Professional Documents
Culture Documents
0326 - 2021.02.05 Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion To Compel or in The Alternative Dismiss M.R.S's Complaint
0326 - 2021.02.05 Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion To Compel or in The Alternative Dismiss M.R.S's Complaint
AT CHATTANOOGA
COMES NOW Defendants Hamilton County, Tyler McRae and Daniel Wilkey
(hereinafter “Defendants”), by and through counsel Sharon Milling, W. Gerald Tidwell and J.
Micah Guster, and files this Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Compel or in the
On May 15, 2020 W. Gerald Tidwell sent interrogatories and Request for Admissions to
MRS on behalf of Defendant Tyler McRae. On June 8, 2020, W. Gerald Tidwell received what
were purported to be answers to Request for Admissions signed by Robin Flores with no
answers. The place for answers was blank. On December 31, 2020, W. Gerald Tidwell received
Defendant Daniel Wilkey sent interrogatories to Plaintiff MRS and received those back unsigned
on December 31, 2020.1 Rule 33(b)(2) of the Fed. R. Civ. P. states that the “responding party
must serve its answers and any objections within 30 days after being served with the
interrogatories.” Rule 33(b)(3) of the Fed. R. Civ. P. states that each “interrogatory must, to the
extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Rule
33(b)(5) of the Fed. R. Civ. P. states that the “person who makes the answers [to the
interrogatories] must sign them.” Plaintiff MRS has not complied with any of these rules. MRS
has had more than 60 days to more than 6 months to simply sign any of the interrogatory answers
under oath, yet this is undone. Demand for answers signed have been made.
Plaintiff MRS has also skipped multiple depositions. Rule 30(a)(2) of the Fed. R. Civ. P.
allows that a “party may, by oral questions, depose any person, including a party, without leave
of court.” MRS’s deposition was originally scheduled on November 20, 2020 by the agreement
of the parties and with appropriate notice sent to Plaintiff’s counsel. Due to prior depositions,
the parties’ counsel agreed to move MRS’s deposition to January 6, 2021. On January 6, 2021,
61 days later, although counsel appeared, MRS failed to appear for that deposition. After that
Tyler McRae’s counsel Tidwell noticed Plaintiff MRS to appear on January 21, 2021 which was
also a date agreed to by the parties. Less than 24 hours before MRS’s third scheduled
1
Counsel for the Plaintiffs have stated that they would endeavor to get these interrogatories signed, but up and
until the filling of this motion, MRS has failed to swear to and sign these interrogatories. Recent developments
noted below indicate that this Plaintiff will not be signing these answers or sitting for a deposition.
MRS would not be appearing at the January 21, 2021 deposition. Thus, it was cancelled.2
Defendants have not received Plaintiff MRS’s presence nor signature under oath in any
form during this litigation. This makes it difficult for Defendants to prepare a defense and
wastes time, money, and effort unnecessarily. The Court has dealt with similar matters before.
In Pealer v. Lowe's Home Centers LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7493 (E.D. Tenn. 2021), Judge
Collier dismissed a case with prejudice when Plaintiff failed to respond to requests for multiple
depositions and notified Defendant’s counsel 4 hours before her final scheduled deposition that
she would not appear. Id at *10-11. In Jones-Maclin v. Tiger Commissary Services Inc.2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13283, (E.D. Tenn. 2015)3, the Court dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiff’s
complaint when they failed to answer interrogatories and requests for production after granting a
motion to compel for that discovery, and Plaintiff’s counsel, but not Plaintiff themself, appeared
In Ray v. Fisk University, the Court dismissed a complaint without prejudice “under the
‘relaxed’ standard for dismissals” when a Plaintiff failed to respond to “the Court’s show-cause
order” to “prosecute under rule Rule 41(b).” Ray v. Fisk University, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
113792, *8-9 (M.D. Tenn. 2020) 4. In Holder v. AT&T Services, Inc., the Court dismissed the
Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice under Rule 37 for failure to prosecute when the Plaintiff
failed to “appear for a third properly noticed deposition” after calling Defendant’s counsel 8 days
2
Upon motion of counsel for MRS to appoint a guardian-ad-litem (Doc. 135), this court appointed Ms. White to
serve in that role (Doc. 255). Plaintiff’s counsel Robin Flores has advised Mr. Tidwell that Ms. White was assisting in
getting the outstanding interrogatories answered and signed.
3
Adopted by the District Judge at Jones-Maclin v. Tiger Commissary Services Inc. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12435 (E.D.
Tenn. 2015).
4
This opinion was adopted by the District Court at Ray v. Fisk University 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132459 (M.D. Tenn.
