Ganzon vs Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 271

Facts

The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.

The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number,
filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of
authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation
of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.

During the pendency of the charges, Respondent Secretary of Department of Local Government
issued a preventive suspension order for a period of sixty (60) days. Later on, when a prima facie evidence
was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the
petitioner’s second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days.

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the
respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he
succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an
action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals

Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending
Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-
Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor.

It is the petitioners’ argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President, as the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials.

The provision in question reads as follows:

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component
units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

Issue

1. Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend
and/or remove local officials.
2. Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government acted with grave abuse of discretion in the
manner by which he suspended petitioner.

Ruling

1. Yes. It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional
language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right—or the President of her
prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local
officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of “as may be provided by law”) signifies nothing more
than to underscore local governments ‘autonomy from congress and to break Congress’ “control”
over local governments affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local
autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular,
concerning discipline.
 It is noteworthy that under the Charter, “local autonomy” is not instantly self- executing, but
subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax law, income
distribution legislation, and a national representation law, and measures designed to realize
autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places
the local governments under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that
the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local
officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local
Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President.

2. Yes. Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is
held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a
presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty Suspension finally is temporary and as the
Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, a
longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued
is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo
Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative
charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is
ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED.

G.R. NO. 195770 PIMENTEL V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JULY 17, 2012

Doctrine: An intervention program formulated by the national government itself but implemented in
partnership with the local government units to achieve the common national goal development and social
progress can by no means be an encroachment upon the autonomy of local governments.
Facts:
 The petioner assets the validity of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 10147 or the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) of 20111 which provides a P21 Billion budget allocation for the Conditional
Cash Transfer Program (CCTP) headed by the Department of Social Welfare & Development (DSWD).
Petitioners seek to enjoin respondents Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa and DSWD Secretary
Corazon Juliano-Soliman from implementing the said program on the ground that it amounts to a
"recentralization" of government functions that have already been devolved from the national
government to the local government units.
 Petitioners admit that the wisdom of adopting the CCTP as a poverty reduction strategy for the
Philippines is with the legislature. They take exception, however, to the manner by which it is being
implemented, that is, primarily through a national agency like DSWD instead of the LGUs to which the
responsibility and functions of delivering social welfare, agriculture and health care services have
been devolved pursuant to Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7160, also known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, in relation to Section 25, Article II & Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
 Petitioners assert that giving the DSWD full control over the identification of beneficiaries and the
manner by which services are to be delivered or conditionalities are to be complied with, instead of
allocating the P21 Billion CCTP Budget directly to the LGUs that would have enhanced its delivery of
basic services, results in the "recentralization" of basic government functions, which is contrary to the
precepts of local autonomy and the avowed policy of decentralization.
Issue: Whether or not the 21 billion budget allocation of Conditional Cash Transfer violates Article 2, Section
2 of Article 10, section 6 of the 1987 Philippine constitution in relation of section 17 of the Local Government
Code of 1991?
Held:
 Petition is dismissed. Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has
not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions.
Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of
 the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In
turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel
social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the
programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common
national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.
 Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.23
Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of proving the invalidity of the provisions under the
GAA of 2011. The allocation of a P21 billion budget for an intervention program formulated by the
national government itself but implemented in partnership with the local government units to
achieve the common national goal development and social progress can by no means be an
encroachment upon the autonomy of local governments.

LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES v DENR

G.R. No. 175368
April 11, 2013

Facts:

 March 28, 1996 - Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden Falcon) filed with the DENR
Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office (MGB RO) an Application for Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) covering an area of 61,136 hectares situated in the Municipalities of
San Miguel, San Ildefonso, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.

 April 29, 1998 - the MGB RO issued an Order denying Golden Falcon's for failure to secure area
clearances. Golden Falcon filed an appeal with the DENR.

 February 10, 2004 - while the appeal was pending, Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo
R. Cruz and Liberato Sembrano filed with the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) of Bulacan their respective Applications for Quarry Permit which covered the same area
subject of Golden Falcon's Application for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.

 July 16, 2004 - the MGB-Central Office (MGB-CO) issued an Order denying Golden Falcon's appeal.

