Day 1& 2 Readings
Day 1& 2 Readings
SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997 On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr.
Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo
vs. Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan
respondent. in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions
at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
NARVASA, C.J.:
. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating,
as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of "manipulated contract" entered into between me
E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as
Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a represented by its sales agent/coordinator,
District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends. SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on and pursued the housing loan without my authority
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is
firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending
also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a abuse of confidence; and that there was no
letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with meeting of the minds between me and the
the company. He wrote: swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts
from me.
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often
of the Philippine Bar may properly use. mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local
legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger,
manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any
essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, man unduly prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his
baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to sign a blank contract on
that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for
closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the senice, or be appropriately correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups"
desciplined (sic) . . ." he still does not know where the property — subject of his supposed agreement with
Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS
policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with
established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those
the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary
Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.2 deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"3 in which he questioned the authority Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the
of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and
him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." baseless allegations." and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean
but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi
and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis;
Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Court and ex-officio It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court
Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ."4 Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both
dated December 15, 1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — in
his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in
order that he might comment thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court were
done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a report and recommendation. 14
housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance
that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, and evident bad faith, resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and
wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.7 He declared that there was no basis
for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense 1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation,
of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain
letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by 2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . .
some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, prejudicial to . . (his) rights and interests;"
Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the
comment as Annex J);8 and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with
the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed 3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by
"deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who
and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority and are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
against . . (his) will," and "concealed the real facts . . ."
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, "
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly
in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment.
and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of
and untold financial suffering, considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had attorney.
been deducted from his salary. 15
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, 22 the
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and
utmost responsibility in the public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands that WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of
"(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a
from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar
public safety and public interest." 17 More than once has this Court emphasized that or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
"the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times SO ORDERED.
be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep
the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18 Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, Jr., JJ., concur.
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or G.R. No. 585 December 14, 1979
public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed
— however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively EMILIA E. ANDRES, petitioner,
intemperate, insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a vs.
right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with STANLEY R. CABRERA, respondent.
propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner
consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty GUERRERO, J.:
and good faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to
vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and In a resolution of this Court dated October 11, 1979, respondent Stanley R. Cabrera. a
an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for successful bar examine in 1977 and against whom a petition to disqualify him from
most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which membership in the Bar is pending in this Court in the above-entitled case, was required
is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial to show cause why he should not be cited and punished for contempt of court.
employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others
at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence,
The above citation for contempt against the respondent was issued by the Court
restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might
following the persistence of the respondent in the use of, abusive and vituperative
perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he
language despite the Court's admonition implicit in Our previous resolution of June 5,
had been grievously wronged.
1979 deferring the oath-taking of respondent pending showing that he has amended
his ways and conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion
to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
The petition to disqualify respondent from admission to the Bar was filed by Atty. Emilia
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who
F. Andres, Legal Officer II in the Office of the Minister, Ministry of Labor on the ground
has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine
of lack of good moral character as shown by his propensity in using vile, uncouth, and
Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or
in civil language to the extent of being reprehensively malicious and criminally libelous
advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney"
and likewise, for his proclivity in filing baseless, malicious and unfounded criminal
is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
cases.
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of
It appears that Atty. Emilia E. Andres, designated as Special Investigator to investigate said manufactured evidence was moronically received by unlawful
the administrative charge filed by Mrs. Presentacion R. Cabrera, mother of the inducement by respondents
respondent, against one, Atty. Benjamin Perez, former Hearing Officer of the defunct
Workmen's Compensation Unit, Region IV, Manila, for alleged dishonesty, oppression idiotic receiving clerk of CAR
and discourtesy, recommended the dismissal of the charge even as the records of two
relevant Workmen's Compensation cases were not produced at the hearing,
notwithstanding the request of the respondent. When the Minister of Labor dismissed unparalleled stupidity of chief respondent
the charges upon Atty. Andres' recommendation, respondent filed with the City Fiscal
of Manila criminal charges of infidelity in the custody of documents. falsification of public On April 28, 1977, this Court required respondent to file an answer to the petition to
documents, and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against the disqualify him from admission to the Bar and ordered at the same time that his oath-
investigator. taking be held in abeyance until further orders. In his answer, respondent admits the
filing of criminal cases in the City Fiscal's Office against the petitioner but he claims that
Supporting these criminal charges are affidavits of respondent Stanley R. Cabrera his language was not vile uncouth and un civil due to the simple reason that the same
wherein Atty. Andres. now the petitioner, points to the vile, in civil and uncouth language is the truth and was made with good intentions and justifiable motives pursuant to
used by respondent, as shown in the following excerpts: respondent's sense of justice as cherished under the New Society, aside from being
absolutely privileged. Respondent's answer, however, repeats his former allegations
that "Atty. Emilia Andres is not only a moron" and reiterates "the moronic discharge of
9. That the moronic statements of Atty. Ernesto Cruz and Atty. Emilia public functions by complainant Atty. Emilia Andres."
Andres are the product of moronic conspiracy to conceal the said
falsified, fraudulent and unauthorized document in the sense that
how can the CARS conduct a diligent search tor the aforesaid The records show repeated motions of respondent dated October 21, 1977 and
document when according to the moronic excuse of the Chief of the February 22, 1978 for the early resolution of his case and in his letter dated April 11,
said office which took over the functions of the defunct WCC 1978 addressed to then Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, respondent sought, in his very
considering that it is easier to resort to the list of the inventory of words "some semblance of justice from the Honorable Supreme Court of the
cases before conducting a diligent search unless both are morons Philippines" and another letter to the Chief Justice dated August 17, 1978 making
with regards to their public office ... (emphasis supplied). reference to the "avalance of the sadistic resolution en banc," "the cruel and inhuman
punishment the Court has speedily bestowed upon undersigned respondent," "the
Court does not honor its own resolution," and closing his letter thus — "A victim of the
10. That due to the fact that Acting Referee Benjamin R. Perez, Court's inhuman and cruel punishment through its supreme inaction."
Alfredo Antonio, Jr., Atty. Ernesto Cruz and Atty. Emilia Andres has
perpetrated a moronic but criminal conspiracy to conceal the falsified
fraudulent and unauthorized petition ... (emphasis supplied). We referred the petition of Atty. Emilia Andres to the Legal Investigator of the Court for
investigation, report and recommendation which was submitted on May 24, 1979.
Acting on said report, the Court resolved to defer the oath-taking of respondent pending
... And to show beyond reasonable doubt that that the letter is a showing that he has amended his ways and has conformed to the use of polite,
manufactured evidence respondent Atty. Andres in another courteous and civil language. Thereafter, respondent filed on September 3, 1979 an
demonstration of her unparalleled stupidity in the discharge of her Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to annul Our resolution of June 5, 1979 and to reinvestigate
public functions moronically failed to affix her signature to further the case, preferably giving opportunity to respondent to argue his case orally before
aggravate matters said manufactured evidence the Court or to allow him to take his oath of office as an attorney. We denied the motion.
was moronically received upon unlawful inducement by respondents
Atty. Cruz and Atty. Andres in furtherance of the criminal conspiracy
by the Idiotic with regards to the discharge of public functions ... On September 11, 1979, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt of Court,
(emphasis supplied) praying the Supreme Court to cite complainant Atty. Emilia Andres for contempt of
court, alleging that her false and malicious accusations coupled with her improper and
obnoxious acts during the investigation impeded, obstructed and degraded the
The same words and phrases are used in respondent's other affidavits supporting the administration of justice. Under paragraph 2 of said motion, he states:
criminal cases against the petitioner such as the following:
2. That with all due respect to this Court, the aforestated resolution
Her moronic but criminal participation as a conspirator en banc to DEFER my oath-taking as an attorney pending showing
that "he has amended his ways and has conformed to the use of
another demonstration of her unparalleled stupidity in the discharge polite, courteous, and civil language" is a degradation of the
of her public functions moronically failed to affix her signature administration of justice due to the fact that the same is bereft of legal
foundation due to the fact that the investigation conducted by Atty.
Victor J. Sevilla, whose supreme stupidity in the discharge of his but was an statement made with utmost good faith out of frustration
official functions is authenticated by his overt partiality to the out of respondent's inability to take his lawyer's oath since April, 1977
complainant as authenticated by the transcript of records of this case and in justifiable indignation at the illegalities perpetrated by both
thus depriving undersigned respondent-movant of the "Cold and complainant Emilia E. Andres and Legal Investigator Victor Sevilla,
neutral impartiality of a judge" tantamount to lack of due process of both members of the Bar which are evident with a cursory perusal of
law; (emphasis supplied). the typewritten transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearings
conducted by Legal Investigator Sevilla which this Court adopted;
We noted that the above paragraph is a repetition of paragraph 4 in respondent's (emphasis supplied).
previous Urgent Ex-Parte Motion dated September 3, 1979 which also states:
We reject totally respondent's supposed humble apology "for all his non-conformity to
4. That with all due respect to this Court, the aforestated resolution the use of polite, courteous and civil language in all his pleadings filed with the Court
en banc to DEFER my oath-taking as an attorney pending showing and on his solemn word of honor pledges not to commit the same hereinafter" and his
that "he has amended his ways and has conformed to the use of disavowal of intent of "defiance of (the) Court's authority nor to scandalize (its) integrity,
polite, courteous and civil language" is a degradation of the dignity and respect which this Court enjoys." Such apology and disavowal appear to be
administration of justice due to the fact that same is bereft of legal in sincere, sham and artful for respondent in the same breadth contends that his
foundation due to the fact that the investigation conducted by Atty. statement calling the Court's resolution of June 5, 1979 as "a degradation of the
Victor J. Sevilla, whose supreme stupidity in the discharge of his administration of justice" was made "with utmost, good faith out of frustration of
official functions is authenticated by his overt partiality to the respondent's inability to take his lawyer's oath since April, 1977 and in justifiable
complainant as authenticated by the transcript of records of this case indignation of the illegalities perpetrated by both complainant Emilia E. Andres and
thus depriving undersigned respondent-movant of the "cold and Legal Investigation Victor Sevilla."
neutral impartiality of a judge, " tantamount to lack of due process of
law: (emphasis supplied). Although respondent is not yet admitted to the legal profession but now stands at the
threshold thereof, having already passed the Bar examinations, it is as much his duty
We also took note in respondent's Urgent Motion for Contempt of Court the language as every attorney-at-law already admitted to the practice of law to ..observe and
used by him in praying this Court "to impose upon said Emilia E. Andres imprisonment maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20, (b), Rule
commensurate to the humiliation and vomitting injustice undersigned respondent- 138, Rules of Court) and "to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no
movant suffered and still suffering from this Court due to complainant Atty. Emilia E. fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
Andres' wanton dishonesty." justice of the cause with which he is charged" (Sec. 20, (f), Rule 138). According to the
Canons of Professional Ethics, it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts
a respectful attitude not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the Judicial office,
It is obvious and self-evident that respondent has not amended his conduct despite the but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges, not being wholly free to
Court's admonition. Respondent persists and keeps on using abusive and vituperative defend themselves, are particularly entitled to receive the support of the Bar against
language before the Court. Accordingly, We resolved in Our resolution of October 11, unjust criticism and clamor. This duty is likewise incumbent upon one aspiring to be a
1979 to require respondent to show cause why he should not be cited and punished for lawyer such as the respondent for the attorney's oath solemnly enjoins him to "conduct
contempt of court. myself as a lawyer according to to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the Courts as to my client.
Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated September 27, 1979
wherein he tried to assure the Court that he has amended his ways and has conformed The power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt is inherent and extends to suits
to the use of polite, courteous and civil language and prayed that he be allowed to take at law as well as to administrative proceedings as in the case at bar for it is as necessary
the lawyer's oath. We denied it on October 16, 1979. to maintain respect for the courts, in administrative cases as it is in any other class of
judicial proceedings. Under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person guilty of any
Thereafter, respondent submitted a pleading entitled "Subrosa" dated October 22, 1979 improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
and answered the citation for contempt against him in the following wise and manner: administration of justice may be punished for contempt, and the reason is that respect
for the courts guarantees their stability and permanence Without such guaranty, the
3. That without prejudice to my Urgent Motion for Reconsideration institution of the courts would be resting on a very loose and flimsy foundation, such
dated Sept. 27, 1979, undersigned respondent respectfully states to power is essential to the proper execution and effective maintenance of judicial
this Court that the respondent charges that the Court's Resolution of authority.
June 5, 1979 is a "degradation of the administration of justice, " was
never intended as a defiance of this Court's authority. nor to Respondent's use of vile rude and repulsive language is patent and palpable from the
scandalize the integrity, dignity, and respect which this Court enjoys, very words, phrases and sentences he has written and which are quoted herein. 'They
speak for themselves in their vulgarity, insolence and calumny. Specifically, legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and
respondent's direct reference to the Court on the ..sadistic resolution en banc, " "the endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations,
cruel and inhuman punishment the Court has speedily bestowed" upon him, that "the principally the deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926.
Court does not honor its own resolution," that he is "a victim of the Court's inhuman and
cruel punishment through its supreme inaction," and that he is suffering "humiliation Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in
and vomitting in justice" from this Court is not only disrespectful but his charges are case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate,
false, sham and unfounded. in the order prescribed to them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:
'There is no excuse, much less plea or pretext to brand ultimately the Court's resolution Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos
deferring oath-taking of the respondent as a new lawyer issued June 5, 1979 as "a sustituyan nuestro legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra
degradation of the administration of justice." By his improper conduct in the use of muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro
highly disrespectful insolent language, respondent has tended to degrade the sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no
administration of justice; he has disparaged the dignity and brought to disrepute the estuviese residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar
integrity and authority of the Court. He has committed contempt of this Court. a nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran
conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o
WHEREFORE respondent Stanley Cabrera is found guilty of contempt and he is hereby incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO
sentenced to pay this Court within ten days from notice hereof a fine of Five Hundred DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon,
Pesos (P500.00) or imprisonment of fifty (50) days. mayor de edad, que descienda legitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros
sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to respondent's personal record in the Office posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta
of the Bar Confidant. de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto o contribution. En
igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad
descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando
SO ORDERED absolutamente faltare persona de estas cualificaciones, la administracion del
HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al senor Obispo de Cebu o
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que
Santos, Fernandez, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur. tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al
Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.
G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until
JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee, her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio
vs. Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July
1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter,
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant. beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the
position of administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case,
reference will be made later in this decision.
Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.
Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofileña for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants. Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of
Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna
Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned
MAKALINTAL, J.: in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and
embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his
This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or
The office in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. of his brother's assumption of the position.
Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and
appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui. Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a
letter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and September 1960, the demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the
Doña Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same
invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by
office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed
founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation. courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly
under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to
to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary
circumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such
However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree
among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.
abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que
pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion." The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing
test advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator
The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these,
Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A
1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of
him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b);
disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute
by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and
the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili. conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act;
and shall administer properties of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to be
presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo would be a distinct asset.
de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the
deed of donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should
not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the
or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant, to the office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a
defendant and by the intervenor. member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed
of donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed on the ground,
among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral
We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de character. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court
abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however,
membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of
law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o instrumento dado para administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof
ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Real no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.
Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en
el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los
derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer
or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the
that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking,
prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial
are devolved by law as a consequence. administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation
therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must,
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person
of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar of good moral character — a fit and proper person to practice law. The court
examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the
Court, this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The academic degree disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was
of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5 Am.
"successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)
officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however,
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to ruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of
reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following the Hospicio.
his conviction, and the requirements for reinstatement have been held to be
the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may require Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March
a greater degree of proof than in an original admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & 1950, the Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the
Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.) Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen
the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then filed a third-party complaint against
The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken oath as
applicant is "of good moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is used administrator. On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of recognition by the opinion
when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground
with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and whether his mental that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration of the Hospicio.
qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954 he was
public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct able to take another oath of office as administrator before President Magsaysay, and
from his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816). soon afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. President
Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court, stated in a
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking telegram to his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may
reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in disregard the oath" thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and
paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in the other parties in the case filed their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. The
this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal and the trial
disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out. Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants thereupon
instituted a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was
decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was dismiss upon motion of
the prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, the parties, who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ...
taken from section 216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent
after the right of plaintiff to hold the office arose. by whomsoever is not occupying the office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No.
L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in quo warranto was filed
1932. On January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid motion for dismissal.
Teodoro Cui, who assumed the administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano
Cui, the plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The case was On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as
dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the member of the Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as
complaint and complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the administrator in his favor, pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on the
order of dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.
37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated in the decision
of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued as
administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the
accepted a position as assistant administrator. first case of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further
proceedings; his acceptance instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowing
Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator and his failure to file an action in quo
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-
maneuvers. First he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that the
February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he had "made clear" his intention of conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an action — all these
occupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up with another circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of the rule that an
letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over the administration as of 1 action in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold
January 1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of office before a notary public only the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro
on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the
Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the position statutory period. And the fact that this action was filed within one year of the defendant's
as stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was assumption of office in September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position any
referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 better, for the basis of the action is his own right to the office and it is from the time such
April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effect right arose that the one-year limitation must be counted, not from the date the
incumbent began to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent
624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161. Dionisio Ramos for contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978
and March 13, 1979, the hearings in this administrative case were postponed on the
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, basis of respondent's motions for postponement. These motions were predicated on
grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned respondent's allegations that on said dates he had a case set for hearing before Branch
by them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case
Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The No. 35906). Upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused in said case is one
deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores (those "Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas Manila." Respondent
appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de admits that he used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before said court in connection
edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he had a right to do so because in his
Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... Birth Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos", and -his parents are
En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an
quien tenia ultimamente la administration." Besides being a nearer descendant than abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his other given name and maternal surname.
Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the
circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the "Roll of
founders was to confer the administration by line and successively to the descendants Attorneys" is "Dionisio D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official record
of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since containing the names and signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A
the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor Attorneys in his practice of law.
belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of
donation. The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood".
As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is "truthfulness, candor and frankness". 1 Indeed, candor and frankness should
reversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage. This has to be so because the
dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant. court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In representing himself to
the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent has
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Regala, JJ., violated his solemn oath.
concur.
The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be
overempahisized. These injunctions circumscribe the general duty of entire devotion of
the attorney to the client. As stated in a case, his I nigh vocation is to correctly inform
the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving
at correct conclusions. He violates Ms oath of office ,when he resorts to deception or
permits his client to do so." 2
In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by
which he was authorized to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect
A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979 resorted to deception. The demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts. The
circumstance that this is his first aberration in this regard precludes Us from imposing
a more severe penalty.
SANTA PANGAN, complainant
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely
REPRIMANDED and warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his
suspencion or disbarment from the practice of law.
RESOLUTION
It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed, the Investigator of
ANTONIO, J.: this Court is directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as soon as
possible. The request of complainant to appear in the afore-mentioned hearing,
assisted by her counsel, Atty. Jose U. Lontoc, is hereby granted.
SO ORDERED 2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature
has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such
Barredo, (Chairman), Concepcion Jr. and Abad Santos, JJ., concur. firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to
those engaged in the practice of accountancy — a profession requiring the same
degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of
Aquino, J., concur in the result. attorney and client — to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there is
no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals
Santos, is on leave. of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such
firm name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3
July 30, 1979
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33
SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. that:
CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G.
GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. ... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner
FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should
CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners. be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
... 4
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF
THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." 4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their
RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general
MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners. letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were
connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and international law
RESOLUTION directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1 5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a
professional firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in
the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7
Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty.
Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to
continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed 6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships
away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal
profession of most countries in the world.8
consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments: The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in
1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its
firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a this Court advising the firm to desist from including in their firm designation the name
firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."
Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph that:
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the 11964, entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law
partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as part firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting
thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be
deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is
partnership. 1 already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and
Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by
petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms
held proper. of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm
name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself
starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on
that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso
Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use of the name of
the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by
from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of
Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the
including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of
deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the personal and the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership which continues
confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client, and the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part
the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal
no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could reorganization.
give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are
accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from their firm Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to
name. protect rather than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose
reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and
Court. cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down. As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial
partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the right to carry
on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a
Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. ... (60
names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
Code which provides:
On the other hand,
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which
may or may not include the name of one or more of the partners.
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the
individual skill of the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a firm asset on its
names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner. dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation
may be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must agreement relating to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115)
either be those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living (Emphasis supplied)
persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits
a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by
liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically
as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy.10
Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the
payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or
net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere
because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments relationship or association for a particular purpose. ... It is not a
will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business
neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a
death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper. 12
corresponding liability.
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm names have
applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining to business is evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership changed.
that the law is a profession.
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the partners designated by it is proper only where sustained by local
the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern custom and not where by custom this purports to Identify the active
Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men pursuing a members. ...
learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service, — no
less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon,
livelihood." as to the propriety of adding the name of a new partner and at the
same time retaining that of a deceased partner who was never a
xxx xxx xxx partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp.
207208) (Emphasis supplied).
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from
business are: The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of
a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in
and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making a firm title.
much money.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because
involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability. it is sanctioned by custom.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary. In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733)
which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme
Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, ten partners of the firm bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by
fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of custom and did not offend any statutory provision or legislative policy and was adopted
advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly by agreement of the parties. The Court stated therein:
with their clients. 13
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a offends no statutory provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the
privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special Canons of Professional Ethics of both the American Bar Association
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in and the New York State Bar Association provides in part as follows:
its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special "The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner,
privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16 when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should
be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar use." There is no question as to local custom. Many firms in the city
Association" in support of their petitions. use the names of deceased members with the approval of other
attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name the First Department has considered the matter and reached The
of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a conclusion that such practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis
practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken supplied)
that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
xxx xxx xxx
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the
continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice
partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or more in question. The use of the firm name herein is also sustainable by
senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of reason of agreement between the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their
Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly firms indicating the years during which they served as such.
observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no
judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of SO ORDERED.
evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of
justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any
other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur
requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as
a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.
adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social
custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such
statute. Not so with the latter.
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice PER CURIAM:
and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade."