2020).
undisclosed information from Plaintiff’s earlier phone call. Holder v. AT&T Services, Inc., 2015
Rule 37(d)(1)(A)(i)(ii) of the Fed. R. Civ. P. states that “the court where the action is
pending may, on motion, order sanctions if: (i) a party…fails, after being served with proper
notice, to appear for that person's deposition; or (ii) a party, after being properly served with
interrogatories under Rule 33…fails to serve its answers, objections, or written response.” “In
construing a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, the court should consider four factors: (1)
whether the party's failure to cooperate in discovery is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault; (2)
whether the adversary was prejudiced by the party's failure to cooperate in discovery; (3)
whether the party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to the sanctions; and (4)
whether less drastic sanctions were first imposed or considered. Freeland, 103 F.3d at 1277
(citing Reg'l Refuse Sys., Inc., v. Granger Sales, Inc., 842 F.2d 150, 155 (6th Cir. 1987)).”
Holder at *21-23. (See also Pealer at *4-10 and Ray v. Fisk University at *6-8, citing all four
factors). “If a plaintiff fails properly to prosecute an action, it can be dismissed either pursuant
to the Court's inherent power to control its docket, or involuntarily under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).
Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962); Boudwin v.
Graystone Insurance Co., 756 F.2d 399 (5th Cir.1985).” Jones-Maclin at *3. “Typically, none
of the factors is outcome dispositive, and dismissal is entrusted to the discretion of the Court.” Id
at *3 (citing Knoll v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 176 F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir.1999).
The first factor weighs in favor of dismissal. “To meet this standard, a plaintiff's conduct
must ‘display either an intent to thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard for the effect
of his conduct on those proceedings.’ Kovacic v. Tyco Valves & Controls, LP, 433 F. App'x 376,
is ‘a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct.’ Carpenter, 723 F.3d at 704.” The Pealer
Court found factor one “weigh[ed] heavily in favor of dismissal” citing “refusal to comply with
discovery requests can establish a clear record of delay. Id at *4-6. See Harmon v. CSX Transp.,
Inc., 110 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 1997). In Harmon, the plaintiff's repeated failure to respond to
the defendant's interrogatory requests was found to demonstrate delay...” Pealer at *7. The
Pealer Court also found under the first factor that “Plaintiff refused to respond to Defendant's
request to schedule her deposition and repeated efforts to confirm her deposition date for three
months.” Id at *7. Factor one can weigh heavily in favor of Defendants because Plaintiff MRS
has (1) not signed interrogatories under oath, (2) provided them months after initial service to the
Defendants, and (3) not appeared at any deposition. (See also Holder v. AT&T Services, Inc.,
finding Plaintiff’s “third failure to appear” at her deposition “was not in good faith”). MRS
simply refuses to comply with valid discovery requests or to appear at her deposition.
The second factor heavily weighs in favor of dismissal. “The second factor that a court
must consider is whether the adversary was prejudiced by the dismissed party's conduct. Wu,
420 F.3d at 643-44 (quoting Knoll v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 176 F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 1999)).
Failure to cooperate with discovery requests has been found to constitute prejudice. See, e.g.,
Harmon, 110 F.3d at 368. In Harmon, the plaintiff's failure to respond to the defendant's
discovery requests meant [n]ot only had [the defendant] been unable to secure the information
requested, but it was also required to waste time, money, and effort in pursuit of cooperation
which [the plaintiff] was legally obligated to provide. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit had no doubt that [the defendant] was prejudiced by [the plaintiff's] failure to respond to
its interrogatories. Pealer at *4.” Plaintiff MRS’s deposition “is critical to the defendant's
As the Court noted in Pealer “[l]ike the Court of Appeals in Harmon, the Court has no
doubt Plaintiff's conduct has prejudiced Defendant. Plaintiff's conduct has caused Defendant to
waste time, money, and effort to schedule and prepare for Plaintiff's deposition.” Pealer at *8
Further, as the Court noted in recommending dismissal in Jones-Maclin “Plaintiff did not
respond to the interrogatories and requests for production of documents” nor appear for her
deposition even with counsel appearing at it. Further “Defendants have been prejudiced in that it
has taken substantial steps to further the case without cooperation from Plaintiff. Without her
Maclin at *4. Wherefore, with Plaintiff MRS’s unwillingness to effectively cooperate with
discovery, Defendants have been prejudiced, and this factor weighs heavily in their favor.
