Case Summary
Case Summary
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the
Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a
spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by
Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes alleged that it was not a shoot-out but a rob out instead.
Bienvenido Blancaflor investigated the incident and absolved from any criminal liability all the
PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved stating that it was a legit police operation.
Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modifed the Blancaflor panel's fnding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents.
Accused filed for motion for reconsideration
Ombudsman filed eleven (11) amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, wherein
petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr.
and others.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
o They contend that RA 7975limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where
one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG)
27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General)
or higher
Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as
none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
Special Prosecutor moved for reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the
Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, were introduced in Congress,
defining/expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought,
among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal"
from the phrase "principal accused"
Arguements
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7
o statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith a
o an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused to
procedural process
o if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process
would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the
Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975,
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the
rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be
o word "principal" before the word "accused" in the amendment
o R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law 33 because its enactment was
particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan
Resolution
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not a penal
law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character.
The right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the
enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in
nature that can be regulated by law
The offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.
The amended informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors are wanting of
specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense
charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.
there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said
principal accused w a s intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police
officers.
intimate connection between the offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as
earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, 73 not the Sandiganbayan
PETER PAUL DIMATULAC and VERONICA DIMATULAC , petitioners, vs. HON. SESINANDO
VILLON
That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring
and confederating with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, who has already been charged for
the same offense before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under Crim. Case No. 93-129891 and
mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to
kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one RICARDO QUEJONG Y BELLO, by then and
there stabbing him twice with a bladed weapon and hitting him with a gun at the back, thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
o In its Decision dated 30 September 1997, the trial court found Abarquez guilty as an
accomplice in the crime of homicide. The trial court held that the prosecution failed to prove
that Abarquez was a co-conspirator of Almojuela in the killing of Quejong. Hence, Abarquez
could not be convicted as a principal in the crime of homicide. However, the trial court ruled
that Abarquez, in holding and restraining Paz, prevented the latter from helping Quejong
and allowed Almojuela to pursue his criminal act without resistance
o The Issues The issues Abarquez raises before the Court may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt;
2. Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in giving more credence to
the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
The Ruling of the appellate Court
o Paz's testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuela's criminal design.
"Tumigil" literally means "stop." Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the
fray, not from helping Quejong.
o When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt should be resolved in his favor
o Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in issue or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses
That on or about September 23, 1987, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping each other, with intent to gain did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
enter the house of one Violeta Sayaman Parnala, and once inside, by means of violence and
intimidation, rob, take and carry away a necklace worth P600.00 and ring worth P440.00 belonging to
one Jay Vee Parnala Custodio, son of Violeta Sayaman Parnala, without the consent of the said owner
and to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of P1,100.00, Philippine Currency and that on the
occasion of the said robbery, and in pursuance of their conspiracy, the abovenamed accused, with intent
to kill, did, then and there, wilfully unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, scald and stab Jay Vee
Parnala inflicting upon Jay Vee Parnala Custodio 3 incised and 15 stab wounds and upon Teresita
Minorca CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com Rosalinas 1 incised and 6 stab wounds on the
different parts of their body, which ultimately caused their deaths.
Respondent’s argument
Appellant countered, however, that witness Violeta could not have known him personally since
her son and maid rode coincidentally on appellant's jeepney only on occasions whenever he
passed by the witness' house in the course of regular work.
The implication is that Violeta could not have positively identified him as one of those who
emerged from the garage door of the victims' house, they being complete strangers to each
other.
Appellant presented Rafael Diaz, owner of RM Motor Works in Parañaque, where appellant
used to work as an all around employee and where he allegedly spent the night on September
23, 1987, the time when the crime was committed.
Appellant insists that, as proof of his innocence, he did not escape nor evade arrest after the
commission of the crime imputed against him.
Appellant claims that the evidence against him is purely circumstantial which is insuMcient to
sustain his conviction.
Court Ruling
Appellant Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and convincing proof, that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the victims' house at the time the crime was committed,
apart from his self-serving declaration that he was at RM Motors Works in Parañaque on the
fateful night of September 23, 1987, seconded by the discredited testimony of his alleged
employer, Rafael Diaz.
