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Peter Kivisto - Social Theory - Roots and Branches-Roxbury (2000)
Peter Kivisto - Social Theory - Roots and Branches-Roxbury (2000)
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SOCIAL
THEORY
ROOTS AND BRANCHES
Readings
Peter Kivisto
Augustana College
Copyright © 2000 by Roxbury Publishing Company. All rights reserved under International
and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
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Printed on acid-free paper in the United States of America. This paper meets the standards
for recycling of the Environmental Protection Agency.
ISBN: 1-891487-26-4
Introduction. 1
I. Karl Marx
1. Alienated Labor. 5
Alienation is Marxs central focus in this early critique
of capitalism.
2. Theses on Feuerbach. 13
In this critique of Feuerbach's materialism, Marx sug¬
gests the need for an historical dimension which appre¬
ciates the connection between theory and praxis.
4. Commodities. 23
This selection from Capital presents Marx's under¬
standing of what he means by the term "commodity."
in
8. Anomic Suicide. 47
In this selection, Durkheim discusses anomic suicide,
one of the four types of suicide he identifies. He con¬
tends that anomie is a characteristic social pathology
of modern society
13. Bureaucracy. 80
The first important analyst of bureaucracy, Weber saw
it as an essential ingredient for the expansion of capi¬
talism; here he offers an ideal typical portrait of bu¬
reaucracy.
IV
17. The Problem of Sociology. 105
This essay presents Simmels understanding of the
proper object of sociology—which he refers to as "so-
ciation"—and his opinion about how sociology differs
from psychology.
24. The Fusion of the T and the 'Me' in Social Activities. 144
George Herbert Mead
According to Mead, the "I" and the "me" are the two
aspects of the self that must work together to make act¬
ing in social life possible.
v
VI. Neglected Voices
25. The Conservation of Races. 149
W. E. B. Du Bois
Du Bois contends that there are significant spiritual
and psychical differences among the major races and
as a result various races have contributed in different
ways to civilizational development.
VI
31. Functional Differentiation. 186
Niklas Luhmann
According to Luhmann, the inability to speak about the
unity of the social system means that our capacity to
resolve social problems on the basis of shared value
commitments is severely limited.
Vll
38. Society as Symbolic Interaction. 232
Herbert Blumer
Blumer offers an outline of what he termed “symbolic
interactionism," seeking to contrast how his approach
of beginning with the interpretive work of actors in the
process of constructing their social lives differs from
competing theories such as behaviorism and function¬
alism.
39. Bases of Fun. 239
Erving Goffman
Depicting games as being structured to stand outside
of the routines of everyday life, Goffman shows how
they are nevertheless implicated in and often spill over
into those routines.
40. The Drama in the Routine: A Prolegomenon to a
Praxiological Sociology. 247
Stanford M. Lyman
In his outline of a sociology of praxis, Lyman argues for
the importance of considering routine or habitual be¬
haviors as providing the frameworks within which
more innovative and dramatic actions are played out.
Vlll
XI. Exchange Theory and Rational Choice Theory
45. Social Behavior as Exchange . 287
George C. Homans
One of the key figures associated with the development
of exchange theory, Homans sketches an outline of an
exchange paradigm that in its most elementary form
seeks to explain social behavior in terms of costs and
rewards.
IX
51. Sociology From Womens Experience: A Reaffirmation .... 339
Dorothy E. Smith
Smith makes a case for a theoretical perspective that
begins with women's concrete experiences; here she
discusses her understanding of the notion of "stand¬
point."
x
XIV. Postmodernism and Poststructuralism
57. Advertising. 382
Jean Baudrillard
As a radical proponent of postmodernism, Baudrillard
offers a vision of a world saturated by the media and
entertainment industries. The result, he contends, is a
dissolving of the differences between the real and im¬
ages, signs, and simulations.
XI
63. The Time-Space Constitution of Social Systems . 427
Anthony Giddens
Giddens’ attempt to overcome the dualism between
structure and agency becomes articulated as "structu¬
ration theory." In this passage he outlines ten features
of such an approach.
64. Queer-ing Sociology, Sociologizing Queer Theory 434
Steven Seidman
Seidman is the key sociological proponent of "queer
theory," which attempts to redress the theoretical si¬
lence regarding sexual orientation that has charac¬
terized both classical and contemporary social theory.
Xll
Social Theory:
An Introduction
Social theory encompasses a body of writ- The reader is divided into two sections,
ing, dating from the early nineteenth century which I have termed "Roots" and "Branches."
that has informed and continues to inform The former comprises the period, from
the field of sociology This anthology is de¬ roughly 1840 to 1920, when sociology began
signed to introduce students in social theory to emerge as a distinctive enterprise. The
classes to the range and scope of this writing. classic figures in the discipline were respon¬
A casual perusal of the 64 entries in this col¬ sible, even when they were not trying to do
lection will reveal the remarkable variety of so, for giving sociology its initial identity.
work that falls under the rubric "social the¬ There is widespread consensus that four fig¬
ory/’ Looking a bit further, you will find am¬ ures played the major roles in this history:
ple indications that social theory is a con¬ Karl Marx, who never claimed to be a socio¬
tested terrain abounding in intellectual de¬ logist or suggested he wanted to advance so¬
bates and controversies. I selected Peter ciology’s cause; Emile Durkheim, who was
Xiao’s "Intellectual Pursuits" for the cover of single-mindedly determined to promote soci¬
the book because it humorously conveys the ology as a science quite distinct from other
sense of urgency and importance that think¬ social sciences; Max Weber, who became a
ers attach to ideas. While it is not often that sociologist late in life but who never gave up
intellectual disputes lead scholars to throw considering himself to also be an economist
books at one another, it is true that social and a historian; and Georg Simmel, whose
theorists are capable of being quite feisty! reputation in recent years has finally landed
They take ideas seriously, and as such their him in the pantheon of founding figures.
debates with those who have a different sense The history of this period would be incom¬
of the nature and purpose of theory are not plete without the inclusion of readings from
entered into lightly. two other groups. On the one hand, numer¬
While the selection process necessarily ex¬ ous influential intellectuals from outside of
sociology proper have been taken seriously
cluded many significant theorists, I have
by sociologists and have informed certain de¬
tried to identify and include representatives
velopments in social theory. A trio of philoso¬
of those theoretical approaches that have had
phers (Friedrich Nietzsche, William James,
the greatest impact on sociology. The history and George Herbert Mead) along with the
of sociology has been an ongoing process of founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud,
defining disciplinary boundaries while re¬ are particularly important in this regard, and
maining open to interdisciplinary dialogues. representative readings from their works are
The readings I have selected reflect an at¬ included. On the other hand, some individu¬
tempt to show how sociology has developed als, because of their race or gender, were mar¬
as a distinctive enterprise while also reveal¬ ginalized during their lifetimes and as a re¬
ing the ways in which voices from outside the sult failed to influence developments in the¬
discipline have continued to enrich it. ory the way we might, looking retrospec-
1
2 Social Theory: An Introduction
tively, have thought they would have. Such is resemblances to one or another of the major
the case with W. E. B. Du Bois, the first black theory approaches, are nonetheless suffi¬
Ph.D. from Harvard; the feminist thinker ciently novel to be simply gathered under the
Charlotte Perkins Gilman; Jane Addams, the heading “Further Directions.”
founder of Hull House; and the anthropolo¬ The choice of entries for any particular
gist Elsie Clews Parsons. Readings from all theorist or theory school included consider¬
four are also included in the “Roots” section. ation of their importance and accessibility to
Turning to the “Branches” section, we fo¬ student readers—an inherently difficult mat¬
cus on the proliferation of schools or para¬ ter in social theory anthologies. While I make
digms in recent years. Indeed, there are so no claim that the readings are easy, I do be¬
many theory camps that not all could be in¬ lieve that careful attention has been paid to
cluded, and thus what we have here is only including seminal readings that can be made
part of the story—although, I believe, the comprehensible to most students taking a re¬
most important part. Beginning after World quired theory course.
War II, three major theoretical orientations My confidence is reinforced by the fact
took root in sociology, especially in its Ameri¬ that I received valuable advice from a num¬
can variant. The first, functionalism or struc¬ ber of people who currently teach theory
tural functionalism, under the aegis of Talcott courses. These instructors include: Joan Al-
Parsons, became the reigning orthodoxy.
way, University of Miami; Janet S. Chafetz,
The other two, conflict theory and symbolic
University of Houston; David R. Dickens,
interactionism, became, in effect, the loyal
University of Nevada at Las Vegas; Keith
opposition. The several selections from each
Doubt, Truman State University; Anne Eisen-
of these theory paradigms affords an appre¬
berg, University of North Texas; Thomas
ciation of all three traditions, which continue
to have an impact on theory today. Fararo, University of Pittsburgh; Joseph
Hopper, University of Chicago; Gary Jawor-
As the remaining sections aptly reveal,
these three are no longer the only games in ski, Fairleigh Dickinson University; Meg
town. Indeed, from within sociology proper, Wilkes Karraker, University of St. Thomas;
schools of thought such as phenomenology, Jerry Lewis, Kent State University; Mary Ro¬
ethnomethodology, exchange theory, rational gers, University of West Florida; Teresa L.
choice theory, and critical theory have devel¬ Scheid, University of North Carolina at Char¬
oped sociological constituencies, and in lotte; Steven Seidman, SUNY at Albany;
many instances, fruitful dialogues with other Kathleen Slobin, North Dakota State Univer¬
approaches have enriched and enlivened cur¬ sity; Gerald M. Turkel, University of Dela¬
rent debates. At the same time, a heightened ware; and Leon Warshay, Wayne State Uni¬
appreciation of intellectual currents outside versity. I want to thank each of them for their
of sociology has informed feminist theory perceptive and constructive comments. I also
and discussions concerning postmodernism. want to thank Claude Teweles, whose judg¬
Finally, the collection concludes with essays ment on these matters I have also come to
from authors who, although bearing family appreciate. ♦
Part One
The Roots—Classical Social Theory
Alienated Labor 5
I. Karl Marx
free trade, and the division of landed prop¬ of the object or slavery to it, and appropria¬
erty were only seen as fortuitous circum¬ tion as alienation, as extemalization.
stances created by will and force, not devel¬ The realization of labour appears as a loss
oped and comprehended as necessary, inevi¬ of reality to an extent that the worker loses
table, and natural results of monopoly, cor¬ his reality by dying of starvation. Objectifica¬
porations, and feudal property tion appears as a loss of the object to such an
So what we have to understand now is the extent that the worker is robbed not only of
essential connection of private property, self¬ the objects necessary for his life but also of
ishness, the separation of labour, capital, and the objects of his work. Indeed, labour itself
landed property, of exchange and competi¬ becomes an object he can only have in his
tion, of the value and degradation of man, of power with the greatest of efforts and at ir¬
monopoly and competition, etc.—the con¬ regular intervals. The appropriation of the
nection of all this alienation with the money object appears as alienation to such an extent
system. that the more objects the worker produces,
Let us not be like the political economist the less he can possess and the more he falls
who, when he wishes to explain something, under the domination of his product, capital.
puts himself in an imaginary original state of All these consequences follow from the
affairs. Such an original stage of affairs ex¬ fact that the worker relates to the product of
plains nothing. He simply pushes the ques¬ his labour as to an alien object. For it is evi¬
tion back into a grey and nebulous distance. dent from this presupposition that the more
He presupposes as a fact and an event what the worker externalizes himself in his work,
the more powerful becomes the alien, objec¬
he ought to be deducing, namely the neces¬
tive world that he creates opposite himself,
sary connection between the two things, for
the poorer he becomes himself in his inner
example, between the division of labour and
life and the less he can call his own. It is just
exchange. Similarly, the theologian explains
the same in religion. The more man puts into
the origin of evil through the fall, i.e. he pre¬
God, the less he retains in himself. The
supposes as an historical fact what he should
worker puts his life into the object and this
be explaining.
means that it no longer belongs to him but to
We start with a contemporary fact of po¬
the object. So the greater this activity, the
litical economy:
more the worker is without an object. What
The worker becomes poorer the richer is
the product of his labour is, that he is not. So
his production, the more it increases in
the greater this product the less he is him-
power and scope. The worker becomes a self.The extemalization of the worker in his
commodity that is all the cheaper the more product implies not only that his labour be¬
commodities he creates. The depreciation of comes an object, an exterior existence but
the human world progresses in direct propor¬ also that it exists outside him, independent
tion to the increase in value of the world of and alien, and becomes a self-sufficient
things. Labour does not only produce com¬ power opposite him, that the life that he has
modities; it produces itself and the labourer lent to the object affronts him, hostile and
as a commodity and that to the extent to alien.
which it produces commodities in general. Let us now deal in more detail with objec¬
What this fact expresses is merely this: the tification, the production of the worker, and
object that labour produces, its product, con¬ the alienation, the loss of the object, his prod¬
fronts it as an alien being, as a power inde¬ uct, which is involved in it.
pendent of the producer. The product of la¬ The worker can create nothing without na¬
bour is labour that has solidified itself into an ture, the sensuous exterior world. It is the
object, made itself into a thing, the objectifi¬ matter in which his labour realizes itself, in
cation of labour. The realization of labour is which it is active, out of which and through
its objectification. In political economy this which it produces.
realization of labour appears as a loss of re¬ But as nature affords the means of life for
ality for the worker, objectification as a loss labour in the sense that labour cannot live
Alienated Labor 7
without objects on which it exercises itself, ship of the man of means to the objects of
so it affords a means of life in the narrower production and to production itself is only a
sense, namely the means for the physical sub¬ consequence of this first relationship. And it
sistence of the worker himself. confirms it. We shall examine this other as¬
Thus the more the worker appropriates pect later.
the exterior world of sensuous nature by his So when we ask the question: what rela¬
labour, the more he doubly deprives himself tionship is essential to labour, we are asking
of the means of subsistence, firstly since the about the relationship of the worker to pro¬
exterior sensuous world increasingly ceases duction.
to be an object belonging to his work, a Up to now we have considered only one
means of subsistence for his labour; secondly, aspect of the alienation or externalization of
since it increasingly ceases to be a means of the worker, his relationship to the products
subsistence in the direct sense, a means for of his labour. But alienation shows itself not
the physical subsistence of the worker. only in the result, but also in the act of pro¬
Thus in these two ways the worker be-' duction, inside productive activity itself.
comes a slave to his object: firstly he receives How would the worker be able to affront the
an object of labour, that is he receives labour, product of his work as an alien being if he did
and secondly, he receives the means of sub¬ not alienate himself in the act of production
sistence. Thus it is his object that permits him itself? For the product is merely the summary
to exist first as a worker and secondly as a of the activity of production. So if the product
physical subject. The climax of this slavery is of labour is externalization, production itself
that only as a worker can he maintain himself must be active externalization, the extemali-
as a physical subject and it is only as a physi¬ zation of activity, the activity of extemaliza-
cal subject that he is a worker. tion. The alienation of the object of labour is
(According to the laws of political econ-y*^ only the resume of the alienation, the exter¬
omy the ahenation of tKeTvorkerin-his object/ ^ nalization in the activity of labour itself.
is expresse3Tfs foh worker / What does the externalization of labour
produces the less he has to consume, the consist of then?
more values he creates the more valueless / Firstly, that labour is exterior to the
and worthless he becomes, the more formed * r worker, that is, it does not belong to his es¬
the product the more deformed the worker, sence. Therefore he does not confirm himself
the more civilized the product, the more bar¬ in his work, he denies himself, feels miser¬
baric the worker, the more powerful the work able instead of happy, deploys no free physi¬
the more powerless becmnes_tEworker, the cal and intellectual energy, but mortifies his
more cuTtured tEe work the more philistine body and ruins his mind. Thus the worker
the worker becomes and more of a slave to only feels a stranger. He is at home when he
nature.) is not working and when he works he is not
Political economy hides the alienation in at home. His labour is therefore not volun¬
the essence of labour by not considering the tary but compulsory, forced labour. It is
immediate relationship between the worker therefore not the satisfaction of a need but
(labour) and production. Labour produces only a means to satisfy needs outside itself.
works of wonder for the rich, but nakedness How alien it really is is very evident from the
for the worker. It produces palaces, but only fact that when there is no physical or other
hovels for the worker; it produces beauty, but compulsion, labour is avoided like the
cripples the worker; it replaces labour by ma¬ plague. External labour, labour in which man
chines but throws a part of the workers back externalizes himself, is a labour of self-sacri¬
to a barbaric labour and turns the other part fice and mortification. Finally, the external
into machines. It produces culture, but also character of labour for the worker shows it¬
imbecility and cretinism for the worker. self in the fact that it is not his own but some¬
The immediate relationship of labour to one else s, that it does not belong to him, that
its products is the relationship of the worker he does not belong to himself in his labour
to the objects of his production. The relation¬ but to someone else. As in religion the human
8 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ I. Karl Marx
imaginations own activity, the activity of ture, and the more universal man is than ani¬
man's head and his heart, reacts inde¬ mals the more universal is the area of inor¬
pendently on the individual as an alien activ¬ ganic nature from which he lives. From the
ity of gods or devils, so the activity of the theoretical point of view, plants, animals,
worker is not his own spontaneous activity It stones, air, light, etc. form part of human con¬
belongs to another and is the loss of himself. sciousness, partly as objects of natural sci¬
The result we arrive at then is that man ence, partly as objects of art; they are his in¬
(the worker) only feels himself freely active tellectual inorganic nature, his intellectual
in his animal functions of eating, drinking, means of subsistence, which he must first
and procreating, at most also in his dwelling prepare before he can enjoy and assimilate
and dress, and feels himself an animal in his them. From the practical point of view, too,
human functions. they form a part of human life and activity.
Eating, drinking, procreating, etc. are in¬ Physically man lives solely from these prod¬
deed truly human functions. But in the ab¬ ucts of nature, whether they appear as food,
straction that separates them from the other heating, clothing, habitation, etc. The univer¬
round of human activity and makes them sality of man appears in practice precisely in
into final and exclusive ends they become the universality that makes the whole of na¬
animal. ture into his inorganic body in that it is both
We have treated the act of alienation of (i) his immediate means of subsistence and
practical human activity, labour, from two as¬ also (ii) the material object and tool of his
pects. (1) The relationship of the worker to vital activity. Nature is the inorganic body of
the product of his labour as an alien object a man, that is, in so far as it is not itself a
that has power over him. This relationship is human body. That man lives from nature
at the same time the relationship to the sen¬ means that nature is his body with which he
suous exterior world and to natural objects must maintain a constant interchange so as
as to an alien and hostile world opposed to not to die. That man's physical and intellec¬
him. (2) The relationship of labour to the act tual life depends on nature merely means
of production inside labour. This relationship that nature depends on itself, for man is a
is the relationship of the worker to his own part of nature.
activity as something that is alien and does While alienated labour alienates (1) nature
not belong to him; it is activity that is passiv¬ from man, and (2) man from himself, his own
ity, power that is weakness, procreation that active function, his vital activity, it also alien¬
is castration, the workers own physical and ates the species from man; it turns his spe¬
intellectual energy, his personal life (for what cies-life into a means towards his individual
is life except activity?) as an activity directed life. Firstly it alienates species-life and indi¬
against himself, independent of him and not vidual life, and secondly in its abstraction it
belonging to him. It is self-alienation, as makes the latter into the aim of the former
above it was the alienation of the object. which is also conceived of in its abstract and
We now have to draw a third characteristic alien form. For firstly, work, vital activity, and
of alienated labour from the two previous productive life itself appear to man only as a
ones. means to the satisfaction of a need, the need
Man is a species-being not only in that to preserve his physical existence. But pro¬
practically and theoretically he makes both ductive life is species-life. It is life producing
his own and other species into his objects, but life. The whole character of a species, its ge¬
also, and this is only another way of putting neric character, is contained in its manner of
the same thing, he relates to himself as to the vital activity, and free conscious activity is the
present, living species, in that he relates to species-characteristic of man. Life itself ap¬
himself as to a universal and therefore free pears merely as a means to life.
being. The animal is immediately one with its vi¬
Both with man and with animals the spe¬ tal activity. It is not distinct from it. They are
cies-life consists physically in the fact that identical. Man makes his vital activity itself
man (like animals) lives from inorganic na¬ into an object of his will and consciousness.
Alienated Labor 9
He has a conscious vital activity. He is not turns the advantage he has over animals into
immediately identical to any of his charac¬ a disadvantage in that his inorganic body, na¬
terizations. Conscious vital activity differen¬ ture, is torn from him.
tiates man immediately from animal vital ac¬ Similarly, in that alienated labour de¬
tivity. It is this and this alone that makes man grades mans own free activity to a means, it
a species-being. He is only a conscious being, turns the species-life of man into a means for
that is, his own life is an object to him, pre¬ his physical existence.
cisely because he is a species-being. This is Thus consciousness, which man derives
the only reason for his activity being free ac¬ from his species, changes itself through al¬
tivity. Alienated labour reverses the relation¬ ienation so that species-life becomes a means
ship so that, just because he is a conscious for him.
being, man makes his vital activity and es¬ Therefore alienated labour:
sence a mere means to his existence. (3) makes the species-being of man, both
The practical creation of an objective nature and the intellectual faculties of his
world, the working-over of inorganic nature, species, into a being that is alien to him, into
is the confirmation of man as a conscious a means for his individual existence. It alien¬
species-being, that is, as a being that relates ates from man his own body, nature exterior
to the species as to himself and to himself as to him, and his intellectual being, his human
to the species. It is true that the animal, too, essence.
produces. It builds itself a nest, a dwelling, (4) An immediate consequence of mans
like the bee, the beaver, the ant, etc. But it alienation from the product of his work, his
only produces what it needs immediately for vital activity and his species-being, is the al¬
itself or its offspring; it produces one-sidedly
ienation of man from man. When man is op¬
whereas man produces universally; it pro¬
posed to himself, it is another man that is
duces only under the pressure of immediate
opposed to him. What is valid for the rela¬
physical need, whereas man produces freely
tionship of a man to his work, of the product
from physical need and only truly produces
of his work and himself, is also valid for the
when he is thus free; it produces only itself
relationship of man to other men and of their
whereas man reproduces the whole of na¬
labour and the objects of their labour.
ture. Its product belongs immediately to its
In general, the statement that man is alien¬
physical body whereas man can freely sepa¬
ated from his species-being, means that one
rate himself from his product. The animal
only fashions things according to the stan¬ man is alienated from another as each of
dards and needs of the species it belongs to, them is alienated from the human essence.
whereas man knows how to produce accord¬ The alienation of man and in general of
ing to the measure of every species and every relationship in which man stands to
knows everywhere how to apply its inherent himself is first realized and expressed in the
standard to the object; thus man also fash¬ relationship with which man stands to other
ions things according to the laws of beauty. men.
Thus it is in the working over of the objec¬ Thus in the situation of alienated labour
tive world that man first really affirms him¬ each man measures his relationship to other
self as a species-being. This production is his men by the relationship in which he finds
active species-life. Through it nature appears himself placed as a worker.
as his work and his reality. The object of work We began with a fact of political economy,
is therefore the objectification of the species- the alienation of the worker and his produc¬
life of man; for he duplicates himself not only tion. We have expressed this fact in concep¬
intellectually, in his mind, but also actively in tual terms: alienated, externalized labour. We
reality and thus can look at his image in a have analysed this concept and thus analysed
world he has created. Therefore when alien¬ a purely economic fact.
ated labour tears from man the object of his Let us now see further how the concept of
production, it also tears from him his species- alienated, externalized labour must express
life, the real objectivity of his species and and represent itself in reality.
10 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ I. Karl Marx
If the product of work is alien to me, op¬ the relationship of layman to priest, or, be¬
poses me as an alien power, whom does it cause here we are dealing with a spiritual
belong to then? world, to a mediator, etc. In the practical, real
If my own activity does not belong to me world, the self-alienation can only appear
and is an alien, forced activity to whom does through the practical, real relationship to
it belong then? other men. The means through which aliena¬
To another being than myself. tion makes progress are themselves practical.
Who is this being? Through alienated labour, then, man creates
The gods? Of course in the beginning of not only his relationship to the object and act
history the chief production, as for example, of production as to alien and hostile men; he
the building of temples etc. in Egypt, India, creates too the relationship in which other
and Mexico was both in the service of the men stand to his production and his product
gods and also belonged to them. But the gods and the relationship in which he stands to
alone were never the masters of the work. these other men. Just as he turns his produc¬
And nature just as little. And what a paradox tion into his own loss of reality and punish¬
it would be if, the more man mastered nature ment and his own product into a loss, a prod¬
through his work and the more the miracles uct that does not belong to him, so he creates
of the gods were rendered superfluous by the the domination of the man who does not pro¬
miracles of industry, the more man had to duce over the production and the product. As
give up his pleasure in producing and the he alienates his activity from himself, so he
enjoyment in his product for the sake of these hands over to an alien person an activity that
powers. does not belong to him.
The alien being to whom the labour and Up till now we have considered the rela¬
the product of the labour belongs, whom the tionship only from the side of the worker and
labour serves and who enjoys its product, can we will later consider it from the side of the
only be man himself. If the product of labour non-worker.
does not belong to the worker but stands over Thus through alienated, externalized la¬
against him as an alien power, this is only bour the worker creates the relationship to
possible in that it belongs to another man this labour of a man who is alien to it and
apart from the worker. remains exterior to it. The relationship of the
If his activity torments him it must be a joy worker to his labour creates the relationship
and a pleasure to someone else. This alien to it of the capitalist, or whatever else one
power above man can be neither the gods nor wishes to call the master of the labour. Private
nature, only man himself. property is thus the product, result, and nec¬
Consider further the above sentence that essary consequence of externalized labour, of
the relationship of man to himself first be¬ the exterior relationship of the worker to na¬
comes objective and real to him through his ture and to himself.
relationship to other men. So if he relates to Thus private property is the result of the
the product of his labour, his objectified la¬ analysis of the concept of externalized labour,
bour, as to an object that is alien, hostile, i.e. externalized man, alienated work, alien¬
powerful, and independent of him, this rela¬ ated life, alienated man.
tionship implies that another man is the We have, of course, obtained the concept
alien, hostile, powerful, and independent of externalized labour (externalized life)
master of this object. If he relates to his own from political economy as the result of the
activity as to something unfree, it is a rela¬ movement of private property. But it is evi¬
tionship to an activity that is under the domi¬ dent from the analysis of this concept that,
nation, oppression, and yoke of another man. although private property appears to be the
Every self-alienation of man from himself ground and reason for externalized labour, it
and nature appears in the relationship in is rather a consequence of it, just as the gods
which he places himself and nature to other are originally not the cause but the effect of
men distinct from himself. Therefore reli¬ the aberration of the human mind, although
gious self-alienation necessarily appears in later this relationship reverses itself.
Alienated Labor 11
It is only in the final culmination of the pressed in its political form by the emancipa¬
development of private property that these tion of the workers. This is not because only
hidden characteristics come once more to the their emancipation is at stake but because
fore, in that firstly it is the product of exter¬ general human emancipation is contained in
nalized labour and secondly it is the means their emancipation. It is contained within it
through which labour externalizes itself, the because the whole of human slavery is in¬
realization of this extemalization. volved in the relationship of the worker to his
This development sheds light at the same product and all slave relationships are only
time on several, previously unresolved con¬ modifications and consequences of this rela¬
tradictions. tionship.
1. Political economy starts from labour as Just as we have discovered the concept of
the veritable soul of production, and yet it private property through an analysis of the
attributes nothing to labour and everything concept of alienated, externalized labour, so
to private property Proudhon has drawn a all categories of political economy can be de¬
conclusion from this contradiction that is fa¬ duced with the help of these two factors. We
vourable to labour and against private prop¬ shall recognize in each category of market,
erty But we can see that this apparent con¬ competition, capital, money, only a particu¬
tradiction is the contradiction of alienated lar and developed expression of these first
labour with itself and that political economy two fundamental elements.
has only expressed the laws of alienated la¬ However, before we consider this structure
bour. let us try to solve two problems:
We can therefore also see that wages and 1. To determine the general essence of pri¬
private property are identical: for wages, in vate property as it appears as a result of al¬
which the product, the object of the labour, ienated labour in its relationship to truly hu¬
remunerates the labour itself, are just a nec¬ man and social property.
essary consequence of the alienation of la¬ 2. We have taken the alienation and exter-
bour. In the wage system the labour does not nalization of labour as a fact and analysed
appear as the final aim but only as the servant this fact. We now ask, how does man come to
of the wages. We will develop this later and externalize, to alienate his labour? How is
for the moment only draw a few conse¬ this alienation grounded in human develop¬
quences. ment? We have already obtained much mate¬
An enforced raising of wages (quite apart rial for the solution of this problem, in that
from other difficulties, apart from the fact we have turned the question of the origin of
that, being an anomaly, it could only be main¬ private property into the question of the rela¬
tained by force) would only mean a better tionship of externalized labour to the devel¬
payment of slaves and would not give this opment of human history. For when we speak
human meaning and worth either to the of private property we think we are dealing
worker or to his labour. with something that is exterior to man. When
Indeed, even the equality of wages that we speak of labour then we are dealing di¬
Proudhon demands only changes the rela¬ rectly with man. This new formulation of the
tionship of the contemporary worker to his problem already implies its solution.
labour into that of all men to labour. Society To take point 1, the general nature of pri¬
is then conceived of as an abstract capitalist. vate property and its relationship to truly hu¬
Wages are an immediate consequence of man property.
alienated labour and alienated labour is the Externalized labour has been broken
immediate cause of private property. Thus down into two component parts that deter¬
the disappearance of one entails also the dis¬ mine each other or are only different expres¬
appearance of the other. sions of one and the same relationship. Ap¬
2. It is a further consequence of the rela¬ propriation appears as alienation, as exter-
tionship of alienated labour to private prop¬ nalization, and extemalization as appropria¬
erty that the emancipation of society from tion, and alienation as true enfranchisement.
private property, etc., from slavery, is ex¬ We have dealt with one aspect, alienated la-
12 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ I. Karl Marx
bour as regards the worker himself, that is, tionship that this man, who is alien to labour
the relationship of externalized labour to it¬ and the worker, has to the worker, to labour
self. As a product and necessary result of this and its object.
relationship we have discovered the property The first remark to make is that everything
relationship of the non-worker to the worker that appears in the case of the worker to be
and his labour. an activity of extemalization, of alienation,
As the material and summary expression appears in the case of the non-worker to be a
of alienated labour, private property em¬ state of extemalization, of alienation.
braces both relationships, both that of the Secondly, the real, practical behaviour of
worker to his labour, the product of his la¬ the worker in production and towards his
bour and the non-worker, and that of the non¬ product (as a state of mind) appears in the
worker to the worker and the product of his case of the non-worker opposed to him as
labour. theoretical behaviour. Thirdly, the non¬
We have already seen that for the worker worker does everything against the worker
who appropriates nature through his work, that the worker does against himself but he
this appropriation appears as alienation, his does not do against himself what he does
own activity as activity for and of someone against the worker.
else, his vitality as sacrifice of his life, produc¬ Let us consider these three relationships
tion of objects as their loss to an alien power, in more detail. . . . [The manuscript breaks
an alien man: let us now consider the rela¬ off unfinished here.] ♦
Theses on Feurbach 13
VIII
VI
All social life is essentially practical. All
Feuerbach resolves the religious essence mysteries which lead theory to mysticism
into the human essence. But the human es¬ find their rational solution in human practice
sence is no abstraction inherent in each sin¬ and in the comprehension of this practice.
gle individual. In its reality it is the ensemble
of the social relations. IX
Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a
criticism of this real essence, is consequently The highest point reached by contempla¬
compelled: tive materialism, that is materialism, which
1. To abstract from the historical process does not comprehend sensuousness as prac¬
and to fix the religious sentiment as some¬ tical activity, is the contemplation of single
thing by itself and to presuppose an ab¬ individuals and of civil society.
stract—isolated— human individual.
2. Essence, therefore, can be compre¬ X
hended only as “genus”, as an internal, dumb
generality which naturally unites the many The standpoint of the old materialism is
individuals. civil society; the standpoint of the new is hu¬
man society, or social humanity.
VII XI
Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that The philosophers have only interpreted the
the “religious sentiment” is itself a social world, in various ways; the point is to change
product, and that the abstract individual it. ♦
Manifesto of the Communist Party 15
classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoi¬ Each step in the development of the bour¬
sie and Proletariat. geoisie was accompanied by a corresponding
From the serfs of the Middle Ages sprang political advance of that class. An oppressed
the chartered burghers of the earliest towns. class under the sway of the feudal nobility, an
From these burgesses the first elements of armed and self-governing association in the
the bourgeoisie were developed. mediaeval commune;4 here independent ur¬
The discovery of America, the rounding of ban republic (as in Italy and Germany), there
the Cape, opened up fresh ground for the ris¬ taxable “third estate” of the monarchy (as in
ing bourgeoisie. The East-Indian and Chi¬ France), afterwards, in the period of manu¬
nese markets, the colonisation of America, facture proper, serving either the semi-feudal
trade with the colonies, the increase in the or the absolute monarchy as a counterpoise
means of exchange and in commodities gen¬ against the nobility, and, in fact, corner-stone
erally, gave to commerce, to navigation, to of the great monarchies in general, the bour¬
industry, an impulse never before known, geoisie has at last, since the establishment of
and thereby, to the revolutionary element in Modem Industry and of the world-market,
the tottering feudal society, a rapid develop¬ conquered for itself, in the modem repre¬
ment. sentative State, exclusive political sway. The
The feudal system of industry, under executive of the modem State is but a com¬
which industrial production was monopo¬ mittee for managing the common affairs of
lised by closed guilds, now no longer sufficed the whole bourgeoisie.
for the growing wants of the new markets. The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a
The manufacturing system took its place. most revolutionary part.
The guild-masters were pushed on one side The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the
by the manufacturing middle class; division upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, pa¬
of labour between the different corporate triarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly
guilds vanished in the face of division of la¬ torn asunder the motley feudal ties that
bour in each single workshop. bound man to his “natural superiors,” and
Meantime the markets kept ever growing, has left remaining no other nexus between
the demand ever rising. Even manufacture man and man than naked self-interest, than
no longer sufficed. Thereupon, steam and callous “cash payment.” It has drowned the
machinery revolutionised industrial produc¬ most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour,
tion. The place of manufacture was taken by of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine senti¬
the giant, Modem Industry, the place of the mentalism, in the icy water of egotistical cal¬
industrial middle class, by industrial million¬ culation. It has resolved personal worth into
aires, the leaders of whole industrial armies, exchange value, and in place of the number¬
the modem bourgeois. Modern industry has less indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set
established the world-market, for which the up that single, unconscionable freedom—
discovery of America paved the way. This Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation,
market has given an immense development veiled by religious and political illusions, it
to commerce, to navigation, to communica¬ has substituted naked, shameless, direct,
tion by land. This development has, in its brutal exploitation.
turn, reacted on the extension of industry; The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo
and in proportion as industry, commerce, every occupation hitherto honoured and
navigation, railways extended, in the same looked up to with reverent awe. It has con¬
proportion the bourgeoisie developed, in¬ verted the physician, the lawyer, the priest,
creased its capital, and pushed into the back¬ the poet, the man of science, into its paid
ground every class handed down from the wage-labourers.
Middle Ages. The bourgeoisie has torn away from the
We see, therefore, how the modern bour¬ family its sentimental veil, and has reduced
geoisie is itself the product of a long course the family relation to a mere money relation.
of development, of a series of revolutions in The bourgeoisie has disclosed how it came
the modes of production and of exchange. to pass that the brutal display of vigour in the
Manifesto of the Communist Party 17
Middle Ages, which Reactionists so much ad¬ their satisfaction the products of distant
mire, found its fitting complement in the lands and climes. In place of the old local and
most slothful indolence. It has been the first national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we
to show what mans activity can bring about. have intercourse in every direction, universal
It has accomplished wonders far surpassing inter-dependence of nations. And as in mate¬
Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and rial, so also in intellectual production. The
Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expedi¬ intellectual creations of individual nations
tions that put in the shade all former Exo¬ become common property. National one-sid-
duses of nations and crusades. edness and narrow-mindedness become
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without con¬ more and more impossible, and from the nu¬
stantly revolutionising the instruments of merous national and local literatures, there
production, and thereby the relations of pro¬ arises a world literature.
duction, and with them the whole relations The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improve¬
of society. Conservation of the old modes of ment of all instruments of production, by the
production in unaltered form, was, on the immensely facilitated means of communica¬
contrary, the first condition of existence for tion, draws all, even the most barbarian, na¬
all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolu¬ tions into civilisation. The cheap prices of its
tionising of production, uninterrupted dis¬ commodities are the heavy artillery with
turbance of all social conditions, everlasting which it batters down all Chinese walls, with
uncertainty and agitation distinguish the which it forces the barbarians' intensely ob¬
bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All stinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It
fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to
ancient and venerable prejudices and opin¬ adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it
ions, are swept away, all new-formed ones compels them to introduce what it calls civi¬
become antiquated before they can ossify. All lisation into their midst, i.e., to become bour¬
that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is geois themselves. In one word, it creates a
profaned, and man is at last compelled to face world after its own image.
with sober senses, his real conditions of life, The bourgeoisie has subjected the country
and his relations with his kind. to the rule of the towns. It has created enor¬
The need of a constantly expanding mar¬ mous cities, has greatly increased the urban
ket for its products chases the bourgeoisie population as compared with the rural, and
over the whole surface of the globe. It must has thus rescued a considerable part of the
nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, estab¬ population from the idiocy of rural life. Just
lish connexions everywhere. as it has made the country dependent on the
The bourgeoisie has through its exploita¬ towns, so it has made barbarian and semi¬
tion of the world-market given a cosmopoli¬ barbarian countries dependent on the civi¬
tan character to production and consump¬ lised ones, nations and peasants on nations
tion in every country. To the great chagrin of of bourgeois, the East on the West.
Reactionists, it has drawn from under the The bourgeoisie keeps more and more do¬
feet of industry the national ground on which ing away with the scattered state of the popu¬
it stood. All old-established national indus¬ lation, of the means of production, and of
tries have been destroyed or are daily being property. It has agglomerated population,
destroyed. They are dislodged by new indus¬ centralised means of production, and has
tries, whose introduction becomes a life and concentrated property in a few hands. The
death question for all civilised nations, by in¬ necessary consequence of this was political
dustries that no longer work up indigenous centralisation. Independent, or but loosely
raw material, but raw material drawn from connected provinces, with separate interests,
the remotest zones; industries whose prod¬ laws, governments and systems of taxation,
ucts are consumed, not only at home, but in became lumped together into one nation,
every quarter of the globe. In place of the old with one government, one code of laws, one
wants, satisfied by the productions of the national class-interest, one frontier and one
country, we find new wants, requiring for customs-tariff.
18 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ I. Karl Marx
The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce all earlier epochs, would have seemed an ab¬
one hundred years, has created more massive surdity—the epidemic of over-production.
and more colossal productive forces than Society suddenly finds itself put back into a
have all preceding generations together. Sub¬ state of momentary barbarism; it appears as
jection of Nature s forces to man, machinery, if a famine, a universal war of devastation
application of chemistry to industry and ag¬ had cut off the supply of every means of sub¬
riculture, steam-navigation, railways, elec¬ sistence; industry and commerce seem to be
tric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents destroyed; and why? Because there is too
for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole much civilisation, too much means of subsis¬
populations conjured out of the ground— tence, too much industry, too much com¬
what earlier century had even a presentiment merce. The productive forces at the disposal
that such productive forces slumbered in the of society no longer tend to further the devel¬
lap of social labour? opment of the conditions of bourgeois prop¬
We see then: the means of production and erty; on the contrary, they have become too
of exchange, on whose foundation the bour¬ powerful for these conditions, by which they
geoisie built itself up, were generated in feu¬ are fettered, and so soon as they overcome
dal society At a certain stage in the develop¬ these fetters, they bring disorder into the
ment of these means of production and of whole of bourgeois society, endanger the
exchange, the conditions under which feudal existence of bourgeois property. The condi¬
society produced and exchanged, the feudal tions of bourgeois society are too narrow to
organisation of agriculture and manufactur¬ comprise the wealth created by them. And
ing industry, in one word, the feudal relations how does the bourgeoisie get over these cri¬
of property became no longer compatible ses? On the one hand by enforced destruction
with the already developed productive forces; of a mass of productive forces; on the other,
they became so many fetters. They had to be by the conquest of new markets, and by the
burst asunder; they were burst asunder. more thorough exploitation of the old ones.
Into their place stepped free competition, That is to say, by paving the way for more
accompanied by a social and political consti¬ extensive and more destructive crises, and by
tution adapted to it, and by the economical diminishing the means whereby crises are
and political sway of the bourgeois class. prevented.