The third factor weighs slightly in Defendants’ favor. Defendants are requesting the
Court compel or alternatively dismiss the case. While the Defendants’ intention to file a motion
to compel with appropriate sanctions has been made known to counsel for MRS, counsel has no
way of knowing if this has been made known to the Plaintiff here for reasons explained below. If
the Court compels Plaintiff’s discovery, this can provide MRS with sufficient warning of
discovery sanctions. Notwithstanding, Plaintiff MRS has not participated substantially in this
litigation for months by not properly signing and timely returning her interrogatories or Request
for Admissions to the Defendants, nor appearing for multiple scheduled and noticed depositions
in this case. Given more than 6 months of untoward behavior, a warning already seems
reasonably or sufficiently supplied when someone does not show up at their deposition or sign
Cummings (MRS’s stepfather) has been taken on January 14, 2021.5 MRS has been running
away from home. She has run away from home without permission about five times in the last
year. She was gone for the entire summer of 2020. Her parents believe she was with an adult
boyfriend and may have been living in hotels with him. On January 4, 2021, MRS was in
Juvenile Court regarding this behavior and the Judge refused to remove her ankle monitor that
had been ordered by the court due to her running away from home. That night she ran away and
had not been home since. Hence her failure to appear on January 6, 2021 for her deposition. Her
stepfather testified that she had not been to school either in person or online this school year.6
MRS will be eighteen years old in a few weeks. It is reasonable to assume that she is not
returning home and that she will never prosecute this lawsuit that was filed by her mother as next
The fourth factor is in Defendants’ favor as well. In Pealer, the Court dismissed the case
with prejudice as “an appropriate sanction based not only on Plaintiff's representation, but also
on her failure to comply with Defendant's discovery efforts.” Id at * 11. While Plaintiff MRS
may have not verbally said she is no longer participating in the litigation, her actions speaker
louder than words. As stated previously, she still to this day has not properly responded to
discovery provided to her in May and October 2020, nor has appeared for any previously
scheduled deposition. MRS is stating by her actions she does not want to participate in this
litigation. If the Court issues an order providing lesser sanctions, this factor will weigh even
more heavily in Defendants’ favor. An alternative to lengthy and costly litigation is to give
5
The transcript has not been prepared and delivered yet so the representations as to content are from notes of
counsel and memory.
6
School records from Soddy Daisy High School obtained by defense counsel using a court order confirm this.
without prejudice. Therefore, factors three and four would be stronger. Notwithstanding, factors
one and two do weigh heavily in Defendants’ favor, and underneath 6th Circuit case law, no
factors are “outcome dispositive,” thus dismissal can be granted on those two bases alone
without warning or lesser sanctions. Jones-Maclin at *3 (citing Knoll v. American Telephone &
Lastly, counsel would note for the Court the seriousness of the accusations against these
Defendants. MRS has accused Wilkey of sexually molesting her. She has accused McRae of
standing by and watching without intervening. There has been unusually extensive press
coverage and these men have been damaged in ways that can never be repaired. The Defendants
vehemently deny these claims and would note that numerous false statements of the other four
Plaintiffs that were present at this event have been shown through written discovery and
deposition testimony of those Plaintiffs and Preston Sylar.7 These salacious and sensational
allegations smack of group think and collaborative memory of events. After doing so, MRS will
not even face those she has accused and allow their counsel to question her about the many
contradictions, unlikely claims, and sorted allegations she has made against these men.
Counsel filing this motion are aware that Plaintiff’s counsel has filed a motion to
withdraw and then struck it on technical grounds indicating it will be refiled. That motion has
7
Sylar was an occupant of the car pulled over on the night of this event with the five Plaintiffs. He has not filed
suit and has no reason to misrepresent the events of that night. Several of the Plaintiffs stated in their complaints
that the Defendants ordered Sylar to strip his clothes off in the rain down to his underwear which he did and then
take off his boxer shorts which he refused. MRS did not claim this. Sylar was deposed and denied it, even laughing
at this assertion. When confronted with this, several Plaintiffs persisted in this claim even though the video
evidence did not support it. This is typical of the claims of these Plaintiffs in their complaints. MRS made claims in
her complaints of both actions by Wilkey and statements made by the Defendants of a profane and inappropriate
nature that cannot be heard on the audio of that video. There are other such contradictions in the physical and
testimonial evidence when compared to the written claims of MRS and other Plaintiffs.
counsel’s ability to withdraw, but only to bring these issues before the court so that they can be
addressed with any motion to withdraw so that if granted, a reasonable deadline would exist for
answering written discovery and a date for the deposition of the Plaintiff if the court chooses the
path of compulsion of discovery. It is not the intention of defense counsel to use this motion to
keep the Plaintiff’s counsel in the case since they have requested the court allow them to
withdraw.
Wherefore pursuant to Rules 37 and 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Case
Number 1:19-cv-00348, the Defendants ask that their Motion to Compel be granted or
alternatively the Court dismiss Plaintiff MRS’s complaint with or without prejudice. Counsel
contends that sanctions are appropriate against MRS. Although she is a minor, she shows no
sense of responsibility or awareness of the damage she has caused and continues to cause. It is
an appropriate exercise of this Court’s power to impose consequences on this young person for
Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have served a true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading upon
the following individual(s) via ECF, hand delivery, fax, email and/or regular U.S. mail, postage
prepaid, and correctly addressed as follows: