G.R. No.

159926 January 20, 2014

PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS BOULEY ARD, INC., vs. FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY, NOW BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND HECTOR I. GALURA.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for the annulment of a judgment, must emanate from an act of the adverse party, and
the fraud must be of such nature as to have deprived the petitioner of its day in court. The fraud is not extrinsic if
the act was committed by the petitioner's own counsel.

The Case

This appeal seeks to undo the dismissal by the Court of Appeals (CA) of the petitioner's action for annulment of
judgment through the assailed resolution promulgated on July 31, 2003,1 as well as the denial of its motion for
reconsideration on September 12, 2003.2

Antecedents

On various dates in 1993, Bonier de Guzman (Bonier), then the President of petitioner corporation (Pinausukan, for
short), executed four real estate mortgages involving the petitioner’s 517 square meter parcel of land situated in
Pasay City3 in favor of Far East Bank and Trust Company (now Bank of Philippine Islands), to be referred to herein
as the Bank. The parcel of land was registered in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 126636 of the Register of Deeds of
Pasay City under the name of Pinausukan.4 When the unpaid obligation secured by the mortgages had ballooned
to ₱15,129,303.67 as of June 2001, the Bank commenced proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgages on August 13, 2001 in the Office of the Ex Officio Sheriff, Regional Trial Court (RTC), in Pasay City.5 Two
weeks thereafter, the sheriff issued the notice of sheriff’s sale, setting the public auction on October 8, 2001 at the
main entrance of the Hall of Justice of Pasay City.6

Learning of the impending sale of its property by reason of the foreclosure of the mortgages, Pinausukan,
represented by Zsae Carrie de Guzman, brought against the Bank and the sheriff an action for the annulment of
real estate mortgages in the RTC on October 4, 2001 (Civil Case No. 01-0300), averring that Bonier had obtained
the loans only in his personal capacity and had constituted the mortgages on the corporate asset without
Pinausukan’s consent through a board resolution. The case was assigned to Branch 108.7 Pinausukan applied for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the Bank and the sheriff
from proceeding with the extrajudicial foreclosure and the public auction.

In the ensuing trial of Civil Case No. 01-0300, Pinausukan presented Zsae Carrie de Guzman as its first witness on
May 30, 2002. However, the subsequent hearing dates were reset several times. In August 2002, the parties
informed the RTC about their attempts to settle the case.

The counsels of the parties did not appear in court on the hearing scheduled on September 5, 2002 despite having
agreed thereto. Accordingly, on October 31, 2002, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 01-0300 for failure to
prosecute.8 The order of dismissal attained finality.9

On June 24, 2003, the sheriff issued a notice of extrajudicial sale concerning the property of Pinausukan.10 The
notice was received by Pinausukan a week later.

Claiming surprise over the turn of events, Pinausukan inquired from the RTC and learned that Atty. Michael Dale
Villaflor (Atty. Villaflor), its counsel of record, had not informed it about the order of dismissal issued on October
31, 2002.

On July 24, 2003, Pinausukan brought the petition for annulment in the CA seeking the nullification of the order of
October 31, 2002 dismissing Civil Case No. 01-0300. Its petition, under the verification of Roxanne de Guzman-San
Pedro (Roxanne), who was one of its Directors, and concurrently its Executive Vice President for Finance and
Treasurer, stated that its counsel had been guilty of gross and palpable negligence in failing to keep track of the
case he was handling, and in failing to apprise Pinausukan of the developments on the case. It further pertinently
stated as follows:

6. Inquiry from counsel, Atty. Michael Dale T. Villaflor disclosed that although the Registry Return Receipt indicated
that he received the Order on November 28, 2002, according to him, as of said date, he no longer holds office at
12th Floor, Ever Gotesco Corporate Center, 1958 C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila but has transferred to Vecation (sic)
Club, Inc., with office address 10th Floor Rufino Tower, Ayala Avenue, Makati City. Petitioner was never notified of
the change of office and address of its attorney.

7. The palpable negligence of counsel to keep track of the case he was handling constituted professional
misconduct amounting to extrinsic fraud properly warranting the annulment of the Order dated October 31, 2003
as petitioner was unduly deprived of its right to present evidence in Civil Case No. 01-0300 through no fault of its
own.11

On July 31, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment,12 citing the failure to attach the affidavits of
witnesses attesting to and describing the alleged extrinsic fraud supporting the cause of action as required by
Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court; and observing that the verified petition related only to the correctness of
its allegations, a requirement entirely different and separate from the affidavits of witnesses required under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court.

On September 12, 2003,13 the CA denied Pinausukan’s motion for reconsideration.

Issue

Pinausukan posits that the requirement for attaching the affidavits of witnesses to the petition for annulment
should be relaxed; that even if Roxanne had executed the required affidavit as a witness on the extrinsic fraud, she
would only repeat therein the allegations already in the petition, thereby duplicating her allegations under her
oath; that the negligence of Atty. Villaflor, in whom it entirely relied upon, should not preclude it from obtaining
relief; and that it needed a chance to prove in the RTC that Bonier had no right to mortgage its property.