A similar movement is going on before our The weapons with which the bourgeoisie
own eyes. Modem bourgeois society with its felled feudalism to the ground are now
relations of production, of exchange and of turned against the bourgeoisie itself.
property, a society that has conjured up such But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the
gigantic means of production and of ex¬ weapons that bring death to itself; it has also
change, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer called into existence the men who are to
able to control the powers of the nether world wield those weapons—the modem working
whom he has called up by his spells. For class—the proletarians.
many a decade past the history of industry In proportion as the bourgeoisie, i.e., capi¬
and commerce is but the history of the revolt tal, is developed, in the same proportion is
of modern productive forces against modern the proletariat, the modem working class, de¬
conditions of production, against the prop¬ veloped—a class of labourers, who live only
erty relations that are the conditions for the so long as they find work, and who find work
existence of the bourgeoisie and of its rule. It only so long as their labour increases capital.
is enough to mention the commercial crises These labourers, who must sell themselves
that by their periodical return put on its trial, piece-meal, are a commodity, like every other
each time more threateningly, the existence article of commerce, and are consequently
of the entire bourgeois society. In these crises exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition,
a great part not only of the existing products, to all the fluctuations of the market.
but also of the previously created productive Owing to the extensive use of machinery
forces, are periodically destroyed. In these and to division of labour, the work of the pro¬
crises there breaks out an epidemic that, in letarians has lost all individual character, and
Manifesto of the Communist Party 19
consequently, all charm for the workman. He tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and
becomes an appendage of the machine, and peasants—all these sink gradually into the
it is only the most simple, most monotonous, proletariat, partly because their diminutive
and most easily acquired knack, that is re¬ capital does not suffice for the scale on which
quired of him. Hence, the cost of production Modern Industry is carried on, and is
of a workman is restricted, almost entirely, to swamped in the competition with the large
the means of subsistence that he requires for capitalists, partly because their specialised
his maintenance, and for the propagation of skill is rendered worthless by new methods
his race. But the price of a commodity, and of production. Thus the proletariat is re¬
therefore also of labour,5 is equal to its cost cruited from all classes of the population.
of production. In proportion, therefore, as The proletariat goes through various
the repulsiveness of the work increases, the stages of development. With its birth begins
wage decreases. Nay more, in proportion as its stmggle with the bourgeoisie. At first the
the use of machinery and division of labour contest is carried on by individual labourers,
increases, in the same proportion the burden then by the workpeople of a factory, then by
of toil also increases, whether by prolonga¬ the operatives of one trade, in one locality,
tion of the working hours, by increase of the against the individual bourgeois who directly
work exacted in a given time or by increased exploits them. They direct their attacks not
speed of the machinery, etc. against the bourgeois conditions of produc¬
Modem industry has converted the little tion, but against the instruments of produc¬
workshop of the patriarchal master into the tion themselves; they destroy imported wares
great factory of the industrial capitalist. that compete with their labour, they smash to
Masses of labourers, crowded into the fac¬ pieces machinery, they set factories ablaze,
tory, are organised like soldiers. As privates they seek to restore by force the vanished
of the industrial army they are placed under status of the workman of the Middle Ages.
the command of a perfect hierarchy of offi¬ At this stage the labourers still form an
cers and sergeants. Not only are they slaves incoherent mass scattered over the whole
of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois country, and broken up by their mutual com¬
State; they are daily and hourly enslaved by petition. If anywhere they unite to form more
the machine, by the over-looker, and, above compact bodies, this is not yet the conse¬
all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer quence of their own active union, but of the
himself. The more openly this despotism pro¬ union of the bourgeoisie, which class, in or¬
claims gain to be its end and aim, the more der to attain its own political ends, is com¬
petty, the more hateful and the more embit¬ pelled to set the whole proletariat in motion,
tering it is. and is moreover yet, for a time, able to do so.
The less the skill and exertion of strength At this stage, therefore, the proletarians do
implied in manual labour, in other words, the not fight their enemies, but the enemies of
more modem industry becomes developed, their enemies, the remnants of absolute mon¬
the more is the labour of men superseded by archy, the landowners, the non-industrial
that of women. Differences of age and sex bourgeois, the petty bourgeoisie. Thus the
have no longer any distinctive social validity whole historical movement is concentrated
for the working class. All are instruments of in the hands of the bourgeoisie; every victory
labour, more or less expensive to use, accord¬ so obtained is a victory for the bourgeoisie.
ing to their age and sex. But with the development of industry the
No sooner is the exploitation of the la¬ proletariat not only increases in number; it
bourer by the manufacturer, so far, at an end, becomes concentrated in greater masses, its
that he receives his wages in cash, than he is strength grows, and it feels that strength
set upon by the other portions of the bour¬ more. The various interests and conditions of
geoisie, the landlord, the shopkeeper, the life within the ranks of the proletariat are
pawnbroker, etc. more and more equalised, in proportion as
The lower strata of the middle class—the machinery obliterates all distinctions of la¬
small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired bour, and nearly everywhere reduces wages
20 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ I. Karl Marx
to the same low level. The growing competi¬ bourgeoisie of foreign countries. In all these
tion among the bourgeois, and the resulting battles it sees itself compelled to appeal to the
commercial crises, make the wages of the proletariat, to ask for its help, and thus, to
workers ever more fluctuating. The unceas¬ drag it into the political arena. The bourgeoi¬
ing improvement of machinery, ever more sie itself, therefore, supplies the proletariat
rapidly developing, makes their livelihood with its own elements of political and general
more and more precarious; the collisions be¬ education, in other words, it furnishes the
tween individual workmen and individual proletariat with weapons for fighting the
bourgeois take more and more the character bourgeoisie.
of collisions between two classes. Thereupon Further, as we have already seen, entire
the workers begin to form combinations sections of the ruling classes are, by the ad¬
(Trades Unions) against the bourgeois; they vance of industry, precipitated into the prole¬
club together in order to keep up the rate of tariat, or are at least threatened in their con¬
wages; they found permanent associations in ditions of existence. These also supply the
order to make provision beforehand for these proletariat with fresh elements of enlighten¬
occasional revolts. Here and there the contest ment and progress.
breaks out into riots. Finally, in times when the class struggle
Now and then the workers are victorious, nears the decisive hour, the process of disso¬
t but only for a time. The real fruit of their
battles lies, not in the immediate result, but
lution going on within the ruling class, in fact
within the whole range of society, assumes
\ in the ever-expanding union of the workers. such a violent, glaring character, that a small
This union is helped on by the improved section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift,
means of communication that are created by and joins the revolutionary class, the class
modern industry and that place the workers that holds the future in its hands. Just as,
of different localities in contact with one an¬ therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the
other. It was just this contact that was needed nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now
to centralise the numerous local struggles, all a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the
of the same character, into one national proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the
struggle between classes. But every class bourgeois ideologists, who have raised them¬
struggle is a political struggle. And that un¬ selves to the level of comprehending theoreti¬
ion, to attain which the burghers of the Mid¬ cally the historical movement as a whole.
dle Ages, with their miserable highways, re¬ Of all the classes that stand face to face
quired centuries, the modern proletarians, with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat
thanks to railways, achieve in a few years. alone is a really revolutionary class. The
This organisation of the proletarians into other classes decay and finally disappear in
a class, and consequently into a political the face of Modem Industry; the proletariat
party, is continually being upset again by the is its special and essential product. The lower
competition between the workers them¬ middle class, the small manufacturer, the
selves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these
firmer, mightier. It compels legislative recog¬ fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from
nition of particular interests of the workers, extinction their existence as fractions of the
by taking advantage of the divisions among middle class. They are therefore not revolu¬
the bourgeoisie itself. Thus the ten-hours' bill tionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are
in England was carried. reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel
Altogether collisions between the classes of history. If by chance they are revolutionary,
of the old society further, in many ways, the they are so only in view of their impending
course of development of the proletariat. The transfer into the proletariat, they thus defend
bourgeoisie finds itself involved in a constant not their present, but their future interests,
battle. At first with the aristocracy; later on, they desert their own standpoint to place
with those portions of the bourgeoisie itself, themselves at that of the proletariat.
whose interests have become antagonistic to The “dangerous class,” the social scum,
the progress of industry; at all times, with the that passively rotting mass thrown off by the
Manifesto of the Communist Party 21
lowest layers of old society may here and sie lays the foundation for the sway of the
there, be swept into the movement by a pro¬ proletariat.
letarian revolution; its conditions of life, Hitherto, every form of society has been
however, prepare it far more for the part of a based, as we have already seen, on the an¬
bribed tool of reactionary intrigue. tagonism of oppressing and oppressed
In the conditions of the proletariat, those classes. But in order to oppress a class, cer¬
of old society at large are already virtually tain conditions must be assured to it under
swamped. The proletarian is without prop¬ which it can, at least, continue its slavish exis¬
erty; his relation to his wife and children has tence. The serf, in the period of serfdom,
no longer anything in common with the raised himself to membership in the com¬
bourgeois family-relations; modern indus¬ mune, just as the petty bourgeois, under the
trial labour, modem subjection to capital, the yoke of feudal absolutism, managed to de¬
same in England as in France, in America as velop into a bourgeois. The modern labourer,
in Germany, has stripped him of every trace on the contrary, instead of rising with the
progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper
of national character. Law, morality, religion,
below the conditions of existence of his own
are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, be¬
class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism
hind which lurk in ambush just as many
develops more rapidly than population and
bourgeois interests.
wealth. And here it becomes evident, that the
All the preceding classes that got the upper
bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the rul¬
hand, sought to fortify their already acquired
ing class in society, and to impose its condi¬
status by subjecting society at large to their
tions of existence upon society as an over-rid¬
conditions of appropriation. The proletari¬ ing law. It is unfit to rule because it is incom¬
ans cannot become masters of the productive petent to assure an existence to its slave
forces of society, except by abolishing their within his slavery, because it cannot help let¬
own previous mode of appropriation, and ting him sink into such a state, that it has to
thereby also every other previous mode of feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society
appropriation. They have nothing of their can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in
own to secure and to fortify; their mission is other words, its existence is no longer com¬
to destroy all previous securities for, and in¬ patible with society.
surances of, individual property. The essential condition for the existence,
All previous historical movements were and for the sway of the bourgeois class, is the
movements of minorities, or in the interests formation and augmentation of capital; the
of minorities. The proletarian movement is condition for capital is wage-labour. Wage-la¬
the self-conscious, independent movement of bour rests exclusively on competition be¬
the immense majority, in the interests of the tween the labourers. The advance of industry,
immense majority. The proletariat, the low¬ whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoi¬
est stratum of our present society, cannot stir, sie, replaces the isolation of the labourers,
cannot raise itself up, without the whole su¬ due to competition, by their revolutionary
perincumbent strata of official society being combination, due to association. The devel¬
sprung into the air. opment of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts
Though not in substance, yet in form, the from under its feet the very foundation on
struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoi¬ which the bourgeoisie produces and appro¬
sie is at first a national struggle. The proletar¬ priates products. What the bourgeoisie,
iat of each country must, of course, first of all therefore, produces, above all, is its own
settle matters with its own bourgeoisie. grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the
In depicting the most general phases of the proletariat are equally inevitable. . . .
development of the proletariat, we traced the
Endnotes
more or less veiled civil war, raging within
existing society, up to the point where that 1. By bourgeoisie is meant the class of modem
war breaks out into open revolution, and Capitalists, owners of the means of social pro¬
where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoi¬ duction and employers of wage-labour. By
22 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ I. Karl Marx
proletariat, the class of modem wage-labour¬ vate Property and the State], 2nd edition,
ers who, having no means of production of Stuttgart 1886. [Engels, English edition of
their own, are reduced to selling their labour- 1888]
power in order to live. [Engels, English edition
3. Guild-master, that is, a full member of a guild,
of 1888]
a master within, not a head of a guild. [Engels,
2. That is, all written history. In 1847, the pre¬ English edition of 1888]
history of society, the social organisation ex¬
isting previous to recorded history, was all but 4. "Commune” was the name taken, in France,
unknown. Since then, Haxthausen discov¬ by the nascent towns even before they had
ered common ownership of land in Russia, conquered from their feudal lords and mas¬
Maurer proved it to be the social foundation ters local self-government and political rights
from which all Teutonic races started in his¬ as the "Third Estate.” Generally speaking, for
tory, and by and by village communities were the economical development of the bourgeoi¬
found to be, or to have been the primitive sie, England is here taken as the typical coun¬
form of society everywhere from India to Ire¬ try; for its political development, France.
land. The inner organisation of this primitive [Engels, English edition of 1888]
Communistic society was laid bare, in its This was the name given their urban com¬
typical form, by Morgan s crowning discovery munities by the townsmen of Italy and
of the true nature of the gens and its relation France, after they had purchased or wrested
to the tribe. With the dissolution of these pri¬ their initial rights of self-government from
maeval communities society begins to be
their feudal lords. [Engels, German edition of
differentiated into separate and finally
1890]
antagonistic classes. I have attempted to re¬
trace this process of dissolution in: “Der Ur- 5. Subsequently Marx pointed out that the
sprung der Familie, des Privateigenthums worker sells not his labour but his labour
und des Staats” [The Origin of the Family, Pri¬ power. ♦
Commodities 23
change-value, the wheat has, therefore, a of equal value.... An hundred pounds' worth
great many. But since x blacking, y silk, or z of lead or iron, is of as great value as one
gold, &c., each represent the exchange-value hundred pounds’ worth of silver or gold.” As
of one quarter of wheat, x blacking, y silk, z use-values, commodities are, above all, of dif¬
gold, &c., must, as exchange-values, be re¬ ferent qualities, but as exchange-values they
placeable by each other, or equal to each are merely different quantities, and conse¬
other. Therefore, first: the valid exchange-val¬ quently do not contain an atom of use-value.
ues of a given commodity express something If then we leave out of consideration the
equal; secondly, exchange-value, generally, is use-value of commodities, they have only one
only the mode of expression, the phenomenal common property left, that of being products
form, of something contained in it, yet distin¬ of labour. But even the product of labour it¬
guishable from it. self has undergone a change in our hands. If
Let us take two commodities, e.g., corn we make abstraction from its use-value, we
and iron. The proportions in which they are make abstraction at the same time from the
exchangeable, whatever those proportions material elements and shapes that make the
may be, can always be represented by an product a use-value; we see in it no longer a
equation in which a given quantity of com is table, a house, yam, or any other useful thing.
equated to some quantity of iron: e.g., 1 quar¬ Its existence as a material thing is put out of
ter corn = x cwt. iron. What does this equa¬ sight. Neither can it any longer be regarded
tion tell us? It tells us that in two different as the product of the labour of the joiner, the
things—in 1 quarter of com and x cwt. of mason, the spinner, or of any other definite
iron, there exists in equal quantities some¬ kind of productive labour. Along with the use¬
thing common to both. The two things must ful qualities of the products themselves, we
therefore be equal to a third, which in itself put out of sight both the useful character of
is neither the one nor the other. Each of them, the various kinds of labour embodied in
so far as it is exchange-value, must therefore them, and the concrete forms of that labour;
be reducible to this third. there is nothing left but what is common to
A simple geometrical illustration will them all; all are reduced to one and the same
make this clear. In order to calculate and sort of labour, human labour in the abstract.
compare the areas of rectilinear figures, we Let us now consider the residue of each of
decompose them into triangles. But the area these products; it consists of the same unsub¬
of the triangle itself is expressed by some¬ stantial reality in each, a mere congelation of
thing totally different from its visible figure, homogeneous human labour, of labour-
namely, by half the product of the base into power expended without regard to the mode
the altitude. In the same way the exchange- of its expenditure. All that these things now
values of commodities must be capable of tell us is, that human labour-power has been
being expressed in terms of something com¬ expended in their production, that human la¬
mon to them all, of which thing they repre¬ bour is embodied in them. When looked at as
sent a greater or less quantity. crystals of this social substance, common to
This common “something” cannot be them all, they are—Values.
either a geometrical, a chemical, or any other We have seen that when commodities are
natural property of commodities. Such prop¬ exchanged, their exchange-value manifests
erties claim our attention only in so far as itself as something totally independent of
they affect the utility of those commodities, their use-value. But if we abstract from their
make them use-values. But the exchange of use-value, there remains their Value as de¬
commodities is evidently an act charac¬ fined above. Therefore, the common sub¬
terised by a total abstraction from use-value. stance that manifests itself in the exchange-
Then one use-value is just as good as another, value of commodities, whenever they are ex¬
provided only it be present in sufficient quan¬ changed, is their value. The progress of our
tity. Or, as old Barbon says, “one sort of wares investigation will show that exchange-value
are as good as another, if the values be equal. is the only form in which the value of com¬
There is no difference or distinction in things modities can manifest itself or be expressed.
Commodities 25
and vice versa, the less the productiveness of Let us take two commodities such as a coat
labour, the greater is the labour-time required and 10 yards of linen, and let the former be
for the production of an article, and the double the value of the latter, so that, if 10
greater is its value. The value of a commodity, yards of linen = W, the coat = 2W.
therefore, varies directly as the quantity, and The coat is a use-value that satisfies a par¬
inversely as the productiveness, of the labour ticular want. Its existence is the result of a
incorporated in it. special sort of productive activity, the nature
A thing can be a use-value, without having of which is determined by its aim, mode of
value. This is the case whenever its utility to operation, subject, means, and result. The la¬
man is not due to labour. Such are air, virgin bour, whose utility is thus represented by the
soil, natural meadows, &c. A thing can be value in use of its product, or which mani¬
useful, and the product of human labour, fests itself by making its product a use-value,
without being a commodity. Whoever di¬ we call useful labour. In this connexion we
rectly satisfies his wants with the produce of consider only its useful effect.
As the coat and the linen are two qualita¬
his own labour, creates, indeed, use-values,
tively different use-values, so also are the two
but no commodities. In order to produce the
forms of labour that produce them, tailoring
latter, be must not only produce use-values,
and weaving. Were these two objects not
but use-values for others, social use-values.
qualitatively different, not produced respec¬
(And not only for others, without more. The
tively by labour of different quality, they
mediaeval peasant produced quit-rent-corn
could not stand to each other in the relation
for his feudal lord and tithe-corn for his par¬
of commodities. Coats are not exchanged for
son. But neither the quit-rent-corn nor the
coats, one use-value is not exchanged for an¬
tithe-corn became commodities by reason of
other of the same kind.
the fact that they had been produced for oth¬
To all the different varieties of values in use
ers. To become a commodity a product must there correspond as many different kinds of
be transferred to another, whom it will serve useful labour, classified according to the or¬
as a use-value, by means of an exchange.)10 der, genus, species, and variety to which they
Lastly nothing can have value, without being belong in the social division of labour. This
an object of utility. If the thing is useless, so division of labour is a necessary condition for
is the labour contained in it; the labour does the production of commodities, but it does
not count as labour, and therefore creates no not follow, conversely, that the production of
value. commodities is a necessary condition for the
division of labour. In the primitive Indian
Section 2. The Two-fold Character community there is social division of labour,
without production of commodities. Or, to
of the Labour Embodied
take an example nearer home, in every fac¬
in Commodities tory the labour is divided according to a sys¬
tem, but this division is not brought about by
At first sight a commodity presented itself the operatives mutually exchanging their in¬
to us as a complex of two things—use-value dividual products. Only such products can
and exchange-value. Later on, we saw also become commodities with regard to each
that labour, too, possesses the same two-fold other, as result from different kinds of labour,
nature; for, so far as it finds expression in each kind being carried on independently
value, it does not possess the same charac¬ and for the account of private individuals.
teristics that belong to it as a creator of use- To resume, then: In the use-value of each
values. I was the first to point out and to commodity there is contained useful labour,
examine critically this two-fold nature of the i.e., productive activity of a definite kind and
labour contained in commodities. As this exercised with a definite aim. Use-values can¬
point is the pivot on which a clear compre¬ not confront each other as commodities, un¬
hension of Political Economy turns, we must less the useful labour embodied in them is
go more into detail. qualitatively different in each of them. In a
Commodities 27
community, the produce of which in general titative difference, which for the present does
takes the form of commodities, i.e., in a com¬ not concern us. We bear in mind, however,
munity of commodity producers, this quali¬ that if the value of the coat is double that of
tative difference between the useful forms of 10 yds. of linen, 20 yds. of linen must have
labour that are carried on independently by the same value as one coat. So far as they are
individual producers, each on their own ac¬ values, the coat and the linen are things of a
count, develops into a complex system, a so¬ like substance, objective expressions of es¬
cial division of labour. sentially identical labour. But tailoring and
Anyhow, whether the coat be worn by the weaving are, qualitatively, different kinds of
tailor or by his customer, in either case it labour. There are, however, states of society
operates as a use-value. Nor is the relation in which one and the same man does tailor¬
between the coat and the labour that pro¬ ing and weaving alternately, in which case
duced it altered by the circumstance that tai¬ these two forms of labour are mere modifica¬
loring may have become a special trade, an tions of the labour of the same individual,
independent branch of the social division of and no special and fixed functions of differ¬
labour. Wherever the want of clothing forced ent persons; just as the coat which our tailor
them to it, the human race made clothes for makes one day, and the trousers which he
thousands of years, without a single man be¬ makes another day, imply only a variation in
coming a tailor. But coats and linen, like the labour of one and the same individual.
every other element of material wealth that Moreover, we see at a glance that, in our capi¬
is not the spontaneous produce of Nature, talist society, a given portion of human la¬
must invariably owe their existence to a spe¬ bour is, in accordance with the varying de¬
cial productive activity, exercised with a defi¬ mand, at one time supplied in the form of
nite aim, an activity that appropriates par¬ tailoring, at another in the form of weaving.
ticular nature-given materials to particular This change may possibly not take place
human wants. So far therefore as labour is a without friction, but take place it must.
creator of use-value, is useful labour, it is a Productive activity, if we leave out of sight
necessary condition, independent of all its special form, viz., the useful character of
forms of society, for the existence of the hu¬ the labour, is nothing but the expenditure of
man race; it is an eternal nature-imposed ne¬ human labour-power. Tailoring and weaving,
cessity, without which there can be no mate¬ though qualitatively different productive ac¬
rial exchanges between man and Nature, and tivities, are each a productive expenditure of
therefore no life. human brains, nerves, and muscles, and in
The use-values, coat, linen, &c., i.e., the this sense are human labour. They are but
bodies of commodities, are combinations of two different modes of expending human la¬
two elements—matter and labour. If we take bour-power. Of course, this labour-power,
away the useful labour expended upon them, which remains the same under all its modifi¬
a material substratum is always left, which is cations, must have attained a certain pitch of
furnished by Nature without the help of man. development before it can be expended in a
The latter can work only as Nature does, that multiplicity of modes. But the value of a com¬
is by changing the form of matter. Nay more, modity represents human labour in the ab¬
in this work of changing the form he is con¬ stract, the expenditure of human labour in
stantly helped by natural forces. We see, then, general. And just as in society, a general or a
that labour is not the only source of material banker plays a great part, but mere man, on
wealth, of use-values produced by labour. As the other hand, a very shabby part,11 so here
William Petty puts it, labour is its father and with human labour. It is the expenditure of
the earth its mother. simple labour-power, i.e., of the labour-power
Let us now pass from the commodity con¬ which, on an average, apart from any special
sidered as a use-value to the value of com¬ development, exists in the organism of every
modities. ordinary individual. Simple average labour,
By our assumption, the coat is worth twice it is true, varies in character in different
as much as the linen. But this is a mere quan¬ countries and at different times, but in a par-
28 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ I. Karl Marx
ticular society it is given. Skilled labour labour-power must have been expended dur¬
counts only as simple labour intensified, or ing twice the time necessary for the produc¬
rather, as multiplied simple labour, a given tion of the former.
quantity of skilled being considered equal to While, therefore, with reference to use-
a greater quantity of simple labour. Experi¬ value, the labour contained in a commodity
ence shows that this reduction is constantly counts only qualitatively, with reference to
being made. A commodity may be the prod¬ value it counts only quantitatively, and must
uct of the most skilled labour, but its value, first be reduced to human labour pure and
by equating it to the product of simple un¬ simple. In the former case, it is a question of
skilled labour, represents a definite quantity How and What, in the latter of How much?
of the latter labour alone.12 The different pro¬ How long a time? Since the magnitude of the
portions in which different sorts of labour are value of a commodity represents only the
reduced to unskilled labour as their standard, quantity of labour embodied in it, it follows
are established by a social process that goes that all commodities, when taken in certain
on behind the backs of the producers, and, proportions, must be equal in value.
consequently, appear to be fixed by custom. If the productive power of all the different
For simplicity's sake we shall henceforth ac¬ sorts of useful labour required for the pro¬
count every kind of labour to be unskilled, duction of a coat remains unchanged, the
simple labour; by this we do no more than sum one coat represents x days' labour, two
save ourselves the trouble of making the re¬ coats represent 2x days' labour, and so on.
duction. But assume that the duration of the labour
Just as, therefore, in viewing the coat and necessary for the production of a coat be¬
linen as values, we abstract from their differ¬ comes doubled or halved. In the first case,
ent use-values, so it is with the labour repre¬ one coat is worth as much as two coats were
sented by those values: we disregard the dif¬ before; in the second case, two coats are only
ference between its useful forms, weaving worth as much as one was before, although
and tailoring. As the use-values, coat and in both cases one coat renders the same ser¬
linen, are combinations of special productive vice as before, and the useful labour embod¬
activities with cloth and yam, while the val¬ ied in it remains of the same quality. But the
ues, coat and linen, are, on the other hand, quantity of labour spent on its production
mere homogeneous congelations of undiffer¬ has altered.
entiated labour, so the labour embodied in An increase in the quantity of use-values is
these latter values does not count by virtue of an increase of material wealth. With two
its productive relation to cloth and yam, but coats two men can be clothed, with one coat
only as being expenditure of human labour- only one man. Nevertheless, an increased
power. Tailoring and weaving are necessary quantity of material wealth may correspond
factors in the creation of the use-values, coat to a simultaneous fall in the magnitude of its
and linen, precisely because these two kinds value. This antagonistic movement has its
of labour are of different qualities; but only origin in the two-fold character of labour.
in so far as abstraction is made from their Productive power has reference, of course,
special qualities, only in so far as both pos¬ only to labour of some useful concrete form,
sess the same quality of being human labour, the efficacy of any special productive activity
do tailoring and weaving form the substance during a given time being dependent on its
of the values of the same article. productiveness. Useful labour becomes,
Coats and linen, however, are not merely therefore, a more or less abundant source of
values, but values of definite magnitude, and products, in proportion to the rise or fall of
according to our assumption, the coat is its productiveness. On the other hand, no
worth twice as much as the ten yards of linen. change in this productiveness affects the la¬
Whence this difference in their values? It is bour represented by value. Since productive
owing to the fact that the linen contains only power is an attribute of the concrete useful
half as much labour as the coat, and conse¬ forms of labour, of course it can no longer
quently, that in the production of the latter, have any bearing on that labour, so soon as
Commodities 29
we make abstraction from those concrete “worth” in the sense of value in use, and
useful forms. However then productive “value” in the sense of exchange-value. This
power may vary, the same labour, exercised is quite in accordance with the spirit of a lan¬
guage that likes to use a Teutonic word for the
during equal periods of time, always yields
actual thing, and a Romance word for its re¬
equal amounts of value. But it will yield, dur¬
flexion. [Marx]
ing equal periods of time, different quantities
of values in use; more, if the productive 5. In bourgeois societies the economic fictio juris
prevails, that every one, as a buyer, possesses an
power rise, fewer, if it fall. The same change
encyclopaedic knowledge of commodities.
in productive power, which increases the
[Marx]
fruitfulness of labour, and, in consequence,
the quantity of use-values produced by that 6. “La valeur consiste dans le rapport d echange
labour, will diminish the total value of this qui se trouve entre telle chose et telle autre,
entre telle mesure dune production, et telle
increased quality of use-values, provided
mesure dune autre.” (Le Trosne: “Del’lnteret
such change shorten the total labour-time
Social. Physiocrates, Ed. Daire. Paris, 1846 P.
necessary for their production; and vice 889.) [Marx]
versa.
On the one hand all labour is, speaking 7. “Nothing can have an intrinsick value.” (N.
Barbon, 1. c., p. 6); or as Butler says—“The
physiologically, an expenditure of human la¬
value of a thing is just as much as it will
bour-power, and in its character of identical
bring.” [Marx]
abstract human labour, it creates and forms
the value of commodities. On the other hand, 8. “The value of them (the necessaries of life),
all labour is the expenditure of human la¬ when they are exchanged the one for another,
is regulated by the quantity of labour neces¬
bour-power in a special form and with a defi¬
sarily required and commonly taken in pro¬
nite aim, and in this, its character of concrete
ducing them.” (“Some Thoughts on the
useful labour, it produces use-values. Interest of Money in General, and Particu¬
larly in the Publick Funds, &c.” Lond., p. 36.)
Endnotes This remarkable anonymous work, written in
the last century, bears no date. It is clear, how¬
1. Karl Marx, “Zur Kritik der Politischen Oek-
ever, from internal evidence, that it appeared
onomie.” Berlin, 1859, p. 3. [Marx]
in the reign of George II. about 1739 or 1740.
2. “Desire implies want; it is the appetite of the [Marx]
mind, and as natural as hunger to the
body. . . . The greatest number (of things) 9. “Toutes les productions d’un meme genre ne
have their value from supplying the wants of forment proprement qu'une masse, dont le
the mind.” Nicholas Barbon: “A Discourse prix se determine en general et sans egard aux
Concerning Coining the New Money Lighter. circonstances particulieres.” (Le Trosen, 1. c.,
In Answer to Mr. Lockes Considerations,” p. 893.) [Marx]
&c., London, 1696, pp. 2, 3. [Marx]
10. I am inserting the parenthesis because its
3. “Things have an intrinsick vertue” (this is Bar¬ omission has often given rise to the misun¬
bon s special term for value in use) “which in derstanding that every product that is con¬
all places have the same vertue; as the load¬ sumed by some one other than its producer
stone to attract iron” (1. c., p. 6). The property is considered in Marx a commodity. [Engels,
which the magnet possesses of attracting 4th German edition]
iron, became of use only after by means of
that property the polarity of the magnet had 11. Comp. Hegel, “Philosophic des Rechts.” Ber¬
been discovered. [Marx] lin, 1840. P. 250, § 190. [Marx]
4. “The natural worth of anything consists in its 12. The reader must note that we are not speaking
fitness to supply the necessities, or serve the here of the wages or value that the labourer
conveniences of human life.” (John Locke, gets for a given labour-time, but of the value
“Some Considerations on the Consequences of the commodity in which that labour-time
of the Lowering of Interest, 1691,” in Works is materialised. Wages is a category that, as
Edit. Lond., 1777, Vol. II., p. 28.) In English yet, has no existence at the present stage of
writers of the 17th century we frequently find our investigation. [Marx] ♦
30 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ I. Karl Marx
The result, in which the phases of the process vention of money, in the second by that of a
vanish, is the exchange of money for money, commodity.
M—M. If I purchase 2,000 lbs. of cotton for In the circulation C—M—C, the money is
£100, and resell the 2,000 lbs. of cotton for in the end converted into a commodity, that
£110, I have, in fact, exchanged £100 for serves as a use-value; it is spent once for all.
£110, money for money. In the inverted form, M—C—M, on the con¬
Now it is evident that the circuit M—C—M trary, the buyer lays out money in order that,
would be absurd and without meaning if the as a seller, he may recover money. By the pur¬
intention were to exchange by this means two chase of his commodity be throws money
equal sums of money, £100 for £100. The mi¬ into circulation, in order to withdraw it again
sers plan would be far simpler and surer; he by the sale of the same commodity. He lets
sticks to his £ 100 instead of exposing it to the the money go, but only with the sly intention
dangers of circulation. And yet, whether the of getting it back again. The money, there¬
merchant who has paid £100 for his cotton fore, is not spent, it is merely advance.
sells it for £110, or lets it go for £100, or even In the circuit C—M—C, the same piece of
£50, his money has, at all events, gone money changes its place twice. The seller gets
through a characteristic and original move¬ it from the buyer and pays it away to another
ment, quite different in kind from that which seller. The complete circulation, which be¬
it goes through in the hands of the peasant gins with the receipt, concludes with the pay¬
ment, of money for commodities. It is the
who sells com, and with the money thus set
very contrary in the circuit M—C—M. Here
free buys clothes. We have therefore to exam¬
it is not the piece of money that changes its
ine first the distinguishing characteristics of
place twice, but the commodity. The buyer
the forms of the circuits M—C—M and C—
takes it from the hands of the seller and
M—C, and in doing this the real difference
passes it into the hands of another buyer. Just
that underlies the mere difference of form
as in the simple circulation of commodities
will reveal itself.
the double change of place of the same piece
Let us see, in the first place, what the two
of money effects its passage from one hand
forms have in common.
into another, so here the double change of
Both circuits are resolvable into the same
place of the same commodity brings about
two antithetical phases, C—M, a Sale, and
the reflux of the money to its point of depar¬
M—C, a purchase. In each of these phases the
ture.
same material elements—a commodity, and
Such reflux is not dependent on the com¬
money, and the same economic dramatis per¬ modity being sold for more than was paid for
sonae, a buyer and a seller—confront one an¬ it. This circumstance influences only the
other. Each circuit is the unity of the same amount of the money that comes back. The
two antithetical phases, and in each case this reflux itself takes place, so soon as the pur¬
unity is brought about by the intervention of chased commodity is resold, in other words,
three contracting parties, of whom one only so soon as the circuit M—C—M is completed.
sells, another only buys, while the third both We have here, therefore, a palpable differ¬
buys and sells. ence between the circulation of money as
What, however, first and foremost distin¬ capital, and its circulation as mere money.
guishes the circuit C—M—C from the circuit The circuit C—M—C comes completely to
M—C—M, is the inverted order of succession an end, so soon as the money brought in by
of the two phases. The simple circulation of the sale of one commodity is abstracted again
commodities begins with a sale and ends by the purchase of another.
with a purchase, while the circulation of If, nevertheless, there follows a reflux of
money as capital begins with a purchase and money to its starting-point, this can only hap¬
ends with a sale. In the one case both the pen through a renewal of repetition of the
starting-point and the goal are commodities, operation. If I sell a quarter of com of £3, and
in the other they are money. In the first form with this £3 buy clothes, the money, so far as
the movement is brought about by the inter¬ I am concerned, is spent and done with. It
32 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ I. Karl Marx
belongs to the clothes merchant. If I now sell drawn from circulation at the finish than was
a second quarter of com, money indeed flows thrown into it at the start. The cotton that was
back to me, not however as a sequel to the bought for £100 is perhaps resold for
first transaction, but in consequence of its £100+£10or£110.The exact form of this pro¬
repetition. The money again leaves me, so cess is therefore M—C—M', where M' = M+
soon as I complete this second transaction by AM = the original sum advanced, plus an in¬
a fresh purchase. Therefore, in the circuit C— crement. This increment or excess over the
M—C, the expenditure of money has nothing original value I call “surplus-value.” The
to do with its reflux. On the other hand, in value originally advanced, therefore, not only
M—C—M, the reflux of the money is condi¬ remains intact while in circulation, but adds
tioned by the very mode of its expenditure. to itself a surplus-value or expands itself. It is
Without this reflux, the operation fails, or the this movement that converts it into capital.
process is interrupted and incomplete, owing Of course, it is also possible, that in C—
to the absence of its complementary and final M—C, the two extremes G—C, say com and
phase, the sale. clothes, may represent different quantities of
The circuit C—M—C starts with one com¬ value. The farmer may sell his com above its
modity, and finishes with another, which falls value, or may buy the clothes at less than
out of circulation and into consumption. their value. He may, on the other hand, “be
Consumption, the satisfaction of wants, in done” by the clothes merchant. Yet, in the
one word, use-value, is its end and aim. The form of circulation now under consideration,
circuit M—C—M, on the contrary, com¬ such differences in value are purely acciden¬
mences with money and ends with money. Its tal. The fact that the com and the clothes are
leading motive, and the goal that attracts it, equivalents, does not deprive the process of
is therefore mere exchange-value. all meaning, as it does in M—C—M. The
In the simple circulation of commodities, equivalence of their values is rather a neces¬
the two extremes of the circuit have the same sary condition to its normal course.
economic form. They are both commodities, The repetition or renewal of the act of sell¬
and commodities of equal value. But they are ing in order to buy, is kept within bounds by
also use-values differing in their qualities, as, the very object it aims at, namely, consump¬
for example, com and clothes. The exchange tion or the satisfaction of definite wants, an
of products, of the different materials in aim that lies altogether outside the sphere of
which the labour of society is embodied, circulation. But when we buy in order to sell,
forms here the basis of the movement. It is we, on the contrary, begin and end with the
otherwise in the circulation M—C—M, same thing, money, exchange-value; and
which at first sight appears purposeless, be¬ thereby the movement becomes intermina¬
cause tautological. Both extremes have the ble. No doubt, M becomes M+AM, £100 be¬
same economic form. They are both money, come £110. But when viewed in their quali¬
and therefore are not qualitatively different tative aspect alone, £110 are the same as
use-values; for money is but the converted £100, namely money; and considered quanti¬
form of commodities, in which their particu¬ tatively, £110 is, like £100, a sum of definite
lar use-values vanish. To exchange £100 for and limited value. If now, the £110 be spent
cotton, and then this same cotton again for as money, they cease to play their part. They
£110, is merely a roundabout way of ex¬ are no longer capital. Withdrawn from circu¬
changing money for money, the same for the lation, they become petrified into a hoard,
same, and appears to be an operation just as and though they remained in that state till
purposeless as it is absurd. One sum of doomsday, not a single farthing would accrue
money is distinguishable from another only to them. If, then, the expansion of value is
by its amount. The character and tendency of once aimed at, there is just the same induce¬
the process M—C—M, is therefore not due to ment to augment the value of the £ 110 as that
any qualitative difference between its ex¬ of the £100; for both are but limited expres¬
tremes, both being money, but solely to their sions for exchange-value, and therefore both
quantitative difference. More money is with¬ have the same vocation to approach, by
The General Formula for Capital 33
quantitative increase, as near as possible to tion, is attained by the more acute capitalist,
absolute wealth. Momentarily, indeed, the by constantly throwing it afresh into circula¬
value originally advanced, the £100, is distin¬ tion.
guishable from the surplus-value of £10, that The independent form, i.e., the money-
is annexed to it during circulation; but the form, which the value of commodities as¬
distinction vanishes immediately. At the end sumes in the case of simple circulation,
of the process, we do not receive with one serves only one purpose, namely, their ex¬
hand the original £100, and with the other, change, and vanishes in the final result of the
the surplus-value of £10. We simply get a movement. On the other hand, in the circu¬
value of £110, which is in exactly the same lation M—C—M, both the money and the
condition and fitness for commencing the ex¬ commodity represent only different modes of
panding process, as the original £100 was. existence of value itself, the money its general
Money ends the movement only to begin it mode, and the commodity its particular, or,
again.1 Therefore, the final result of every so to say, disguised mode. It is constantly
separate circuit, in which a purchase and changing from one form to the other without
consequent sale are completed, forms of it¬ thereby becoming lost, and thus assumes an
self the starting-point of a new circuit. The automatically active character. If now we
simple circulation of commodities—selling take in turn each of the two different forms
in order to buy—is a means of carrying out a which self-expanding value successively as¬
purpose unconnected with circulation, sumes in the course of its life, we then arrive
namely, the appropriation of use-values, the at these two propositions: Capital is money:
satisfaction of wants. The circulation of Capital is commodities. In truth, however,
money as capital is, on the contrary, an end value is here the active factor in a process, in
in itself, for the expansion of value takes place which, while constantly assuming the form
only within this constantly renewed move¬ in turn of money and commodities, it at the
ment. The circulation of capital has therefore same time changes in magnitude, differenti¬
no limits.2 ates itself by throwing off surplus-value from
As the conscious representative of this itself; the original value, in other words, ex¬
movement, the possessor of money becomes pands spontaneously. For the movement, in
a capitalist. His person, or rather his pocket, the course of which it adds surplus-value, is
is the point from which the money starts and its own movement, its expansion, therefore,
to which it returns. The expansion of value, is automatic expansion. Because it is value,
which is the objective basis or main-spring of it has acquired the occult quality of being
the circulation M—C—M, becomes his sub¬ able to add value to itself. It brings forth liv¬
jective aim, and it is only in so far as the ing offspring, or, at the least, lays golden eggs.
appropriation of ever more and more wealth Value, therefore, being the active factor in
in the abstract becomes the sole motive of his such a process, and assuming at one time the
operations, that he functions as a capitalist, form of money, at another that of commodi¬
that is, as capital personified and endowed ties, but through all these changes preserving
with consciousness and a will. Use-values itself and expanding, it requires some inde¬
must therefore never be looked upon as the pendent form, by means of which its identity
real aim of the capitalist; neither must the may at any time be established. And this form
profit on any single transaction. The restless it possesses only in the shape of money. It is
never-ending process of profit-making alone under the form of money that value begins
is what he aims at. This boundless greed after and ends, and begins again, every act of its
riches, this passionate chase after exchange- own spontaneous generation. It began by be¬
value, is common to the capitalist and the ing £100, it is now £110, and so on. But the
miser; but while the miser is merely a capi¬ money itself is only one of the two forms of
talist gone mad, the capitalist is a rational value. Unless it takes the form of some com¬
miser. The never-ending augmentation of ex¬ modity, it does not become capital. There is
change-value, which the miser strives after, here no antagonism, as in the case of board¬
by seeking to save his money from circula¬ ing, between the money and commodities.
