NATO Conventional Defense: Force Augmentation With European Reservists (1989)
NATO Conventional Defense: Force Augmentation With European Reservists (1989)
A RAND NOTE
Roy F. Phillips
January 1989
RAND J
The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force
uder contract No. F49620-86-C-0008 and by the U5nited States Army under
contract No. MDA903-86-C-0059.
The RAND Publication Series: The Report is the principal publication doc-
umenting and transmitting RAND's major research findings and final research
results. The RAND Note reports other outputs of sponsored research for
general distribution. Publications of The RAND Corporation do not neces-
sarily reflect the opinions or policies cf the sponsors of RAND research.
Roy F. Phillips
January 1989
7 ~ I
RAN
F
RAND tlIlla
- iii -
PREFACE
SUMMARY
2
The labor cost component of this and succeeding estimates was
derived from market wages paid to American servicemen. While more
reflective of the societal cost of military labor, this estimate may
overestimate the monetary cost that would be borne by implementation of
the reserve option in the conscription-based military service systems in
Europe.
- viii -
CONCLUSIONS
The reserve .option could provide NATO with a robust forward
defense capability at a cost of $50 billion (spread over 15 years).
Another way to assess the reserve option is to compare its capabilities
with those that could be acquired with similar expenditure elsewhere. A
recent study by the Congressional Budget Office assessed three
alternatives costing between $40 and $50 billion (spread over 20
years). 3 The least expensive alternative, at a cost of $41.2 billion,
would purchase one U.S.-based heavy division with a companion
POMCUS' set in Europe. The addition of a single division, however,
would not come close to providing NATO with the capability to mount a
successful forward defense.
In summary, the reserve option warrants serious consideration as
NATO discusses alternatives for improving its conventional capabilities.
3Congressional
Budget Office, U.S. Ground Forces and the
ConventionAl Balance in Europe, Washington D.C., June 1988.
4POMCUS is the acronym for Prepositioned Materiel Configured in
Unit Sets.
- ix -
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
CONTENTS
PREFACE .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . .1i
SUMMARY.............................................................. v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS....................................................... ix
FIGURES............................................................ xiii
TABLES............................................................... xv
GLOSSARY........................................................... xvii
Sect ion
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 1
Problem Description............................................1
The Range of Alternatives and the Reserves Option...............3
Timeliness of a Reserves Option Assessment......................5
Analytic Framework.............................................7
Organization of This Study.....................................10
Appendix
A. DE SCORES FOR WP AND NATO UNITS..................................75
B. THE MASTER SIMULATION MODEL.....................................114
C. ARMY UNIT COST MODEL........................................... 118
REFERENCES.......................................................... 121
-xiii-
FIGURES
1.1. Methodology................................................... 9
2.1. WP National Boundaries and Soviet MIs..........................20
2.2. NATO Corps Areas of Responsibility.............................25
2.3. Initial Disposition of Attacking and Defending Forces .... 31
2.4. Penetration (by Axis)........................................ 31
2.5. Penetration (Average)........................................ 32
2.6. Red Attrition................................................ 32
2.7. Blue Attrition............................................... 33
2.8. Theater Force Ratio.................... ...................... 33
2.9. Committed Red Forces......................................... 34
2.10. Committea Blue Forces........................................ 35
3.1. Unit Proficiency............................................. 41
4.1. Add Reserve DEs on D+l....................................... 50
4.2. Add Reserve DEs on D+l, D+9, Rnd D+16..........................51
5.1. German Manpower Availability Age 18 Males......................57
5.2. Dutch Manpower Availability Age 18 Males.......................57
5.3. Belgian Manpower Availability Age 18 Males....................58
B.1. Movement: Covering Force Area ................................ 115
B.2. Movement: Main Battle Area ................................... 116
B.3. Movement: Rear Area........................116
B.4. Attrition: Defending Force (NArc)............................ 117
B.5. Attrition: Attacking Force (WP).............................. 117
-xv-
TABLES
GLOSSARY
I. INTRODUCTION
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
NATO's security problem results in part from an imbalance of
conventional forces between the WP and NATO in Central Europe. This
imbalance is generally described in terms of the forces available to
each side under different scenarios (static comparisons) and in terms of
estimates of war outcomes (dynamic analyses) if those forces engage in
conflict. Static comparisons and dynamic analyses will differ depending
upon.(among other things):
* Scenarios
• Data sources
* Assumptions about weapon effectiveness
* Assumptions about the adjudication of conflict
Common themes (often implicit) among most assessments are that the WP
has a conventional advantage in Europe and that remedies are needed.
-3 -
* Force structure
* Technology
* Strategy and tactics
Force structure refers to the men and equipment that make up NATO
armed forces. In 1952, NATO decisionmakers called for 96 divisions to
meet the threat from the East. 4 Political and budgetary constraints
prevented NATO from ever reaching this goal (and the WP has had an
advantage in conventional forces since its inception). Instead of
fielding a commensurate conventional force, NATO has primarily relied on
strategic and theater nuclear weapons to deter a conventional attack by
the Soviet Union.
2
NATO coordinates its collective defense efforts through one of two
means: either through NATO's formal Force Planning Process (FPP) or
through special initiatives. The FPP functions on a biannual schedule.
In odd years NATO military authorities describe and evaluate the threat
posed by the WP. NATO ministers use this and other inputs to produce a
Guidance to assist in developing force proposals. In even years,
military authorities use the Guidance to develop specific proposals
which are later modified by the ministers (accounting for political
considerations) and developed into Force Goals. Special initiatives
supplement (some would say bypass altogether) the NATO FPP. Special
initiatives (e.g., AD-70, LTDP and the AWACs purchase) highlight
priorities and, through high-level political involvement, pressure the
membership to expressly pursue these priorities. See James C. Wendt and
Nanette Brown, Improving the Force Planning Process: Lessons from Past
Efforts, The RAND Corporation, R-3383-USDP, June 1986.
2Alternatively,
the imbalance could be redressed by a WP decision
to draw down its forces (either unilaterally or through an arms control
agreement).
4Steven L. Canby, Short and Long War Responses: Restructuring,
Border Defense and Reserve Mobilization for Armored Warfare, Technology
Service Corporation, Silver Spring Maryland, March 1978, p. 3.
-4-
Karber, "In Defense of Forward Defense," Armed Forces Journal, May 1984;
Robert Levine et al., A Survey of NATO Defense Concepts, The RAND
Corporation, N-1871-AF, June 1982; Samuel P. Huntington, "Conventional
Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," International
Security, Winter 1983/84, and Canby, Short and Long War Responses.
6The reserve option can have both technology and strategy/tactics
components. With respect to technology, reserve option units might be
outfitted with technologically advanced weapons systems (e.g., MLRS or
some type of indirect or direct fire precision guided anti-tank system).
