisfies the content requirements
set under Section 5, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the approval of a notice of
appeal becomes the ministerial duty of the lower court, provided the appeal is
filed on time.27 Hence, the RTC's Order dated September 9, 2010 denying due
course to Bernardo's seasonably-filed Notice of Appeal was a departure from
the provisions of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. In accordance with the Rules,
Bernardo's Notice of Appeal should have been deemed perfected as to her.

In denying due course to Bernardo's Notice of Appeal, it was the RTC's

contention, as affirmed by the CA, that the pendency of the Motion for Partial
Consideration of Soriano precluded Bernardo from filing her own Notice of
Appeal. The CA ratiocinated that the RTC's Decision dated August 5, 2010,
despite being a judgment on the merits, was not appealable at that time by
Bernardo, asserting that "a final order contemplates one in which there is
nothing more for the court to do in order to resolve the case." 28 The RTC
believed that Bernardo could more appropriately file her Notice of Appeal only
after Soriano's Motion for Partial Consideration had been decided upon.

In other words, following the line of thinking of the RTC and CA, in so far as
Bernardo was concerned, the RTC's Decision dated August 5, 2010,
notwithstanding the fact that it is a judgment on the merits, was to be treated
as a mere interlocutory order not subject to appeal owing to the pendency of
Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Hence, despite already having her
own Motion for Reconsideration denied by the RTC, Bernardo's right to appeal
was made contingent and dependent on Soriano's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration.

The RTC and CA's positions are erroneous.

With respect to Bernardo, the RTC's Decision did not cease to be an

appealable judgment, transforming into a mere interlocutory order, for
the sole reason that the opposing party, Soriano, filed her own Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. With Bernardo's own Motion for Reconsideration
having been denied by the RTC, according to Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
Bernardo already had 15 days to file a Notice of Appeal regardless of Soriano
filing her own Motion for Reconsideration.

The RTC and CA seem to have confused the right of a party to appeal and the
right of another party to file a motion for reconsideration. There is nothing in
the Rules which makes a party's right to appeal dependent or contingent on
the opposing party's motion for reconsideration. Similarly, a party's
undertaking to file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment is not hindered
by the other party's filing of a notice of appeal. Jurisprudence holds that "each
party has a different period within which to appeal" 29 and that "[s]ince each
party has a different period within which to appeal, the timely filing of a
motion for reconsideration by one party does not interrupt the other or another
party's period of appeal."30

Hence, a party's ability to file his/her own appeal upon receipt of the assailed
judgment or the denial of a motion for reconsideration challenging the said
judgment within the reglementary period of 15 days is not affected by the other
parties' exercise of discretion to file their respective motions for
reconsideration.

Contrary to the holding of the CA, if the RTC granted due course to Bernardo's
Notice of Appeal, the RTC would not have been divested of jurisdiction to
decide Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration and that Soriano's right to
file her own Motion for Reconsideration would not have been defeated
whatsoever. This is the case because under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the
case only upon the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties .

Further, the CA's concern that allowing due course Bernardo's Notice of Appeal
would have led to a multiplicity of appeals is unfounded, considering that the
respective appeals of Bernardo and Soriano could have been consolidated by
the appellate court.

Nevertheless, despite the foregoing, even with the RTC having committed an
error in procedure when it denied due course Bernardo's Notice of Appeal, the
CA was not in error to deny Bernardo's Certiorari Petition.

First and foremost, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to

cure mere errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.31

Further, grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words,
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.32

The RTC's act of denying due course Bernardo's Notice of Appeal was not
borne out of a capricious, whimsical, and arbitrary exercise of judgment. The
records reveal that the RTC was motivated, albeit erroneously, by practicality,
wanting to first decide Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration and avoid a
multiplicity of appeals before the CA.

More importantly, it is elementary that a writ of certiorari will not issue where

the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The remedies of appeal
in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. 33A petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper only if the aggrieved
party has no plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of
law.34

As seen in the RTC's Order dated September 9, 2010 denying due course
Bernardo's Notice of Appeal, the RTC did not completely preclude Bernardo
from appealing the RTC's Decision dated August 5, 2010. What the RTC merely
did was to deny due course the Notice of Appeal in the meantime and order
Bernardo to file her comment on Soriano's Comment (With Motion for Partial
Reconsideration), so that upon the RTC's eventual disposition of the said
Motion for Partial Reconsideration, Bernardo and/or Soriano could henceforth
file their respective notices of appeal.

Subsequently, the RTC issued its Order dated October 22, 2010 granting
Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration, modifying the RTC's Decision
dated August 5, 2010. Hence, Bernardo could have, at that time, appealed yet
again by filing another notice of appeal assailing the RTC's Decision. In fact, as
a clear indication that Bernardo had an adequate and available remedy,
Bernardo was able to question the modification of the RTC's Decision and file a
Motion for Reconsideration on November 22, 2010, which was prior to the
filing of the Certiorari Petition on March 15, 2011. When such Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its Order dated January 31, 2011,
Bernardo had 15 days from the receipt of the said Order to appeal the RTC's
Decision dated August 5, 2010 before the CA.