34 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ I. Karl Marx
The capitalist knows that all commodities, its result without the intermediate stage, in
however scurvy they may look, or however the form M—M', “en style lapidaire” so to say,
badly they may smell, are in faith and in truth money that is worth more money, value that
money, inwardly circumcised Jews, and what is greater than itself.
is more, a wonderful means whereby out of M—C—M' is therefore in reality the gen¬
money to make more money. eral formula of capital as it appears prima
In simple circulation, C—M—C, the value facie within the sphere of circulation.
of commodities attained at the most a form
independent of their use-values, i.e., the form Endnotes
of money; but that same value now in the
circulation M—C—M, or the circulation of 1. “Capital is divisible . . . into the original capi¬
capital, suddenly presents itself as an inde¬ tal and the profit, the increment to the capital
pendent substance, endowed with a motion ... although in practice this profit is immedi¬
of its own, passing, through a life-process of ately turned into capital, and set in motion
its own, in which money and commodities with the original.” (F. Engels, “Umrisse zu
are mere forms which it assumes and casts einer Kritik der Nationalokonomie, in the
“Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbiicher,” edited
off in turn. Nay, more: instead of simply rep¬
by Arnold Ruge and Karl Marx.” Paris, 1844,
resenting the relations of commodities, it en¬
p. 99.) [Marx]
ters now, so to say, into private relations with
itself. It differentiates itself as original value 2. Aristotle opposes Oeconomic to Chrematis-
tic. He starts from the former. So far as it is
from itself as surplus-value; as the father dif¬
the art of gaining a livelihood, it is limited to
ferentiates himself from himself qua the son,
procuring those articles that are necessary to
yet both are one and of one age: for only by existence, and useful either to a household or
the surplus-value of £10 does the £100 origi¬ the state. “True wealth consists of such values
nally advanced become capital, and so soon in use; for the quantity of possessions of this
as this takes place, so soon as the son, and by kind, capable of making life pleasant, is not
the son, the father, is begotten, so soon does unlimited. There is, however, a second mode
their difference vanish, and they again be¬ of acquiring things, to which we may by pref¬
come one, £110. erence and with correctness give the name of
Chrematistic, and in this case there appear to
Value therefore now becomes value in pro¬
be no limits to riches and possessions. Trade
cess, money in process, and, as such, capital.
(literally retail trade, and Aristotle takes this
It comes out of circulation, enters into it kind because in it values in use predominate)
again, preserves and multiplies itself within does not in its nature belong to Chrematistic,
its circuit, comes back out of it with ex¬ for here the exchange has reference only to
panded bulk, and begins the same round ever what is necessary to themselves (the buyer or
afresh. M—M', money which begets money, seller).” Therefore, as he goes on to show, the
such is the description of Capital from the original form of trade was barter, but with the
mouths of its first interpreters, the Mercan¬ extension of the latter, there arose the neces¬
sity for money. On the discovery of money,
tilists.
barter of necessity developed into trading in
Buying in order to sell, or, more accurately, commodities, and this again, in opposition to
buying in order to sell dearer, M—C—M', ap¬ its original tendency, grew into Chrematistic,
pears certainly to be a form peculiar to one into the art of making money. Now Chrema¬
kind of capital alone, namely merchants' tistic is distinguishable from Oeconomic in
capital. But industrial capital too is money, this way, that “in the case of Chrematistic cir¬
that is changed into commodities, and by the culation is the source of riches. And it appears
sale of these commodities, is re-converted to revolve about money, for money is the be¬
ginning and end of this kind of exchange.
into more money. The events that take place
Therefore also riches, such as Chrematistic
outside the sphere of circulation, in the inter¬
strives for, are unlimited. Just as every art that
val between the buying and selling, do not is not a means to an end, but an end in itself,
affect the form of this movement. Lastly, in has no limit to its aims, because it seeks con¬
the case of interest-bearing capital, the circu¬ stantly to approach nearer and nearer to that
lation M—C—M'. appears abridged. We have end, while those arts that pursue means to an
The General Formula for Capital 35
end, are not boundless, since the goal itself confounding these two forms, which overlap
imposes a limit upon them, so with Chrema- each other, some people have been led to look
tistic, there are no bounds to its aims, these upon the preservation and increase of money
aims being absolute wealth. Oeconomic not ad infinitum as the end and aim of Oe¬
Chrematistic has a limit. . . the object of the conomic.” (Aristoteles, "De-rep.” edit. Bekker.
former is something different from money, of lib. I. c. 8, 9. passim.) [Marx] ♦
the latter the augmentation of money ... By
36 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ II. Emile Durkheim
Solidarity Introduction
The Problem
Emile Durkheim The division of labor is not of recent origin,
but it was only at the end of the eighteenth
century that social cognizance was taken of
Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) used two meta¬
the principle, though, until then, unwitting
phors to describe the different bases of solidar¬
submission had been rendered to it. To be
ity, or social order, in traditional preindustrial
sure, several thinkers from earliest times saw
and modem industrial societies. He saw tradi¬
its importance;1 but Adam Smith was the
tional society as characterized by mechanical
first to attempt a theory of it. Moreover, he
solidarity and modem society as defined in
adopted this phrase that social science later
terms of organic solidarity. In this excerpt from
lent to biology.
his first major book, The Division of Labor in
Nowadays, the phenomenon has devel¬
Society (1893), Durkheim poses a fundamen¬
oped so generally it is obvious to all. We need
tal question about modem society: How can it
have no further illusions about the tenden¬
facilitate individual autonomy while people
cies of modem industry; it advances steadily
are increasingly more dependent on others? As
towards powerful machines, towards great
the title of the book might suggest, the answer
concentrations of forces and capital, and
has to do with the evermore complex and dif¬
consequently to the extreme division of labor.
ferentiated division of labor in industrial socie¬
Occupations are infinitely separated and spe¬
ties.
cialized, not only inside the factories, but
each product is itself a specialty dependent
upon others. Adam Smith and John Stuart
... JLhis work had its origins in the question Mill still hoped that agriculture, at least,
of the relations of the individual to social would be an exception to the rule, and they
solidarity. Why does the individual, while saw it as the last resort of small-scale indus¬
becoming more autonomous, depend more try. Although one must be careful not to gen¬
upon society? How can he be at once more eralize unduly in such matters, nevertheless
individual and more solidary? Certainly, it is hard to deny today that the principal
branches of the agricultural industry are
steadily being drawn into the general move¬
Reprinted with permission of The Free Press, a Divi¬
sion of Simon & Schuster, Inc., from The Division of La¬ ment.2 Finally, business itself is ingeniously
bor in Society by Emile Durkheim. Translated by George following and reflecting in all its shadings the
Simpson. Copyright © 1947, 1964 by The Free Press. infinite diversity of industrial enterprises;
On Mechanical and Organic Solidarity 37
and, while this evolution is realizing itself ther the common soul of society in its living
with unpremeditated spontaneity, the econo¬ parts, nor even, at least not generally, that of
mists, examining its causes and appreciating special groups, and, consequently, it can de¬
its results, far from condemning or opposing termine only a very moderate reaction. All
it, uphold it as necessary. They see in it the that is necessary is that the functions concur
supreme law of human societies and the con¬ in a regular manner. If this regularity is dis¬
dition of their progress. . . . rupted, it behooves us to re-establish it. As¬
suredly, that is not to say that the develop¬
*** ment of the division of labor cannot be affec¬
tive of penal law. There are, as we already
. . . [T]he relations governed by co-opera¬ know, administrative and governmental
tive law with restitutive sanctions and the functions in which certain relations are regu¬
solidarity which they express, result from the lated by repressive law, because of the par¬
division of social labor. We have explained, ticular character which the organ of common
moreover, that, in general, co-operative rela¬ conscience and everything that relates to it
tions do not convey other sanctions. In fact, has. In still other cases, the links of solidarity
it is in the nature of special tasks to escape which unite certain social functions can be
the action of the collective conscience, for, in such that from their break quite general re¬
order for a thing to be the object of common percussions result invoking a penal sanction.
sentiments, the first condition is that it be But, for the reason we have given, these
common, that is to say, that it be present in counter-blows are exceptional.
all consciences and that all can represent it This law definitely plays a role in society
in one and the same manner. To be sure, in analogous to that played by the nervous sys¬
so far as functions have a certain generality, tem in the organism. The latter has as its task,
everybody can have some idea of them. But in effect, the regulation of the different func¬
the more specialized they are, the more cir¬ tions of the body in such a way as to make
cumscribed the number of those cognizant of them harmonize. It thus very naturally ex¬
each of them. Consequently, the more mar¬
presses the state of concentration at which
ginal they are to the common conscience.
the organism has arrived, in accordance with
The rules which determine them cannot have
the division of physiological labor. Thus, on
the superior force, the transcendent author¬
different levels of the animal scale, we can
ity which, when offended, demands expia¬
measure the degree of this concentration ac¬
tion. It is also from opinion that their author¬
ity comes, as is the case with penal rules, but cording to the development of the nervous
from an opinion localized in restricted re¬ system. Which is to say that we can equally
gions of society. measure the degree of concentration at
Moreover, even in the special circles where which a society has arrived in accordance
they apply and where, consequently, they are with the division of social labor according to
represented in people, they do not corre¬ the development of co-operative law with res¬
spond to very active sentiments, nor even titutive sanctions. We can foresee the great
very often to any type of emotional state. For, services that this criterion will render us. . . .
as they fix the manner in which the different
***
functions ought to concur in diverse combi¬
nations of circumstances which can arise, the
objects to which they relate themselves are Since negative solidarity does not produce
not always present to consciences. We do not any integration by itself, and since, moreover,
always have to administer guardianship trus¬ there is nothing specific about it, we shall
teeship,3 or exercise the rights of creditor or recognize only two kinds of positive solidar¬
buyer, etc., or even exercise them in such and ity which are distinguishable by the following
such a condition. But the states of conscience qualities:
are strong only in so far as they are perma¬ 1. The first binds the individual directly to
nent. The violation of these rules reaches nei¬ society without any intermediary. In the sec-
38 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ II. Emile Durkheim
ond, he depends upon society, because he de¬ mits us to say, for we are no longer ourselves,
pends upon the parts of which it is composed. but the collective life.
2. Society is not seen in the same aspect in The social molecules which can be coher¬
the two cases. In the first, what we call society ent in this way can act together only in the
is a more or less organized totality of beliefs measure that they have no actions of their
and sentiments common to all the members own, as the molecules of inorganic bodies.
of the group: this is the collective type. On the That is why we propose to call this type of
other hand, the society in which we are soli¬ solidarity mechanical. The term does not sig¬
dary in the second instance is a system of nify that it is produced by mechanical and
different, special functions which definite re¬ artificial means. We call it that only by anal¬
lations unite. These two societies really make ogy to the cohesion which unites the ele¬
up only one. They are two aspects of one and ments of an inanimate body, as opposed to
the same reality, but none the less they must that which makes a unity out of the elements
be distinguished. of a living body. What justifies this term is
3. From this second difference there arises that the link which thus unites the individual
another which helps us to characterize and to society is wholly analogous to that which
name the two kinds of solidarity. attaches a thing to a person. The individual
The first can be strong only if the ideas and conscience, considered in this light, is a sim¬
tendencies common to all the members of the ple dependent upon the collective type and
society are greater in number and intensity follows all of its movements, as the possessed
than those which pertain personally to each object follows those of its owner. In societies
member. It is as much stronger as the excess where this type of solidarity is highly devel¬
is more considerable. But what makes our oped, the individual does not appear, as we
personality is how much of our own individ¬ shall see later. Individuality is something
ual qualities we have, what distinguishes us which the society possesses. Thus, in these
from others. This solidarity can grow only in social types, personal rights are not yet dis¬
inverse ratio to personality. There are in each tinguished from real rights.
of us, as we have said, two consciences: one It is quite otherwise with the solidarity
which is common to our group in its entirety, which the division of labor produces.
which, consequently, is not ourself, but soci¬ Whereas the previous type implies that indi¬
ety living and acting within us; the other, on viduals resemble each other, this type pre¬
the contrary, represents that in us which is sumes their difference. The first is possible
personal and distinct, that which makes us only in so far as the individual personality is
an individual.4 Solidarity which comes from absorbed into the collective personality; the
likenesses is at its maximum when the collec¬ second is possible only if each one has a
tive conscience completely envelops our sphere of action which is peculiar to him;
whole conscience and coincides in all points that is, a personality. It is necessary, then, that
with it. But, at that moment, our individual¬ the collective conscience leave open a part of
ity is nil. It can be bom only if the community the individual conscience in order that spe¬
takes smaller toll of us. There are, here, two cial functions may be established there, func¬
contrary forces, one centripetal, the other tions which it cannot regulate. The more this
centrifugal, which cannot flourish at the region is extended, the stronger is the cohe¬
same time. We cannot, at one and the same sion which results from this solidarity. In ef¬
time, develop ourselves in two opposite fect, on the one hand, each one depends
senses. If we have a lively desire to think and much more strictly on society as labor is
act for ourselves, we cannot be strongly in¬ more divided; and, on the other, the activity
clined to think and act as others do. If our of each is much more personal as it is, more
ideal is to present a singular and personal specialized. Doubtless, as circumscribed as it
appearance, we do not want to resemble is, it is never completely original. Even in the
everybody else. Moreover, at the moment exercise of our occupation, we conform to
when this solidarity exercises its force, our usages, to practices which are common to
personality vanishes, as our definition per¬ our whole professional brotherhood. But,
On Mechanical and Organic Solidarity 39
even in this instance, the yoke that we submit awaken without upheavals occurring, for, as
to is much less heavy than when society com¬ it varies from one man to another in quality
pletely controls us, and it leaves much more and quantity, everything that it produces has
place open for the free play of our initiative. the same character. Centrifugal tendencies
Here, then, the individuality of all grows at thus multiply at the expense of social cohe¬
the same time as that of its parts. Society sion and the harmony of its movements.
becomes more capable of collective move¬ On the other hand, strong and defined
ment, at the same time that each of its ele¬ states of the common conscience are the
ments has more freedom of movement. This roots of penal law. But we are going to see
solidarity resembles that which we observe that the number of these is less today than
among the higher animals. Each organ, in heretofore, and that it diminishes, progres¬
effect, has its special physiognomy, its auton¬ sively, as societies approach our social
omy. And, moreover, the unity of the organ¬ type. . . .
ism is as great as the individuation of the To prove this, it would avail us nothing to
parts is more marked. Because of this anal¬ compare the number of rules with repressive
ogy, we propose to call the solidarity which is sanctions in different social types, for the
due to the division of labor, organic. . . . number of rules does not vary exactly with
the sentiments the rules represent. The same
*** sentiment can, in effect, be offended in sev¬
eral different ways, and thus give rise to sev¬
Not only, in a general way, does mechani¬ eral rules without diversifying itself in so do¬
cal solidarity link men less strongly than or¬ ing. Because there are now more ways of ac¬
ganic solidarity, but also, as we advance in the quiring property, there are also more ways of
scale of social evolution, it grows ever slacker. stealing, but the sentiment of respect for the
The force of social links which have this property of another has not multiplied itself
origin vary with respect to the three following proportionally. . . .
conditions: This is not to say, however, that the com¬
1. The relation between the volume of the mon conscience is threatened with total dis¬
common conscience and that of the individ¬ appearance. Only, it more and more comes to
ual conscience. The links are as strong as the consist of very general and very indetermi¬
first more completely envelops the second. nate ways of thinking and feeling, which
2. The average intensity of the states of the leave an open place for a growing multitude
collective conscience. The relation between of individual differences. There is even a
volumes being equal, it has as much power place where it is strengthened and made pre¬
over the individual as it has vitality. If, on the cise: that is the way in which it regards the
other hand, it consists of only feeble forces, individual. As all the other beliefs and all the
it can but feebly influence the collective other practices take on a character less and
sense. It will the more easily be able to pursue less religious, the individual becomes the ob¬
its own course, and solidarity will be less ject of a sort of religion. We erect a cult in
strong. behalf of personal dignity which, as every
3. The greater or lesser determination of strong cult, already has its superstitions. It is
these same states. That is, the more defined thus, if one wishes, a common cult, but it is
beliefs and practices are, the less place they possible only by the ruin of all others, and,
leave for individual divergencies. They are consequently, cannot produce the same ef¬
uniform moulds into which we all, in the fects as this multitude of extinguished beliefs.
same manner, couch our ideas and our ac¬ There is no compensation for that. Moreover,
tions. The consensus is then as perfect as pos¬ if it is common in so far as the community
sible; all consciences vibrate in unison. In¬ partakes of it, it is individual in its object. If
versely, the more general and indeterminate it turns all wills towards the same end, this
the rules of conduct and thought are, the end is not social. It thus occupies a com¬
more individual reflection must intervene to pletely exceptional place in the collective
apply them to particular cases. But it cannot conscience. It is still from society that it takes
40 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ II. Emile Durkheim
all its force, but it is not to society that it this cannot be any other than that which
attaches us; it is to ourselves. Hence, it does comes from the division of labor.
not constitute a true social link. That is why If, moreover, one recalls that even where it
we have been justly able to reproach the theo¬ is most resistant, mechanical solidarity does
rists who have made this sentiment exclu¬ not link men with the same force as the divi¬
sively basic in their moral doctrine, with the sion of labor, and that, moreover, it leaves
ensuing dissolution of society. We can then outside its scope the major part of phenom¬
ena actually social, it will become still more
conclude by saying that all social links which
evident that social solidarity tends to become
result from likeness progressively slacken.
exclusively organic. It is the division of labor
This law, in itself, is already enough to
which, more and more, fills the role that was
show the tremendous grandeur of the role of
formerly filled by the common conscience. It
the division of labor. In sum, since mechani¬ is the principal bond of social aggregates of
cal solidarity progressively becomes enfee¬ higher types.
bled, life properly social must decrease or This is a function of the division of labor a
another solidarity must slowly come in to good deal more important than that ordinar¬
take the place of that which has gone. The ily assigned to it by economists.
choice must be made. In vain shall we con¬
tend that the collective conscience extends Endnotes
and grows stronger at the same time as that
1. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, El 133a, 16.
of individuals. We have just proved that the
2. Journal des Economistes, November 1884, p.
two terms vary in a sense inverse to each
211.
other. Social progress, however, does not con¬
3. That is why the law which governs the rela¬
sist in a continual dissolution. On the con¬ tions of domestic functions is not penal, al¬
trary, the more we advance, the more pro¬ though these functions are very general.
foundly do societies reveal the sentiment of 4. However, these two consciences are not in re¬
self and of unity. There must, then, be some gions geographically distinct from us, but
other social link which produces this result; penetrate from all sides. ♦
What Is a Social Fact? 41
illusion of having ourselves created that the source from which these habits were de¬
which actually forced itself from without. If rived. It is true that, according to Spencer, a
the complacency with which we permit our¬ rational education ought to reject such meth¬
selves to be carried along conceals the pres¬ ods, allowing the child to act in complete lib¬
sure undergone, nevertheless it does not erty; but as this pedagogic theory has never
abolish it. Thus, air is no less heavy because been applied by any known people, it must
we do not detect its weight. So, even if we be accepted only as an expression of personal
ourselves have spontaneously contributed to opinion, not as a fact which can contradict
the production of the common emotion, the the aforementioned observations. What
impression we have received differs mark¬ makes these facts particularly instructive is
edly from that which we would have experi¬ that the aim of education is, precisely, the
enced if we had been alone. Also, once the socialization of the human being; the process
crowd has dispersed, that is, once these social of education, therefore, gives us in a nutshell
influences have ceased to act upon us and we the historical fashion in which the social be¬
are alone again, the emotions which have ing is constituted. This unremitting pressure
passed through the mind appear strange to to which the child is subjected is the very
us, and we no longer recognize them as ours. pressure of the social milieu which tends to
We realize that these feelings have been im¬ fashion him in its own image, and of which
pressed upon us to a much greater extent parents and teachers are merely the repre¬
than they were created by us. It may even sentatives and intermediaries.
happen that they horrify us, so much were It follows that sociological phenomena
they contrary to our nature. Thus, a group of cannot be defined by their universality. A
individuals, most of whom are perfectly inof¬ thought which we find in every individual
fensive, may, when gathered in a crowd, be consciousness, a movement repeated by all
drawn into acts of atrocity. And what we say individuals, is not thereby a social fact. If
of these transitory outbursts applies similarly sociologists have been satisfied with defining
to those more permanent currents of opinion them by this characteristic, it is because they
on religious, political, literary, or artistic mat¬ confused them with what one might call the
ters which are constantly being formed reincarnation in the individual. It is, how¬
around us, whether in society as a whole or ever, the collective aspects of the beliefs, ten¬
in more limited circles. dencies, and practices of a group that char¬
To confirm this definition of the social fact acterize truly social phenomena. As for the
by a characteristic illustration from common forms that the collective states assume when
experience, one need only observe the man¬ refracted in the individual, these are things
ner in which children are brought up. Con¬ of another sort. This duality is clearly dem¬
sidering the facts as they are and as they have onstrated by the fact that these two orders of
always been, it becomes immediately evident phenomena are frequently found dissociated
that all education is a continuous effort to from one another. Indeed, certain of these
impose on the child ways of seeing, feeling, social manners of acting and thinking ac¬
and acting which he could not have arrived quire, by reason of their repetition, a certain
at spontaneously. From the very first hours of rigidity which on its own account crystallizes
his life, we compel him to eat, drink, and them, so to speak, and isolates them from the
sleep at regular hours; we constrain him to particular events which reflect them. They
cleanliness, calmness, and obedience; later thus acquire a body, a tangible form, and con¬
we exert pressure upon him in order that he stitute a reality in their own right, quite dis¬
may learn proper consideration for others, tinct from the individual facts which produce
respect for customs and conventions, the it. Collective habits are inherent not only in
need for work, etc. If, in time, this constraint the successive acts which they determine but,
ceases to be felt, it is because it gradually by a privilege of which we find no example in
gives rise to habits and to internal tendencies the biological realm, they are given perma¬
that render constraint unnecessary; but nent expression in a formula which is re¬
nevertheless it is not abolished, for it is still peated from mouth to mouth, transmitted by
44 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ II. Emile Durkheim
education, and fixed even in writing. Such is vidual and on the particular circumstances in
the origin and nature of legal and moral which he is placed. Thus they are not socio¬
rules, popular aphorisms and proverbs, arti¬ logical phenomena in the strict sense of the
cles of faith wherein religious or political word. They belong to two realms at once; one
groups condense their beliefs, standards of could call them sociopsychological. They in¬
taste established by literary schools, etc. terest the sociologist without constituting the
None of these can be found entirely repro¬ immediate subject matter of sociology. There
duced in the applications made of them by exist in the interior of organisms similar phe¬
individuals, since they can exist even without nomena, compound in their nature, which
being actually applied. form in their turn the subject matter of the
No doubt, this dissociation does not al¬ "hybrid sciences," such as physiological
ways manifest itself with equal distinctness, chemistry, for example.
but its obvious existence in the important and The objection may be raised that a phe¬
numerous cases just cited is sufficient to nomenon is collective only if it is common to
prove that the social fact is a thing distinct all members of society, or at least to most of
from its individual manifestations. More¬ them—in other words, if it is truly general.
over, even when this dissociation is not im¬ This may be true; but it is general because it
mediately apparent, it may often be disclosed is collective (that is, more or less obligatory),
by certain devices of method. Such dissocia¬ and certainly not collective because general.
tion is indispensable if one wishes to separate It is a group condition repeated in the indi¬
social facts from their alloys in order to ob¬ vidual because imposed on him. It is to be
serve them in a state of purity. Currents of found in each part because it exists in the
opinion, with an intensity varying according whole, rather than in the whole because it
to the time and place, impel certain groups exists in the parts. This becomes conspicu¬
either to more marriages, for example, or to ously evident in those beliefs and practices
more suicides, or to a higher or lower birth¬ which are transmitted to us ready-made by
rate, etc. These currents are plainly social previous generations; we receive and adopt
facts. At first sight they seem inseparable them because, being both collective and an¬
from the forms they take in individual cases. cient, they are invested with a particular
But statistics furnish us with the means of authority that education has taught us to rec¬
isolating them. They are, in fact, represented ognize and respect. It is, of course, true that
with considerable exactness by the rates of a vast portion of our social culture is trans¬
births, marriages, and suicides, that is, by the mitted to us in this way; but even when the
number obtained by dividing the average an¬ social fact is due in part to our direct collabo¬
nual total of marriages, births, suicides, by ration, its nature is not different. A collective
the number of persons whose ages lie within emotion which bursts forth suddenly and vio¬
the range in which marriages, births, and sui¬ lently in a crowd does not express merely
cides occur.2 Since each of these figures con¬ what all the individual sentiments had in
tains all the individual cases indiscrimi¬ common; it is something entirely different, as
nately, the individual circumstances which we have shown. It results from their being
may have had a share in the production of the together, a product of the actions and reac¬
phenomenon are neutralized and, conse¬ tions which take place between individual
quently, do not contribute to its determina¬ consciousnesses; and if each individual con¬
tion. The average, then, expresses a certain sciousness echoes the collective sentiment, it
state of the group mind (lame collective). is by virtue of the special energy resident in
Such are social phenomena, when disen¬ its collective origin. If all hearts beat in uni¬
tangled from all foreign matter. As for their son, this is not the result of a spontaneous
individual manifestations, these are indeed, and pre-established harmony but rather be¬
to a certain extent, social, since they partly cause an identical force propels them in the
reproduce a social model. Each of them also same direction. Each is carried along by all.
depends, and to a large extent, on the or- We thus arrive at the point where we can
ganopsychological constitution of the indi¬ formulate and delimit in a precise way the
What Is a Social Factl 45
domain of sociology. It comprises only a lim¬ into our cities instead of scattering into the
ited group of phenomena. A social fact is to country, this is due to a trend of public opin¬
be recognized by the power of external coer¬ ion, a collective drive that imposes this con¬
cion which it exercises or is capable of exer¬ centration upon the individuals. We can no
cising over individuals, and the presence of more choose the style of our houses than of
this power may be recognized in its turn our clothing—at least, both are equally
either by the existence of some specific sanc¬ obligatory. The channels of communication
tion or by the resistance offered against every prescribe the direction of internal migrations
individual effort that tends to violate it. One and commerce, etc., and even their extent.
can, however, define it also by its diffusion Consequently, at the very most, it should be
within the group, provided that, in conform¬ necessary to add to the list of phenomena
ity with our previous remarks, one takes care which we have enumerated as presenting the
to add as a second and essential charac¬ distinctive criterion of a social fact only one
teristic that its own existence is independent additional category, “ways of existing"; and,
of the individual forms it assumes in its dif¬ as this enumeration was not meant to be rig¬
fusion. This last criterion is perhaps, in cer¬ orously exhaustive, the addition would not be
tain cases, easier to apply than the preceding absolutely necessary.
one. In fact, the constraint is easy to ascertain Such an addition is perhaps not necessary,
when it expresses itself externally by some for these “ways of existing" are only crystal¬
direct reaction of society, as is the case in law, lized “ways of acting." The political structure
morals, beliefs, customs, and even fashions. of a society is merely the way in which its
But when it is only indirect, like the con¬ component segments have become accus¬
straint which an economic organization ex¬ tomed to live with one another. If their rela¬
ercises, it cannot always be so easily detected. tions are traditionally intimate, the segments
Generality combined with externality may, tend to fuse with one another, or, in the con¬
then, be easier to establish. Moreover, this trary case, to retain their identity. The type of
second definition is but another form of the habitation imposed upon us is merely the
first; for if a mode of behavior whose exis¬ way in which our contemporaries and our
tence is external to individual conscious¬ ancestors have been accustomed to construct
nesses becomes general, this can only be their houses. The methods of communica¬
brought about by its being imposed upon tion are merely the channels which the regu¬
them. 3 lar currents of commerce and migrations
But these several phenomena present the have dug, by flowing in the same direction.
same characteristic by which we defined the To be sure, if the phenomena of a structural
others. These ways of existing" are imposed character alone presented this permanence,
on the individual precisely in the same fash¬ one might believe that they constituted a dis¬
ion as the ‘ways of acting" of which we have tinct species. A legal regulation is an arrange¬
spoken. Indeed, when we wish to know how ment no less permanent than a type of archi¬
a society is divided politically, of what these tecture, and yet the regulation is a “physi¬
divisions themselves are composed, and how ological" fact. A simple moral maxim is as¬
complete is the fusion existing between them, suredly somewhat more malleable, but it is
we shall not achieve our purpose by physical much more rigid than a simple professional
inspection and by geographical observations; custom or a fashion. There is thus a whole
for these phenomena are social, even when series of degrees without a break in continu¬
they have some basis in physical nature. It is ity between the facts of the most articulated
only by a study of public law that a compre¬ structure and those free currents of social life
hension of this organization is possible, for it which are not yet definitely molded. The dif¬
is this law that determines the organization, ferences between them are, therefore, only
as it equally determines our domestic and differences in the degree of consolidation
civil relations. This political organization is, they present. Both are simply life, more or
then, no less obligatory than the social facts less crystallized. No doubt, it may be of some
mentioned above. If the population crowds advantage to reserve the term “morphologi-
46 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ II. Emile Durkheim
cal" for those social facts which concern the to follow, not only that imitation does not al¬
social substratum, but only on condition of ways express the essential and characteristic
not overlooking the fact that they are of the features of the social fact, but even that it
same nature as the others. Our definition will never expresses them. No doubt, every social
fact is imitated; it has, as we have just shown,
then include the whole relevant range of facts
a tendency to become general, but that is be¬
if we say: A social fact is every way of acting,
cause it is social, i.e., obligatory. Its power of
fixed or not, capable of exercising on the indi¬ expansion is not the cause but the conse¬
vidual an external constraint; or again, every quence of its sociological character. If, further,
way of acting which is general throughout a only social facts produced this consequence,
given society, while at the same time existing imitation could perhaps serve, if not to ex¬
in its own right independent of its individual plain them, at least to define them. But an
manifestations A individual condition which produces a whole
series of effects remains individual never¬
Endnotes theless. Moreover, one may ask whether the
word “imitation” is indeed fitted to designate
1. We do not intend to imply, however, that all an effect due to a coercive influence. Thus, by
constraint is normal. We shall return to this this single expression, very different phenom¬
point later. ena, which ought to be distinguished, are con¬
2. Suicides do not occur at every age, and they fused.
take place with varying intensity at the differ¬ 4. This close connection between life and struc¬
ent ages in which they occur. ture, organ and function, may be easily
3. It will be seen how this definition of the social proved in sociology because between these
fact diverges from that which forms the basis two extreme terms there exists a whole series
of the ingenious system of M. Tarde. First of of immediately observable intermediate stages
all, we wish to state that our researches have which show the bond between them. Biology
nowhere led us to observe that preponderant is not in the same favorable position. But we
influence in the genesis of collective facts may well believe that the inductions on this
which M. Tarde attributes to imitation. More¬ subject made by sociology are applicable to
over, from the preceding definition, which is biology and that, in organisms as well as in
not a theory but simply a resume of the im¬ societies, only differences in degree exist be¬
mediate data of observation, it seems indeed tween these two orders of facts. ♦
Anomic Suicide 47
itself, has become the supreme end of indi¬ hastily experienced stages. What blinded him
viduals and societies alike. Thereupon the ap¬ to himself was his expectation always to find
petites thus excited have become freed of any further on the happiness he had so far
limiting authority. By sanctifying them, so to missed. Now he is stopped in his tracks; from
speak, this apotheosis of well-being has now on nothing remains behind or ahead of
placed them above all human law. Their re¬ him to fix his gaze upon. Weariness alone,
straint seems like a sort of sacrilege. For this moreover, is enough to bring disillusion¬
reason, even the purely utilitarian regulation ment, for he cannot in the end escape the
of them exercised by the industrial world it¬ futility of an endless pursuit.
self through the medium of occupational We may even wonder if this moral state is
groups has been unable to persist. Ultimately, not principally what makes economic catas¬
this liberation of desires has been made trophes of our day so fertile in suicides. In
worse by the very development of industry societies where a man is subjected to a
and the almost infinite extension of the mar¬ healthy discipline, he submits more readily
ket. So long as the producer could gain his to the blows of chance. The necessary effort
profits only in his immediate neighborhood, for sustaining a little more discomfort costs
the restricted amount of possible gain could him relatively little, since he is used to dis¬
not much overexcite ambition. Now that he comfort and constraint. But when every con¬
may assume to have almost the entire world straint is hateful in itself, how can closer con¬
as his customer, how could passions accept straint not seem intolerable? There is no ten¬
their former confinement in the face of such dency to resignation in the feverish impa¬
limitless prospects? tience of mens lives. When there is no other
Such is the source of the excitement pre¬
aim but to outstrip constantly the point ar¬
dominating in this part of society, and which
rived at, how painful to be thrown back! Now
has thence extended to the other parts. There,
this very lack of organization characterizing
the state of crisis and anomy is constant and,
our economic condition throws doors wide
so to speak, normal. From top to bottom of
to every sort of adventure. Since imagination
the ladder, greed is aroused without knowing
is hungry for novelty, and ungoverned, it
where to find ultimate foothold. Nothing can
gropes at random. Setbacks necessarily in¬
calm it, since its goal is far beyond all it can
crease with risks and thus crises multiply, just
attain. Reality seems valueless by compari¬
when they are becoming more destructive.
son with the dreams of fevered imaginations;
reality is therefore abandoned, but so too is Yet these dispositions are so inbred that soci¬
possibility abandoned when it in turn be¬ ety has grown to accept them and is accus¬
comes reality. A thirst arises for novelties, un¬ tomed to think them normal. It is everlast¬
familiar pleasures, nameless sensations, all ingly repeated that it is mans nature to be
of which lose their savor once known. Hence¬ eternally dissatisfied, constantly to advance,
forth one has no strength to endure the least without relief or rest, toward an indefinite
reverse. The whole fever subsides and the ste¬ goal. The longing for infinity is daily repre¬
rility of all the tumult is apparent, and it is sented as a mark of moral distinction,
seen that all these new sensations in their whereas it can only appear within unregu¬
infinite quantity cannot form a solid founda¬ lated consciences which elevate to a rule the
tion of happiness to support one during days lack of rule from which they suffer. The doc¬
of trial. The wise man, knowing how to enjoy trine of the most ruthless and swift progress
achieved results without having constantly to has become an article of faith. But other theo¬
replace them with others, finds in them an ries appear parallel with those praising the
attachment to life in the hour of difficulty. advantages of instability, which, generalizing
But the man who has always pinned all his the situation that gives them birth, declare
hopes on the future and lived with his eyes life evil, claim that it is richer in grief than in „
fixed upon it, has nothing in the past as a pleasure and that it attracts men only by false
comfort against the presents afflictions, for claims. Since this disorder is greatest in the
the past was nothing to him but a series of economic world, it has most victims there.
Anomic Suicide 49
Industrial and commercial functions are distinguish from the others. It differs from
really among the occupations which furnish them in its dependence, not on the way in
the greatest number of suicides (see Table which individuals are attached to society, but
8-1). Almost on a level with the liberal profes¬ on how it regulates them. Egoistic suicide
sions, they sometimes surpass them; they are results from mans no longer finding a basis
especially more afflicted than agriculture, for existence in life; altruistic suicide, be¬
where the old regulative forces still make cause this basis for existence appears to man
their appearance felt most and where the fe¬ situated beyond life itself. The third sort of
ver of business has least penetrated. Here is suicide, the existence of which has just been
best recalled what was once the general con¬ shown, results from mans activity's lacking
stitution of the economic order. And the di¬ regulation and his consequent sufferings. By
vergence would be yet greater if, among the virtue of its origin we shall assign this last
suicides of industry, employers were distin¬ variety the name of anomic suicide.
guished from workmen, for the former are Certainly, this and egoistic suicide Ijavp
probably most stricken by the state of anomy. kindred ties. Both spring from society's insuf¬
The enormous rate of those with inde¬ ficient presence in individuals. But the
pendent means (720 per million) sufficiently sphere of its absence is not the same in both
shows that the possessors of most comfort cases. In egoistic suicide it is deficient in truly
suffer most. Everything that enforces subor¬ collective activity, thus depriving the latter of
dination attenuates the effects of this state. object and meaning. In anomic suicide, soci¬
At least the horizon of the lower classes is ety's influence is lacking in the basically indi¬
limited by those above them, and for this vidual passions, thus leaving them without a
same reason their desires are more modest. check-rein. In spite of their relationship,
Those who have only empty space above therefore, the two types are independent of
them are almost inevitably lost in it, if no each other. We may offer society everything
force restrains them. social in us, and still be unable to control our
, Anomy, therefore, is a regular and specific desires; one may live in an anomic state with¬
factor in suicide in our modem societies; one out being egoistic, and vice versa. These two
of the springs from which the annual contin¬ sorts of suicide therefore do not draw their
gent feedsITSo we have here a new type to chief recruits from the same social environ-
Table 8-1
Belgium (1886-90) —
160 1
160 100
Wurttemberg (1873-78) 273 — 190 206 —
* When statistics distinguish several different sorts of liberal occupations, we show as a specimen the one in which the suicide-rate is highest,
f From 1826 to 1880 economic functions seem less affected (see Compte-rendu of 1880); but were occupational statistics very accurate?
$ This figure is reached only by men of letters.
§ Figure represents Trade, Transportation and Industry combined for Saxony. Ed.
50 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ II. Emile Durkheim
ments; one has its principal field among in¬ it is more chronic and because it will serve to
tellectual careers, the world of thought—the illustrate the nature and functions of mar¬
other, the industrial or commercial world. riage.
But economic anomy is not the only In the Annales de demographie inter-
anomy which may give rise to suicide. The nationale (September 1882), Bertillon pub¬
suicides occurring at the crisis of widowhood lished a remarkable study of divorce, in
. . . are really due to domestic anomy result¬ which he proved the following proposition:
ing from the death of husband or wife. A fam¬ throughout Europe the number of suicides
ily catastrophe occurs which affects the sur¬ varies with that of divorces and separations.
vivor. He is not adapted to the new situation If the different countries are compared from
in which he finds himself and accordingly this twofold point of view, this parallelism is
offers less resistance to suicide. apparent (see Table 8-2). Not only is the rela¬
But another variety of anomic suicide tion between the averages evident, but the
should draw greater attention, both because single irregular detail of any importance is
Table 8-2
Comparison of European States from the Point of View of Both Divorce and Suicide
that of Holland, where suicides are not as tons follow, from both points of view, and
frequent as divorces. only then come the Catholic cantons. Within
The law may be yet more vigorously veri¬ each group the same agreements appear.
fied if we compare not different countries but Among the Catholic cantons Solothum and
different provices of a single country. Nota¬ Inner Appenzell are marked by the high num¬
bly, in Switzerland the agreement between ber of their divorces; they are likewise
phenomena is striking (see Table 8-3). The marked by the number of their suicides.
Protestant cantons have the most divorces Freiburg, although Catholic and French, has
and also the most suicides. The mixed can¬ a considerable number of both divorces and
Table 8-3
Comparison of Swiss Cantons From the Point of View of Divorce and Suicide
/. Catholic Cantons
French and Italian
Tessina 7.6 57 Freiburg 15.9 119
Valais 4.0 47
German
tJri —
60 Solothum 37.7 205
Upper Unterwalden 4.9 20 Inner Appenzell 18.9 158
Lower Unterwalden 5.2 1 Zug 14.8 87
Schwyz 5.6 70 Luzern 13.0 100
German
Bern 47.2 229 Schaffhausen 106.0 602
Basel (city) 34.5 323 Outer Appenzell 100.7 213
Basel (country) 33.0 288 Glaris 83.1 127
Zurich 80.0 288
suicides. Among the Protestant German can¬ tains. The latter are recruited especially from
tons none has so many divorces as among people of irregular lives, persons of
Schaffhausen; Schaffhausen also leads the poor character and intelligence, whom this
list for suicides. Finally, the mixed cantons, temperament predisposes to suicide. The
with the one exception of Argau, are classed parallelism would then be due, not to the in¬
in exactly the same way in both respects. fluence of divorce itself upon suicide, but to
The same comparison, if made between the fact that these two phenomena derive
French departments, gives the same result. from a similar cause which they express dif¬
Having classified them in eight categories ac¬ ferently. But this association of divorce with
cording to the importance of their suicidal certain psychopathic flaws is made arbitrar¬
mortality, we discovered that the groups thus ily and without proof. There is no reason to
formed were arranged in the same order as think that there are 15 times as many unbal¬
with reference to divorces and separations: anced people in Switzerland as in Italy and
from 6 to 7 times as many as in France, and
Average of Divorces yet in the first of these countries divorces are
Suicides per and Separations 15 times as frequent as in the second and
Million per 1,000 Marriages about 7 times as frequent as in the third.
Moreover, so far as suicide is concerned, we
1st group ( 5 departments) Below 50 2.6
2nd group (18 department) From 51 to 75 2.9
know how far purely individual conditions
3rd group (15 departments) 76 to 100 5.0 are from accounting for it. Furthermore, all
4th group (19 departments) 101 to 150 5.4 that follows will show the inadequacy of this
5th group (10 departments) 151 to 200 7.5 theory.
6th group ( 9 departments) 201 to 250 8.2 One must seek the cause of this remark¬
7th group ( 4 departments) 251 to 300 10.0 able relation not in the organic predisposi¬
8th group ( 5 departments) Above 300 12.4
tions of people but in the intrinsic nature of
divorce. As our first proposition here we may
Having shown this relation, let us try to assert: in all countries for which we have the
explain it. necessary data, suicides of divorced people
We shall mention only as a note the expla¬ are immensely more numerous than those of
nation Bertillon summarily suggested. Ac¬ other portions of the population.
cording to that author, the number of sui¬ Thus, divorced persons of both sexes kill
cides and that of divorces vary in parallel themselves between three and four times as
manner because both depend on the same often as married persons, although younger
factor: the greater or less frequency of people (40 years in France as against 46 years), and
with unstable equilibrium. There are actu¬ considerably more often than widowed per¬
ally, he says, more divorces in a country the sons in spite of the aggravation resulting for
more incompatible married couples it con¬
Suicides In a Million
Unmarried
Above 15 Years Married Widowed Divorced
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Saxony(1847-1858) — —
481 120 1,242 240 3,102 312
Saxony (1876) 555.18f 821 146 — —
3,252 389
Wurttemberg (1846-1860) — —
226 52 530 97 1,298 281
Wurttemberg (1873-1892) 251 —
218 f 405| 796 f
* There appears to be some error in the figures for Prussia here.—Ed
f Men and women combined.—Ed.