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
public service. A trade ... aims primarily at personal gain; a profession the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime
at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction,
wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;2 and
the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem to be constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the
freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to Rules of Court.3
acquire as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed
him by law. But the member of a profession does not regard himself
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD
as in competition with his professional brethren. He is not bartering
issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an
his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill
ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004.4 After that hearing,
and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no
complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint
such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of the
and its attachments.5 Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper,
professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling
which he did on July 27, 2004.6 Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for
equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of
resolution.
his profession even if done with no expectation of reward, This spirit
of public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be
exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and
according to law. The other two elements of a profession, namely, Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.
they secure and maintain that spirit. 25
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for
must bow to legal and ethical impediment. frustrated homicide,7 which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop The facts leading to respondent’s conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the
the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:
"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home "2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because
after gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;
Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that
the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent "3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault,
member of the Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a
accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held
him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing
the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been "4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and
drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, fled;
the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged,
stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter "5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent
boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again denied that he had shot Complainant;
and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm
around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified and then "6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was
released him. The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that the one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his
vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them
up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the "7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,]
accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant."12
him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him
out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution
corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano."8 adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as
brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
the left side of his neck,9 complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had
not received timely medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving
Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused
moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer
paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.
is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no
longer possessed of good moral character.13 In the instant case, respondent has been
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since
2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on his conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question, the only
several conditions. These included satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the] issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated
court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano."10 homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice,
comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
Appeals.11 social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."14
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that
respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been
involving moral turpitude. discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,15 a labor case
concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this
but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the Court rejected the employer’s contention and held that homicide in that case did not
following facts: involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRI’s
Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court
explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer made a
"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car; pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine
conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence
courts, as explained thus: of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert
a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.
"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of
the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of
known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed
moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding firearm18 and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.19 He has thus brazenly
circumstances. x x x."16 (Emphasis supplied) violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both
in his attorney’s oath20 and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the to "obey the laws of the land."
Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of
aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic
circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows: sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his
sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years21 since he was
"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains
and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance,
then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the
to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that earning capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon
he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never even fully restore what the
victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several latter has lost.
times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to
defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self- Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the
defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.22 Where their
circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally
vile, immoral or unjust."17 unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license
and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from that
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances office.23
clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
We also adopt the IBP’s finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice
latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.24
by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the
circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer’s In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous
assault. behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel
Fariñas, an out-of-court settlement with complainant’s family.25 But when this effort
We also consider the trial court’s finding of treachery as a further indication of the failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was
skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position complainant’s family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a
to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the neurosurgeon.26
unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the
latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible
of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed story of having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.27 The trial court
his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime. had this to say:
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his "The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined
conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant
it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor
slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on that it is improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said
his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced were bent on beating him to death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his
vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a
injuries sustain the complainant’s version of the incident particularly when he said that be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served
he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x."28 on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more
important than truthfulness.29 The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium SO ORDERED.
on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the
court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to G.R. No. 63145 October 5, 1999
act in good faith.
SULPICIA VENTURA, petitioner,
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal vs.
profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a HON. FRANCIS J. MILITANTE, in His Capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who Trial Court, 7th Judicial District, Branch XII, Cebu City; and JOHN
are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because UY, respondent.
they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."31 PUNO, J.:
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Order 1 of public respondent directing her
basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the to file an Answer to the Complaint for a Sum of Money with Damages filed by private
penalty recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate. respondent after denying her Motion to Dismiss. 2
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice There is no dispute as to the following relevant facts:
by requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable
and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.32 Thus, Private respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money and Damages against
whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile petitioner which reads:
confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU
the end desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence
to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society
and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be 14th Judicial District
irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a
shining exemplar of truth and justice. BRANCH ___
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high MR. JOHN UY, Proprietor of Cebu
degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but
also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has
Textar Auto Supply,
fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal
profession.
Plaintiff,
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances
– not the mere fact of their conviction – would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the -versus- CIVIL CASE NO. R-21968
legal profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and
brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a For: SUM OF MONEY AND
member of the bar.
DAMAGES
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision
ESTATE OF CARLOS NGO as 2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees plus P4,000.00 as reimbursement of
represented by surviving the initial litigation expenditures.
spouse Ms. SULPICIA VENTURA, FURTHER plaintiff prays for such other relief or remedy in
accordance with law, justice and equity.
Defendant.
Cebu City, Philippines, March 29, 1982.
4. As a consequence of the refusal to pay the plaintiff was Private respondent opposed the foregoing motion. 9 He insisted that petitioner, being
compelled to retain the services of counsel with whom he the wife of the deceased Carlos Ngo, is liable to pay the obligation which benefited
contracted to pay P10,000.00 as attorney's fees. Upon institution of their family.
this complaint, he has further incurred initial litigation expenditures
in the sum of P4,000.00.1âwphi1.nêt Public respondent issued an Order giving private respondent twenty four (24) hours to
file his amended complaint "so that the Court can determine for itself whether there is
WHEREFORE, this Honorable Court is most respectfully prayed to really a cause of action against the defendant who would be substituted to the Estate
render judgment for the plaintiff by — of Carlos Ngo," considering that "it would seem from the arguments of counsel for
plaintiff . . . that the debt incurred by the deceased Carlos [sic] Ngo was in behalf of
1. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P48,889.70 the conjugal partnership so that the wife of Carlos Ngo might be liable to pay the
plus interest until the obligation is fully paid; obligation." 10
Private respondent then filed his Amended Complaint 11 with the new allegations
underscored therein as follows:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES xxx xxx xxx12
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU Petitioner filed a Comment to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.13 She reiterated that
whether the unsecured debt was contracted by her husband alone or as a charge
14th Judicial District against the conjugal partnership of gains, it cannot be denied that her husband was
now deceased, the said debt does not survive him, the conjugal partnership of gains
is terminated upon the death of one of the spouses, and the debts and charges
BRANCH XII against the conjugal partnership of gains may only be paid after an inventory is made
in the appropriate testate or intestate proceeding.
MR. JOHN UY, Proprietor of Cebu
Private respondent filed a Rejoinder to Defendant's Comment. 14 He countered that
Textar Auto Supply, the defendant in his amended complaint was now petitioner and that she was not
deceased, hence the inapplicability of the legal rules on the abatement of money
Plaintiff, claims in case the defendant dies pending their prosecution.
-versus- CIVIL CASE NO. R-21968 Public respondent issued the herein assailed order which reads as follows:
MS. SULPICIA VENTURA, DAMAGES This case is called today to deal on the motion for reconsideration
of the order of this Court dated November 16, 1982 denying the
motion of the defendant to dismiss the complaint.
Defendant.
In its order of November 16, 1982, the Court in the interest of
justice advised the plaintiff to make the proper amendment so that
the proper party defendant may be impleaded considering that the
AMENDED COMPLAINT motion to dismiss then was anchored on the ground that the estate
of Carlos Ngo was not a natural nor juridical person, hence it could
not be sued. On December 23, 1982, the plaintiff amended its
PLAINTIFF thru counsel, unto this Honorable Court most
complaint and this time the defendant is already Sulpicia Ventura.
respectfully states that:
The defendant now argues that even the amended complaint would
show that this is really a collection of a debt of the conjugal
1. . . . partnership of deceased Carlong [sic] Ngo and his wife.
2. During the lifetime of Carlos Ngo he and his wife, the defendant Perusing the amended complaint, the Court finds that in Paragraph
herein are indebted with the plaintiff in the amount of P48,889.70 as 2 the allegation states: "During the lifetime of Carlos Ngo, he and
evidenced by the hereto attached statement marked as Annexes A his wife, the defendant, are indebted with the plaintiff in the amount
and A-1 which account was obtained for the benefit of their of P48,689.70, (sic) etc.," so that the indebtedness was incurred by
family and is being confirmed by their son Roy Ngo per his Carlos Ngo and defendant Sulpicia Ventura and since Carlos Ngo
signature marked as Annex "A-2"; is now dead that will not preclude the plaintiff from filing a case
against the living defendant, Sulpicia Ventura.
3. . . .
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED
4. For several times, the defendant had concealed herself in her and the defendant may file her answer within fifteen (15) days from
house when the plaintiff's representative went to her residence to today.
collect payment of the said account;
IT IS SO ORDERED. 15
5. . . .
Petitioner scurried to this Court praying that the foregoing order of the public To cure this fatal defect, private respondent amended his original complaint. In his
respondent be set aside and the amended complaint of private respondent, ordered amended complaint, private respondent deleted the estate of Carlos Ngo and named
dismissed. 16 petitioner as the defendant. When petitioner, in her comment to the amended
complaint, reasoned that the conjugal partnership of gains between her and Carlos
We grant the petition. Ngo was terminated upon the latter's death and that the debt which he contracted,
assuming it was a charge against the conjugal property, could only be paid after an
inventory is made in the appropriate testate or intestate proceeding, private
First. Sec. 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provided that "only natural or respondent simply reiterated his demand that petitioner pay her husband's debt
judicial persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action". This which, he insisted, redounded to the benefit of everyone in her family.
was the rule in 1982 at the time that private respondent filed his complaint against
petitioner. In 1997, the rules on civil procedure were revised, but Sec. 1, Rule 3
remained largely unaltered, except for the change of the word, "judicial" to "juridical". It is true that amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice,
in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in
order to speed the trial of causes or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary
Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. The plaintiff in an action is the party expense. 25 But amendments cannot be allowed so as to confer jurisdiction upon a
complaining, and a proper party plaintiff is essential to confer jurisdiction on the court that never acquired it in the first place. 26 When it is evident that the court has no
court.17 In order to maintain an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter and that the pleading is so fatally
actual legal existence, that is, he, she or it must be a person in law and possessed of defective as not to be susceptible of amendment, or that to permit such amendment
a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person, and no suit can be lawfully would radically alter the theory and the nature of the action, then the court should
prosecuted save in the name of such a person. 18 refuse the amendment of the defective pleading and order the dismissal of the
case. 27
The rule is no different as regards party defendants. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff,
when he institutes a judicial proceeding, to name the proper party defendant to his Moreover, as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates upon
cause of action.19 In a suit or proceeding in personam of an adversary character, the the death of either spouse. 28 After the death of one of the spouses, in case it is
court can acquire no jurisdiction for the purpose of trial or judgment until a party necessary to sell any portion of the conjugal property in order to pay outstanding
defendant who actually or legally exists and is legally capable of being sued, is obligations of the partnership, such sale must be made in the manner and with the
brought before it. 20 It has even been held that the question of the legal personality of formalities established by the Rules of Court for the sale of the property of deceased
a party defendant is a question of substance going to the jurisdiction of the court and persons. 29 Where a complaint is brought against the surviving spouse for the
not one of procedure. 21 recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, any judgment
obtained thereby is void. 30 The proper action should be in the form of a claim to be
The original complaint of petitioner named the "estate of Carlos Ngo as represented filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. 31
by surviving spouse Ms. Sulpicia Ventura" as the defendant. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the same on the ground that the defendant as named in the complaint had no In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the spouses, there
legal personality. We agree. is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not mean, however, that the
conjugal partnership continues. 32 And private respondent cannot be said to have no
Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court
deceased person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so for letters of administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased
much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the Carlos Ngo if after thirty (30) days from his death, petitioner failed to apply for
court. 22 An action begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun administration or request that administration be granted to some other
by a legal person, since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a person.1âwphi1.nêt
motion to amend the party plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the
court to amend. 23 Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Amended
to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and Complaint filed by private respondent is HEREBY DISMISSED.
may not be named a party defendant in a court action. 24
SO ORDERED.
Second. It is clear that the original complaint of private respondent against the estate
of Carlos Ngo was a suit against Carlos Ngo himself who was already dead at the
time of the filing of said complaint. At that time, and this private respondent admitted, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
no special proceeding to settle his estate had been filed in court. As such, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over either the deceased Carlos Ngo or his estate. Davide, Jr., C.J., and Kapunan, J., are on official leave.
G.R. No. 96492 November 26, 1992 their official functions, they asked for the dismissal of the case and
claimed moral damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of
ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO MANANGHAYA, petitioners, P165,000.00 (Answer with Counterclaim, Records, pp. 48-51).
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUFROCINA DE LA CRUZ and VIOLETA DELOS For his part, defendant Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and
REYES, respondents. mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and approval, and non-
payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the
government, as his defenses. He also demanded actual and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees (Answer, pp. 77-78).
NOCON, J.:
During the pendency of the case in the lower court, Mendoza of the
case in the lower court, Mendoza was in possession of the subject
Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya question the lots and had cultivated the same. Upon motion of plaintiff, the court
respondent Court's decision promulgated on November 22, 1990, 1 which affirmed with directed its Deputy Sheriff to supervise the harvesting of the palay
modification the agrarian court's decision promulgated January 10, 1990,2 which crops, to cause the threshing thereof and to deposit the net harvest
ordered them and the other defendants therein to, among others, restore possession (after deducting from the expenses incurred), in a bonded warehouse
of the disputed landholding to private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz. Said of the locality subject to the disposition of the court. 3
respondent court's decision is now final and executory as to Olympio Mendoza and
Severino Aguinaldo, the other petitioners in the respondent court, since they did not
appeal the same. The respondent Court rendered judgment affirming the appealed agrarian court's
decision with the modification that Lot 106 is not covered by it.
Since petitioners do not dispute the findings of fact of the respondent Court, the same
shall be quoted verbatim and are as follows: The dispositive portion of the appealed decision, which was modified, states as follows:
It appears from the records that Juan Mendoza, father of herein WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, in favor of plaintiff and
defendant Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and against defendants:
106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare,
Candaba, Pampanga, with an area of 23,000 square meters and On the Mandatory Injunction:
19,000 square meters, respectively. Devoted to the production of
palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian dela Cruz, 1. Ordering said defendants to restore possession of the landholding
husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz. Julian died on September subject of the action to the plaintiff and enjoining said defendants and
25, 1979. any person claiming under them to desist from molesting them or
interfering with the possession and cultivation of the landholding
In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of Julian, she descriptive in paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:
succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the subject lots; that between
July 7 to July 15, 1984, Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453
other defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba,
through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and Pampanga, with a total area of 23,969 square
working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of the instant meters, more or less, owned by a certain Juan
case, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus Mendoza, and devoted principally to the
violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment production of palay, as evidenced by a
for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary Certification from the Ministry of Agrarian Reform
mandatory injunction in the meantime. issued on July 30, 1984.
Defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, duly 2. a) Ordering the defendants to vacate the premises of the two
elected and/or appointed barangay officials of Bahay Pare, Candaba, landholding in question and to respect the tenancy rights of plaintiff
Pampanga, denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing with respect to the same;
between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza, particularly in the
cultivation of the latter's farm lots. Claiming that they have always
exercised fairness, equity, reason and impartiality in the discharge of
b) Ordering defendants, jointly and severally to pay unto plaintiff 220 respondents, who are entitled to the possession and peaceful enjoyment of the farmlot
cavans of palay or its equivalent in cash of P33,000.00 from the as provided for in Section 23 of the Agrarian Reform Law, should be compensated for
principal crop year of 1984, and every harvest time until defendants the lost income by the petitioners who are solidarily liable with Olympio Mendoza and
finally vacate and surrender possession and cultivation of the Severino Aguinaldo. 11
landholding in question to plaintiff.
We find for the private respondents.
c) the prayer for moral damages, not having been sufficiently proved,
the same is denied. It is clear that petitioners are asking Us to re-examine all the evidence already
presented and evaluated by the trial court and re-evaluated again by the respondent
d) Ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit. appellate court. Said evidence served as basis in arriving at the trial court and appellate
court's findings of fact. We shall not analyze such evidence all over again but instead
The awards herein provided should first be satisfied from the put finis to the factual findings in this case. Settled is the rule that only questions of law
deposits of the harvests ordered by the Court from which the planting may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
and harvesting expenses have been paid to defendant Olympio Court 12 absent the exceptions which do not obtain in the instant case. 13
Mendoza; and if said net deposits with the Court or the warehouses
as ordered by the Court are insufficient, then the balance should be We agree with the appellate court in its retiocination, which We adopt, on why it has to
paid by defendants, jointly and severally. 4 dismiss the appeal. Said the Court:
Defendants who are the petitioners in this case, in a Petition for Review on Certiorari, In her Complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that she "is the tenant of
present for the consideration of the Court: Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106 Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare
Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with a total area of 23,969
[T]he lone issue of whether or not they can be held liable, jointly and square meters, more or less . . ." (Complaint, Record, vol. 1, p.1).
severally, with the other defendants, for the harvests of the litigated However, during Violeta's testimony, she clarified that actually only
property, Lot No. 46, or the money equivalent thereof starting from Lot No. 106, which contains an area of P19,000 square meters, is
the principal crop years of 1984 and every harvest time thereafter not included in this controversy (T.S.N., August 10, 1989, p. 5; May
until the possession and cultivation of the aforestated landholding are 8, 1989, p. 12). This statement was corroborated by plaintiff's
finally surrendered to the private respondent. 5 counsel, Atty. Arturo Rivera, who informed the court that the 19,000
square meter lot is subject of a pending case before the MTC of Sta.
Ana, Pampanga (Ibid., p. 15). The inconsistency between the
It is the position of petitioners that they are not liable jointly and severally with Olympio averment of the complaint and the testimony of the witness should
Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo because the present petition involves Lot No. 46, not only because there was no showing that she intended to mislead
Block 2, Psd-38453 of the bahay Pare Estate, bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga and defendants and even the trial court on the subject matter of the suit.
not Lot No. 106 of the estate, which lot was purchased by petitioner Romeo Reyes from It would in the complaint since together with Lot 106 had been include
Olympio Mendoza's father, Juan, and which he later donated to the barangay Bahay in the complaint since together with Lot 46, it is owned by Olympio's
Pare of Candaba, Pampanga, for the construction of the Bahay Pare Barangay High father.
School. 6 As to their supposed participation in the dispossession of private respondent
from the disputed landholding, petitioners present the September 30, 1987 Resolution
of Investigating Fiscal Jesus M. Pamintuan, as approved by Pampanga Provincial We also concur with the trial court's finding on the participation of the
Fiscal Villamor I. Dizon, in I.S. No. 8576, 7 wherein private respondent's complaint other appellants in the dispossession of appellee. They not only
against petitioners and the other defendants in the agrarian court for violation of P.D. knew Olympio personally, some of them were even asked by
5838 was dismissed, to show that private respondent's "point is already settled and Olympio to help him cultivate the land, thus lending credence to the
considered closed." 9 lastly, petitioners claim that they were included in the present allegation that defendant Olympio, together with his co-defendants,
controversy so that their political career would be destroyed.10 prevented plaintiff and her workers from entering the land through
"strong arm methods". (Decision of RTC, records, vol. II p. 564).
Private respondents deny petitioners' allegations and contend that it was petitioners
who conspired with Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo in ejecting them not Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably
only from Lot No. 46 but also from Lot No. 106. They maintain that it was in Farmlot considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson (Annexes
No. 46 from where they were ejected and dispossessed, so much so that even if "B" and "C") although the affiants were not presented and subjected
Farmlot No. 106 was removed by the Court of Appeals from the judgment, as Farmlot to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the
No. 46 was harvesting palay worth at least P33,000.00 per year since 1989, private "Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a
suppletory character." The same provision states that "In the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the
affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible offended party the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
in evidence".
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no
more than substantial evidence. This substantial evidence rule was On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape 1 of a girl less than
incorporated in section 18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect on June nine (9) years old, committed on December 28, 1991, in the town of Barangay San Luis,
17, 1976 (Castro vs. CS, G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989). In San Joaquin, Iloilo.
Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226, the Supreme
Court defined what substantial evidence is:
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and the
prosecution presented as its witnesses the victim, her mother, her six (6) year-old
Substantial evidence does not necessarily import playmate, and the medico-legal officer who examined the victim.
preponderant evidence, as is required in an
ordinary civil case. It has been defined to be such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might For the defense, appellant presented one German Toriales and himself. Appellant
accept as adequate to support a conclusion and denied committing the rape and claimed that he merely tried to stop the two girls, the
its absence is not shown by stressing that there is victim and her playmate, from quarreling.
contrary evidence on record, direct or
circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot On October 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision 2 finding appellant guilty as
substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of charged. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
the trial court in determining wherein lies the
weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
belief.14 reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentences him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua together its accessory penalty. The
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the petition is accused is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to the
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on complainant and another amount for costs, without subsidiary
November 22, 1990 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioners. penalty in case of failure to pay the civil liability and the cost.
TELAN, respondent.
On October 27, 1988, the lower court awarded the possession of the property in
question to ROBERTO and Souses VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN.
Peter Donnely A. Barot for petitioners.
PEDRO and ANGELINA informed Atty. Paguiran that they wanted to appeal the case,
Monsanto Law Office for private respondent. but since Atty. Paguiran was disposed not to do so, PEDRO and ANGELINA asked
another person to sign for them. 9
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Resolution dated December 28, 1989 of the Court of
Appeals 1 which considered the appeal of the herein petitioner, spouses Pedro and In the course of their eatery business, petitioner ANGELINA TELAN became
Angelina Telan (hereinafter PEDRO and ANGELINA), ABANDONED and DISMISSED, acquainted with Ernesto Palma who represented himself to be a "lawyer." Having no
for their failure to file an appeal brief within the reglementary period, pursuant to Section counsel to assist them in their appeal, Angelina asked "Atty. Palma" to handle their
I(f), Rule 50 of the Rules of the Court. case. he cosented and the petitioners paid his "lawyer's fees."
In the meantime, on August 5, 1988, PEDRO TELAN broke his hip while he was getting
off from a passenger jeepney. On September 5, 1988, unable to withstand the pain, he
went to the Philippine General Hospital for treatment where he was diagnosed to have
The only issue involved in this petition for review on certiorari is: a "fractured, closed, complete, femoral neck garden type IV (R) femur." 11 On the spot,
the doctors recommended an operation.