With respect to strategy and tactics, reserve option units might allow
defense options currently impossible due to a force structure barely
large enough to adequately cover the front (e.g., additional units could
make possible the creation of sizable operational reserve forces, not
only to guard against WP breakthroughs but also to take advantage of WP
weaknesses through offense).
'Hamilton, Redressing the Conventional Balance; Robert Komer, "Is
Conventional Defense of Europe Feasible?" Naval War College Review,
Sept.-Oct. 1982, Vol. 35, No. 5, pp. 80-91; Steven L. Canby, "Military
Reform and the Art of War," International Security Review, Vol. VII, No.
3, Fall 1982, pp. 245-268.
$Robustness refers to the ability to exceed minimum acceptable
performance under a wide range of conditions, such as worse-than-
expected enemy behavior (e.g., when weapons work only half as well as
expected).
- 6 -
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
This reserve option study is an outgrowth of a larger RAND study
that was designed to assess NATO's conventional defense requirements in
the 1990s. This larger, two-year study surveyed the rarge of possible
NATO force improvements and used theater-level combat simulation and
cost analysis to evaluate them. During its course, the conventional
defense study utilized the five basic elements of policy analysis--
objectives, alternatives, impacts, criteria and model(s).10 A brief
review of the phases of the conventional defense study illustrates the
process of policy analysis and the general methodology used in the
reserve option study.
The first phase of the conventional defense study began with the
identification of the problem and the statement of objectives. The
objective was to develop and assess different strategies that would
allow NATO to defend forward. Strategies were designed to satisfy
certain criteria, which included:
* Military requirements
* Deterrence requirements
* Political, economic, and demographic constraints
* Arms control
The final phase of the study involved running the alternative cases
through the models to discern impacts. Cases were run under different
sets of scenario assumptions. Two classes of alternatives were
identified as most promising. The first involved the creation of
additional operational reserves, fighting behind improved barrier
defenses. The second involved the procurement of "smart" munitions.
During the course of the conventional defense study the reserve
option was identified as a promising alternative. The analysis in this
study follows the framework of the larger conventional defense study.
The major components of this study include the development cf a
base case and reserve option alternatives. Alternatives considered
include creating heavy units (mobile armor or mechanized infantry),
light units (infantry and anti-tank), and artillery units from the
currently un- or under-utilized pool of European reservists. In
analyzing the alternatives, several key policy variables are adjusted to
derive specific impacts. The policy variables used in this study and
the areas in which they have a specific impact are listed in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1
Societal/
Policy Effective- Budgetary Political
Variables ness Costs Impacts
Unit quantity x x x
Unit type x x
Unit quality x x
Mobilization time
Deployment time
Proficiency level
Unit supplier (country) x x
sequsrment
an Bugetra s t
* Soc~tal/pl~ticloImpctsl/
eedSenrovariablesnassm t
~~~ MoeldIpat
Much analysis and speculation has been devoted to NATO defense, the
most pressing issues being the size of the threat and our ability to
meet the threat. Static and dynamic analyses are the methods most often
used to address these issues. This section first uses static
comparisons to describe the threat faced by NATO in Central Europe. The
exercise involves counting the number of units NATO and the WP could
mobilize and deploy to wartime positions, normalizing for comparable
combat capabilities, and then comparing the totals. Second, dynamic
analysis is used to describe how the war might "play out," using a
simulation model to capture the "rules" of modern warfare.
STATIC COMPARISONS
All WP/NATO balance assessments begin with a static count of the
combat units (and the men and equipment comprised by them) that military
strategists expect to engage in hostilities.' Which units are counted
depends upon which units are or could be made available to support
various attack and defense scenarios. Table 2.1 lists additive
groupings of units that the WP could conceivably use if it were to
attack across NATO's Central Front. Likewise, Table 2.2 lists additive
groupings of units that NATO could conceivably use in its defense.
These groupings are based upon the readiness and location of the combat
units, and the political/military propensities of the nations involved.
Table 2.1
WP COMBAT UNITS
Standing 35 26.21
SU/EG x 10 9 1 15.31
SU/CZ x 2 3 4.02
EG/EG x 2 4 4.24
CZ/CZ x 1 3 2.64
Reinforce-1 50 36.43
SU/PO x 2 1.80
CZ/CZ x 2 1 2.24
PO/PO x 5 3 2 5.98
PO/PO x 0.20
Reinforce-2 62 43.17
SU/SU-Bal x 1 2.33 1.10
SU/SU-Bal x 1 0.62
SU/SU-Bel x 2 0.33 1.68
SU/SU-Bel x 2 1.24
SU/SU-Car x 1 0.33 0.86
SU/SU-Car x 2 1.24
NOTE: The data in this table are gleaned from IISS, The Military
Balance, 1986-87, London, 1986. IISS defines Warsaw Pact categories
as follows: Category 1: full strength on 24-hour notice, equipment
complete; Category 2: 50 to 75 percent strength, complete with fighting
- 14 -
Key:
DE - Division equivalent
SU - Soviet Union
EG - East Germany
CZ - Czechoslovakia
PO - Poland
SU-Bal - Baltic Military District in the Soviet Union
SU-Bel - Belorussian Military District in the Soviet Union
SU-Car - Carpathian Military District in the Soviet Union
SU-Mos - Moscow Military District in the Soviet Union
SU-Vol - Volga Military District in the Soviet Union
SU-Url - Ural Military District in the Soviet Union
SU-Kiv - Kiev Military District in the Soviet Union
- 15 -
Table 2.2
Standing 22 15.11
GE/GE[a] x 6.67 4 2 7.13
US/GE[b] x 3 2.33 5.72
UK/GE[c] x 2.67 1.68
NE/GE[d] x 0.33 0.16
BE/GE[e] x 0.33 0.33 0.22
CA/GE x 0.33 0.20
NOTE: The data in this table are gleaned from Isby and Kamps, Armies
of NATO's Central Front, 1985, and IISS, The Military Balance, 1986-87.
Infantry units include airborne and air assault. DE scores include
separate artillery assets for NATO's 8 Corps sectors (I, II, and III German,
V and VII United States, I British, I Dutch, and I Belgian). The units
counted in each grouping are as follows:
Standing Forces
[a] GE armor consists of six divisions and two 50-series Home Defense
Brigades (HDBs). GE infantry consists of a mountain division and three
airborne brigades.