Simply stated, despite the earlier denial of due course by the RTC of
Bernardo's Notice of Appeal, Bernardo still had the available remedy of filing
another Notice of Appeal after the RTC eventually modified its Decision dated
August 5, 2010 when it granted Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

However, despite the remedy of assailing the RTC's judgment on the

merits via an ordinary appeal being readily available to Bernardo prior to the
filing of her Certiorari Petition, the latter chose to instead focus her sight on
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's Order denying due course
Bernardo's Notice of Appeal. Instead of fixating on the denial on due course of
her earlier Notice of Appeal, Bernardo could have appealed the modified RTC
Decision before the CA by filing anew another Notice of Appeal. To reiterate, a
petition for certiorari can be availed of only if the aggrieved party has no plain,
adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 11,
2011 and Resolution dated January 6, 2012 rendered by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 118506 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 219984

VALEN CIA (BUKIDNON) FARMERS COOPERATIVE MARKETING

ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF FARMERS COOPERATIVE MARKETING
ASSOCIATION (FACOMA) AS TRUSTEES, HEREIN REPRESENTED
BY DAVID M. PORTICOS, BOARD CHAIRMAN, Petitioner
vs.
HEIRS OF AMANTE P. CABOTAJE, NAMELY: ESTHER M.
CABOTAJE, AMANTE M. CABOTAJE, JR., JULINDA M.
CABOTAJE, FERNANDO M. CABOTAJE, CHRISTINA IMELDA M.
CABOTAJE-NELAM, ALL HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ESTHER M.
CABOTAJE, Respondents

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition)

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the petitioner Valencia
(Bukidnon) Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
(petitioner FACOMA), represented by its Board of Directors, herein
represented by the Board Chairman David M. Porticos, assailing the
Decision2 dated March 27, 2014 (assailed Decision) and
Resolution3 dated August 13, 2015 (assailed Resolution) issued by
the Court of Appeals - Cagayan de Oro City (CA) Twenty-first Division
and Special Former Twenty-first Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 04244-MIN, reversing the Resolution 4 dated April 4, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City (RTC), Branch 8 in Civil Case
No. 2663-97, which denied the Notice to Appeal filed by respondents
Heirs of Amante P. Cabotaje (respondents Heirs of Cabotaje).

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

As narrated by the CA in the assailed Decision, the essential facts

and antecedent proceedings of the instant case are as follows:

[Petitioner FACOMA,] represented by its Directors Sergio Belera

and Pedro Pagonzaga instituted an action for quieting of title
and recovery of ownership and possession of parcel of land,
and damages against [respondents Heirs of Cabotaje] and
Francisco Estrada.

On December 3, 2010, the [RTC] rendered a Decision[,]

the fallo of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is issued in favor of the

plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the
Annulment and Cancellation of the Deed of Sale
executed by Francisco Estrada in favor of Amante
Cabotaje and all the Transfer Certificates of Titles issued
pursuant thereto as follows:

xxxx

Ordering defendant Amante Cabotaje and members of

his family, agents and assigns from interfering with
plaintiff's exercise of ownership over the properties and
vacate the same if and when they succeed in taking
 possession thereof;

Ordering the demolition of all improvements introduced

thereon in bad faith. Also ordering the Register of Deeds
to restore the Certificates of Titles issued to the plaintiff
subject hereof."

Aggrieved, [respondents Heirs of Cabotaje] tiled a Motion for

Reconsideration[,) mainly contending the following:

1. [Petitioner] FACOMA has no legal personality to sue and be

sued as [therein] defendant Francisco Estrada asseverated in
his Answer. [Petitioner] FACOMA's failure to present to the
[RTC the] original copy of the re-registration, according to
[respondents Heirs of Cabotaje], would mean that it had no
capacity to sue;

2. The Deed of Sale of the subject properties, which was

allegedly admitted by [petitioner] FACOMA during the Pre-trial
Conference and was allegedly executed and subscribed before a
Notary Public is regular and valid contrary to the [RTC's]
findings; and

3. The sale made by [therein] defendant Francisco Estrada to

[respondents Heirs of Cabotaje] is also binding and valid.

On February 3, 2011, the [RTC] denied the aforesaid Motion for

Reconsideration. Thus, on February 25, 2011, [respondents
Heirs of Cabotaje] filed the Notice of Appeal. Incidentally,
[petitioner] FACOMA filed a Motion to Dismiss the Notice of
Appeal averring that the Motion for Reconsideration earlier
filed by [respondents Heirs of Cabotaje] did not toll the running
of the reglementary period to appeal for the reason that the
Motion was but pro forma and raised no new issue.

On April 4, 2011, the [RTC] issued [a Resolution] which denied

the Notice of Appeal for being filed out of time. [The RTC
deemed the respondents Heirs of Cabotaje 's Motion for
Reconsideration as a pro forma motion, failing to toll the
reglementary period to file an appeal.] Hence, [respondents
Heirs of Cabotaje filed a Petition for Certiorari (Certiorari
Petition) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on June 6, 2011.
An Amended Petition for Certiorari5 dated July 25, 2011 was
 filed by respondents Heirs of Cabotaje.] x x x.6

[During the pendency of the Certiorari Petition before the CA,

petitioner FACOMA filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment,
which was initially denied by the RTC. Unsatisfied, petitioner
FACOMA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC's denial
of its Motion for Execution of Judgment. On December 13,
2011, the RTC issued a Resolution 7 granting petitioner
FACOMA's Motion for Execution of Judgment.]8

The Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision, the CA granted the Certiorari Petition filed

by respondents Heirs of Cabotaje, setting aside the RTC's Resolution
dated April 4, 2011. Consequently, the CA ordered the RTC to give
due course to the respondents Heirs of Cabotaje's Notice of Appeal.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition

for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution dated April
4, 2011 is SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 8,
Malaybalay City is ORDERED to give due course of petitioners'
Notice of Appeal.

SO ORDERED.9

In sum, the CA found that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by

respondents Heirs of Cabotaje is not a pro forma motion. Hence, the
Notice of Appeal filed by the latter, having been filed three days after
receipt of the RTC's Resolution, was not filed out of time. On April 24,
2014, petitioner FACOMA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 10 which
was eventually denied by the CA in its assailed Resolution.

Hence, the instant Petition.

Petitioner FACOMA filed a Motion for Early Resolution of

Appeal11 dated February 23, 2016. The respondents Heirs of Cabotaje
filed their Comment12 dated November 3, 2016 and
Compliance  dated November 4, 2016. Petitioner FACOMA
13

responded by filing its Reply14 dated May 25, 2017.