Whether or not the representation of the petitioner by a fake lawyer amounts to a
deprivation of his right to counsel and hence a lack of due process. Another operation followed on September 22, 1988. All the while, from September 5,
1988 up to October 2, 1988, PEDRO was confined a the PGH. He had to go back to
The circumstances under which the case arose are as follows: PGH several times for check-up even after was released from the hospital.
The petitioner PEDRO is a retired government employee and high school graduate who It was only by January 1990 that PEDRO managed to walk again although still with
settled in 1973 on a property abutting the national highway in Guibang, Gamu, Isabela. much difficulty.
In 1977, when the government needed the land, PEDRO was compelled to transfer his
residence to the other side of the national highway on a lot owned by Luciano Sia where Meanwhile, on December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution which
he rented 750 square meters for P50.00 a month. Because the lot was en route to the considered the appeal interposed by petitioners as abandoned and dismissed "for
shrine of Our Lady of Guibang which was frequented by pilgrims, PEDRO set up failure ... to file an appeal brief within the reglementary period, pursuant to Section 1
business enterprises such as a vulcanizing shop and an eatery. Shortly thereafter, his (f), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. 13
cousins, the herein private respondents Roberto Telan and Spouses Vicente and
virginia Telan (hereinafter ROBERTO, VICENTE, and VIRGINIA), followed suit by
setting up their own eatery within the same lot. On March 27, 1984, PEDRO and his The petitioners were not aware of the dismissal of their appeal. They only came to know
spouses ANGELINA received a Notice to Vacate from the Development Bank of the about it on May 1990, when somebody in the Isabela Provincial Capitol at Ilagan
Philippine (DBP). This was followed by a letter from VIRGINIA herself, reiterating the informed PEDRO TELAN immediately verified the facts. "Atty. Palma" could no longer
said demand. Apparently VICENTE and VIRGINIA had executed a Deed of Sale with be found. PEDRO in verifying the existence of "Atty. Palma" in the Roll of Attorneys
with the Bar Confidant's Office. This was followed by the filing of Criminal Case No. pleading they denominated as Addendum. Apparently, changing their minds, on July
389-90 for Estafa against "Atty. Palma." 15 By now PEDRO had realized that "Atty. 23, 1991, the private respondents filed their memorandum.
Palma" was a fake.
We rule for the petitioners. We hold that they had not been accorded due process of
The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated August 27, 1990 ruled as follows: law because they lost their to appeal when deprived of the right to counsel.
It should be recalled that the instant appeal was dismissed only on December 28, 1989 xxx xxx xxx
(p. 13 rollo). Prior thereto, appellant's counsel received on July 25, 1989 this Court's
letter-notice dated July 14, 1989 requiring him to file the appellants' brief within forty- No person shall be deprived of life, or property, without due process of law, nor shall
five (45) days from receipt thereof. Per report dated October 185, 1989 of the brief, non any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
has yet been filed as of said date and hence, this Court issued a Resolution dated
October 20, 1989 for appellants to show cause, within ten (10) days, why the appeal
should not be dismissed for failure to file the appellants' brief within the reglementary The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, 19
period. Hence from July 25, 1989 when appellants' counsel received this Court's letter- specially so when as a consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or
notice to file brief until the JRD's report on December 15, 1989 that no appellant's brief in danger of loss.
has been filed, a period of about four (4) months and twenty-three (23) days have
elapsed, thus giving appellants enough to time to file their brief. Unfortunately, no In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar
appellants' brief was ever filed during said period. Let it be stressed that the rules is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if
prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done or certain proceedings the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused
taken are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delay and the orderly afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel. 20
and speedy discharge of judicial business. (FJR Garment Industries v. CA, 130 SCRA
216, 218). 16 There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different from that in civil
cases. The preeminent right to due process of law applies not only to life and liberty but
On January 24, 1990, the Resolution dated December 28, 1989 became final and was also to property. There can be no fair hearing unless a party, who is in danger of losing
entered on May 24, 1990 in the Book of Entries of Judgment. his house in which he and his family live and in which he has established a modest
means of livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
On September 12, 1990, the presiding judge of the lower court issue the Writ of
Demolition for the enforcement of the decision. 17 Even the most experienced lawyers ge tangled in the web of procedure. To demand as
much form ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would
The Petition for Review on certiorari before this Court was filed on October 18, 1990 by turn the legal system into a intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped
the spouses PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN with an Urgent Prayer for Temporary of his property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does
Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction. 18 not know how to establish such right.
On October 24, 1990, after deliberating on the petition for review on certiorari, the Court The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case
without giving due course required the respondents to COMMENT within ten (10) days of an on-going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way,
form notice thereof. At the same time, as prayed for, effective "immediately" and with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company.
"continuing until further orders from this Court", a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER was issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Order dated No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right
September 12, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. 279. to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the
pursuit of the appeal.
In due time, after the filing of the necessary pleadings, the petition was given due
course and the parties were ordered to submit simultaneously their respective This is the reason why under ordinary circumstances, a lawyer can not simply refuse
memoranda. The petitioners filed their memorandum while the private respondents anyone the counsel that only the exercise of his office can impart. 21
manifested to adopt their Comments dated November 5, 1990. However, after the filing
of the petitioners' memorandum, the private respondents filed on June 10, 1991, a
in each of the three cases and was sentenced to three reclusion perpetua plus
indemnity.) The decision is dated April 2, 1984, but the petitioner claims that it was
Curiously, the counsel of the private respondents, ROBERTO TELAN and spouses promulgated on May 3, 1984, without the presence of his counsel and even of the
VICENTE and VIRGINIA, would still insist that the petitioners, spouses PEDRO and Fiscal; that no notice was issued in respect of the promulgation; and that no copy of
ANGELINA TELAN, had lost their right to appeal because of the negligence of their the decision was given to the defense counsel of record.
counsel, referring to "Atty. Palma."
The case was set for hearing on August 6, 1984, and thereafter the Court issued a
A client is generally bound by the action of his counsel in the management of a litigation resolution which reads:
even by the attorney's mistake or negligence in procedural technique. 22 But how can
there be negligence by the counsel in the case at bar when the "lawyer", "Atty. Palma," At the hearing this morning the following appeared: Attys. Jose V. Juan and
turned out to be fake? The Affidavit of the petitioner PEDRO TELAN, the sworn Petition, Antonio T. Nicolas of the Special Appealed Cases Division, Citizens' Legal
the Certifications of the Bar Confidant's Office and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Assistance Office, Ministry of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for the petitioner;
and the submitted records of Criminal Case No. 389-90 more than sufficiently establish respondent Judge Gregorio U. Aquilizan on his own behalf; and North
the existence of an Ernesto Palma who misrepresented himself as a lawyer. 23 Cotabato Provincial Fiscal Aquiles Narajos who brought the record of
Criminal Case Nos. 13, 14 and 15 in the sala of the respondent judge.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner is GRANTED; the proceedings in CA-G.R CV No. 20786
are hereby REINSTATED and the respondent Court of Appeals is ordered to give DUE Counsels for the petitioner mentioned several irregularities said to have been
COURSE to the appeal and to decide the same on the merits. committed by the respondent judge in the handling of the case above-
mentioned. Resort to the record proved to be fruitless because it was grossly
SO ORDERED. deficient.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur. Counsels for the petitioner are hereby given ten (10) days from notice hereof
to submit a memorandum specifying the irregularities said to have been
committed by the respondent judge with supporting evidence. A copy of the
G.R. No. L-67422-24 October 31, 1984 memorandum shall be furnished to the respondent judge who is required to
answer the same point by point within ten (10) days from receipt. (Rollo, p.
FERNANDO VALDEZ alias WILSON VALDEZ, petitioner, 127.)
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE GREGORIO U. AQUILIZAN, Presiding Judge of the The memoranda are now before this Court and the immediate reaction is that the
Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, Branch XVI, Kabacan, North petition is highly impressed with merit.
Cotabato, respondents.
In the hearing of the three criminal cases on May 26, 1983, the private complainant
ABAD SANTOS, J.: was to be cross- examined inasmuch as her direct examination had been finished at
the previous hearing on April 7, 1983. On May 26, the private prosecutor, Atty.
This is a petition for certiorari which was posted on March 22, 1984, in Cotabato City Norberto Ela, was absent. Thereafter, the respondent judge stated: "It appears in the
by speed airmail but was received only on April 26, 1984. The petitioner is accused of records that the complaining witness is still under cross. It is the Honorable Judge
rape in three cases — Criminal Case Nos. 13, 14 and 15 — filed in the court presided who is examining her ... (Addressing the witness) During the last hearing of this case,
by the respondent judge. The private complainant is the same in all the three cases the Honorable Court reserved its right to cross examine you on your testimony." And
but the rapes were alleged to have been committed on different dates, namely: the respondent judge examined the witness but the examination is better described
February 10, 1982, March 17, 1982 and April 10, 1982. as direct rather than cross. Witness the following:
The petition seeks to annul the proceedings which were conducted by the respondent COURT: ... After going over the records of the cases and
judge and to disqualify him from the case. Because the verified petition imputed the supposed exhibits, you mentioned about a pair of
serious irregularities to the respondent judge, this Court issued a temporary scissors used to intimidate you, coerced and forced by the
restraining order on May 21, 1984, restraining him from further proceeding with accused, by pressing the same at your left side?
Criminal Case Nos. 13, 14 and 15.
A. Yes, your Honor.
In the comment which the respondent judge was required to submit, he said that he
had already decided the three cases. (Petitioner Wilson Valdez was convicted of rape COURT: Proceed Fiscal.
FISCAL FULVADORA: To be sure a trial judge has the right, nay even the duty, to address questions to
witnesses. But the questions should be clarificatory; they should not build the case for
Q You mentioned about a pair of scissors used by the any of the adversaries.
accused. Showing to you this scissors, what relation is this
scissors which was used by the accused in threatening On June 23, 1983, a hearing was scheduled. The transcript for that day shows that
you on February 10, 1982? Fiscal Camilo Fulvadora appeared for the prosecution but private prosecutor Ela, was
absent. Also absent was Atty. Jorge Zerrudo, counsel for the accused. The transcript
A Yes, sir, this is the one being used by him. does not show whether or not the accused was brought to court. Notwithstanding the
absence of counsel for the accused and probably the accused himself, the
respondent judge continued his "cross-examination" of the private complainant. The
COURT: respondent judge explained his behaviour thus:
Q Is this the very scissors that you saw when he pressed WHEREFORE, premises considered, in view of the absence of
it? Atty. Zerrudo who in spite of due notice in open court, during the
last hearing of this case and without justifiable reason failed to
A Yes, your Honor. appear, however, for the sake of justice in order not to prejudice the
right of the accused as the complaining witness was on cross-
Q When was this used by the accused Wilson Valdez? examination, stated the witness is being cross examined by the
court in order to get an illustration of certain facts needed by all
defense here or the prosecution of the accused Wilson Valdez alias
A On February 10, 1982, your Honor. Willy. (TSN, June 23, 1983.)
FISCAL FULVADORA: In his memorandum the respondent judge claims that he "did not proceed with the
trial but merely sought clarifications on vital aspects taken up in the hearing of April 7,
May we request that this scissors Identified by the witness 1983."
be marked as Exh. "F", your Honor.
The explanation of the respondent judge is belied by the transcript which shows that
COURT: he asked the private complainant searching questions and this is reflected on pages 4
to 12 of the transcript.
Mark it.
The statement of the respondent judge that he wanted to protect the right of the
accused to a speedy trial is not appreciated. He "protected" the rights of the accused
Q Please demonstrate to the Court how this Exh. "F" was
by holding a trial in the absence of the latter's counsel. If an accused has a "protector"
used by the accused in intimidating you?
like the respondent judge, there is no need for a fiscal or a private prosecutor. It may
not be amiss to state in this connection that the accused did not complain of delay in
A (Witness demonstrating to the Court) the trial of his case probably because he was not there. At any rate if the respondent
judge had wanted to expedite the trial he should have appointed a temporary counsel
The witness demonstrating to the supposed victim the for the accused.
pressing of the pointed scissors at the left side abdomen.
The hearing on the three cases was resumed on August 18, 1983. In the meantime,
Q Did he also use that during the accord rape he Atty. Zerrudo was replaced by Atty. Julian Ruiz as counsel for the accused because
committed he wanted an Ilocano lawyer to represent him for better communication. On that day.
the private complainant was still on cross-examination. Without any request from the
parties, the respondent judge decided to hold the hearing in his chamber "due to
A Yes your Honor.
delicadeza." Present in the chamber were counsel for the accused, the fiscal and the
stenographer only; the accused was not allowed to go inside.
Q About the third time, he use also?
The respondent judge claims, however, "that the accused together
A Yes your Honor. (TSN, May 26, 1983.) with his guard were at the door of a make-shift room, so-called
judge's chamber." This might well have been the case but the FISCAL FULVADORA:
accused was entitled as of right to be inside the room because it
was his liberty and honor which were at stake. On August 31, 1983, I remembered right that it is the purpose for the trial, that
the respondent judge announced, "We will hear this in chamber." the manifestation of the defense counsel that he is through
And then the following took place: with the testimony of the witness, he requested that the
prosecution will be continued in some other time.
ATTY. RUIZ:
ATTY. RUIZ:
Now, last time this case was presented and was
scheduled for hearing inside the chamber. Counsel for the We concur with the Provincial Fiscal but prior, we are
accused requested that the accused be given chance to petitioning the Honorable Court to recall the witness for
confront the complaining witness but this, your honor was further direct examination and I am requesting that will
denied so at this instance it is reiterated that the accused have to continue the proceeding. We are convinced with
be given again a chance to be present during the the observation of the Court that it is discretionary of the
investigation (sic). Honorable Court but this representation however, we
would like to request and reiterate and manifest for the
COURT: petition that he be recalled. It is not the intention of the
defense counsel, your honor, to delay the speedy
Fiscal. termination of these cases. As a counsel for the accused, I
would like to reiterate that the accused be recalled to the
witness stand.
FISCAL CAMILO FULVADORA:
FISCAL FULVADORA:
With the sound discretion of the
Honorable Court.
The Honorable Court will decide on that part of
presentation of the accused, whether to grant it or not the
COURT: manifestation.
On February 7, 1984, the following took How many questions are you asking?
place:
ATTY. RUIZ:
ATTY. RUIZ:
Due to lack of material time, the three cases, I forgot to
Your honor, we are still in the process of direct ask few questions regarding the evidences or exhibits
examination for the accused. We are recalling the accused which are the panty, knife, and scissors, in the direct
in the witness stand. I understand your honor last time, examination in that, it was overlooked in the part of this
due to lack of material time, we requested for a resetting of representation that the three after presented some of the
these three cases inasmuch as the matter whether to give exhibits per prosecution, were not questioned.
the accused for the meantime your honor, I am petitioning
that he must be recalled and placed in the witness stand.
FISCAL FULVADORA:
COURT:
It is not the matter of forgotting the exhibits of the counsel,
there are time given to present this trial. I remembered that
It is discretionary on the part of the he propounded few questions for the defense and he
Judge. What can you say Fiscal? manifested that he is through in his direct examination and
it is my time to cross the testimony of the accused.
ATTY. RUIZ: G.R. No. L-6513 December 15, 1911
I forgot, before the Honorable Court that this FAUSTINO LICHAUCO, in his own name and in behalf of his coheirs, Eugenia,
representation have reasons of overlooking why I was not Clara, Luisa, Crisanto, Zacarias, Galo and Timotea Lichauso, plaintiffs-appellants,
able to question to all the matters considering of the lack vs.
of material time and that there are other cases waiting ANA ALEJANDRINO and her husband W. WEINMANN, defendant-appellees.
which are ready for the hearing. It is the discretionary on
the part of the Honorable Court specially that the criminal Ramon Salinas, for appellants.
penalty is death and while the Provincial Fiscal having No appearance for appellees.
further presentation of exhibits at the beginning of the
case, where the questioning we were already finished, yet
the Provincial Fiscal continued separately to the
presentation of other cases. JOHNSON, J.:
COURT': On the 16th of July, 1908, the plaintiffs commenced an action against the defendants,
in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, for the purpose of recovering the sum of
P1,657.75, with interest at 12 per cent from the said 16th of July, 1908.
Denied.
To this complaint the defendants demurred, which demurrer was, on the 23d of
Under cross. (TSN Feb. 7, 1984.) November, 1908, sustained by the Hon. Julio Llorente, judge. On the same day (the
23d of November, 1908) the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against the
It is obvious from the foregoing that the respondent judge did not manifest the defendants.itc@alf The complaint was accompanied by Exhibit A, B, C, and
requisite cold impartiality which the petitioner deserved. D.1awphil.net
The petition which questions the actuations of the respondent judge and seeks his Later the defendants presented a demurrer which was overruled. On the 2d of July,
disqualification was received by him on March 29, 1984. Prudence dictated that he 1909, the defendants presented a general and special answer, in which they prayed to
refrain from deciding the cases or at the very least to hold in abeyance the be relieved from all liability under the complaint, with costs against the plaintiffs.
promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court. But prudence gave way to
imprudence; the respondent judge acted precipitately by deciding the cases on April After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the Hon. Julio Llorente,
2, 1984, and promulgating his decision on May 3 of the same year. All of the acts of judge, on the 10th of February, 1901, rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and
the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack against the defendants for the sum of P610.22 Philippine currency, with interest at 6
of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner. per cent from the 16th of July, 1908, with the provision that if the defendants failed to
pay the said amount, the plaintiffs were entitled to sell at public auction one-sixth part
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision in Criminal Case Nos. 13, of the land mortgaged under and by virtue of a contract between Mariano Alejandrino
14 and 15 of the respondent judge is set aside; the aforesaid cases shall be and Cornelia Laochangco, dated the 30th of July, 1886. (See Exhibit A.) Mariano
transferred to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial Court in Kidapawan for trial de Alejandrino was the father of the defendant, Ana Alejandrino, and Cornelia Laochangco
novo which shall also resolve the petitioner's motion for release on recognizance as the mother of the plaintiffs. Mariano Alejandrino and Cornelia Laochangco are both
under Sec. 191 of P.D. No. 603. No costs. dead.
SO ORDERED. From the judgment of the lower court the plaintiffs appealed.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur. From an examination of the record, the following facts seem to be true:
Aquino, J., took no part. First. That on the 30th of July, 1886, the said Mariano Alejandrino borrowed from the
said Cornelia Laochangco the sum of P6,000 Mex., under certain conditions mentioned
in the said contract. (See Exhibit A.)
Second. That on the 15th of August, 1895, the said Mariano Alejandrino and Cornelia
Laochangco liquidated the amount due under the said contract, Exhibit A, and it was
found on the date that there was still due under the said contract the sum of P4,115.75. consent to the commencement of the present action. It may be assumed that they did,
On the same day (August 15, 1895) the said Mariano Alejandrino borrowed from but this not sufficient. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides that in Courts of
Cornelia Laochangco the additional sum of P234.25, making a total amount due of First Instance a party may conduct his litigation personally or by the aid of a lawyer,
4,350 pesos Mex. (Exhibit B.) and his appearance must be either personal or by the aid of a duly authorized member
of the bar. (Sec. 34, Act No. 190.) In the present case the co-heirs are neither in court
Third. That on the 15th of December, 1906, all of the children of the said Mariano personally nor by the a duly authorized member of the bar. Therefore they are not in
Alejandrino, except the defendant herein, Ana Alejandrino, entered into a contract, by court at all, and any judgment which we might render in the present case, with reference
the terms of which they obligated themselves to pay to the plaintiffs the balance due to the heirs, either pro or con, would in no way be binding upon them. (Espiritu vs.
from their father, Mariano Alejandrino. (See Exhibit D.) Crossfield and Vicente Guasch, No. 5313). 1
Fifth. That on the 23d of April, 1898, the amount due on the said contract of July 30, The present case seems to have been tried in the lower court upon the theory that all
1886, was again liquidated and it was found that there was remaining due and unpaid of the interested parties were present, and for that reason we have discussed the case
on the said contract, the sum of P4,465. (See Exhibit C.) upon its merits, believing that the parties would deem further litigation unnecessary,
once being informed of the views of this court upon the facts presented. This
assumption, however, is based upon the ground that even though the co-heirs had
Under the provisions of Exhibit D (the contract which was entered into by all of the heirs been represented in the trial of the cause, in accordance with law, no other or different
of Mariano Alejandrino, except the defendant herein, Ana Alejandrino), they obligated evidence would have been adduced.
themselves to pay their proportional amount of the indebtedness of their father, together
with 12 per cent interest. The plaintiffs claim that the amount due on the contract of July
30, 1886, at the time of the commencement of the present action (the 15th of July, Therefore, following the decision of this court in the case of Lichauco vs. Limjuco (19
1908), together with the interest amounted to the sum of P9,946.50, and that the Phil. Rep., 12), the judgment of the lower court is hereby set aside, unless the coheirs
defendant herein, Ana Alejandrino, was liable for one-sixth part of said sum, or the sum of Faustino Lichauco, within a period of ten days from notification of this decision, shall
of P1,657.75. appear personally or by attorney in the Court of First Instance of the Province or
Pampanga, either as plaintiffs or defendants, and in writing indicate their full
conformance with the proceedings had in the present cause. In which case, the Court
The defendant, Ana Alejandrino, was not a party to the contract represented by Exhibit of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga is hereby directed to enter a judgment
D. she did not agree to pay 12 per cent interest on the amount remaining due on the confirming the judgment heretofore rendered by said court on the 10th day of February,
23rd of April, 1898, of the debt between her father and the plaintiffs herein. There is no 1910.
proof in the record that any demand was ever made upon her for the payment of her
aliquot part of the balance found to be due on the 23rd of April, 1898, either judicially
or extrajudicially. She was, therefore, not liable to pay interest or her aliquot part of the Mapa, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
said amount. The lower court correctly held, however, that she was liable for the
payment of one-sixth part of said amount by virtue of her having accepted her G.R. No. 114385 January 29, 1998
proportional part of the property involved and covered by the original contract between
her father and the mother of the plaintiffs, bearing date of July 30, 1886, or for the sum PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
of 744.16 pesos Mex., which, reduced to conant, amounted to P610.22, the amount for vs.
which the lower court rendered judgment, with 6 per cent from the 16th of July, 1908. EFREN JEREZ, accused-appellant.