 September 13, 2004 - Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with the PENRO of
Bulacan an Application for Exploration Permit (AEP) area covered by Golden Falcon's Application.

 Confusion of rights resulted from the overlapping applications of AMTC and the persons applying for
quarry permits.

 October 19, 2004 - upon query by MGB-RO Director Cabantog, DENR-MGB Director Ramos stated
that the denial of Golden Falcon’s application became final on August 11, 2004, or fifteen days after
Golden Falcon received the order of denial of its application. Hence, the area of Golden Falcon’s
application became open to permit applications only on that date.

 Subsequently, the Provincial Legal Officer of Bulacan issued a legal opinion on the issue, stating that
the subject area became open for new applications on the date of the first denial on April 29, 1998
(MGB-RO’s order of denial), as MGB-CO’s order of denial on July 16, 2004 was a mere reaffirmation
of the MGB-RO’s April 29 order; hence, the reckoning period should be April 29.

 Based on this legal opinion, MGB-RO Director Cabantog endorsed the applications for quarry permit,
now apparently converted to applications for small-scale mining permit, to the Governor of Bulacan.

 PENRO of Bulacan recommended to the Governor the approval of said applications.

 Eventually, the Governor issued the small-scale mining permits.

  AMTC appealed to the DENR Secretary

 The DENR Secretary decided in favor of the AMTC and nullified and cancelled the governor’s
issuance of small-scale mining permits. It agreed with DENR-MGB Director Ramos that the area
was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004 (15 days after the MGB-CO denial). Hence,
the applications for quarry permit filed on February 10, 2004 were null as these were filed when
the area was still closed to mining location. On the other hand, AMTC filed its application when the
area was already open to other mining applicants; hence, its application was valid. The small-
scale mining permits were also issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the
authority of the Governor pursuant to Sec. 43 of RA 7942 because the area was never proclaimed to
be under the small-scale mining program.

 Hence, petitioner League of Provinces filed this petition. Petitioner is a duly organized league of local
governments incorporated under R.A. No. 7160. Petitioner declares that it is composed of 81
provincial governments, including the Province of Bulacan. It states that this is not an action of one
province alone, but the collective action of all provinces through the League, as a favorable ruling will
not only benefit one province, but all provinces and all local governments.

Issues:

 WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 17(B)(3)(III) OF THE, 1991 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AND SECTION 24
OF THE PEOPLE'S SMALL-SCALE MINING ACT OF 1991 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR PROVIDING FOR
EXECUTIVE CONTROL AND INFRINGING UPON THE LOCAL AUTONOMY OF PROVINCES.

 WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT OF RESPONDENT [DENR] IN NULLIFYING, VOIDING AND CANCELLING THE
SMALL-SCALE MINING PERMITS AMOUNTS TO EXECUTIVE CONTROL, NOT MERELY SUPERVISION AND
USURPS THE DEVOLVED POWERS OF ALL PROVINCES.

Ruling:

Petition denied.

1. NO.

 Control of the DENR over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted by three statutes: (1) R.A. 7061
or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. 7076 or the People's Small Scale Mining Act of 1991; and
(3) R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.

 The Constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Article X, Sec. 2 of the Constitution refers to the
administrative autonomy of the LGUs or the decentralization of government authority. Administrative
autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but it is still subject to limitations, like following national
policies or standards and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring of LGUs and
the allocation of powers/responsibilities/resources among the LGUs and local officials are placed by the
Constitution to Congress under Article X Section 3.

 It is the DENR which is incharge of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural resources, pursuant to
the provisions of Section 17, b(3)(III) of the LGC. Hence, the enforcement of the small-scale mining law by
the provincial government is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR. The LGC did not
fully devolve to the provincial government the enforcement of the small-scale mining law.

 RA 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining program was established to be implemented by the DENR
Secretary in coordination with other government agencies (Section 4, RA 7076). Section 24 of the law
makes the Provincial/ Mining Regulatory Board under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary,
its powers and functions subject to review by the same.
 DENR Administrative Order No. 34 (1992) which contains the IRR of RA 7076 likewise provides that the
DENR Secretary shall exercise direct supervision and control over the People’s Small-Scale Mining
Program, and that the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board’s (PMRB) powers and functions shall be
subject to review by the DENR Secretary.

2. NO.

 DENR Secretary was granted the power of review in the PMRB’s resolution of disputes under Sec. 24 of
RA 7076 and Section 22 of its IRR. The decision of the DENR Secretary to nullify and cancel the
Governor’s issuance of permits emanated from its power of review under RA 7076 and its IRR. Its power
to review and decide on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial
Governor is a quasi-judicial function which involves the determination of what the law is and what the
legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and on the basis
thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.

 The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under RA 7076 and its IRR to the extent necessary in
settling disputes, conflicts, or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial power of the DENR can
neither be equated with “substitution of judgment” of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale
Mining Permits nor “control” over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the
rights of the AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.
 Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation

FACTS:

In 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand their casino operations into Cagayan de Oro and leased a portion of a
building owned by Pryce Properties. The city along with other civic groups wanted to stop PAGCOR from
operating a casino in Cagayan de Oro (herein, CDO), calling such an “affront to the welfare of the city.”

Therefore, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (herein, SP) of CDO enacted Ordinance 3353 which would prohibit
and cancel business permits of establishments allowing or using its premises (or a portion of it) for casino
operations. Furthermore, the SP enacted another Ordinance (Ordinance 3375-93) which outright prohibits
the operation of Casinos as a “measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and general welfare
of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such activity pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to
protect social and moral welfare of the community.”

Pryce Properties (owner of the portion of the lot to be leased to PAGCOR) assailed both mentioned
ordinances before the CA which succeeded. The CA subsequently declared the ordinances invalid. However,
the Mayor brought the case to the SC to have the ordinances declared to be valid.

The Mayor’s argument for the validity of the assailed ordinances prohibiting operating casinos in CDO are as
follows:

1. CDO is empowered to enact ordinances and vested with police power under the General Welfare
Clause (Section 16 of the LGC) and pursuant to such Clause, a Local Government Unit’s Powers,
Duties, Functions (Section 458 of the LGC) include the power to “enact ordinances to prevent,
suppress, and impose appropriate penalties for…..gambling and other prohibited games of chance.”

2. Under these provisions, the SP has the power to prohibit casinos and all other games of chances in
the city. Even if PD 1869 (PAGCOR’s charter) permits operating casinos, it is subordinate to whatever
ordinances enacted by the LGU pursuant to the LGC

3. The Mayor also argues that this is consistent with the policy of local autonomy mandated in the
Constitution.

4. Using Statutory Construction, the fact that the LGC expressly authorized the local government units
to prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance, it meant all forms of
gambling. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos or where the law does not distinguish,
one does not distinguish. It further argued that if the law would have expressly excluded gambling
authorized by special law, it would have done so. Instead of stating “gambling and other prohibited
games of chance” it should have stated “gambling and other prohibited games of chance EXCEPT
those authorized by special law”

5. The Mayor also argues that the LGC has already modified PD 1869 since the LGC was a later
enactment than PD 1869. Basing on this argument, the LGC has “modified pro tanto” or modified PD
1869 only to the extent regarding operation of casinos in LGUs. The mayor argues that with the
enactment of the LGC, PAGCOR which used to have the power to operate casino’s anywhere in the
country, can now only do so without objection from the local government unit where it will be
operating since the LGC has modified PD 1869.

6. Lastly, the mayor argues that gambling is intrinsically harmful

Issue: Can a local government unit, pursuant to the general welfare clause and Section 458 of the LGC, enact
an ordinance to prohibit the operation of Casinos within its territorial jurisdiction despite the fact that
PAGCOR’s charter (PD 1869) empowers it to operate casinos nationwide?

Ruling:
No, a local government cannot enact an ordinance in contravention of a statute.