Issues

In sum, the instant Petition presents three main issues tor the
Court's consideration:

(1) whether the CA erred in holding that what was assailed by

the Certiorari Petition instituted by the respondents Heirs of Cabotaje
was the RTC's Resolution dated April 4, 2011, which denied the
latter's Notice of Appeal;

(2) whether the CA erred in holding that Notice of Appeal filed by the
respondents Heirs of Cabotaje was wrongfully denied by the RTC,
considering that the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration was not
a pro forma motion; and

(3) whether the CA committed an error for failing to declare

the Certiorari Petition moot and academic, considering that the RTC
had granted the Motion for Execution of Judgment filed by petitioner
FACOMA during the pendecy of the Certiorari Petition.

The Court shall discuss the three aforementioned issues in seriatim.

The Court's Ruling

I. The Certiorari Petition assailed
the RTC 's Resolution dated April
4, 2011 and not the Decision
dated December 3, 2010.

As its first submission, petitioner FACOMA argues that the

allegations in the Certiorari Petition filed by respondents Heirs of
Cabotaje reveal that what was actually being assailed by the latter in
their Certiorari Petition was the RTC's Decision dated December 3,
2010 which granted petitioner FACOMA's complaint for quieting of
title and recovery of ownership and possession over the subject
property, and not the RTC's Resolution dated April 4, 2011 which
denied the Notice of Appeal filed by respondents Heirs of Cabotaje.
Hence, petitioner FACOMA maintains that respondents Heirs of
Cabotaje's Certiorari Petition should have been dismissed as it was
tantamount to being an illegal substitute to a lost appeal. 15

The Court finds the first submission of petitioner FACOMA

unmeritorious.

The CA found as a fact that the Certiorari Petition filed by

respondents Heirs of Cabotaje was centered on the RTC's Resolution
dated April4, 2011, which denied the Notice of Appeal filed by the
latter due to the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration supposedly
being pro forma:

[A] reading of the [Certiorari Petition] shows that what was

assailed by the [respondents Heirs of Cabotaje] was the
Resolution dated April 4, 2011 denying their Notice of Appeal,
a copy thereof was received by them on April 6, 2011, and not
the December 3, 2010 [D]ecision adverted to by [petitioner
FACOMA] x x x.16

Well-settled is the rule that the Court is not a trier of facts. When
supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this
Court.17

The Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the factual finding of the
CA that the Certiorari Petition filed by respondents Heirs of Cabotaje,
as a fact, assailed the RTC's Resolution dated April 4, 2011. To be
sure, a simple perusal of the Certiorari Petition reveals that
respondents Heirs of Cabotaje allege in their Petition that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing its Resolution dated April 4, 2011:

In view of the 4 April 2011 Resolution of the [RTC] denying

due course to their [N]otice of [A]ppeal, [the respondents Heirs
of Cabotaje are] left with no plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, but to file this
[Certiorari Petition] in accordance with Rule 65 and Section
3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines (As
Amended).18

Hence, the Court resolves to deny petitioner FACOMA's first

submission.

II. The respondents Heirs of

Cabotaje's Motion for
Reconsideration on the RTC's
Decision dated December 3,
2010 is not a pro forma
motion. Hence the Notice of
Appeal filed by the
respondents Heirs of Cabotaje
should be given due course.
As to the second issue raised by petitioner FACOMA, the latter
argues that the CA erred in holding that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the Notice of Appeal filed by
respondents Heirs of Cabotaje on the ground that their Motion for
Reconsideration was purportedly a pro forma motion.

Again, the Court finds the second submission of petitioner FACOMA

without merit.

As jurisprudence dictates, grave abuse of discretion arises when a

lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence.19

In its Resolution dated April 4, 2011, the RTC found the respondents
Heirs of Cabotaje's Motion for Reconsideration a pro forma motion
because it did not raise any new arguments. However, the Court has
decided in a catena of cases that the mere reiteration in a motion for
reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon
by the court does not make a motion pro forma. The Court,
in Coquilla v. Commission on Elections,20 held that:

x x x The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the

issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does
not make a motion pro forma otherwise, the movant's remedy
would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial
or some other remedy. But, as we have held in another case:

Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is

addressed, one is precisely to convince the court that its
ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or
the evidence and in doing so, the movant has to dwell of
necessity upon the issues passed upon by the court. If a
motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues,
the consequence would be that after a decision is
rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing
only motions for reopening and new trial.

Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was

held to be pro forma, the motion was so held because (1) it was
a second motion for reconsideration, or (2) it did not comply
with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and
conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by
the evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors,
or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was
 contrary to law, or (5) the adverse party was not given notice
thereof.21

Thus, it is evidently settled that the respondents Heirs of Cabotaje's

Motion for Reconsideration is not a pro forma motion. It is not alleged
to be a second motion for reconsideration. It is not contended that
the said Motion failed to specify the findings and conclusions
contained in the RTC's Decision that the respondents Heirs of
Cabotaje opined were contrary to law or not supported by the
evidence. It is likewise not alleged that the said Motion merely alleged
that the Decision in question was contrary to law without making
any explanation.

In addition, the CA was correct in invoking the Court's Decision

in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Uy,22 citing Security Bank and
Trust Company, Inc. v. Cuenca,23 which held that a motion for
reconsideration is not pro forma just because it reiterated the
arguments earlier passed upon and rejected by the appellate court. A
movant may raise the same arguments precisely to convince the
court that its ruling was erroneous.

As found by the CA, "[a] thorough examination of the Motion for

Reconsideration reveals that [respondents Heirs of Cabotaje] had
stressed the issue on [petitioner] FACOMA's legal capacity to sue
them which [was] not discussed in the Decision dated December
3, 2010. This alone would readily tell Us that [respondents Heirs of
Cabotaje's] [M]otion for [R]econsideration was not pro forma."24

Hence, the Court upholds the CA's finding that respondents Heirs of
Cabotaje's Motion for Reconsideration on the RTC's Decision dated
December 3, 2010 is not a pro forma motion that prevented the
tolling of the reglementary period to file an appeal. Hence, the Court
sustains the CA's order upon the RTC to give due course to the
Notice of Appeal filed by respondents Heirs of Cabotaje.