Ruling

The appeals lacks merit.

1.
Nature and statutory requirements for an action to annul a judgment or final order

The remedy of annulment of judgment has been long authorized and sanctioned in the Philippines. In Banco
Español-Filipino v. Palanca,14 of 1918 vintage, the Court, through Justice Street, recognized that there were only
two remedies available under the rules of procedure in force at the time to a party aggrieved by a decision of
the Court of First Instance (CFI) that had already attained finality, namely: that under Sec. 113, Code of Civil
Procedure, which was akin to the petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, Rules of Court; and that under
Sec. 513, Code of Civil Procedure, which stipulated that the party aggrieved under a judgment rendered by the
CFI "upon default" and who had been "deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence" and the CFI had "finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court" could "present
his petition to the Supreme Court within sixty days after he first learns of the rendition of such judgment, and
not thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying to have judgment set aside."15 It categorically ruled out a
mere motion filed for that purpose in the same action as a proper remedy.

The jurisdiction over the action for the annulment of judgment had been lodged in the CFI as a court of general
jurisdiction on the basis that the subject matter of the action was not capable of pecuniary estimation. Section
56, paragraph 1, of Act No. 136 (An Act providing for the Organization of Courts in the Philippine Islands),
effective on June 11, 1901, vested original jurisdiction in the CFI over "all civil actions in which the subject of
litigations is not capable of pecuniary estimation." The CFI retained its jurisdiction under Section 44(a) of
Republic Act No. 296 (The Judiciary Act of 1948), effective on June 17, 1948, which contained a similar provision
vesting original jurisdiction in the CFI over "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of
pecuniary estimation."

In the period under the regimes of Act No. 136 and Republic Act No. 296, the issues centered on which CFI, or
branch thereof, had the jurisdiction over the action for the annulment of judgment. It was held in Mas v.
Dumara-og16 that "the power to open, modify or vacate a judgment is not only possessed by, but is restricted to
the court in which the judgment was rendered." In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Torres,17 the Court declared that
"the jurisdiction to annul a judgment of a branch of the Court of First Instance belongs solely to the very same
branch which rendered the judgment." In Sterling Investment Corporation v. Ruiz,18 the Court enjoined a
branch of the CFI of Rizal from taking cognizance of an action filed with it to annul the judgment of another
branch of the same court.

In Dulap v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court observed that the philosophy underlying the pronouncements in these
cases was the policy of judicial stability, as expressed in Dumara-og, to the end that the judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction could not be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. Seeing that the
pronouncements in Dumara-og, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Sterling Investment confining the jurisdiction to
annul a judgment to the court or its branch rendering the judgment would "practically amount to judicial
legislation," the Court found the occasion to re-examine the pronouncements. Observing that the plaintiff’s
cause of action in an action to annul the judgment of a court "springs from the alleged nullity of the judgment
based on one ground or another, particularly fraud, which fact affords the plaintiff a right to judicial interference
in his behalf," and that that the two cases were distinct and separate from each other because "the cause of
action (to annul judgment) is entirely different from that in the action which gave rise to the judgment sought to
be annulled, for a direct attack against a final and executory judgment is not incidental to, but is the main object
of, the proceeding," the Court concluded that "there is no plausible reason why the venue of the action to annul
the judgment should necessarily follow the venue of the previous action" if the outcome was not only to violate
the existing rule on venue for personal actions but also to limit the opportunity for the application of such rule
on venue for personal actions.20 The Court observed that the doctrine under Dumara-og, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
and Sterling Investment could then very well "result in the difficulties precisely sought to be avoided by the
rules; for it could be that at the time of the filing of the second action for annulment, neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant resides in the same place where either or both of them did when the first action was commenced and
tried," thus unduly depriving the parties of the right expressly given them by the Rules of Court "to change or
transfer venue from one province to another by written agreement – a right conferred upon them for their own
convenience and to minimize their expenses in the litigation – and renders innocuous the provision on waiver of
improper venue in Section 4 (of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court)."21 The Court eventually ruled:

Our conclusion must therefore be that a court of first instance or a branch thereof has the authority and
jurisdiction to take cognizance of, and to act in, a suit to annul a final and executory judgment or order rendered
by another court of first instance or by another branch of the same court. The policy of judicial stability, which
underlies the doctrine laid down in the cases of Dumara-og, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Sterling Investment
Corporation, et al., supra, should be held subordinate to an orderly administration of justice based on the
existing rules of procedure and the law.22 x x x

In 1981, the Legislature enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).23 Among
several innovations of this legislative enactment was the formal establishment of the annulment of a judgment
or final order as an action independent from the generic classification of litigations in which the subject matter
was not capable of pecuniary estimation, and expressly vested the exclusive original jurisdiction over such
action in the CA.24 The action in which the subject of the litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation
continued to be under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, which replaced the CFI as the court of
general jurisdiction.25 Since then, the RTC no longer had jurisdiction over an action to annul the judgment of the
RTC, eliminating all concerns about judicial stability. To implement this change, the Court introduced a new
procedure to govern the action to annul the judgment of the RTC in the 1997 revision of the Rules of Court
under Rule 47, directing in Section 2 thereof that "[t]he annulment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction."26

The Court has expounded on the nature of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order in Dare
Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals,27 viz:

A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of
only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be
annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being
exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final
judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the
annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that
ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.