(b] US V Corps consists of the 3rd Armored Division, the llth ACR
(listed as 0.33 armor), and the 8th Mechanized Division. US VII Corps
consists of the 1st Armored Division, the 2nd ACR (listed as 0.33 armor),
- 16 -
Key:
DE - Division equivalent
GE - West Germany
US - United States
UK - United Kingdom
NE - Netherlands
BE - Belgium
CA - Canada
FR - France
DN - Denmark
- 17 -
2
WP Mobilization Scenarios
Because we are not privy to the WP's military contingency plans, it
is difficult to estimate which WP forces would be committed to an invasion
Table 2.3
1984-85; and William P. Mako, U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of
Central Europe, 1983.
3Soviet armed forces are organized in four groups of forces in
Eastern Europe (in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary)
and in 16 military districts in the Soviet Union.
- 19 -
8 IND
I i
I'.~U U.ti
II
- 21 -
7
The stages of mobilization are based on the author's discussions
with NATO officials.
$France withdrew from NATO's military command structure in 1967.
Nonetheless it continues to maintain forces in West Germany and adheres
to an alliance pledge of military assistance if NATO is attacked. In
this study we assume a forthright commitment of all French forces, but
one that delays commitment until after an actual attack. In general,
all NATO members are assumed reliable. That is, everyone shows up
(eventually) and everyone fights.
'Early arriving U.S.-based units would utilize prepositioned
equipment (POMCUS) already in the theater. The United States has a
limited ability (most notably its small fleet of SL-7 transport ships)
to move additional units to the theater. In this study it is
optimistically assumed that, in addition to POMCUS, the United States
would be able to bring four light and the equivalent of four heavy
divisions into the theater over a period of 30 to 40 days. See P. M.
Dadant et al., A Comparison of Methods for Improving U.S. Capability to
Project Ground Forces to Southwest Asia in the 1990's, The RAND
Corporation, November 1984, and Congressional Budget Office, U.S.
Airlift Forces: Enhancement Alternatives for NATO and Non-NATO
Contingencies, April 1979.
- 22 -
DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
Dynamic analysis brings a greater dimension (as well as a greater
level of complexity) to the realm of threat assessment. A dynamic
assessment allows the analyst to "play" the war. In doing so, the
analyst can capture important time and space aspects associated with the
initial disposition and the movement of units, and the additive
attrition effects associated with unit engagements.
Games and computer games are ':eul for the development of rule
sets and assumptions that can then be used in simulations in place of
human players. Once structured, simulations have advantages over games
which include fast run times, low manpower requirements, transparency,
reproducibility, and the capability to more easily perform sensitivity
tests (i.e., tests which show how model outputs change when selected
changes are made to scenario inputs or model assumptions).1 2 In this
study a simulation model is usei to assess the effectiveness of reserve
force options. The following paragraphs describe a base case
mobilization (attacker and defender) scenario, and show representative
output from a run of the simulation model with this scenario. The
simulation model used in this study is described in Appendix B.
1001 Canal
AW Bremerhaven
%%../ 41
Bremen NE
XXX
Weser River
FRG I
xxx
UK
xxx
Ems River
BE
FRG III
.0-1 pLy
V us
.0-10 0.
VII us
FRG 11
Abdrar R1w
Munich
Loch RAw
C? I? C?
COEO
14C e4 C.?
IVi
I-i
C4C?@
V4 C4
Sit me
2 02W4
-29-
kc C4
00000-.0,C.
-g
1 dIt~
- 30 -
play in the base case NATO defense and the day and the area in which
they enter NATO's force structure. Figure 2.3 compares the disposition
of attacking and defending forces at the start of the simulation.
"The simulation plays only the eight corps sectors of AFCENT; the
Danish Axis (Axis One in Tables 2.4 and 2.5) is not included. Thus,
simulation results do not reflect the total number of divisions,
described above, attacking and defending in Central Europe.
"9One of the reasons for the depth of penetration among some axes
is the existence of a flank variable, set in this study to 60
kilometers. When forces along an axis fall back, forces in adjacent
axes will fall back to avoid excessive flank exposure. The model does
not permit defending forces to attack into the flank of an attacker's
penetration. Likewise, there is no requirement that the attacker hold
local reserves to blunt such counterattacks.
- 31-
6
-NATO
-wP
5
20-
30 Bae0as
20
2610 Day
hs20 *-.
.S
C.180
0
0 2
NE0 I-FRO UK.
,/I BE FR VpUS V Uso
0I
%.-eerto
%b Fig. axs
- 32-
20L
0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Day
Fig. 2.5-Penetration (average)
70
60
so
S40 - Survingtorces
30 - -
20
10
0ON I i I . I
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28
Day
Fig. 2.6-Red attrition
-33 -
Base case
80
70-
60
,
50
C
0CT40
C
.0 Committed forces
30-
20- uvvrgfre
10
0L I I I I I I I It
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28
Day
Fig. 2.7-Blue attrition
4 Base case
3.8
3.6
3.4
3.2
0 3
j2.8
*2.6
2.4
2.2
2
1.6
1.4
1.2
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28
Day
Fig. 2.8-Theater force ratio
- 34 -
Finally, Figures 2.9 and 2.10 display the location of forces over
the course of the simulation (in five day intervals). In Figure 2.9 we
observe the WP's initial concentration of its forces against the Dutch,
Belgian, and German II Corps sectors. Model algorithms.order WP forces
that enter theater reserve to reinforce success. We observe most
reinforcement to occur in the same axes where the initial attack is
focused. In Figure 2.10 we observe that NATO initially has forces
spread fairly evenly across the front. Model algorithms order NATO
forces that enter theater reserve to shore up weak axes (i.e., to
reinforce failure). As the WP builds up forces against the Dutch,
Belgian, German II, and (later) the US VII Corps sectors, NATO responds
20
by reinforcing them.
Base case
18
17 Day
16
15 10 .
*../
14 15
13 20,...
-.. 20
225
3 b3
1
NE I FRG UK BE III FRO V US VII US II FRG
18 Base case
17 -
16 -
15 -
14- Day
13 -
12 5
11 - 10
J10
U)" 9 -- 15
20,
.2
8D -$ 25
-7
6
4 t
3 "
2-
1
NE IFRG UK BE II FRG V US VII US IFRG
Fig. 2. 10-Committed blue forces
2
'Alternatively one could argue that NATO's ability to react (i.e.,
detect major axes of attack (intelligence) and apportion its forces
appropriately (mobility), were insufficient. If NATO forces could move
forces instantaneously then all local force ratios would be equal to the
theater force ratio.
- 36 -
'The term "reserve unit" may be misleading in that very few reserve
units are composed of only reservists; most have active cadres. The
cadre maintains the unit's equipment, organizes its refresher training,
and would assume most leadership activities in war. Cadre sizes vary
considerably and generally include active servicemen who have peacetime
assignments away from the reserve unit. Some observers prefer to use
the term aobilizable units, recognizing that while these types of units
have active components, they would not be able to perform their wartime
tasks until they had fully mobilized.