While we have not discussed the assignments of error in detail, we believe that we ROMERO, J.:
have answered each of them in effect. We have discussed the question upon their
merits as they are presented in the record. There is a question of parties, however,
which has not been presented, which we can not overlook. Appellant Efren Jerez, along with Joselito Quijan, Zaldy Victa and Efren Bola (at large),
were charged with the crime of robbery with double homicide in Criminal Case No. 6755
before the Regional Trial Court 1 of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 38, under an
It will be noted that Faustino Lichauco has brought this action for himself and in information 2 dated October 15, which reads as follows:
representation of his co-heirs. So far as the record shows, the co-heirs have no
knowledge of the pendency of the action. Faustino Lichauco shows no authority for
representing his co-heirs except the mere allegation in the title of his complaint. He That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 23, 1990 within the Basit
speaks of himself as the plaintiff. The attorney signs himself as attorney for the plaintiff Compound at barangay Sta. Rosa, municipality of Jose Panganiban, province
— not for the plaintiffs. Faustino Lichauco represents himself and his co-heirs, and the of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
attorney-at-law, who signs the complaint, represents as he alleges "the plaintiff." There Court, the above-named (accused) armed with revolvers and bladed weapons
is nothing in the record which shows that the co-heirs are not capable of representing conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping with one another, did
themselves. There is nothing in the record which shows that they ever gave their then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by
means of violence take from REYNALDO OCHOA and JOSELITO Appellant, on the other hand, proferred alibi as his defense and that the extra-judicial
BALBASTRO the following personal properties, to wit: cash money amounting confession was allegedly obtained through the use of physical violence, coercion and
to P45,000.00, two (2) gold plated Seiko 5 wristwatch(es), one (1) golden intimidation.
Horseshoe type ring and one (1) gold plated Ray-ban with the total value of
P52,000.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to said Reynaldo Ochoa and He contended that on the day the incident in question occurred, he was with his
Joselito Balbastro; that on the occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of common law wife, Mercedes Sarical, at the house of a certain Felix Rellolosa from 9:00
enabling the said accused to take, steal and carry away the aforesaid articles, o'clock a.m. to 4:00 o'clock p.m. drinking liquor with some friends.6 He further tried to
the herein accused in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there buttress his alibi by declaring that no one saw with as a participant in the slaying nor
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery, was any property of the victims recovered from him.
evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior number and
strength, assault, attack and stab said Reynaldo Ochoa and Joselito
Balbastro, thereby inflicting upon them multiple mortal wounds on the different In a decision dated April 19, 1993, the trial court convicted appellant, the dispositive
parts of their bodies, and as a result thereof, the said Reynaldo Ochoa and portion of which reads:
Joselito Balbastro died instantly, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the victims. WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding accused EFREN JEREZ
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with double homicide,
CONTRARY TO LAW. he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify and/or reimburse the heirs of the following:
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
To the Heirs of Reynaldo Ochoa
A concise narration of the factual circumstances that led to appellant's conviction
follows: 1. P 50,000.00 damage for death
2. 100,000.00 loss of earning capacity
(estimated income x life span)
On May 23, 1990, while waiting for passengers near Josie's Restaurant in the 3. 25,000.00 articles/money lost
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte, tricycle driver Gil Villafranca was approached (P20,000.00, watch, others)
by a person, later identified as appellant, informing him that he was looking for a 4. 50,000.00 burial and other expenses
carabao buyer. 3 Subsequently, Villafranca accompanied the latter to the house of one —————
Reynaldo Ochoa. When apprised of purpose of the visit, Julian, the son of Reynaldo, P225,000.00
sought his father near Kathleen Pawnshop and advised him about the four carabaos
allegedly for sale at Barangay Teddy, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.4
To the Heirs of Joselito Balbastro
Appellant, together with Reynaldo and another carabao buyer, Joselito Balbastro,
boarded a motorcycle and proceeded to Barangay Teddy to check the condition of the 1. P 50,000.00 damage for death
carabaos. It was the last time, however, that the two were seen alive. When the latter 2. 100,000.00 loss of earning capacity
failed to return the following day, a search, led by Julian, was conducted. In the course (estimated income x life span)
of their inquiry, it was learned that the motorcycle owned by Reynaldo was in the 3. 27,000.00 articles/money lost
custody of the barangay captain of Teddy, Jose Panganiban who told them that it was (P17,000.00, watch, Ray-Ban)
recovered from the Basit Compound. Forthwith, they proceeded to the said compound 4. 50,000.00 burial and other expenses
and found Reynaldo and Joselito lifeless, having sustained several mortally-inflicted —————
stab wounds in different parts of their bodies. The victims were divested of their P227,000.00
watches, rayban glasses, and a sum of money amounting to P37,000.00.
But for insufficiency of evidence, Joselito Quijan and Zaldy Victa are hereby
Police Major Roberto Rosales of the Camarines Norte Integrated National Police acquitted.
testified that upon appellant's arrest, the latter was apprised of his constitutional rights.
On June 25, 1990, in the presence of Atty. August Schneider, an investigation SO ORDERED. 7
conducted by the police ensued and statements therein were reduced to writing, signed
and sworn to before Jose Panganiban Municipal Mayor Arnie Arenal, who likewise Appellant assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the extra-judicial
inquired whether or not appellant understood the consequences of his confession.5 statement, stating that at the time of the taking thereof, he was assisted by an
ineffectual counsel who could not safeguard his constitutional rights and interests.
We affirm appellant's conviction. Nais mo bang maging gabay mong manananggol ang ating
kaharap na manananggol na si Atty. Augusto B. Schneider?
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that for a confession to be admissible, it "must satisfy
all four fundamental requirements: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the Sagot: Opo.
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
(3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in Pangatlo: Nais din naming malaman mo at ng lahat na ikaw
writing."8 Appellant argued that the first and second requirements were not complied ay hindi namin pinangangakuan, sinasaktan o tinatakot
with. The records of the case, however, reveal otherwise. upang magbigay ng iyong sariling salaysay, kundi, ito ay
pawang katotohanang kusang loob mong sasabihin at
It must be borne in mind that when appellant executed the extrajudicial confession, it isasalaysay. Nauunawaan mo ito?
was done in the presence of his counsel, Atty. Schneider, and sworn to before Mayor
Arenal. If indeed his confession were obtained as a result of coercion and intimidation Sagot: Opo.
by policemen at the police station, he could have informed the Mayor of the
maltreatment he suffered. Having failed to convince the authorities, the extra-judicial
confession voluntarily made by Jerez is admissible in evidence. "The presumption, Tanong: Kung nauunawaan mong lahat itong mga
therefore, of spontaneity and voluntariness stands unless the defense proves pasubaling ito, ikaw ba ay nakahanda ng magbigay ng
otherwise."9 iyong sariling malayang salaysay?
Appellant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his right to have an Sagot: Opo.10
independent counsel of his own choice. The records show that at the time the
extrajudicial confession was executed, appellant disclosed to the police officers that his While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial
counsel of choice was Atty. Freddie Venida but that the latter would not be available as investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer or (where the preferred lawyer is
he is due to depart for Manila on the same day. Subsequently, Major Rosales available as in the case at bar) is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the
suggested that Atty. Schneider, supposedly the only lawyer available in Jose accused has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for
Panganiban, appear as the counsel of appellant during investigation and the latter another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused
answered in the affirmative, as shown from the excerpts of his extrajudicial confession, where he never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the
thus: course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his
statement before the swearing officer. 11 Thus, "once the prosecution has shown that
PASUBALI: — Ginoong Jerez, ikaw ay kukunan namin ng there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation
malayang salaysay tungkol sa isang usapin na aming advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the
sinisiyasat. Subalit, bago ang lahat, nais naming malaman burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. The burden is on the
mo na ikaw ay may mga karapatan susog sa ating Saligang accused to destroy this presumption. A confession is admissible until the accused
Batas. Ito ay ang mga sumusunod: successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or
promise of reward or leniency. 12
Una: Ikaw ay may karapatang tumangging magbigay ng
salaysay o kaya ay magbigay ng salaysay, sapagkat ang Although appellant thereafter claimed that the confession he gave was made under
anumang sasabihin mo sa pagtatanong na ito ay maaaring duress, there is, however, no evidence on record to support the same. In People
gamitin laban sa iyo sa harap ng hukuman. Nauunawaan v. Villanueva, this Court declared that "voluntariness of a confession may be inferred
mo ito? from its language such that if upon its face the confession exhibits no sign of suspicious
circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details,
which could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and
Sagot: Opo. coherence which psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to which violence
and torture have been applied, it may be considered voluntary." 13 A scrutiny of the
Ikalawa: Ikaw ay may karapatang ding kumuha ng isang sworn statement discloses in detail relevant facts surrounding the commission of the
manananggol na sarili mong pili upang siyang maging offense charged which the accused himself could only have known.
gabay mo sa pagtatanong na ito. Nauunawaan mo ito?
The Court, therefore, finds that appellant's constitutional right to counsel was not
Sagot: Opo breached when he agreed to be represented by Atty. Schneider.
Appellant likewise argued that the trial court should have admitted his defense of alibi SO ORDERED.
"considering that he was not properly identified and physical evidence like properties,
money, fingerprints were not discovered by the arresting officers." 14 Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
This contention is simply unavailing in the case at bar. It is settled in this jurisdiction G.R. No. 103276 April 12, 1994
that "for alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused prove that he was somewhere
else when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its DOMINGO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
commission." 15 Appellant testified that on the day in question, he was engaged in a vs.
drinking spree with his friends at the house of Felix Rellolosa at Talobatib, Labo, THE SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE
Camarines Norte and he went home at 4:00 o'clock p.m. staying thereat for the rest of PHILIPPINES, respondents.
the night. Unfortunately, this version of the appellant was contradicted by prosecution
witnesses, Julian Ochoa and Gil Villafranca, who positively identified him in court as V.E. Del Rosario & Associates and Eduardo R. Robles for petitioner.
the person scouting for carabao buyers in the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte at
around 9:00 o'clock a.m. on May 23, 1990. Needless to say, where an accused's alibi The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.
is established only by himself, his relatives and friends, his denial of culpability should
be accorded the strictest scrutiny. They are necessarily suspect and cannot prevail over
the testimonies of the more credible witnesses for the prosecution. 16 CRUZ, J.:
The Court is, therefore, convinced that appellant's culpability of the offense charged The petitioner seeks reversal of his conviction for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act
was proved beyond reasonable doubt. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He claims that
as his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, he should be accorded the
constitutional presumption of innocence. The petitioner presumes too much.
The computation, however, of the damages awarded by the trial court for loss of earning
capacity fixing the same at P100,000.00 for each victim is erroneous.
At the time of the incident in question, Domingo de Guzman was the Officer-in-Charge
and Assistant Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry. 1 As such, he received the sum
"The formula consistently used by the Supreme Court in determining life expectancy is of P200,000.00 on December 17, 1985, with authority to disburse it in connection with
(2/3 x [80 - age of the victim at the time of death])." 17 Thus, the award for loss of earning certain official training programs of the Department of Agriculture. 2 In a disbursement
capacity for each victim shall be as follows: voucher dated February 5, 1986, 3 he claimed credit for the amount but when required
later to produce the supporting receipts failed or refused to do so. This led to the filing
Joselito Balbastro against him of the corresponding information, 4 to which he pleaded not guilty.
P36,000.00 — gross annual income (P3,000.00 x 12 mos.) At the trial, the People presented one witness 5 and several exhibits purporting to show
Multiply: 30 — life expectancy (2/3 x 45 [80 - 35 {age at time of that as a public officer the accused had received the said amount but failed to show
death}]) that it had been lawfully disbursed for the training programs allegedly held at Ipil,
P1,080,000.00 — total loss of earning capacity Zamboanga del Sur, and Baguio City. 6 After the prosecution had rested, the defense
sought but did not obtain leave to file a demurrer to evidence but filed it just the
Reynaldo Ochoa same.7 Under Rule 119, Section 15, of the Rules of Court, this would result in the
forfeiture of the right of the defense to submit its own evidence if the demurrer was
denied. Ultimately, on November 19, 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment
P36,000.00 — gross annual income (P3,000.00 x 12 mos.) disposing as follows:
Multiply: 21 — life expectancy (2/3 x 31 [80 - 49 {age at time of
death}])
P756,000.00 — total loss of earning capacity WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Domingo de Guzman y Mateo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED and the decision of as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
the trial court finding accused-appellant EFREN JEREZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt Practices Act, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant shall penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
indemnify Joselito Balbastro and Reynaldo Ochoa in the amount of P1,080,000.00 and MONTH as the minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as
P756,000.00, respectively, for losses of their respective earning capacity. Costs against the maximum; to further suffer perpetual disqualification from public
appellant.
office; to indemnify the Government of the Republic of the Philippines conjecture that the training programs could have been held is no proof that they were
in the amount of P200,000.00, and to pay the costs of this action. 8 actually held.
In the present petition, the respondent court is faulted for basing its conviction on The petitioner also places much value on Exhibit E, 10 the petitioner's disbursement
inconclusive evidence and giving credence to the lone government witness as against voucher carrying the certification of the Chief Accountant that inter alia it "is supported
the documentary evidence of the lawful disbursement of the amount in question. It is by documents appearing legal and proper." That is a bare statement, however, and
argued that in criminal prosecutions every doubt must be resolved in favor of the there is no explanation of what these documents are, nor are the supporting receipts
accused, but this rule was disregarded by the Sandiganbayan. attached or annexed to the said voucher. As the Sandiganbayan correctly concluded:
We see no such doubts in the case before us. . . . When accused claimed credit for the cash advance of
P200,000.00 in the Disbursement Voucher, dated February 5, 1986
The petitioner himself has admitted having received the sum of P200,000.00 in his (Exhibit E), for the expenses incurred during Three Regional
capacity as OIC and Assistant Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry. He claims this Trainings in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur and Baguio City without any
was spent for training programs in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur and Baguio City, but there supporting receipts in liquidation thereof, as can be seen from said
is no positive evidence whatsoever that such training programs were really conducted. exhibit itself, and without submitting testimonial or documentary
He has not presented a single receipt to support his alleged disbursements and show evidence to justify either the cash advance or the alleged expenses,
that no undue injury has been caused to the Government. Clearly, all this has resulted then it stands clearly and positively established that he had
in violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, reading as follows: misappropriated said amount for his personal use or benefit. The
attempt to liquidate the cash advance in question appears to be
amateurish and ill-conceived and which sustains anew the
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or prosecution's charge that accused had acted with manifest partiality
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the and evident bad faith in the discharge of his official functions, thus
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and causing undue injury to the government. (Emphasis supplied)
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
The evidence against the petitioner is in our view sufficient to convict. The government
xxx xxx xxx had established that he had received the money and had failed to account for it, thus
overcoming the presumption of innocence in his favor. Instead of refuting that evidence,
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, he smugly belittled it as if it were too inconsequential to disprove. Significantly, he
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence, which he filed just the same even if leave
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial was denied by the respondent court.
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.. . .. The petitioner insists that it is not for him to show that the supporting receipts exist; on
the contrary, it is for the prosecution to prove that they do not exist. This is, indeed, a
In her testimony for the prosecution, Josephine Angeles declared that as training officer strange manner of accounting. As for the possibility that the training programs "might
and chief of the training unit of the Bureau of Plants and Industry from 1985 to 1986, have really occurred," to use Angeles' words, this is a mere speculation that cannot
she knew of no training programs conducted by the BPI at Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur, explain the petitioner's failure to account for the P200,000.00 entrusted to him.
and Baguio City during that period. Such training programs would have been officially
brought to her attention if they had actually been held. 9 The situation before us is starkly simple. The petitioner received P200,000.00 from the
government to defray the expenses of training programs. He has not liquidated it short
The petitioner argues, however, that on cross-examination she admitted that there of saying it was spent for some amorphous training programs not on record. Who
might have been training programs held at that time that might not have been officially should prove those training programs? The petitioner, of course. And he should do so
communicated to her. It is now suggested that the training programs at Ipil, Zamboanga with concrete facts and figures supported by receipts, not with the mere undocumented
de Sur, and Baguio City might well have been among such programs. surmise that the training programs could have been held.
In the first place, this negative statement cannot prevail against her categorical and We should not stretch the presumption of innocence beyond its reasonable intendment.
positive assertion that as chief of the training program she was supposed to know, and Let us not forget that it is only a presumption and can yield to contrary evidence of guilt.
did know, about all such training programs funded by the BPI. In the second place, she That evidence has been amply established in this case. The petitioner's conviction was
said that the training programs that could have been held without her knowledge were not based on what the Sandiganbayan mistakenly called a presumption of his guilt. The
those funded not by the BPI but by foreign agencies. In the third place, the mere finding of guilt was not a presumption but a conclusion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so Arriving at the directed place at about 5:00 o'clock that same day, Sgt. Francisco Allaga,
ordered. the designated poseur-buyer and principal prosecution witness, proceeded to a sari-
sari store (ibid., p. 6) and inquired, from a child therein, about one "Esmie" (ibid., p. 7).
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, The child pointed to the Appellant who was seated under a waiting shade about ten
Quiason, Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur. (10) meters away (ibid.). Sgt. Allaga then approached and asked Appellant if he (the
latter) could "score" (lingo for marijuana users). Reacting, Appellant asked "how much
do you want" to which Sgt. Allaga replied "worth P30.00" (ibid., p. 8). Asked to wait
Bidin, J., is on leave. (ibid.), Sgt. Allaga then gave the amount to Appellant, who left and returned after five
(5) minutes with a parcel wrapped in a "Camel" cigarette pack (ibid., pp. 17-18).
G.R. No. 92534 July 9, 1991 Appellant handed the parcel to Sgt. Allaga, who opened it, and upon seeing that it
contained marijuana arrested Appellant (ibid., pp. 10-11).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. At the Narcom headquarters, Lt. Salde placed identifying marks on the package which
ESMENIO DE LA PEÑA y BEDRIO, accused-appellant. he kept in a padlocked steel cabinet for safekeeping (ibid., p. 14). Lt. Salde also issued
a receipt for the property seized (Exh. C) consisting of fifteen (15) sticks of marijuana
The Solicitor General for palintiff-appellee. wrapped in a "Camel" cigarette pack (Exh. C-1) which was witnessed by Sgt. Allaga
Raymundo Magat for accused-appellant (Exh. C-2), and signed by Appellant (Exh. C-3) Tests conducted at the PC crime
laboratory yielded positive results for marijuana (Exh. B).
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: On 29 May 1989, after the prosecution had rested its case, Appellant, with leave of
Court, filed a "Demurrer to Evidence" on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to
produce conviction (Orig. Record, p. 53). Ruling that the arguments advanced did not
Condemned to a life in prison1 for peddling marijuana,2 Esmenio de la Peña reiterates appear indubitable, the Trial Court denied dismissal and ordered the reception of
his plea of innocence before this Court. evidence for the accused (ibid., p. 68).
Records show that Appellant was arrested on 24 March 1988 for selling marijuana in a Denying any and all culpability, Appellant's narration is that on the date and time in
"buy-bust operation" conducted by the officers of the Narcotics Command of Region VI, question, as he was washing clothes at his aunt's house (tsn., 21 August 1989, p. 2), a
Iloilo City. On 7 April 1988, Appellant executed a counter-affidavit before a CLAO man, whom he later came to know as Sgt. Francisco Allaga, arrived and inquired from
Attorney, vehemently denying culpability (Exh. D). After preliminary investigation, the him where marijuana could be bought (ibid., p. 3). Appellant replied that he did not
Third Assistant City Prosecutor recommended dismissal of the case on the ground that know. When Sgt. Allaga insisted, saying that he needed it as medication for a patient
appellant was instigated to commit the crime by the Narcom officers (Exh. Y). This (ibid.). Appellant again disowned any knowledge. At that moment, one Aris Magarse
recommendation, however, was reversed by the City Prosecutor, who ordered another and a certain Angeles Octavio passed by and Appellant informed them that the man
prosecutor to file the necessary Information (Exh. I). A petition for review of said needed marijuana but that he did not know where the item could be bought (ibid., p. 4).
reversal was denied by the Department of Justice, which ruled that there was sufficient Aris volunteered to look for marijuana (ibid.). She was given money by Sgt. Allaga
evidence to establish probable cause against Appellant and that the question of (ibid.). Ten minutes later, Aris returned and handed the marijuana to Appellant which
instigation or entrapment is for the Court, and not for the Investigating Fiscal, to he, in turn, gave to Sgt. Allaga (ibid., p. 5). No sooner had the Sgt. taken hold of it when
determine (Exh. E). the latter identified himself as a Narcom agent and apprehended him (ibid.).
The corresponding Information having been filed, upon arraignment, Appellant entered Angeles Octavio, a neighbor and close friend of Appellant, corroborated the latter's
a plea of not guilty. testimony.