III. The instant case has not been

rendered moot and academic
by the RTC's granting of petitioner FACOMA 's Motion
for Execution of Judgment.

Finally, as to petitioner FACOMA's theory that the execution of the

RTC's Decision has purportedly made the instant case moot and
academic, this too is without any merit.
The Court agrees with the CA when it held that the "alleged execution
of the RTC judgment cannot be considered as a supervening event
that would automatically moot the issues in this petition." 25

A case or issue is considered moot and academic only when it ceases

to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,
so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue
would be of no practical value or use.26

However, it must be stressed that the Rules of Court precisely covers

the situation wherein an already executed judgment may still be
reversed or remedied upon appeal.1âшphi1 In other words, according
to the Rules of Court, the execution of a judgment may not
necessarily be a supervening event that renders an appeal without
value and of no practical value.

Rule 39, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states that where the
executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on
appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such
orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice
may warrant under the circumstances.

Simply stated, in the eventuality that the appeal of respondents Heirs

of Cabotaje will prosper, contrary to the mistaken view of petitioner
FACOMA, the RTC may still order the restitution or reparation of
damages in favor of respondents Heirs of Cabotaje. Hence, the
argument raised by petitioner FACOMA is erroneous; the appeal filed
by respondents Heirs of Cabotaje would not be a futile and purely
hypothetical exercise that has no practical use or value.

As held by the Court in Silverio v. Court of Appeals,27 execution "does

not bar the continuance of the appeal on the merits, for the Rules of
Court precisely provide for restitution according to equity and justice
in case the executed judgment is reversed on appeal." 28

In Regulus Development, Inc. v. Dela Cruz,29 the petitioners therein

claimed that the therein assailed CA petition, which was a Rule 65
Petition (such as in the instant case), should have been dismissed for
being moot and academic because the lower court's judgment had
already been executed. In the said case, the Court denied the therein
petitioner's argument, holding that "[a]n issue on
jurisdiction prevents the petition [for Certiorari pending with the CA]
from becoming 'moot and academic [despite the execution of the
lower court's judgment.]"30 In the instant case, it is undeniable that
the RTC was allegedly and subsequently found to have committed
grave abuse of discretion that amounted to a lack or excess of
jurisdiction; an Issue of jurisdiction is extant.

Further, in Carpio v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court explained that the

execution of a lower court's judgment

cannot be considered as a supervening event that would

automatically moot the issues in the appealed case x x x.
Otherwise, there would be no use appealing a judgment, once a
writ of execution is issued and satisfied. That situation would
be absurd. On the contrary, the Rules of Court in fact provides
for cases of reversal or annulment of an executed judgment.
Section 5 of Rule 39 provides that in those cases, there should
be restitution or reparation as warranted by justice and equity.
Therefore, barring any supervening event, there is still the
possibility of the appellate court's reversal of the appealed
decision - even if already executed - and, consequently, of
a restitution or a reparation.32

Hence, the Court finds the third submission of petitioner FACOMA

lacking in merit.

All told, petitioner FACOMA failed to present any reversible error

committed by the CA in issuing the assailed Decision and Resolution
that would warrant the Court's exercise of its discretionary appellate
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is

hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March 27, 2014 and Resolution
dated August 13, 2015 issued by the Court of Appeals - Cagayan de
Oro City Twenty-first Division and Special Former Twenty-First
Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 04244-MIN are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, and Lazaro-Javier,

JJ., concur.
J. Reyes, Jr., J., on wellness leave.
 G.R. No. 214593

DANA S. SANTOS, Petitioner
vs.
LEODEGARIO R. SANTOS, Respondent

This is a petition for review on certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of

Court, dated November 24, 2014, assailing two Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 115420, respectively dated April 15,
2014,2 which denied petitioner Dana S. Santos' (Dana) Motion to Open and/or
Reinstate Petition; and September 26, 2014, 3 which denied Dana's Motion for
Reconsideration and/or to Submit Petition for Decision (with Plea to Preserve
Marital Union). The case arose from a petition for relief from judgment against
the Decision4 dated June 24, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo
City, Branch 72, in Civil Case No. 03-6954 declaring the marriage between
Dana and respondent Leodegario S. Santos (Leodegario) null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Facts

Dana and Leodegario first met each other in 1982, in a wake, through a
common friend. Their relationship developed into a romance. Soon, the couple
began living together. Their cohabitation produced two children. As their
business ventures prospered, Dana and Leodegario married each other on
December 3, 1987, before a Catholic priest. Two more children were born to
the couple after the marriage. However, their relationship started to deteriorate
as time passed by. Heated arguments and suspicions of infidelity marred their
marriage so much, so that in 2001, Dana and Leodegario filed a joint petition
for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, which was granted. 5

The final straw came on September 11, 2003, when Leodegario filed a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with the RTC, docketed as Civil
Case No. 03-6954, alleging psychological incapacity on the part of Dana. The
case was assigned to Branch 72 of the aforesaid court. On April 2, 2004, Dana
filed her Answer, alleging that Leodegario filed the petition in order to marry
his paramour, with whom he had a son.6

The case proceeded to trial on the merits. The Public Prosecutor found no
evidence of collusion between Dana and Leodegario. Both parties appeared in
the pre-trial conference and marked their documentary exhibits. Leodegario
presented as witnesses a clinical psychologist, a former employee of the
couple's joint business, and himself. However, when it was Dana's turn to
present evidence, her counsel failed to appear despite notice. On February 26,
2009, the trial court issued an Order declaring Dana to have waived her right
to present evidence and ordering Leodegario to submit his memorandum, after
which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. 7

On June 24, 2009, the trial court rendered its Decision. 8 It declared the
marriage between Dana and Leodegario null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The court held that Dana was afflicted with grave,
incurable, and juridically antecedent Histrionic Personality Disorder. Dana
received a copy of the decision on August 26, 2009.