The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or final resolution is
understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final
judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and
unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus,
procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies,
at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is
made by the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. As to the latter, controversies
cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice demand
that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.
The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the judgment or
final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense.
If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the
original action being refiled in the proper court.28 If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the
ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for
new trial had been granted therein.29 The remedy is by no means an appeal whereby the correctness of the
assailed judgment or final order is in issue; hence, the CA is not called upon to address each error allegedly
committed by the trial court.30

Given the extraordinary nature and the objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order,
Pinausukan must be mindful of and should closely comply with the following statutory requirements for the
remedy as set forth in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of
the petitioner.31 This means that the remedy, although seen as "a last remedy,"32 is not an alternative to the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal and petition for relief. The petition must aver, therefore, that the
petitioner failed to move for a new trial, or to appeal, or to file a petition for relief without fault on his part. But
this requirement to aver is not imposed when the ground for the petition is lack of jurisdiction (whether alleged
singly or in combination with extrinsic fraud), simply because the judgment or final order, being void, may be
assailed at any time either collaterally or by direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any
action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless the ground of lack of jurisdiction is meanwhile barred by
laches.33

The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to either extrinsic fraud or
lack of jurisdiction.

Not every kind of fraud justifies the action of annulment of judgment. Only extrinsic fraud does.1âwphi1 Fraud
is extrinsic, according to Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals,34 "where the unsuccessful party has
been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by
keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge
of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without
authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in
the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the
former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing."

The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented the petitioner from having his day in court.35 Nonetheless, extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid
ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.36

In contrast, intrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair and just determination of
the case, but the difference is that the acts or things, like falsification and false testimony, could have been
litigated and determined at the trial or adjudication of the case.37 In other words, intrinsic fraud does not
deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can guard against that kind of fraud through so many
means, including a thorough trial preparation, a skillful cross-examination, resorting to the modes of discovery,
and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of documents and evidence for use at the trial and
perjury in court testimony have been regarded as not preventing the participation of any party in the
proceedings, and are not, therefore, constitutive of extrinsic fraud.38

Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the courts
over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves the
service of summons or other process on the petitioner. A judgment or final order issued by the trial court
without jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is always void, and, in the words of Justice
Street in Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca,39 "in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."40 But the defect
of lack of jurisdiction over the person, being a matter of procedural law, may be waived by the party concerned
either expressly or impliedly.

The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be
filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be
brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
Laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence could nor should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.41 Its other name is stale demands, and it is based upon grounds of public policy that
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not
a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim
to be enforced or asserted.42 The existence of four elements must be shown in order to validate laches as a
defense, to wit: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom a claim is made, giving rise to a
situation for which a complaint is filed and a remedy sought; (b) delay in asserting the rights of the complainant,
who has knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct and has been afforded an opportunity to institute a
suit; (c) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant will assert the right on
which the latter has based the suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event that the
complainant is granted a relief or the suit is not deemed barred.43

Estoppel precludes a person who has admitted or made a representation about something as true from denying
or disproving it against anyone else relying on his admission or representation.44 Thus, our law on evidence
regards estoppel as conclusive by stating that "whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it."45

The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege with particularity the
facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner’s good and substantial
cause of action or defense, as the case may be.46 The need for particularity cannot be dispensed with because
averring the circumstances constituting either fraud or mistake with particularity is a universal requirement in
the rules of pleading.47 The petition is to be filed in seven clearly legible copies, together with sufficient copies
corresponding to the number of respondents, and shall contain essential submissions, specifically: (a) the
certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution, to be attached to the original copy of the petition
intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner;48 (b) the affidavits of witnesses or documents
supporting the cause of action or defense; and (c) the sworn certification that the petitioner has not theretofore
commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the CA or the different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of
the same, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending
before the Supreme Court, the CA, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes
to promptly inform the said courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five days therefrom.49

The purpose of these requirements of the sworn verification and the particularization of the allegations of the
extrinsic fraud in the petition, of the submission of the certified true copy of the judgment or final order or
resolution, and of the attachment of the affidavits of witnesses and documents supporting the cause of action or
defense is to forthwith bring all the relevant facts to the CA’s cognizance in order to enable the CA to determine
whether or not the petition has substantial merit. Should it find prima facie merit in the petition, the CA shall
give the petition due course and direct the service of summons on the respondent; otherwise, the CA has the
discretion to outrightly dismiss the petition for annulment.50

2.
Pinausukan’s petition for annulment was
substantively and procedurally defective

A review of the dismissal by the CA readily reveals that Pinausukan’s petition for annulment suffered from
procedural and substantive defects.