Through its witnesses, the principal one being Sgt. Allaga, a team member, the After assessing the evidence before it, the Trial Court rejected Appellant's version for
prosecution wrapped up its evidence thus: being replete with inconsistencies and improbabilities, gave more credence to the
testimony of the prosecution's main witness, Sgt. Allaga, and adjudged Appellant "to
On 24 March 1988, at about 2:00 o'clock P.M., Lt. Eleuterio Salde of the Narcotics suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to pay a fine of P20,000,00 without subsidiary
Command, Region VI, Iloilo City, received a telephone call from a concerned citizen imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs."
informing him that a certain "Esmie" later identified as Appellant Esmenio de la Peña,
was selling marijuana at Punta Baluarte, Molo, Iloilo City. Immediately, he organized Unable to accept the verdict, Appellant contends that the Trial Court erred (1) in giving
and led a team composed of six (6) persons to conduct a "buy-bust operation" (tsn., 17 credence to the prosecution evidence rather than to his corroborated testimony; (2) in
April 1989, pp. 4-5). not finding that the circumstances leading to his apprehension constitute instigation
rather than a valid entrapment; and, overall, in not acquitting him in the face of the weak The Trial Court aptly characterized the circumstances surrounding Appellant's
prosecution evidence. apprehension as "entrapment" and not "instigation." Firstly, Appellant's story that he
had consistently denied to Sgt. Allaga having marijuana but that because of the latter's
After a review of the oral and documentary evidence, we rule as follows: insistence, he was induced to look for and produce marijuana, can not be given
credence, his testimony having been found to be unworthy of belief, as already
expounded. The prosecution version, being more credible, the operation was, in fact,
The Court a quo cannot be faulted for giving credence to the testimony of Sgt. Allaga. an entrapment not an instigation, the underlying difference being in the origin of the
Although uncorroborated, it is positive and credible and is sufficient to support criminal intent. In entrapment, means rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The
conviction. He has convincingly established the details of the crime. He was present Idea and resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officers
when information was received at Narcom headquarters about Appellant's illegal conceive the commission of the crime and suggest it to the accused, who adopts the
activities. He was the principal actor, the designated poseur-buyer, in the "buy-bust" idea and carries it into execution (Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46638, 9
operation. It was he who arrested Appellant after determining that the parcel delivered July 1986, 142 SCRA 534). Entrapment is sanctioned by the Revised Penal Code.
to him contained marijuana. He witnessed the issuance of a receipt for the seized Instigation is tabooed.
marijuana, which Appellant had signed. He was also with Lt. Salde when the marijuana
was delivered to the PC crime laboratory for examination. More, absent is any showing
that Sgt. Allaga was motivated by any improper motive other than to perform his In this case, Sgt. Allaga's inquiry addressed to Appellant was far from a suggestion. It
mandated duty. He is also presumed to have regularly performed his official duty in the was a query to which Appellant immediately responded by asking how much was
absence of any opposite evidence. needed, requesting the Sgt. to wait, and returning after a few minutes with the "goods"
in hand. Appellant needed no prodding, no inducement, and much less, instigation. His
reaction was natural to one who was already engaged in the illicit trade of marijuana
Contrary to Appellant's contention, the marijuana identified by Sgt. Allaga during trial and all that Narcom did was to catch him in the act.
was the same item seized from Appellant. Said witness was present when Lt. Salde
made identifying marks on the parcel in question and when it was handed to the police
custodian for safekeeping. Proper safeguards were taken to protect the identity of the Under the circumstances, Appellant does not deserve acquittal.
exhibit. After appropriate labelling, it was kept in a padlocked steel cabinet until it was
taken to the laboratory for examination four (4) days later. It needs stressing, however, that Appellant's signature on the receipt of the property
seized (Exh. C-1), a procedural step after arrest, is not a factor in his conviction. That
Appellant's story pointing to another individual, one Aris Magarse, as the supplier of the signature is inadmissible in evidence against him. It was obtained in violation of
prohibited drug, is far from credible notwithstanding its corroboration by defense Appellant's right as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an
witness Angeles Octavio. For, as found by the Trial Court, Appellant had involved offense, there being nothing in the records to show that he was then assisted by
himself in inconsistencies. In his Counter-Affidavit, the authenticity of which he had counsel. (People v. Bagano, G.R. No. 77777, 5 February 1990, 181 SCRA 747).
acknowledged, he stated that when he was approached by a man, who turned out later Appellant's guilt has been adequately established by other evidence of record.
to be a Narcom poseur buyer, he was watching his friends playing mahjong (Exh. D).
His testimony in Court, however, was that he was washing clothes in the house of his WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, except that the Penalty
aunt when so approached. Contradicting both statements is the testimony of defense should be life imprisonment (Pres. Decree No. 1675, Section 4) and not "reclusion
witness, Angeles Octavio, that he was with Aris Magarse when they passed by perpetua" as imposed by the Trial Court. Costs against accused-appellant, Esmenio de
Appellant in a "footpath" conversing with Sgt. Allaga. Besides, if Aris were, indeed, the la Peña.
marijuana supplier she would surely have been arrested also.
SO ORDERED.
Further, in his Counter-Affidavit, Appellant stated that "I left him and some few minutes
later I returned with fifteen (15) sticks of marijuana cigarettes for him." In open Court, Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
however, he was attributing sole fault to Aris Magarse in an effort to shift culpability
from him.
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
These inconsistencies cast a heavy pall of doubt on Appellant's version of the
incident.1âwphi1 Of significance, too, is the fact that instant rapport was established RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
between Appellant and Sgt. Allaga when the latter asked for a "score," a term vs.
apparently used by addicts and pushers. If Appellant, in fact, had not been engaged in CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
such nefarious activity, the term would have been alien to him, but it was not. APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary
of Budget and Management, respondents.
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only ... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears
profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence. in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C: controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied) This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-
177) stated:
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution which similarly provides: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
(Emphasis supplied) the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office. practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Black defines "practice of law" as:
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court
3rd ed.) and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It
is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary
functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill,
of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation
Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is
Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours) taken up.
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms
as advocacy, counselling and public service. MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on
for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows the Commission on Audit?
some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney
at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is
auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And,
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our
of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent
to the practice of law.
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted
a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which
I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. MR. OPLE. Thank you.
May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
... ( Emphasis supplied)
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the
The Commissioner will please proceed. Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be
certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by
Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting
from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways
least ten years". synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in
private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners.
(Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986],
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar p. 15).
who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the
clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not
necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering
legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners."
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of
chairman, of the Commission on Audit. the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations
and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.). constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some
of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both
essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social
(Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate
593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank
& Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are
Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition practice of law.
would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends
practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the
self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.). Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an
accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning,"
"Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and decisional contexts.
the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies
today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the
General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must
1989, p. 4). stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a
"model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal therefrom.
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of
lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting
their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has
shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy
such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687). of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary
approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the
relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained
else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-
traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such
negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in
mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.). business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level
of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
similar types of complex decision-making. finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to
wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money
and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types
industry. of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of legal function itself.
the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their
legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a
for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
legal problems in-house. jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's;
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law. strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in other arenas.
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a
the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization
the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business. legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies
After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4). countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at
(Emphasis supplied) that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken
Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be
of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group- as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment.
context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes. Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general
counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects
vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations,
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
considerations. (Emphasis supplied) interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex
make or by decisions.
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors
are apropos: This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge
inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels.
(Emphasis supplied) The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than
a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet,
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What
involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office.
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus: On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for
from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
and void. program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo) International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. supplied)
Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group
(1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica
and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the
and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co- International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, supplied)
in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law
and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set
a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a
hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied) agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
member. men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene
mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there
are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly
an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal
who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied) industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and
the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down
the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any
Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the
(1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) Court said:
covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my
the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is
authority can decide. (emphasis supplied) being defined.
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations,
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated: most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means,
are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising
but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The law, without first becoming lawyers.
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This
be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against
An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action
is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
We now proceed:
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four
(4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on
issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only
Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200) upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power,
Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides: since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with clearly shown.
the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold Additionally, consider the following:
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only (1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President,
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his (2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would (3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible
a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day,
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate
asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends
agreed on condition that — to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin
M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine
citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
No blade shall touch his skin;
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule
No blood shall flow from his veins. 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every
iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the
This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a
beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against
any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
spirit of the agreement. the Philippines.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the
SO ORDERED. qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur. conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.) responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave. We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain
modifications.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner. morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to
RESOLUTION the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership
in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by
a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence
CORONA, J.:
which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to
resume the practice of law.
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid
provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May
practice law.
2004.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance (a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the
with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to IBP;
practice law.
(b) the payment of professional tax;
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that
an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one (c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s
produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.6
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar
examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving
from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10 Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a
continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED,
payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such
tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject the Philippine bar.
to judicial disciplinary control.14
SO ORDERED.
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law
in the Philippines? No. G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship vs.
is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other Office, respondent.
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law
in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16 Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen respondent.
of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because
"all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to MONTEMAYOR, J.:
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost
his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and
he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines
automatic right to resume law practice accrues. Patent Office.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had
and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said
otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other
conditioned on: persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said
examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
similar examinations. behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and
passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and
requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice
examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
of the law.
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
. . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
prescribed by respondent. . . . learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc.
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
who practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly
authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office,
the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights
been holding tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent
qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and
that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law,
bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent
careful thought and consideration. Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office
involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall
Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare.
or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was
to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor
prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law. named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than
one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual
inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to an application the commissioner should decide not only questions of law, but
connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of
cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation, the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of
a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is
31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and
the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further
any time after the expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it
person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being worked advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him
in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and
Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine
Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the
of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and
condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new
trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to
food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require
involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination,
legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic
prepared. Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States
Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he
(respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and provisions of said Rules of Practice:
decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct
evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides
that: Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a
register agents are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names
of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to Office in the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration
a proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the
party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
from any final order or decision of the director.
(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the practice before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or
Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with
exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent
appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.
engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
xxx xxx xxx
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions
and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.
(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and
register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested
interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the
public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and
copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to
(Emphasis supplied). enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise
competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may
up to the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of
whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral
his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical
matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78,
must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in is silent on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express
the case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications of
of the Patent Office. persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to
Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to
which reads as follows: secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to
carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau.
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval
agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the
parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon
persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules
repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We
render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau
competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to
or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. The govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing,
suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision
practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on
incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent
comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of
in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less
applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal
circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures,
exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any
reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of
suspended by the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.
under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by
its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied) In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar
authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said
to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the
and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to
and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or
purposes of comparison: quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the
law, taken to the Supreme Court.
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent
not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office. Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to
an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine
the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008
Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that
they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service
to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form
WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant, counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing,
vs. respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
RESOLUTION engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service.
CORONA, J.:
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:8
located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina
Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2 and SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and
Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of and transactions of any public official ands employee and are hereby
Manila4 where the parties reside. declared to be unlawful:
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to xxx xxx xxx
conciliation meetings.5 When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement,
respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials
and employees during their incumbency shall not:
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and
Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his xxx xxx xxx
appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant
filed the instant administrative complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an act
of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the (2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless
defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
between the litigants as punong barangay. practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to
hear complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a
heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality
towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the
commission of a patent injustice against her. For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from
the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.9 This was adopted and approved
investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh by the IBP Board of Governors.10
out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their
respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP- We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well
CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.7 as the recommendation on the imposable penalty.
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former
presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Government Lawyers
Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented
Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio.
In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of (c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official
Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials
has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
while in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule
6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said elective local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of
service." profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of
RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.13
complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and
Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of barangays are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of
Profession of Elective Local Government Officials the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and
the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities
incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession "unless and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all
public officials and employees. Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 716012 governs: the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are
required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and
attention to the performance of their official duties.
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal
mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
executives. panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may
practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are
That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not: required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week.14 Since the law itself
grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to
local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of
government is the adverse party; these purposes.
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors,
employee of the national or local government is accused of an provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial
offense committed in relation to his office; proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any
proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And
official; and this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact,
the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.16
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the
permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his word delicadeza.
appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court
Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and
Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to guidance.
society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and
importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional SO ORDERED.
Responsibility.
G.R. No. 1203 May 15, 1903
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission,
respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of
service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional law.
Responsibility:
PER CURIAM:
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical
standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility: Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First
Instance, in the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be
suspended as a member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:
First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after MAKALINTAL, J.:
he had been notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading
the law then in force in said city; and, Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on
October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental
Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and Mindoro he was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor
after its organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of
purpose of evading the law. death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed on June 30,
1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua. After
The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the
answer to these charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted
reading testimony given by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States vs. "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
H. D. Terrell,1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and after reading the said affidavits
in his behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court below found, and decided as a fact, On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder
that the charges aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were true, and thereupon case, filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed
made an order suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his
directed the clerk of the court to transmit to this court a certified copy of the order of answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding pardon in
suspension, as well as a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43
Phil. 293.
We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they
were such as to justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from
and acts of the accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime
Club were of such a nature and character as to warrant his suspension from practice. insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral
turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it
violating or evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which
an attorney, an officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of
his office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, right and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd
sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest, 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.
or the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the United respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance
States, vs. Terrell was acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been is placed by him squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted
convicted of crime, and as the acts with which he is charged in this proceeding, while of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent viction,
unprofessional and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we are of this Court decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to strike an attorney's
opinion that the ends of justice will be served by the suspension of said Howard D. name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has
Terrell from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands for the term of one year from been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any
the 7th day of February, 1903. proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted."
It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be suspended from the practice It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it
of law for a term of one year from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered. the Court proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok
was absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the
citations to support it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex.
A.M. No. L-363 July 31, 1962 Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of
GUTIERREZ, respondent. the felony conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding
provided for in article 226. The record, when offered in evidence, was met with
Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint. an unconditional pardon, and could not, therefore, properly be said to afford
Nestor M. Andrada for respondent. "proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been thus cancelled, all its force
as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this would not
be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act of executive A.M. No. P-06-2177 June 27, 2006
grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. (Formerly A.M. No. 06-4-268-RTC)
149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.
RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED ON THE BOOKS OF
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok ACCOUNTS OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO, CLERK OF COURT IV, REGIONAL
case is as follows: TRIAL COURT, ORAS, EASTERN SAMAR .
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt RESOLUTION
of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and
blots out the existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as CORONA, J.:
innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon
conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties This administrative case is a result of the audit conducted by the Office of the Court
and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights it makes him, as it were, Administrator (OCA) of the books of accounts of Atty. Raquel G. Kho, former clerk of
a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar. The audit covered
the period March 1985 to October 31, 2005.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely
remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike The OCA, in its memorandum dated April 18, 2006, had the following findings: (1) there
that in Ex parte Garland, which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense by him was a shortage of P545.00 in remittances to the General Fund; (2) a cash shortage
committed in connection with rebellion (civil war) against government of the United of P24.00 in the Sheriff’s General Fund; and (3) Atty. Kho did not deposit on time in the
States." authorized depository bank the collections for the Fiduciary Fund (P60,000) and
Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (P5,000). It also noted that Atty. Kho had
already restituted the P545.00 and P24.00 cash shortages.
The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent
Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to
the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated Regarding the delayed remittance of the amount of P60,000 representing the amount
by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position of a confiscated cash bond, Kho explained that the Land Bank of the Philippines (the
(respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. authorized depository bank) had no branch in their locality. The nearest Land Bank
People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such branch was approximately 95 kilometers away so it was his practice to keep his
as to justify his being purged from the profession. collections in the court’s safety vault.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain On the other hand, the amount of P5,000 was collected as filing fee for an election
rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar protest. According to Kho, this was collected under Rule 40 of the Commission on
the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure. In defense, he presented a letter addressed
satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither to Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño inquiring where to remit said
dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them amount. The OCA, through Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, responded that
or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. pending official instructions on how to manage the money collected under Rule 40 of
263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly the COMELEC Rules, it was to be treated as trust deposits and temporarily deposited
bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, in the Fiduciary Fund.1 However, Kho failed to do this.
to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very
bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious Consequently, the audit team advised him to deposit the P5,000 in the Special
example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic. Allowance for the Judiciary Fund as provided under Sec. 21 (g) of the amended
Administrative Circular No. 35-2004.2 He was also advised to deposit the
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the confiscated P60,000 cash bond in the Judicial Development Fund account. He
crime for which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered complied with both directives on November 15, 2005.
disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of lawyers.
On January 26, 2006, the OCA received a letter-complaint with the information that
Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., Kho, along with his alleged common-law-wife, stenographer Riza Amor L. Libanan, was
concur. engaged in lending out to court employees money in his possession as clerk of court,
Padilla, J., took no part. personally deriving profit from the interest earned.
The OCA found Kho liable for violating OCA Circular No. 8A-933 dated April 21, 1993 Atty. Kho is further ordered to SHOW CAUSE within the same period why he should
when he kept the funds in a safety vault for more than a year. All clerks of lower courts not be disciplined for such misconduct as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court.
are supposed to deposit all collections from bail bonds, rental deposits and other
fiduciary collections with the Land Bank upon receipt thereof. Thus, it recommended SO ORDERED.
that (1) the audit report be docketed as a regular administrative complaint against Kho
and (2) a fine in the amount of P10,000 be imposed on him.
A.C. No. 4904 August 12, 2004
We agree with the OCA’s recommendations.
ANA A. CHUA and MARCELINA HSIA, complainants,
vs.
trust.4
Public office is a public Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from the ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR., respondent.
justices and judges to the lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility.5 Not only must their conduct at all times be characterized by
propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be beyond suspicion.6
DECISION
A clerk of court, aside from being the custodian of the court’s funds, revenues, property PER CURIAM:
and premises, is also entrusted with the primary responsibility of correctly and
effectively implementing regulations regarding fiduciary funds.7 Safekeeping of funds
and collections is essential to an orderly administration of justice and no protestation of By a verified complaint1 received by the Office of the Bar Confidant on May 5,
good faith can override the mandatory nature of the circulars designed to promote full 1998,2 Ana Alvaran Chua and Marcelina Hsia administratively charged Atty. Simeon M.
accountability for government funds.8 Clerks of court have always been reminded of Mesina, Jr., for breach of professional ethics, gross professional misconduct, and
their duty to immediately deposit the various funds received by them to the authorized culpable malpractice.
government depositories for they are not supposed to keep funds in their custody.9
As related by complainants, the following facts gave rise to the filing of the complaint.
Kho failed to make a timely turn-over of cash deposited with him. This was inexcusable
because he could have purchased postal money orders from the local post office Respondent was, for years, Ana Alvaran Chua and her now deceased husband Chua
payable to the chief accountant, Accounting Division, FMO-OCA. The money could Yap An’s legal counsel and adviser upon whom they reposed trust and confidence.
have earned interest had he not kept them in the vault for over a year.10 As found by They were in fact lessees of a building situated at Burgos Street, Cabanatuan City
the OCA, although Kho had restituted all his cash accountabilities, he was nevertheless (Burgos property) owned by respondent’s family, and another property containing an
liable for failing to immediately deposit the collections for the judiciary funds. area of 854 sq. m., situated at Melencio Street, Cabanatuan City (Melencio property),
also owned by respondent’s family whereon they (spouses Chua) constructed their
The failure to remit the funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and gross house. These two properties were mortgaged by the registered owner, respondent’s
misconduct. It diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary.11 Dishonesty, being in mother Felicisima Melencio vda. de Mesina (Mrs. Mesina), in favor of the Planters
the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service Development Bank to secure a loan she obtained.
even if committed for the first time. However, Kho showed remorse by immediately
restituting the cash shortages and complying with the directives of the audit team. And As Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank, respondent convinced
considering that this is his first offense, we find that the penalty of P10,000 fine is complainant Ana Chua and her husband to help Mrs. Mesina by way of settling her
sufficient. obligation in consideration for which the Melencio property would be sold to them
at P850.00/sq. m.
We note that Kho has already transferred to the Department of Justice. However, it
neither renders this matter moot nor frees him from liability. Accommodating respondent’s request, the spouses Chua and their business partner,
herein co-complainant Marcelina Hsia, settled Mrs. Mesina’s bank obligation in the
Moreover, his misconduct reflects on his fitness as a member of the bar. His amount of P983,125.40.
malfeasance prima facie contravenes Canon 1, 12 Rule 1.0113 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Hence, he should explain why no further disciplinary A Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 19, 19853 conveying the Melencio property
sanction should be imposed on him. for P85,400.00 was thereafter executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name appears therein
as "Felicisima M. Melencio," in favor of complainants.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Raquel G. Kho is hereby found GUILTY of gross misconduct for
his failure to make timely remittance of judiciary funds in his custody. He is ordered to As complainants were later apprised of the amount of capital gains tax they were to
pay a FINE of P10,000 within ten (10) days from receipt of this resolution. pay, they consulted respondent about it. Respondent thus suggested to them that
another Deed of Absolute Sale should be executed, antedated to 1979 before the property in complainants’ favor. In fact, respondent gave complainants a written
effectivity of the law mandating the payment of capital gains tax. As suggested by undertaking8 dated May 2, 1990 reading:
respondent, another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated February 9, 19794 was executed
by Mrs. Mesina, whose name again appears therein as "Felicisima M. Melencio," in Received the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 4383 issued by the Register
favor of complainants wherein the purchase price was also indicated to be P85,400.00. of Deeds, Cabanatuan City registered in the name of Felicisima Mesina,
widow, consisting of about 854 square meters more or less located at calle
After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses "in the redemption of the Melencio, Cabanatuan City from Mrs. Ana Chua and Marcelina Hsia.
MESINA properties," Mrs. Mesina was found to have "an existing balance" due the
spouses in the amount of P400,000.00, on account of which they advised respondent I promise to and undertake to have the Deed of Sale of the above-mentioned
about it. Respondent, by Affidavit of February 18, 1986, "acknowledged such property in favor of Ana Chua and Marcelina Hsia to be signed by
obligation" to be his and undertook to settle it within two years. Mrs. Felicisima Mesina, within four (4) months from date hereof so that the
above-mentioned property and title maybe transferred in the name of Ana
Complainants were subsequently issued on January 21, 1986 a title over the Melencio Chua and Macelina Hsia. (Underscoring supplied)
property.
In the meantime, Mrs. Mesina died "in the early part of 1991."
Not long after the execution of the February 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale or in
February 1986, one Juanito Tecson (Tecson) filed an Affidavit5 dated February 20, Despite respondent’s repeated promises "to effect" the transfer of title in complainants’
1986 before the Cabanatuan City Prosecutor’s Office charging respondent’s mother, name, he failed to do so. Complainants were later informed that the Melencio property
the spouses Chua, Marcelina Hsia and the two witnesses to the said Deed of Absolute was being offered for sale to the public.
Sale, for Falsification of Public Document and violation of the Internal Revenue Code.
In his complaint affidavit, Tecson alleged that he was also a lessee of the Melencio
property and was, along with the Chua spouses, supposed to purchase it but that The spouses Chua and complainant Marcelina Hsia thus filed on August 24, 1992 a
contrary to their agreement, the property was sold only to complainant and her co- Complaint9 against respondent and his two siblings before the Regional Trial Court
complainant, to his exclusion. Tecson went on to relate that the February 9, 1979 Deed (RTC) of Nueva Ecija in Cabanatuan City, for "Declaration of Nullity of Sale and
of Absolute Sale did not reflect the true value of the Melencio property and was Reconveyance of Real Property."
antedated "to evade payment of capital gains tax."