Anomic Suicide 53
the latter from their advanced age. What is death, but by a judicial act, and that the ag¬
the explanation? gravation which afflicts divorced persons is a
There is no doubt that the change of moral result not of the divorce but of the marriage
and material regimen which is a conse¬ ended by divorce? It must be connected with
quence of divorce is of some account in this some quality of the matrimonial society, the
result. But it does not sufficiently explain the influence of which the couple continue to ex¬
matter. Widowhood is indeed as complete a perience even when separated. If they have
disturbance of existence as divorce; it usually so strong an inclination to suicide, it is be¬
even has much more unhappy results, since cause they were already strongly inclined to
it was not desired by husband and wife, while it while living together and by the very effect
divorce is usually a deliverance for both. Yet of their common life.
divorced persons who, considering their age, Admitting so much, the correspondence
should commit suicide only one half as often between divorces and suicides becomes ex¬
as widowed persons, do so more often every¬ plicable. Actually, among the people where
where, even twice as often in certain coun¬ divorce is common, this peculiar effect of
tries. This aggravation, to be represented by marriage in which divorce shares must nec¬
a coefficient between 2.5 and 4, does not de¬ essarily be very wide-spread; for it is not con¬
pend on their changed condition in any way. fined to households predestined to legal sepa¬
Let us refer to one of the propositions es¬ ration. If it reaches its maximum intensity
tablished above to discover the causes of this among them, it must also be found among
fact. . . . [I]n a given society the tendency of the others, or the majority of the others,
widowed persons to suicide was a function of though to a lesser degree. For just as where
the corresponding tendency of married per¬ there are many suicides, there are many at¬
sons. While the latter are highly protected, tempted suicides, and just as mortality can¬
the former enjoy an immunity less, to be sure, not grow without morbidity increasing si¬
but still considerable, and the sex best pro¬ multaneously, so wherever there are many
tected by marriage is also that best protected actual divorces there must be many house¬
in the state of widowhood. Briefly, when con¬ holds more or less close to divorce. The num¬
jugal society is dissolved by the death of one ber of actual divorces cannot rise, accord¬
of the couple, the effects which it had with ingly, without the family condition predis¬
reference to suicide continue to be felt in part posing to suicide also developing and becom¬
by the survivor... . Then, however, is it not to ing general in the same degree, and thus the
be supposed that the same thing takes place two phenomena naturally vary in the same
when the marriage is interrupted, not by general direction. . . . ♦
54 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ II. Emile Durkheim
the point of being indistinct. Moieties were have a moral significance; but whereas for us
the first genera; clans, the first species. they are hardly more than metaphors, origi¬
Things were thought to be integral parts of nally they meant what they said. Things of
society, and it was their place in society which the same class were really considered as rela¬
determined their place in nature. We may tives of the individuals of the same social
even wonder whether the schematic manner group, and consequently of each other. They
in which genera are ordinarily conceived are of The same flesh', the same family. Logi¬
may not have depended in part on the same cal relations are thus, in a sense, domestic
influences. It is a fact of current observation relations. Sometimes, too, as we have seen,
that the things which they comprise are gen¬ they are comparable at all points with those
erally imagined as situated in a sort of idea¬ which exist between a master and an object
tional milieu, with a more or less clearly de¬ possessed, between a chief and his subjects.
limited spatial circumscription. It is certainly We may even wonder whether the idea of the
not without cause that concepts and their pre-eminence of genus over species, which is
interrelations have so often been represented so strange from a positivistic point of view,
by concentric and eccentric circles, interior may not be seen here in its rudimentary form.
and exterior to each other, etc. Might it not Just as, for the realist, the general idea domi¬
be that this tendency to imagine purely logi¬ nates the individual, so the clan totem domi¬
cal groupings in a form contrasting so much nates those of the sub-clans and, still more,
with their true nature originated in the fact the personal totems of individuals; and wher¬
that at first they were conceived in the form ever the moiety has retained its original sta¬
of social groups occupying, consequently, bility it has a sort of primacy over the divi¬
definite positions in space? And have we not sions of which it is composed and the particu¬
in fact seen this spatial localization of genus lar things which are included in them.
and species in a fairly large number of very Though he may be essentially Wartwut and
different societies? partially Moiwiluk, the Wotjobaluk described
Not only the external form of classes, but by Howitt is above all a Krokitch or a Ga-
also the relations uniting them to each other, mutch. Among the Zuni, the animals symbol¬
are of social origin. It is because human izing the six main clans are set in sovereign
groups fit one into another—the sub-clan charge over their respective sub-clans and
into the clan, the clan into the moiety, the over creatures of all kinds which are grouped
moiety into the tribe—that groups of things with them.
are ordered in the same way. Their regular But if the foregoing has allowed us to
diminution in span, from genus to species, understand how the notion of classes, linked
species to variety, and so on, comes from the to each other in a single system, could have
equally diminishing extent presented by so¬ been born, we still do not know what the
cial groups as one leaves the largest and old¬ forces were which induced men to divide
est and approaches the more recent and the things as they did between the classes. From
more derivative. And if the totality of things the fact that the external form of the classi¬
is conceived as a single system, this is be¬ fication was furnished by society, it does not
cause society itself is seen in the same way. It necessarily follow that the way in which the
is a whole, or rather it is the unique whole to framework was used is due to reasons of the
which everything is related. Thus logical hi¬ same origin. A priori it is very possible that
erarchy is only another aspect of social hier¬ motives of a quite different order should have
archy, and the unity of knowledge is nothing determined the way in which things were
else than the very unity of the collectivity, connected and merged, or else, on the con¬
extended to the universe. trary, distinguished and opposed.
Furthermore, the ties which unite things The particular conception of logical con¬
of the same group or different groups to each nexions which we now have permits us to
other are themselves conceived as social ties. reject this hypothesis. We have just seen, in
We recalled in the beginning that the expres¬ fact, that they are represented in the form of
sions by which we refer to these relations still familial connexions, or as relations of eco-
56 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ II. Emile Durkheim
nomic or political subordination; so that the that for many peoples it is profoundly differ¬
same sentiments which are the basis of do¬ entiated according to regions. This is because
mestic, social, and other kinds of organiza¬ each region has its own affective value. Under
tion have been effective in this logical divi¬ the influence of diverse sentiments, it is con¬
sion of things also. The latter are attracted or nected with a special religious principle, and
opposed to each other in the same way as consequently it is endowed with virtues sui
men are bound by kinship or opposed in the generis which distinguish it from all others.
vendetta. They are merged as members of the And it is this emotional value of notions
same family are merged by common senti¬ which plays the preponderant part in the
ment. That some are subordinate to others is manner in which ideas are connected or
analogous in every respect to the fact that an separated. It is the dominant characteristic
object possessed appears inferior to its in classification. It has quite often been said
owner, and likewise the subject to his master. that man began to conceive things by relating
It is thus states of the collective mind (time) them to himself. The above allows us to see
which gave birth to these groupings, and more precisely what this anthropocentrism,
these states moreover are manifestly affec¬ which might better be called sociocentrism,
tive. There are sentimental affinities between consists of. The centre of the first schemes of
things as between individuals, and they are nature is not the individual; it is society.3 It is
classed according to these affinities. this that is objectified, not man. Nothing
We thus arrive at this conclusion: it is pos¬ shows this more clearly than the way in
sible to classify other things than concepts, which the Sioux retain the whole universe, in
and otherwise than in accordance with the a way, within the limits of tribal space; and
laws of pure understanding. For in order for we have seen how universal space itself is
it to be possible for ideas to be systematically nothing else than the site occupied by the
arranged for reasons of sentiment, it is nec¬ tribe, only indefinitely extended beyond its
essary that they should not be pure ideas, but real limits. It is by virtue of the same mental
that they should themselves be products of disposition that so many peoples have placed
sentiment. And in fact, for those who are the centre of the world, 'the navel of the
called primitives, a species of things is not a earth’, in their own political or religious capi¬
simple object of knowledge but corresponds tal,4 i.e. at the place which is the centre of
above all to a certain sentimental attitude. All their moral life. Similarly, but in another or¬
kinds of affective elements combine in the der of ideas, the creative force of the universe
representation made of it. Religious emo¬ and everything in it was first conceived as a
tions, notably, not only give it a special tinge, mythical ancestor, the generator of the society.
but attribute to it the most essential proper¬ This is how it is that the idea of a logical
ties of which it is constituted. Things are classification was so hard to form, as we
above all sacred or profane, pure or impure, showed at the beginning of this work. It is
friends or enemies, favourable or unfavour¬ because a logical classification is a classi¬
able;2 i.e. their most fundamental charac¬ fication of concepts. Now a concept is the
teristics are only expressions of the way in notion of a clearly determined group of
which they affect social sensibility. The dif¬ things; its limits may be marked precisely.
ferences and resemblances which determine Emotion, on the contrary, is something es¬
the fashion in which they are grouped are sentially fluid and inconsistent. Its conta¬
more affective than intellectual. This is how gious influence spreads far beyond its point
it happens that things change their nature, in of origin, extending to everything about it, so
a way, from society to society; it is because that it is not possible to say where its power
they affect the sentiments of groups differ¬ of propagation ends. States of an emotional
ently. What is conceived in one as perfectly nature necessarily possess the same charac¬
homogeneous is represented elsewhere as es¬ teristic. It is not possible to say where they
sentially heterogeneous. For us, space is begin or where they end; they lose themselves
formed of similar parts which are substitut¬ in each other, and mingle their properties in
able one for the other. We have seen, however, such a way that they cannot be rigorously
Primitive Classification 57
categorized. From another point of view, in stand the manner in which the ideas of cause,
order to be able to mark out the limits of a substance, and the different modes of reason¬
class, it is necessary to have analysed the ing, etc. were formed. As soon as they are
characteristics by which the things assem¬ posed in sociological terms, all these ques¬
bled in this class are recognized and by which tions, so long debated by metaphysicians and
they are distinguished. Now emotion is natu¬ psychologists, will at last be liberated from
rally refractory to analysis, or at least lends the tautologies in which they have lan¬
itself uneasily to it, because it is too complex. guished. At least, this is a new way which
Above all when it has a collective origin it deserves to be tried.
defies critical and rational examination. The
pressure exerted by the group on each of its Endnotes
members does not permit individuals to
judge freely the notions which society itself 1. As such they are very clearly distinguished
has elaborated and in which it has placed from what might be called technological clas¬
something of its personality. Such constructs sifications. It is probable that man has always
classified, more or less clearly, the things on
are sacred for individuals. Thus the history of
which he lived, according to the means he
scientific classification is, in the last analysis, used to get them: for example, animals living
the history of the stages by which this ele¬ in the water, or in the air or on the ground.
ment of social affectivity has progressively But at first such groups were not connected
weakened, leaving more and more room for with each other or systematized. They were
the reflective thought of individuals. But it is divisions, distinctions of ideas, not schemes
not the case that these remote influences of classification. Moreover, it is evident that
which we have just studied have ceased to be these distinctions are closely linked to practi¬
felt today. They have left behind them an ef¬ cal concerns, of which they merely express
certain aspects. It is for this reason that we
fect which survives and which is always pre¬
have not spoken of them in this work, in
sent; it is the very cadre of all classification,
which we have tried above all to throw some
it is the ensemble of mental habits by virtue light on the origins of the logical procedure
of which we conceive things and facts in the which is the basis of scientific classifications.
form of co-ordinated or hierarchized groups.
2. For the adherent of many cults, even now,
This example shows what light sociology foodstuffs are classified first of all into two
throws on the genesis, and consequently the main classes, fat and lean, and we know to
functioning, of logical operations. What we what extent this classification is subjective.
have tried to do for classification might 3. De la Grasserie has developed ideas fairly
equally be attempted for the other functions similar to our own, though rather obscurely
or fundamental notions of the under¬ and above all without evidence (1899, chap.
standing. We have already had occasion to III).
mention, in passing, how even ideas so ab¬ 4. Something understandable enough for the
stract as those of time and space are, at each Romans and even the Zuni, but less so for the
point in their history, closely connected with inhabitants of Easter Island, called Te Pito-te
the corresponding social organization. The Henua (navel of the earth); but the idea is per¬
same method could help us likewise to under¬ fectly natural everywhere. ♦
58 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ II. Emile Durkheim
sis of any religion in particular, greatly risk upon us powers superior to those which we
losing themselves in space. have of our own nature? Howsoever rich it
might be in affective virtues, it could add
*** nothing to our natural vitality; for it could
only release the motive powers which are
The theorists who have undertaken to ex¬ within us, neither creating them nor increas¬
plain religion in rational terms have gener¬ ing them. From the mere fact that we con¬
ally seen in it before all else a system of ideas, sider an object worthy of being loved and
corresponding to some determined object. sought after, it does not follow that we feel
This object has been conceived in a multitude ourselves stronger afterwards; it is also nec¬
of ways: nature, the infinite, the unknowable, essary that this object set free energies supe¬
the ideal, etc.; but these differences matter rior to these which we ordinarily have at our
but little. In any case, it was the conceptions command and also that we have some means
and beliefs which were considered as the es¬ of making these enter into us and unite them¬
sential elements of religion. As for the rites, selves to our interior lives. Now for that, it is
from this point of view they appear to be only not enough that we think of them; it is also
an external translation, contingent and ma¬ indispensable that we place ourselves within
terial, of these internal states which alone their sphere of action, and that we set our¬
pass as having any intrinsic value. This con¬ selves where we may best feel their influence;
ception is so commonly held that generally in a word, it is necessary that we act, and that
the disputes of which religion is the theme we repeat the acts thus necessary every time
turn about the question whether it can con¬ we feel the need of renewing their effects.
ciliate itself with science or not, that is to say, From this point of view, it is readily seen how
whether or not, there is a place beside our that group of regularly repeated acts which
scientific knowledge for another form of form the cult get their importance. In fact,
thought which would be specifically reli¬ whoever has really practiced a religion knows
gious. very well that it is the cult which gives rise to
But the believers, the men who lead the these impressions of joy, of interior peace, of
religious life and have a direct sensation of serenity, of enthusiasm which are, for the be¬
what it really is, object to this way of regard¬ liever, an experimental proof of his beliefs.
ing it, saying that it does not correspond to The cult is not simply a system of signs by
their daily experience. In fact, they feel that which the faith is outwardly translated; it is
the real function of religion is not to make us a collection of the means by which this is
think, to enrich our knowledge, nor to add to created and recreated periodically. Whether
the conceptions which we owe to science oth¬ it consists in material acts or mental opera¬
ers of another origin and another character, tions, it is always this which is efficacious.
but rather, it is to make us act, to aid us to Our entire study rests upon this postulate
live. The believer who has communicated that the unanimous sentiment of the believ¬
with his god is not merely a man who sees ers of all times cannot be purely illusory. To¬
new truths of which the unbeliever is igno¬ gether with a recent apologist of the faith1 we
rant; he is a man who is stronger. He feels admit that these religious beliefs rest upon a
within him more force, either to endure the specific experience whose demonstrative
trials of existence, or to conquer them. It is value is, in one sense, not one bit inferior to
as though he were raised above the miseries that of scientific experiments, though differ¬
of the world, because he is raised above his ent from them. We, too, think that “a tree is
condition as a mere man; he believes that he known by its fruits/’2 and that fertility is the
is saved from evil, under whatever form he best proof of what the roots are worth. But
may conceive this evil. The first article in from the fact that a “religious experience,” if
every creed is the belief in salvation by faith. we choose to call it this, does exist and that it
But it is hard to see how a mere idea could has a certain foundation— and, by the way,
have this efficacy. An idea is in reality only a is there any experience which has none?—it
part of ourselves; then how could it confer does not follow that the reality which is its
60 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ II. Emile Durkheim
foundation conforms objectively to the idea In addition to all the reasons which have
which believers have of it. The very fact that been given to justify this conception, a final
the fashion in which it has been conceived one may be added here, which is the result of
has varied infinitely in different times is our whole work. As we have progressed, we
enough to prove that none of these concep¬ have established the fact that the fundamen¬
tions express it adequately. If a scientist states tal categories of thought, and consequently
it as an axiom that the sensations of heat and of science, are of religious origin. We have
light which we feel correspond to some ob¬ seen that the same is true for magic and con¬
jective cause, he does not conclude that this sequently for the different processes which
is what it appears to the senses to be. Like¬ have issued from it. On the other hand, it has
wise, even if the impressions which the faith¬ long been known that up until a relatively
ful feel are not imaginary, still they are in no advanced moment of evolution, moral and
way privileged intuitions; there is no reason legal rules have been indistinguishable from
for believing that they inform us better upon ritual prescriptions. In summing up, then, it
the nature of their object than do ordinary may be said that nearly all the great social
sensations upon the nature of bodies and institutions have been bom in religion.4 Now
their properties. In order to discover what in order that these principal aspects of the
this object consists of, we must submit them collective life may have commenced by being
to an examination and elaboration analogous only varied aspects of the religious life, it is
to that which has substituted for the sensu¬ obviously necessary that the religious life be
ous idea of the world another which is scien¬ the eminent form and, as it were, the concen¬
tific and conceptual. This is precisely what trated expression of the whole collective life.
we have tried to do, and we have seen that If religion has given birth to all that is essen¬
this reality, which mythologies have repre¬ tial in society, it is because the idea of society
sented under so many different forms, but is the soul of religion.
which is the universal and eternal objective Religious forces are therefore human
cause of these sensations sui generis out of forces, moral forces. It is true that since col¬
which religious experience is made, is soci¬ lective sentiments can become conscious of
ety. We have shown what moral forces it de¬ themselves only by fixing themselves upon
velops and how it awakens this sentiment of external objects, they have not been able to
a refuge, of a shield and of a guardian support take form without adopting some of their
which attaches the believer to his cult. It is characteristics from other things: they have
that which raises him outside himself; it is thus acquired a sort of physical nature; in this
even that which made him. For that which way they have come to mix themselves with
makes a man is the totality of the intellectual the life of the material world, and then have
property which constitutes civilization, and considered themselves capable of explaining
civilization is the work of society. Thus is ex¬ what passes there. But when they are consid¬
plained the preponderating role of the cult in ered only from this point of view and in this
all religions, whichever they may be. This is role, only their most superficial aspect is
because society cannot make its influence felt seen. In reality, the essential elements of
unless it is in action, and it is not in action which these collective sentiments are made
unless the individuals who compose it are have been borrowed by the understanding. It
assembled together and act in common. It is ordinarily seems that they should have a hu¬
by common action that it takes conscious¬ man character only when they are conceived
ness of itself and realizes its position; it is under human forms;5 but even the most im¬
before all else an active co-operation. The col¬ personal and the most anonymous are noth¬
lective ideas and sentiments are even possible ing else than objectified sentiments.
only owing to these exterior movements It is only by regarding religion from this
which symbolize them, as we have estab¬ angle that it is possible to see its real signifi¬
lished.3 Then it is action which dominates the cance. If we stick closely to appearances, rites
religious life, because of the mere fact that it often give the effect of purely manual opera¬
is society which is its source. tions: they are anointings, washings, meals.
The Human Meaning of Religion 61
To consecrate something, it is put in contact men have lightened their sufferings, but in
with a source of religious energy, just as today which they have never really lived. It is
a body is put in contact with a source of heat merely an idea which comes to express our
or electricity to warm or electrify it; the two more or less obscure aspirations towards the
processes employed are not essentially differ¬ good, the beautiful and the ideal. Now these
ent. Thus understood, religious technique aspirations have their roots in us; they come
seems to be a sort of mystic mechanics. But from the very depths of our being; then there
these material manoeuvres are only the exter¬ is nothing outside of us which can account
nal envelope under which the mental opera¬ for them. Moreover, they are already reli¬
tions are hidden. Finally, there is no question gious in themselves; thus it would seem that
of exercising a physical constraint upon blind the ideal society presupposes religion, far
and, incidentally, imaginary forces, but from being able to explain it.6
rather of reaching individual conscious¬ But, in the first place, things are arbitrarily
nesses of giving them a direction and of dis¬ simplified when religion is seen only on its
ciplining them. It is sometimes said that in¬ idealistic side: in its way, it is realistic. There
ferior religions are materialistic. Such an ex¬ is no physical or moral ugliness, there are no
pression is inexact. All religions, even the vices or evils which do not have a special
crudest, are in a sense spiritualistic: for the divinity. There are gods of theft and trickery,
powers they put in play are before all spiri¬ of lust and war, of sickness and of death.
tual, and also their principal object is to act Christianity itself, howsoever high the idea
upon the moral life. Thus it is seen that what¬ which it has made of the divinity may be, has
ever has been done in the name of religion been obliged to give the spirit of evil a place
cannot have been done in vain: for it is nec¬ in its mythology. Satan is an essential piece
essarily the society that did it, and it is hu¬ of the Christian system; even if he is an im¬
manity that has reaped the fruits. pure being, he is not a profane one. The anti¬
god is a god, inferior and subordinated, it is
But, it is said, what society is it that has true, but nevertheless endowed with ex¬
thus made the basis of religion? Is it the real tended powers; he is even the object of rites,
society, such as it is and acts before our very at least of negative ones. Thus religion, far
eyes, with the legal and moral organization from ignoring the real society and making
which it has laboriously fashioned during the abstraction of it, is in its image; it reflects all
course of history? This is full of defects and its aspects, even the most vulgar and the most
imperfections. In it, evil goes beside the good, repulsive. All is to be found there, and if in
injustice often reigns supreme, and the truth the majority of cases we see the good victori¬
is often obscured by error. How could any¬ ous over evil, life over death, the powers of
thing so crudely organized inspire the senti¬ light over the powers of darkness, it is be¬
ments of love, the ardent enthusiasm and the cause reality is not otherwise. If the relation
spirit of abnegation which all religions claim between these two contrary forces were re¬
of their followers? These perfect beings versed, life would be impossible; but, as a
which are gods could not have taken their matter of fact, it maintains itself and even
traits from so mediocre, and sometimes even tends to develop.
so base a reality. But if, in the midst of these mythologies
But, on the other hand, does someone and theologies we see reality clearly appear¬
think of a perfect society, where justice and ing, it is nonetheless true that it is found there
truth would be sovereign, and from which only in an enlarged, transformed and ideal¬
evil in all its forms would be banished for¬ ized form. In this respect, the most primitive
ever? No one would deny that this is in close religions do not differ from the most recent
relations with the religious sentiment; for, and the most refined. For example, we have
they would say, it is towards the realization seen how the Arunta place at the beginning
of this that all religions strive. But that soci¬ of time a mythical society whose organiza¬
ety is not an empirical fact, definite and ob¬ tion exactly reproduces that which still exists
servable; it is a fancy, a dream with which today; it includes the same clans and phra-
62 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ II. Emile Durkheim
tries, it is under the same matrimonial rules lar impressions which he receives, he attri¬
and it practises the same rites. But the per¬ butes to the things with which he is in most
sonages who compose it are ideal beings, direct contact properties which they have
gifted with powers and virtues to which com¬ not: exceptional powers and virtues which
mon mortals cannot pretend. Their nature is the objects of everyday experience do not
not only higher, but it is different, since it is possess. In a word, above the real world
at once animal and human. The evil powers where his profane life passes he has placed
there undergo a similar metamorphosis: evil another which, in one sense, does not exist
itself is, as it were, made sublime and ideal¬ except in thought, but to which he attributes
ized. The question now raises itself of whence a higher sort of dignity than to the first. Thus,
this idealization comes. from a double point of view it is an ideal
Some reply that men have a natural faculty world.
for idealizing, that is to say, of substituting The formation of the ideal world is there¬
for the real world another different one, to fore not an irreducible fact which escapes
which they transport themselves by thought. science; it depends upon conditions which
But that is merely changing the terms of the observation can touch; it is a natural product
problem; it is not resolving it or even advanc¬ of social life. For a society to become con¬
ing it. This systematic idealization is an es¬ scious of itself and maintain at the necessary
sential characteristic of religions. Explaining degree of intensity the sentiments which it
them by an innate power of idealization is thus attains, it must assemble and concen¬
simply replacing one word by another which trate itself. Now this concentration, brings
is the equivalent of the first; it is as if they said about an exaltation of the mental life which
that men have made religions because they takes form in a group of ideal conceptions
have a religious nature. Animals know only where is portrayed the new life thus awak¬
one world, the one which they perceive by ened; they correspond to this new set of psy¬
experience, internal as well as external. Men chical forces which is added to those which
alone have the faculty of conceiving the ideal, we have at our disposition for the daily tasks
of adding something to the real. Now where of existence. A society can neither create it¬
does this singular privilege come from? Be¬ self nor recreate itself without at the same
fore making it an initial fact or a mysterious time creating an ideal. This creation is not a
virtue which escapes science, we must be sort of work of supererogation for it, by
sure that it does not depend upon empirically which it would complete itself, being already
determinable conditions. formed; it is the act by which it is periodically
The explanation of religion which we have made and remade. Therefore when some op¬
proposed has precisely this advantage, that it pose the ideal society to the real society, like
gives an answer to this question. For our defi¬ two antagonists which would lead us in op¬
nition of the sacred is that it is something posite directions, they materialize and op¬
added to and above the real: now the ideal pose abstractions. The ideal society is not
answers to this same definition; we cannot outside of the real society; it is a part of it. Far
explain one without explaining the other. In from being divided between them as between
fact, we have seen that if collective life awak¬ two poles which mutually repel each other,
ens religious thought on reaching a certain we cannot hold to one without holding to the
degree of intensity, it is because it brings other. For a society is not made up merely of
about a state of effervescence which changes the mass of individuals who compose it, the
the conditions of psychic activity. Vital ener¬ ground which they occupy, the things which
gies are over-excited, passions more active, they use and the movements which they per¬
sensations stronger; there are even some form, but above all is the idea which it forms
which are produced only at this moment. A of itself. It is undoubtedly true that it hesi¬
man does not recognize himself; he feels him¬ tates over the manner in which it ought to
self transformed and consequently he trans¬ conceive itself; it feels itself drawn in diver¬
forms the environment which surrounds gent directions. But these conflicts which
him. In order to account for the very particu¬ break forth are not between the ideal and
The Human Meaning of Religion 63
reality, but between two different ideals, that its material foundation and bears its mark,
of yesterday and that of today, that which has just as the mental life of an individual de¬
the authority of tradition and that which has pends upon his nervous system and in fact his
the hope of the future. There is surely a place whole organism. But collective conscious¬
for investigating whence these ideals evolve; ness is something more than a mere epiphe-
but whatever solution may be given to this nomenon of its morphological basis, just as
problem, it still remains that all passes in the individual consciousness is something more
world of the ideal. Thus the collective ideal than a simple efflorescence of the nervous
which religion expresses is far from being system. In order that the former may appear,
due to a vague innate power of the individual, a synthesis sui generis of particular con¬
but it is rather at the school of collective life sciousnesses is required. Now this synthesis
that the individual has learned to idealize. It has the effect of disengaging a whole world
is in assimilating the ideals elaborated by so¬ of sentiments, ideas and images which, once
ciety that he has become capable of conceiv¬ bom, obey laws all their own. They attract
ing the ideal. It is society which, by leading each other, repel each other, unite, divide
him within its sphere of action, has made him themselves, and multiply, though these com¬
acquire the need of raising himself above the binations are not commanded and necessi¬
world of experience and has at the same time tated by the condition of the underlying real¬
furnished him with the means of conceiving ity. The life thus brought into being even en¬
another. For society has constructed this new joys so great an independence that it some¬
world in constructing itself, since it is society times indulges in manifestations with no pur¬
which this expresses. Thus both with the in¬ pose or utility of any sort, for the mere plea¬
dividual and in the group, the faculty of ide¬ sure of affirming itself. We have shown that
alizing has nothing mysterious about it. It is this is often precisely the case with ritual ac¬
not a sort of luxury which a man could get tivity and mythological thought.7
along without, but a condition of his very
existence. He could not be a social being, that But if religion is the product of social
is to say, he could not be a man, if he had not causes, how can we explain the individual
acquired it. It is true that in incarnating cult and the universalistic character of cer¬
themselves in individuals, collective ideals tain religions? If it is born in foro extemo, how
tend to individualize themselves. Each has it been able to pass into the inner con¬
understands them after his own fashion and science of the individual and penetrate there
marks them with his own stamp; he sup¬ ever more and more profoundly? If it is the
presses certain elements and adds others. work of definite and individualized societies,
Thus the personal ideal disengages itself how has it been able to detach itself from
from the social ideal in proportion as the in¬ them, even to the point of being conceived as
dividual personality develops itself and be¬ something common to all humanity? In the
comes an autonomous source of action. But course of our studies, we have met with the
if we wish to understand this aptitude, so germs of individual religion and of religious
singular in appearance, of living outside of cosmopolitanism, and we have seen how they
reality, it is enough to connect it with the were formed; thus we possess the more gen¬
social conditions upon which it depends. eral elements of the reply which is to be given
Therefore it is necessary to avoid seeing in to this double question. We have shown how
this theory of religion a simple restatement the religious force which animates the clan
of historical materialism: that would be mis¬ particularizes itself, by incarnating itself in
understanding our thought to an extreme de¬ particular consciousnesses. Thus secondary
gree. In showing that religion is something sacred beings are formed; each individual
essentially social we do not mean to say that has his own, made in his own image associ¬
it confines itself to translating into another ated to his own intimate life, bound up with
language the material forms of society and its his own destiny; it is the soul, the individual
immediate vital necessities. It is true that we totem, the protecting ancestor, etc. These be¬
take it as evident that social life depends upon ings are the object of rites which the individ-
64 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ II. Emile Durkheim
ual can celebrate by himself, outside of any A man cannot retain them any length of time
group; this is the first form of the individual by a purely personal effort; it is not thus that
cult. To be sure, it is only a very rudimentary they are bom or that they are acquired; it is
cult; but since the personality of the individ¬ even doubtful if they can be kept under these
ual is still only slightly marked, and but little conditions. In fact, a man who has a veritable
value is attributed to it, the cult which ex¬ faith feels an invincible need of spreading it:
presses it could hardly be expected to be very therefore he leaves his isolation, approaches
highly developed as yet. But as individuals others and seeks to convince them, and it is
have differentiated themselves more and the ardour of the convictions which he
more and the value of an individual has in¬ arouses that strengthens his own. It would
creased, the corresponding cult has taken a quickly weaken if it remained alone.
relatively greater place in the totality of the It is the same with religious universalism
religious life and at the same time it is more as with this individualism. Far from being an
fully closed to outside influences. exclusive attribute of certain very great reli¬
Thus the existence of individual cults im¬ gions, we have found it, not at the base, it is
plies nothing which contradicts or embar¬ true, but at the summit of the Australian sys¬
rasses the sociological interpretation of reli¬ tem. Bunjil, Daramulum or Baiame are not
gion; for the religious forces to which it ad¬ simple tribal gods; each of them is recognized
dresses itself are only the individualized by a number of different tribes. In a sense,
forms of collective forces. Therefore, even their cult is international. This conception is
when religion seems to be entirely within the therefore very near to that found in the most
individual conscience, it is still in society that recent theologies. So certain writers have felt
it finds the living source from which it is it their duty to deny its authenticity, howso¬
nourished. We are now able to appreciate the ever incontestable this may be.
value of the radical individualism which And we have been able to show how this
would make religion something purely indi¬ has been formed.
vidual: it misunderstands the fundamental Neighboring tribes of a similar civilization
conditions of the religious life. If up to the cannot fail to be in constant relations with
present it has remained in the stage of theo¬ each other. All sorts of circumstances give an
retical aspirations which have never been re¬ occasion for it: besides commerce, which is
alized, it is because it is unrealizable. A phi¬ still rudimentary, there are marriages; these
losophy may well be elaborated in the silence international marriages are very common in
of the interior imagination, but not so a faith. Australia. In the course of these meetings,
For, before all else, a faith is warmth, life, men naturally become conscious of the
enthusiasm, the exaltation of the whole men¬ moral relationship which united them. They
tal life, the raising of the individual above have the same social organization, the same
himself. Now how could he add to the ener¬ division into phratries, clans and matrimo¬
gies which he possesses without going out¬ nial classes; they practise the same rites of
side himself? How could he surpass himself initiation, or wholly similar ones. Mutual
merely by his own forces? The only source of loans and treaties result in reinforcing these
life at which we can morally reanimate our¬ spontaneous resemblances. The gods to
selves is that formed by the society of our which these manifestly identical institutions
fellow beings; the only moral forces with were attached could hardly have remained
which we can sustain and increase our own distinct in their minds. Everything tended to
are those which we get from others. Let us bring them together and consequently, even
even admit that there really are beings more supposing that each tribe elaborated the no¬
or less analogous to those which the mytholo¬ tion independently, they must necessarily
gies represent. In order that they may exer¬ have tended to confound themselves with
cise over souls the useful direction which is each other. Also, it is probable that it was in
their reason for existence, it is necessary that inter-tribal assemblies that they were first
men believe in them. Now these beliefs are conceived. For they are chiefly the gods of
active only when they are partaken by many. initiation, and in the initiation ceremonies,
The Human Meaning of Religion 65
the different tribes are usually represented. the higher ideas of the religious system, but
So if sacred beings are formed which are con¬ even the principles upon which it rests. . . .
nected with no geographically determined
society, that is not because they have an ex¬ Endnotes
tra-social origin. It is because there are other
groups above these geographically deter¬ 1. William James, The Varieties of Religious Ex¬
mined ones, whose contours are less clearly perience.
marked: they have no fixed frontiers, but in¬ 2. Quoted by James, op. cit., p. 20.
clude all sorts of more or less neighbouring
3. See above, pp. 262 ff.
and related tribes. The particular social life
thus created tends to spread itself over an 4. Only one form of social activity has not yet
area with no definite limits. Naturally the been expressly attached to religion: that is
mythological personages who correspond to economic activity. Sometimes processes that
are derived from magic have, by that fact
it have the same character; their sphere of
alone, an origin that is indirectly religious.
influence is not limited; they go beyond the Also, economic value is a sort of power or ef¬
particular tribes and their territory. They are ficacy, and we know the religious origins of
the great international gods. the idea of power. Also, richness can confer
Now there is nothing in this situation mana; therefore it has it. Hence it is seen that
which it peculiar to Australian societies. the ideas of economic value and of religious
There is no people and no state which is not value are not without connection. But the
a part of another society, more or less unlim¬ question of the nature of these connections
ited, which embraces all the peoples and all has not yet been studied.
the states with which the first comes in con¬ 5. It is for this reason that Frazer and even
tact, either directly or indirectly; there is no Preuss set impersonal religious forces out¬
national life which is not dominated by a col¬ side of, or at least on the threshold of religion,
lective life of an international nature. In pro¬ to attach them to magic.
portion as we advance in history, these inter¬ 6. Boutroux, Science et Religion, pp. 206-207.
national groups acquire a greater importance 7. See above, pp. 423 ff. On this same question,
and extent. Thus we see how, in certain cases, see also our article, "Representations indi-
this universalistic tendency has been able to viduelles et representations collectives," in
develop itself to the point of affecting not only the Revue de Metaphysique, May, 1898. ♦
66 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ III. Max Weber
the last analysis, the “regular" recurrence of explicable only as the consequence of an¬
certain causal relationships. The “laws" other equally individual constellation which
which we are able to perceive in the infinitely has preceded it. As far back as we may go into
manifold stream of events must—according the grey mist of the far-off past, the reality to
to this conception—contain the scientifically which the laws apply always remains equally
“essential" aspect of reality As soon as we individual, equally undeducible from laws. A
have shown some causal relationship to be a cosmic “primeval state" which had no indi¬
“law," i.e., if we have shown it to be univer¬ vidual character or less individual character
sally valid by means of comprehensive his¬ than the cosmic reality of the present would
torical induction or have made it immedi¬ naturally be a meaningless notion. But is
ately and tangibly plausible according to our there not some trace of similar ideas in our
subjective experience, a great number of field in those propositions sometimes de¬
similar cases order themselves under the for¬ rived from natural law and sometimes veri¬
mula thus attained. Those elements in each fied by the observation of “primitives," con¬
individual event which are left unaccounted cerning an economic-social “primeval state"
for by the selection of their elements subsum- free from historical “accidents," and charac¬
able under the “law" are considered as scien¬ terized by phenomena such as “primitive
tifically unintegrated residues which will be agrarian communism," sexual “promiscuity,"
taken care of in the further perfection of the etc., from which individual historical devel¬
system of “laws." Alternatively they will be opment emerges by a sort of fall from grace
viewed as “accidental" and therefore scien¬ into concreteness?
tifically unimportant because they do not fit The social-scientific interest has its point
into the structure of the “law;" in other of departure, of course, in the real, i.e., con¬
words, they are not typical of the event and crete, individually-structured configuration
hence can only be the objects of “idle curios¬ of our cultural life in its universal relation¬
ity." Accordingly, even among the followers of ships which are themselves no less individu¬
the Historical School we continually find the ally-structured, and in its development out of
attitude which declares that the ideal which other social cultural conditions, which them¬
all the sciences, including the cultural sci¬ selves are obviously likewise individually
ences, serve and towards which they should structured. It is clear here that the situation
strive even in the remote future is a system of which we illustrated by reference to astron¬
propositions from which reality can be “de¬ omy as a limiting case (which is regularly
duced." As is well known, a leading natural drawn on by logicians for the same purpose)
scientist believed that he could designate the appears in a more accentuated form.