An ordinance is valid provided it follows the following substantive requirements:

1. It must not contravene the constitution or any statute
2. It must not be unfair or oppressive
3. It must not be partial or discriminatory
4. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade
5. It must be general and consistent with public policy
6. It must not be unreasonable

Under Sec. 458, LGU’s are empowered to prohibit “gambling and other prohibited games of chance.” The SC
explained that what the LGU is allowed to prohibit are games of chance that are prohibited. Logically, an LGU
is not allowed to prohibit, by ordinance or otherwise, games of chance that are no prohibited by law.
Furthermore, the ordinances enacted by the SP of CDO are invalid since it contravenes a statute (PD 1869).
The argument of the Mayor that the LGC “modified pro tanto” PD 1869 so that PAGCOR can now only
operate casinos if the LGU’s do not object to it, is flawed.

As pointed out by the SC, the Mayor’s argument was merely “playing with words” when they averred that
the LGC “modified pro tanto” PD 1869. What the Mayor was actually saying in that argument was that the
LGC has already repealed PD 1869 since the Code, using the Mayor’s argument, has “shorn PAGCOR of all
power to centralize and regulate casinos.” Basically, the SC explained that using the Mayor’s argument that
Section 458 mandates the prohibition of all kinds of gambling (illegal or legal) by the LGUs, then PAGCOR can
no longer operate casinos anywhere at all. Therefore, there is a clash between the LGC and PD 1869 IF we
were to use the argument of the Mayor.

However, there is no proof of express repeal of PD 1869 by the LGC since the repealing clause (sec. 534)
listed down the laws and provisions expressly repealed by the LGC and PD 1869 is not included.

Furthermore, there is also no implied repeal in this case given the principle that implied repeal is frowned
upon by our legal system and the Court must exert all effort to harmonize all laws before accepting an
implied repeal. In the case at bar, there is no indication at all of an implied repeal of PD 1869. In fact, PD
1869 and the LGC can be harmonized: under the LGC, local government units shall suppress all kinds of
gambling EXCEPT those allowed by statutes like PD 1869.

CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V. COA

FACTS:

1. These consolidated petitions question the constitutionality of EO 220 which created the Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR).
2. It is assailed on the primary ground that it preempts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress
and the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act
through a plebiscite.
3. Brief Background: After the Edsa revolution, cory signed a ceasefire agreement with Fr. Balweg (the
leader of the Cordillera Bodong Administration). That they will work together in drafting the organic
act for the cordilleras.
4. Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art.
XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) , which
covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of
Baguio
5. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the
establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
6. Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the
region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the executive
departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying,
planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region
7. During the pendency of this case, RA 6766, An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed into law. The Act recognizes the CAR and the offices
and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of R.A. No.
6766.

ISSUE:

1. WON by issuing EO 220, the president pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an
organic act? NO.
2. WON EO220 created a new territorial and political subdivision?
 3. WON the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the
provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City)
which compose the CAR.

HELD:

1. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the
creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.
2. The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras. A regional consultative commission shall first be created. The President shall then appoint
the members of a regional consultative commission from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral
bodies. The commission shall assist the Congress in preparing the organic act for the autonomous
region. The organic act shall be passed by the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution within
eighteen months from the time of its organization and enacted into law. Thereafter there shall be
held a plebiscite for the approval of the organic act Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite, shall
the autonomous region be created.
3. Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as
the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the
urgent needs of the Cordilleras
4. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are
they autonomous government agencies.
a. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional
government. It created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with
the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and
services.
b. To determine policy, it created a representative assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-
day regular session, tasked with, among others, identifying priority projects and development
programs.
c. To serve as an implementing body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board composed of the
Mayor of Baguio City, provincial governors and representatives of the Cordillera Bodong
Administration, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations as regular
members and all regional directors of the line departments of the National Government as ex-
officio members and headed by an Executive Director.
5. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local
governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and
non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.

Second Issue: NO

1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a
separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the
powers that are normally granted to public corporations
2. The CAR may be considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the
National Government, similar to the regional development councils which the President may create
under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. These councils are "composed of local government officials,
regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-
governmental organizations within the region for purposes of administrative decentralization to
strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and
development of the units in the region.
a. The CAR may be considered as a more sophisticated version of the regional development
council.