There appears to be no motive on the part of Violeta Parnala to falsely accuse appellant, other
than her sincere desire to seek justice for the deaths of her son and maid.
Appellant himself admitted that he was not aware of any reason or motive why Violeta should
testify falsely against him.
Accused chose to flee from the scene of the crime and to stay beyond the clutches of the law,
thus, spotlighting the legal maxim 'the guilty fleet while the innocent stands fast, bold as a lion.
The evidence on record does not warrant reversal of this finding by the trial court.
Direct evidence is not only the basis upon which the guilt of an accused may be proved; it may
also be established through circumstantial evidence
The charge and the corresponding conviction should have been for robbery with homicide only
although two persons were killed. The multiplicity of the victims slain, though, is appreciated as
an aggravating circumstance.
The Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the conviction is for
robbery with homicide
That on or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA and
NENITA P. AGUIL, both public o?cers, being then the President and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu
State College, and as such by reason of their positions and duties are accountable for public funds under
their administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with
MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public o?cer, being then the Administrative O?cer V of the said school, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the payment of
wages of casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, which
amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the
said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service.
CONTRARY TO LAW. Appellant's co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted.
Norma Abdulla was convicted of the crime charged and was meted a fine of three thousand pesos. She
is further imposed the penalty of temporary special disquali6cation for a period of six (6) years. She shall
also pay the costs of the suit.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellant's sentence by deleting
the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her
Respondent’s argument
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove criminal intent
on her part
good faith is a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation as it would negate criminal
intent on the part of the accused which the prosecution failed to prove
The second assigned error refers to the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence of
all the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation
She argued that the public funds in question, having been established to form part of
savings, had therefore ceased to be appropriated by law or ordinance for any specific
purpose.
JUANITO LIM, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
The evidence of the prosecution tried to establish that Sergio Pabilona had vacated his
house in Barangay Tiglimao, Cagayan de Oro City, because of the worsening communist
insurgency problem in that barangay, of which he used to be the barangay captain; that he
had taken temporary residence in Barangay Pagatpat, also of Cagayan de Oro City.
That upon arriving in Barangay Tuburan, Sgt. Bacalso ordered the men of Pabilona to proceed to
the compound of ECG Mining Corporation and to remove from the heavy equipment found
therein their parts; that he also ordered them to unload and to carry with them the acetylene
equipment owned by accused-appellant Juanito Lim which was covered by canvass on board the
truck;
They brought the various heavy equipment parts, among which were nine tires with rims, to the
Mercedes Benz truck and loaded them thereon; that Pabilona, his men and their military escort
repaired back to Barangay Tiglimao and loaded the personal belongings of Pabilona; that they
then drove back to Lapasan, stopping at the "bodega" of accused Juanito Lim which was located
a few meters away from the residence of Sgt. Bacalso;
The accused arrive at his "bodega" on board his yellow pick-up vehicle; that they then saw the
accused remove from his "bodega" the nine tires with rims, load them on his yellow pick-up
vehicle and then drive away;
Inculpation of petitioner was anchored on the principal observation that the witnesses who
testified against him had no ulterior motive to prevaricate which rendered their testimony
worthy of credence when juxtaposed with petitioner's defense of denial and alibi.
The prosecution has duly proved that the appellant had dealt with the stolen items and had
possession of the same because the said spare parts and tires which were the subject of
thievery or robbery
petitioner's argument that the Anti-Fencing Law does not contemplate the inclusion of civil
liability as part of the penalty for violation thereof, respondent court opined that when he was
instructed to pay the sum of P206,320.00 less the value of the spare parts recovered, such
imposition refers to his civil liability, in line with the penal axiom that a person criminally liable is
also civilly liable.
Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the
subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
the petition is hereby dismissed and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 15,
1991 is hereby AFFIRMED.
That on or about the 18th day of May, 1992, at Barangay Dilan, municipality of Pozorrubio, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody one
(1) long 7rearm of unknown caliber or make, without authority of law, and which he used in shooting
Barangay Captain Eduardo Datario, Bernabe Bayona and Cinderella Estrella.