(factually unattainable) ideal goal of such a Whereas in astronomy, the heavenly bodies
treatment of cultural reality as a sort of uas¬ are of interest to us only in their quantitative
tronomical” knowledge. and exact aspects, the qualitative aspect of
Let us not, for our part, spare ourselves the phenomena concerns us in the social sci¬
trouble of examining these matters more ences. To this should be added that in the
closely—however often they have already social sciences we are concerned with psy¬
been discussed. The first thing that impresses chological and intellectual (geistig) phenom¬
one is that the “astronomical" knowledge ena the empathic understanding of which is
which was referred to is not a system of laws naturally a problem of a specifically different
at all. On the contrary, the laws which it pre¬ type from those which the schemes of the
supposes have been taken from other disci¬ exact natural sciences in general can or seek
plines like mechanics. But it too concerns to solve. Despite that, this distinction in itself
itself with the question of the individual con¬ is not a distinction in principle, as it seems at
sequence which the working of these laws in first glance. Aside from pure mechanics, even
an unique configuration produces, since it is the exact natural sciences do not proceed
these individual configurations which are without qualitative categories. Furthermore,
significant for us. Every individual constella¬ in our own field we encounter the idea
tion which it “explains" or predicts is causally (which is obviously distorted) that at least the
68 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ III. Max Weber
phenomena characteristic of a money-econ¬ from "laws” and "factors.” This is not because
omy—which are basic to our culture—are some higher mysterious powers reside in liv¬
quantifiable and on that account subject to ing phenomena (such as "dominants,” "en-
formulation as "laws.” Finally it depends on telechies,” or whatever they might be called).
the breadth or narrowness of ones definition This, however, is a problem in its own right.
of "law” as to whether one will also include The real reason is that the analysis of reality
regularities which because they are not quan¬ is concerned with the configuration into
tifiable are not subject to numerical analysis. which those (hypothetical!) "factors” are ar¬
Especially insofar as the influence of psycho¬ ranged to form a cultural phenomenon
logical and intellectual (geistig) factors is con¬ which is historically significant to us. Fur¬
cerned, it does not in any case exclude the thermore, if we wish to "explain” this individ¬
establishment of rules governing rational ual configuration "causally” we must invoke
conduct. Above all, the point of view still per¬ other equally individual configurations on
sists which claims that the task of psychology the basis of which we will explain it with the
is to play a role comparable to mathematics aid of those (hypothetical!) "laws.”
for the Geisteswissenschaften in the sense The determination of those (hypothetical)
that it analyzes the complicated phenomena "laws” and "factors” would in any case only
of social life into their psychic conditions and be the first of the many options which would
effects, reduces them to their most elemen¬ lead us to the desired type of knowledge. The
tary possible psychic factors and then ana¬ analysis of the historically given individual
lyzes their functional interdependences. configuration of those "factors” and their sig¬
Thereby, a sort of "chemistry” if not "mechan¬ nificant concrete interaction, conditioned by
ics” of the psychic foundations of social life their historical context and especially the ren¬
would be created. Whether such investiga¬ dering intelligible of the basis and type of this
tions can produce valuable and—what is significance would be the next task to be
something else—useful results for the cul¬ achieved. This task must be achieved, it is
tural sciences, we cannot decide here. But true, by the utilization of the preliminary
this would be irrelevant to the question as to analysis but it is nonetheless an entirely new
whether the aim of social-economic knowl¬ and distinct task. The tracing as far into the
edge in our sense, i.e., knowledge of reality past as possible of the individual features of
with respect to its cultural significance and its these historically evolved configurations
causal relationships can be attained through which are contemporaneously significant,
the quest for recurrent sequences. Let us as¬ and their historical explanation by antece¬
sume that we have succeeded by means of dent and equally individual configurations
psychology or otherwise in analyzing all the would be the third task. Finally the predic¬
observed and imaginable relationships of so¬ tion of possible future constellations would
cial phenomena into some ultimate elemen¬ be a conceivable fourth task.
tary "factors,” that we have made an exhaus¬ For all these purposes, clear concepts and
tive analysis and classification of them and the knowledge of those (hypothetical) "laws”
then formulated rigorously exact laws cover¬ are obviously of great value as heuristic
ing their behavior. What would be the signifi¬ means—but only as such. Indeed they are
cance of these results for our knowledge of quite indispensable for this purpose. But
the historically given culture or any individ¬ even in this function their limitations be¬
ual phase thereof, such as capitalism, in its come evident at a decisive point. In stating
development and cultural significance? As an this, we arrive at the decisive feature of the
analytical tool, it would be as useful as a text¬ method of the cultural sciences. We have des¬
book of organic chemical combinations ignated as "cultural sciences” those disci¬
would be for our knowledge of the biogenetic plines which analyze the phenomena of life
aspect of the animal and plant world. In each in terms of their cultural significance. The
case, certainly an important and useful pre¬ significance of a configuration of cultural
liminary step would have been taken. In nei¬ phenomena and the basis of this significance
ther case can concrete reality be deduced cannot however be derived and rendered in-
‘Objectivity ’ in Social Science 69
description of even the smallest slice of reality tribute to the causal imputation of individual
can never be exhaustive? The number and phenomena and, more indirectly, to the
type of causes which have influenced any understanding of the significance of cultural
given event are always infinite and there is events.
nothing in the things themselves to set some What is the consequence of all this?
of them apart as alone meriting attention. A Naturally, it does not imply that the knowl¬
chaos of "existential judgments” about edge of universal propositions, the construc¬
countless individual events would be the only tion of abstract concepts, the knowledge of
result of a serious attempt to analyze reality regularities and the attempt to formulate
"without presuppositions.” And even this re¬ “laws” have no scientific justification in the
sult is only seemingly possible, since every cultural sciences. Quite the contrary, if the
single perception discloses on closer exami¬ causal knowledge of the historians consists
nation an infinite number of constituent per¬ of the imputation of concrete effects to con¬
ceptions which can never be exhaustively ex¬ crete causes, a valid imputation of any indi¬
pressed in a judgement. Order is brought into vidual effect without the application of "no-
this chaos only on the condition that in every mological”knowledge— i.e., the knowledge of
case only a part of concrete reality is interest¬ recurrent causal sequences—would in gen¬
ing and significant to us, because only it is eral be impossible. Whether a single individ¬
related to the cultural values with which we ual component of a relationship is, in a con¬
approach reality. Only certain sides of the in¬ crete case, to be assigned causal responsibil¬
finitely complex concrete phenomenon, ity for an effect, the causal explanation of
namely those to which we attribute a general which is at issue, can in doubtful cases be
cultural significance—are therefore worth¬ determined only by estimating the effects
while knowing. They alone are objects of which we generally expect from it and from
causal explanation. And even this causal ex¬ the other components of the same complex
planation evinces the same character; an ex¬ which are relevant to the explanation. In
haustive causal investigation of any concrete other words, the "adequate” effects of the
phenomenon in its full reality is not only causal elements involved must be considered
practically impossible—it is simply non¬ in arriving at any such conclusion. The extent
sense. We select only those causes to which to which the historian (in the widest sense of
are to be imputed in the individual case, the the word) can perform this imputation in a
"essential” feature of an event. Where the in¬ reasonably certain manner with his imagina¬
dividuality of a phenomenon is concerned, tion sharpened by personal experience and
the question of causality is not a question of trained in analytic methods and the extent to
laws but of concrete causal relationships; it is which he must have recourse to the aid of
not a question of the subsumption of the special disciplines which make it possible,
event under some general rubric as a repre¬ varies with the individual case. Everywhere,
sentative case but of its imputation as a con¬ however, and hence also in the sphere of com¬
sequence of some constellation. It is in brief plicated economic processes, the more cer¬
a question of imputation. Wherever the tain and the more comprehensive our general
causal explanation of a "cultural phenome- knowledge the greater is the certainty of im¬
non”an "historical individual”1—is under putation. This proposition is not in the least
consideration, the knowledge of causal laws affected by the fact that even in the case of all
is not the end of the investigation but only a so-called "economic laws” without excep¬
means. It facilitates and renders possible the tion, we are concerned here not with "laws”
causal imputation to their concrete causes of in the narrower exact natural science sense,
those components of a phenomenon the in¬ but with adequate causal relationships ex¬
dividuality of which is culturally significant. pressed in rules and with the application of
So far and only so far as it achieves this, is it the category of "objective possibility.” The es¬
valuable for our knowledge of concrete rela¬ tablishment of such regularities is not the end
tionships. And the more "general,” i.e., the but rather the means of knowledge. It is en¬
more abstract the laws, the less they can con¬ tirely a question of expediency, to be settled
1Objectivity ’ in Social Science 71
separately for each individual case, whether ture." He can attain this point of view only
a regularly recurrent causal relationship of after viewing the culture in which he lives
everyday experience should be formulated from the standpoint of his values, and finding
into a "law." Laws are important and valuable it "too soft." This is the purely logical-formal
in the exact natural sciences, in the measure fact which is involved when we speak of the
that those sciences are universally valid. For logically necessary rootedness of all histori¬
the knowledge of historical phenomena in cal entities (historische Individuen) in "evalu¬
their concreteness, the most general laws, be¬ ative ideas." The transcendental presupposi¬
cause they are most devoid of content are also tion of every cultural science lies not in our
the least valuable. The more comprehensive finding a certain culture or any "culture" in
the validity—or scope—of a term, the more it general to be valuable but rather in the fact
leads us away from the richness of reality that we are cultural beings, endowed with the
since in order to include the common ele¬ capacity and the will to take a deliberate at¬
ments of the largest possible number of phe¬ titude towards the world and to lend it signifi¬
nomena, it must necessarily be as abstract as cance. Whatever this significance may be, it
possible and hence devoid of content. In the will lead us to judge certain phenomena of
cultural sciences, the knowledge of the uni¬ human existence in its light and to respond
versal or general is never valuable in itself. to them as being (positively or negatively)
The conclusion which follows from the meaningful. Whatever may be the content of
above is that an "objective" analysis of cul¬ this attitude—these phenomena have cul¬
tural events, which proceeds according to the tural significance for us and on this signifi¬
thesis that the ideal of science is the reduc¬ cance alone rests its scientific interest. Thus
tion of empirical reality to "laws," is mean¬ when we speak here of the conditioning of
ingless. It is not meaningless, as is often cultural knowledge through evaluative ideas
maintained, because cultural or psychic (Wertideen) (following the terminology of
events for instance are "objectively" less gov¬ modern logic), it is done in the hope that we
erned by laws. It is meaningless for a number will not be subject to crude misunderstand¬
of other reasons. Firstly, because the knowl¬ ings such as the opinion that cultural signifi¬
edge of social laws is not knowledge of social cance should be attributed only to valuable
reality but is rather one of the various aids phenomena. Prostitution is a cultural phe¬
used by our minds for attaining this end; sec¬ nomenon just as much as religion or money.
ondly, because knowledge of cultural events All three are cultural phenomena only be¬
is inconceivable except on a basis of the sig¬ cause and only insofar as their existence and
nificance which the concrete constellations the form which they historically assume
of reality have for us in certain individual touch directly or indirectly on our cultural
concrete situations. In which sense and in interests and arouse our striving for knowl¬
which situations this is the case is not re¬
edge concerning problems brought into fo¬
vealed to us by any law; it is decided accord¬ cus by the evaluative ideas which give signifi¬
cance to the fragment of reality analyzed by
ing to the value-ideas in the light of which we
view "culture" in each individual case. "Cul¬ those concepts. . . .
ture" is a finite segment of the meaningless
Endnote
infinity of the world process, a segment on
which human beings confer meaning and sig¬ 1. We will use the term which is already occa¬
nificance. This is true even for the human sionally used in the methodology of our dis¬
being who views aparticular culture as a mor¬ cipline and which is now becoming widespread
tal enemy and who seeks to "return to na¬ in a more precise forumlation in logic. ♦
72 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ III. Max Weber
From The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, pp. "Remember, that time is money. He that
47-55 and 181 -183, by Max Weber. Copyright © 1996 can earn ten shillings a day by his labour, and
by Roxbury Publishing Company. All rights reserved. goes abroad, or sits idle, one half of that day,
The Spirit of Capitalism 73
though he spends but sixpence during his di¬ into. To prevent this, keep an exact account
version or idleness, ought not to reckon that for some time both of your expenses and your
the only expense; he has really spent, or income. If you take the pains at first to men¬
rather thrown away, five shillings besides. tion particulars, it will have this good effect:
“Remember, that credit is money. If a man you will discover how wonderfully small, tri¬
lets his money lie in my hands after it is due, fling expenses mount up to large sums, and
he gives me the interest, or so much as I can will discern what might have been, and may
make of it during that time. This amounts to for the future be saved, without occasioning
a considerable sum where a man has good any great inconvenience/'
and large credit, and makes good use of it.
“For six pounds a year you may have the
“Remember, that money is of the prolific,
use of one hundred pounds, provided you are
generating nature. Money can beget money,
a man of known prudence and honesty.
and its offspring can beget more, and so on.
“He that spends a groat a day idly, spends
Five shillings turned is six, turned again it is
idly above six pounds a year, which is the
seven and threepence, and so on, till it be¬
price for the use of one hundred pounds.
comes a hundred pounds. The more there is
“He that wastes idly a groat s worth of his
of it, the more it produces every turning, so
time per day, one day with another, wastes the
that the profits rise quicker and quicker. He
privilege of using one hundred pounds each
that kills a breeding-sow, destroys all her off¬
day.
spring to the thousandth generation. He that
murders a crown, destroys all that it might “He that idly loses five shillings worth of
have produced, even scores of pounds/' time, loses five shillings, and might as pru¬
dently throw five shillings into the sea.
“He that loses five shillings, not only loses
“Remember this saying, The good paymas¬
that sum, but all the advantage that might be
ter is lord of another man’s purse. He that is
made by turning it in dealing, which by the
known to pay punctually and exactly to the
time that a young man becomes old, will
time he promises, may at any time, and on
amount to a considerable sum of money."2
any occasion, raise all the money his friends
can spare. This is sometimes of great use. It is Benjamin Franklin who preaches to
After industry and frugality, nothing contrib¬ us in these sentences, the same which Ferdi¬
utes more to the raising of a young man in nand Kiimberger satirizes in his clever and
the world than punctuality and justice in all malicious Picture of American Culture3 as the
his dealings; therefore never keep borrowed supposed confession of faith of the Yankee.
money an hour beyond the time you prom¬ That it is the spirit of capitalism which here
ised, lest a disappointment shut up your speaks in characteristic fashion, no one will
friend s purse for ever. doubt, however little we may wish to claim
“The most trifling actions that affect a that everything which could be understood as
mans credit are to be regarded. The sound of pertaining to that spirit is contained in it. Let
your hammer at five in the morning, or eight us pause a moment to consider this passage,
at night, heard by a creditor, makes him easy the philosophy of which Kiimberger sums up
six months longer; but if he sees you at a in the words, “They make tallow out of cattle
billiard-table, or hears your voice at a tavern, and money out of men". The peculiarity of
when you should be at work, he sends for his this philosophy of avarice appears to be the
money the next day; demands it, before he ideal of the honest man of recognized credit,
can receive it, in a lump. and above all the idea of a duty of the indi¬
“It shows, besides, that you are mindful of vidual toward the increase of his capital,
what you owe; it makes you appear a careful which is assumed as an end in itself. Truly
as well as an honest man, and that still in¬ what is here preached is not simply a means
creases your credit. of making ones way in the world, but a pecu¬
“Beware of thinking all your own that you liar ethic. The infraction of its rules is treated
possess, and of living accordingly. It is a mis¬ not as foolishness but as forgetfulness of
take that many people who have credit fall duty. That is the essence of the matter. It is
74 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ III. Max Weber
not mere business astuteness, that sort of hypocrisy seems to have been confirmed by
thing is common enough, it is an ethos. This this striking case. But in fact the matter is not
is the quality which interests us. by any means so simple. Benjamin Franklins
When Jacob Fugger, in speaking to a busi¬ own character, as it appears in the really un¬
ness associate who had retired and who usual candidness of his autobiography, belies
wanted to persuade him to do the same, since that suspicion. The circumstance that he as¬
he had made enough money and should let cribes his recognition of the utility of virtue
others have a chance, rejected that as pusil¬ to a divine revelation which was intended to
lanimity and answered that "he (Fugger) lead him in the path of righteousness, shows
thought otherwise, he wanted to make that something more than mere garnishing
money as long as he could”,4 the spirit of his for purely egocentric motives is involved.
statement is evidently quite different from In fact, the summum honum of this ethic,
that of Franklin. What in the former case was the earning of more and more money, com¬
an expression of commercial daring and a bined with the strict avoidance of all sponta¬
personal inclination morally neutral,5 in the neous enjoyment of life, is above all com¬
latter takes on the character of an ethically pletely devoid of any eudaemonistic, not to
coloured maxim for the conduct of life. The say hedonistic, admixture. It is thought of so
concept spirit of capitalism is here used in purely as an end in itself, that from the point
this specific sense,6 it is the spirit of modern of view of the happiness of, or utility to, the
capitalism. For that we are here dealing only single individual, it appears entirely tran¬
with Western European and American capi¬ scendental and absolutely irrational.9 Man is
talism is obvious from the way in which the dominated by the making of money, by acqui¬
problem was stated. Capitalism existed in sition as the ultimate purpose of his life. Eco¬
China, India, Babylon, in the classic world, nomic acquisition is no longer subordinated
and in the Middle Ages. But in all these cases, to man as the means for the satisfaction of
as we shall see, this particular ethos was lack¬ his material needs. This reversal of what we
ing. should call the natural relationship, so irra¬
Now, all Franklins moral attitudes are col¬ tional from a naive point of view, is evidently
oured with utilitarianism. Honesty is useful, as definitely a leading principle of capitalism
because it assures credit; so are punctuality, as it is foreign to all peoples not under capi¬
industry, frugality, and that is the reason they talistic influence. At the same time it ex¬
are virtues. A logical deduction from this presses a type of feeling which is closely con¬
would be that where, for instance, the ap¬ nected with certain religious ideas. If we thus
pearance of honesty serves the same purpose, ask, why should "money be made out of
that would suffice, and an unnecessary sur¬ men”, Benjamin Franklin himself, although
plus of this virtue would evidently appear to he was a colourless deist, answers in his auto¬
Franklin s eyes as unproductive waste. And as biography with a quotation from the Bible,
a matter of fact, the story in his autobiogra¬ which his strict Calvinistic father drummed
phy of his conversion to those virtues,7 or the into him again and again in his youth: "Seest
discussion of the value of a strict mainte¬ thou a man diligent in his business? He shall
nance of the appearance of modesty, the as¬ stand before kings” (Prov. xxii. 29). The earn¬
siduous belittlement of ones own deserts in ing of money within the modem economic
order to gain general recognition later,8 con¬ order is, so long as it is done legally, the result
firms this impression. According to Franklin, and the expression of virtue and proficiency
those virtues, like all others, are virtues only in a calling; and this virtue and proficiency
in so far as they are actually useful to the are, as it is now not difficult to see, the real
individual, and the surrogate of mere appear¬ Alpha and Omega of Franklins ethic, as ex¬
ance is always sufficient when it accom¬ pressed in the passages we have quoted, as
plishes the end in view. It is a conclusion well as in all his works without exception.10
which is inevitable for strict utilitarianism. And in truth this peculiar idea, so familiar
The impression of many Germans that the to us today, but in reality so little a matter of
virtues professed by Americanism are pure course, of ones duty in a calling, is what is
The Spirit of Capitalism 75
most characteristic of the social ethic of capi¬ universality of man which it involves, is a
talistic culture, and is in a sense the funda¬ condition of any valuable work in the modern
mental basis of it. It is an obligation which world; hence deeds and renunciation inevita¬
the individual is supposed to feel and does bly condition each other today. This funda¬
feel towards the content of his professional11 mentally ascetic trait of middle-class life, if it
activity, no matter in what it consists, in par¬ attempts to be a way of life at all, and not
ticular no matter whether it appears on the simply the absence of any, was what Goethe
surface as a utilization of his personal pow¬ wanted to teach, at the height of his wisdom,
ers, or only of his material possessions (as in the Wander-jahren, and in the end which he
capital). gave to the life of his Faust.13 For him the
Of course, this conception has not ap¬ realization meant a renunciation, a depar¬
peared only under capitalistic conditions. On ture from an age of full and beautiful human¬
the contrary, we shall later trace its origins ity, which can no more be repeated in the
back to a time previous to the advent of capi¬ course of our cultural development than can
talism. Still less, naturally, do we maintain the flower of the Athenian culture of antiq¬
that a conscious acceptance of these ethical uity.
maxims on the part of the individuals, entre¬ The Puritan wanted to work in a calling;
preneurs or labourers, in modern capitalistic we are forced to do so. For when asceticism
enterprises, is a condition of the further exis¬ was carried out of monastic cells into every¬
tence of present-day capitalism. The capital¬ day life, and began to dominate worldly mo¬
istic economy of the present day is an im¬ rality, it did its part in building the tremen¬
mense cosmos into which the individual is dous cosmos of the modern economic order.
born, and which presents itself to him, at This order is now bound to the technical and
least as an individual, as an unalterable order economic conditions of machine production
of things in which he must live. It forces the which to-day determine the lives of all the
individual, in so far as he is involved in the individuals who are born into this mecha¬
system of market relationships, to conform nism, not only those directly concerned with
to capitalistic rules of action. The manufac¬ economic acquisition, with irresistible force.
turer who in the long run acts counter to Perhaps it will so determine them until the
these norms, will just as inevitably be elimi¬ last ton of fossilized coal is burnt. In Baxters
nated from the economic scene as the worker view the care for external goods should only
who cannot or will not adapt himself to them lie on the shoulders of the "saint like a light
will be thrown into the streets without a cloak, which can be thrown aside at any mo¬
job. . . . ment/'14 But fate decreed that the cloak
One of the fundamental elements of the should become an iron cage.
spirit of modem capitalism, and not only of Since asceticism undertook to remodel the
that but of all modern culture: rational con¬ world and to work out its ideals in the world,
duct on the basis of the idea of the calling, material goods have gained an increasing
was born—that is what this discussion has and finally an inexorable power over the lives
sought to demonstrate—from the spirit of of men as at no previous period in history.
Christian asceticism. One has only to re-read To-day the spirit of religious asceticism—
the passage from Franklin, quoted at the be¬ whither finally, who knows?—has escaped
ginning of this essay, in order to see that the from the cage. But victorious capitalism,
essential elements of the attitude which was since it rests on mechanical foundations,
there called the spirit of capitalism are the needs its support no longer. The rosy blush of
same as what we have just shown to be the its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems
content of the Puritan worldly asceticism,12 also to be irretrievably fading, and the idea of
only without the religious basis, which by duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives
Franklins time had died away. The idea that like the ghost of dead religious beliefs. Where
modem labour has an ascetic character is of the fulfilment of the calling cannot directly
course not new. Limitation to specialized be related to the highest spiritual and cultural
work, with a renunciation of the Faustian values, or when, on the other hand, it need
76 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ III. Max Weber
not be felt simply as economic compulsion, religious ideas a significance for culture and
the individual generally abandons the at¬ national character which they deserve. But it
tempt to justify it at all. In the field of its is, of course, not my aim to substitute for a
highest development, in the United States, one-sided materialistic an equally one-sided
the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture
and ethical meaning, tends to become asso¬ and of history. Each is equally possible,18 but
ciated with purely mundane passions, which each, if it does not serve as the preparation,
often actually give it the character of sport.15 but as the conclusion of an investigation, ac¬
No one knows who will live in this cage in complishes equally little in the interest of his¬
the future, or whether at the end of this tre¬ torical truth.19
mendous development entirely new prophets
will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of Endnotes
old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mecha¬
1. These passages represent a very brief sum¬
nized petrification, embellished with a sort of mary of some aspects of Weber’s methodo¬
convulsive self-importance. For of the last logical views. At about the same time that he
stage of this cultural development, it might wrote this essay he was engaged in a thorough
well be truly said: "Specialists without spirit, criticism and revaluation of the methods of
sensualists without heart; this nullity imag¬ the Social Sciences, the result of which was a
ines that it has attained a level of civilization point of view in many ways different from the
never before achieved." prevailing one, especially outside of Ger¬
But this brings us to the world of judg¬ many. In order thoroughly to understand the
significance of this essay in its wider bearings
ments of value and of faith, with which this
on Webers sociological work as a whole it is
purely historical discussion need not be bur¬ necessary to know what his methodological
dened. The next task would be rather to show aims were. Most of his writings on this sub¬
the significance of ascetic rationalism, which ject have been assembled since his death (in
has only been touched in the foregoing 1920) in the volume Gesammelte Aufsatze zur
sketch, for the content of practical social eth¬ Wissenschaftslehre. A shorter exposition of
ics, thus for the types of organization and the the main position is contained in the opening
functions of social groups from the conventi¬ chapters of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Grun-
cle to the state. Then its relations to human¬ driss der Sozialokonomik, III.— Translator's
Note.
istic rationalism,16 its ideals of life and cul¬
tural influence; further to the development of 2. The final passage is from Necessary Hints to
Those That Would Be Rich (written 1736,
philosophical and scientific empiricism, to
Works, Sparks edition, 11, p. 80), the rest
technical development and to spiritual ideals
from Advice to a Young Tradesman (written
would have to be analysed. Then its historical 1748, Sparks edition, II, pp. 87 ff.). The italics
development from the mediaeval beginnings in the text are Franklin's.
of worldly asceticism to its dissolution into 3. Der Amerikamude (Frankfurt, 1855), well
pure utilitarianism would have to be traced known to be an imaginative paraphrase of Le-
out through all the areas of ascetic religion. nau’s impressions of America. As a work of
Only then could the quantitative cultural sig¬ art the book would to-day be somewhat diffi¬
nificance of ascetic Protestantism in its rela¬ cult to enjoy, but it is incomparable as a docu¬
tion to the other plastic elements of modern ment of the (now long since blurred over)
culture be estimated. differences between the German and the
Here we have only attempted to trace the American outlook, one may even say of the
type of spiritual life which, in spite of every¬
fact and the direction of its influence to their
thing, has remained common to all Germans,
motives in one, though a very important Catholic and Protestant alike, since the Ger¬
point. But it would also further be necessary man mysticism of the Middle Ages, as against
to investigate how Protestant Asceticism was the Puritan capitalistic valuation of action.
in turn influenced in its development and its 4. Sombart has used this quotation as a motto
character by the totality of social conditions, for his section dealing with the genesis of
especially economic.17 The modern man is in capitalism {Der modeme Kapitalismus, first
general, even with the best will, unable to give edition, I, p. 193. See also p. 390).
The Spirit of Capitalism 77
5. Which quite obviously does not mean either my affair went on smoothly, and I ever after
that Jacob Fugger was a morally indifferent practised it on such occasions; and from my
or an irreligious man, or that Benjamin frequent successes, can heartily recommend
Franklin s ethic is completely covered by the it. The present little sacrifice of your vanity
above quotations. It scarcely required Bren¬ will afterwards be amply repaid. If it remains
tano s quotations (Die Anfange des modemen awhile uncertain to whom the merit belongs,
Kapitalismus, pp. 150 ff.) to protect tfiis well- someone more vain than yourself will be en¬
known philanthropist from the misunder¬ couraged to claim it, and then even envy will
standing which Brentano seems to attribute be disposed to do you justice by plucking
to me. The problem is just the reverse: how those assumed feathers and restoring them to
could such a philanthropist come to write their right owner.” Autobiography, p. 140.
these particular sentences (the especially 9. Brentano (op. cit., pp. 125, 127, note 1) takes
characteristic form of which Brentano has this remark as an occasion to criticize the
neglected to reproduce) in the manner of a later discussion of “that rationalization and
moralist? discipline” to which worldly asceticism* has
6. This is the basis of our difference from Som- subjected men. That he says, is a ratio¬
bart in stating the problem. Its very consider¬ nalization toward an irrational mode of life.
able practical significance will become clear He is, in fact, quite correct. A thing is never
later. In anticipation, however, let it be re¬ irrational in itself, but only from a particular
marked that Sombart has by no means ne¬ rational point of view. For the unbeliever
glected this ethical aspect of the capitalistic every religious way of life is irrational, for the
entrepreneur. But in his view of the problem hedonist every ascetic standard, no matter
it appears as a result of capitalism, whereas whether measured with respect to its particu¬
for our purposes we must assume the oppo¬ lar basic values. If this essay makes any con¬
site as an hypothesis. A final position can only tribution at all, may it be to bring out the
be taken up at the end of the investigation. complexity of the only superficially simple
For Sombarts view see op. cit., pp. 357, 380, concept of the rational.
etc. His reasoning here connects with the bril¬
10. In reply to Brentano s (Die Anfange des mod¬
liant analysis given in Simmels Philosophic
emen Kapitalismus, pp. 150 ff.) long and
des Geldes (final chapter). Of the polemics
somewhat inaccurate apologia for Franklin,
which he has brought forward against me in
whose ethical qualities I am supposed to have
his Bourgeois I shall come to speak later. At
misunderstood, I refer only to this statement
this point any thorough discussion must be
which should, in my opinion, have been suf¬
postponed.
ficient to make that apologia superfluous.
7. “I grew convinced that truth, sincerity, and in¬
tegrity in dealings between man and man 11. The two terms profession and calling I have
were of the utmost importance to the felicity used in translation of the German Beruf
of life; and I formed written resolutions, whichever seemed best to fit the particular
which still remain in my journal book to prac¬ context. Vocation does not carry the ethical
tise them ever while I lived. Revelation had connotation in which Weber is interested. It
indeed no weight with me as such; but I en¬ is especially to be remembered that profes¬
tertained an opinion that, though certain ac¬ sion in this sense is not contrasted with busi¬
tions might not be bad because they were ness, but it refers to a particular attitude
forbidden by it, or good because it com¬ toward ones occupation, no matter what that
manded them, yet probably these actions occupation may be. This should become
might be forbidden because they were bad for abundantly clear from the whole of Webers
us, or commanded because they were benefi¬ argument.—Translator's Note.
cial to us in their own nature, all the circum¬ 12. That those other elements, which have here
stances of things considered.” Autobiography not yet been traced to their religious roots,
(ed. F. W. Pine, Henry Holt, New York, 1916), especially the idea that honesty is the best pol¬
p. 112. icy (Franklins discussion of credit), that are
8. “I therefore put myself as much as I could out also of Puritan origin, must be proved in a
of sight and started it”—that is the project of somewhat different connection. . . . Here I
a library which he had initiated—"as a shall limit myself to repeating the following
scheme of a number of friends, who had re¬ remark of J. A. Rowntree (Quakerism, Past
quested me to go about and propose it to such and Present, pp. 95-6), to which E. Bernstein
as they thought lovers of reading. In this way has called my attention: “Is it merely a coin-
78 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ III. Max Weber
cidence, or is it a consequence, that the lofty ligious ideas on the material culture is really
profession of spirituality made by the Friends beyond doubt. It would have been easy to pro¬
has gone hand in hand with shrewdness and ceed beyond that to a regular construction
tact in the transaction of mundane affairs? which logically deduced everything charac¬
Real piety favours the success of a trader by teristic of modern culture from Protestant
insuring his integrity and fostering habits of rationalism. But that sort of thing may be left
prudence and forethought, important items to the type of dilettante who believes in the
in obtaining that standing and credit in the unity of the group mind and its reducibility
commercial world, which are requisites for to a single formula. Let it be remarked only
the steady accumulation of wealth.”. . .“Hon¬ that the period of capitalistic development ly¬
est as a Huguenot” was as proverbial in the ing before that which we have studied was
seventeenth century as the respect for law of everywhere in part determined by religious
the Dutch which Sir W. Temple admired, and influences, both hindering and helping. Of
a century later, that of the English as com¬ what sort these were belongs in another chap¬
pared with those Continental peoples that ter. Furthermore, whether, of the broader prob¬
had not been through this ethical schooling.
lems sketched above, one or another can be
13. Well analysed in Bielschowsky's Goethe, II, dealt with in the limits of this Journal [the essay
chap, xviii. For the development of the scien¬ first appeared in the Archiv fur Sozialwissen-
tific cosmos Windelband, at the end of his schaft und Sozialpolitik—Translator’s Note] is
Bliitezeit der deutschen Philosophie (Vol. II of not certain in view of the problems to which
the Gesch. d. Neueren Philosophie), has ex¬ it is devoted. On the other hand, to write
pressed a similar idea. heavy tomes, as thick as they would have to
14. Saints’ Everlasting Rest, chap. xii. be in this case, and dependent on the work of
15. “Couldn't the old man be satisfied with his others (theologians and historians), I have no
$75,000 a year and rest? No! The frontage of great inclination (I have left these sentences
the store must be widened to 400 feet. Why? unchanged).
That beats everything, he says. In the evening For the tension between ideals and reality
when his wife and daughter read together, he in early capitalistic times before the Reforma¬
wants to go to bed. Sundays he looks at the tion, see now Strieder, Studien zur Geschichte
clock every five minutes to see when the day derkapit. Organizationformen, 1914, Book II.
will be over—what a futile life!” In these (Also as against the work of Keller, cited
terms the son-in-law (who had emigrated from above, which was utilized by Sombart.)
Germany) of the leading dry-goods man of an 19. I should have thought that this sentence and
Ohio city expressed his judgment of the latter, the remarks and notes immediately preced¬
a judgment which would undoubtedly have ing it would have sufficed to prevent any mis¬
seemed simply incomprehensible to the old understanding of what this study was meant
man. A symptom of German lack of energy.
to accomplish, and I find no occasion for add¬
16. This remark alone (unchanged since his criti¬ ing anything. Instead of following up with an
cism) might have shown Brentano {op. cit.) immediate continuation in terms of the above
that I have never doubted its independent sig¬ programme, I have, partly for fortuitous rea¬
nificance. That humanism was also not pure sons, especially the appearance of Troeltschs
rationalism has lately again been strongly Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und
emphasized by Borinski in the Abhandl. der Gruppen, which disposed of many things I
Miinchener Akad. derWiss., 1919. should have had to investigate in a way in
17. The academic oration of V. Below, Die Ursa- which I, not being a theologian, could not
chen der Reformation (Freiburg, 1919), is not have done it; but partly also in order to cor¬
concerned with this problem, but with that of rect the isolation of this study and to place it
the Reformation in general, especially Luther. in relation to the whole of cultural develop¬
For the question dealt with here, especially ment determined, first, to write down some
the controversies which have grown out of comparative studies of the general historical
this study, I may refer finally to the work of relationship of religion and society. These fol¬
Hermelink, Reformation und Gegenreforma- low. Before them is placed only a short essay in
tion, which, however, is also primarily con¬ order to clear up the concept of sect used above,
cerned with other problems. and at the same time to show the significance
18. For the above sketch has deliberately taken up of the Puritan conception of the Church for the
only the relations in which an influence of re¬ capitalistic spirit of modem times.
The Spirit of Capitalism 79
I. II.
There is the principle of fixed and official The principles of office hierarchy and of
jurisdictional areas, which are generally or¬ levels of graded authority mean a firmly or¬
dered by rules, that is, by laws or adminis¬ dered system of super- and subordination in
trative regulations. which there is a supervision of the lower of¬
1. The regular activities required for the fices by the higher ones. Such a system offers
purposes of the bureaucratically governed the governed the possibility of appealing the
structure are distributed in a fixed way as decision of a lower office to its higher author¬
official duties. ity, in a definitely regulated manner. With the
full development of the bureaucratic type,
the office hierarchy is monocratically orga¬
“Bureaucracy,” from From Max Weber: Essays in Sociol¬ nized. The principle of hierarchical office
ogy by Max Weber, edited by H. H. Gerth & C. Wright
authority is found in all bureaucratic struc¬
Mills, translated by H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills.
Translation copyright © 1946, 1958 by H. H. Gerth & tures: in state and ecclesiastical structures as
C. Wright Mills. Used by permission of Oxford Univer¬ well as in large party organizations and pri¬
sity Press, Inc. vate enterprises. It does not matter for the
Bureaucracy 81
among the demands of the quite proletarian service. Moreover, in every sort of selection
and expert officials (the tretyj element) dur¬ of officials by election, parties quite naturally
ing the Russian revolution. give decisive weight not to expert consider¬
Usually the social esteem of the officials as ations but to the services a follower renders
such is especially low where the demand for to the party boss. This holds for all kinds of
expert administration and the dominance of procurement of officials by elections, for the
status conventions are weak. This is espe¬ designation of formally free, elected officials
cially the case in the United States; it is often by party bosses when they determine the
the case in new settlements by virtue of their slate of candidates, or the free appointment
wide fields for profit-making and the great by a chief who has himself been elected. The
instability of their social stratification. contrast, however, is relative: substantially
.
2 The pure type of bureaucratic official is similar conditions hold where legitimate
appointed by a superior authority. An official monarchs and their subordinates appoint of¬
elected by the governed is not a purely bu¬ ficials, except that the influence of the follow¬
reaucratic figure. Of course, the formal exis¬ ings are then less controllable.
tence of an election does not by itself mean Where the demand for administration by
that no appointment hides behind the elec¬ trained experts is considerable, and the party
tion—in the state, especially, appointment by followings have to recognize an intellectually
party chiefs. Whether or not this is the case developed, educated, and freely moving 'pub¬
does not depend upon legal statutes but upon lic opinion,' the use of unqualified officials
the way in which the party mechanism func¬ falls back upon the party in power at the next
tions. Once firmly organized, the parties can election. Naturally, this is more likely to hap¬
turn a formally free election into the mere pen when the officials are appointed by the
acclamation of a candidate designated by the chief. The demand for a trained adminis¬
party chief. As a rule, however, a formally free tration now exists in the United States, but in
election is turned into a fight, conducted ac¬ the large cities, where immigrant votes are
cording to definite rules, for votes in favor of 'corraled,' there is, of course, no educated
one of two designated candidates. public opinion. Therefore, popular elections
In all circumstances, the designation of of¬ of the administrative chief and also of his
ficials by means of an election among the subordinate officials usually endanger the ex¬
governed modifies the strictness of hierarchi¬ pert qualification of the official as well as the
cal subordination. In principle, an official precise functioning of the bureaucratic
who is so elected has an autonomous position mechanism. It also weakens the dependence
opposite the superordinate official. The of the officials upon the hierarchy. This holds
elected official does not derive his position at least for the large administrative bodies
'from above' but 'from below,' or at least not that are difficult to supervise. The superior
from a superior authority of the official hier¬ qualification and integrity of federal judges,
archy but from powerful party men ('bosses'), appointed by the President, as over against
who also determine his further career. The elected judges in the United States is well
career of the elected official is not, or at least known, although both types of officials have
not primarily, dependent upon his chief in the been selected primarily in terms of party con¬
administration. The official who is not siderations. The great changes in American
elected but appointed by a chief normally metropolitan administrations demanded by
functions more exactly, from a technical reformers have proceeded essentially from
point of view, because, all other circum¬ elected mayors working with an apparatus of
stances being equal, it is more likely that officials who were appointed by them. These
purely functional points of consideration and reforms have thus come about in a 'Caesarist'
qualities will determine his selection and ca¬ fashion. Viewed technically, as an organized
reer. As laymen, the governed can become form of authority, the efficiency of 'Cae-
acquainted with the extent to which a candi¬ sarism,' which often grows out of democracy,
date is expertly qualified for office only in rests in general upon the position of the 'Cae¬
terms of experience, and hence only after his sar' as a free trustee of the masses (of the
84 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ III. Max Weber
army or of the citizenry), who is unfettered conventions of the salon. For this very rea¬
by tradition. The 'Caesar is thus the unre¬ son, if other things are equal, in the eyes of
strained master of a body of highly qualified the master stratum the judge is considered
military officers and officials whom he se¬ less qualified for social intercourse than are
lects freely and personally without regard to officers and administrative officials, whose
tradition or to any other considerations. This greater dependence on the master is a greater
'rule of the personal genius/ however, stands guarantee of their conformity with status
in contradiction to the formally 'democratic' conventions. Of course, the average official
principle of a universally elected officialdom. strives for a civil-service law, which would
.
3 Normally, the position of the official is materially secure his old age and provide in¬
held for life, at least in public bureaucracies; creased guarantees against his arbitrary re¬
and this is increasingly the case for all similar moval from office. This striving, however, has
structures. As a factual rule, tenure for life is its limits. A very strong development of the
presupposed, even where the giving of notice 'right to the office’ naturally makes it more
or periodic reappointment occurs. In con¬ difficult to staff them with regard to technical
trast to the worker in a private enterprise, the efficiency, for such a development decreases
official normally holds tenure. Legal or ac¬ the career-opportunities of ambitious candi¬
tual life-tenure, however, is not recognized as dates for office. This makes for the fact that
the official's right to the possession of office, officials, on the whole, do not feel their de¬
as was the case with many structures of pendency upon those at the top. This lack of
authority in the past. Where legal guarantees a feeling of dependency, however, rests pri¬
against arbitrary dismissal or transfer are de¬ marily upon the inclination to depend upon
veloped, they merely serve to guarantee a one’s equals rather than upon the socially in¬
strictly objective discharge of specific office ferior and governed strata. The present con¬
duties free from all personal considerations. servative movement among the Badenia
In Germany, this is the case for all juridical clergy, occasioned by the anxiety of a presum¬
and, increasingly, for all administrative offi¬ ably threatening separation of church and
cials. state, has been expressly determined by the
Within the bureaucracy, therefore, the desire not to be turned 'from a master into a
measure of 'independence,' legally guaran¬ servant of the parish.'4
teed by tenure, is not always a source of in¬ .
4 The official receives the regular pecuni¬
creased status for the official whose position ary compensation of a normally fixed salary
is thus secured. Indeed, often the reverse and the old age security provided by a pen¬
holds, especially in old cultures and commu¬ sion. The salary is not measured like a wage
nities that are highly differentiated. In such in terms of work done, but according to
communities, the stricter the subordination 'status,' that is, according to the kind of func¬
under the arbitrary rule of the master, the tion (the 'rank') and, in addition, possibly, ac¬
more it guarantees the maintenance of the cording to the length of service. The relatively
conventional seigneurial style of living for the great security of the official’s income, as well
official. Because of the very absence of these as the rewards of social esteem, make the
legal guarantees of tenure, the conventional office a sought-after position, especially in
esteem for the official may rise in the same countries which no longer provide opportu¬
way as, during the Middle Ages, the esteem nities for colonial profits. In such countries,
of the nobility of office3 rose at the expense this situation permits relatively low salaries
of esteem for the freemen, and as the king's for officials.
judge surpassed that of the people's judge. In .