Third Issue: NO

1. local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local
government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority.
 2. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras,
which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just
administrative autonomy these regions.
3. CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for
the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent
territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an
autonomous region vested with political autonomy.

SEPARATE OPINION:

With the enactments of Republic Acts No. 6658 and No. 6766, the questioned Executive Order No. 220
has been superseded. The basic issues have become moot and academic. The Cordillera Regional
Consultative Commission and the Cordillera Autonomous Region have taken over the functions of the
Cordillera Administrative Region. The latter office has become functus oficio. Moreover, there can be no
question about the validity of its acts because if it is not de jure, at the very least it is a de facto office.

Metropolitan Traffic Command West Traffic District vs. Gonong

GR No. 91023, July 13, 1990Cruz, J.

GR Nos. 95203-05, December 18, 1990 Sarmiento, J.

Atty. Dante David claims that the rear license plate of his car was removed by petitioner while his vehicle
was parked in Escolta. He filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila. He questioned the petitioner¶s act on the
ground that not only was the car not illegally parked but that there was no law or ordinance authorizing such
removal. The lower court ruled that LOI 43, which the defendant (petitioner) invoked, did not empower it to
detach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates or motor vehicles illegally parked and unattended. It merely
authorizes the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to free passage or continued flow of traffic
on streets and highways. Moreover, the said LOI had been PD 1605.

The petitioners pray for injunctive relief to stop the ERB from implementing its Order mandating a
provisional increase in the prices of petroleum and petroleum products. The Order, which was in pursuance
to EO 172, was a response to the separate applications of Caltex, Pilipinas Shell and Petron Corporation for
the Board to increase the wholesale posted prices of petroleum products. Petitioners submit that the Order
was issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and without proper notice and
hearing.

ISSUE: W/N the ERB committed grave abuse of discretion

ISSUE: W/N petitioner is authorized to penalize traffic violations as such

HELD: NO. While under EO 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex
parte, a provisional increase, as it did, subject to its final disposition of whether or not: 1) to make it
permanent;2) to reduce or increase it further; or 3) to deny the application. The Board has jurisdiction to
decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may
order, under Section 8 of EO 172, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject
to the final outcome of the proceeding.

HELD: No. What the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic obstruction, which is an altogether
different offense. LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles that stall on streets and highways and not those that are
intentionally parked in a public place in violation of a traffic law or regulation. In the case at bar, it is not
alleged or shown that private respondents¶ vehicle stalled on a public thoroughfare and obstructed the flow
of traffic. The charge against him is that he purposely parked his vehicle in a no-parking area. The act, if true
is a violation that may not be punished under LOI 43. The applicable law is PD 1605, which does not include
removal and confiscation of the license plate of the vehicle among the imposable penalties.

Adminstrative Law
Arellano Univeristy School of Law
aiza ebina/2015

PELAEZ vs AUDITOR GENERAL

15 SCRA 569
Delegation to Administrative Agencies

FACTS: During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting
to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121,
124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after the date
last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines
and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been
impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

Said Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code empowers the President of the Philippines by executive
order to define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township]
municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein,
may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province,
into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any
new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in question constitute an undue delegation of legislative power

RULING: Yes. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. As the
Supreme Court of Washington has put it "municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes." It is
obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle
conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature —
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities
— the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.

Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such
policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope
of his authority. Hence, he could thereby delegate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but,
also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be
attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be
carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the
 evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of
the first sentence of Section 68, the President:

... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require.

It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare may require"
qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the
government may be transferred. At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is
concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said Section 68,
qualifies all other clauses thereof. In Section 68, as above indicated, the creation of municipalities, is not an
administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in character. The question of
whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a
legislative question ".

