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Collision Avoidance and Colregs-LBS
Collision Avoidance and Colregs-LBS
Chennai
COLLISION REGULATIONS
A navigator is well versed in international Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (Colregs)
prior to his MOT examinations but thereafter in time is most likely to forget many important
provisions of the Rules. Some of course are confused about certain parts of Colregs from the
beginning others understanding of certain implications of the Rules may become clouded slowly due
to non-use.
Collision Regulations 1972 were the result of comprehensive research and discussions between
members countries of IMO at that time. These rules re-structured the order of importance of the 1960
rules, reduced the number of words to almost 75% and re-defined some of the most important
international marine practices pertaining to sea passages of ships in light of modern day conditions.
The 1972 rules are presently under considerations of IMO for a further revision. Even so their
essential content may not undergo a sea change.
A survey was conducted by the Australian Maritime College to test mariners clear understanding of
Colregs. The questionnaire comprised of six clear visibility and six restricted visibility collision
situations. The analysis of answers was very revealing. About 85% replies to restricted visibility
questions were wrong but in clear visibility situations the score was better with only 25% answers
being wrong. What’s more 40% of these 25% wrong replies were in case of overtaking situations.
Most of the total 85% wrong replies were from foreign going masters and senior watchkeepers.
While the usefulness of the Colregs to avoid collisions because of certain inherent ambiguities of the
Rules themselves can be a subject of heated discussion, I would like to dwell only on the Colregs as
they stand today and their implications
Clear understanding the Rules can be improved by referring to books and documents listed in the end.
Of these I recommend reference one as it also includes all the Rules ‘M’ notices listed are the best to
start with due to their immediate availability on board.
Study of near miss collisions is also an extremely useful tool to iron out faults in the understanding of
the Rules. But nobody documents collision near misses. An excellent effort however is being done by
Nautical Institute’s “Seaways” magazine which publishes ‘Mars’ reports covering navigational near
misses and these are sincerely recommended for discussion among bridge watchkeepers.
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Rule 5 Lookout: Of all the 38 Colregs and 4 annexes I shall refer to only 2 or 3 and I have no
hesitation in taking you first to a Rule, conscious compliance of which would have saved many
collisions, i.e. Lookout
“Every vessel snail at all times maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing as well as by all
available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full
appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision.”
“At all times” includes at anchor. A vessel ‘Gerda Toft’ was blamed by the Cburt when she dragged
her anchor and collided with ‘Elizabeth Mary’ the watchkeepers were doing some paperwork in the
chartroom and the AB was on gangway duty below.
“By Sight”. Guidance on maintaining a proper lookout is given in the STCW’95. These important
guidelines can enlighten navigators and shore mangers about how may lookouts duties of a lookouts.
Duties of a lookout, and matters such as, can a watchkeeping officer be the sole lookout.
1. The lookout must be able to give full attention to the keeping of a proper lookout and no other
duties shall be undertaken or assigned to him which could interfere with that task.
2. The duties of lookout man and helmsperson are separate. The helmsperson shall not be
considered to be the lookout while steering. (Only exception being bridge with all-round view on
small ships)
3. The O.O.W may be the sole lookout provided on each occasion
- situation is carefully assessed to establish without doubt that it is safe to do so
- account is taken of weather, visibility, traffic density, proximity to danger to navigation, TSS
etc, and
- assistance is immediately available if any change in situation occurs.
4. In determining composition of bridge watch to ensure proper lookout, master shall consider
- Visibility and weather
- Traffic density
- Presence of TSS etc
- Workload of other functions of the ship on watchkeepers
- Knowledge and confidence in competence of officers and crew
- Experience of officers and degree of their familiarization
- Radiocommunication taking place during the watch
“By hearing” implication is to keep bridge doors open or and post the lookout outside the wheelhouse
from where he can hear. In fog it may also be necessary to stop all noisy work on the vessel to
improve audibility so that watch officer will be able to hear other vessel’s whistle signals.