5 The official is set for a ‘career’ within the
Germany, the military officer or the adminis¬ hierarchical order of the public service. He
trative official can be removed from office at moves from the lower, less important, and
any time, or at least far more readily than the lower paid to the higher positions. The aver¬
'independent judge,' who never pays with loss age official naturally desires a mechanical
of his office for even the grossest offense fixing of the conditions of promotion: if not
against the 'code of honor’ or against social of the offices, at least of the salary levels. He
Bureaucracy 85
wants these conditions fixed in terms of ‘sen¬ sideration, irrespective of the often subaltern
iority/ or possibly according to grades character of the educational certificate, has
achieved in a developed system of expert ex¬ led to a condition in which the highest politi¬
aminations. Here and there, such examina¬ cal offices, especially the positions of ‘minis¬
tions actually form a character indelebilis of ters/ are principally filled without reference
the official and have lifelong effects on his to such certificates. . . .
career. To this is joined the desire to qualify
the right to office and the increasing ten¬ Endnotes
dency toward status group closure and eco¬
1. Frederick II of Prussia.
nomic security. All of this makes for a ten¬
dency to consider the offices as ‘prebends' of 2. Cf. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, pp. 73 ff. and
those who are qualified by educational cer¬ part II. (German Editor.)
tificates. The necessity of taking general per¬ 3. ‘Ministerialan.’
sonal and intellectual qualifications into con¬ 4. Written before 1914. (German editors note.) ♦
86 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ III. Max Weber
ets as of judges or leaders in war or great tatively specialised, in which case qualitative
hunting expeditions. We have to thank limitations are imposed on the mission and
Rudolph Sohm for having worked out the power of its bearer by the internal character
sociological features of this type of power- of his charisma, not by external regulation.
structure in relation to one particular case of The meaning and content of the mission may
great historical importance (the historical be (and normally are) directed to a human
development of the power of the Christian group which is defined geographically, ethni¬
Church in its early stages) in a way which is cally, socially, politically, occupationally, or in
intellectually coherent and so, from a purely some other way; its limits are then set by the
historical point of view, necessarily one¬ boundaries of that group.
sided. But the same situation in all its essen¬ Charismatic domination is diametrically
tials is repeated everywhere, even though opposed to bureaucratic in all respects, and
often expressed in its purest form in the reli¬ hence in its economic sub-structure. Bureau¬
gious domain. cracy depends on constancy of income, and
In contrast with all forms of bureaucratic so a fortiori on a money economy and money
administrative system, the charismatic struc¬ taxation, while charisma lives in the world,
ture recognises no forms or orderly proce¬ but is certainly not of it. The true meaning of
dures for appointment or dismissal, no ‘ca¬ this remark needs to be understood. Fre¬
reer, no ‘advancement', no ‘salary'; there is quently there is a completely conscious sense
no organised training either for the bearer of of horror at the possession of money and at
charisma or his aides, no arrangements for money incomes as such, as in the case of St.
supervision or appeal, no allocation of local Francis and many like him. But of course this
areas of control or exclusive spheres of com¬ is not the general rule. The domination exer¬
petence, and finally no standing institutions cised even by a gifted pirate may be ‘charis¬
comparable to bureaucratic ‘governing bod¬ matic’ in the value-free sense of that term
ies’ independent of persons and of their used here, and charismatic political heroes
purely personal charisma. Rather, charisma seek booty, above all in the form of money.
recognises only those stipulations and limi¬ But the important point is that charisma re¬
tations which come from within itself. The jects as dishonourable all rational planning
bearer of charisma assumes the tasks appro¬ in the acquisition of money, and in general all
priate to him and requires obedience and a rational forms of economy. In this it is
following in virtue of his mission. His success sharply contrasted also with all ‘patriarchal’
depends on whether he finds them. If those structures, which are based on the orderly
to whom he feels himself sent do not recog¬ foundation of the ‘household’. In its ‘pure’
nise his mission, then his claims collapse. If form, charisma is not a private source of in¬
they do recognise him, then he remains their come for its bearer, either in the sense of be¬
master for as long as he is able to retain their ing economically exploited in the fashion of
recognition by giving ‘proofs'. His right to an exchange of services or in the other sense
rule, however, is not dependent on their will, of being salaried; equally, it is without any
as is that of an elected leader; on the contrary, organised levying of tribute to provide for the
it is the duty of those to whom he is sent to material needs of the mission. Rather, if its
recognise his charismatic qualification. mission is a peaceful one, its requirements
When the Emperor's right to rule is said, in are economically provided either by individ¬
the Chinese theory, to depend on recognition ual patrons or by the donations, contribu¬
by the people, that is no more a case of the tions or other voluntary services given by
acceptance of popular sovereignty than is the those to whom it is directed. Alternatively, in
requirement of the early Christian Church the case of charismatic war heroes, booty fur¬
that prophets should be recognised' by the nishes both one of the goals of the mission
faithful. Rather, it is a sign of the charismatic and a means of supplying its material needs.
character of the monarch’s office, based as it ‘Pure’ charisma is opposed to all forms of
is on personal qualification and proof. Cha¬ regulated economy—in contrast with all
risma may be, and obviously often is, quali¬ kinds of ‘patriarchal’ domination in the sense
88 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ III. Max Weber
of that term used here: it is a, indeed the, charismatic hero does not derive his author¬
anti-economic force, even (indeed precisely) ity from ordinances and statutes, as if it were
when it seeks to obtain possession of material an official 'competence', nor from customary
goods, as in the case of the charismatic war usage or feudal fealty, as with patrimonial
hero. This is possible because charisma, by power: rather, he acquires it and retains it
its very essence, is not a permanent 'institu¬ only by proving his powers in real life. He
tional' structure, but rather, when it is func¬ must perform miracles if he wants to be a
tioning in its 'pure' form, the exact opposite. prophet, acts of heroism if he wants to be a
Those who possess charisma—not only the leader in war. Above all, however, his divine
master himself but his disciples and follow¬ mission must 'prove' itself in that those who
ers—must, in order to fulfil their mission, entrust themselves to him must prosper. If
keep themselves free of all worldly ties, free they do not, then he is obviously not the mas¬
from everyday occupations as well as from ter sent by the gods. This very serious concep¬
everyday family responsibilities. The prohi¬ tion of genuine charisma obviously stands in
bition against accepting payment for ecclesi¬ stark contrast with the comfortable preten¬
astical office laid down in the statutes of the sions of the modem theory of the 'divine right
Jesuit order, the prohibition against owning of kings', with its references to the 'inscruta¬
property imposed on members of an order, or ble' decrees of God, 'to whom alone the mon¬
even, as in the original rule of the Francis¬ arch is answerable': the genuinely charis¬
cans, on the order itself, the rule of celibacy matic leader, by contrast, is answerable
for priests and members of knightly orders, rather to his subjects. That is, it is for that
the actual celibacy of many bearers of pro¬ reason and that reason alone that precisely
phetic or artistic charisma—all express the he personally is the genuine master willed by
necessary 'alienation from the world' of those God.
who have a share ('KArjpog') in charisma. The Someone who holds power in a way which
economic conditions of having such a share still has important residual charismatic ele¬
may, however, seem from the outside to be ments, as the Chinese monarchs did (at least
opposed to each other, depending on the kind in theory), will blame himself if his adminis¬
of charisma and the way of life which ex¬ tration does not succeed in exorcising some
presses its meaning (religious or artistic, for calamity which has befallen his subjects,
example). When modern charismatic move¬ whether a flood or a defeat in war: openly,
ments of artistic origin suggest 'those of in¬ before the whole people, he will condemn his
dependent means' (or, putting it in plainer own sins and shortcomings, as we have seen
language, rentiers) as the persons normally even in the last few decades. If even this peni¬
best qualified to be followers of someone tence does not appease the gods, then he re¬
with a charismatic mission, this is just as signs himself to dismissal and death, which
logical as was the vow of poverty taken by the is often the method of atonement. This is the
medieval monastic orders, which had pre¬ very specific meaning of the proposition
cisely the opposite economic implications. found, for instance, in Mencius that the voice
The continued existence of charismatic of the people is 'the voice of God' (according
authority is, by its very nature, charac¬ to Mencius, this is the only way in which God
teristically unstable: the bearer may lose his speaks!): once he is no longer recognised by
charisma, feel himself, like Jesus on the the people, the master becomes (as is ex¬
cross, to be 'abandoned by his God', and show pressly said) a simple private citizen, and, if
himself to his followers as 'bereft of his he aspires to anything more, he is a usurper
power', and then his mission is dead, and his and deserves to be punished. The situation
followers must hopefully await and search expressed in these phrases, with their ex¬
out a new charismatic leader. He himself, tremely revolutionary resonance, can also be
however, is abandoned by his following, for found, in forms which carry no hint of pa¬
pure charisma recognises no 'legitimacy' thos, in primitive societies, where authority
other than that conferred by personal power, has the charismatic character to be found in
which must be constantly re-confirmed. The almost all primitive authority, with the excep-
The Nature of Charismatic Domination 89
tion of domestic power in the strictest sense, both are products in part of a system of jus¬
and the chief is often simply deserted if suc¬ tice which is already highly rationalised and
cess deserts him. in part of the abstract concepts of Natural
The purely de facto 'recognition', whether Law: the phrase 'ex fide bona contains in any
active or passive, of his personal mission by case an allusion to good commercial 'moral¬
the subjects, on which the power of the char¬ ity' and so has as little to do with genuinely
ismatic lord rests, has its source in submis¬ irrational justice as does our own 'free judi¬
sion by faith to the extraordinary and un¬ cial opinion'. To be sure, all forms of trial by
heard-of, to that which does not conform to ordeal are derived from charismatic justice.
any rule or tradition and is therefore re¬ But to the extent that they substitute for the
garded as divine—a submission bom from personal authority of a bearer of charisma a
distress and enthusiasm. In genuine charis¬ rule-bound mechanism for the formal deter¬
matic domination, therefore, there are no ab¬ mination of the divine will, they already be¬
stract legal propositions and regulations and long to the domain of that 'bringing down to
no 'formalised' legal judgments. 'Objective' earth' of charisma which is shortly to be dis¬
law, in such a case, flows from concrete and cussed.
intensely personal experience of heavenly As we saw, bureaucratic rationalisation
grace and a semi-divine heroic stature: it can also be, and often has been, a revolution¬
means the rejection of the bonds of external ary force of the first order in its relation to
organisation in favour of nothing but the ec¬ tradition. But its revolution is carried out by
stasy of the true prophet and hero. It thus technical means, basically 'from the outside'
leads to a revolutionary revaluation of every¬ (as is especially true of all economic reorgan¬
thing and a sovereign break with all tradi¬ isation); first it revolutionises things and or¬
tional or rational norms: 'it is written, but I ganisations, and then, in consequence, it
say unto you'. The specifically charismatic changes people, in the sense that it alters the
method of settling disputes is a revelation conditions to which they must adapt and in
through the prophet or oracle, or the 'Solo¬ some cases increases their chances of adapt¬
monic' judgments of a charismatically quali¬ ing to the external world by rational determi¬
fied sage based on evaluations which, while nation of means and ends. The power of cha¬
extremely concrete and individual, yet claim risma, by contrast, depends on beliefs in reve¬
absolute validity. This is the true home of lation and heroism, on emotional convictions
'Kadi-justice', in the proverbial rather than about the importance and value of a reli¬
the historical sense of that word. For, as an gious, ethical, artistic, scientific, political or
actual historical phenomenon, the judg¬ other manifestation, on heroism, whether as¬
ments of the Islamic Kadi were bound up cetic or military, or judicial wisdom or magi¬
with sacred traditions and their often ex¬ cal or other favours. Such belief revolution¬
tremely formalistic interpretation: they ises men 'from within' and seeks to shape
amounted in some situations, to be sure, to things and organisations in accordance with
specific, rule-free evaluations of the individ¬ its revolutionary will. This contrast must, to
ual case, but only where these sources of be sure, be rightly understood. For all the vast
knowledge had failed. Genuinely charismatic differences in the areas in which they oper¬
justice is always rule-free in this sense: in its ate, the psychological origins of ideas are es¬
pure form it is completely opposed to all the sentially the same, whether they are reli¬
bonds of formalism and tradition and is as gious, artistic, ethical, scientific or of any
free in its attitude to the sanctity of tradition other kind: this is especially true of the organ¬
as to rationalistic deductions from abstract ising ideas of social and political life. Only a
concepts. There will be no discussion here of purely subjective, 'time-serving' evaluation
the relation of the reference to ‘aequum et could attribute one sort of idea to ‘under¬
bonum in Roman Law and the original sense standing’ and another to 'intuition' (or what¬
of the term 'equity' in English law to charis¬ ever other pair of terms one might care to
matic justice in general and the theocratic use): the mathematical ‘imagination’ of a
Kadi-justice of Islam in particular. However, Weierstrass is ‘intuition’ in exactly the same
90 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ III. Max Weber
sense as that of any artist, prophet or, for that like the bureaucratic official, holds his
matter, of any demagogue: that is not where authority in virtue of a certain established
the difference lies.1 If we are to understand order: the difference between this order and
the true meaning of ‘rationalism’, we must the laws and regulations of the bureaucracy
emphasise that the difference does not lie in is that it is not deliberately created by men
general in the person or in the inner ‘experi¬ but has been accepted as inviolably valid
ences’ of the creator of the ideas or the ‘work’, from time immemorial. The bearer of cha¬
but in the manner in which it is inwardly risma holds his authority in virtue of a mis¬
‘appropriated’ or ‘experienced’ by those sion held to be incarnate in his person: this
whom he rules or leads. We have already seen mission need not always or necessarily be of
that, in the process of rationalisation, the a revolutionary nature, dedicated to the sub¬
great majority of those who are led merely version of all hierarchies of value and the
appropriate the external technical conse¬ overthrow of existing morality, law and tra¬
quences which are of practical importance to dition, but it certainly has been in its highest
their interests, or else adapt themselves to forms. However unstable the existence of pa¬
them (in the same way that we ‘learn’ our triarchal power may be in the case of any
multiplication tables or as all too many ju¬ particular individual, it is nevertheless the
rists learn the techniques of the law): the ac¬ structure of social domination which is ap¬
tual content of their creator’s ideas remains propriate to the demands of everyday life and
irrelevant to them. This is the meaning of the which, like everyday life itself, continues to
assertion that rationalisation and rational or¬ function without regard to changes in the in¬
ganisation revolutionise ‘from the outside’,
dividual holder of power or in the environ¬
whereas charisma, wherever its charac¬
ment. In these respects it may be contrasted
teristic influence is felt, on the contrary ex¬
with the charismatic structure which is bom
erts its revolutionary power from within, by
of extraordinary situations of emergency and
producing a fundamental change of heart
enthusiasm. Both kinds of structure may, in
(‘metanoia’) in the ruled. The bureaucratic
themselves, be suited to any sphere of life:
form of organisation merely replaces the be¬
many of the old German armies, for instance,
lief in the holiness of what has always been—
fought patriarchally, divided into families
the traditional standards—with submission
each under the leadership of its head. The
to deliberately created rules: everyone knows
that anyone with sufficient power can always ancient colonising armies of Eastern mon-
replace these rules with others, equally delib¬ archs and the contingents of small farmers in
erately created, and so that they are not in the Frankish army, marching under the
any sense ‘sacred’. By contrast, charisma, in leadership of their ‘seniores', were patrimoni-
its highest forms, bursts the bonds of rules ally organised. The religious function of the
and tradition in general and overturns all head of the household and religious worship
ideas of the sacred. Instead of the pious fol¬ within the household persist alongside the
lowing of time-hallowed custom, it enforces official community cult on the one hand and
inner subjection to something which has the great movements of charismatic proph¬
never before existed, is absolutely unique and ecy, which in the nature of the case are almost
is therefore considered divine. It is in this always revolutionary, on the other. Along
purely empirical and value-free sense the with the peacetime leader who deals with the
characteristically ‘creative’ revolutionary everyday economic business of the commu¬
force in history. nity, and the popular levy in times of war
Although both charismatic and patriar¬ involving the whole community, there is
chal power rest on personal submission to found nevertheless, among the Germans as
‘natural leaders' and personal exercise of well as the Indians, the charismatic war hero,
authority by them (in contrast with the ‘ap¬ who takes the field with his volunteer force
pointed’ leaders of bureaucratic systems), the of followers; even in official national wars the
submission and the authority take very dif¬ normal peacetime authorities are very often
ferent forms in the two cases. The patriarch, replaced by the war-prince, proclaimed as
The Nature of Charismatic Domination 91
‘Herzog on an ad hoc basis because he has the double nature of what one might call 'the
proved himself as a hero in such adventures. spirit of capitalism', and equally the specific
In the political sphere, as in the religious, features of the modem, professionalised, bu¬
it is traditional, customary, everyday needs reaucratic form of everyday capitalism if one
which are served by the patriarchal structure, leams to make the conceptual distinction be¬
resting as it does on habit, respect for tradi¬ tween these two structural elements, which
tion, piety towards elders and ancestors and are thoroughly entangled with one another,
bonds of personal loyalty, in contrast with the but are in the last analysis distinct.
revolutionary role of charisma. This holds Although a 'purely' charismatic authority
likewise in the economic sphere. The econ¬ in the sense of the word used here cannot, to
omy, as an organised permanent system of the extent that it preserves its purity, be
transactions for the purpose of planned pro¬ understood as an 'organisation' in the usual
vision for the satisfaction of material needs, sense of an ordering of men and things ac¬
is the specific home of the patriarchal struc¬ cording to the principle of ends and means,
ture of domination, and of the bureaucratic nevertheless its existence implies, not an
structure as it becomes increasingly ratio¬ amorphous, unstructured condition, but a
nalised to the level of the 'enterprise'. Never¬ well-defined form of social structure with
theless, even here there may be room for cha¬ personal organs and a suitable apparatus for
risma. In primitive societies, charismatic fea¬ providing services and material goods for the
tures are often found in the organisation of mission of the bearer of charisma. The
hunting, which was at that time an important leader's personal aides and, among them, a
branch of the provision of material needs, certain kind of charismatic aristocracy rep¬
even if it became less important as material resent a narrower group of followers within
culture increased: hunting was organised in the group, formed on principles of disci-
a similar way to war, and even at a later stage pleship and personal loyalty and chosen ac¬
was long treated in much the same way as cording to personal charismatic qualifica¬
war (even up to the time of the Assyrian royal tion. The provision of material goods, though
inscriptions). But even in specifically capital¬ in theory voluntary, non-statutory and fluctu¬
ist economies the antagonism between cha¬ ating, is regarded as a bounden duty of the
risma and the everyday can be found, except charismatic mler's subjects to an extent suf¬
that here it is not charisma and 'household', ficient to cover what is required, and such
but charisma and 'enterprise' which are op¬ services are offered according to need and
posed. When Henry Villard, with the aim of capacity. The more the purity of the charis¬
pulling off a coup on the stock exchange in¬ matic structure is maintained, the less the
volving the shares of the Northern Pacific followers or disciples receive their material
Railroad, arranged the famous 'blind pool', means of support or social position in the
asked the public, without stating his purpose, form of prebends, stipends, or any form of
for fifty million pounds for an undertaking remuneration or salary, or in the form of ti¬
which he refused to specify any further, and tles or places in an ordered hierarchy. As far
got the loan without security on the basis of as material needs are concerned, to the extent
his reputation, his action was an example of that individuals have no other means of sup¬
grandiose booty-capitalism and economic port, the master, in a community under
brigandage which, like other similar exam¬ authoritarian leadership, shares with his fol¬
ples, was fundamentally different in its whole lowers, without any form of deduction or
structure and spirit from the rational man¬ contract, the wealth which flows in, accord¬
agement of a normal large capitalist 'enter¬ ing to circumstances, in the form of dona¬
prise', while on the other hand resembling tions, booty or bequests; in some cases, there¬
the large financial undertakings and projects fore, they have rights of commensality and
for colonial exploitation, or the 'occasional claims to equipment and donations which he
trade' combined with piracy and slave-hunt¬ bestows on them. As for non-material needs,
ing expeditions, which have been known they have a right to share in the social, politi¬
since earliest times. One can only understand cal and religious esteem and honour which is
92 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ III. Max Weber
paid to the master himself. Every deviation tends to happen: the first stage in its decline
from this sullies the purity of the charismatic is the 'prebend', the 'allowance' granted in
structure and marks a step towards other place of the earlier communistic mode of
structural forms. provision from the common store. Every pos¬
Together with the household community sible means is used by the proponents of true
(though distinct from it), charisma is thus the charisma to set limits to this decline. All spe¬
second great historical example of commu¬ cifically warrior states—Sparta is a typical
nism, if that term is taken to mean a lack of example—retained remnants of charismatic
'calculation' in the consumption of goods, communism and sought (no less than reli¬
rather than the rational organisation of the gious orders) to protect the heroes from the
production of goods for some kind of com¬ 'temptations' presented by a concern for pos¬
mon benefit (which might be called 'social¬ sessions, rational industry, and family cares.
ism'). Every form of 'communism' in this The adjustments achieved between these
sense which is known to history finds its true remnants of the older charismatic principles
home either in traditional or patriarchal so¬ and individual economic interests, which en¬
cieties (household communism)—the only ter with the introduction of prebends and are
form in which it has been or is now a phe¬ constantly hammering at the doors, take the
nomenon of the everyday—or amongst char¬ most varied forms. In all cases, however, the
ismatic modes of thought far removed from limitless freedom to found families and ac¬
the everyday: in the latter case, when com¬ quire wealth which is finally given marks the
plete, it is either the camp-communism of the end of the domination of true charisma. It is
robber band or the love-communism of the only the shared dangers of the military camp
monastery in all its varied forms and its ten¬ or the loving disposition of disciples who are
dency to degenerate into mere 'charity' or withdrawn from the world which can hold
alms-giving. Camp-communism (in varying communism together, and it is only commu¬
degrees of purity) can be found in charis¬ nism in its turn which can ensure the purity
matic warrior societies in all periods, from of charisma against the interests of the every¬
the pirate-state of the Ligurian islands to the day.
organisation of Islam under the Caliph Omar All charisma, however, in every hour of its
and the warrior orders of Christendom and existence finds itself on this road, from a pas¬
of Japanese Buddhism. Love-communism in sionate life in which there is no place for the
one form or another is found at the origins of economic to slow suffocation under the
all religions, and lives on amongst the profes¬ weight of material interests, and with every
sional followers of the god, or monks; it is hour of its existence it moves further along
also to be found in the many pietistic sects
(Labadie, for instance) and other extremist
religious communities. Both the genuine he¬
roic disposition and genuine sanctity, as it Endnote
seems to their true advocates, can only be
preserved by maintenance of the communis¬ 1. And incidentally they correspond completely
tic basis and absence of the urge towards in¬ with each other also in the 'value-sphere,'
which does not concern us here, in that they
dividual private property. In this they are
all—even artistic intuition—in order to make
right: charisma is a force which is essentially
themselves objective and so in general to
outside the everyday and so necessarily out¬ prove their reality, imply 'grasping', or, if it is
side economics. It is immediately threatened preferred, being 'grasped' by the claims of the
in its innermost being when the economic 'work', and not a subjective 'feeling' or 'expe¬
interests of everyday life prevail, as always rience' like any other. ♦
Class, Status, Party 93
may speak of a 'class' when (1) a number of come effective in price wars or in competitive
people have in common a specific causal struggles.
component of their life chances, in so far as Within these categories, however, class
(2) this component is represented exclusively situations are further differentiated: on the
by economic interests in the possession of one hand, according to the kind of property
goods and opportunities for income, and (3) that is usable for returns; and, on the other
is represented under the conditions of the hand, according to the kind of services that
commodity or labor markets. [These points can be offered in the market. Ownership of
refer to 'class situation,’ which we may ex¬ domestic buildings; productive establish¬
press more briefly as the typical chance for a ments; warehouses; stores; agriculturally us¬
supply of goods, external living conditions, able land, large and small holdings—quanti¬
and personal life experiences, in so far as this tative differences with possibly qualitative
chance is determined by the amount and consequences—; ownership of mines; cattle;
kind of power, or lack of such, to dispose of men (slaves); disposition over mobile instru¬
goods or skills for the sake of income in a ments of production, or capital goods of all
given economic order. The term 'class' refers sorts, especially money or objects that can be
to any group of people that is found in the exchanged for money easily and at any time;
same class situation.] disposition over products of one's own labor
It is the most elemental economic fact that or of others' labor differing according to their
the way in which the disposition over mate¬ various distances from consumability; dispo¬
rial property is distributed among a plurality sition over transferable monopolies of any
kind—all these distinctions differentiate the
of people, meeting competitively in the mar¬
class situations of the propertied just as does
ket for the purpose of exchange, in itself cre¬
the 'meaning' which they can and do give to
ates specific life chances. According to the
the utilization of property, especially to prop¬
law of marginal utility this mode of distribu¬
erty which has money equivalence. Accord¬
tion excludes the non-owners from compet¬
ingly, the propertied, for instance, may be¬
ing for highly valued goods; it favors the own¬
long to the class of rentiers or to the class of
ers and, in fact, gives to them a monopoly to
entrepreneurs.
acquire such goods. Other things being
Those who have no property but who offer
equal, this mode of distribution monopolizes
services are differentiated just as much ac¬
the opportunities for profitable deals for all
cording to their kinds of services as accord¬
those who, provided with goods, do not nec¬ ing to the way in which they make use of
essarily have to exchange them. It increases, these services, in a continuous or discontinu¬
at least generally, their power in price wars ous relation to a recipient. But always this is
with those who, being propertyless, have the generic connotation of the concept of
nothing to offer but their services in native class: that the kind of chance in the market is
form or goods in a form constituted through the decisive moment which presents a com¬
their own labor, and who above all are com¬ mon condition for the individual’s fate. 'Class
pelled to get rid of these products in order situation’ is, in this sense, ultimately 'market
barely to subsist. This mode of distribution situation.' The effect of naked possession per
gives to the propertied a monopoly on the se, which among cattle breeders gives the
possibility of transferring property from the non-owning slave or serf into the power of
sphere of use as a 'fortune,' to the sphere of the cattle owner, is only a forerunner of real
'capital goods;’ that is, it gives them the en¬ ‘class’ formation. However, in the cattle loan
trepreneurial function and all chances to and in the naked severity of the law of debts
share directly or indirectly in returns on capi¬ in such communities, for the first time mere
tal. All this holds true within the area in ‘possession’ as such emerges as decisive for
which pure market conditions prevail. 'Prop¬ the fate of the individual. This is very much
erty' and 'lack of property’ are, therefore, the in contrast to the agricultural communities
basic categories of all class situations. It does based on labor. The creditor-debtor relation
not matter whether these two categories be¬ becomes the basis of 'class situations’ only in
Class, Status, Party 95
those cities where a ‘credit market/ however have even this result. Furthermore, often
primitive, with rates of interest increasing ac¬ merely an amorphous communal action
cording to the extent of dearth and a factual emerges. For example, the ‘murmuring’ of
monopolization of credits, is developed by a the workers known in ancient oriental ethics:
plutocracy Therewith ‘class struggles’ begin. the moral disapproval of the work-master’s
Those men whose fate is not determined conduct, which in its practical significance
by the chance of using goods or services for
was probably equivalent to an increasingly
themselves on the market, e.g., slaves, are
typical phenomenon of precisely the latest
not, however, a ‘class’ in the technical sense
industrial development, namely, the ‘slow
of the term. They are, rather, a ‘status group.’
down' (the deliberate limiting of work effort)
of laborers by virtue of tacit agreement. The
Communal Action Flowing From degree in which ‘communal action’ and pos¬
Class Interest sibly ‘societal action,’ emerges from the ‘mass
actions’ of the members of a class is linked to
According to our terminology, the factor
general cultural conditions, especially to
that creates ‘class’ is unambiguously eco¬
nomic interest, and indeed, only those inter¬ those of an intellectual sort. It is also linked
ests involved in the existence of the ‘market.’ to the extent of the contrasts that have al¬
Nevertheless, the concept of ‘class-interest’ is ready evolved, and is especially linked to the
an ambiguous one: even as an empirical con¬ transparency of the connections between the
cept it is ambiguous as soon as one under¬ causes and the consequences of the ‘class
stands by it something other than the factual situation.’ For however different life chances
direction of interests following with a certain may be, this fact in itself, according to all
probability from the class situation for a cer¬ experience, by no means gives birth to ‘class
tain ‘average’ of those people subjected to the action' (communal action by the members of
class situation. The class situation and other a class). The fact of being conditioned and the
circumstances remaining the same, the di¬ results of the class situation must be dis¬
rection in which the individual worker, for
tinctly recognizable. For only then the con¬
instance, is likely to pursue his interests may
trast of life chances can be felt not as an ab¬
vary widely, according to whether he is con¬
solutely given fact to be accepted, but as a
stitutionally qualified for the task at hand to
a high, to an average, or to a low degree. In resultant from either (1) the given distribu¬
the same way, the direction of interests may tion of property, or (2) the structure of the
vary according to whether or not a communal concrete economic order. It is only then that
action of a larger or smaller portion of those people may react against the class structure
commonly affected by the ‘class situation,’ or not only through acts of an intermittent and
even an association among them, e.g., a irrational protest, but in the form of rational
‘trade union,’ has grown out of the class situ¬ association. There have been ‘class situ¬
ation from which the individual may or may ations’ of the first category (1), of a specifi¬
not expect promising results. [Communal ac¬ cally naked and transparent sort, in the urban
tion refers to that action which is oriented to centers of Antiquity and during the Middle
the feeling of the actors that they belong to¬ Ages; especially then, when great fortunes
gether. Societal action, on the other hand, is
were accumulated by factually monopolized
oriented to a rationally motivated adjust¬
trading in industrial products of these locali¬
ment of interests.] The rise of societal or even
ties or in foodstuffs. Furthermore, under cer¬
of communal action from a common class
situation is by no means a universal phe¬ tain circumstances, in the rural economy of
nomenon. the most diverse periods, when agriculture
The class situation may be restricted in its was increasingly exploited in a profit-making
effects to the generation of essentially similar manner. The most important historical ex¬
reactions, that is to say, within our terminol¬ ample of the second category (2) is the class
ogy, of ‘mass actions.’ However, it may not situation of the modern ‘proletariat.’
96 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ III. Max Weber
Typ es of Class Struggle Now 'status groups' hinder the strict car¬
rying through of the sheer market principle.
Thus every class may be the carrier of any In the present context they are of interest to
one of the possibly innumerable forms of us only from this one point of view. Before we
'class action/ but this is not necessarily so. In briefly consider them, note that not much of
any case, a class does not in itself constitute a general nature can be said about the more
a community To treat 'class' conceptually as specific kinds of antagonism between
having the same value as 'community' leads 'classes' (in our meaning of the term). The
to distortion. That men in the same class situ¬ great shift, which has been going on continu¬
ation regularly react in mass actions to such ously in the past, and up to our times, may be
tangible situations as economic ones in the summarized, although at the cost of some
direction of those interests that are most ade¬ precision: the struggle in which class situ¬
quate to their average number is an impor¬ ations are effective has progressively shifted
tant and after all simple fact for the under¬ from consumption credit toward, first, com¬
standing of historical events. Above all, this petitive struggles in the commodity market
fact must not lead to that kind of pseudo-sci¬ and, then, toward price wars on the labor
entific operation with the concepts of 'class' market. The 'class struggles’ of antiquity—to
and 'class interests' so frequently found these the extent that they were genuine class strug¬
days, and which has found its most classic gles and not struggles between status
expression in the statement of a talented groups—were initially carried on by indebted
author, that the individual may be in error peasants, and perhaps also by artisans threat¬
concerning his interests but that the 'class' is ened by debt bondage and struggling against
'infallible' about its interests. Yet, if classes as urban creditors. For debt bondage is the nor¬
such are not communities, nevertheless class mal result of the differentiation of wealth in
situations emerge only on the basis of com- commercial cities, especially in seaport cit¬
munalization. The communal action that ies. A similar situation has existed among cat¬
brings forth class situations, however, is not tle breeders. Debt relationships as such pro¬
basically action between members of the duced class action up to the time of Cataline.
identical class; it is an action between mem¬ Along with this, and with an increase in pro¬
bers of different classes. Communal actions vision of grain for the city by transporting it
that directly determine the class situation of from the outside, the struggle over the means
the worker and the entrepreneur are: the la¬ of sustenance emerged. It centered in the first
bor market, the commodities market, and the place around the provision of bread and the
capitalistic enterprise. But, in its turn, the determination of the price of bread. It lasted
existence of a capitalistic enterprise presup¬ throughout antiquity and the entire Middle
poses that a very specific communal action Ages. The propertyless as such flocked to¬
exists and that it is specifically structured to gether against those who actually and sup¬
protect the possession of goods per se, and posedly were interested in the dearth of
especially the power of individuals to dis¬ bread. This fight spread until it involved all
pose, in principle freely, over the means of those commodities essential to the way of life
production. The existence of a capitalistic en¬ and to handicraft production. There were
terprise is preconditioned by a specific kind only incipient discussions of wage disputes
of 'legal order.' Each kind of class situation, in antiquity and in the Middle Ages. But they
and above all when it rests upon the power of have been slowly increasing up into modem
property per se, will become most clearly ef¬ times. In the earlier periods they were com¬
ficacious when all other determinants of re¬ pletely secondary to slave rebellions as well
ciprocal relations are, as far as possible, as to fights in the commodity market.
eliminated in their significance. It is in this The propertyless of antiquity and of the
way that the utilization of the power of prop¬ Middle Ages protested against monopolies,
erty in the market obtains its most sovereign pre-emption, forestalling, and the withhold¬
importance. ing of goods from the market in order to raise
Class, Status, Party 97
prices. Today the central issue is the determi¬ organized neighborhood, very often the rich¬
nation of the price of labor. est man is simply the chieftain. However, this
This transition is represented by the fight often means only an honorific preference.
for access to the market and for the determi¬ For example, in the so-called pure modem
nation of the price of products. Such fights 'democracy,' that is, one devoid of any ex¬
went on between merchants and workers in pressly ordered status privileges for individu¬
the putting-out system of domestic handi¬ als, it may be that only the families coming
craft during the transition to modern times. under approximately the same tax class
Since it is quite a general phenomenon we dance with one another. This example is re¬
must mention here that the class antago¬ ported of certain smaller Swiss cities. But
nisms that are conditioned through the mar¬ status honor need not necessarily be linked
ket situation are usually most bitter between with a 'class situation.' On the contrary, it
those who actually and directly participate as normally stands in sharp opposition to the
opponents in price wars. It is not the rentier, pretensions of sheer property.
the share-holder, and the banker who suffer Both propertied and propertyless people
the ill will of the worker, but almost exclu¬ can belong to the same status group, and fre¬
sively the manufacturer and the business ex¬ quently they do with very tangible conse¬
ecutives who are the direct opponents of quences. This 'equality' of social esteem may,
workers in price wars. This is so in spite of however, in the long mn become quite pre¬
the fact that it is precisely the cash boxes of carious. The 'equality' of status among the
the rentier, the share-holder, and the banker American 'gentlemen,' for instance, is ex¬
into which the more or less unearned' gains pressed by the fact that outside the subordi¬
flow, rather than into the pockets of the nation determined by the different functions
manufacturers or of the business executives. of 'business,' it would be considered strictly
This simple state of affairs has very fre¬ repugnant—wherever the old tradition still
quently been decisive for the role the class prevails—if even the richest 'chief,' while
situation has played in the formation of po¬ playing billiards or cards in his club in the
litical parties. For example, it has made pos¬ evening, would not treat his ‘clerk’ as in every
sible the varieties of patriarchal socialism sense fully his equal in birthright. It would be
and the frequent attempts—formerly, at repugnant if the American 'chief would be¬
least—of threatened status groups to form stow upon his ‘clerk’ the condescending 'be¬
alliances with the proletariat against the nevolence' marking a distinction of ‘position,’
'bourgeoisie/ which the German chief can never dissever
from his attitude. This is one of the most im¬
portant reasons why in America the German
Status Honor ‘clubby-ness’ has never been able to attain the
attraction that the American clubs have. . . .
In contrast to classes, status groups are
normally communities. They are, however,
often of an amorphous kind. In contrast to Parties
the purely economically determined 'class
situation' we wish to designate as 'status situ¬ Whereas the genuine place of ‘classes' is
ation' every typical component of the life fate within the economic order, the place of
of men that is determined by a specific, posi¬ ‘status groups' is within the social order, that
tive or negative, social estimation of honor. is, within the sphere of the distribution of
This honor may be connected with any qual¬ ‘honor.’ From within these spheres, classes
ity shared by a plurality, and, of course, it can and status groups influence one another and
be knit to a class situation: class distinctions they influence the legal order and are in turn
are linked in the most varied ways with status influenced by it. But 'parties' live in a house
distinctions. Property as such is not always of 'power.'
recognized as a status qualification, but in Their action is oriented toward the acqui¬
the long run it is, and with extraordinary sition of social 'power,' that is to say, toward
regularity. In the subsistence economy of the influencing a communal action no matter
98 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ III. Max Weber
what its content may be. In principle, parties also designate as parties the ancient and me¬
may exist in a social 'club' as well as in a dieval ‘parties,’ despite the fact that their
'state/ As over against the actions of classes structure differs basically from the structure
and status groups, for which this is not nec¬ of modem parties. By virtue of these struc¬
essarily the case, the communal actions of tural differences of domination it is impossi¬
'parties' always mean a societalization. For ble to say anything about the structure of par¬
party actions are always directed toward a ties without discussing the structural forms
goal which is striven for in planned manner. of social domination per se. Parties, which are
This goal may be a 'cause' (the party may aim always stmctures struggling for domination,
at realizing a program for ideal or material are very frequently organized in a very strict
purposes), or the goal may be 'personal' (si¬ 'authoritarian' fashion. . . .
necures, power, and from these, honor for the Concerning 'classes,' 'status groups,' and
leader and the followers of the party). Usually ‘parties,’ it must be said in general that they
the party action aims at all these simultane¬ necessarily presuppose a comprehensive so¬
ously. Parties are, therefore, only possible cietalization, and especially a political frame¬
within communities that are societalized, work of communal action, within which they
that is, which have some rational order and operate. This does not mean that parties
a staff of persons available who are ready to would be confined by the frontiers of any
enforce it. For parties aim precisely at influ¬ individual political community. On the con¬
encing this staff, and if possible, to recruit it trary, at all times it has been the order of the
from party followers. day that the societalization (even when it
In any individual case, parties may repre¬ aims at the use of military force in common)
sent interests determined through 'class situ¬ reaches beyond the frontiers of politics. This
ation' or ‘status situation,' and they may re¬ has been the case in the solidarity of interests
cruit their following respectively from one or among the Oligarchs and among the demo¬
the other. But they need be neither purely crats in Hellas, among the Guelfs and among
‘class' nor purely 'status' parties. In most Ghibellines in the Middle Ages, and within
cases they are partly class parties and partly the Calvinist party during the period of reli¬
status parties, but sometimes they are nei¬ gious struggles. It has been the case up to the
ther. They may represent ephemeral or en¬ solidarity of the landlords (International
during structures. Their means of attaining Congress of Agrarian Landlords), and has
power may be quite varied, ranging from na¬ continued among princes (Holy Alliance,
ked violence of any sort to canvassing for Karlsbad Decrees), socialist workers, conser¬
votes with coarse or subtle means: money, vatives (the longing of Prussian conservatives
social influence, the force of speech, sugges¬ for Russian intervention in 1850). But their
tion, clumsy hoax, and so on to the rougher aim is not necessarily the establishment of
or more artful tactics of obstruction in par¬ new international political, i.e. territorial, do¬
liamentary bodies. minion. In the main they aim to influence the
The sociological structure of parties dif¬ existing dominion.2
fers in a basic way according to the kind of
communal action which they struggle to in¬ Endnotes
fluence. Parties also differ according to
1. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, part HI, chap. 4,
whether or not the community is stratified by
pp. 631-40. The first sentence in paragraph
status or by classes. Above all else, they vary one and the several definitions in this chapter
according to the structure of domination which are in brackets do not appear in the
within the community. For their leaders nor¬ original text. They have been taken from
mally deal with the conquest of a community. other contexts of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft.