Dana filed a Notice of Appeal on September 4, 2009; but she withdrew her
appeal and instead filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC,
dated October 19, 2009, alleging that extrinsic fraud and mistake prevented
her from presenting her case at the trial. Leodegario filed a comment on the
petition.

In an Order9 dated February 17, 2010, the trial court denied Dana's petition,
ruling that there was no sufficient allegation of fraud or mistake in the
petition.

Dana filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in an
Order10 dated April 22, 2010. Aggrieved, she filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA,11 ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when
it denied her petition for relief and allowed the Decision dated June 24, 2009
to stand despite her inability to present her evidence. After a further exchange
of pleadings, the appellate court, in a Resolution 12 dated February 7, 2011,
referred Dana's petition to the Philippine Mediation Center.

On June 6, 2011, under the auspices of the appellate court mediator, Dana
and Leodegario entered into a compromise agreement, 13 where they agreed to
transfer the titles to their conjugal real properties in the name of their four
common children. On June 16, 2011, Dana moved for the archival of the case.
On July 19, 2011, the CA issued a Resolution 14 declaring the case closed and
terminated by virtue of the compromise agreement and ordering the issuance
of entry of judgment.

On July 3, 2012, Dana filed a Manifestation 15 alleging that Leodegario was not
complying with the compromise agreement. She reiterated this allegation in
her Motion to Reopen and/or Reinstate the Petition16 which she filed on August
14, 2012. Ordered by the appellate court to comment on the Motion to Reopen,
Leodegario countered that he has complied with the essential obligations
under the compromise agreement. He, subsequently, filed a Manifestation
showing such compliance, attaching the copies of the transfer certificates of
title with the required annotations thereon, deeds of sale in favor of their
common children, and the new transfer certificates of title in the names of
their common children.17

Resolution dated April 15, 2014

On April 15, 2014, the Former 15th Division of the CA rendered the first
assailed Resolution18 denying Dana's Motion to Reopen, thusly:

WHEREFORE, the motion to open and/or reinstate the petition is

hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Respondent's manifestation
showing compliance with the compromise agreement is hereby
NOTED.

SO ORDERED.19

The appellate court noted Leodegario's Manifestation showing his compliance

with the terms of the compromise agreement; on the other hand, it found that
Dana did not make any allegation or showing of her compliance with the terms
of the compromise agreement. It then concluded that the motion was
unmeritorious since Dana, as a party to the compromise agreement herself,
should also prove her faithful compliance therewith.

Undaunted, Dana filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Submit Petition

for Decision (with Plea to Preserve Marital Union), 20 asserting that the
compromise agreement was never intended to settle the issue of the validity
and subsistence of her marriage to Leodegario.

Resolution dated September 26, 2014

On September 26, 2014, the Former 15th Division of the CA rendered the
second assailed Resolution21 denying Dana's Motion for Reconsideration
and/or to Submit Petition for Decision, disposing, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Submit

Petition for Decision is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.22

The appellate court found the Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Submit
Petition for Decision unmeritorious. It held that the marital ties between Dana
and Leodegario had been severed by the trial court's decision of June 24,
2009; hence, the compromise agreement did not involve the validity of their
marriage but only their property relations. Furthermore, the appellate court
found that Dana, in her Motion to Archive Case, had conceded her intention to
have the case dismissed upon compliance with the stipulations of the
Compromise Agreement.23

Aggrieved, Dana filed the present petition for review on certiorari before this
Court on November 24, 2014. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and
Leodegario filed their respective Comments on the petition.

The Issues

Dana raises the following issues for resolution by this Court:

1) Whether or not the assailed resolutions of the CA, which terminated her
case by reason of the compromise agreement, were erroneous for being
contrary to the State's legal mandate to defend the sanctity of marriage;

2) Whether or not the assailed resolutions of the CA, which in effect upheld the
order of the trial court dismissing her petition for relief, violated her right to
due process; and

3) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court's decision
declaring the marriage void had attained finality despite the filing of the
petition for relief from judgment.24

Dana argues that she never intended to compromise the issue of the validity of
her marriage, as this cannot be the subject of compromise under Article 2035
of the New Civil Code. She further asserts that under Article 2041 of the New
Civil Code, as applied in Miguel v. Montanez,25 she is entitled to simply
consider the compromise agreement as rescinded, since Leodegario committed
a breach of the agreement. Dana also claims that the termination of the case
on the basis of the compromise agreement violated her right to due process,
since she was unable to present her side of the controversy. Lastly, she
contends that the appellate court erred in ruling that the trial court decision
declaring the marriage void had become final, claiming that her petition for
relief amounted to a motion for new trial, the filing of which is one of the
requirements for filing an appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. 26

The defensor vinculi, in his Comment, asserts that Dana's failure to file a

motion for reconsideration or an appeal paved the way for the trial court
judgment to attain finality. Due to Dana's failure to file an appeal in
accordance with Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the OSG now contends,
as the appellate court similarly concluded, that the trial court decision had
attained finality.

Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

The core issue in this petition is the propriety of setting aside the judgment
upon compromise rendered by the court a quo. Dana maintains that the
judgment should be vacated because of Leodegario's alleged breach of their
compromise; and because she did not intend to compromise the issue of the
validity of her marriage. To bolster her stand, she invokes Sections 1 and 2,
Article XV of the Constitution and urges the State to uphold, or at least try to
uphold, her marriage. Leodegario, on the other hand, asserts the binding force
of the trial court's decision and the judgment on compromise, claiming that the
courts a quo acted according to law and jurisprudence in rendering the
assailed judgments.