“By all available means” includes Radar, VHF, binoculars etc. yes binoculars Master and Pilot of
vessel ‘Santa Alicia’ were found at fault for not using the binoculars to look for the vessel ‘Germ’
before the vessels collided.
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A listening watch on VHF is implied for lookout purposes and warnings or intentions heard must be
given due consideration to make a full apprasal of the situation. Use of VHF for collision avoidance
of course can be dangerous if identification of vessels is not positive, if too much time is spent in
communicating instead if taking action and if action agreed between vessels is contrary to Colregs.
Advantages of VHF and above points should be appreciated before taking an extreme view of
altogether disallowing the use of VHF and above points should be appreciated before taking an
extreme view of altogether disallowing the use of VHF.
“Full appraisal of the situation” keeping a listening watch on agencies like VTMS (Vessel Traffic
Management System) has been held as part of making a full appraise by all available means. For
example a vessel on her maiden voyage collided off Bremen with a Ro-Ro vessel. The VTMS
repeatedly warned her of impending collision with the crossing “Ro- Ro star”. But the master
misinterpreted his correctly occurred. This human error was due to over-reliance on one means of
lookout to the exclusion of all other means.
In another case keeping a lookout and making full appraisal has been deemed to include watching
navigational instruments like autopilot. Poor lookout at a crucial time and not watching own compass
resulted in a collision between ‘Trentbank’ and ‘Fogo’. The trentbank had just overtaken the tanker
Fogo when the formers autopilot failed and the Fogo was so close (that even the deviation within the
possible 10 deg. Limit set for the alarm). Caused the trentbank to steer towards Fogo and collision
occurred. The chief officer on watch on trentbank was busy with some paperwork in the wheelhouse
at the type. Here is what the judge said in his verdict
“The attitude of the master of the trentbank and her chief officer was most lamentable towards
automatic steering. The master had given no orders to ensure that somebody was on lookout all the
time. The chief officer, according to his own story saw nothing wrong in undertaking a clerical task
and giving only an he was the only man on this ship who was keeping any semblance of a lookout at
all. The automatic pilot can lead to disaster if left to look after itself while vigilance is relaxed it is on
men that safety at sea depends and they cannot make a greater mistake than to suppose that machines
can do all their work for them.”
Lookout by radar of course is practiced and requires little elaboration. Some checks of the equipment
preferably every watch are recommended in ‘M notices referred to even today, believe it or not, some
masters are skeptical about the use of radar and some still hope to prolong the life of the equipment
through discouraging use. Here are few observations, on the use of radar, taken form court
judgements.
a. If radar is not functioning properly so as to be unreliable then it may be hazardous to use it.
b. Radar may be temporarily disregarded due to excessive interference etc. (which means lake all
precautions during the interim period as if there in no radar)
c. This does not however mean that if there is a properly functioning radar set, the master has any
discretion to disallow its use or turn off the radar. If a vessel carries a properly functioning radar
set, then its use must be made especially in restricted visibility.
d. Whether keeping a lookout by radar or not visual lookout must be maintained.
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How to improve lookout? As one solution to the problem of poor lookout I think experienced Masters
will agree that frequent visits to the bridge by the master, especially at change of watch time and
when officers are new to the vessel will tremendously improve collision avoidance capability as well
as navigational safety of their vessels. Secondly, not allowing non-navigational paperwork or chart
correction on the bridge without additional lookout will help.
When are casualties more likely? U.K. P&I Club studied 236 collisions from 1987 to 1995 and found
that 55% of collisions occurred in good visibility and only 33% in poor visibility local time of
maximum number of collisions was 0500 to 0800 during which 25% of collisions took place further
remember the proven truth about change of watch 50% of all navigation related casualties occurred
within 15 minutes before or 15 minutes after change of watch also 90% of all major accident take
place in or close proximity of harbours and ports. Such statistical inputs form accident studies can be
useful in determining when to monitor bridge operations to ensure proper lookout and safe
navigation.
“Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can take proper and effective action
to avoid collision and be stopped within distance appropriate to the prevailin circumstances and
conditions and then the Rule describes 6 criteria by all ships and 6 more when having an operational
radar. All 1 must be considered carefully in determining safe speed in a given set of conditions.
It may be noted that safe speed can be a speed higher than present speed in certain cases. This was
evident in the collision case of ‘Ring’ and ‘Orlik’. The ring waiting ahead of Orlik was to pick up her
pilot after the Orlik. The Ring was faulted for losing her steerage way and fall of her course into the
path of the Orlik as the Orlik picked up her pilot.
Safe speed is usually full speed in clear open waters but must be less than full in case of restricted
visibility or in increased traffic conditions etc. if no radar is operational on board and in traffic and or
in fog, perhaps the safe speed should be deemed to be zero requiring possible anchorage till visibility
improved.
Further full speed in fog for commercial expediency is never likely to be accepted as an excuse in
case of a collision. For compelling commercial reasons or otherwise it is not rare that ships proceed at
speeds much greater than what can be considered safe speed especially in fog.
Against this scenario, two Colregs requirements need to be emphasized. Firstly, Rule 19 dealing with
conduct in restricted visibility requires all vessels to have engines ready for immediate manoeuvring
and reminds once again in this Rule to adapt to safe speed as per conditions of restricted visibility.
Secondly vessels constrained by draught (showing 3 red lights) by Rule 18 are told to navigate with
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particular caution having full regard to their special condition. An IMO clarification to deep drafted
vessels states that such vessels should have their engines ready for manoeuvring.
A deep drafted VLCC proceeding at 14 knots in a TSS in good visibility spotted a tug and tow
crossing the traffic lanes ahead from port to stud at 8 knots. The VLCC gave 5 short blasts etc., then
reduced speed then went astern but could not avoid colliding with the tug and tow which was
crossing at right angles to the lanes as required. The tug was blamed 70% for impeding deep drafted
VLCC’s navigation for not giving way as per crossing situation when the ROC (risk of collision)
existed and also for going at an excessive speed in the circumstances. The VLCC had done
everything right except that its initial speed of 14 knots when there was traffic about was considered
in excess of safe speed for her existing condition and was blamed 30%.
Next consider Rule 10: Traffic Separation Schemes. The TSS set up in many parts of the world is
perhaps the single most dramatic occurrence responsible for reducing the number of collisions by
drastically reducing end-on situations. However when passage planning through TSS some facts need
to be kept in mind.
1. Rule 10 is only applicable to IMO approved schemes although charts may show both approved
and non-approved schemes. How to decide? The booklet “Ships Routeing” and also B.A. Annual
notice no.17 give the details. Approved or not approved should be entered on the passage plans. A
US court held that a vessel which had collided and was not complying with charted TSS off the
coast of Japan was not at fault as the TSS was not IMO approved and so Rule 10 did not apply.
Hence additional caution is necessary near non-approved schemes because vessels may be
proceeding in the wrong lane. Good seamanship as recommended in Rule 2, however demands
that charted TSS, whether approved or not, should be complied with.
2. Using the scheme does not mean priority over vessels not using the scheme. Normal Colregs
always apply.
3. Finishing is not prohibited by Rule 10 in the TSS as long as fishing vessels keep clear of vessels
using the scheme. They thus might get out of the way only at the last minute, causing concern to
large vessels.
4. Avoiding heavy weather or avoiding traffic are not considered sufficient reasons for using the
Inshore Traffic Zone and any power driven vessel longer than 20 m must use the lanes of the
main TSS and not use the Inshore Traffic Zones unless she is proceeding to or from a port within
the ITZ.
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I sincerely hope the above refresher discussion generates interest in understanding and compliance of
these and other Colregs to effectively prevent collisions the most dreaded “Big bangs” of marine
casualties.
Annex 4 Distress signal Existing distress signals listed in Survival craft Radar
this annex transponder (SART) now
added to 14 existing
distress signals.
Hindustan Institute of Maritime Training
Chennai