As of the time of the filing of the present administrative complaint in 1998, the civil case
Tecson submitted documents showing that indeed the July 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute against the Mesina siblings was still pending.
Sale was antedated.
This Court, by Resolution of July 13, 1998, 10 directed respondent to file Comment on
Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the falsification charge against Mrs. the complaint within ten days.
Mesina et al. He proposed to complainants that they would simulate a deed of sale of
the Melencio property wherein complainants would resell it to Mrs. Mesina. By Resolution of December 2, 1998,11 this Court, noting that the copy of the Resolution
of July 13, 1998 requiring respondent to comment on the complaint sent to him at his
Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainants executed a Deed of Absolute Sale office address at S. M. Mesina Law Office, 30 Jupiter St., Paseo de Roxas, Bel-Air
dated April 1, 19866 conveying to "Felicisima M. Melencio" the Melencio property Subd., Makati City was returned unserved with the notation "Moved," considered the
for P85,400.00. Resolution of July 13, 1998 served on respondent by substituted service pursuant to
Rule 13, Section 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent was accordingly
deemed to have waived the filing of the required comment.
A new title was accordingly issued on April 4, 1986 in the name of "Felicisima M.
Melencio," the owner’s copy of which was entrusted to complainants.
By the same Resolution of December 2, 1998, the case was referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety
Tecson subsequently filed before the Cabanatuan City Prosecutor’s Office an Affidavit days.
of Desistance dated September 5, 19867 alleging that his filing of the criminal complaint
"arose out of mere misunderstanding and difference" with herein complainants and their
co-respondents and he had no sufficient evidence against them. The IBP, acting on the complaint, issued a notice of hearing on September 14,
2001,12 copy of which was sent to respondent at his office address via registered mail,
covered by Registry Receipt No. 2605 of the Meralco Post Office.13 On the scheduled
Some years later or on May 2, 1990, respondent approached complainants and told date of hearing, complainants personally appeared with their counsel. Respondent
them that he would borrow the owner’s copy of Mrs. Mesina’s title with the undertaking failed to show up.
that he would, in four months, let Mrs. Mesina execute a deed of sale over the Melencio
Given the length of time that the case remained pending from its filing, the IBP at his office address by registered mail covered by Registry Receipt No. 2953 issued
Commission on Bar Discipline, by Order of October 12, 2001,14 directed complainants by the Meralco Post Office.27
to just file their position paper with affidavits and supporting documents in lieu of actual
presentation of witnesses and to serve a copy thereof to respondent at his last known On the scheduled hearing on January 15, 2003, the IBP Investigating Commissioner,
address. by Order of even date,28 noted the presence of complainants, and the absence of
respondent, copy of the notice of hearing to whom was returned unserved with the
In compliance with the IBP Order, complainants filed on April 1, 2002 their position notation "RTS-Moved." The case was thereupon deemed submitted for report and
paper,15 annexed to which were photocopies of: 1) a May 5, 1993 Certification16 issued recommendation.
by the Metrobank Cabanatuan Branch certifying that "it issued the demand drafts to the
payees enumerated below, which were debited from the account of Mr. Chua Yap An On June 21, 2003, the IBP passed Resolution No. XV-2003-34229 adopting and
under Savings Account No. 760: approving the report and recommendation of Atty. Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, the
Investigating Commissioner of the case.
and recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of One (1) Year.
2) Affidavit dated February 18, 198617 of respondent acknowledging a debt
of P400,000.00 to complainant Ana Alvaran Chua and promising to pay interest thereon This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
within 2 years to commence upon the signing thereof [February 16, 1998] and, in the
event no partial or full payment of the principal is made within 2 years, Ana Alvaran
Chua "is under no obligation to pay any lease rentals over the lot situated in Burgos First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to
Avenue, Cabanatuan City where the Oceanic Hardware Bldg. is erected;" 3) Deed of 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect
Absolute Sale dated January 19, 1985 18 and 4) Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 9, for law and legal processes, 31 and not to abet activities aimed at defiance of the
1979,19 both executed by "Felicisima M. Melencio" in favor of complainant; 5) TCT No. law;32 That respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a private party but the
T-4811420 issued by the Cabanatuan City in the name of complainants on January 21, government is aggravating.33
1986; 6) Affidavit of Juanito C. Tecson21 dated January 20, 1986 charging complainants
et al. for Falsification of Public Documents; 7) Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 1, Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a
1986 executed by complainants in favor of Mrs. Mesina;22 and 8) TCT No. T- simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants
48383issued on April 4, 1986 in the name of "Felicisima M. Melencio;"23 and 9) reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committed dishonesty.34
Complaint of spouses Chua Yap An and Ana Alvaran Chua and Marcelina Hsia, for
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of Real Property against Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua spouses,
respondent and his two siblings.24 into turning over to him the owner’s copy of his mother’s title upon the misrepresentation
that he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his mother in favor of
A copy of complainant’s position paper was sent on March 18, 2002 to respondent at complainants, he likewise committed dishonesty.
his office address by registered mail covered by Registry Receipt No. 5278.25 There is
no showing if respondent received this mail matter. That the signature of "Felicisima M. Melencio" in the 1985 document35 and that in the
1979 document36 are markedly different is in fact is a badge of falsification of either the
The IBP once more scheduled, by notice of December 13, 2002,26 a hearing of the 1979 or the 1985 document or even both.
administrative case to January 15, 2003, copy of which notice was sent to respondent
A propos is this Court’s following pronouncement in Nakpil v. Valdez37 CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT
AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business REPOSED IN HIM.
transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The
measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR. is, for gross misconduct,
with his client is a much higher standard that is required in business dealings hereby DISBARRED.
where the parties trade at "arms length." Business transactions between an
attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for,
by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of
the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence SO ORDERED.
or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney’s
favor.38 (Underscoring supplied) A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989
Respondent having welched on his promise to cause the reconveyance of the Melencio IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE
property to complainants, consideration of whether he should be ordered to honor such INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
promise should be taken up in the civil case filed for the purpose, the issue there being
one of ownership while that in the case at bar is moral fitness.39
In fine, respondent violated his oath of office and, more specifically, the following PER CURIAM:
canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL Center (or PICC), the following were elected by the House of Delegates (composed of
PROCESSES. 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed as officers:
Rule 1.02. - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of Atty. Violeta Drilon President
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Atty. Bella Tiro Executive Vice-President
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Delegates
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo Secretary, House of
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave Delegates
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
for Central Luzon
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard,
Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The
for Metro Manila Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya,
June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The
Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon Governor & Vice-President Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the
for Southern Luzon Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and
pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal
Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly
for Bicolandia "poured heart, soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."
Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a
for Eastern Visayas disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung
IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations, and she had the
added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of the Department of
Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by her husband,
for Western Visayas the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged that there was
rampant vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary
Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President Drilon's fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz,
for Eastern Mindanao Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government
positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary.
Atty. Simeon Datumanong Governor & Vice-President
for Western Mindanao Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned
"talk of personnel of the Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers,
notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the
The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined
before the Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports and dined continuously, womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price of
received by some members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of
participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns the election, some twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial, appreciated to
of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the P50,000."
candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the association,
namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary
use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with
influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a room of the PICC (the
prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of Philippine International Convention Center where the convention/election were held)
supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP during a recess x x x."
officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the some embellishments.
canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec,"
headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged
by the participants and observers to be above board. For Justice Puno took it upon II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15,
1989, directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors,
the principal officers and Chairman of the House of Delegates to appear before it on The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado
Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and there to inform the Court on the were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of information relative to
veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the the IBP elections. Their stories were based, they said, on letters, phone calls and
Court, appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening personal interviews with persons who claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but
adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP. whom they, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to identify.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its organization and assessing evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and
commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court, after deliberating thereon,
that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.
Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national,
or regional, or chapter. The fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and
ability to serve."
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in
connection with the election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House
of Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on reports carried by media and "SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is strictly non-
transmitted as well by word of mouth, that there was extensive and intensive political, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is
campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of considerable strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer
sums of money by candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect." holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in
the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L. in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor,
Reyes, attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee
advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on the one hand, and the outgoing of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
and in coming IBP officers on the other, was an informal one. Thereafter, the Court his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for
resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited acts and any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial,
activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any
elections of IBP's national officers. political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. "'
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts
Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio relative to IBP elections:
A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, as members, to
conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the
committee's Recording Secretary. SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. — The
following acts and practices relative to election are prohibited,
whether committed by a candidate for any elective office in the
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any
issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of form or manner, by himself or through another person:
three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the
three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective
headquarters and where they billeted their supporters were summoned. The officer of (a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign
the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the material;
Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate
used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of (b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other
delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that than a statement of the biodata of a candidate on not more than
some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the one page of a legal-size sheet of paper; or causing distribution of
Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized
reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. by the officer presiding at the elections;
Drilon.
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies of his nomination
elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the forms which read:
Government or any political subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof; "Nomination Form
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules: Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of — himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday
Vice-President; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Inn, which served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff
Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three suites were to be occupied by
Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid
(Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western P150,000 for the hotel bills of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost
Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce). P990 per day with breakfast.
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C. Perez,
Vice President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Tolomeo Ligutan Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar,
Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe Juanita Subia,
Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, (e) Danny Deen 20,000
Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente
Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, (f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office) 10,000
Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero
Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, (g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000
Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro,
Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas,
Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, (h) Cosme Rossel 15,300
Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her delegates
at the Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she
occupied was registered. But she did ask for a room where she could rest during the
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza convention. She admitted, however, that she paid for her hotel room and meals to
Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989).
which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and
conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed with the Philippine Plaza
was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty. Callanta." The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at
the Philippine Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon,
Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong, Callanta, Pena, Tiu,
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao Caingat, Manuel Yuson,
Mariano Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon
suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He gave her the name of Atty. Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil
Callanta who would make the arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be Batula Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil
the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Palma, Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad
Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza, Felix
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.
beverages consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30.
Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior partner,
Callanta still has an outstanding account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza. gave P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of
his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention. Most of the members of his law firm are
Plaza. He made a downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho
following persons contributed for that down payment: Fraternity). He admitted being sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the
members of her slate, two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong — are
Sigma Rhoans. They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being
(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office) P 25,000 a sigma rhoan.
(b) Antonio Carpio 20,000 Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members of his
own firm who attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He made the
(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office) 10,000 reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp.
30-34).
(d) Jay Castro 10,000
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by soliciting Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill
the votes of delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former teacher (but the latter of P23,110 during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls
was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a classmate of his in the (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from his room.
U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22, 29, 39).
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon,
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE. Gladys Tiongco (candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong
(candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms served as the "action
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract with the center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were discussed before and during
Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a the convention. It was in these rooms where the supporters of the Drilon group, like
downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot
P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45. their moves.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales (7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
department manager, credit manager, and reservation manager, respectively of the
Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates
pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo). paying the IBP dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or support them, but she has
no way of ascertaining whether it was a candidate who paid the delinquent dues of
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those who another, because the receipts are issued in the name of the member for whom
committed themselves to his candidacy. payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B. Batula, John She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May
E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, during any election year. This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of
Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, last year (a non-election year from Pl,413,425 to Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p.
Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, 25).
R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop
Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, (8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal
Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada. size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be
distributed his bio-data and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed their tickets and bio-data.
holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government'
(Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were
Department of Labor and Employment, testified that he took a leave of absence from printed by his own printing shop.
his office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the
Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did (9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those
so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).
significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of
Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there is that the husband is my brother in
the Sigma Rho." Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the
convention floor. Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign materials
distributed at the convention site this year than in previous years. The election was
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her immediate more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).
circle which included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon,
Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress of the campaign, and
measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other groups The group had sessions Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a
as early as the later part of May. candidate for chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that
campaign materials were distributed during the convention by girls and by lawyers.
He saw members of the ACCRA law firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July
3,1989, pp. 142-145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of the Department
candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws). of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets
and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-104). But he
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to declined the offer because he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.
withdraw his candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-
chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 137, 149). Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a
businessman, Henry Dy, approached him to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo.
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and But Llosa told Dy that he was already committed to Nisce.
president of the Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May
1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department of Labor & Employment at the Green He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two
Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty. Drilon, together with two labor companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for
officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room
would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
chapter presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern
Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had
earlier committed his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of
judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay). When Nisce confronted campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the
Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that there was such an offer. chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a
Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP candidate who also withdrew. voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol
nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989,
candidate for Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. pp. 9-14).
104).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court the expenses for his campaign which began several months before the June 3rd
Administrator Tiro went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some delegates.
candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP chapters informed him that
labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp,
mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June showed that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid
29,1989,p.111) P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's
supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention's end.
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the Western
Visayas, expressed his disappointment over the IBP elections because some FINDINGS.
delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He testified that when he arrived at
the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an assistant regional director of the DOLE From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates
who offered to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory
legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a
room had been reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of
102-106). the By-Laws.
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon,
three candidates had their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The
Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He knew about this Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the
because a week before the elections, representatives of Atty. Drilon went to island hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-
Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law member House of Delegates that elects the national officers and regional governors;
the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the
positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this
of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely
delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as
of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which
of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter presidents seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a
in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data of the noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:
candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to
P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to 1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.
distribute their campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election;
the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group;
the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the 2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates
Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the
to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for their following national officers:
support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from
one ticket to another for some rumored consideration; all these practices made a (a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole election process.
(b) the IBP president; and
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-
Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all (c) the executive vice-president,
lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the
laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from
'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of
(Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law,
engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP 3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President
formulated for their observance. elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP
regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-
association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was
lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should
the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem. be as it is hereby restored.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and 4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall
outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors
the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of
committee was created. The subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who
has revealed that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a
have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital information succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9)
from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign. regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the
Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice-President to
seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional
to participate in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The
judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their respective
interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board
inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To
of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of 12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP
the Board. regions within three (3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this
case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows: Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves the IBP national president
and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the candidates in the election
of the national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those
the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon
Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any
be appointed by the President with the consent of the House of position.
Delegates.'
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here
Secretary-Treasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such further and other
repealed measures as are warranted in the premises.
Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar of the G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of
nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in
Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
(1) Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the vs.
House of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY,
should be rotated among the different Chapters in the region. and JON DE YSASI, respondents.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows: F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.
(1) month before the national convention the delegates from each
region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which
shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the
region. REGALADO, J.:
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case,
part of the first paragraph: notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would
indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and
membership shall be held prior to any election in an election year. with the grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial
intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they distaste, the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same
are hereby deleted. reasoned detachment accorded any judicial proceeding before it.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein
banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith private respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros
are hereby repealed or modified. Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as
sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager
of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on
a fixed salary, with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, character of the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent,
gasoline, medical and dental expenses. that is, whether the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not
there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities
and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a
fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and
the hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84,6 for which
respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In
house there. compliance with the Court's resolution of November 16, 1992,7 NLRC filed its
comment on February 12, 1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter.8
wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized
on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter
underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. is worth noting:
During his recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr.
Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact
for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984. that because of the special relationship of the parties and the
nature of the action involved, this case could very well go down (in)
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. For
medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in this case is an action filed by an only son, his father's namesake,
April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. the only child and therefore the only heir against his own father. 9
Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden
withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
and legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however,
were not acted upon.
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations
were noted that may justify why this labor case deserves special
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, considerations. First, most of the complaints that petitioner and
for brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, private respondent had with each other, were personal matters
docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal affecting father and son relationship. And secondly, if any of the
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of complaints pertain to their work, they allow their personal
full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary relationship to come in the way.10
damages, as well as attorney's fees.
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the of just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He
NLRC,1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his also charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of
employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings
the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination thereof.
of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of
the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto.3 his functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground
to terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is
wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and
His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been denied for lack of the NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court.
merit,5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults
whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of
to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; stenographic notes, erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be
and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and Section 16[c] and [d],
attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of
necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such page references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
as the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay.16 On the other hand, it
technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be is well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the employer
controlling, and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively to effect the former's dismissal from employment.17
ascertain the facts in each case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities of
law or procedure in the interest of due process. After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent
gravely erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be petitioner abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such
rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who employment. For want of substantial bases, in fact or
conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to
who penned the decision does not impair the validity of the judgment,11 provided that the factual findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent
he draws up his decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that they NLRC,18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by
truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19
of and evidence submitted in the case.12
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. acceptance:
Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11,
1985, and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from
eventually decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering October 1982 to December 1982, cannot be construed as
that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse.
functions,13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted. Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal
around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn,
application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must
be interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by
private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his medical bills sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan,
arguments. The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to
worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters of the
after due process.14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not really obliged
an employer may validly terminate an employment, to wit: to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual
neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of xxx xxx xxx
the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d)
commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special
or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) circumstances involved and basic human experience, petitioner's
other causes analogous to the foregoing. illness and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II
may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to
of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or December 1982. In any event, such absence does not warrant
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a
written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least xxx xxx xxx
one (1) month before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the
corresponding separation pay rates provided by law.15 Suffering from a disease by The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an
reason whereof the continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is employee are as follows:
prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his
(1) failure to report for work or absence without to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of his work. What
valid or justifiable reason; and (2) clear intention is essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and,
to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he
Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and Social proved to be quite successful, as there was at least a showing of increased
Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133). production during the time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations.
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years
abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 1983 to 1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating
328), the Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must be a from illness and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm
concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act from operations were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable
which it may be inferred that the employee has no more interest to by private respondent as employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying that
work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, the control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm
Inc. v. NLRC (184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a valid administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.
cause for termination of employment, there must be a deliberate,
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. . . While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm
Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no
acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin
not want to work anymore. with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any
transfer of residence would justify the termination of his employment. That petitioner
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no changed his residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably among
abandonment. First, petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to
his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness terminate an employer-employee relationship.
and strained family relations. Second he has some medical
certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to work, Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his
petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of son's intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept
his intention to assume again his employment. Last, but not the petitioner on the payroll, reported him as an employee of the hacienda for social
least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he security purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions
realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he
petitioner had no intention to abandon his employment.20 became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered
the latter to have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's employee. According to private respondent, whatever amount of money was given to
confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical petitioner from that time until
treatment. Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware of April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles
petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical from a father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were
and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to made therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped
work again. The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner
serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is had been saying about sending him to jail.
beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said illnesses, the details of
which were amply substantiated by the attending physician,21 and as the records are Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral
bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was justifiable deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los
cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of
unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives
constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment.22 on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon
accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel position that the
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm
may be classified as a managerial employee23 to whom the law grants an amount of legally converts the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation.25
discretion in the discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I
assigned myself where I want to go,"24 he was simply being candid about what he As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew
could do within the sphere of his authority. His duties as farm administrator did not about petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The
strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times, or assertion regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his
continued performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from It is also significant that the special power of attorney32 executed
May to the last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating —
and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued
since April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and xxx xxx xxx
capability to resume his work at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September
14, 1984.26 With these, petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly
pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance, with or That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident
without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as farm of Hda. Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL,
administrator.27 am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a duly
accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA
PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may
justly be made there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with
to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more BIPA representing payment for all checks and papers to which I am
determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find entitled to (sic) as such planter-member;
dismally wanting in this case.
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and
plans of returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982, lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
prolonged though it may have been, was not without valid causes of which private
respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that JON de YSASI III
petitioner was no longer returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor
substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion. whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME
and in my name, place and stead, my check/checks
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the
even after January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" power and authority to sign for me and in my name, place and
that petitioner would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks.
services directly required by his position as farm administrator. These are duly and PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn the same over to me
machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for for my proper disposition.
additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod
through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the additional cash advances for That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities, Inc.,30 and remitting to Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the
private respondent through receipts therefor.
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil.31
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged xxx xxx xxx
abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the
father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a
determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums received monthly report to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the
by petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration for services rendered place of work at all dismissals effected by him during the month,
emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers, the reasons
can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We for their dismissal, the dates of commencement and termination of
are also hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted into a employment, the positions last held by them and such other
voluntary resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a information as may be required by the Ministry for policy guidance
desire to terminate his employment. The very concept of resignation as a ground for and statistical purposes.
termination by the employee of his employment38 does not square with the elements
constitutive of abandonment.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that
petitioner was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private about his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be
respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice heard. Even as private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin
and hearing.39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, requirements of procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect admits that
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the certification
where the employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the
grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of petitioner was
obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any submitted thereto.41
ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment.40
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed,
out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this as the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly
wise: requires service thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of substantial
compliance. While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss employee, especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements of due
a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise
or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of
of such a power or prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the implementing rules, and not the
guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the employee.42 failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of
General rejoins as follows: every worker to security of tenure.44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory
mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its
The Labor Arbiter held thus: denial:
While we are in full agreement with the Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the
respondent as to his defense of implied employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for
resignation and/or abandonment, records a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
somehow showed that he failed to notify the unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
Department of without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
Labor and Employment for his sons' backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of
(sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
required by BP 130. And for this failure, the other compensation was withheld from him up to the time of actual
requisite for a valid termination by an employer reinstatement.
was not complied with. This however, would not
work to invalidate the otherwise (sic) existence of Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the
a valid cause for dismissal. The validity of the absence of just cause for dismissal.45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions
cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times has tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing
provided however that sanctions must be that in some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the
imposed on the respondent for his failure to practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares that where there
observe the notice on due process requirement. are strained relations between the employer and the employee, payment of back
(Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587). wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement,46 and more
(Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" particularly when managerial employees are concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement
Petition), . . . is no longer possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given
his fair and just share of what the law accords him.48
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation
v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to
once an employee is dismissed for just cause, he must not be wit:
rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
observe procedural due process. The public policy behind this is shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
that, it may encourage the employee to do even worse and render a to his backwages computed from the time his compensation was
mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed. withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC,
However, the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. vs. NLRC,
process. In the present case, however, not only was petitioner 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held that when it comes to
dismissed without due process, but his dismissal is without just reinstatement, differences should be made between managers and
cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he has the ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that a company
a justifiable excuse.43 which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a
competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC should know the
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory difference between managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot
provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed imprudently order the reinstatement of managers with the same
employee to reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of ease and liberality as that of rank and file workers who had been
the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not be appropriate or
requirements. Private respondent, for his part, maintains that there was error in feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism between the parties
imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office, as required
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be three years from date of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement,
reinstated as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1)
relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction of six months
a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer relationship is being considered as one (1) year in accordance with recent
hardly possible.49 jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for
damages should be dismissed, for both parties are equally at
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal fault.54
from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or
was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for exemplary The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records,
damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded
employers. that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts
one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration
feelings, and social humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again,
or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof.50 Exemplary we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to
damages, under Article 2229, are imposed by way of example or correction for the avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of
They are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court to decide life. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather
whether or not they should be adjudicated.51 than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.56
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a)
recovery of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit
bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy,52 and of exemplary damages if the was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The
dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.53 We do not records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a
feel, however, that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted
proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have
aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary damages were found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.
awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and were
undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power. In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case
has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute
faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this within his jurisdiction."57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the
controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of
claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the same.
the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted
in good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other. One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged
For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be to make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family
awarded to petitioner. leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful
and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
recommendation of the Solicitor General: jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may have
failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to
this dispute, and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be to the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the
modified. There was no voluntary abandonment in this case parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore,
because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence, or such that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights in
absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and this decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution
hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal dismissal. of their differences on more convivial terms.