The procedural defect consisted in Pinausukan’s disregard of the fourth requirement mentioned earlier consisting
in its failure to submit together with the petition the affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of
action. It is true that the petition, which narrated the facts relied upon, was verified under oath by Roxanne.
However, the submission of the affidavits of witnesses together with the petition was not dispensable for that
reason. We reiterate with approval the CA’s emphatic observation in the resolution of July 31, 2003 dismissing the
petition for annulment to the effect that Roxanne’s verification related only "to the correctness of the allegations
in the petition" and was "not the same or equivalent to the affidavit of witnesses that the above-cited Rule
requires."51 To us, indeed, the true office of the verification is merely to secure an assurance that the allegations
of a pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith.52

Pinausukan’s failure to include the affidavits of witnesses was fatal to its petition for annulment.1âwphi1 Worthy
to reiterate is that the objective of the requirements of verification and submission of the affidavits of witnesses is
to bring all the relevant facts that will enable the CA to immediately determine whether or not the petition has
substantial merit. In that regard, however, the requirements are separate from each other, for only by the
affidavits of the witnesses who had competence about the circumstances constituting the extrinsic fraud can the
petitioner detail the extrinsic fraud being relied upon as the ground for its petition for annulment. This is because
extrinsic fraud cannot be presumed from the recitals alone of the pleading but needs to be particularized as to the
facts constitutive of it. The distinction between the verification and the affidavits is made more pronounced when
an issue is based on facts not appearing of record. In that instance, the issue may be heard on affidavits or
depositions presented by the respective parties, subject to the court directing that the matter be heard wholly or
partly on oral testimony or depositions.53

The substantive defect related to the supposed neglect of Atty. Villaflor to keep track of the case, and to his failure
to apprise Pinausukan of the developments in the case, which the CA did not accept as constituting extrinsic fraud,
because –

Based solely on these allegations, we do not see any basis to give due course to the petition as these allegations do
not speak of the extrinsic fraud contemplated by Rule 47. Notably, the petition’s own language states that what is
involved in this case is mistake and gross negligence of petitioner’s own counsel. The petition even suggests that
the negligence of counsel may constitute professional misconduct (but this is a matter for lawyer and client to
resolve). What is certain, for purposes of the application of Rule 47, is that mistake and gross negligence cannot be
equated to the extrinsic fraud that Rule 47 requires to be the ground for an annulment of judgment. By its very
nature, extrinsic fraud relates to a cause that is collateral in character, i.e., it relates to any fraudulent act of the
prevailing party in litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party has been
prevented from presenting fully his side of the cause, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.
Even in the presence of fraud, annulment will not lie unless the fraud is committed by the adverse party, not by
one’s own lawyer. In the latter case, the remedy of the client is to proceed against his own lawyer and not to re-
litigate the case where judgment had been rendered.54

We concur with the CA. Verily, such neglect of counsel, even if it was true, did not amount to extrinsic fraud
because it did not emanate from any act of FEBTC as the prevailing party, and did not occur outside the trial of the
case. Moreover, the failure to be fully aware of the developments in the case was Pinausukan's own responsibility.
As a litigant, it should not entirely leave the case in the hands of its counsel, for it had the continuing duty to keep
itself abreast of the developments if only to protect its own interest in the litigation. It could have discharged its
duty by keeping in regular touch with its counsel, but it did not. Consequently, it has only itself to blame.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 31, 2003 and
September 12, 2003; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 37-38; penned by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a Member of this Court), with the concurrence
of Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios (retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga (retired).

2 Id. at 41-45.

3 Id. at 164-183 (The real estate mortgages were to secure the payment of the following loans, to wit:
₱2,000,000.00 dated February 19, 1993; ₱1,500,000.00 dated May 4, 1993; ₱262,500.00 dated June 25, 1993; and
₱2,000,000.00 dated September 2, 1993).

4 Id. at 161-162.

5 Id. at 184-187.

6 Id. at 188.

7 Id. at 52-65.

8 Id. at 48.

9 Id. at 190.

10 Id. at 159-160.

11 CA rollo, pp. 4-5.

13 Supra note 2.

14 37 Phil. 921 (1918).

15 Id. at 948.

16 No. L-16252, September 29, 1964, 12 SCRA 34, 37.

17 No. L-24717, December 4, 1967, 21 SCRA 1169, 1172.

18 No. L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 322.

19 No. L-28306, December 18, 1971, 42 SCRA 537.

20 Id. at 541-543.

21 Id. at 542.

22 Id. at 545.

23 Approved on August 14, 1981.

24 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 9, (2).

25 Id., Section 19, (1).

26 The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which was adopted by the Court in Baguio City on April 8, 1997 in Bar Matter
No. 803, took effect on July 1, 1997.