For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative powers, state
laws granting the judicial department, the power to determine whether certain territories should be
annexed to a particular municipality or vesting in a Commission the right to determine the plan and frame of
government of proposed villages and what functions shall be exercised by the same, although the powers
and functions of the village are specifically limited by statute or conferring upon courts the authority to
declare a given town or village incorporated, and designate its metes and bounds, upon petition of a
majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area desired to be included in such village or
authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area and population, to be incorporated as a town, on
certain steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on certain determination by a court and subsequent
vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the court is allowed to determine whether the lands
embraced in the petition "ought justly" to be included in the village, and whether the interest of the
inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation, and to enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the
proposed village "as justice may require" or creating a Municipal Board of Control which shall determine
whether or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll road is in the "public interest" and whether
the requirements of the law had been complied with, in which case the board shall enter an order creating a
municipal corporation and fixing the name of the same.

To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies no
standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied
to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules
of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking, Sec. 3 sets
up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion
described in Sec. 1. In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions
that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws
for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the
code making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is "virtually
unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that "public
welfare," which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the validity of the
delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to a
statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public
welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in
favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system established by our
Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold.

RATIO: Accordingly, in delegating powers to administrative bodies, the legislature must ordinarily prescribe a
policy, standard, or rule for their guidance and must not vest them with an arbitrary and uncontrolled
discretion with regard thereto, and a statute which is deficient in this respect is invalid.

---
CASE NO.: 16
CASE TITLE: Mariano vs. COMELEC
TOPIC: Municipal Corporation: Types, Requisites, Creation
AUTHOR: Dadivas

FACTS:

Petitioners (as taxpayers) filed a declaratory relief action to assail as unconstitutional Sections 2, 51 and 52 of
R.A. No. 7854 entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known
as the City of Makati” on the following grounds:
 it did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, and
 it attempts to alter or restart the "three-consecutive term" limit for local elective officials Petitioner
also contend that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for:
(1) reapportionment cannot made by a special law;
(2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill; and
(3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only 450,000.

ISSUE: The constitutionality of the specific provisions

RULING: CONSTITUTIONAL

Description of Territorial Limit of LGU

 Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code require that the delineation of the area of a local
government unit should be made by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. The boundaries
must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can
legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction.
 Section 2 of R.A. 7854 is constitutional. The description made in section 2 of RA 7854 did not change
the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 stated that the city's land
area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality."
 The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the
proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the
time of the consideration of RA 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati
and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. They did not want to foreclose the dispute
by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. The Court has taken judicial
notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of
land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes.
 The existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will
prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit.
 Congress did not intend that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical
descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such
description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose
which the Local Government Code seeks to serve.
 So long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to
common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that
the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.

Exercise of Judicial Review

 Elective local officials have a term of three years and are prohibited from serving for more than three
consecutive terms. Petitioners argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new
corporate existence, section 51 of RA 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective
officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously serve by them.
 The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run
again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he
would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies
may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an
actual case or controversy.
  Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are also not the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue.
 Moreover, the issues are raised in a petition for declaratory relief over which the Supreme Court has
no original jurisdiction.

Creation of a new legislative district

 In Tobias v. Abalos, it has been ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that
Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus
worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA
7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district.
 Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least
250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the
1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement of 250,000.

GRIÑO VS. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 105120 SEPTEMBER 2, 1992

FACTS:

Griño and his LDP political party filed a certiorari case against COMELEC in relation to the May 11, 1992
election. Griño is a candidate for Governor of Iloilo where the sub-province of Guimaras is located. LGC of
1991 took effect requiring the conversion of existing sub-provinces into regular provinces, and Guimaras is
one such sub-provinces, upon approval by majority of votes cast in a plebiscite. The plebiscite favored the
conversion of Guimaras into a regular province but petitioner questioned the COMELEC that ballots should
have contained spaces to allow voting for Gov, Vice Gov and members of the Sanggunian of Iloilo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a complete failure of election in Guimaras.

HELD:

The court held that COMELEC was under mistaken presumption that under the LGC of 1991, whether or not
the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province is ratified by the people in plebiscite, the President will
appoint provincial officials. However, the voters favored for the conversion of Guimaras into a regular
province so there was need to undo what COMELEC has done in plebiscite. There ballots in Guimaras should
have contained spaces for Gov and Vice Gov. etc. but SC has now considered the case moot and academic
since majority voted in the affirmative for the conversion of Guimaras.

