LaPorta Verdict Reversed
LaPorta Verdict Reversed
LaPorta Verdict Reversed
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
2 At trial the City disputed LaPorta’s account and instead argued that
LaPorta shot himself with Kelly’s gun. Because we are reviewing a denial
of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we view the evidence in
LaPorta’s favor. Ruiz-Cortez v. City of Chicago, 931 F.3d 592, 601 (7th Cir.
2019).
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II. Discussion
The City challenges the denial of its motion for judgment
as a matter of law. We review that ruling de novo. Ruiz-
Cortez v. City of Chicago, 931 F.3d 592, 601 (7th Cir. 2019). The
City also renews its request for a new trial based on coun-
sel’s improper remarks during closing argument. Because
we agree with the City’s first argument, we have no need to
reach the second.
Section 1983 states, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress … .
The statute thus provides a remedy for violations of fed-
eral rights committed by persons acting under color of state
law. To prevail on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove
that “(1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation was
visited upon him by a person or persons acting under color
of state law.” Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee,
570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009).
An action is not “under color of state law” merely be-
cause it is performed by a public employee or officer; the
action must be “related in some way to the performance of
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explained more than three decades ago, the Clause does not
impose a duty on the state to protect against injuries inflict-
ed by private actors.
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process
Clause itself requires the State to protect the
life, liberty, and property of its citizens against
invasion by private actors. The Clause is
phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to
act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels
of safety and security. It forbids the State itself
to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without “due process of law,” but its lan-
guage cannot fairly be extended to impose an
affirmative obligation on the State to ensure
that those interests do not come to harm
through other means.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
DeShaney involved a due-process claim on behalf of a
young boy who was abused by his father. Id. at 191. County
social workers became aware of suspicious injuries and
other signs of abuse but took no action to remove the child
from his father’s custody. Id. After the latest and most severe
beating left the boy permanently disabled, the father was
arrested and convicted of child abuse. The boy’s mother then
sued the county and the social workers under § 1983 alleging
that they violated her son’s right to due process. Id. at 193.
The Supreme Court rejected the claim, explaining that
the purpose of the Due Process Clause is “to protect the
people from the State, not to ensure that the State protect[s]
them from each other.” Id. at 196. The Court accordingly
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930 F.3d 307, 319 (4th Cir. 2019); M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v.
Abbott, 907 F.3d 237, 248–49 (5th Cir. 2018); Matthews v.
Bergdorf, 889 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2018); L.R. v. Sch. Dist.
of Philadelphia, 836 F.3d 235, 241–42 (3d Cir. 2016); Kruger v.
Nebraska, 820 F.3d 295, 302–03 (8th Cir. 2016); Matican v. City
of New York, 524 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2008); Rivera v. Rhode
Island, 402 F.3d 27, 34–35 (1st Cir. 2005); Butera v. District of
Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 647–50 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Wyke v. Polk
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 566–67 (11th Cir. 1997).
LaPorta resists application of DeShaney by shifting the
focus to the Monell framework for municipal liability. The
judge agreed with this approach, reasoning that because the
jury found that the City’s policy failures “caused” Kelly to
shoot LaPorta, DeShaney was inapplicable. Other judges in
the Northern District of Illinois have issued similar rulings.
See Wagner v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 378 F. Supp. 3d 713,
714–15 (N.D. Ill. 2019); Falcon v. City of Chicago, No. 17 C
5991, 2018 WL 2716286, at *3–5 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 2018);
Cazares v. Frugoli, No. 13 C 5626, 2017 WL 1196978, at *15
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2017); Obrycka v. City of Chicago, No. 07 C
2372, 2012 WL 601810, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2012).
These decisions reflect a basic misunderstanding of the
relationship between Monell and DeShaney. Monell and
DeShaney are not competing frameworks for liability. The
two cases concern fundamentally distinct subjects. Monell
interpreted § 1983 and addressed the issue of who can be
sued under the statute; the Court held that a municipality is
a “person” under § 1983 and may be liable—just like an
individual public official—for its own violations of federal
rights. 436 U.S. at 694. Monell did not address the substance
of any right under the federal Constitution or laws. It has
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