27 G.R. No. 161122, September 24, 2012, 681 SCRA 580, 586-587.

28 Rules of Court, Rule 47, Section 7.

29 Id.

30 Republic v. Heirs of Sancho Magdato, G.R. No. 137857, September 11, 2000, 340 SCRA 115, 124.

31 Rules of Court, Rule 47, Section 1.

32 2 Feria & Noche, Civil Procedure, Annotated, 2001 Edition, Central Lawbook Publishing, Quezon City, p. 219.

33 Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370. March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 725, 735 (The respondent therein knew that the
petitioner was already residing at another address, but he nevertheless alleged in his petition that the petitioner
was residing at a different address. The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition by substituted
service on the address stated in the petition. The petitioner was compelled to file a petition under Rule 47 to assail
the decision rendered despite lack of summons. The CA denied the petition on the ground that there was no "clear
and specific averment by petitioner that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Neither is there any averment or
allegation that the present petition is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nor yet
that, on the assumption that extrinsic fraud can be a valid ground therefor, that it was not availed of, or could not
have been availed of, in a motion for new trial, or petition for relief.")

34 G.R. No. 114311, November 29, 1996, 265 SCRA 168, 180.

35 Tolentino v. Leviste, G.R. No. 156118, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 274, 282.

36 Arcenas v. Queen City Development Bank, G.R. No. 166819, June 16, 2010, 621 SCRA 11, 18.

37 Ybañez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117499, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 540, 551.

38 Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126673, August 28, 1998, 294 SCRA 714, 723.
39 Supra note 14, at 949.

40 In his dissent in the same case (id., at 950-951), Justice Malcolm was equally expressive of the lack of value of a
void judgment, quoting from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Mills v. Dickson (6 Rich. [S.C.], 487), to wit:
"A judgment which is void upon its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment roll to demonstrate
its want of vitality is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the power so to do exists. It
can bear no fruit to the plaintiff, but is a constant menace to the defendant."

41 Olizon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107075, September 1, 1994, 236 SCRA 148, 157-158, citing Tejido v.
Zamacoma, G.R. No. L-63040, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 78; Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23
SCRA 29; Sotto v. Teves, No. L-38018, October 31, 1978, 86 SCRA 154, 183.

42 Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 83588, September 29, 1997, 279 SCRA 590, 601.

43 Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho, et al., 96 Phil. 622, 637 (1955); Maneclang v. Baun, G.R. No. 27876, April 22, 1992, 208
SCRA 179, 198.

44 The Civil Code provides:

Article 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it,
and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

45 Rules of Court, Rule 131, Section 2(a).

46 Id., Rule 47, Section 4.

47 Id., Rule 8, Section 5.

48 Id., Rule 47, Section 4.

49 Id.

50 Id., Rule 47, Section 5.

51 Supra note 1.

52 Oshita v. Republic, No. L-21180, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 700, 702.

53 Rules of Court, Rule 133, Section 7.

54 Supra note 2.

G.R. No. 189881 April 19, 2017

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the August 26, 20092 and October 9, 20093 Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108033. The CA denied due course and dismissed Baclaran Marketing
Corporation's (BMC) Petition for Annulment of Judgment on the ground that it is not a remedy available to BMC.

Petitioner BMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of distribution, marketing and delivery of
cement. 4 It is one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 1218-A, entitled "Mamerto Sibulo, Jr. v. Ricardo Mendoza
and Baclaran Marketing, Inc." pending with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Branch 74 (Antipolo Court).5 The
case is one for damages arising from a vehicular collision in Taytay, Rizal between a 10-wheeler truck owned by
BMC and driven by its employee Ricardo Mendoza (Mendoza), and a car owned and driven by Mamerto Sibulo, Jr.
(Sibulo). The Antipolo Court, in its Decision6 dated November 21, 1990 (1990 Decision), ruled in favor of BMC and
Mendoza and dismissed Sibulo's complaint. 7 It found that the damages suffered by Sibulo were the result of his
own reckless and imprudent driving.8

On appeal, the CA, in its Decision9 dated May 9, 2005 reversed the Antipolo Court and held that Mendoza's
negligence caused the collision. It awarded Sibulo damages in the total amount of ₱765,159.55. 10 In the absence
of a motion for reconsideration, the Decision became final and executory on June 12, 2005. 11 The Antipolo Court
subsequently issued a Writ of Execution12 on January 16, 2006. Then, in an Order13 dated February 23, 2006, it
directed the Deputy Sheriff, upon motion of Sibulo, to implement the Writ of Execution against the real properties
owned by BMC, as it appears that BMC has no personal properties. The sheriff of the Antipolo Court levied upon
BMC's real property in Parafiaque City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34587 (property). He sold
the property and its improvements through public auction on April 17, 2006. Respondent Fernando C. Nieva
(Nieva) emerged as the highest bidder paying the total price of ₱800,000.00. 14