"Although the 5 percent figure is somewhat arbitrary, it is chosen
based upon discussions with U.S. Army personnel. A cadre of 5 percent
is considered a minimum level for adequate peacetime administration and
equipment
3
maintenance of a brigade-sized unit.
Reserve units (like active units), when built into larger fighting
entities, require both combat and support elements. Combat elements,
e.g., infantry, armor, and artillery units, deliver fire. Support
elements, e.g., engineer, supply, and maintenance units, enhance or help
to sustain the efficiency with which combat units deliver fire. In this
study, we build combat units with a requisite level of support to
- 37 -
Table 3.1
Heavy Armored
brigade[b] 116 152 31 16 56 0.33
Light Infantry
brigade[c] 18 108 72 0.13
Arty Artillery
brigade[d] 72 0.11
SMission capable-
less stressful mission
unit commitment times. The point estimates used here (in Tables 3.2 and
3.3) represent average estimates based on professional military opinion.
"Training programs whose activities more closely resemble wartime
operations (e.g., large-scale FTXs) are more effective than those that
do not (e.g., individual skills training). Commanders often complain
about inadequate funds and training space to conduct full-scale training
activities. Such complaints are not confined to particular nations.
"German compulsory service will change from 15 months to 18 months
beginning in 1989.
- 43 -
directly engage the enemy. Their tasks are perceived as less demanding
than heavy units in that their operations are strictly defensive and
they can be effectively organized at smaller (e.g., battalion and
company) levels. Artillery units, having the least demanding tasks of
the three reserve option units, are located behind engaged troops,
operate fewer types of equipment, and can be organized at smaller
levels. While they support both offensive and defensive operations,
they do not directly engage the enemy. We can rank the level of
difficulty of missions performed by these three types of units as 1, 2,
and 3, respectively.
NATO military authorities expect cadre-type reserve units to be
mission-proficient in 1 to 25 days. 1 2 Table 3.2 suggests wartime
refresher training requirements (i.e., the time it would take for a
particular unit to reach an acceptable proficiency level) based upon the
level of mission difficulty, and the effectiveness of the initial
training program.12
Table 3.2
Initial GE NE BE
Training
Program A B C
Mission Hvy 1 7 14 21
Difficulty Lt 2 4 8 12
Arty 3 1 2 3
* Mobilization
* Refresher training
* Deployment
* Notification
* Movement to processing centers
* Processing
* Breakout and servicing of unit equipment
* Issuing of equipment and munitions
* Formation of individuals and units into larger combat
organizations
Table 3.3
Initial GE NE BE
Training
Program A B C
Mission Hvy 1 11 19 26
Difficulty Lt 2 8 13 17
Arty 3 5 7 8
STUDY ALTERNATIVES
The discussion to this point suggests the option that will be
examined in this study. The option involves building three types of
reserve combat units: heavy, light and artillery. The units are built
with support elements so that they will be capable of sustained (and
effective) battlefield operations. In this section, two types of
estimates have been produced to enable an evaluation of the theater-
level contribution these units make to NATO's defense. The first is an
estimate of unit strength based upon the unit's weapon systems. This
estimate is reflected in the DE scores listed in Table 3.1. The second
is an estimate of unit availability and is reflected in Table 3.3. The
effectiveness of these alternatives is evaluated in the next section.
- 49 -
'See U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations, May 1986, pp. 129-151; and
U.S. Army, RB 101-999, Staff Officers' Handbook, 1983, pp. -1-21through
3-36. 2
This objective is consistent with a "stalwart conventional defense
capability," defined as "a balance in which NATO forces would prevent a
substantial Warsaw Pact advance into West German territory under a range
of assumptions and scenarios." See Thomson and Gantz, p. 4. In this
study, robustness was captured through a fortiori analysis as explained
in the next footnote.
3Obviously, the i-DE result is sensitive to different factors
including mobilization time and the schedule (time and space) of force
arrivals. These sensitivities were addressed during the course of this
study through the analysis of different scenarios. The results
- 50 -
Penetration
240
220
200-
180
1160- Maximum penetration
S140-
.2
100
100 -- %,,Average penetration
80-
60- Defense objective
40 - ! -- t-
Base +2 +4 +6 +8 +10 +12
Territory lost
(km2 x 1000) 115,215 67,395 51,016 43,116 35,068 30,715 26,255
Day defense
objective
penetrated 12 17 19 22 25 29 -
Force ratio
on day 30 2.32 1.82 1.65 1.49 1.33 1.23 1.16
Penetration
240
220
200
180
La160
140 - Maximum penetration
100
-120 -
80I~ •I
- 52 -
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 depict the addition of reserve armored units
according to the schedule of availability in Table 3.3. Specifically,
Figure 4.1 displays the results of adding German armored units, which
would be available 11 days after mobilization was ordered (D+l in the
25/10 base case). Figure 4.2 displays the results of adding German,
Dutch, and Belgian armored units 11, 19, and 26 days after mobilization
was ordered in a 2:1:1 sharing arrangement. Comparing the two cases
shows that more timely forces result in a more favorable outcome for
NATO. In both cases, there are diminishing returns to force additions.
The addition of DEs depicted in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 track easily
with additions of armored units. Armored units are mobile and robust
fighting units. They can be ordered to axes where they are most needed
and can engage the enemy in a variety of terrains and defensive
postures. The addition of DEs can, to some extent, be reconciled with
the addition of infantry and artillery units. Additional infantry could
be ordered to areas where they would enjoy terrain conditions favorable
to their employment. In doing so, armored units would be able to fall
back into the operational reserve from where they could be ordered to
positions where they would be most useful. Additional artillery could
be used to strengthen units all across the front. Stronger units, in
that they equalized local force ratios, would permit some to fall back
into the operational reserve where they could be ordered to weak axes.
According to the schedule of availability in Table 3.3, German, Dutch,
and Belgian infantry units would be available, in the 25/10 case, on
D-2, D+3, and D+7, respectively. Artillery units from each nation would
all be available before the war started. Results of running these cases
are similar to those depicted in Figure 4.1.6
Table 4.1 displays the unit totals necessary to fill DE
requirements.
Table 4.1
UNIT REQUIREMENTS
(in Brigades)
DE
Increment
2 6 15 18
4 12 31 36
6 18 46 55
8 24 62 73
10 30 77 91
12 36 92 109
14 42 108 127
'The analysis in this study uses a mixed strategy. That is, each
DE is filled with a one-third DE of armor, a one-third DE of infantry,
and a one-third DE of artillery.
- 54 -
European combat unit cost data are not readily available. European
combat units, however, are configured similarly to American units, i.e.,
divisions are built around a three-brigade structure and have associated
support elements. We use U.S. data to estimate costs of European
reserve option units. Unit costs have manpower, equipment, and
operating components. In this section, first we estimate manpower costs
and then combine manpower costs with equipment and operating costs to
derive cost estimates for whole reserve option units.