He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is Finally, on December 5, 1968, this Court ordered Adriano to show cause within ten
hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages days from notice thereof why he should not be suspended from the practice of law "for
for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction,58 and, in gross misconduct and violation of his oath of office as attorney." By express order of
lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of this Court, the resolution was personally served upon him on December 18, 1968. He
service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year. ignored the resolution.
G.R. No. L-26868 February 27, 1969 1. By specific authority, this Court may assign an attorney to render professional aid to
a destitute appellant in a criminal case who is unable to employ an attorney.
IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY LOPE E. ADRIANO Member of the Philippine Correspondingly, a duty is imposed upon the lawyer so assigned "to render the required
Bar. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, service." 2 A lawyer so appointed "as counsel for an indigent prisoner", our Canons of
vs. Professional Ethics demand, "should always exert his best efforts" in the indigent's
REMIGIO ESTEBIA, accused-appellant. behalf. 3
SANCHEZ, J.: No excuse at all has been offered for non-presentation of appellant's brief. And yet,
between December 20, 1966, when he received notice of his appointment, and
December 5, 1968, when the last show cause order was issued by this Court, more
Once again, this Court is confronted with the unwanted task of ascertaining whether than sufficient time was afforded counsel to prepare and file his brief de oficio. The
certain acts and conduct of a member of the Bar deserve disciplinary action. death sentence below imposed was upon a plea of guilty. The record of the proceedings
leading to the lower court's sentence consists of but 31 pages. Counsel had the record
The problem arose because of facts that follow: since January 19, 1967. In fact, in his third motion for extension of time, he manifested
that the drafting of apellant's brief "is more than half-way through" and that "additional
One Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court of First Instance of time is needed to review, effectuate the necessary corrections, put in final form and
Samar, 1 and sentenced to suffer the capital punishment. His case came up before this print the said brief." In his motion for fourth extension, he intimated that the preparation
Court on review. of the brief "is almost through" and that "additional time is needed to redraft and rehash
some significant portions of said brief and have the same stencilled and mimeographed
upon completion of a definitive text." His motion for last (fifth) extension of time came
On December 14, 1966, Lope E. Adriano, a member of the Bar, was appointed by this with the excuse that he "suddenly got sick (influenza) in the course of redrafting and
Court as Estebia's counsel de oficio. In the notice of his appointment, Adriano was rehashing some significant portions of said brief, which ailment hampered and
required to prepare and file his brief within thirty days from notice. He was advised that interrupted his work thereon for sometime." Finally, in his "Special Extension of Time"
to enable him to examine the case, the record would be at his disposal. Adriano to file brief, he claimed that he needed only five days from April 21, 1967 to put said
received this notice on December 20, 1966. On January 19, 1967, Adriano sought for brief in final form and have the same stencilled and mimeographed.lawphi1.nêt
a 30-day extension to file appellant's brief in mimeographed form. On February 18,
Adriano again moved for a 20-day extension (his second). This was followed by a third
filed on March 8, for fifteen days. And a fourth on March 27, also for fifteen days. He In the face of the fact that no brief has ever been filed, counsel's statements in his
moved for a "last" extension of ten days on April 11. On April 21, he even sought a motions for extension have gone down to the level of empty and meaningless words;
special extension of five days. All these motions for extension were granted. The brief at best, have dubious claim to veracity.
was due on April 26, 1967. But no brief was filed.
It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de
On September 25, 1967, Adriano was ordered to show cause within ten days from oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant
notice thereof why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for failure to file himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and
appellant's brief despite the lapse of the time therefor. Adriano did not bother to give professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. His is to render effective
any explanation. assistance. The accused defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory
representation. We do not accept the paradox that responsibility is less where the
defended party is poor. It has been said that courts should "have no hesitancy in
For failing to comply with the September 25, 1967 resolution, this Court, on October 3, demanding high standards of duty of attorneys appointed to defend indigent persons
1968, resolved to impose upon him a fine of P500 payable to this Court within fifteen charged with crime." 4 For, indeed, a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice
days from notice with a warning that upon further non-compliance with the said is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self interest.
resolution of September 25, 1967 within the same period of fifteen days, "more drastic Because of this, a lawyer should remain ever conscious of his duties to the indigent he
disciplinary action will be taken against him." Still, counsel paid no heed. defends.
Worth remembering is the 1905 case of In the matter of Jose Robles Lahesa. 5 He was Controlling here is the 1961 decision In the Matter of Atty. Filoteo Dianala Jo. 10 There,
counsel de oficio before the Supreme Court in two cases: one for robo en cuadrilla and as here, counsel failed to file appellant's brief (in a criminal case) despite extensions of
the other for homicide. He failed to take any action in behalf of the defendants in both time granted him by this Court. Likewise, this Court issued a show-cause order why
eases. This Court imposed upon him a fine of P200. Significant is the pronouncement disciplinary action should not be taken against him. The explanation was considered
we there made that: "This court should exact from its officers and subordinates the most unsatisfactory. This Court imposed a fine of P50 payable in ten days from notice.
scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the Attorney Dianala Jo did not pay that fine. Came the subsequent resolution of this Court
performance of those duties necessarily result in delays in the prosecution of criminal advising him to pay the fine, otherwise, he would be arrested and confined to jam. This
cases and the detention of accused persons pending appeal." The validity of the warning was not heeded. On November 18, 1960, the Court resolved to give him ten
foregoing observation remains to the present day. 6 It applies to the present case. days from notice within which to explain why he should not be suspended from the
practice of law. Despite receipt of this notice, he did not care to explain his behaviour
Here, appellant was without brief since December 20, 1966. The effect of this long delay which this Court considered as "consumacy and unwillingness to comply with the lawful
need not be essayed. We, therefore, find that Attorney Lope E. Adriano has violated orders of this Court of which he is an officer or to conduct himself as a lawyer should,
his oath that he will conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his "knowledge in violation of his oath of office." He was suspended from the practice of law for three
and discretion". months.
2. An attorney's duty of prime importance is "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due In the present case, counsel's pattern of conduct, it would seem to us, reveals a
to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The first Canon of the Code of Ethics enjoins propensity on the part of counsel to benumb appreciation of his obligation as counsel
a lawyer "to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the de oficio and of the courtesy and respect that should be accorded this Court.
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance." By the oath of office, the lawyer undertook to "obey the laws as well as For the reasons given, we vote to suspend Attorney Lope E. Adriano from the practice
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities." In People vs. Carillo, 8 this Court's of law throughout the Philippines for a period of one (1) year.
pointed observation was that as an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's "sworn and moral
duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record, in this Court, of Lope
the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice." E. Adriano as member of the Bar. So ordered.
Here, we have a clear case of an attorney whose acts exhibit willful dis-obedience of G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974
lawful orders of this Court. A cause sufficient is thus present for suspension or
disbarment. 9 Counsel has received no less than three resolutions of this Court requiring
compliance of its orders. To be recalled is that on September 25, 1967, this Court ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,
directed him, in ten days from notice, to show cause why disciplinary action should not vs.
be taken against him for his failure to file appellant's brief despite the lapse of the time HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
therefor. Nothing was done by counsel for over a year. To impress upon counsel the Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.
gravity of his repeated failure to obey this Court's orders, on October 3,1968, a fine of
P500 was clamped upon him. He was directed to pay that fine in ten days. He was in Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.
that order also required to file his brief in fifteen days. He was warned that more drastic
disciplinary action would be taken upon his failure to do either. Still he remained Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.
unmoved. Then, this Court issued the peremptory order of December 5, 1968
commanding him to show cause within ten days from notice thereof why he should not
be suspended from the practice of law for gross misconduct and violation of his oath of FERNANDO, J.:p
office. The Court made it certain that this order would reach him. He personally
acknowledged receipt thereof. He has not paid the fine. He has done nothing. What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying
a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.1 One of the
This is 1969. No brief has as yet been filed. And this, inspite of the fact that as early as grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election
March 27, 1967, when he moved for a fourth extension of time to file his brief de oficio, Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time
he represented to this Court that all that was needed was to redraft and to rehash some to the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea,
significant portions of the brief which was almost through and to have the same notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being]
stencilled and mimeographed upon completion of a definitive text. to delay this case."2 It was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and
that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category
being precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It
Disrespect is here present. Contumacy is as patent. Disciplinary action is in order. cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel
could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
There is, however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that 2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his
must be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is
balance. This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance a privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the
of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For
Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of
is likely to be very much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is
to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is
should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit. understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so
designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban:7 "There is
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate
Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting
and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are
of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the
withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an
appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that
3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his
premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters
well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. That
handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly
November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent
futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.3 upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled."8
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail. So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa,9 where respondent
was de oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court
should exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of
1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to their official duties, especially when negligence in the performance of those duties
withdraw as counsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases ...."10 Justice Sanchez
was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in in People v. Estebia11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a
the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high
order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in
to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf
accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-
Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For,
witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger
motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest."12
Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial
would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status
of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963,
October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the
1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964."4 Reference was then made to another apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to
order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel
indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 9, could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief
1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its instance, this case has Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can be no
been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have to fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The
come all the way from Manapala."5 After which, it was noted in such order that there right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of
and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted
and that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case."6 And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for
this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has
become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it
is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face
not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no
the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I
him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
own."13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts.14 The present Constitution is even
more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the
be heard by himself and counsel,"15 there is this new provision: "Any person under speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment
to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.
any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."16
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through
counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary
an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member
to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to
for the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future
responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be
be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending out public
demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would
above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would
counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced
remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for
those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of the position of Chief Justice.
them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-
interest.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI,
Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner. Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur. shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate
in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Explaining the import of the
Barredo, J., took no part. underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009 Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant, discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary
vs. that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent. resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense."1
DECISION
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long
VELASCO, JR., J.: experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of
the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators
Pobre invites the Court’s attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor- are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not
Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor: for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value
if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon
a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. judge’s speculation as to the motives.2
I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of
institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.7 Senator
Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements
Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of would make on the people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and
its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting
in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in
Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more:
uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.3 The disciplinary
authority of the assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or
correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.5 x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing
up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am
for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots
however, that this could not be the last word on the matter. x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were
member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of
To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official
professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used
intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its
that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that
cohorts in the Supreme Court," and calling the Court a "Supreme Court of idiots." parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members
of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her attention to the ensuing benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.
passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities.
believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law
into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.1avvphi1 Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable to what she
considered as an "unjust act" the JBC had taken in connection with her application for
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Court’s supervision,
allowed to erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBC’s ex-
violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, officio chairperson,8 have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the
which respectively provide: position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiago’s
wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language critical and defamatory words against all of them.
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of
Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:
the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for
themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited xxxx
authority on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks,
and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the
and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and
and procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the
the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other Rules of Court speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not confined to
things: one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers’ professional
duties, but also covers any misconduct, which––albeit unrelated to the actual practice
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own of their profession––would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to privileges which their license and the law invest in them.16
maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people’s faith in courts and trust in
xxxx the rule of law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for
malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration
of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9 and women who compose them. We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente
Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty.
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,10 we reiterated our Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang17 who repeatedly insulted and threatened the
pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer11 that the duty of attorneys to the Court in a most insolent manner.
courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the
judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty.
Philippines: Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her
part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from
of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and
lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is
attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity x imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts
x x to the courts." of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-
accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s
v. Cloribel12 that: representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made
responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.18 It is
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and
intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its
to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." members.
Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial
edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and
liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, "offensive or
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that improper language against another Senator or against any public institution."19 But
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not
justice."13 apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics
Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a circumstance.20 The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is
strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on
dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may her.
not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the
discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre’s motives in filing his complaint, stating that
oath as a lawyer.14 disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot
agree with her more. We cannot overstress that the senator’s use of intemperate
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation of
as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,15 a good the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.21
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact Complainant alleged that it was during this dinner when respondents
made the statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has were first introduced to him, his wife Jenny, his brother Glenn, and
not categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making the latter’s mother-in-law Mrs. Ban Ha; that respondent Go claimed
them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the that he is a very powerful "high ranking" commissioner at the NLRC;
Court. that respondents were personally overseeing the developments of
the labor case although it was pending before another division; that
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam it was merely respondent Go’s secretary or clerk who would be
Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED. drafting the decision of the said case; and that respondents told him
to simply give in to Tiu’s demands.8
SO ORDERED.
Second Meeting on September 26, 2003 at Akiga Japanese Restaurant,
Mandaluyong
A.C. No. 7547 September 4, 2009
Complainant alleged that respondents brought with them a certain
GREGORY U. CHAN, Complainant, Mr. Alfredo Lim, a former schoolmate of respondent Go and a
vs. godfather of Tiu; that Lim demanded the settlement of Tiu’s claims;
NLRC COMMISSIONER ROMEO L. GO and ATTY. JOSE RAULITO E. that he illustrated he is not a bad employer Tiu painted him to be as
PARAS, Respondents. the latter even invited him to her wedding; that respondent Go offered
him the services of respondent Paras as legal counsel; and that
DECISION respondents asked him to give them pertinent documents relating to
the labor case in their next meeting.9
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Third Meeting on October 20, 2003 at Korean Village Restaurant, Manila
In a verifiedComplaint1 dated June 5, 2007, complainant Gregory U. Chan prayed for
the disbarment or imposition of proper disciplinary sanctions upon respondents Complainant alleged that his group brought their company
Commissioner Romeo Go of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and accountant Ms. Leah Pascual, while respondents brought Atty.
Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras for perpetrating acts unbecoming and degrading to the legal Jessie Andres who was introduced to be connected with then
profession, in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,2 Canons of Senator Noli De Castro; that he showed the group the company
Professional Ethics,3 and the Rules of Court.4 documents proving payment to Tiu of her sales commission; that
respondents did not bother expressing interest in examining the
Complainant alleged that respondents are influence peddlers who pride themselves in documents; that respondent Go left the dinner early for another
being able to direct the outcome of cases pending before the NLRC; that respondents business commitment; and that the remaining people instead
belittled and denigrated the nobility of the legal profession by indicating that decisions discussed his possible support for Sen. De Castro’s campaign.10
of the NLRC are merely drafted by humble secretaries or clerks who write in
accordance to their mandate; and that respondents attempted to extort money from Fourth Meeting on December 2, 2003at Akiga Japanese Restaurant, Mandaluyong
him.
Complainant alleged that he did not personally attend the meeting to
The present controversy stemmed from an illegal dismissal case5 filed by Susan Que avoid a confrontation with Tiu; that Jenny, Glenn, and Pascual met
Tiu against complainant and his companies. On July 18, 2003, the labor arbiter6 ruled with respondents, Lim, Tiu, and her husband; that respondent Go
in favor of Tiu and ordered her employers to pay backwages, separation pay, unpaid dismissed the documents presented by Jenny and claimed that it
commissions, and 10% attorney’s fees.7 Pending resolution of their appeal before was his tactic for Tiu to submit a sur-rejoinder with photo-
the NLRC, complainant alleged that respondents Go and Paras attempted to extort attachments11 showing MCC Industrial Sales, Corp. and Sanyo Seiki
money from him in behalf of Tiu. He narrated that respondent Go arranged for meetings Industrial Sales, Corp. conducting business in one office; that
at expensive restaurants to wit: respondent Go goaded Jenny to give in to Tiu’s demands as the latter
was suffering from cancer; that Jenny refused the demands,
First Meeting on September 16, 2003 at Yuraken Japanese Restaurant, Diamond prompting her to lose her appetite and walk out to regain her
Hotel, Manila composure; and that respondent and his companions simply enjoyed
their free sumptuous meals.12
Fifth Meeting on February 24, 2004 at California Pizza Kitchen, Shangri-La Plaza without provocation, complainant suddenly pushed his left shoulder and hurled insults
Mall, Mandaluyong and invectives when his group bumped onto him on March 31, 2007 at Fish and Co.
restaurant in Shangri-La Mall at Mandaluyong City.
Complainant alleged that his wife Jenny again met with respondent
Go, Mr. Lim, Ms. Que Tiu and her husband; that Tiu lowered the On July 9, 2007, complainant filed a Manifestation26 stating that he received death
settlement amount to P450,000.00; that Jenny insisted that Tiu’s threats27 about two weeks after filing the present complaint.
claim should not exceed P198,000.00; and that respondent Go
prevented Jenny from walking out of their meeting with assurances On July 23, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolutions of the NLRC, with
that he will further convince Tiu.13 modification that the total monetary award should be P737,757.41.28 Complainant and
his companies thus filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court which is still
Sixth Meeting on March 3, 2004 at Palm Court Café, Diamond Hotel, Manila pending resolution. 29
Complainant alleged that he, together with his wife Jenny, and In his Comment,30 respondent Paras alleged that the present complaint, like the
brother Glenn met with respondents Paras and Go and his wife; Ombudsman case for Grave Misconduct, was filed by complainant to gain leverage
and that respondent Go assured them that it’s going to be their last against him for the criminal case (I.S. No. 07-71604-D) he filed against the latter. Paras
meeting and Tiu will just settle for P300,000.00.14 denied conspiring with Go in the commission of the acts complained of. He likewise
denied knowing Tiu or the labor case. As for the enumerated meetings, respondent
Seventh Meeting on October 4, 2004 at Una Mas, Greenhills Paras alleged that he was not present on September 16, 2003, December 2, 2003, and
February 24, 2004; that he merely fetched respondent Go at the meeting on September
26, 2003; that he was present during the October 20, 2003 meeting, but deemed the
Complainant alleged that respondent Paras asked for another dinner same to be social dinner rather than a conciliation/mediation for settlement; that during
appointment to which he sent his brother Glenn to attend; that the March 3, 2004 meeting, he merely accompanied respondent Go and his wife
respondent Paras disclosed during the meeting that the matter was because they previously came from an earlier dinner; that it was complainant’s brother
no longer in their hands as they decided not to push through with the Glenn who asked for an appointment on October 4, 2004 and offered to secure his
deal with Tiu; that Glenn was shocked at respondent’s fraudulent services as their counsel for the labor case against Tiu; and that days later, Glenn even
duplicity that he left the restaurant in a huff after paying the bill.15 asked for his services regarding a collection case which he declined because it was his
law firm’s policy not to accept simple collection cases.
As proof of these meetings, complainant attached receipts16 for the meals ordered at
the above-mentioned establishments and affidavits of Jenny Chan,17 Leah Respondent Paras also alleged that complainant’s charge of violation of Rule 6.02,
Pascual,18 and Glenn Chan,19 recounting the matters that transpired therein. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is misplaced as he was not a lawyer
in the government service at the time material to the acts complained of.
On September 10, 2004, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, but removed
the award of separation pay and ordered complainant to reinstate Tiu to her former Meanwhile, respondent Go labelled as blatant lies the allegations of Chan in his
position without loss of seniority rights and privileges.20 On July 12, 2005, the NLRC complaint. He alleged that he met Chan, Jenny, and Glenn, through his mother’s close
denied the parties’ Motions for Reconsideration and sustained its earlier Resolution.21 friends Yek Ti L. Chua and Ban Ha; that he came to know of the labor case of Susan
Que Tiu during a casual bridge session with the latter’s godfather Alfredo Lim; that it
On June 5, 2007, or simultaneously with the filing of the present administrative was complainant who organized the meetings and persisted in asking his help
complaint, complainant filed a case for Grave Misconduct22 against respondents Go regarding the said labor case; that he refused to help complainant because he would
and Paras with the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging the same set of facts in the not want to influence his colleagues in the NLRC to reverse their judgments; that he did
administrative case. not impress upon complainant and his family that he is engaged in influence peddling;
that when he relayed to Lim complainant’s intention to amicably settle the case, Lim
Previously, complainant also filed an Estafa case23 against Susan Que Tiu, Ramon agreed to be introduced to complainant; that he never introduced respondent Paras as
Givertz, and Zed Metal and Construction Corporation. However, it was dismissed by his associate; that he only assisted the parties during the conciliation meetings but
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila in a Resolution24 dated May 22, 2006, for never coerced complainant to give in to the demands of Lim; and that he did not extort
insufficiency of evidence.1avvphi1 money from complainant.
Thereafter, in April 2007, respondent Paras filed a complaint against complainant Chan To substantiate his claim, Go submitted affidavits of Yek Ti L. Chua;31 Evangeline C.
for Grave Oral Slander, Serious Slander by Deed, Grave Threats, and Alarms and Apanay32 and Marina R. Taculao, 33 both of whom are administrative personnel
Scandals25 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong. He alleged that assigned at his office in the NLRC.