Sarangani v. COMELEC
June 26, 2000 | Buena, J. | Sec. 9, LGC - Abolition

SUMMARY:
Comelec declared Padian Torogan as a ghost precinct and excluded it from the special election to be
conducted in Madalum. Court ruled that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and
duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, in the absence of any finding of grave abuse of
discretion. The Court clarified, though, that the fact that nobody resides in the barangay does not result in its
automatic cessation as a unit of local government. Under the LGC, abolition of a local government unit may
be done by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision.

FACTS:
 A petition for the annulment of the precinct in Padian Torogan in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur was filed
with the Comelec by private respondent Omar.
 o Alleges that the precinct in Padian Torogan, together with the other precincts in Madalum
was a “ghost precinct.”
 The incumbent mayor of Madalum, together with 23 barangay chairmen filed their Answer, attesting
to the fact that the move to annul the book of voters and abolish the questioned election precincts
were for the purpose of diminishing the bailiwicks of the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao del
Sur.
 Comelec-Law Department conducted an ocular inspection on the alleged ghost precincts. The
inspection in Padian Torogan yield the following results:
o “It appears that in this area there are only two structures: One is a concrete house with no
roof, and the other is a wooden structure without walls and roof. This obviously mean that no
single human being could possibly reside in these two structures.”
o “It came out that the name Padian-Torogan means a cemetery not a residential place. So this
contradicts the records being brought by the COMELEC Team from the Census saying that the
area has 45 households with a total population of 285.”

o “The Chairman of the COMELEC Investigating Team asked the people around who among
them is a resident or a registered voter in the so-called Barangay Padian-Torogan, and no one
answered affirmatively.”
o “Unfortunately, at the peak of this ocular inspection, the Madalum Municipal Chief of Police
Mahdi Mindalano, armed with UZI pistolized Machine Gun, arrived at the scene at exactly
12:55 pm boarding an orange Mitsubishi car with four armed bodyguards, confronted the
Team Leader of the COMELEC Investigating Group and angrily insisted to stop the ocular
inspection.”
 From these results, Comelec issued an Order finding Padian Torogan as a ghost
precinct, excluding it from the special election to be conducted in Madalum.
o This prompted the private respondents to file a petition for certiorari and mandamus before
the SC, urging the High Court to nullify Comelec’s Order for grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE/RATIO:
W/N COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DECLARING PADIAN TOROGAN AS A GHOST
PRECINCT - NO

 Firstly, it should be noted that Padian Torogan is a barangay in Madalum, not an election precinct.

 Secondly, it is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own
assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, in the absence of any
finding of grave abuse of discretion.

o Under the Omnibus Election Code, there should be at least one precinct per barangay.

o In designating election precincts, the COMELEC usually refers to them by number. The
determination of whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not and whether the
voters registered in said precinct are real voters is a factual matter.

o Upon review of the records, the Court finds that the COMELEC had exerted efforts to
investigate the facts and verified that there were no public or private buildings in the said
place, hence its conclusion that there were no inhabitants.

 If there were no inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the

registered voters may have left the place.

 It is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants considering
that people migrate.

o The sacred right of suffrage guaranteed by the Constitution is not tampered when a list of
fictitious voters is excluded from an electoral exercise.
 o Suffrage is conferred by the Constitution only on citizens who are qualified to vote and are not
otherwise disqualified by law.

 However, a barangay may officially exist on record and the fact that nobody resides in the place does
not result in its automatic cessation as a unit of local government.

o Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit may be
done by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political
subdivision.

o In the case of a barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural communities, it
may be done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panglungsod concerned
subject to the mandatory requirement of a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the
political units affected.

DISPOSITIVE:

Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus DENIED.

Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783 case brief summary

December 8, 1994

Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition
questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Before
the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the
constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of
Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two
separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the
House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts
increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the Constitution. Third,
Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5.
Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the minimum
population requirement was attained.

Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement?

Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first
contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is
not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence.
In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this
court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives, the provision
of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House
of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law”.
Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify
their separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not met,
the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including
due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of
separate legislative district
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.