They are, in the general concept which is 2. The posthumously published text breaks off
maintained here, not only products of spe¬ here. We omit an incomplete sketch of types
cially modem forms of domination. We shall of ‘warrior estates.' ♦
Fashion 99
of other forms, honor especially, the double absolute indifference of fashion to the mate¬
function of which consists in revolving rial standards of life is well illustrated by the
within a given circle and at the same time way in which it recommends something ap¬
emphasizing it as separate from others. Just propriate in one instance, something ab¬
as the frame of a picture characterizes the struse in another, and something materially
work of art inwardly as a coherent, homoge¬ and aesthetically quite indifferent in a third.
neous, independent entity and at the same The only motivations with which fashion is
time outwardly severs all direct relations concerned are formal social ones. The reason
with the surrounding space, just as the uni¬ why even aesthetically impossible styles
form energy of such forms cannot be ex¬ seem distingue, elegant, and artistically toler¬
pressed unless we determine the double ef¬ able when affected by persons who carry
fect, both inward and outward, so honor them to the extreme, is that the persons who
owes its character, and above all its moral do this are generally the most elegant and pay
rights, to the fact that the individual in his the greatest attention to their personal ap¬
personal honor at the same time represents pearance, so that under any circumstances
and maintains that of his social circle and his we would get the impression of something
class. These moral rights, however, are fre¬ distingue and aesthetically cultivated. This
quently considered unjust by those without impression we credit to the questionable ele¬
the pale. Thus fashion on the one hand signi¬ ment of fashion, the latter appealing to our
fies union with those in the same class, the consciousness as the new and consequently
uniformity of a circle characterized by it, most conspicuous feature of the tout ensem¬
and, uno actu, the exclusion of all other ble.
groups. Fashion occasionally will affect objec¬
Union and segregation are the two funda¬ tively determined subjects such as religious
mental functions which are here inseparably faith, scientific interests, even socialism and
united, and one of which, although or be¬ individualism; but it does not become opera¬
cause it forms a logical contrast to the other, tive as fashion until these subjects can be
becomes the condition of its realization. considered independent of the deeper human
Fashion is merely a product of social de¬ motives from which they have risen. For this
mands, even though the individual object reason the rule of fashion becomes in such
which it creates or recreates may represent a fields unendurable. We therefore see that
more or less individual need. This is clearly there is good reason why externals—cloth¬
proved by the fact that very frequently not the ing, social conduct, amusements—constitute
slightest reason can be found for the cre¬ the specific field of fashion, for here no de¬
ations of fashion from the standpoint of an pendence is placed on really vital motives of
objective, aesthetic, or other expediency. human action. It is the field which we can
While in general our wearing apparel is really most easily relinquish to the bent towards
adapted to our needs, there is not a trace of imitation, which it would be a sin to follow
expediency in the method by which fashion in important questions. We encounter here a
dictates, for example, whether wide or nar¬ close connection between the consciousness
row trousers, colored or black scarfs shall be of personality and that of the material forms
worn. As a rule the material justification for of life, a connection that runs all through his¬
an action coincides with its general adoption, tory. The more objective our view of life has
but in the case of fashion there is a complete become in the last centuries, the more it has
separation of the two elements, and there re¬ stripped the picture of nature of all subjective
mains for the individual only this general ac¬ and anthropomorphic elements, and the
ceptance as the deciding motive to appropri¬ more sharply has the conception of individ¬
ate it. Judging from the ugly and repugnant ual personality become defined. The social
things that are sometimes in vogue, it would regulation of our inner and outer life is a sort
seem as though fashion were desirous of ex¬ of embryo condition, in which the contrasts
hibiting its power by getting us to adopt the of the purely personal and the purely objec¬
most atrocious things for its sake alone. The tive are differentiated, the action being syn-
Fashion 101
chronous and reciprocal. Therefore wher¬ ence without, the prescribed set. On the other
ever man appears essentially as a social being hand, there exists a wide-spread predilection
we observe neither strict objectivity in the for importing fashions from without, and
view of life nor absorption and independence such foreign fashions assume a greater value
in the consciousness of personality within the circle, simply because they did not
Social forms, apparel, aesthetic judgment, originate there. The prophet Zephaniah ex¬
the whole style of human expression, are con¬ pressed his indignation at the aristocrats who
stantly transformed by fashion, in such a way, affected imported apparel. As a matter of fact
however, that fashion—i.e., the latest fash¬ the exotic origin of fashions seems strongly
ion—in all these things affects only the upper to favor the exclusiveness of the groups
classes. Just as soon as the lower classes be¬ which adopt them. Because of their external
gin to copy their style, thereby crossing the origin, these imported fashions create a spe¬
line of demarcation the upper classes have cial and significant form of socialization,
drawn and destroying the uniformity of their which arises through mutual relation to a
coherence, the upper classes turn away from point without the circle. It sometimes ap¬
this style and adopt a new one, which in its pears as though social elements, just like the
turn differentiates them from the masses; axes of vision, converge best at a point that is
and thus the game goes merrily on. Naturally not too near. The currency, or more precisely
the lower classes look and strive towards the the medium of exchange among primitive
upper, and they encounter the least resis¬ races, often consists of objects that are
tance in those fields which are subject to the brought in from without. On the Solomon
whims of fashion; for it is here that mere Islands, and at Ibo on the Niger, for example,
external imitation is most readily applied. there exists a regular industry for the manu¬
The same process is at work as between the facture of money from shells, etc., which are
different sets within the upper classes, al¬ not employed as a medium of exchange in the
though it is not always as visible here as it is, place itself, but in neighboring districts, to
for example, between mistress and maid. In¬ which they are exported. Paris modes are fre¬
deed, we may often observe that the more quently created with the sole intention of set¬
nearly one set has approached another, the ting a fashion elsewhere.
more frantic becomes the desire for imitation This motive of foreignness, which fashion
from below and the seeking for the new from employs in its socializing endeavors, is re¬
above. The increase of wealth is bound to stricted to higher civilization, because nov¬
hasten the process considerably and render elty, which foreign origin guarantees in ex¬
it visible, because the objects of fashion, em¬ treme form, is often regarded by primitive
bracing as they do the externals of life, are races as an evil. This is certainly one of the
most accessible to the mere call of money, reasons why primitive conditions of life favor
and conformity to the higher set is more eas¬ a correspondingly infrequent change of fash¬
ily acquired here than in fields which de¬ ions. The savage is afraid of strange appear¬
mand an individual test that gold and silver ances; the difficulties and dangers that beset
cannot affect. his career cause him to scent clanger in any¬
We see, therefore, that in addition to the thing new which he does not understand and
element of imitation the element of demarca¬ which he cannot assign to a familiar category.
tion constitutes an important factor of fash¬ Civilization, however, transforms this affec¬
ion. This is especially noticeable wherever tation into its very opposite. Whatever is ex¬
the social structure does not include any su¬ ceptional, bizarre, or conspicuous, or what¬
perimposed groups, in which case fashion as¬ ever departs from the customary norm, exer¬
serts itself in neighboring groups. Among cises a peculiar charm upon the man of cul¬
primitive peoples we often find that closely ture, entirely independent of its material jus¬
connected groups living under exactly simi¬ tification. The removal of the feeling of inse¬
lar conditions develop sharply differentiated curity with reference to all things new was
fashions, by means of which each group es¬ accomplished by the progress of civilization.
tablishes uniformity within, as well as differ¬ At the same time it may be the old inherited
102 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ IV. Georg Simmel
prejudice, although it has become purely for¬ groups of primitive races, the development of
mal and unconscious, which, in connection fashion has no sense at all.
with the present feeling of security, produces It is interesting to observe how the preva¬
this piquant interest in exceptional and odd lence of the socializing impulse in primitive
things. For this reason the fashions of the peoples affects various institutions, such as
upper classes develop their power of exclu¬ the dance. It has been noted quite generally
sion against the lower in proportion as gen¬ that the dances of primitive races exhibit a
eral culture advances, at least until the min¬ remarkable uniformity in arrangement and
gling of the classes and the leveling effect of rhythm. The dancing group feels and acts like
democracy exert a counter-influence. a uniform organism; the dance forces and
Fashion plays a more conspicuous role in accustoms a number of individuals, who are
modern times, because the differences in our usually driven to and fro without rime or rea¬
standards of life have become so much more son by vacillating conditions and needs of
strongly accentuated, for the more numerous life, to be guided by a common impulse and
and the more sharply drawn these differ¬ a single common motive. Even making allow¬
ences are, the greater the opportunities for ances for the tremendous difference in the
emphasizing them at every turn. In innumer¬ outward appearance of the dance, we are
able instances this cannot be accomplished dealing here with the same element that ap¬
by passive inactivity, but only by the develop¬ pears in socializing force of fashion. Move¬
ment of forms established by fashion; and ment, time, rhythm of the gestures, are all
this has become all the more pronounced undoubtedly influenced largely by what is
since legal restrictions prescribing various worn: similarly dressed persons exhibit rela¬
forms of apparel and modes of life for differ¬ tive similarity in their actions. This is of es¬
ent classes have been removed. pecial value in modem life with its individu¬
alistic diffusion, while in the case of primitive
*** races the effect produced is directed within
and is therefore not dependent upon changes
Two social tendencies are essential to the of fashion. Among primitive races fashions
establishment of fashion, namely, the need of will be less numerous and more stable be¬
union on the one hand and the need of isola¬ cause the need of new impressions and forms
tion on the other. Should one of these be ab¬ of life, quite apart from their social effect, is
sent, fashion will not be formed—its sway far less pressing. Changes in fashion reflect
will abruptly end. Consequently the lower the dulness of nervous impulses: the more
classes possess very few modes and those nervous the age, the more rapidly its fashions
they have are seldom specific; for this reason change, simply because the desire for differ¬
the modes of primitive races are much more entiation, one of the most important ele¬
stable than ours. Among primitive races the ments of all fashion, goes hand in hand with
socializing impulse is much more powerfully the weakening of nervous energy. This fact in
developed than the differentiating impulse. itself is one of the reasons why the real seat
For, no matter how decisively the groups may of fashion is found among the upper
be separated from one another, separation is classes. .. .
for the most part hostile in such a way that The very character of fashion demands
the very relation the rejection of which within that it should be exercised at one time only
the classes of civilized races makes fashion by a portion of the given group, the great
reasonable, is absolutely lacking. Segrega¬ majority being merely on the road to adopt¬
tion by means of differences in clothing, ing it. As soon as an example has been uni¬
manners, taste, etc., is expedient only where versally adopted, that is, as soon as anything
the danger of absorption and obliteration ex¬ done only by a few has really come to be
ists, as is the case among highly civilized na¬ practiced by all—as is the case in certain por¬
tions. Where these differences do not exist, tions of our social conduct—we no longer
where we have an absolute antagonism, as speak of fashion. As fashion spreads, it
for example between not directly friendly gradually goes to its doom. The distinctive-
Fashion 103
ness which in the early stages of a set fashion the transitory and vacillating elements of life
assures for it a certain distribution is de¬ acquire more room for the display of their
stroyed as the fashion spreads, and as this activity. The break with the past, which, for
element wanes, the fashion also is bound to more than a century, civilized mankind has
die. By reason of this peculiar play between been laboring unceasingly to bring about,
the tendency towards universal acceptation makes the consciousness turn more and
and the destruction of its very purpose to more to the present. This accentuation of the
which this general adoption leads, fashion present evidently at the same time empha¬
includes a peculiar attraction of limitation, sizes the element of change, and a class will
the attraction of a simultaneous beginning turn to fashion in all fields, by no means only
and end, the charm of novelty coupled to that in that of apparel, in proportion to the degree
of transitoriness. The attractions of both in which it supports the given civilizing ten¬
poles of the phenomena meet in fashion, and dency. It may almost be considered a sign of
show also here that they belong together un¬ the increased power of fashion, that it has
conditionally, although, or rather because, overstepped the bounds of its original do¬
they are contradictory in their very nature. main, which comprised only personal exter¬
Fashion always occupies the dividing-line be¬ nals, and has acquired an increasing influ¬
tween the past and the future, and conse¬ ence over taste, over theoretical convictions,
quently conveys a stronger feeling of the pre¬ and even over the moral foundations of life.
sent, at least while it is at its height, than most
other phenomena. What we call the present ***
is usually nothing more than a combination
of a fragment of the past with a fragment of From the fact that fashion as such can
the future. Attention is called to the present never be generally in vogue, the individual
less often than colloquial usage, which is derives the satisfaction of knowing that as
rather liberal in its employment of the word, adopted by him it still represents something
would lead us to believe. special and striking, while at the same time
Few phenomena of social life possess such he feels inwardly supported by a set of per¬
a pointed curve of consciousness as does sons who are striving for the same thing, not
fashion. As soon as the social consciousness as in the case of other social satisfactions, by
attains to the highest point designated by a set actually doing the same thing. The fash¬
fashion, it marks the beginning of the end for ionable person is regarded with mingled feel¬
the latter. This transitory character of fash¬ ings of approval and envy; we envy him as an
ion, however, does not on the whole degrade individual, but approve of him as a member
it, but adds a new element of attraction. At all of a set or group. Yet even this envy has a
events an object does not suffer degradation peculiar coloring. There is a shade of envy
by being called fashionable, unless we reject which includes a species of ideal participa¬
it with disgust or wish to debase it for other, tion in the envied object itself. An instructive
material reasons, in which case, of course, example of this is furnished by the conduct
fashion becomes an idea of value. In the prac¬ of the poor man who gets a glimpse of the
tice of life anything else similarly new and feast of his rich neighbor. The moment we
suddenly disseminated is not called fashion, envy an object or a person, we are no longer
when we are convinced of its continuance absolutely excluded from it; some relation or
and its material justification. If, on the other other has been established—between both
hand, we feel certain that the fact will vanish the same psychic content now exists—al¬
as rapidly as it came, then we call it fashion. though in entirely different categories and
We can discover one of the reasons why in forms of sensations. This quiet personal
these latter days fashion exercises such a usurpation of the envied property contains a
powerful influence on our consciousness in kind of antidote, which occasionally counter¬
the circumstance that the great, permanent, acts the evil effects of this feeling of envy. The
unquestionable convictions are continually contents of fashion afford an especially good
losing strength, as a consequence of which chance of the development of this concil-
104 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ IV. Georg Simmel
iatory shade of envy, which also gives to the teristic of fashion that it renders possible a
envied person a better conscience because of social obedience, which at the same time is a
his satisfaction over his good fortune. This is form of individual differentiation. Fashion
due to the fact that these contents are not, as does this because in its very nature it repre¬
many other psychic contents are, denied ab¬ sents a standard that can never be accepted
solutely to any one, for a change of fortune, by all. While fashion postulates a certain
which is never entirely out of the question, amount of general acceptance, it never¬
may play them into the hands of an individ¬ theless is not without significance in the
ual who had previously been confined to the characterization of the individual, for it em¬
state of envy. phasizes his personality not only through
From all this we see that fashion furnishes omission but also through observance. In the
an ideal field for individuals with dependent dude the social demands of fashion appear
natures, whose self-consciousness, however, exaggerated to such a degree that they com¬
requires a certain amount of prominence, at¬ pletely assume an individualistic and pecu¬
tention, and singularity. Fashion raises even liar character. It is characteristic of the dude
the unimportant individual by making him that he carries the elements of a particular
the representative of a class, the embodiment fashion to an extreme; when pointed shoes
of a joint spirit. And here again we observe are in style, he wears shoes that resemble the
the curious intermixture of antagonistic val¬ prow of a ship; when high collars are all the
ues. Speaking broadly, it is characteristic of rage, he wears collars that come up to his
a standard set by a general body, that its ac¬ ears; when scientific lectures are fashionable,
ceptance by any one individual does not call you cannot find him anywhere else, etc., etc.
attention to him; in other words, a positive Thus he represents something distinctly indi¬
adoption of a given norm signifies nothing. vidual, which consists in the quantitative in¬
Whoever keeps the laws the breaking of tensification of such elements as are qualita¬
which is punished by the penal code, who¬ tively common property of the given set of
ever lives up to the social forms prescribed by class. He leads the way, but all travel the same
his class, gains no conspicuousness or noto¬ road. Representing as he does the most re¬
riety. The slightest infraction or opposition, cently conquered heights of public taste, he
however, is immediately noticed and places seems to be marching at the head of the gen¬
the individual in an exceptional position by eral procession. In reality, however, what is
calling the attention of the public to his ac¬ so frequently true of the relation between in¬
tion. All such norms do not assume positive dividuals and groups applies also to him: as
importance for the individual until he begins a matter of fact, the leader allows himself to
to depart from them. It is peculiarly charac¬ be led. . . . ♦
The Problem of Sociology 105
S ociety exists where a number of individu¬ ately concrete loci of all historical reality)—
drive, interest, purpose, inclination, psychic
als enter into interaction. This interaction al¬ state, movement—everything that is present
ways arises on the basis of certain drives or
in them in such a way as to engender or me¬
for the sake of certain purposes. Erotic, reli¬
diate effects upon others or to receive such
gious, or merely associative impulses; and
effects. In themselves, these materials which
purposes of defense, attack, play, gain, aid, or
fill life, these motivations which propel it, are
instruction—these and countless others
not social. Strictly speaking, neither hunger
cause man to live with other men, to act for
them, with them, against them, and thus to nor love, work nor religiosity, technology nor
the functions and results of intelligence, are
From On Individuality & Social Forms, by Georg Simmel, social. They are factors in sociation only
edited by Donald Levine. From the series The Heritage when they transform the mere aggregation of
of Sociology, edited by Morris Janowitz. Copyright ©
isolated individuals into specific forms of be¬
1971 by The University of Chicago. Reprinted from
“The Problem of Sociology,” translated by Kurt H.
ing with and for one another, forms that are
Wolff, in Georg Simmel, 1858-1918: A Collection of Es¬ subsumed under the general concept of inter¬
says, with Translations and a Bibliography, edited by Kurt action. Sociation is the form (realized in in¬
H. Wolff. Copyright 1959 by the Ohio State University numerably different ways) in which individu¬
Press. All rights reserved. Originally published in Ger¬
als grow together into a unity and within
man as “Das Problem der Soziologie,” in Soziologie
(Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1908). Re¬
which their interests are realized. And it is on
printed with permission of The University of Chicago the basis of their interests—sensuous or
Press. ideal, momentary or lasting, conscious or un-
106 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ IV. Georg Simmel
school as in a family. However diverse the thing as interaction “as such”—there are only
interests that give rise to these sociations, the specific kinds of interaction. And it is with
forms in which the interests are realized are their emergence that society too emerges, for
identical. On the other hand, the identical they are neither the cause nor the conse¬
interest may take on form in very different quence of society but are, themselves, society.
sociations. Economic interest is realized The fact that an extraordinary multitude and
both in competition and in the planned orga¬ variety of interactions operate at any one mo¬
nization of producers, in isolation from other ment has given a seemingly autonomous his¬
groups and in fusion with them. Although the torical reality to the general concept of soci¬
religious contents of life remain identical, at ety. Perhaps it is this hypostatization of a
one time they demand an unregulated, at an¬ mere abstraction that is the reason for the
other time a centralized, form of community. peculiar vagueness and uncertainty involved
The interests upon which the relations be¬ in the concept of society and in the custom¬
tween the sexes are based are satisfied by an ary treatises in general sociology. We are here
almost endless variety of family forms. The reminded of the fact that not much headway
educational interest may lead to a liberal or was made in formulating a concept of “life”
to a despotic relation between teacher and as long as it was conceived of as an immedi¬
pupil, to individualistic interaction between ately real and homogeneous phenomenon.
them, or to a more collectivistic type of inter¬ The science of life did not establish itself on
action between the teacher and the totality of a firm basis until it investigated specific pro¬
his pupils. Hence, not only may the form in cesses within organisms—processes whose
which the most widely different contents are sum or web life is; not until, in other words,
realized be identical, but a content too may it recognized that life consists of these par¬
persist while its medium—the interactions of ticular processes.
the individuals—moves in a variety of forms. Only if we follow the conception here out¬
We see, then, that the analysis in terms of lined can we grasp what in “society” really is
form and content transforms the facts— society. Similarly, it is only geometry that de¬
which in their immediacy present form and termines what the spatiality of things in
content as an indissoluble unity of social space really is. Sociology, the discipline that
life—in such a way as to furnish the legitima¬ deals with the purely social aspects of man
tion of the sociological problem. This prob¬ (who, of course, can be an object of scientific
lem demands that the pure forms of sociation inquiry in innumerable other respects), is re¬
be identified, ordered systematically, ex¬ lated to the other special science of man as
plained psychologically, and studied from geometry is related to the physicochemi¬
the standpoint of their historical develop¬ cal sciences. Geometry studies the forms
ment. . . . through which any material becomes an em¬
This conception of society implies a fur¬ pirical body, and these forms as such exist, of
ther proposition: A given number of individu¬ course, in abstraction only, precisely like the
als may be a society to a greater or a smaller forms of sociation. Both geometry and soci¬
degree. With each formation of parties, with ology leave to other sciences the investigation
each joining for common tasks or in a com¬ of the contents realized in the forms, that is,
mon feeling or way of thinking, with each the total phenomena whose forms they ex¬
articulation of the distribution of positions of plore.
submission and domination, with each com¬ It is hardly necessary to point out that this
mon meal, with each self-adornment for oth¬ analogy with geometry does not go beyond
ers—with every growth of new synthesizing the clarification of the fundamental problem
phenomena such as these, the same group of sociology. It was only in attempting this
becomes “more society” than it was before. clarification that we made use of this analogy.
There is no such thing as society “as such”; Above all, geometry has the advantage of hav¬
that is, there is no society in the sense that it ing at its disposal extremely simple struc¬
is the condition for the emergence of all these tures into which it can resolve the more com¬
particular phenomena. For there is no such plicated figures. Geometry can construe the
108 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ IV. Georg Simmel
whole range of possible formations from a the particular character of its object; by what
relatively few fundamental definitions. Not contemporaneous formal and material fea¬
even a remotely similar resolution into sim¬ tures of a society it is increased or reduced;
ple elements is to be hoped for in the foresee¬ and how competition between individuals
able future as regards the forms of sociation. differs from that between groups. In short,
Sociological forms, if they are to be even ap¬ we must ascertain what competition is as a
proximately definite, can apply only to a lim¬ form of relation among individuals. This
ited range of phenomena. Even if we say, for form may involve all sorts of contents. But in
instance, that superordination and subordi¬ spite of the great variety of these contents, the
nation are forms found in almost every hu¬ form maintains its own identity and proves
man sociation, we gain very little from this that it belongs to a sphere which is governed
general knowledge. What is needed is the by its own laws and which may legitimately
study of specific kinds of superordination be abstracted from other spheres or from to¬
and subordination, and of the specific forms tal reality. What we are suggesting, in brief,
in which they are realized. Through such a is that similar elements be singled out of the
study, of course, these forms would lose in complex phenomena so as to secure a cross-
applicability what they would gain in defini¬ section, whereby dissimilar elements—in our
teness. case the contents—reciprocally paralyze
In our day, we are used to asking of every each other, as it were.
science whether it is devoted to the discovery We have to proceed in this fashion with
of timelessly valid laws or to the presentation respect to all the great situations and inter¬
and conceptualization of real, unique histori¬ actions that form society—the formation of
cal processes. Generally, this alternative ig¬ parties; imitation; the formation of classes
nores innumerable intermediate phenomena and circles; secondary subdivisions; the em¬
dealt with in the actual practice of science. It bodiment of types of social interaction in spe¬
is irrelevant to our conception of the problem cial structures of an objective, personal, or
of sociology because this conception renders ideal nature; the growth and the role of hier¬
a choice between the two answers unneces¬ archies; the representation of groups by indi¬
sary. For, on the one hand, in sociology the viduals; the bearing of common hostility on
object abstracted from reality may be exam¬ the inner solidarity of the group. In addition
ined in regard to laws entirely inhering in the to such major problems, there are others
objective nature of the elements. These laws which no less regularly involve the form of
must be sharply distinguished from any the group and which are either more special¬
spatiotemporal realization; they are valid ized or more complex than these. Among the
whether the historical actualities enforce more specialized questions, there are those
them once or a thousand times. On the other such as the significance of the non-partisan,
hand, the forms of sociation may be exam¬ the role of the poor as organic members of
ined, with equal validity, in regard to their society, the numerical determination of
occurrence at specific places and at specific group elements, and the phenomena of pri¬
times, and in regard to their historical devel¬ mus inter pares and tertius gaudens. Among
opment in specific groups. In this latter case, more complex processes are the intersection
ascertaining them would be in the service of of various social circles in the individual; the
history, so to speak; in the former case, it special significance of the secret for the for¬
would provide material for the induction of mation of groups; the modification of the
timeless uniformities. About competition, for character of groups by a membership com¬
instance, we learn something from a great posed of individuals who belong together
many fields—political science, economics, geographically, or by the addition of elements
history of religion, history of art, and so on. who do not; and innumerable other pro¬
The point is to ascertain from all the facts cesses.
what competition is as a pure form of human In this whole discussion, as I have already
behavior; under what circumstances it indicated, I waive the question of whether
emerges and develops; how it is modified by there ever occurs an absolute identity of
The Problem of Sociology 109
forms along with a difference in content. The of our complex fact which is, after all, real
approximate identity that forms exhibit un¬ only along with all its contents. In other
der materially dissimilar circumstances (and words, there is no sure method for answering
vice versa) is enough to conceive, in princi¬ the question of what purely sociological con¬
ple, of an affirmative answer to this question. figurations and what specific interactions of
The fact that absolute identity is not actually individuals (irrespective of the interests and
realized shows the difference between his¬ impulses residing in the individual, and of
torical-psychological and geometrical phe¬ purely objective conditions) are involved in
nomena. Historical-psychological processes, the historical process. On the contrary, all
in their fluctuations and complexities, can this can be interpreted in more than one way
never be completely rationalized. Geometry, and, furthermore, the historical facts that at¬
by contrast, does have the power to isolate test to reality of the specific sociological
absolutely pure forms out of their material forms must be presented in their material
realizations. It should always be remem¬ totality. In brief, there is no means of teaching
bered that this identity of the kinds of inter¬ and, under certain conditions, even of per¬
action in the face of the simultaneously exist¬ forming, the analysis of form and content
ing variety of human or objective material into sociological elements. The case is com¬
(and vice versa) is nothing primarily but a parable to the proof of a geometrical theorem
device to make and legitimate the scientific by means of figures drawn in the unavoidably
discrimination between form and content in accidental and crude way of all drawings. The
the treatment of empirical phenomena. mathematician can feel quite safe in assum¬
Methodologically speaking, this discrimina¬ ing that, in spite of the imperfect drawing, the
tion would be required even if the actual con¬ concept of the ideal geometrical figure is
stellations did not call for the inductive pro¬ known and understood, and that it is re¬
cedure of crystallizing the like out of the un¬ garded as the essential significance of the
like. In the same way, the geometrical ab¬ chalk or ink marks. The sociologist, however,
straction of the spatial form of a body would may not make the corresponding assump¬
be justified even if a body with such a particu¬ tion; the isolation of truly pure sociation out
lar form occurred only once empirically. of the complex total phenomenon cannot be
It cannot be denied, however, that this dis¬ forced by logical means.
cussion suggests a difficulty in methodology. Here we must take upon ourselves the
For instance, toward the end of the Middle odium of talking about intuitive procedures
Ages, extended trade relations forced certain (however far these are removed from specu¬
guild masters to employ apprentices and to lative, metaphysical intuition). We admit that
adopt new ways of obtaining materials and we are discussing a particular viewpoint that
attracting customers. All of this was inconsis¬ helps to make the distinction between form
tent with traditional guild principles, accord¬ and content. This viewpoint, for the time be¬
ing to which every master was to have the ing, can be conveyed only by means of exam¬
same living as every other. Through these in¬ ples. Only much later may it be possible to
novations, every master sought to place him¬ grasp it by methods that are fully conceptu¬
self outside this traditional narrow unity. alized and are sure guides to research. The
Now, what about the purely sociological form difficulty is increased by two factors. Not
which is abstracted from the special content only is there no perfectly clear technique for
of this whole process? The process seems to applying the fundamental sociological con¬
indicate that the expansion of the circle with cept itself (that is, the concept of sociation),
which the individual is connected through but, in addition, where this concept can be
his actions is accompanied by a greater ar¬ effectively applied, there are still many ele¬
ticulation of individuality, an expansion of ments in the phenomena to be studied whose
the freedom of the individual, and a greater subsumption under the concept or form and
differentiation of the members of the circle. content remains arbitrary. There will be con¬
Yet, as far as I can see, there is no sure method trary opinions, for instance, concerning the
of distilling this sociological significance out extent to which the phenomenon of the poor
110 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ IV. Georg Simmel
is a matter of form or content; the extent to number of different viewpoints and thereby
which it is a result of formal relations within make it into a plurality of mutually inde¬
the group, a result which is determined by pendent scientific subject matters. This ap¬
general currents and shifts that are the nec¬ plies, too, to those psychological phenomena
essary outcome of contacts among human whose contents fail to combine into an
beings; or the extent to which poverty is to be autonomous spatial world and which are not
regarded as a merely material characteristic strikingly set apart from their psychic reality.
of certain individuals, a characteristic that Language, for instance, is certainly con¬
must be studied exclusively from the view¬ structed out of psychological forces and for
point of economic interests (that is, as re¬ psychological purposes. But its forms and
gards its content). . . . laws are treated by the science of linguistics
To this extent, any history or description with complete neglect of the realization (a
of a social situation is an exercise of psycho¬ realization which alone is given) that this
logical knowledge. But it is of extreme meth¬ is the object; they are treated exclusively
odological relevance even of decisive impor¬ through the presentation and analysis of the
tance to the principles of human studies in construction of the content and the forms
general to note that the scientific treatment that result from it.
of psychic data is not thereby automatically The facts of sociation offer a similar pic¬
psychological. Even where we constantly use ture. That people influence one another—
psychological rules and knowledge, even that an individual does something, suffers
where the explanation of every single fact is something, shows his existence or his devel¬
possible only psychologically (as is true in opment because there are others who express
sociology), the sense and intent of our activi¬ themselves, act, or feel—is, of course, a psy¬
ties do not have to be psychological. They do chological phenomenon. And the only way to
not have to aim, that is, at an understanding grasp the historical emergence of each par¬
of the law of the psychic process itself (which, ticular instance of this general phenomenon
to be sure, has its content), but can aim rather is to re-create it psychologically, to construct
at this content and its configurations. There plausible psychological series, to interpret
is only a difference in degree between the the externally observable by means of psy¬
studies of man and the sciences of external chological categories. Yet from the particular
nature. After all, the natural sciences too, in¬ scientific viewpoint conceived by the notion
asmuch as they are phenomena of the intel¬ of sociation, this psychological phenomenon
lectual life, have their locus in the mind. The as such may be entirely ignored, and atten¬
discovery of every astronomical or chemical tion may be focused rather upon tracing, ana¬
truth, as well as the rethinking of each of lyzing, and connecting its contents. Suppose,
them, is an event occurring in consciousness, for example, that it is noted that the relation
an event which a perfect psychology could of a stronger to a weaker individual, which
deduce without residue from physical condi¬ has the form of primus inter pares, tends to
tions and developments alone. The proce¬ lead to a possession of absolute power by the
dure followed by the natural sciences in stronger party and a gradual elimination of
choosing the contents and interrelations of any elements of equality. This, in terms of
psychological processes—rather than the historical reality, is certainly a psychological
processes themselves—for their subject mat¬ process. Yet from the sociological viewpoint,
ter is similar to the procedure which deter¬ we are interested only in such questions as:
mines the significance of a painting from its How do the various phases of superordina¬
aesthetic relevance and from its place in the tion and subordination follow one another?
history of art, rather than from the physical To what extent is superordination in a given
oscillations which produce its colors and relation compatible with co-ordination in
which constitute and carry its whole, actual other relations? How much superordination
existence. There is always one reality and we is required in the initial phase of the relation
cannot grasp it scientifically in its immediacy to destroy co-ordination completely? Has
and wholeness but must consider it from a combination or co-operation a greater chance
The Problem of Sociology 111
tenance of an ideal, wholly unpolitical pan- the significance of conflict consists in the ar¬
Hellenism. ticulation of the latent relationship and unity;
For the direction taken by the relationship conflict is more the occasion of unifications
under discussion, historical cases are so close which are required internally than it is the
at hand that the only point worth insisting purpose of these unifications. To be sure,
upon is the observation of the degrees of uni¬ within the collective interest in conflict, there
fication which are possible through conflict. is a further gradation, namely, according to
Uppermost is the establishment of the uni¬ whether the unification for the purpose of
fied state. Essentially, France owes the con¬ conflict refers to attack and defense or to de¬
sciousness of its national unity only to its fense only. Unification for the exclusive pur¬
fight against the English, and only the Moor¬ pose of defense probably occurs in most coa¬
ish war made the Spanish regions into one litions of extant groups, especially when the
people. The next lower grade of unification is groups are numerous and heterogeneous.
constituted by confederacies and federations This defense purpose is the collectivistic
of states, with additional numerous grada¬ minimum, because even for the single group
tions according to their cohesion and the and the single individual it constitutes the
measure of power of their central authorities. least avoidable test of the drive for self-pres¬
The United States needed the War of Inde¬ ervation. Evidently, the more numerous and
pendence; Switzerland, the fight against Aus¬ varied are the elements which associate, the
tria; the Netherlands, rebellion against smaller is the number of interests in which
Spain; the Achaean League, the struggle they coincide—in the extreme case, the num¬
against Macedonia; and the founding of the ber is reduced to the most primitive urge, the
new German Empire furnishes a parallel to defense of ones existence. Thus, in reply to
all of these instances. the entrepreneurs’ fear that all English trade
Here also belongs the formation of unified unions might unite one day, one of their most
estates. The element of conflict (latent and ardent adherers pointed out that even if it
open contrasts) is of such evident signifi¬ came to that, it could only be for purposes of
cance for them that I only mention a negative defense.
example. The fact that Russia has no proper In comparison with these cases in which
aristocracy as a closed estate would seem to the collectivizing effect of conflict transcends
be bound to favor the broad and unrestrained the moment and the immediate purpose of
development of a bourgeoisie. In reality, the the group (and this may happen even in re¬
opposite is the case. If, as elsewhere, there gard to the minimum just mentioned), the
had been a powerful aristocracy, it certainly extent of this effect is slighter when the uni¬
would have put itself in frequent opposition fication occurs only ad hoc. Two types must
to the prince, who in turn would have de¬ be distinguished here. On the one hand, there
pended upon an urban bourgeoisie. Evi¬ is association for a single action. Frequently,
dently, among the princes such a conflict situ¬ especially in wars properly speaking, this
ation would have aroused an interest in de¬ claims the total energies of its elements. It
veloping a unified bourgeois class. The bour¬ creates a unit without residue; but after
geois themselves found no militant stimulus achieving or failing to achieve its immediate
(in this case, no stimulus at all) to close ranks objective, this unit lets its parts go back to
as an estate. If they had, they could have their former separate existence—as, for in¬
gained from the conflict by joining one or the stance, did the Greeks after eliminating the
other side. danger from the Persians. In the second type,
In all positive cases of this type, it is char¬ the unity is less complete but also less transi¬
acteristic that the unity, while it originates in tory. Here, the elements are grouped around
conflict and for purposes of conflict, main¬ a war aim which is singular, not so much in
tains itself beyond the period of struggle. It terms of time as in terms of content, and
comes to have additional interests and asso¬ which does not cause any contact among
ciative forces which no longer have any rela¬ them other than in this one respect. Thus
tion to the initial militant purpose. In fact, there has been in England a Federation of
114 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ IV. Georg Simmel
Associated Employers of Labour, founded in ficient for one of the internal parties to in¬
1873 to fight the influence of trade unions; crease its hostility to Spain or England, Sa¬
and a few years later, a similar association voy or the Netherlands, and the other at once
was formed in the United States in order to joined this foreign power—without regard to
counteract strikes, no matter in what branch the harmony or disharmony between that
of industry. power and its own positive aims. These par¬
The character of both types of unification ties in France, however, had very concrete
appears of course most pointed when it is goals and only needed “room/' freedom from
composed of elements who at other times or the opponent. They were thus ready to join
in respects other than the one at issue are not up with any opponent of that opponent if
only indifferent but hostile toward one an¬ only he had the same intention, in utter dis¬
other. The unifying power of the principle of regard of their usual relations with him. The
conflict nowhere emerges more strongly than more purely negative or destructive a given
when it manages to carve a temporal or con- enmity is, the more easily will it bring about
tentual area out of competitive or hostile re¬ a unification of those who ordinarily have no
lationships. Under certain circumstances, motive for any community.
the contrast between ordinary antagonism The lowest step in this scale of unifications
and momentary association for purposes of on the basis of conflict, their least acute form,
fight can be so pointed that it is precisely the is constituted by associations which are held
depth of the mutual hostility of the parties together only by a common mood. In such
which forms the direct cause of their joining cases, members know that they belong to¬
up. In the English parliament, the Opposition gether in so far as they have a similar aver¬
has sometimes been formed when the ex¬ sion or similar practical interest against a
treme partisans of the ministerial policy were third party. This interest, however, does not
not satisfied with the administration and necessarily lead to a common aggression
joined their radical opponents with whom against that party. Here too, two types must
they were connected by the common antago¬ be distinguished. The first is illustrated by the
nism against the ministry. For instance, un¬ opposition between masses of workers and
der Pulteney, the Ultra-Whigs united with the few employers in large-scale industry. In the
High-Tories against Robert Walpole. It was struggle for working conditions, this situ¬
precisely the radicalism of the principle of ation evidently produces not only particular,
enmity against the Tories which united its really effective coalitions among the labor¬
adherents with the Tories: had their anti-To¬ ers, but also the quite general feeling that
ryism not been so fundamental, they would they all belong together somehow because
not have joined their enemies in order to they all are united in the basically identical
bring about the fall of the Whig minister who struggle against the employers. To be sure, at
for them was not Whiggish enough. certain points this feeling is crystallized in
This case is so extreme because the com¬ particular actions of political party forma¬
mon adversary brings otherwise mutual ene¬ tion or wage struggles. Yet as a whole, it can
mies together; in the view of each of these by its own nature not become practical. It
enemies, he, their common adversary, leans remains the mood of an abstract belonging-
too much toward the other side. But this ex¬ together by virtue of common opposition to
treme case is only the purest example of the an abstract adversary. Here, then, the feeling
trivial experience that even the bitterest en¬ of unity is abstract but lasting.
mities do not prevent an association if this In the second type, it is concrete but tem¬
association is directed against a common en¬ porary. This second type is exemplified when
emy. This is particularly true if both or at least persons who are not acquainted with each
one of the parties now cooperating has very other but who share the same level of educa¬
concrete and immediate goals, and all that is tion or sensitivity, find themselves together,
needed to attain them is the removal of par¬ perhaps in a railroad car or under similar
ticular adversaries. French history from the circumstances, with others of crude and vul¬
Huguenots to Richelieu shows that it was suf¬ gar behavior. Without any scene, without so
Conflict as the Basis of Group Formation 115
much as exchanging a word or glance with image the object of which is in any sense rep¬
each other, they still feel like a party, held resented as "distant" seems almost always to
together by their common aversion to the vul¬ have a more impersonal effect. If accompa¬
garity (which is aggressive at least in the ideal nied by such a representation, the individual
sense) of those others. This unification, with reaction following from immediate closeness
its extremely tender and delicate, though and touch is less poignant, has a less imme¬
wholly unambiguous character, marks the diately subjective character, and thus can be
extreme on the scale of unifications of com¬ the same for a larger number of individuals.
pletely alien elements through a common an¬ The general concept which covers a number
tagonism. of particulars is the more abstract (that is, the
The synthetic strength of a common oppo¬ more distant from each of the particulars),
sition may be determined, not by the number the more numerous and different from each
of shared points of interest, but by the dura¬ other these particulars are. Just so, a point of
tion and intensity of the unification. In this social unification at a greater distance from
case, it is especially favorable to the unifica¬ the elements to be unified (both in a spatial
tion if instead of an actual fight with the en¬ and in a figurative sense) likewise appears to
emy, there is a permanent threat by him. In have specifically unifying and comprehen¬
regard to the first period of the Achaean sive effects. Unification by a more chronic
League, that is, around 270 B.C., it is empha¬ than acute danger, by an always latent but
sized that Achaea was surrounded by ene¬ never exploding conflict, will be most effec¬
mies, all of whom, however, had something tive where the problem is the lasting unifica¬
else to do than attack it. It is said that such a tion of somehow divergent elements. This
period of danger which always threatened was true of the Achaean League I already
but never materialized, was especially apt to mentioned. In the same vein, Montesquieu
strengthen the feeling of unity. remarks that while peace and confidence are
This is a case of a peculiar type: a certain the glory and security of monarchies, repub¬
distance between the elements to be united, lics need somebody they fear. This observa¬
on the one hand, and the point and interest tion is apparently based on a feeling for the
uniting them, on the other, is a particularly constellation discussed. Monarchy itself sees
favorable constellation for unification, nota¬ to it that possibly antagonistic elements are
bly in large groups. Religious relations are a held together. But when such elements have
case in point. In contrast to tribal and na¬ nobody above them to enforce their unity but
tional deities, the world-spanning God of instead enjoy relative sovereignty, they will
Christianity has an infinite distance from the easily break apart unless a danger shared by
believers. He is entirely without features re¬ all forces them together. Evidently, such a
lated to the specific character of the individ¬ danger can last and can guarantee a perma¬
ual. In compensation, however, he can com¬ nent group structure only by a permanent
prise even the most heterogeneous peoples threat of conflict, rather than through a sin¬
and personalities in an incomparable reli¬ gle, open fight.
gious community. Another illustration: dress While this is more a question of degree, the
always characterizes certain social strata as basic connection between collectivity and
belonging together; and it seems to fulfill this hostility requires the following additional
social function best when it is imported from comments. From their very origin, aggres¬
abroad. To dress as one dresses in Paris, sive, much more than peaceful, enterprises
means to have a close and exclusive associa¬ tend to solicit the cooperation of the largest
tion with a certain social stratum in other possible number of elements which would
countries—already the prophet Zephaniah otherwise remain scattered and would not
speaks of noblemen as wearing foreign have started action on their own account. On
clothes. the whole, people engaging in peaceful ac¬
The very manifold meanings connoted by tions usually limit themselves to those who
the symbol ''distance" have much psychologi¬ are close to them in other respects as well.
cal affinity with one another. For instance, an For "allies," however—and linguistic usage
116 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ IV. Georg Simmel
has indeed given a warlike color to this intrin¬ motive of the easy reciprocal stimulation of
sically neutral concept—one often enough hostility. Even within a group which feuds
accepts elements with whom one hardly has, with another, all kinds of latent or half-for¬
or even wants to have, anything in common. gotten hostilities of its members against
There are several reasons for this. First, war, those of the other group come to the fore. In
and not only political war, often constitutes this way, war between two groups usually
an emergency in which one cannot be choosy evokes in a third group much ill will and re¬
about friends. Secondly, the object of the ac¬ sentment against one of the two. By them¬
tion lies outside the territory or periphery of selves, these feelings would not have led to an
the allies' other immediate interests, so that outbreak but now that another group has led
after the fight is over they can return to their the way, as it were, they cause the third group
earlier distance. Thirdly, while gain by means to join it in its action. It is quite in line with
of fight is dangerous, if the fight is successful, this that in general, convergent relations
the gain usually is quick and intensive. Hence among peoples as wholes, especially in earlier
for certain elements, it has a formal attrac¬ times, existed only for purposes of war, while
tion which peaceful enterprises can engender other relations, such as trade and commerce,
only through a particular content. Fourthly, hospitality, and intermarriage, only con¬
in conflict, the specifically personal element cerned individuals. Agreements between the
in the fighter recedes; and thus the unifica¬ peoples made these individual relationships
tion of otherwise wholly heterogeneous ele¬ possible, but did not themselves initiate
ments is possible. Finally must be noted the them. ♦
The Stranger 117
of his activity, he settles down there. In innu¬ ference and involvement. I refer to my analy¬
merable cases even this is possible only if he sis of the dominating positions gained by ali¬
can live by trade as a middleman. Any closed ens, in the discussion of superordination and
economic group where land and handicrafts subordination,1 typified by the practice in
have been apportioned in a way that satisfies certain Italian cities of recruiting their judges
local demands will still support a livelihood from outside, because no native was free
for the trader. For trade alone makes possible from entanglement in family interests and
unlimited combinations, and through it in¬ factionalism.
telligence is constantly extended and applied Connected with the characteristic of ob¬
in new areas, something that is much harder jectivity is a phenomenon that is found
for the primary producer with his more lim¬ chiefly, though not exclusively, in the stranger
ited mobility and his dependence on a circle who moves on. This is that he often receives
of customers that can be expanded only very the most surprising revelations and confi¬
slowly. Trade can always absorb more men dences, at times reminiscent of a confes¬
than can primary production. It is therefore sional, about matters which are kept care¬
the most suitable activity for the stranger, fully hidden from everybody with whom one
who intrudes as a supernumerary, so to is close. Objectivity is by no means nonpar¬
speak, into a group in which all the economic ticipation, a condition that is altogether out¬
positions are already occupied. The classic side the distinction between subjective and
example of this is the history of European objective orientations. It is rather a positive
Jews. The stranger is by his very nature no and definite kind of participation, in the
owner of land—land not only in the physical same way that the objectivity of a theoretical
sense but also metaphorically as a vital sub¬ observation clearly does not mean that the
stance which is fixed, if not in space, then at mind is a passive tabula rasa on which things
least in an ideal position within the social inscribe their qualities, but rather signifies
environment. the full activity of a mind working according
Although in the sphere of intimate per¬ to its own laws, under conditions that ex¬
sonal relations the stranger may be attractive clude accidental distortions and emphases
and meaningful in many ways, so long as he whose individual and subjective differences
is regarded as a stranger he is no “landowner" would produce quite different pictures of the
in the eyes of the other. Restriction to inter¬ same object.
mediary trade and often (as though subli¬ Objectivity can also be defined as freedom.
mated from it) to pure finance gives the The objective man is not bound by ties which
stranger the specific character of mobility. could prejudice his perception, his under¬
The appearance of this mobility within a standing, and his assessment of data. This
bounded group occasions that synthesis of freedom, which permits the stranger to expe¬
nearness and remoteness which constitutes rience and treat even his close relationships
the formal position of the stranger. The as though from a bird's-eye view, contains
purely mobile person comes incidentally into many dangerous possibilities. From earliest
contact with every single element but is not times, in uprisings of all sorts the attacked
bound up organically, through established party has claimed that there has been incite¬
ties of kinship, locality, or occupation, with ment from the outside, by foreign emissaries
any single one. and agitators. Insofar as this has happened,
Another expression of this constellation is it represents an exaggeration of the specific
to be found in the objectivity of the stranger. role of the stranger: he is the freer man, prac¬
Because he is not bound by roots to the par¬ tically and theoretically; he examines condi¬
ticular constituents and partisan dispositions tions with less prejudice; he assesses them
of the group, he confronts all of these with a against standards that are more general and
distinctly “objective” attitude, an attitude more objective; and his actions are not con¬
that does not signify mere detachment and fined by custom, piety, or precedent.2
nonparticipation, but is a distinct structure Finally, the proportion of nearness and re¬
composed of remoteness and nearness, indif¬ moteness which gives the stranger the char-
The Stranger 119
acter of objectivity also finds practical ex¬ beyond him and us, and connect us only be¬
pression in the more abstract nature of the cause they connect a great many people.
relation to him. That is, with the stranger one A trace of strangeness in this sense easily
has only certain more general qualities in enters even the most intimate relationships.
common, whereas the relation with organi¬ In the stage of first passion, erotic relations
cally connected persons is based on the simi¬ strongly reject any thought of generalization.
larity of just those specific traits which differ¬ A love such as this has never existed before;
entiate them from the merely universal. In there is nothing to compare either with the
fact, all personal relations whatsoever can be person one loves or with our feelings for that
analyzed in terms of this scheme. They are person. An estrangement is wont to set in
not determined only by the existence of cer¬ (whether as cause or effect is hard to decide)
tain common characteristics which the indi¬ at the moment when this feeling of unique¬
viduals share in addition to their individual ness disappears from the relationship. A
differences, which either influence the rela¬ skepticism regarding the intrinsic value of
tionship or remain outside of it. Rather, the the relationship and its value for us adheres
kind of effect which that commonality has on to the very thought that in this relation, after
the relation essentially depends on whether all, one is only fulfilling a general human des¬
it exists only among the participants them¬ tiny, that one has had an experience that has
selves, and thus, although general within the occurred a thousand times before, and that,
relation, is specific and incomparable with if one had not accidentally met this precise
person, someone else would have acquired
respect to all those on the outside, or whether
the same meaning for us.
the participants feel that what they have in
Something of this feeling is probably not
common is so only because it is common to
absent in any relation, be it ever so close,
a group, a type, or mankind in general. In the
because that which is common to two is per¬
latter case, the effect of the common features
haps never common only to them but belongs
becomes attenuated in proportion to the size
to a general conception which includes much
of the group bearing the same charac¬
else besides, many possibilities of similari¬
teristics. The commonality provides a basis
ties. No matter how few of these possibilities
for unifying the members, to be sure; but it
are realize and how often we may forget
does not specifically direct these particular about them, here and there, nevertheless,
persons to one another. A similarity so widely they crowd in like shadows between men, like
shared could just as easily unite each person a mist eluding every designation, which must
with every possible other. This, too, is evi¬ congeal into solid corporeality for it to be
dently a way in which a relationship includes called jealousy. Perhaps this is in many cases
both nearness and remoteness simultane¬ a more general, at least more insurmount¬
ously. To the extent to which the similarities able, strangeness than that due to differences
assume a universal nature, the warmth of the and obscurities. It is strangeness caused by
connection based on them will acquire an the fact that similarity, harmony, and close¬
element of coolness, a sense of the contingent ness are accompanied by the feeling that they
nature of precisely this relation—the con¬ are actually not the exclusive property of this
necting forces have lost their specific, cen¬ particular relation, but stem from a more
tripetal character. general one—a relation that potentially in¬
In relation to the stranger, it seems to me, cludes us and an indeterminate number of
this constellation assumes an extraordinary others, and therefore prevents that relation
preponderance in principle over the individ¬ which alone was experienced from having an
ual elements peculiar to the relation in ques¬ inner and exclusive necessity.
tion. The stranger is close to us insofar as we On the other hand, there is a sort of
feel between him and ourselves similarities “strangeness" in which this very connection
of nationality or social position, of occupa¬ on the basis of a general quality embracing
tion or of general human nature. He is far the parties is precluded. The relation of the
from us insofar as these similarities extend Greeks to the barbarians is a typical example;
120 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ IV. Georg Simmel
so are all the cases in which the general char¬ the fluctuations of his fortune. But the Jew as
acteristics one takes as peculiarly and merely taxpayer was first of all a Jew, and thus his
human are disallowed to the other. But here fiscal position contained an invariable ele¬
the expression “the stranger ’ no longer has ment. This appears most forcefully, of course,
any positive meaning. The relation with him once the differing circumstances of individ¬
is a non-relation; he is not what we have been ual Jews are no longer considered, limited
discussing here: the stranger as a member of though this consideration is by fixed assess¬
the group itself. ments, and all strangers pay exactly the same
As such, the stranger is near and far at the head tax.
same time, as in any relationship based on Despite his being inorganically appended
merely universal human similarities. Be¬ to it, the stranger is still an organic member
tween these two factors of nearness and dis¬ of the group. Its unified life includes the spe¬
tance, however, a peculiar tension arises, cific conditioning of this element. Only we do
since the consciousness of having only the not know how to designate the characteristic
absolutely general in common has exactly the unity of this position otherwise than by say¬
effect of putting a special emphasis on that ing that it is put together of certain amounts
which is not common. For a stranger to the of nearness and of remoteness. Although
country, the city, the race, and so on, what is both these qualities are found to some extent
stressed is again nothing individual, but alien in all relationships, a special proportion and
origin, a quality which he has, or could have, reciprocal tension between them produce the
in common with many other strangers. For specific form of the relation to the “stranger/'
this reason strangers are not really perceived
as individuals, but as strangers of a certain
Endnotes
type. Their remoteness is no less general than
their nearness.