It must be borne in mind that Civil Case No. 03-6954 is a proceeding for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between Dana and Leodegario on the
ground of psychological incapacity. The applicable substantive laws are,
therefore, the Family Code and the New Civil Code, while the governing
procedural law is A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, with the Rules of Court applying
suppletorily.27

In the case at bar, the CA 28 and the OSG29 both concluded that the trial court
decision had attained finality after Dana's inability to file an appeal therefrom.
The two resolutions of the appellate court presuppose that the judgment on
the validity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage had attained finality. Dana, on
the other hand, asserts that it had not.

The Court agrees with the conclusion of the CA and the defensor

vinculi regarding the finality of the RTC decision; however, we do not agree with
their assertions as to the effect of the decision on the subsequent
proceedings a quo.

There is indeed no showing in the record that Dana moved for reconsideration
or new trial from the RTC decision. She, nevertheless, filed an appeal.
However, probably cognizant of the proscription in Section 20 30 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, which makes the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a motion
for new trial a precondition for filing an appeal, she withdrew her appeal and
filed a petition for relief from judgment.

There is no provision in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC prohibiting resort to a petition

for relief from judgment in a marriage nullity case. Furthermore, the said Rule
sanctions the suppletory application of the Rules of Court 31 to cases within its
ambit. It cannot, therefore, be said that Dana availed of an inappropriate
remedy to question the decision of the trial court. Indeed, the trial court
admitted Dana's petition for relief, heard the parties on the issues thereon, and
rendered an order denying the petition. Dana then properly and seasonably
assailed the order of denial via certiorari to the CA. It is, therefore, clear that
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-6954 continued even after the trial court
had rendered judgment and even after the lapse of the 15-day period for
appealing the decision.

Nevertheless, considering the nature and office of a petition for relief, which is
to set aside a final judgment,32 the Court cannot agree with Dana's assertion
that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 03-6954 had not attained
finality. In fact, the decision has already been annotated in their marriage
contract.33 This finding, however, does not detract from the fact that the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-6954 continued even after the trial court had
rendered judgment, precisely because Dana filed a petition for relief from that
judgment. From the denial of her petition, she sought recourse to the appellate
court. The appellate court, in dismissing the case upon the parties'
compromise on their conjugal properties, invoked the finality of the RTC
decision as a bar to the litigation of the other issues raised by Dana's petition.
This conclusion is untenable.

In Samia v. Medina,34 which involved the application of the

statutory ascendant of Rule 38 in the old Code of Civil Procedure,
the Court held:

There is a great deal of similarity between an order granting a

motion for a new trial based upon "accident or surprise which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against" under section
145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and an order granting a motion
for a new trial based upon "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect," under section 113 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as both set aside the judgment, order, or proceeding
complained of; both call for a new trial, and in both the injured
party may question the order granting the motion for the new trial
upon appeal from the new judgment rendered upon the merits of
the case. The only fundamental difference lies in this, that while
the judgment, order, or proceeding coming under section 145 of
the Code of Civil Procedure is not final, that coming under section
113 is final. But this does not alter the nature or effect of the order
granting the new trial, for this order does not put an end to the
litigation in the sense that the party injured thereby has no
other remedy short of appeal; he may question the propriety
of the new trial on appeal from an adverse judgment rendered
after such trial.35 (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)

In Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Sheriff of Manila,36 decided prior to the

enactment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court held:
 There is no question that a judgment or order denying relief under
Rule 38 is final and appealable, unlike an order granting such
relief which is interlocutory. However, the second part of the
above-quoted provision (that in the course of an appeal from the
denial or dismissal of a petition for relief, a party may also assail
the judgment on the merits) may give the erroneous impression
that in such appeal the appellate court may reverse or modify the
judgment on the merits. This cannot be done because the
judgment from which relief is sought is already final and executor.
xxx

The purpose of the rule is to enable the appellate court to

determine not only the existence of any of the grounds relied upon
whether it be fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but
also and primarily the merit of the petitioner's cause of action or
defense, as the case may be. If the appellate court finds that one of
the grounds exists and, what is of decisive importance, that the
petitioner has a good cause of action or defense, it will reverse the
denial or dismissal, set aside the judgment in the main case and
remand the case to the lower court for a new trial in accordance
with Section 7 of Rule 38.37 (Citations omitted)

The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure changed the nature of an order of denial of a
petition for relief from judgment, making it unappealable 38 and, hence,
assailable only via a petition for certiorari.39 Nevertheless, the appellate court,
in deciding such petitions against denials of petitions for relief, remains tasked
with making a factual determination, i.e., whether or not the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition. To do so, it is still
obliged, as Service Specialists instructs, to "determine not only the existence of
any of the grounds relied upon whether it be fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, but also and primarily the merit of the petitioner's cause of
action or defense, as the case may be."40 Stated otherwise, the finality of the
RTC decision cannot bar the appellate court from determining the issues
raised in the petition for relief, if only to determine the existence of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying such petition. While a
Rule 38 Petition does not stay the execution of the judgment, 41 the grant
thereof reopens the case for a new trial; 42 and thus, if merit be found in
Dana's certiorari petition assailing the trial court's denial of her petition for
relief, the case will be reopened for new trial.

The CA, therefore, erred in refusing to reopen Dana's petition on the basis of
the finality of the trial court decision.

The Court now resolves the question regarding the propriety of setting aside
the judgment on compromise.
On one hand, the immutability and immediate effect of judgments upon
compromise is well-settled. In Magbanua v. Uy,43 it was held that:

When a compromise agreement is given judicial approval, it

becomes more than a contract binding upon the parties. Having
been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a determination of a
controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment. It is
immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of
consent or forgery. The nonfulfillment of its terms and conditions
justifies the issuance of a writ of execution; in such an instance,
execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.44

However, like any other judgment, a judgment upon compromise which is

contrary to law is a void judgment; and "[a] void judgment or order has no legal
and binding effect. It does not divest rights, and no rights can be obtained
under it; all proceedings founded upon a void judgment are equally
worthless."45

On the other hand, Article 2035(2) and Article 5 of the New Civil Code provide:

ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be

valid:

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;

ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or

prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity.

Again, the Court reiterates, at the risk of being repetitive, that the petition
which gave rise to these proceedings is for the declaration of nullity of Dana
and Leodegario's marriage. Dana's petition for certiorari with the CA, which is
nothing but a consequence of the proceedings before the RTC, alleges the
fraudulent deprivation of her chance to refute and controvert Leodegario's
allegations and to present her side of the issue, which she also lays down in
her petition. The core issue of Dana's petition is, therefore, the validity of her
marriage to Leodegario. The termination of the case by virtue of the
compromise agreement, therefore, necessarily implies the settlement by
compromise of the issue of the validity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage.

In Uy v. Chua,46 which also involves an issue not subject to compromise under

Article 2035, the Court held:

The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent,

executed on 18 February 2000 and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in
 its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No.
8830-CEB, obviously intended to settle the question of petitioner's
status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of
respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan
acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent,
respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00
each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence
of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived
away her rights to future support and future legitime as an
illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise
Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and
respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of
the Civil Code.47 (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)

In a long line of cases,48 the Court has censured and punished lawyers, and
even judges, who have drafted agreements to dissolve marriages or to sanction
adulterous relations. The rule applies a fortiori to the CA. It was, therefore,
erroneous for the appellate court to terminate Dana's suit - which puts in
issue the validity of her marriage - by virtue of the execution of the Decision 11
Q.R. No. 214593 compromise agreement which only covers the property
relations of the spouses. While these issues are intertwined, a compromise of
the latter issue should not and cannot operate as a compromise of the former,
per Article 2035 of the Civil Code.

The Court cannot give its imprimatur to the dismissal of the case at bar even
if, as the appellate court held, it was Dana's intention 49 to have the case
terminated upon the execution of the compromise agreement. Nevertheless, the
Court agrees with the appellate court when it ruled that the scope of the
compromise agreement is limited to Dana and Leodegario's property
relations vis-à-vis their children, as Article 2036 of the Civil Code provides that
"[a] compromise comprises only those objects which are definitely stated
therein, or which by necessary implication from its terms should be deemed to
have been included in the same." As held by the appellate court:

The agreement makes no mention of the marital ties between

[Leodegario] and [Dana] but is limited only to their property
relations vis-à-vis their children.50

However, despite the error committed by the appellate court, absent vices of
consent or other defects, the compromise agreement remains valid and binding
upon Dana and Leodegario, as they have freely and willingly agreed to, and
have already complied with, the covenants therein. The agreement operates as
a partial compromise on the issue of the disposition of the properties of the
marriage.
Nevertheless, the Court is constrained to uphold the appellate court's decision,
because the trial court's denial of Dana's petition for relief from judgment does
not amount to grave abuse of discretion.

While the remaining issues in the petition partake of a factual nature, the
Court deems it necessary to write finis to this case at this level in order to
avoid remanding the case to the appellate court. It has been held that "remand
is not necessary if the Court is in a position to resolve a dispute on the basis of
the records before it; and if such remand would not serve the ends of
justice."51 A careful perusal of the petitions filed by Dana before the trial court,
the appellate court, and this Court betrays the lack of allegations sufficient to
support a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38.

Jurisprudence provides that fraud, as a ground for a petition for relief, refers
to extrinsic or collateral fraud52 which, in turn, has been defined as fraud that
prevented the unsuccessful party from fully and fairly presenting his case or
defense and from having an adversarial trial of the issue, as when the lawyer
connives to defeat or corruptly sells out his client's interest. Extrinsic fraud
can be committed by a counsel against his client when the latter is prevented
from presenting his case to the court.53 In Lasala v. National Food
Authority,54 the Court defined extrinsic fraud in relation to parties represented
by counsel, viz.:

Extrinsic fraud x x x refers to "any fraudulent act of the prevailing

party in litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, where
the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by
keeping him away from court, by giving him a false promise of a
compromise, or where an attorney fraudulently or without
authority connives at his defeat."

Because extrinsic fraud must emanate from the opposing party,

extrinsic fraud concerning a party's lawyer often involves the
latter's collusion with the prevailing party, such that his lawyer
connives at his defeat or corruptly sells out his client's interest.

In this light, we have ruled in several cases that a lawyer's mistake

or gross negligence does not amount to the extrinsic fraud that
would grant a petition for annulment of judgment.

We so ruled not only because extrinsic fraud has to involve the

opposing party, but also because the negligence of counsel, as a
rule, binds his client.55 (Citations omitted)
Given this definition, the Court found the following circumstances sufficient to
make out a case for extrinsic fraud:

The party in the present case, the NFA, is a government agency

that could rightly rely solely on its legal officers to vigilantly
protect its interests. The NFA's lawyers were not only its counsel,
they were its employees tasked to advance the agency's legal
interests.

Further, the NFA's lawyers acted negligently several times in

handling the case that it appears deliberate on their part.

First, Atty. Mendoza caused the dismissal of the NFA's complaint

against Lasala by negligently and repeatedly failing to attend the
hearing for the presentation of the NFA's evidence-in-chief.
Consequently, the NFA lost its chance to recover from Lasala the
employee benefits that it allegedly shouldered as indirect
employer.

Atty. Mendoza never bothered to provide any valid excuse for this
crucial omission on his part.1aшphi1 Parenthetically, this was not
the first time Atty. Mendoza prejudiced the NFA; he did the same
when he failed to file a motion for reconsideration and an appeal in
a prior 1993 case where Lasala secured a judgment of
P34,500,229.67 against the NFA.

For these failures, Atty. Mendoza merely explained that the NFA's
copy of the adverse decision was lost and was only found after the
lapse of the period for appeal. Under these circumstances, the NFA
was forced to file an administrative complaint against Atty.
Mendoza for his string of negligent acts.

Atty. Cahucom, Atty. Mendoza's successor in handling the case,

notably did not cross-examine Lasala's witnesses, and did not
present controverting evidence to disprove and counter Lasala's
counterclaim. Atty. Cahucom further prejudiced the NFA when he
likewise failed to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal
from the trial court's September 2, 2002 decision, where Lasala
was awarded the huge amount of P52,788,970.50, without any
convincing evidence to support it.

When asked to justify his failure, Atty. Cahucom, like Atty.

Mendoza, merely mentioned that the NFA's copy of the decision
was lost and that he only discovered it when the period for appeal
had already lapsed.
 The trial court's adverse decision, of course, could have been
avoided or the award minimized, if Atty. Cahucom did not waive
the NFA's right to present its controverting evidence against
Lasala's counterclaim evidence. Strangely, when asked during
hearing, Atty. Cahucom refused to refute Lasala's testimony and
instead simply moved for the filing of a memorandum.

The actions of these lawyers, that at the very least could be

equated with unreasonable disregard for the case they were
handling and with obvious indifference towards the NFA's plight,
lead us to the conclusion that Attys. Mendoza's and Cahucom's
actions amounted to a concerted action with Lasala when the
latter secured the trial court's huge and baseless counterclaim
award. By this fraudulent scheme, the NFA was prevented from
making a fair submission in the controversy. 56

Lasala has been subsequently reiterated in Cagayan Economic Zone Authority

v. Meridien Vista Gaming Corporation,57 where the Court held that:

[I]n cases of gross and palpable negligence of counsel and of

extrinsic fraud, the Court must step in and accord relief to a client
who suffered thereby. x x x [F]or the extrinsic fraud to justify a
petition for relief from judgment, it must be that fraud which the
prevailing party caused to prevent the losing party from being
heard on his action or defense. Such fraud concerns not the
judgment itself but the manner in which it was obtained. Guided
by these pronouncements, the Court in the case of Apex Mining,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals wrote:

If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of

counsel is so great and the error committed as a
result thereof is so serious that the client, who
otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied
his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to
give the client another chance to present his case.
Similarly, when an unsuccessful party has been
prevented from fully and fairly presenting his case as
a result of his lawyer's professional delinquency or
infidelity, the litigation may be reopened to allow the
party to present his side. Where counsel is guilty
of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of
duty, which resulted in the clients being held liable
for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of
his day in court and the judgment may be set aside
 on such ground.58 (Citations omitted and emphases
in the original)

As in Lasala, the Court found sufficient factual justification for the grant of
CEZA's petition for relief, viz.:

At the inception, CEZA was already deprived of its right to present

evidence during the trial of the case when Atty. Baniaga filed a
joint manifestation submitting the case for decision based on the
pleadings without informing CEZA. In violation of his sworn duty
to protect his client's interest, Atty. Baniaga agreed to submit the
case for decision without fully substantiating their defense. Worse,
after he received a copy of the decision, he did not even bother to
inform his client and the OGCC of the adverse judgment. He did
not even take steps to protect the interests of his client by filing an
appeal. Instead, he allowed the judgment to lapse into finality.
Such reckless and gross negligence deprived CEZA not only of the
chance to seek reconsideration thereof but also the opportunity to
elevate its case to the CA.59

Turning now to the case at bar, it is clear that Dana's allegations in her
petition for relief fall way short of the jurisprudential threshold for extrinsic
fraud. The Court quotes the allegations Dana made in her petition for relief
with the trial court:

In all candor, [Dana] wanted to present her side of the controversy

and all she intended was to take the witness stand. Without her
knowing it, however, her time to present her evidence passed
without her being able to do so. Her previous counsel did not
remind, much less advice [sic], her of the hearing dates to present
her case. Particularly, she was not simply aware of the hearings
held by this [h]onorable [c]ourt on February 26 and March 26,
2009. She can only surmise that somebody must have
maneuvered to impress, if not mislead, the [h]onorable [c]ourt that
she was not interested to present her side.

This must be so since after [Dana] confronted her counsel about

the promulgation of the Decision without her being able to present
evidence, her counsel nonchalantly told her that it was their
mutual decision not to present any evidence. This was not what
[Dana] thought and knew. In the first place, she filed her Answer
to the petition and assailed all the material allegations therein.
She found no reason to abandon her case.
 [Dana], by these assertions does not accuse her previous
counsel any wrongdoing or neglect, or any other parties
probably in cahoots with her said counsel. But it certainly had
caused some harm to and, in fact, defrauded this [h]onorable
[c]ourt which was led into believing that [Dana] was not interested
in presenting her evidence. Hence, this [h]onorable [c]ourt found
that [Dana] failed to appear despite notice as already mentioned
above. Had it known that she was interested on [sic] presenting
her side, this [h]onorable [c]ourt certainly would not have denied
her that right. Otherwise put, by the deception, this Honorable
Court was not aware that [Dana] was deprived of her day in
court.60 (Emphasis and underlining Ours)

Dana's petition is anchored on two main allegations: first, that her counsel
failed to notify her of the hearings dated February 26 and March 26, 2009; and
second, that her counsel nonchalantly told her that it was their mutual
decision to not present any evidence. However, she categorically admits that
she "does not accuse her previous counsel [of] any wrongdoing or neglect, or
any other parties probably in cahoots with her said counsel." 61 Furthermore,
the petition makes no specific citation of other acts or circumstances
attributable to her counsel that fraudulently deprived Dana of her opportunity
to fully ventilate her claims and defenses with the trial court. The acts
complained of in the petition constitute neither "gross and palpable negligence"
nor corruption or collusion amounting to extrinsic fraud. The general rule,
which binds the client to the negligence of her counsel, remains applicable to
this case. All told, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed her petition for
relief.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The

Resolutions dated April 15, 2014 and September 26, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 115420, are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as they
declared the proceedings CLOSED and TERMINATED. SO ORDERED.