The duty of the Court towards members of the bar is not only limited to the have known that respondents could not deliver on their alleged promises to influence
administration of discipline to those found culpable of misconduct but also to the the outcome of the case in his favor; that they were only trying to extort money from
protection of the reputation of those frivolously or maliciously charged. In disbarment him, and abusing him for free meals. As such, he should have stopped meeting them,
proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the complainant and this Court will exercise or immediately filed criminal and/or administrative charges against them, or at the least,
its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes his case by clear, convincing refused to foot the bill for their meals.
and satisfactory evidence.34
This Court agrees with respondent Paras that complainant’s charge of violation of Rule
After a careful study of the instant case, we find no sufficient evidence to support 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is misplaced because he was
complainant’s claim. Except for complainant’s bare allegations, there is no proof that not a government lawyer at the time material to the acts complained of. This fact is
respondents engaged in influence peddling, extortion, or in any unlawful, dishonest, certified36 by the Training and Administrative Manager37 of Lepanto Consolidated
immoral, or deceitful conduct. It is axiomatic that he who alleges the same has the onus Mining Co. where respondent Paras was employed as Assistant Manager, then as
of validating it.351avvph!1 Manager for Legal Services and Government Affairs from July 31, 2000 to March 31,
2004.
We note that the labor case of Tiu has already been decided in the latter’s favor prior
the alleged meetings. Even after the said meetings, the NLRC still affirmed the decision WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondents Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and
of the labor arbiter which was adverse to herein complainant and his companies. If NLRC Commissioner Romeo Go is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
respondent Go really agreed to influence the outcome of the case, then the results
would have been otherwise. SO ORDERED.
In addition, the receipts presented by complainant do not necessarily prove the A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC August 19, 2009
presence of respondents in said meetings. They only show that certain persons went
to the aforenamed restaurants to eat and meet. However, it could not be said with
certainty that respondents were among them – based only on the receipts presented. QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk of Court -
BRANCH 81, ROMBLON, ROMBLON - ON THE PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING
IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW.
Moreover, the alleged representations by respondent Go regarding the drafting of
NLRC decisions were refuted by the affidavits executed by Apanay and Taculao. Also,
no proof was presented in support of the allegation regarding the belittling or DECISION
denigration of the legal profession and the NLRC.1avvphi1
BRION, J.:
Significantly, the present complaint was filed only after the lapse of almost four years
since the alleged extortion was made or two years since the resolution of the labor case This administrative matter started as a letter-query dated March 4, 2008 of Atty.
by the NLRC. Complainant did not offer any reason for the belated filing of the case Karen M. Silverio-Buffe (Atty. Buffe) addressed to the Office of the Court
thus giving the impression that it was filed as a leverage against the case for Grave Administrator, which query the latter referred to the Court for consideration. In the
Oral Slander, Serious Slander by Deed, Grave Threats, and Alarms and Scandals (I.S. course of its action on the matter, the Court discovered that the query was beyond
No. 07-71604-D) filed by Paras against complainant. pure policy interpretation and referred to the actual situation of Atty. Buffe, and,
hence, was a matter that required concrete action on the factual situation presented.
Also, the ruling of the labor arbiter was favorable to Tiu; hence, there was no need for
respondents to get in touch with complainant to settle the case in Tiu’s behalf. In The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
contrast, complainant who was the defeated party in the labor case has more reason 6713, as amended (or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
to seek avenues to convince Tiu to accept a lower settlement amount. This Court is and Employees). This provision places a limitation on public officials and employees
thus convinced that it was the complainant who arranged to meet with respondent Go during their incumbency, and those already separated from government employment
and not the contrary as he averred. for a period of one (1) year after separation, in engaging in the private practice of their
profession. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 provides:
We cannot lend credence to complainant’s allegation that he or his group met with
respondents six or seven times. Complainant and his group were allegedly angered, SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions
insulted, and offended by respondents yet they still agreed to foot the bills for the meals. of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws,
Even after the denial by the NLRC of their motion for reconsideration, with nothing more the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
to discuss, complainants still allegedly met with respondents. These actions are not in employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
accord with human behavior, logic, and common sense. At this time, complainant would
xxx Then Deputy Court Administrator (now Court Administrator) Jose P. Perez made the
following observations when the matter was referred to him:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not: The general intent of the law, as defined in its title is "to uphold the time-honored
principle of public office being a public trust." Section 4 thereof provides for the norms
xxx of conduct of public officials and employees, among others: (a) commitment to public
interest; (b) professionalism; and (c) justness and sincerity. Of particular significance
is the statement under professionalism that "[t]hey [public officials and employees]
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to peddlers of undue patronage.
conflict with their official functions; or
Thus, it may be well to say that the prohibition was intended to avoid any impropriety
xxx or the appearance of impropriety which may occur in any transaction between the
retired government employee and his former colleagues, subordinates or superiors
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after brought about by familiarity, moral ascendancy or undue influence, as the case may
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of be.21avvphi1
subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his
profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which Subsequently, in a Minute Resolution dated July 15, 2008, we resolved to refer this
case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply. case to the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.3 The OCAT took the view that:
In her letter-query, Atty. Buffe posed these questions: "Why may an incumbent
engage in private practice under (b)(2), assuming the same does not conflict or tend The premise of the query is erroneous. She interprets Section 7 (b) (2) as a blanket
to conflict with his official duties, but a non-incumbent like myself cannot, as is authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. Clearly, there is a misreading
apparently prohibited by the last paragraph of Sec. 7? Why is the former allowed, who of that provision of law.4 and further observed:
is still occupying the very public position that he is liable to exploit, but a non-
incumbent like myself – who is no longer in a position of possible abuse/exploitation –
cannot?"1 The confusion apparently lies in the use of the term "such practice" after the phrase
"provided that." It may indeed be misinterpreted as modifying the phrase "engage in
the private practice of their profession" should be prefatory sentence that public
The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the officials "during their incumbency shall not" be disregarded. However, read in its
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned from her position entirety, "such practice" may only refer to practice "authorized by the Constitution or
effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and within the one-year period of prohibition law" or the exception to the prohibition against the practice of profession. The term
mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she engaged in the private practice of law "law" was intended by the legislature to include "a memorandum or a circular or an
by appearing as private counsel in several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon. administrative order issued pursuant to the authority of law."
Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential treatment xxx
to an incumbent public employee, who may engage in the private practice of his
profession so long as this practice does not conflict or tend to conflict with his official
functions. In contrast, a public official or employee who has retired, resigned, or has The interpretation that Section 7 (b) (2) generally prohibits incumbent public officials
been separated from government service like her, is prohibited from engaging in and employees from engaging in the practice of law, which is declared therein a
private practice on any matter before the office where she used to work, for a period prohibited and unlawful act, accords with the constitutional policy on accountability of
of one (1) year from the date of her separation from government employment. public officers stated in Article XI of the Constitution …
Atty. Buffe further alleged that the intention of the above prohibition is to remove the xxx
exercise of clout, influence or privity to insider information, which the incumbent public
employee may use in the private practice of his profession. However, this situation did The policy thus requires public officials and employees to devote full time public
not obtain in her case, since she had already resigned as Clerk of Court of RTC- service so that in case of conflict between personal and public interest, the latter
Branch 18 of Romblon. She advanced the view that she could engage in the private should take precedence over the former.5[Footnotes omitted]
practice of law before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon, so long as her appearance as
legal counsel shall not conflict or tend to conflict with her former duties as former
Clerk of Court of that Branch.
With respect to lawyers in the judiciary, the OCAT pointed to Section 5, Canon 3 of prosecutor appearing before the same Branch 81, after she took her oath of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel – the rule that deals with outside office as such on August 15, 2008.[Emphasis supplied]
employment by an incumbent judicial employee and which limits such outside
employment to one that "does not require the practice of law."6 The prohibition to She also made known her intent to elevate the dismissal of the above cases "so that
practice law with respect to any matter where they have intervened while in the eventually, the Honorable Supreme Court may put to rest the legal issue/s presented
government service is reiterated in Rule 6.03, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional in the above petitions which is, why is it that R.A. No. 6713, Sec. 7 (b)(2) and last par.
Responsibility, which governs the conduct of lawyers in the government service.7 thereof, apparently contains an express prohibition (valid or invalid) on the private
practice of undersigned’s law profession, before Branch 81, while on the other hand
In view of the OCAT findings and recommendations, we issued not containing a similar, express prohibition in regard to undersigned’s practice of
an En Banc Resolution dated November 11, 2008 directing the Court Administrator to profession, before the same court, as a public prosecutor – within the supposedly
draft and submit to the Court a circular on the practice of profession during restricted 1-year period?"
employment and within one year from resignation, retirement from or cessation of
employment in the Judiciary. We likewise required the Executive Judge of the RTC of OUR ACTION AND RULING
Romblon to (i) verify if Atty. Buffe had appeared as counsel during her incumbency as
clerk of court and after her resignation in February 2008, and (ii) submit to the Court a
report on his verification.8 Preliminary Considerations
In compliance with this our Resolution, Executive Judge Ramiro R. Geronimo of RTC- As we stated at the outset, this administrative matter confronts us, not merely with the
Branch 81 of Romblon reported the following appearances made by Atty. Buffe: task of determining how the Court will respond to the query, both with respect to the
substance and form (as the Court does not give interpretative opinions9 but can issue
circulars and regulations relating to pleading, practice and procedure in all
(1) Civil Case No. V-1564, entitled Oscar Madrigal Moreno, Jr. et al. versus courts10 and in the exercise of its administrative supervision over all courts and
Leonardo M. Macalam, et al. on February 19, 2008, March 4, 2008, April 10, personnel thereof11), but also with the task of responding to admitted violations of
2008 and July 9, 2008 as counsel for the plaintiffs; Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 and to multiple recourses on the same subject.
(2) Civil Case No. V-1620, entitled Melchor M. Manal versus Zosimo Malasa, After our directive to the Office of the Court Administrator to issue a circular on the
et al., on (sic) February, 2008, as counsel for the plaintiff; subject of the query for the guidance of all personnel in the Judiciary, we consider this
aspect of the present administrative matter a finished task, subject only to
(3) Civil Case No. V-1396, entitled Solomon Y. Mayor versus Jose J. Mayor, confirmatory closure when the OCA reports the completion of the undertaking to us.
on February 21, 2008, as counsel for the plaintiff; and
Atty. Buffe’s admitted appearance, before the very same branch she served and
(4) Civil Case No. V-1639, entitled Philippine National Bank versus Sps. immediately after her resignation, is a violation that we cannot close our eyes to and
Mariano and Olivia Silverio, on April 11, 2008 and July 9, 2008, as counsel that she cannot run away from under the cover of the letter-query she filed and her
for the defendants. petition for declaratory relief, whose dismissal she manifested she would pursue up to
our level. We note that at the time she filed her letter-query (on March 4, 2008), Atty.
Atty. Buffe herself was furnished a copy of our November 11, Buffe had already appeared before Branch 81 in at least three (3) cases. The terms of
2008 En Banc Resolution and she filed a Manifestation (received by the Court on Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 did not deter her in any way and her misgivings
February 2, 2009) acknowledging receipt of our November 11, 2008 Resolution. She about the fairness of the law cannot excuse any resulting violation she committed. In
likewise stated that her appearances are part of Branch 81 records. As well, she other words, she took the risk of appearing before her own Branch and should suffer
informed the Court that she had previously taken the following judicial remedies in the consequences of the risk she took.
regard to the above query:
Nor can she hide behind the two declaratory relief petitions she filed, both of which
1. SCA No. 089119028 (Annex C), filed with Branch 54 of the RTC Manila, were dismissed, and her intent to elevate the dismissal to this Court for resolution.
which had been dismissed without prejudice on July 23, 2008 (Annex D) – a The first, filed before the RTC, Branch 54, Manila, was dismissed on July 23, 2008
recourse taken when undersigned was still a private practitioner; because the "court declined to exercise the power to declare rights as prayed for in
the petition, as any decision that may be rendered will be inutile and will not generally
terminate the uncertainty or controversy."12 The second, filed with the RTC, Branch
2. SCA No. 08120423 (Annex A), filed with Branch 17 of the RTC of Manila, 17, Manila, was dismissed for being an inappropriate remedy after the dismissal
which had been also dismissed (with or without prejudice) on December 4, ordered by the RTC, Branch 54, Manila, on December 4, 2008.13 Under these
2008 (Annex B) – a recourse taken when undersigned was already a public circumstances, we see nothing to deter us from ruling on Atty. Buffe’s actions, as no
actual court case other than the present administrative case, is now actually pending the "outside employment" that an incumbent court official or court employee may
on the issue she raised. On the contrary, we see from Atty. Buffe’s recourse to this undertake in addition to his official duties:
Court and the filing of the two declaratory petitions the intent to shop for a favorable
answer to her query. We shall duly consider this circumstance in our action on the Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with
case. all of the following requirements:
A last matter to consider before we proceed to the merits of Atty. Buffe’s actions (a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law
relates to possible objections on procedural due process grounds, as we have not before the courts or conducts business with the Judiciary;
made any formal directive to Atty. Buffe to explain why she should not be penalized
for her appearance before Branch 81 soon after her resignation from that Branch. The
essence of due process is the grant of the opportunity to be heard; what it abhors is (b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working
the lack of the opportunity to be heard.14 The records of this case show that Atty. hours and is not incompatible with the performance of the court personnel’s
Buffe has been amply heard with respect to her actions. She was notified, and she duties and responsibilities;
even responded to our November 11, 2008 directive for the Executive Judge of the
RTC of Romblon to report on Atty. Buffe’s appearances before Branch 81; she (c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided,
expressly manifested that these appearances were part of the Branch records. Her however, that court personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or
legal positions on these appearances have also been expressed before this resource person in law schools, review or continuing education centers or
Court; first, in her original letter-query, and subsequently, in her Manifestation. Thus, similar institutions;
no due process consideration needs to deter us from considering the legal
consequences of her appearances in her previous Branch within a year from her (d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel
resignation. to disclose confidential information acquired while performing officials duties;
The Governing Law: Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 (e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive
branch of government, unless specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions
of public officials and employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the
the private practice of their profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a outside employment reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court
public official or employee can engage in the practice of his or her profession under personnel shall not accept outside employment. [Emphasis supplied]
the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or
by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her
official functions. In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the quoted Canon 3, the
practice of law is covered; the practice of law is a practice of profession, while Canon
3 specifically mentions any outside employment requiring the practice of law.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public In Cayetano v. Monsod,16 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of
official or employee’s resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
for the private practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform
undertaken even within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice
exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree
the office the public officer or employee used to work with. of legal knowledge or skill.17 Under both provisions, a common objective is to avoid
any conflict of interest on the part of the employee who may wittingly or unwittingly
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public use confidential information acquired from his employment, or use his or her
trust; and serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in familiarity with court personnel still with the previous office.
government transactions between a former government official or employee and his
or her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for
the observance and the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours Court Personnel ceases to apply as it applies specifically to incumbents, but Section 7
to serve the public.15 and its subsection (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 continue to apply to the extent discussed
above. Atty. Buffe’s situation falls under Section 7.
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is
not the only prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct Atty. Buffe’s Situation
for Court Personnel also applies. The latter provision provides the definitive rule on
A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty. Buffe’s admission that she CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
immediately engaged in private practice of law within the one-year period of OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL
prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713. We find it noteworthy, too, that PROCESSES
she is aware of this provision and only objects to its application to her situation; she
perceives it to be unfair that she cannot practice before her old office – Branch 81 – xxx
for a year immediately after resignation, as she believes that her only limitation is in
matters where a conflict of interest exists between her appearance as counsel and
her former duties as Clerk of Court. She believes that Section 7 (b)(2) gives Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
preferential treatment to incumbent public officials and employees as against those conduct.
already separated from government employment.
As indicated by the use of the mandatory word "shall," this provision must be strictly
Atty. Buffe apparently misreads the law. As the OCAT aptly stated, she interprets complied with. Atty. Buffe failed to do this, perhaps not with an evil intent, considering
Section 7 (b)(2) as a blanket authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. the misgivings she had about Section 7 (b)(2)’s unfairness. Unlawful conduct under
We reiterate what we have explained above, that the general rule under Section 7 Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, however, does not necessarily require the element of
(b)(2) is to bar public officials and employees from the practice of their professions; it criminality, although the Rule is broad enough to include it.18 Likewise, the presence
is unlawful under this general rule for clerks of court to practice their profession. By of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential to bring his or her act or
way of exception, they can practice their profession if the Constitution or the law omission within the terms of Rule 1.01, when it specifically prohibits lawyers from
allows them, but no conflict of interest must exist between their current duties and the engaging in unlawful conduct.19 Thus, we find Atty. Buffe liable under this quoted
practice of their profession. As we also mentioned above, no chance exists for Rule.
lawyers in the Judiciary to practice their profession, as they are in fact expressly
prohibited by Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel from We also find that Atty. Buffe also failed to live up to her lawyer’s oath and thereby
doing so. Under both the general rule and the exceptions, therefore, Atty. Buffe’s violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when she blatantly and
basic premise is misplaced. unlawfully practised law within the prohibited period by appearing before the RTC
Branch she had just left. Canon 7 states:
As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law
immediately after her separation from the service and without any period limitation CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
that applies to other prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
court’s limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within one year before the INTEGRATED BAR. [Emphasis supplied]
office where he or she used to work with. In a comparison between a resigned, retired
or separated official or employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent official or By her open disregard of R.A. No. 6713, she thereby followed the footsteps of the
employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because the limitation is only models she cited and wanted to replicate – the former court officials who immediately
with respect to the office he or she used to work with and only for a period of one waded into practice in the very same court they came from. She, like they, disgraced
year. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where specifically allowed by the dignity of the legal profession by openly disobeying and disrespecting the
the Constitution and the law and only in areas where no conflict of interests exists. law.20 By her irresponsible conduct, she also eroded public confidence in the law and
This analysis again disproves Atty. Buffe’s basic premises. in lawyers.21 Her offense is not in any way mitigated by her transparent attempt to
cover up her transgressions by writing the Court a letter-query, which she followed up
A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffe’s approach to Section 7 (b)(2) is her awareness of with unmeritorious petitions for declaratory relief, all of them dealing with the same
the law and her readiness to risk its violation because of the unfairness she perceives Section 7 (b)(2) issue, in the hope perhaps that at some point she would find a ruling
in the law. We find it disturbing that she first violated the law before making any favorable to her cause. These are acts whose implications do not promote public
inquiry. She also justifies her position by referring to the practice of other government confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.22
lawyers known to her who, after separation from their judicial employment,
immediately engaged in the private practice of law and appeared as private counsels Considering Atty. Buffe’s ready admission of violating Section 7(b)(2), the principle of
before the RTC branches where they were previously employed. Again we find this a res ipsa loquitur finds application, making her administratively liable for violation of
cavalier attitude on Atty. Buffe’s part and, to our mind, only emphasizes her own Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.23 In
willful or intentional disregard of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713. several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to
any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for
By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful," Atty. Buffe the determination of their administrative liability.
contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides: In Prudential Bank v. Castro,24 the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any
further investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his
unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both the In this case, we cannot discern any mitigating factors we can apply, save OCAT’s
Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard, observation that Atty Buffe’s letter-query may really reflect a misapprehension of the
the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer and his parameters of the prohibition on the practice of the law profession under Section 7 (b)
cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of the (2) of R.A. No. 6713. Ignorance of the law, however, is no excuse, particularly on a
proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases.25 The Court matter as sensitive as practice of the legal profession soon after one’s separation
held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of from the service. If Atty. Buffe is correct in the examples she cited, it is time to ring the
respondents' administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter bell and to blow the whistle signaling that we cannot allow this practice to
under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.26 continue.1avvphi1
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy,27 that no evidentiary As we observed earlier,34 Atty. Buffe had no qualms about the simultaneous use of
hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined for professional various fora in expressing her misgivings about the perceived unfairness of Section 7
misconduct already established by the facts on record. of R.A. 6713. She formally lodged a query with the Office of the Court Administrator,
and soon after filed her successive petitions for declaratory relief. Effectively, she
We applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur once more in In re: Wenceslao exposed these fora to the possibility of embarrassment and confusion through their
Laureta28 where we punished a lawyer for grave professional misconduct solely possibly differing views on the issue she posed. Although this is not strictly the forum-
based on his answer to a show-cause order for contempt and without going into a shopping that the Rules of Court prohibit, what she has done is something that we
trial-type hearing. We ruled then that due process is satisfied as long as the cannot help but consider with disfavor because of the potential damage and
opportunity to be heard is given to the person to be disciplined.29 embarrassment to the Judiciary that it could have spawned. This is a point against
Atty. Buffe that cancels out the leniency we might have exercised because of the
OCAT’s observation about her ignorance of and misgivings on the extent of the
Likewise in Zaldivar v. Gonzales,30 the respondent was disciplined and punished for prohibition after separation from the service.
contempt for his slurs regarding the Court’s alleged partiality, incompetence and lack
of integrity on the basis of his answer in a show-cause order for contempt. The Court
took note that the respondent did not deny making the negative imputations against Under the circumstances, we find that her actions merit a penalty of fine of
the Court through the media and even acknowledged the correctness of his degrading ₱10,000.00, together with a stern warning to deter her from repeating her
statements. Through a per curiam decision, we justified imposing upon him the transgression and committing other acts of professional misconduct.35 This penalty
penalty of suspension in the following tenor: reflects as well the Court’s sentiments on how seriously the retired, resigned or
separated officers and employees of the Judiciary should regard and observe the
prohibition against the practice of law with the office that they used to work with.
The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary
authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over
members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of
Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, professional misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code
he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and of Professional Responsibility. She is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand
resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, Pesos (₱10,000.00), and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of this violation and
pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both the commission of other acts of professional misconduct shall be dealt with more
professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and severely.
contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.31
Let this Decision be noted in Atty. Buffe’s record as a member of the Bar.
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or
formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately SO ORDERED.
exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been
given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded
the opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-query and
Manifestation filed before this Court.
A member of the bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office
as an attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.32 The
appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.33