Republic of The Philippines
Republic of The Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
CRUZ, J.:
After serving the government in various capacities for 38-1/2 years, Evaristo Abaya, Jr.
retired as a principal teacher at the age of 60 on October 15, 1975. Thereafter, pursuant to
PD No. 626, he applied with the Government Service Insurance System for medical services,
appliance and supplies and permanent total disability benefits. The basis of his application
was his claimed service-connected ailment, initially diagnosed as cardio-vascular disease
and aggravating later for cerebral encephalopathy secondary to hypertension.
On June 3, 1976, the GSIS rejected his application on the ground that his ailment was not an
occupational disease. Upon appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission, the case
was on April 19, 1978, remanded to the GSIS for reception of additional evidence showing
that the applicant's illness was work-connected. On June 17, 1979, the GSIS delivered to the
petitioner a check in the amount of P l,218.25, representing his permanent partial disability
benefits for the period from October 15,1975, to March 1976.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioner appealed once again to the
ECC, which this time sustained the GSIS. He then sought assistance from this Court in a
lengthy letter where he explained his claim and bolstered it with citations of case digests
reported in various issues of the Manila Daily Bulletin. Realizing his need for professional
assistance, we referred him to the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, which thereafter
prepared and submitted the herein petition for him.
The only issue before us is whether the petitioner's ailment is permanent total or permanent
partial. Permanent total disability was described by the Court in Landicho v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission as follows:
1
It is important to consider that the petitioner opted to retire when he was only 60 years of age
although he was entitled to continue during good behavior for five more years. This fact, it is
urged, should indicate that he was no longer able to cope with his work because of his
illness.
It is also noted that the GSIS paid him what it called his partial permanent benefits for a total
of 150 days. Our attention is called to Section 2, Rule 7 of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation, providing that "a total disability is permanent if as a result of the
injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous
period exceeding 120 days."
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that the description of the petitioner's ailment
does not by itself prove that he has been permanently and totally disabled. He also argues
that the evaluation of the nature and duration of the employee's illness is vested solely in the
GSIS whose findings should be respected. Dismissing the certification made by the
petitioner's attending physician, he contends that "a mere general statement by his physician
that he has been rendered permanently and totally disabled by his illness is not sufficient to
serve as a basis for granting him permanent and total disability benefits under Art. 192.
The public respondent has apparently forgotten that in Bello v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission we held that "the doctor's certification as to the nature of the claimant's
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disability may be given credence as he normally would not make a false certification." This
ruling was a reiteration of Marte v. Employees Compensation Commission, where the Court 4
said:
No physician in his right mind and who is aware of the far reaching and
serious effect that his statements would cause on a money claim filed with a
government agency, would issue certifications indiscriminately without even
minding his own interests and protection. . . .Under normal circumstances, he
would not sacrifice his medical career for the sake of a lowly public school
teacher.
age of 49, "as a direct consequence of her hypertension and ametropia," or dimness of
vision. The Court, in reversing the public respondent there, held inter alia:
Petitioner could not in all honesty be deemed entitled to merely partial
disability benefit; because she has been forced out of work and has been
rendered incapable of further pursuing her usual job which is teaching. It was
not only her "ability to perform her usual task" which was impaired, and her
"efficiency and competence for work as well as earning capacity" which was
reduced; but ultimately, herein petitioner had to let go of her job as a teacher.
She was forced to retire because her illness rendered her incapable of
teaching (Landicho v. WCC, et al., supra; Marcelino v. Seven-Up Bottling Co.
of the Philippines, supra).
There is no reason to digress from this ruling. In fact, the herein petitioner's ailments are
even more serious than in Gonzaga, and he has even worked longer for the government.
We hold, therefore, that the petitioner is entitled to permanent total compensation benefits to
be determined in accordance with Section 5, Rule XI of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation providing as follows:
And as the record is silent as to the petitioner's monthly salary we hereby fix the said
compensation in the maximum amount of P12,000.00.
We also hold that the petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for his expenses incurred for
medical services, appliances and other supplies in connection with his ailment, conformably
to Section 4, Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees' compensation.
This is the least we can do for this faithful civil servant who was disabled in line of duty and
deserves the recognition and assistance of a grateful government.
SO ORDERED.