MANPOWER COSTS
The simplest measure of manpower costs is budget expenditure, i.e.,
wages paid to servicemen. If the labor market operates freely, then
budget costs represent the economic value or the opportunity cost of
that labor. A reserve option unit is structured so that 5 percent of
its strength is filled by an active cadre of volunteers, i.e., service-
men who freely choose military service, at the prevailing military wage
rate, over civilian occupations. The remaining 95 percent of a reserve
option unit is filled with individuals (reservists) who are statutorily
obligated to perform occasional active service. These reservists
are obligated rather than induced to serve; consequently, it is possi-
ble that their wages (budget cost) may not reflect the true cost of
their labor. In this study, we assume that reservists performing active-
duty service are paid wages corresponding to the civilian wage rate
and that this expenditure reflects the true economic cost of that labor.'
v-4
ILI
j sI
140
13X4
-57-
560
540
520
500
480
460
a~440
10420
0
-c400
380
360
340
320
300
280
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year reaching age 18
Fig. 5. 1-German manpower availability age 18 males
135
130
125
120
-115
2 110
0
~105
100
95
90
85
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year reaching age 18
Fig. 5.2-Dutch manpower availability age 18 males
- 58 -
83
82
81
8o
79
78
77
76
75
-~74
-73
72
71
70
69
68
67
66
65
64
63
62 F i l 1 1 1 1
61
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year reaching age 18
declined since this period and will continue to decline through the
early 1990s. Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 depict these changes.'
Percentage reductions, from 1983 to 2000, will be 43.1 percent, 31.2
percent and 23.8 percent, respectively, for Germany, the Netherlands,
and Belgium. These demographic changes will increase the economic cost
of military labor. That is, as the pool of available manpower shrinks,
wages will have to rise to maintain similarly sized force structures.
Table 5.2
UNIT COSTS
To estimate costs of U.S. Army units and to better understand U.S.
Army organization, The RAND Corporation developed the Army Unit Cost
Model (ACM).' Table 5.6 provides representative output from the model.
The unit being costed is an armored brigade consisting of two M-1
armored battalions and one M-2 mechanized infantry battalion.
The ACM estimates a unit's non-recurring costs (NRC) and annual
recurring costs (ARC) for the combat and support elements of the unit.$
Non-recurring costs are the unit's initial investment or procurement
costs; these have direct and indirect cost components. NRC direct cost
include the following:
Table 5.3
Combat personnel
Officer 316 337 il
Enlisted 3959 4286 1710
Total 4275 4623 1821
Support personnel
Officer 353 382 150
Enlisted 2107 2279 897
Total 2460 2661 1047
Total personnel
Officer 669 719 261
Enlisted 6066 6565 2607
Total 6735 7284 2868
Table 5.4
Table 5.5
NRC indirect costs are those costs associated with the initial training
of unit personnel.
Table 5.6
Annual recurring costs are the annual costs of operating the unit.
Like NRCs they have direct and indirect cost components. ARC direct
costs include the replacement of equipment and the replenishment of
spare parts; replenishment of consumables; and personnel pay and the
costs associated with personnel rotation (PCS travel). ARC indirect
costs include those costs associated with the annual training of unit
personnel.
Support estimates the costs associated with providing the combat
unit with combat service support. Support cost components are
proportionately based upon the size and the composition of the combat
unit. The combined costs, for both the support and combat components of
an active M-1 brigade, total roughly $1 billion for the initial unit
procurement (NRC), and $1/3 billion annually thereafter (ARC)."
Table 5.7
Total indirect 0 0 0
Table 5.8
ARMOR
INFANTRY
ARTILLERY
MANPOWER IMPACTS
The reserve option would be filled with manpower from European
nations. Table 6.2 suggests measures of how the burden would affect
individual nations. For example, if Germany, the Netherlands, and
Belgium were to share the burden in a 2:1:1 arrangement, then the
Table 6.1
Mix of
Armor Infantry Artillery Units [a]
Servicemen
Table 6.2
Current
Active force [a] 488,400 108,100 90,800
Reserve force [a] 770,000 174,400 145,000
Annual accessions [b] 170,000 45,000 45,000
Reserve period (in years) 4.53 3.88 3.22
Reserve option
Active force 498,602 113,200 95,900
Reserve force 963,998 271,400 242,000
Reserve period (in years) 5.67 6.04 5.38
Change in
Active force 10,202 5,100 5,100
(in % terms) (2%) (5%) (6%)
Reserve force 193,998 97,000 97,000
Reserve period (in years) 1.14 2.16 2.16
BUDGETARY IMPACTS
Table 6.3 provides GDP and defense budget data for nations
contributing to the defense of Central Europe. If we assume that one-
third of the U.S. defense budget is devoted to the defense of Central
Europe, then NATO spends a total $194 billion for that defense. 3 The
12-DE reserve option would cost $50 billion over a 15-year period. This
Table 6.3
CONCLUSIONS
This study has shown that a 12-DE reserve option could provide NATO
with a robust conventional defense. The option would require an
increase in the active strength of NATO's force structure of 20,000 men,
an increase in reserve service periods of between one and two years, and
an annual budgetary increase of $3.3 billion. These figures are modest
when compared with current manpower contributions and budgetary
expenditure.
Another way to assess the reserve option is to compare its
capabilities against those that could be acquired with similar
expenditure elsewhere. A recent CBO study assessed three alternatives
costing between $40 and $50 billion.' The least expensive alternative,
at a cost of $41.2 billion, would purchase one U.S.-based heavy division
with a companion POMCUS set in Europe. The reserve option compares
favorably in that it would procure much greater capabilities for a small
additional cost. The second alternative, at a cost of $48.4 billion,
would purchase equipment to enhance the close combat capability of U.S.
forces. The CBO assessment suggests that this alternative would have
about the same effect as the heavy division alternative. The third
alternative, at a cost of $49.7 billion, would acquire weapons to
implement a follow-on forces attack (FOFA) strategy. The CBO assessment
suggests that this alternative would be the equivalent of adding five
armored divisions to NATO. Assessed in this way, it would provide
roughly half the capabilities of the reserve option. The CBO study
observes, however, that that the FOFA alternative is based on
*The methodology used in this study does not test this possibility
(the simulations run only 30 days and attrited equipment is not replaced
with WRS).
- 73 -
Appendix A
DE WUV + WUV
x x y
where x = unit
y = standard unit
Tables
1. WEI factors for WP and NATO equipment 2 A.I-A.2
2. Summary DE scores for WP and NATO units A.3-A.4
3. DE calculations for WP units 3 A.5-A.8
4. DE calculations for NATO units 4 A.9-A.35
2
WEI factors are based on those appearing in William Mako, U.S.
Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe, 1983, pp. 114-125. For
those weapon systems that do not appear in Mako, the author estimated a
WEI score by comparing weapon system characteristics. See Christopher
F. Foss, editor, Jane's Weapon Systems, 1986-87, Jane's Publishing
Company, London, 1986, and Ronald T. Pretty, editor, Jane's Armor and
Artillery, 1986-87, Jane's Publishing Company, London, 1986.
3Equipment
lists for Soviet units were taken from FM 100-2-3, The
Soviet Army, Troops, Organization and Equipment, 1984, by the U.S. Army.
4Equipment lists for NATO units were taken from David C. Isby and
Charles Kamps Jr., Armies of NATO's Central Front, 1985.
- 77 -
Table A.l
Offensive
Category Adjusted
Weapon WEI Weight WEI
TANKS
T-64/72/80 1.10 64 70.40
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
ATGM Launcher Vehicle (BRDM-2)* 0.89 27 24.03
APC with AT (AICV, BMP/BMP-I)* 0.89 27 24.03
ATGM Manpack* 0.50 27 13.50
AT Gun (I00-125mm)* 0.52 27 14.04
ATGL, RPG-16 0.40 27 10.80
SP Assault Gun/85mm 0.30 27 8.10
Recoilless Gun/73mm* 0.21 27 5.67
ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES
BMP, BRDM, BTR, M1976 0.75 36 27.00
ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS
BTR-50/60/70, M1974 1.00 13 13.00
ARTILLERY
Rocket Launcher/122mm (BM-21) 0.54 72 38.88
SP Howitzer/152mm (2S3) 0.46 72 33.12
SP Howitzer/122mm (2SI) 0.44 72 31.68
Field Gun/130mm (M-46) 0.42 72 30.24
Howitzer/122mm (D-30)* 0.40 72 28.80
MORTARS
Mortar/120mm (M1943)* 1.01 37 37.37
NOTE: * indicates WEI based on Mako; otherwise author's
estimate.
- 78 -
Table A.2
Defensive
Category Adjusted
Weapon WEI Weight WEI
TANKS
MiAl Abrams (120mm) 1.25 55 68.75
Leopard 2 (120mm) 1.20 55 66.00
Challenger 1.20 55 66.00
Ml Abrams (105mm) 1.15 55 63.25
Chieftain 1.14 55 62.70
Leopard 1 (105mm)* 1.06 55 58.30
M60/A2/3 1.05 55 57.75
M60/Al* 1.00 55 55.00
AMX-30 0.93 55 51.15
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
M901 TOW Vehicle 1.10 46 50.60
JPzR/TOW* 1.10 46 50.60
M2/M3 Bradley 1.00 46 46.00
M113 TOW Vehicle 1.00 46 46.00
FV-438/Swingfire 0.90 46 41.40
TOW 0.70 46 32.20
VAB/Hot 0.70 46 32.20
Milan* 0.65 46 29.90
Dragon 0.64 46 29.44
JPzR/90mm* 0.53 46 24.38
Carl Gustav/84mm 0.50 46 23.00
LRAC/89mm 0.45 46 20.70
Defensive
Category Adjusted
Weapon WEI Weight WEI
ARTILLERY
SP Howitzer/203mm AdvMun* 1.15 85 97.75
SP Howitzer/155mm AdvMun* 1.00 85 85.00
MLRS/227mm 0.80 85 68.00
SP Howitzer/203mm (8") 0.70 85 59.50
SP Howitzer/155mm* 0.62 85 52.70
Howitzer/155mm 0.55 85 46.75
LARS/1I0mm* 0.47 85 39.95
SP Howitzer/lO5mm 0.40 85 34.00
Howitzer/105mm 0.35 85 29.75
MORTARS
SP Mortar/120mm* 1.13 47 53.11
SP Mortar/107mm 1.00 47 47.00
Mortar/120mm 0.90 47 42.30
Mortar/81mm 0.70 47 32.90
Mortar/60mm 0.60 47 28.20
Mortar/51mm 0.50 47 23.50
Table A.3
Category
1 2 3
IN EAST GERMANY
East German Armor 0.82
East German Mechanized 0.65
Assumptions:
1. GSFG, NGF and CGF divisions 100% strength.
2. Soviet divisions in the Soviet Union:
o Category 1: 95% of GSFG divisions' strength
o Category 2: 90% of GSFG divisions' strength
o Category 3: 85% of GSFG divisions' strength
3. East German divisions: 95% of GSFG divisions strength.
4. Polish and Czech divisions:
o Category 1: 90% of GSFG divisions' strength
o Category 2: 85% of GSFG divisions' strength
o Category 3: 80% of GSFG divisions' strength
- 81 -
Table A.4
WUV DE
UNIT
U.S. Armored Division 58,129 1.00
U.S. Mechanized Division 58,346 1.00
U.S. Light Infantry Division 7,967 0.14
U.S. Armored Cavalry Regiment 17,179 0.30
NOTIONAL UNIT
U.S. Armored Brigade [a) 0.33
U.S. Mechanized Brigade [a] 0.33
U.S. Cavalry Division [b] 0.89
U.S. Seperate Infantry Brigade [c] 0.13
British Armored Brigade [a] 0.21
British Airborne Brigade [d] 0.15
Dutch 101 Infantry Brigade [e] 0.08
- 82 "
WUV DE
CORPS ARTILLERY
U.S. V Corps 8,568 0.15
U.S. VII Colps 17,553 0.30
German I Corps 2,856 0.05
German II Corps 2,356 0.05
German iII Corps 2,856 0.05
British I Corps 2,142 0.04
Belgian I Corps 2,846 0.05
Dutch I Corps 1i,5C6 0.20
Assumptions:
[a] One-third strength of associated division.
[b] Three times ACR.
[c] Configured with 180 Anti-Tank (108 TOW, 72 Dragoij, 18
Artillery (18 105mm Howitzer), and 42 Mortar (15 81mm, 27 60mm).
[d] One-third strength of British infantry division.
[e] One-sixth strength of Dutch mechanized division.