Prosecution’s Argument
The witnesses saw the assailant, at an approximate distance of ten meters, holding a
long firearm aimed towards their group. That assailant, according to this witness, was
herein appellant who was then on the other side of a concrete fence which was more
than five feet high.
Defense’s Argument
Ruling
The courts, however, have been quick to deny evidentiary weight where such delay is not
suBciently justified by any acceptable explanation.
The fence was about a foot more than appellant's admitted height, hence the witness could not
have really seen CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com appellant walking away from
the crime scene
There were people milling around and structures erected for other sideshows, which collectively
obstructed his view. (datario)
exaggerated narration of the facts simultaneously taking place is certainly beyond human
experience (Narsagaray)
No motive was ever attributed to appellant as to why he should kill the deceased or shoot the
other victims since the evidence shows beyond cavil that he did not even know any of them
personally. (The rule is that proof of motive is unnecessary to impute a crime to the accused if
the evidence concerning his identi7cation is convincing)
Accused-appellant Alfonso Bautista is hereby ACQUITTED of the present charges against him and, unless
otherwise detained for some other lawful cause, his release from confinement is consequently directed
Prosecution
"Prosecution witness Conchita Agliday, wife of appellant Reynaldo Agliday, testifed that about 8:00
o'clock on the evening of February 25, 1999 while washing dishes in the kitchen of their house, her son
Richard Agliday was shot with a shotgun by her husband-appellant Ricardo Agliday (pp. 4-5, tsn, July 5,
1999). As a result, her son Richard fell on his belly; her husband-appellant ran away. Although shocked,
Conchita was able to rush out of her house to call for help. Richard was 7rst brought to the Sto. Niño
Hospital, then to the San Carlos General Hospital, and 7nally to the Region I Hospital in Dagupan City
(pp. 5-6, id.). IDCScA "Before the shooting, Conchita and her husband quarreled over her working as a
laundry woman (p. 7, id.). Her son, Richard, at the time of his death, was only nineteen (19) years old
and in 4th year college (p. 9, id.). "Prosecution witness Rey Agliday, another son of appellant, testi7ed
that he was in their house resting on a wooden bed at the time of the incident in question (p. 3, tsn,
June 18, 1999). Rey saw his father-appellant shoot his brother Richard with a shotgun, as he was about
four (4) meters from them
Defense
"While his wife Conchita and his son Richard were about to go upstairs, and while appellant was
cleaning the homemade shotgun, the gun accidentally went off and Richard's buttock was hit
Faced with two conflicting versions of the facts, the trial court gave credence to the prosecution
witnesses who gave straightforward, spontaneous, sincere and frank accounts of the events that had
unfolded before their very eyes. Because of their relationship with appellant, there was no reason for
them to testify falsely against him. The first witness (Rey) was appellant's son who was the victim's
brother, while the other witness (Conchita) was appellant's wife who was the victim's mother.
Issues
He claims that it should have believed him because he had absolutely no reason or motive to kill, much
less shoot, his own son whom he considered to have had a very bright future
He therefore contends that he should be acquitted on the basis of the exempting circumstance of
accident under Article 12 (paragraph 4) of the Revised Penal Code.( The exemption from criminal liability
under the circumstance showing accident is based on the lack of criminal intent.)
Held
In People v. Belbes, 30 the Court found no reckless imprudence in the shooting of a student who, in the
act of destroying the school's bamboo wall, had been caught by a policeman who was responding to a
report that somebody was causing trouble in a school affair. The policeman's action cannot be
characterized as reckless imprudence, because the shooting was intentional. The accused had intended
to 7re at the victim and in fact hit only the latter. In this case, resenting his son's meddling in his
argument with his wife, appellant purposely took his gun and shot his son. WHEREFORE, the appeal is
hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
On 19 October 1993, Crisostomo, a member of the Philippine National Police and a jail guard at the
Solano Municipal Jail was charged with the murder of Renato Suba ("Renato"), a detention prisoner at
the Solano Municipal Jail. The Information alleged that Crisostomo conspired with his co-accused,
Dominador C. dela Cruz ("dela Cruz"), Efren M. Perez ("Perez"), Raki T. Anggo ("Anggo"), Randy A.