For BMC's failure to redeem the property within one year from the sale, Nieva consolidated ownership over it. He
filed a Petition for Cancellation of Transfer Certificate Title No. 34587 and Issuance of New [Title] in the Regional
Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 257 (Parañaque Court) pursuant to Section 107 of Presidential Decree No.
1529.15 The case was docketed as LRC Case No. 07-0119.16 The Parañaque Court granted the petition in its
Decision 17 dated March 26, 2008 and ordered BMC to surrender to Nieva, within 15 days from receipt of the
Decision, its owner's duplicate certificate of title over the property. Failing such, the Parañaque Court ordered the
Register of Deeds to annul TCT No. 34587 and issue a new title in Nieva's name. The Decision of the Parañaque
Court became final on May 8, 2008.18 Consequently, Nieva filed a Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession
over the property in the Parañaque Court. The case was docketed as LRC Case No. 08-0077. The Parañaque Court
granted the petition in its Decision19 dated January 26, 2009 and issued a Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate
against BMC dated March 12, 2009 and March 22, 2009, respective1y. 20

In view of the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate issued against it, BMC filed a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment 21 before the CA. BMC prayed for the annulment of the following orders and decisions:

(a) Writ of Execution dated January 16, 2006 issued by the Antipolo Court in Civil Case No. 1218-A;

(b) Order dated February 23, 2006 of the Antipolo Court in Civil Case No. 1218-A ordering the implementation of
the writ of execution over the real properties of BMC;

(c) Auction Sale dated April 17, 2006;

(d) Decision dated March 26, 2008 of the Parañaque Court in LRC Case No. 07-0119 canceling TCT No. 34587; and

(e) Decision dated January 26, 2009 of the Parañaque Court in LRC Case No. 08-0077, ordering the issuance of a
Writ of Possession. 22

BMC alleged that its counsel, Atty. lsagani B. Rizon (Atty. Rizon), committed acts of gross and inexcusable
negligence constituting "extrinsic fraud," which deprived it of due process and an opportunity to present its side.23
It discovered the fraud only in December 2008 when its representatives tried to pay the real estate tax on the
property, only to learn that the title to it had already been transferred to Nieva.24 BMC averred that it did not
know that Sibulo appealed the 1990 Decision of the Antipolo Court to the CA. It claimed that Atty. Rizon assured
BMC that the 1990 Decision ended the controversy.25 Had BMC la1own of the appeal, it could have opposed the
proceedings or engaged the services of new counsel.
BMC claimed that it immediately called Atty. Rizon in his office upon discovering that the property was levied upon
and sold at public auction. However, BMC was informed that Atty. Rizon died on January 30, 2009. It also learned
that Atty. Rizon ran for public office and won as Mayor of Baroy, Lanao Del Norte in the 1995, 2001, 2004 and 2007
elections.26 BMC alleged that based on court records, notices relative to the case against BMC were sent to Atty.
Rizon but, for some reason unknown to BMC, Atty. Rizon never informed it of the court documents/processes.27

BMC emphasized that the Antipolo Court ruled in its favor in Civil Case No. 1218-A and that it was only when BMC
failed to participate in the appeal that an adverse decision was rendered against it. 28 It maintains that if the
orders of the Antipolo and Parañaque Courts were allowed to stand, BMC will be deprived of its substantial
property rights over the property: when the property was sold to Nieva at the public auction for a bid price of
P800,000.00, its market value29 was already P19,890,000.00.30

The CA, in its Resolution dated August 26, 2009, denied BMC's petition. It ruled that the remedy of annulment of
judgment is not available to BMC because:

(a) Extrinsic fraud refers to a fraud perpetrated by the prevailing party, not by the unsuccessful party's own
counsel.31

(b) BMC is bound by the negligence of Atty. Rizon because it was negligent for not checking on the status of the
case. It did not also inform the Antipolo Court of its change of address. Thus, BMC cannot claim that it was denied
due process. 32

(c) A writ of execution or auction sale are not in the nature of a final judgment, order, or resolution, hence, they
cannot be the subject of an action to annul judgment.33

BMC moved for reconsideration; this, however, was denied. Hence, this petition,34 which raises the sole issue of
whether the CA erred in dismissing BMC's petition for annulment of judgment.

We deny the petition.

Rule 47 of the Rules of Court governs actions for the annulment of final judgments, orders, or resolutions of
regional trial courts in civil actions. It is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases
where there is no available or other adequate remedy.35 Its objective is to set aside a final and executory
judgment, which is not void upon its face, but is entirely regular in form, and whose alleged defect is not
apparent upon its face or from the recitals contained in the judgment.36 Since it disregards the time-honored
rule of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, the Rules of Court impose stringent requirements
before a litigant may avail of it. In Pinausukan Seafood House v. Far East Bank & Trust Company,37 we held that
"[g]iven the extraordinary nature and the objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order,"38 a
petitioner must comply with the statutory requirements as set forth under Rule 47. These are:

(1) The remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner; (2) The grounds for
the action of annulment of judgment are limited to either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction; (3) The action
must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction,
must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel; and (4) The petition must be verified, and should
allege with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the
petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.39

BMC's petition for annulment of judgment fails to meet the first and second requisites.