- 83 -
Table A.5
Offensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
11470 PERSONNEL
TANKS
328 T-64/72/80 1.10 64 23,091
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
9 ATGM Launcher Vehicle 0.89 27 216
240 APC with AT 0.89 27 5,767
469 ATGL,RPG-16 0.40 27 5,065
ARTILLERY
18 Rocket Launcher/122mm 0.54 72 700
18 SP Howitzer/152mm 0.46 72 596
72 SP Howitzer/122mm 0.44 72 2,281
36 Howitzer/122mm 0.40 72 1,037
MORTARS
36 Mortar/120mm 1.01 37 1,345
Table A.6
Offensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
12695 PERSONNEL
TANKS
220 T-64/72/80 1.10 64 15,488
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
36 ATGM Launcher Vehicle 0.89 27 865
132 APC with AT 0.89 27 3,172
24 ATGM Manpack 0.50 27 324
12 AT Gun (100-125mm) 0.52 27 168
598 ATGL, RPG-16 0.40 27 6,458
12 Recoilless Gun/73mm 0.21 27 68
ARTILLERY
18 Rocket Launcher/122mm 0.54 72 700
18 SP Howitzer/152mm 0.46 72 596
36 SP Howitzer/122mm 0.44 72 1,140
72 Howitzer/122mm 0.40 72 2,074
MORTARS
54 Mortar/120mm 1.01 37 2,018
Table A.7
Offensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
6500 PERSONNEL
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
27 ATGM Launcher Vehicle 0.89 27 649
421 ATGL, RPG-16 0.40 27 4,547
31 SP Assault Gun/85mm 0.30 27 251
ALTILLERY
6 Rocket Launcher/122mm 0.54 72 233
30 Hovitzer/122mm 0.40 72 864
MORTARS
18 Mortar/120mm 1.01 37 673
Table A.8
Offensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
36 ATGM Launcher Vehicle (BRDM-2) 0.89 27 865
48 AT Gun (100-125mm) 0.52 27 674
ARTILLERY
72 Rocket Launcher/122mm (BM-21) 0.54 72 2,799
126 SP Howitzer/152mm (2S3) 0.46 72 4,173
168 Field Gun/130mm (M-46) 0.42 72 5,080
Table A.9
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
16295 PERSONNEL
TANKS
348 MIAI Abrams (120mm) 1.25 55 23,925
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
48 M901 TOW Vehicle 1.10 46 2,429
327 M2/M3 Bradley 1.00 46 15,042
168 Dragon 0.64 46 4,946
ARTILLERY
12 SP Howitzer/203mm AdvMun 1.15 85 1,173
72 SP Howitzer/155mm AdvMun 1.00 85 6,120
9 MLRS/227mm 0.80 85 612
MORTARS
66 SP Mortar/107mm 1.00 47 3,102
Table A.IO
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
16597 PERSONNEL
TANKS
290 MlA1 Abrams (120mm) 1.25 55 19,938
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
60 M901 TOW Vehicle 1.10 46 3,036
381 M2/M3 Bradley 1.00 46 17,526
204 Lragon 0.64 46 6,006
ARTILLERY
12 SP Howitzer/203mm AdvMun 1.15 85 1,173
72 SP Howitzer/155mm AdvMun 1.00 85 6,120
9 MLRS/227mm 0.80 85 612
MORTARS
66 SP Mortar/107mm 1.00 47 3,102
Table A.1l
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
10768 PERSONNEL
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
36 TOW 0.70 46 1,159
72 Dragon 0.64 46 2,120
ARTILLERY
8 Howitzer/155mm 0.55 85 374
54 Howitzer/105mm 0.35 85 1,607
MORTARS
36 Mortar/81mm 0.70 47 1,184
54 Mortar/60mm 0.60 47 1,523
Table A.12
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
5000 PERSONNEL
TANKS
129 MiAl Abrams (120mm) 1.25 55 8,869
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
111 M2/M3 Bzadley 1.00 46 5,106
ARTILLERY
24 SP Howitzer/155mm AdvMun 1.00 85 2,040
MORTARS
18 SP Mortar/107mm 1.00 47 846
Table A.13
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
20000 PERSONNEL
TANKS
305 Leopard 2 (120mm) 1.20 55 20,130
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
36 JPzR/TOW 1.i0 46 1,822
180 Milan 0.65 46 5,382
ARTILLERY
o OP Howitzer/203mm 0.70 85 357
54 SP Howitzer/lS5mm 0.62 85 2,846
12 Howitzer/155mm 0.55 85 561
16 LARS/I10mm 0.47 85 639
MOPTARS
24 SP Mortar/120mm 1.13 4J 1,275
Table A.14
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
20000 PERSONNEL
TANKS
249 Leopard 2 (120mm) 1.20 55 16,434
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
36 JPzR/TOW 1.10 46 1,822
216 Milan 0.65 46 6,458
ARTILLERY
6 SP Howitzer/203mm 0.70 85 357
54 SP Howitzer/155mm 0.62 85 2,846
12 Howitzer/155mm 0.55 85 561
16 LARS/ll0mm 0.47 85 639
MORTARS
30 SP Mortar/120mm 1.13 47 1,593
SOURCES: Isby and Kamps, especially pp. 188 and 192. Mako,
especially pp. 117-118.
NOTES: Equipment summary does not include unit helicopter and
air defense assets. Helicopters: 9 Allouette. Air defense: 36
Gepard 25mm, and 46 Rh202 20mm. West German Mechanized
(Panzergrenadier) divisions have two armored brigades and one
mechanized brigade.