Lumabo ("Lumabo"), Rolando M. Norberte ("Norberte") and Mario Calingayan ("Calingayan"), all
inmates at the Solano Municipal Jail, in murdering Renato.
Prosecution
Renato was in good physical condition and did not complain of any bodily pain.
Crisostomo was the one on duty at the time of the death of Renato. At no time was Renato
brought out of the cell during his detention on 13 February 1989 until his death in the evening of
the following day. Crisostomo's position in relation to the cell where the victim was killed was
such that Crisostomo as jail guard could have heard if not seen what was going on inside the cell
at the time that Renato was killed
There are unexplained discrepancies in the list of detainees/prisoners and police blotter
The body bore extensive injuries that could have been inflicted by several persons.
The exhumation and autopsy reports ruled out suicide as the cause of Renato's death.
The deafening silence of the inmates and the jail guard, Crisostomo, point to a conspiracy
Crisostomo's guilt is made apparent when he jumped bail during trial.
Issues
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the crime of murder charged against
crisostomo who is a senior police officer 1 (spo1) at the time of the filing of the information
against him.
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it ruled that Crisostomo is guilty of having conspired in the murder of Renato
despite the Sandiganbayan's admission in its decision that there is no direct evidence that will
show the participation of Crisostomo in the death of the victim
Held
The Court's Ruling The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case. However, the prosecution failed
to prove Crisostomo and Calingayan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, we acquit Crisostomo and
Calingayan
In Sanchez v. Demetriou, the Court ruled that public office must be a constituent element of the crime
as defined in the statute before the Sandiganbayan could acquire jurisdiction over a case.
Crisostomo insists that there is no direct relation between the commission of murder and
Crisostomo's public office
In People v. Montejo the Court explained that a public officer commits an offense in relation to his office
if he perpetrates the offense while performing, though in an improper or irregular manner, his official
functions and he cannot commit the offense without holding his public office. In such a case, there is an
intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused.
The Information alleged that Crisostomo "a public officer, being then a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) stationed at Solano Police Station and a jailer thereat, taking advantage of his
public position and thus committing the offense in relation to his oDce" conspired, confederated and
connived with his co-accused who are inmates of the Solano Municipal Jail to kill Renato, "a detention
prisoner."
In sum, the Sandiganbayan believed that Crisostomo took part in the conspiracy to kill Renato
because of these three circumstances: (1) Crisostomo as the jail guard on duty at the time of
Renato's killing had in his possession the keys to the main door and the cells; (2) Crisostomo was
in such a position that he could have seen or heard the killing of Renato; and (3) there are
discrepancies between the list of detainees/prisoners and the police blotter. According to the
Sandiganbayan, there is a prima facie case against Crisostomo. Except for the extensive injuries
that Renato's body bore, there is no other evidence that proves that there was a prior
agreement between Crisostomo and the six inmates to CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018
cdasiaonline.com kill Renato.
People vs Ferrer
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972
CASTRO, J.:p
FACTS:
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against the respondent Feliciano Co, as he became an officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines,
an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the government.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 29170, another criminal complaint was filed with before Nilo Tayag and fiver
others with subversion, as they were tagged as officers of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive
organization instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite for the purpose of overthrowing
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
Tayag also moved to quash the complaint on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague;
(3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal
protection of the laws.
RULING: No, the Supreme Court said it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a
judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder.
In this case, when the act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the member thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does
is simple to declare the party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for
the purposes of the prohibition.
The term "Communist Part of the Philippines" issues solely for definitional purposes. In fact the act
applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any organisation having the same
purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it
is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title
thereof; and (4) it denies him the equal protection of the laws.
When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment.
What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of
the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in
the outlawed organization.
But the statute specifically requires that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to
further the illegal objectives of the Party.
3. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not
enough to render it a bill of attainder.
4. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the
ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply
retroactively and reach past conduct.