II

Rule 47, Section 1 limits the applicability of the remedy of annulment of judgment to final judgments, orders or
resolutions.40 A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the com1
to do in respect thereto. This may be an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is
in the right, or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground of res judicata or prescription.41 In
contrast, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely but leaves something to be done upon its
merits.42

We find that the CA correctly denied BMC's petition.

It bears stressing that Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure applies only to a petition to annul a judgment or
final order and resolution in civil actions, on the ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction or due process. A
final order or resolution is one which is issued by a court which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what
has been determined by the court. The rule does not apply to an action to annul the levy and sale at public
auction of petitioner's properties or the certificate of sale executed by the deputy sheriff over said properties.
Neither does it apply to an action to nullify a writ of execution because a writ of execution is not a final order or
resolution, but is issued to carry out the mandate of the court in the enforcement of a final order or of a
judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a final order or judgment against the losing party.44 (Citations
omitted, emphasis supplied.)

Corollarily, an order implementing a writ of execution issued over certain real properties is also not a final order
as it merely enforces a judicial process over an identified object. It does not involve an adjudication on the
merits or determination of the rights of the parties.

Closely related to a writ of execution is a writ of possession. In LZK Holdings and Development Corp. v. Planters
Development Bank,45 we explained that a writ of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a
judgment to recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give its possession to
the person entitled under the judgment.46 Thus, similar to a writ of execution, a writ of possession is not a final
order which may be annulled under Rule 47. It is merely a judicial process to enforce a final order against the
losing party. For this reason the Decision of the Antipolo Court ordering the issuance of writ of possession is also
not amenable to an action for annulment of judgment.

In fine, only the Decision of the Parafiaque Court ordering the cancellation ofBMC's title over the property
qualifies as a final judgment. It is a judgment on the merits declaring who between Nieva and BMC has the right
over the title to the property. Therefore, it may be the subject of an action for annulment of judgment. Be that
as it may, BMC failed to prove that any of the grounds for annulment are present in this case.

III

Rule 47, Section 2 provides extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction as the exclusive grounds for the remedy of
annulment of judgment.47 Case law, however, recognizes a third ground--denial of due process of law. Arcelona
v. Court of Appeals48 teaches that a decision which is patently void may be set aside on grounds of want of
jurisdiction or "non-compliance with due process of law. "49

Here, BMC invokes extrinsic fraud and lack of due process as grounds for its petition for annulment of judgment.
It claims that Atty. Rizon's gross negligence in handling the case constitutes extrinsic fraud and deprived it of due
process of law.

We are not persuaded. Extrinsic fraud refers to a fraud committed to the unsuccessful party by his opponent
preventing him from fully exhibiting his case by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise;
or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or
when an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat. 50

In Pinausukan, 51 we held that a lawyer's neglect in keeping track of the case and his failure to apprise his client
of the developments of the case do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Fraud is not extrinsic if the alleged fraudulent
act was committed by petitioner's own counsel. The fraud must emanate from the act of the adverse party and
must be of such nature as to deprive petitioner of its day in court. 52 Thus, in many cases, we have held that a
lawyer's mistake or gross negligence does not amount to extrinsic fraud that would grant a petition for
annulment of judgment. 53

In this case, the CA correctly found that BMC neither alleged nor proved that the gross negligence of its former
counsel was done in connivance with Nieva or Sibulo. 54 Therefore, it is not the extrinsic fraud contemplated
under Rule 47, Section 2.

BMC maintains that it was denied due process of law because it was not able to participate in the proceedings
subsequent to the 1990 Decision of the Antipolo Court. It alleges that Atty. Rizon did not inform it of Sibulo's
appeal and of the orders and processes issued by the courts. 55 BMC pleads that Atty. Rizon's gross negligence
in handling the case is tantamount to abandonment of the same. 56 Thus, it should not be bound by the
negligence of its counsel.
Nieva and Sibulo, on the other hand, assert that BMC was not deprived of due process. They aver that the
records of the CA show that BMC was furnished with a copy of the decision of the CA and a copy of the entry of
judgment.57

BMC' s contentions have no leg to stand on. It is well-settled that the negligence of the counsel binds the client,
except in cases where the gross negligence of the lawyer deprived his client of due process of law. However, mere
allegation of gross negligence does not suffice. In the recent case of Ong Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals,58 we held
that for the exception to apply, the client must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was maliciously
deprived of information that he could not have acted to protect his interests. The error of his counsel must have
been both palpable and maliciously exercised that it could viably be the basis for a disciplinary action.59
Pertinently, malice is never presumed but must be proved as a fact. The record is bereft of showing that BMC
alleged and proved that Atty. Rizon was motivated by malice in failing to infonn it of Sibulo' s appeal.

Moreover, the gross negligence of the counsel must not be accompanied by the client's own negligence.1âwphi1 In
Bejarasco, Jr. v. People,60 we ruled that for his failure to keep himself up-to-date on the status of his case, the
client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him. A litigant bears the responsibility of
monitoring the developments of his case for no prudent party leaves the fate of his case entirely in the hands of his
lawyer.61

In this light, BMC cannot pass all the blame to Atty. Rizon. It admitted in its petition before us that after obtaining a
favorable decision from the Antipolo Court, it did not bother to check the status of the case. 62 While it might be
true that Atty. Rizon assured it that the case has already ended with the 1990 Decision, the prudent thing would
have been for BMC to ask for evidence or proof that the decision was already final. This, BMC failed to do.