- 93 -
Table A. 15
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
TANKS
195 Leopard 2 (120mm) 1.20 55 12,870
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
156 Milan 0.65 46 4,664
17 JPzR/90mm 0.53 46 414
ARTILLERY
6 SP Howitzer/203mm 0.70 85 357
36 SP Howitzer/155mm 0.62 85 1,897
12 Howitzer/155mm 0.55 85 561
16 LARS/1lOmm 0.47 85 639
18 Howitzer/105mm 0.35 85 536
MORTARS
30 SP Mortar/120mm 1.13 47 1,593
Table A.16
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
3500 PERSONNEL
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
96 TOW 0.70 46 3,091
132 Milan 0.65 46 3,947
MORTARS
24 Mortar/120mm 0.90 47 1,015
Table A.17
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
4000 PERSONNEL
TANKS
82 Leopard 1 (105mm) 1.06 55 4,781
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
24 Milan 0.65 46 718
14 JPzR/9Omm 0.53 46 341
ARTILLERY
18 SP Howitzer/105mm 0.40 85 612
MORTARS
12 Mortar/120mm 0.90 47 508
Table A.18
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
4000 PERSONNEL
TANKS
41 M60/A2/3 1.05 55 2,368
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
24 Milan 0.65 46 718
14 JPzR/90mm 0.53 46 341
ARTILLERY
18 SP Howitzer/105mm 0.40 85 612
MORTARS
12 Mortar/120mm 0.90 47 508
Table A.19
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
16300 PERSONNEL
TANKS
285 Challenger 1.20 55 18,810
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
45 FV-438/Swingfire 0.90 46 1,863
120 Milan 0.65 46 3,588
135 Carl Gustav/84mm 0.50 46 3,105
ARTILLERY
48 SP Howitzer/155mm 0.62 85 2,530
24 SP Howitzer/105mm 0.40 85 816
MORTARS
40 Mortar/81mm 0.70 47 1,316
Table A.20
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
16300 PERSONNEL
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
126 Milan 0.65 46 3,767
324 Carl Gustav/84mm 0.50 46 7,452
ARTILLERY
18 SP Howitzer/155mm 0.62 85 949
36 SP Howitzer/105mm 0.40 85 1,224
MORTARS
94 Mortar/81mm 0.70 47 3,093
108 Mortar/51mm 0.50 47 2,538
Table A.21
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
PERSONNEL
TANKS
86 Leopard 1 (105mm) 1.06 55 5,014
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
20 Milan 0.65 46 598
12 JPzR/90mm 0.53 46 293
ARTILLERY
9 SP Howitzer/155mm 0.62 85 474
9 SP Howitzer/105mm 0.40 85 306
MORTARS
6 Mortar/81mm 0.70 47 197
Table A.22
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
PERSONNEL
TANKS
43 Leopard 1 (105mm) 1.06 55 2,507
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
20 Milan 0.65 46 598
12 JPzR/90mm 0.53 46 293
ARTILLERY
9 SP Howitzer/155mm 0.62 85 474
9 SP Howitzer/105mm 0.40 85 306
MORTARS
6 Mortar/81mm 0.70 47 197
Table A.23
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
PERSONNEL
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
12 Milan 0.65 46 359
ARTILLERY
9 Howitzer/105mm 0.35 85 268
Table A.24
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
4070 PERSONNEL
TANKS
59 Leopard 2 (120mm) 1.20 55 3,894
56 Leopard 1 (105mm) 1.06 55 3,265
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
18 TOW 0.70 46 580
27 Carl Gustav/84mm 0.50 46 621
ARTILLERY
18 SP Howitzer/155mm 0.62 85 949
MORTARS
9 SP Mortar/12Omm 1.13 47 478
Table A.25
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
4070 PERSONNEL
TANKS
30 Leopard 2 (120mm) 1.20 55 1,980
28 Leopard 1 (105mm) 1.06 55 1,632
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
36 TOW 0.70 46 1,159
54 Carl Gustav/84mm 0.50 46 1,242
ARTILLERY
18 SP Howitzer/155mm 0.62 85 949
MORTARS
18 SP Mortar/120mm 1.13 47 956
Table A.26
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
5000 PERSONNEL
TANKS
57 Leopard 1 (105mm) 1.06 55 3,323
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
36 TOW 0.70 46 1,159
133 Carl Gustav/84mm 0.50 46 3,059
ARTILLERY
24 SP Howitzer/155mm 0.62 85 1,265
MORTARS
16 Mortar/8lmm 0.70 47 526
26 Mortar/60mm 0.60 47 733
Table A.27
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
9000 PERSONNEL
TANKS
122 AMX-30 0.93 55 6,240
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
12 VAB/Hot 0.70 46 386
48 Milan 0.65 46 1,435
165 LRAC/89mm 0.45 46 3,416
ARTILLERY
40 SP Howitzer/155mm 0.62 85 2,108
MORTARS
18 SP Mortar/120mm 1.13 47 956
8 Mortar/81mm 0.70 47 263
Table A.28
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
6900 PERSONNEL
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
12 VAB/Hot 0.70 46 386
96 Milan 0.65 46 2,870
165 LRAC/89mm 0.45 46 3,416
ARTILLERY
24 Howitzer/155mm 0.55 85 1,122
MORTARS
18 SP Mortar/12Omm 1.13 47 956
Table A.29
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
8800 PERSONNEL
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
36 Milan 0.65 46 1,076
46 LRAC/89mm 0.45 46 952
ARTILLERY
24 Howitzer/105mm 0.35 85 714
MORTARS
18 SP Mortar/120mm 1.13 47 956
36 Mortar/81mm 0.70 47 1,184
Table A.30
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
16500 PERSONNEL
AN'I-TANK WEAPONS
154 Milan 0.65 46 4,605
535 LRAC/89mm 0.45 46 11,075
ARTILLERY
18 Howitzer/105mm 0.35 85 536
MORTARS
54 SP Mortar/120mm 1.13 47 2,868
48 Mortar/81mm 0.70 47 1,579
Table A.31
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
7600 PERSONNEL
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
48 Milan 0.65 46 1,435
230 LRAC/89mm 0.45 46 4,761
ARTILLERY
12 Howitzer/105 0.35 85 357
MORTARS
16 SP Mortar/120mm 1.13 47 850
32 Mortar/81mm 0.70 47 1,053
Table A.32
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
5000 PERSONNEL
TANKS
54 AMX-30 0.93 55 2762
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
48 Milan 0.65 46 1435
±0 LRAC/89mm 0.45 46 2277
ARTILLERY
18 SP Howitzer/155mm 0.62 85 949
MORTARS
12 SP Mortar/120mm 1.13 47 637
16 Mortar/81mm 0.70 47 526
Table A.33
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
7400 PERSONNEL
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
24 VAB/Hot 0.70 46 773
48 Milan 0.65 46 1,435
110 LRAC/89mm 0.45 46 2,277
ARTILLERY
24 Howitzer/155mm 0.55 85 1,122
MORTARS
12 SP Mortar/120mm 1.13 47 637
16 Mortar/81mm 0.70 47 526
Table A.34
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
6400 PERSONNEL
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
48 Milan 0.65 46 1,435
60 LRAC/89nm 0.45 46 1,242
MORTARS
12 SP Mortar/120mm 1.13 47 637
8 Mortar/81mm 0.70 47 263
Table A.35
Defensive
Category
Quantity Weapon WEI Weight Value
Appendix B
THE MASTER SIMULATION MODEL
60
50
40
40
40
0 30 .
10 A
I I
a
0 aI
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Force ratio
60
Terrain type-i
-- Terrain type-2
type-3
50 ... Terrain
Terrain type-4
~40
U) 30
E
0
10 .... .
0 4 5 6 7
Force ratio
60
-Terrain type-i
-- Terrain type-2
50 Terrain type-3
50 Terrain type-4
~40
E 30
10
.2O
10
0
0 12 3 4 5 6 7
Force ratio
14
Covering force area
13-
13 __ -Rear area
12 - Main battle area
11
10
87
.7 7
C/
6/ ?
(L 5
4- - - - - - - - -
3
2
1
0
0 2 3 4 5 6 7
Force ratio
8 - -
F, 7
6/
a) .0e
0 .0
3
IL 2
1
0 L
0 12 3 4 5 6 7
Force ratio
Fig. B.5-Attrition: attackng force (WP)
- 118 -
Appendix C
Table C.l
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