Since Sibulo's claim for damages involves a considerable amount of money, BMC is expected to protect its own
interest and not merely to rely on its counsel. It is the duty of. BMC to be in touch with its counsel regarding the
progress of the case. It cannot just sit back, relax, and wait for the outcome of the case.63 Since the alleged
negligent act of its counsel was accompanied by BMC's own negligence, the latter shall be bound by the fonner's
negligence.

We commiserate with the plight of BMC, assuming that it was indeed unaware of the proceedings subsequent to
the 1990 Decision. Nevertheless, we cannot simply disregard the statutory requirements of an action for
annulment of judgment, lest we open the gates for possible abuse of litigants who seek to delay the enforcement
of final and executory judgments of the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The August 26, 2009 and October 9, 2009 Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108033 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

* Designated as Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes per Raffle dated March 27,
2017.

1 Rollo, pp. 3-37; With Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.

2 Id. at 42-50. Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alino-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas-
Peralta and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.

3 Id. at 52-53.

4 Id. at 5.

5 Id.

6 Rollo, pp. 54-56, penned by Judge Daniel P. Alfonso.

7 Id. at 56.

8 Id
9 Rollo, pp. 58-73. Penned by Associate Justice Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente with Associate Justices Godardo A.
Jacinto and Bienvenido L. Reyes, concurring.

10 Id. at 72.

11 Id. at 192.

12 Id. at 74-75.

13 Id. at 76-77.

14 Id. at 8.

15 Property Registration Decree.

16 Rollo, p. 19.

17 Id. at 89-91.

18 Id. at 92-93

19 Id. at 94-96.

20 Id. at 11.

21 Id. at 131-158; With Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.

22 Id. at 133.

23 Id. at 134.

24 Id.

25 Rollo, p. 137

26 Id

27 Id

28 Rollo, p. 139.

29 Pegged at the time Nieva paid the capital gains tax.

30 Rollo, p. 135.

31 id. at 46.

32 id. at 48.

33 id. at 49-50.

34 id. at 32. BMC also prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin the implementation of the writ of possession issued by the Parañaque Court. BMC maintains that if not
enjoined by this Court, BMC will be ejected from the property and Nieva will undoubtedly transfer it to a third
person.

35 Antonino v. Register of Deeds of Makati City, G.R. No. 185663, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 227, 236 citing Ramos v.
Judge Combong, Jr., G.R. No. 144273, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 499

36 Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102900, October 2, 1997, 280 SCRA 20, 32-33, citing Macabingkil v.
People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, G.R. No. L-29080, August I 7, I 976, 72 SCRA326.

37 G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014, 714 SCRA 226.

39 Id. at 242-247.

40 Sec. I. Coverage. - This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

41 Ybiernas v. Tanco-Gabaldon, G.R. No. 178925, June l, 2011, 650 SCRA 154, 166, citing Intramuros Tennis Club,
Inc. v. Philippine Tourism Authority, G.R. No. 135630, September 26,, 341 SCRA 90.

42 Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., G.R. No. 172829, July 18, 2012, 677 SCRA 113, 119.

43 G.R. No. 146996, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 556.

44 Id. at 562. See also Land Bank of the Philippines v. Planta, G.R. No. 152324, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 664.

45 G.R. No. 167998, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 731.

46 Id. at 738, citing Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121494, June 8, 2000, 333 SCRA 189, 195;;

47 Sec. 2. Grounds for Annulment. -The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief.

48 Supra note 36.

49 See also Benatiro v. Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, G.R. No. 161220, July 30, 2008, 560 SCRA 478, 494- 495, citing
Intestate Estate of the Late Nimfa Sian v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 168882, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA
662.

50 Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114311, November 29, 1996, 265 SCRA 168, 180.

51 Supra note 37.

52 Id. at 232.

53 Lasala v. National Food Authority, G.R. No. 171582, August 19, 2015, 767 SCRA 430, 448.

54 Rollo, p. 46.

55 Id. at 15.

56 Id.at16.

57 Id. at 197.

58 G.R. No. 191972, January 26, 2015, 748 SCRA 198.

59 Id. at 208.

60 G.R.No.159781,February2, 2011,641 SCRA328.

61 Id. at 331, citing Delos Santos v. Elizalde, G .R. No. 141810, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 14, 30-31, further citing
Bernardo v. Court of Appeals (Special Sixth Division), G.R. No. 106153, July 14, 1997, 275 SCRA 143.

62 Rollo, p. 17.

63 Manaya v. Alabang Country Club, Incorporated, G.R. No. 168988, June 19, 2007, 525 SCRA 140, 148, citing GCP-
Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Principe, G.R. No. 141484, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 555, 563-564.