1. Simmel refers here to a passage which may
This form appears, for example, in so spe¬
be found in The Sociology of Georg Simmel,
cial a case as the tax levied on Jews in Frank¬
pp. 216-21.
furt and elsewhere during the Middle Ages.
Whereas the tax paid by Christian citizens 2. Where the attacked parties make such an as¬
varied according to their wealth at any given sertion falsely, they do so because those in
time, for every single Jew the tax was fixed higher positions tend to exculpate inferiors
who previously have been in a close, solidary
once and for all. This amount was fixed be¬
relationship with them. By introducing the
cause the Jew had his social position as a Jew,
fiction that the rebels were not really guilty,
not as the bearer of certain objective con¬ but only instigated, so they did not actually
tents. With respect to taxes every other citi¬ start the rebellion, they exonerate themselves
zen was regarded as possessor of a certain by denying that there were any real grounds
amount of wealth, and his tax could follow for the uprising. ♦
Flirtation 121
play of her physical attractions. In spite of all distance and reserve are in fact maintained
this, she can still be quite different from the at the same time, but rather because it incar¬
flirt. This is because the distinctiveness of the nates concession and withdrawal in the play¬
flirt lies in the fact that she awakens delight ful rhythm of constant alternation. If flirta¬
and desire by means of a unique antithesis tion extends beyond the movements and the
and synthesis: through the alternation or si¬ expression of its own subject, that is only a
multaneity of accommodation and denial; by technical modification of this simultaneity of
a symbolic, allusive assent and dissent, acting implicit consent and refusal. Flirtation is
"as if from a remote distance"; or, platonically fond of utilizing what might be called extra¬
expressed, through placing having and not- neous objects: dogs, flowers, children. On the
having in a state of polar tension even as she one hand, this diverts attention away from
seems to make them felt concurrently. In the the person for whom the flirtation is in¬
behavior of the flirt, the man feels the prox¬ tended. On the other hand, this very diversion
imity and interpenetration of the ability and makes it clear to him how enviable the appar¬
the inability to acquire something. This is the ent object is. It is a way of saying: "It is not
essence of "price." With that twist that turns you that interests me, but rather these things
value into the epigone of price, flirtation here." And yet at the same time: "This is a
makes this acquisition seem valuable and de¬ game I'm playing for your benefit. It is be¬
sirable. The essence of flirtation, expressed cause of my interest in you that I turn to these
with paradoxical brevity, is this: Where love other things."
is present, having and not-having are also If we want to fix the polar coordinates of
present, whether in its fundament or in its flirtation conceptually, it exhibits three pos¬
external aspect. And thus where having and sible syntheses. Flirtation as flattery: "Al¬
not-having are present—even if not in reality though you might indeed be able to conquer
but only in play-love, or something that fills me, I won't allow myself to be conquered."
its place, is also present. Flirtation as contempt: "Although I would ac¬
I shall apply this interpretation of flirta¬ tually allow myself to be conquered, you
tion first to some observations of experience. aren't able to do it." Flirtation as provocation:
A sidelong glance with the head half-turned "Perhaps you can conquer me, perhaps not—
is characteristic of flirtation in its most banal try it!" This movement between having and
guise. A hint of aversion lies in this gesture; not-having—or, rather, this symbolic inter¬
but at the same time it connotes fleeting sub¬ penetration of the two—clearly expresses the
mission, a momentary focusing of attention woman's focus of her attention on a man dif¬
on the other person, who in the same mo¬ ferent from the one she really has in mind.
ment is symbolically rebuffed by the inclina¬ This is not so brutally simple a matter as jeal¬
tion of the body and the head. Physiologi¬ ousy. Jealousy has a different locus, and when
cally, this glance cannot last longer than a few it is unconditionally provoked in order to in¬
seconds, so that the withdrawal of the glance tensify the desire for either acquisition or
is already prefigured as something unavoid¬ possession into a passion, it no longer falls in
able in tbe glance itself. It has the charm of the category of flirtation. On the contrary,
secrecy and furtiveness that cannot persist, flirtation must make the person for whom it
and for this reason consent and refusal are is intended feel the variable interplay be¬
inseparably combined in it. tween consent and refusal; the unwillingness
The full face-to-face glance, no matter how to submit oneself that could be an indirect
penetrating and compelling it may be, never way to self-surrender; the surrender of the
has this distinctive quality of flirtation. The self behind which the withdrawal of the self
swinging and swaying movement of the hips, stands, as a background, a possibility, and a
the "strutting" walk, lies in the same category threat.
of flirtatious effects. It is not merely because Every conclusive decision brings flirtation
this gait palpably stresses these effects to an end. The sovereign peak of its art is
through the motion of the parts of the body exhibited in its apparent approximation to a
that generate sexual excitement, even though definitive condition, while at every moment
Flirtation 123
balancing this condition by its opposite. all ornament: first, only to make the orna¬
When a woman flirts “with” one man in order mented entity more noticeable; and then to
to flirt with another who is the actual object make this entity appear valuable and attrac¬
of her intentions, the double meaning of the tive, to appear eminently worthy of attention,
word “with” is profoundly revealed. On the as well.
one hand, it refers to an instrument; on the However, this ornament, like the orna¬
other hand, to the member of a correlation, mentation of the body in general, can fulfill
as if we could not make a person into a mere this function only insofar as it also conceals.
means without this functioning in a recipro¬ Because of this coincidence, the moment of
cal and retroactive fashion as well. flirtation is given with the primitive form of
Finally, a certain fact—whose primary sig¬ attire: Here refusal and the withdrawal of the
nificance is physical, even though it has a self are fused with the phenomenon of draw¬
psychic significance as well—perhaps dem¬ ing attention to the self and presenting the
onstrates the most direct coincidence of con¬ self in one indivisible act. By ornamenting
sent and refusal, which have equally legiti¬ ourselves or a part of ourselves, we conceal
mate places in the coloration of flirtation: the what is adorned. And by concealing it, we
fact of “semi-concealment.” Under this head¬ draw attention to it and its attractions. This
ing I understand all those internal and exter¬ could be called an optical necessity which
nal cases in which submission or presen¬ incorporates the simultaneity of consent and
tation of the self is suspended by partial con¬ refusal—the formula of all flirtation—into
cealment or refusal of the self, in such a way the first stage of the development of clothing
that the whole is fantasized all the more viv¬ as well.
idly and the desire for the totality of reality is If we go deeper into this matter, we might
excited all the more consciously and inten¬ claim that the entire dualism of this attitude
sively, as a result of the tension between this is only the phenomenon or the empirical
form and that of reality as incompletely dis¬ technique for the realization of a mode of
closed. conduct that is basically completely unified.
It is remarkable how the historical devel¬ I shall examine the nature of this unity later.
opment of the concealment of the body dem¬ Here, I shall only draw the conclusion that
onstrates this motive of simultaneous pre¬ this concomitance of consent and refusal
sentation and refusal. In contemporary eth¬ cannot be a static juxtaposition but must be
nography, it is regarded as certain that the a vital exchange, an intertwined form of mu¬
covering of the sexual organs, and clothing in tual reference. Where this does not succeed,
general, originally had nothing at all to do semi-concealment does not attain its signifi¬
with the feeling of shame. Rather, it served cance as flirtation either but rather exhibits
only the need for ornamentation and the a disagreeable contradiction. . . .
closely related intention of exercising sexual In refusing and conceding, the attitudes of
attraction by means of concealment. Among the sexes are quite characteristically differ¬
peoples who go naked, there are cases in ent. When a man refuses a woman who
which only prostitutes wear clothing! The makes advances to him, this may be thor¬
girdles and petticoats that fulfill the function oughly justified, or even necessary, on ethi¬
of a fig leaf are often quite minimal and de¬ cal, personal, or aesthetic grounds. However,
signed in such a way that concealment as there is always something awkward, unchi-
such simply cannot be their purpose at all. valrous, and in a certain sense blameworthy
They must have another purpose. Another about it. For the woman in this case, a rebuff
phenomenon shows what this purpose is: In can easily assume a tragic character. It is not
an extraordinary number of cases, they are proper for a man to reject a woman, regard¬
quite garishly colored and ornamented in the less of whether it was improper for her to
most striking fashion. Thus their purpose is offer herself to him. In the other direction,
clearly to draw attention to these parts of the however, the balance is struck perfectly
body. Originally, therefore, this concealment clearly: Rebuffing the zealous suitor is, so to
is only ornamental, with the dual function of say, a thoroughly appropriate gesture for the
124 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ IV. Georg Simmel
woman. And yet at the same time—and in ment, behind which her own unbiased per¬
spite of a reservation that will be indicated at sonality stands in complete freedom.
the conclusion of this essay—the womans ca¬ It is a universally confirmed observation
pacity to surrender herself is such a pro¬ that freedom does not remain limited to its
found, total, and exhaustive expression of her negative sense but, rather, immediately or si¬
being that perhaps it can never be attained by multaneously tends to be used for the acqui¬
a man in this way. In saying no and saying sition and exercise of power. In the case of
yes, in surrendering and refusing to surren¬ flirtation, these two senses become directly
der themselves, women are the masters. and inextricably interrelated. The power of
This is the consummation of the sexual the woman in relation to the man is exhibited
role that belongs to the female throughout in consent or refusal. It is precisely this an¬
the animal kingdom: to be the chooser. It is tithesis—in which the conduct of the flirt al¬
probably the basis of a phenomenon ob¬ ternates—that grounds the feeling of free¬
served by Darwin: among our household dom, the independence of the self from the
pets, the females exhibit a much more indi¬ one as well as the other, the autonomous exis¬
vidual attraction and aversion toward the tence that lies beyond the dominated opposi¬
males than the males demonstrate for the fe¬ tions. The power of the woman over consent
males. Since the woman is the chooser she is and refusal is prior to the decision. Once she
influenced much more by the individuality of has decided, in either direction, her power is
ended. Flirtation is a means of enjoying this
the man than he is by hers. The fact that the
power in an enduring form. And at least in a
man has this or that specific characteristic is
number of cases, it can be observed that
responsible for her choice. The man, how¬
women who are very domineering are also
ever, is more disposed to pursue the woman
very flirtatious.
as woman—within the limits that civilization
To clarify the typology of the situation, it
may also modify this fundamental relation¬
should be stressed that all this hesitation and
ship from both sides. This individual selec¬
vacillation does not affect the being of the
tion, which is the lot of the woman, gives her
woman and the determinate quality of its
much more opportunity than the man has to
alignment at all but only its discemability for
leave the choice in abeyance. Thus it is no
her partner. There is no sense in which this
wonder that out of all these moments of flir¬
betrays an objective and inner uncertainty on
tation, a form develops for women that does
the part of the woman. Where this is the case,
not suit men at all. In this form, there is a
it produces a picture quite different from flir¬
sense in which refusal and concession are
tation. Either this picture is only superficially
simultaneously possible for women.
similar to flirtation, or, in a certain embar¬
Reduced to its most general formulation,
rassment, it takes refuge in the forms of flir¬
the motive responsible for this conduct on
tation, perhaps in order to gain time for the
the part of the woman is the fascination of
decision. Inwardly, the flirtatious woman is
freedom and power. Normally there are only
completely resolved in either one direction or
one or two occasions on which the woman is the other. The meaning of the entire situation
in a position to decide the fundamental ques¬ lies only in the fact that she has to conceal
tions of her life. And even in these crucial her resolve and that, as regards something
cases, the individual freedom of her resolu¬ that intrinsically certain, she can place her
tion is quite often only apparent. In flirtation, partner in a state of uncertainty or vacillation
however, there is a sense in which she chroni¬ which holds true only for him. It is this that
cally takes on this decision, even if only in a gives the flirt her power and her superiority:
symbolic and approximate fashion. Suppose the fact that she is resolved and determined
she creates the impression that consent and within herself, as a result of which an under¬
refusal, inclination and aversion either domi¬ standing obtains between her and the man
nate one another by turns or have the same that uproots him and makes him uncertain.
force. In that case, she withdraws herself Consider the fact that the man whose de¬
from both and manipulates each as an instru¬ sire is captivated by the favor of the woman
Flirtation 125
gives himself over to this game, and not the intermediate stages, this also results in an
merely because he has no other alternative. increase in their value as a result of the fasci¬
On the contrary, it is frequently as if he found nation of risk, especially if the element of
a peculiar enticement and delight precisely fate—which is inaccessible to a decision that
in the fickle manner in which he is treated. lies within our own power and is intrinsic to
In the first place, this is quite obviously a all that we attain—heightens its mysterious
consequence of the well-known phenomenon attraction. If we calculated on the basis of its
that a sequence of experience oriented to a completely objective weight the chance of
final feeling of happiness radiates a part of its failure that lies between a preliminary stage
eudaemonistic value onto the moments of and the final stage, then it would hardly come
the sequence that precede this final moment. to an antedating of good fortune. But we also
Flirtation is one of the most trenchant cases experience chance as an allure, an enticing
of this experience. Originally, the only plea¬ gamble for the favor of the incalculable pow¬
sure in the erotic sequence may have been ers.
physiological. The pleasure, however, has In the psychic conduct that the flirt under¬
gradually come to include all the earlier mo¬ stands how to provoke, there is a sense in
ments of the sequence as well. Insofar as a which this eudaemonistic value of risk—the
purely psychological issue is at stake here, it knowledge that one does not know whether
is probable that a historical evolution has in he will succeed or fail—has been arrested and
fact taken place. This is because the meaning stabilized. On the one hand, this conduct
of pleasure extends to moments of the erotic draws anticipated happiness from the prom¬
domain which are all the more remote, allu¬ ise that flirtation implies. The reverse of this,
sive, and symbolic as the personality is more on the other hand, the chance that anticipa¬
refined and cultivated. This process of psy¬ tion may be disappointed by a change in the
chic retreat can go so far that, for example, a situation, results from the remoteness that
young man in love draws more bliss from the the flirt makes her partner feel at the same
first secret clasp of the hand than from any time. Insofar as both are continually played
subsequent unconditional concession; and off against each other, so that neither is suf¬
for many delicate and sensitive natures— ficiently serious to repress the other from
who are by no means necessarily frigid or consciousness, the possibility of the Perhaps
chaste—the kiss, or even the mere conscious¬ still stands above the Negative. Indeed, this
ness of the return of love, surpasses what Perhaps, in which the passivity of submitting
might be called the more substantial erotic and the activity of succeeding form a unity of
delights. In her interest in him and her desire enticement, circumscribes the entire inner
to attract him, the man with whom a woman response to the behavior of the flirt.
flirts already feels the somehow allusive Suppose that by virtue of his delight in risk
charm of possessing her, in quite the same and the characteristic concrete intermeshing
way that the promise of happiness already of its polar possibilities, the reaction of the
anticipates a part of the happiness attained. man signifies much more than simply being
There is a further nuance of this relation¬ carried along with the oscillation of the game
ship that acts with an independent force. of flirtation. In that case, when he begins to
Wherever the value of a final goal is already play the game itself and is attracted by it, not
perceptible in its means or its preliminary by one of its possible definitive results, then
stages, the quantum of the value that is en¬ ultimately his role far surpasses the status of
joyed is modified by the following fact: There a mere object. The entire action is really ele¬
is no real sequence in which what is gained vated into the sphere of play only under this
in an intermediate stage guarantees with ab¬ condition. As long as the man still takes it
solute certainty that the decisive terminal seriously, it intersects with the sphere of re¬
value will also be obtained. The bill for this, ality. Now the man will go no further than the
which we have discounted with the foretaste limits specified by flirtation. In view of the
of pleasure, may never be honored. In addi¬ logical and genetic meaning of flirtation, this
tion to unavoidable reduction in the value of seems to nullify its concept. Actually, how-
126 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ IV. Georg Simmel
ever, it produces the case that exhibits the cant and inextricably interrelated, with each
pure form of flirtation, detached from every necessarily in its place, that it is as if they
deviation and all prospect of change. It is less worked together to realize a completely spe¬
the art of pleasing—which is still somehow cifiable purpose. The flirt acts exactly as if
projected into the sphere of reality—than the she were interested only in the man who hap¬
art of pleasing that constitutes the pivotal pens to be her partner, as if her conduct
point of the relationship and its attractions. should culminate in complete surrender, re¬
Here flirtation completely relinquishes the gardless of how qualified this surrender may
role of an instrument or a mere provisional be. However, this logical, purposive sense of
entity and assumes that of an ultimate value. her conduct—as it might be called—is not her
All the hedonistic value that flirtation ac¬ own view at all. On the contrary, she leaves
quired from the first role is extended into this her conduct suspended in space in an incon¬
second role. The provisional quality of flirta¬ sistent fashion by giving it an aim that is ori¬
tion has lost its quality of being conditioned ented in a completely different direction: to
by something final, or even by the idea of please, to captivate, to be desired, but with¬
something final. Consider the fact that flirta¬ out allowing herself to be taken seriously in
tion has this cachet of the provisional, of sus¬ any way. She proceeds in a thoroughly pur¬
pension and indecision. Although a logical posive fashion but repudiates the “purpose"
contradiction, this is a psychological fact. It to which her conduct would have to lead in
is the ultimate attraction of flirtation, in the sequence of reality, sublimating it into the
which there is no inquiry beyond the moment purely subjective delights of play.
of its existence. This is why the consequence Of course what differentiates the inner or
of flirtatious behavior—an uncertainty and what might be called transcendental nature
uprootedness on the part of the man, a sur¬ of flirtation from that of art is the following
render to a Perhaps that is often full of de¬ consideration. From the outset, art places it¬
spair, corresponding to the inner certainty of self beyond reality. It frees itself from reality
the flirt—is completely transformed into its by means of a perspective that is utterly
opposite in this case. Where the man himself averse to reality. While it is true that flirtation
wants nothing more than this stage, it is pre¬ also does no more than play with reality, yet
cisely the conviction that the flirt is not seri¬ it is still reality with which it plays. The oscil¬
ous that gives him a certain assurance in re¬ lation of impulse that it offers and calls
lation to her. Where consent is not desired forth never draws its fascination entirely
and refusal is not feared—and yet also where from the purely detached forms of consent
the possible obstacles to his longing do not and refusal, from what could be called the
need to be considered—he can abandon him¬ abstract relationship of the sexes—even
self to the fascination of this game more com¬ though this would be the real, albeit never
pletely than would be the case if he wished— completely attainable, consummation of
or perhaps somehow feared as well—that the flirtation. There is always a reminder of
path once taken also led to the final point. sensibilities whose home is to be found only
This is no more than the clearest expres¬ in the sequence of reality. The pure relation
sion of the relationship between art and play, of forms is suffused with them. It is true
which is invariably characteristic of flirta¬ that the flirt and—in the case indicated in
tion. Kants claim about the nature of art— the foregoing—her partner as well play
that it is “purposiveness without purpose"'— with, and in this respect detach themselves
holds true for flirtation to the greatest extent from, reality. Unlike the artist, however,
possible. The work of art has no “purpose" at they do not play with the appearance of re¬
all. However, its parts seem to be so signifi¬ ality but rather with reality itself. . . . ♦
The Madman 127
threw his lantern on the ground, and it broke deeply impressed by the first consequences
and went out. “I come too early/' he said then; of this event—and these first consequences,
“my time has not come yet. This tremendous the consequences for us, are perhaps the re¬
event is still on its way, still wandering—it has verse of what one might expect: not at all sad
not yet reached the ears of man. Lightning and dark, but rather like a new, scarcely de-
and thunder require time, the light of the scribable kind of light, happiness, relief, ex¬
stars requires time, deeds require time even hilaration, encouragement, dawn? Indeed,
after they are done, before they can be seen we philosophers and “free spirits” feel as if a
and heard. This deed is still more distant new dawn were shining on us when we re¬
from them than the most distant stars—and ceive the tidings that “the old god is dead”;
yet they have done it themselves.” our heart overflows with gratitude, amaze¬
It has been related further that on that ment, anticipation, expectation. At last the
same day the madman entered divers horizon appears free again to us, even
churches and there sang his requiem aeter- granted that it is not bright; at last our ships
nam deo. Led out and called to account, he is may venture out again, venture out to face
said to have replied each time, “What are any danger; all the daring of the lover of
these churches now if they are not the tombs knowledge is pemiitted again; the sea, our
and sepulchers of God?”. . .
sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never
yet been such an “open sea.”. . .
***
***
and in relation to it everything else has only self carefully: "Why don't you want to de¬
second-rate value ceive?" especially if it should appear—and it
This unconditional will to truth: what is certainly does appear—that life depends on
it? . . . What do you know in advance of the appearance; I mean, on error, simulation, de¬
character of existence, to be able to decide ception, self-deception; and when life has, as
whether the greater advantage is on the side a matter of fact, always shown itself to be on
of the unconditionally mistrustful or of the the side of the most unscrupulous polytropoi.
unconditionally trusting? Yet if both are re¬ Such an intent, charitably interpreted, could
quired, much trust and much mistrust: perhaps be a quixotism, a little enthusiastic
whence might science then take its uncondi¬ impudence; but it could also be something
tional faith, its conviction, on which it rests, worse, namely, a destructive principle, hos¬
that truth is more important than anything
tile to life. "Will to truth"—that might be a
else, even than any other conviction? Just this
concealed will to death.
conviction could not have come into being if
Thus the question "Why science?" leads
both truth and untruth showed themselves to
back to the moral problem, "For what end
be continually useful, as is the case. Thus,
though there undeniably exists a faith in sci¬ any morality at all" if life, nature, and history
ence, it cannot owe its origin to such a utili¬ are "not moral"? . . . But one will have gath¬
tarian calculus but it must rather have origi¬ ered what I am driving at, namely, that it al¬
nated in spite of the fact that the inutility and ways remains a metaphysical faith upon
dangerousness of the "will to truth/' of "truth which our faith in science rests—that even
at any price," are proved to it continually .. . we devotees of knowledge today, we godless
Consequently, "will to truth" does not ones and anti-metaphysicians, still take our
mean "I will not let myself be deceived" but— fire too from the flame which a faith thou¬
there is no choice—"I will not deceive, not sands of years old has kindled: that Christian
even myself": and with this we are on the faith, which was also Plato's faith, that God
ground of morality. For one should ask one¬ is truth, that truth is divine. . . . ♦
130 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ V. Voices Outside the Discipline
or may not hold good of the world; and dis¬ with respect, sometimes with contumely, sel¬
putes over such notions are unending. The dom with clear understanding. It is evident
pragmatic method in such cases is to try to that the term applies itself conveniently to a
interpret each notion by tracing its respective number of tendencies that hitherto have
practical consequences. What difference lacked a collective name, and that it has
would it practically make to any one if this 'come to stay.'
notion rather than that notion were true? If To take in the importance of Peirce's prin¬
no practical difference whatever can be ciple, one must get accustomed to applying it
traced, then the alternatives mean practically to concrete cases. I found a few years ago that
the same thing, and all dispute is idle. When¬ Ostwald, the illustrious Leipzig chemist, had
ever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able been making perfectly distinct use of the
to show some practical difference that must principle of pragmatism in his lectures on the
follow from one side or the others being right. philosophy of science, though he had not
A glance at the history of the idea will show called it by that name.
you still better what pragmatism means. The "All realities influence our practice," he
term is derived from the same Greek word wrote me, "and that influence is their mean¬
pragma, meaning action, from which our ing for us. I am accustomed to put questions
words practice' and practical' come. It was to my classes in this way: In what respects
first introduced into philosophy by Mr. Char¬ would the world be different if this alterna¬
les Peirce in 1878. In an article entitled 'How tive or that were true? If I can find nothing
to Make Our Ideas Clear,' in the Popular Sci¬ that would become different, then the alter¬
ence Monthly for January of that year, Mr. native has no sense."
Peirce, after pointing out that our beliefs are That is, the rival views mean practically
really rules for action, said that, to develop a the same thing, and meaning, other than
thought's meaning, we need only determine practical, there is for us none. Ostwald in a
what conduct it is fitted to produce: that con¬ published lecture gives this example of what
duct is for us its sole significance. And the he means. Chemists have long wrangled over
tangible fact at the root of all our thought-dis¬ the inner constitution of certain bodies called
tinctions, however subtle, is that there is no 'tautomerous.' Their properties seemed
one of them so fine as to consist in anything equally consistent with the notion that an in¬
but a possible difference of practice. To attain stable hydrogen atom oscillates inside of
perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, them, or that they are instable mixtures of
then, we need only consider what conceiv¬ two bodies. Controversy raged, but never was
able effects of a practical kind the object may decided. "It would never have begun," says
involve—what sensations we are to expect Ostwald, "if the combatants had asked them¬
from it, and what reactions we must prepare. selves what particular experimental fact
Our conception of these effects, whether im¬ could have been made different by one or the
mediate or remote, is then for us the whole other view being correct. For it would then
of our conception of the object, so far as that have appeared that no difference of fact
conception has positive significance at all. could possibly ensue; and the quarrel was as
This is the principle of Peirce, the principle unreal as if, theorizing in primitive times
of pragmatism. It lay entirely unnoticed by about the raising of dough by yeast, one party
any one for twenty years, until I, in an ad¬ should have invoked a 'brownie,' while an¬
dress before Professor Howison's philosophi¬ other insisted on an 'elf as the true cause of
cal union at the University of California, the phenomenon."1
brought it forward again and made a special It is astonishing to see how many philo¬
application of it to religion. By that date sophical disputes collapse into insignificance
(1898) the times seemed ripe for its recep¬ the moment you subject them to this simple
tion. The word 'pragmatism' spread, and at test of tracing a concrete consequence. There
present it fairly spots the pages of the philo¬ can be no difference anywhere that doesn't
sophic journals. On all hands we find the make a difference elsewhere—no difference
'pragmatic movement' spoken of, sometimes in abstract truth that doesn't express itself in
132 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ V. Voices Outside the Discipline
a difference in concrete fact and in conduct much nearer together, would in fact work ab¬
consequent upon that fact, imposed on some¬ solutely hand in hand.
body, somehow, somewhere, and somewhen. Metaphysics has usually followed a very
The whole function of philosophy ought to be primitive kind of quest. You know how men
to find out what definite difference it will have always hankered after unlawful magic,
make to you and me, at definite instants of and you know what a great part in magic
our life, if this world-formula or that world- words have always played. If you have his
formula be the true one. name, or the formula of incantation that
There is absolutely nothing new in the binds him, you can control the spirit, genie,
pragmatic method. Socrates was an adept at afrite, or whatever the power may be. Solo¬
it. Aristotle used it methodically. Locke, mon knew the names of all the spirits, and
Berkeley, and Hume made momentous con¬ having their names, he held them subject to
tributions to truth by its means. Shad worth his will. So the universe has always appeared
Hodgson keeps insisting that realities are to the natural mind as a kind of enigma, of
only what they are 'known as.' But these fore¬ which the key must be sought in the shape of
runners of pragmatism used it in fragments: some illuminating or power-bringing word or
they were preluders only. Not until in our name. That word names the universes prin¬
time has it generalized itself, become con¬ ciple, and to possess it is after a fashion to
scious of a universal mission, pretended to a possess the universe itself. 'God/ 'Matter,'
conquering destiny. I believe in that destiny, 'Reason,' 'the Absolute,’ 'Energy/ are so many
and I hope I may end by inspiring you with solving names. You can rest when you have
them. You are at the end of your metaphysi¬
my belief.
cal quest.
Pragmatism represents a perfectly famil¬
But if you follow the pragmatic method,
iar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist atti¬
you cannot look on any such word as closing
tude, but it represents it, as it seems to me,
your quest. You must bring out of each word
both in a more radical and in a less objection¬
its practical cash-value, set it at work within
able form than it has ever yet assumed. A
the stream of your experience. It appears less
pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once
as a solution, then, than as a program for
for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to
more work, and more particularly as an indi¬
professional philosophers. He turns away
cation of the ways in which existing realities
from abstraction and insufficiency, from ver¬
may be changed.
bal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from
Theories thus become instruments, not an¬
fixed principles, closed systems, and pre¬
swers to enigmas, in which we can rest. We
tended absolutes and origins. He turns to¬
don't lie back upon them, we move forward,
wards concreteness and adequacy, towards
and, on occasion, make nature over again by
facts, towards action and towards power. their aid. Pragmatism unstiffens all our theo¬
That means the empiricist temper regnant ries, limbers them up and sets each one at
and the rationalist temper sincerely given up. work. Being nothing essentially new, it har¬
It means the open air and possibilities of na¬ monizes with many ancient philosophic ten¬
ture, as against dogma, artificiality, and the dencies. It agrees with nominalism for in¬
pretense of finality in truth. stance, in always appealing to particulars;
At the same time it does not stand for any with utilitarianism in emphasizing practical
special results. It is a method only. But the aspects; with positivism in its disdain for ver¬
general triumph of that method would mean bal solutions, useless questions and meta¬
an enormous change in what I called in my physical abstractions.
last lecture the 'temperament' of philosophy. All these, you see, are anti-intellectualist
Teachers of the ultra-rationalistic type would tendencies. Against rationalism as a preten¬
be frozen out, much as the courtier type is sion and a method pragmatism is fully armed
frozen out in republics, as the ultramontane and militant. But, at the outset, at least, it
type of priest is frozen out in protestant stands for no particular results. It has no dog¬
lands. Science and metaphysics would come mas, and no doctrines save its method. As the
What Pragmatism Means 133
young Italian pragmatist Papini has well made Keplers laws for the planets to follow;
said, it lies in the midst of our theories, like a he made velocity increase proportionally to
corridor in a hotel. Innumerable chambers the time in falling bodies; he made the law of
open out of it. In one you may find a man the sines for light to obey when refracted; he
writing an atheistic volume; in the next some established the classes, orders, families and
one on his knees praying for faith and genera of plants and animals, and fixed the
strength; in a third a chemist investigating a distances between them. He thought the ar¬
body's properties. In a fourth a system of ide¬ chetypes of all things, and devised their vari¬
alistic metaphysics is being excogitated; in a ations; and when we rediscover any one of
fifth the impossibility of metaphysics is being these his wondrous institutions, we seize his
shown. But they all own the corridor, and all mind in its very literal intention.
must pass through it if they want a practica¬ But as the sciences have developed farther,
ble way of getting into or out of their respec¬ the notion has gained ground that most, per¬
tive rooms. haps all, of our laws are only approximations.
No particular results then, so far, but only The laws themselves, moreover, have grown
an attitude of orientation, is what the prag¬ so numerous that there is no counting them;
matic method means. The attitude of looking and so many rival formulations are proposed
away from first things, principles, ‘categories, ' in all the branches of science that investiga¬
supposed necessities; and of looking towards tors have become accustomed to the notion
last things, fruits, consequences, facts. that no theory is absolutely a transcript of
So much for the pragmatic method! You reality, but that any one of them may from
may say that I have been praising it rather some point of view be useful. Their great use
than explaining it to you, but I shall presently is to summarize old facts and to lead to new
explain it abundantly enough by showing ones. They are only a man-made language, a
how it works on some familiar problems. conceptual shorthand, as some one calls
Meanwhile the word pragmatism has come them, in which we write our reports of na¬
to be used in a still wider sense, as meaning ture; and languages, as is well known, toler¬
also a certain theory of truth. I mean to give a ate much choice of expression and many dia¬
whole lecture to the statement of that theory, lects.
after first paving the way, so I can be very Thus human arbitrariness has driven di¬
brief now. But brevity is hard to follow, so I vine necessity from scientific logic. If I men¬
ask for your redoubled attention for a quarter tion the names of Sigwart, Mach, Ostwald,
of an hour. If much remains obscure, I hope Pearson, Milhaud, Poincare, Duhem, Ruyssen,
to make it clearer in the later lectures. those of you who are students will easily iden¬
One of the most successfully cultivated tify the tendency I speak of, and will think of
branches of philosophy in our time is what is additional names.
called inductive logic, the study of the condi¬ Riding now on the front of this wave of
tions under which our sciences have evolved. scientific logic Messrs. Schiller and Dewey
Writers on this subject have begun to show a appear with their pragmatistic account of
singular unanimity as to what the laws of what truth everywhere signifies. Everywhere,
nature and elements of fact mean, when for¬ these teachers say, 'truth' in our ideas and
mulated by mathematicians, physicists and beliefs means the same thing that it means in
chemists. When the first mathematical, logi¬ science. It means, they say, nothing but this,
cal, and natural uniformities, the first laws, that ideas (which themselves are hut parts of
were discovered, men were so carried away our experience) become true just in so far as
by the clearness, beauty and simplification they help us to get into satisfactory relation
that resulted, that they believed themselves with other parts of our experience, to summa¬
to have deciphered authentically the eternal rize them and get about among them by con¬
thoughts of the Almighty. His mind also thun¬ ceptual shortcuts instead of following the in¬
dered and reverberated in syllogisms. He also terminable succession of particular phenom¬
thought in conic sections, squares and roots ena. Any idea upon which we can ride, so to
and ratios, and geometrized like Euclid. He speak; any idea that will carry us prosper-
134 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ V. Voices Outside the Discipline
ously from any one part of our experience to but conceiving that in ways as familiar as the
any other part, linking things satisfactorily, case leaves possible. An outree explanation,
working securely, simplifying, saving labor; violating all our preconceptions, would never
is true for just so much, true in so far forth, pass for a true account of a novelty. We
true instrumentally. This is the Instrumental' should scratch round industriously till we
view of truth taught so successfully at Chi¬ found something less excentric. The most
cago, the view that truth in our ideas means violent revolutions in an individuals beliefs
their power to ‘work,’ promulgated so bril¬ leave most of his old order standing. Time
liantly at Oxford. and space, cause and effect, nature and his¬
Messrs. Dewey, Schiller and their allies, in tory, and ones own biography remain un¬
reaching this general conception of all truth, touched. New truth is always a go-between,
have only followed the example of geologists, a smoother-over of transitions. It marries old
biologists and philologists. In the estab¬ opinion to new fact so as ever to show a mini¬
lishment of these other sciences, the success¬ mum of jolt, a maximum of continuity. We
ful stroke was always to take some simple hold a theory true just in proportion to its
process actually observable in operation—as success in solving this ‘problem of maxima
denudation by weather, say, or variation from and minima.’ But success in solving this
parental type, or change of dialect by incor¬ problem is eminently a matter of approxima¬
poration of new words and pronunciations— tion. We say this theory solves it on the whole
and then to generalize it, making it apply to more satisfactorily than that theory; but that
all times, and produce great results by sum¬ means more satisfactorily to ourselves, and
mating its effects through the ages. individuals will emphasize their points of sat¬
The observable process which Schiller and isfaction differently. To a certain degree,
Dewey particularly singled out for generali¬ therefore, everything here is plastic.
zation is the familiar one by which any indi¬ The point I now urge you to observe par¬
vidual settles into new opinions. The process ticularly is the part played by the older truths.
here is always the same. The individual has a Failure to take account of it is the source of
stock of old opinions already, but he meets a much of the unjust criticism levelled against
new experience that puts them to a strain. pragmatism. Their influence is absolutely
Somebody contradicts them; or in a reflec¬ controlling. Loyalty to them is the first prin¬
tive moment he discovers that they contra¬ ciple—in most cases it is the only principle;
dict each other; or he hears of facts with for by far the most usual way of handling
which they are incompatible; or desires arise phenomena so novel that they would make
in him which they cease to satisfy. The result for a serious re-arrangement of our precon¬
is an inward trouble to which his mind till ception is to ignore them altogether, or to
then had been a stranger, and from which he abuse those who bear witness for them.
seeks to escape by modifying his previous You doubtless wish examples of this pro¬
mass of opinions. He saves as much of it as cess of truth’s growth, and the only trouble is
he can, for in this matter of belief we are all their superabundance. The simplest case of
extreme conservatives. So he tries to change new truth is of course the mere numerical
first this opinion, and then that (for they re¬ addition of new kinds of facts, or of new sin¬
sist change very variously), until at last some gle facts of old kinds, to our experience—an
new idea comes up which he can graft upon addition that involves no alteration in the old
the ancient stock with a minimum of distur¬ beliefs. Day follows day, and its contents are
bance of the latter, some idea that mediates simply added. The new contents themselves
between the stock and the new experience are not true, they simply, come and are. Truth
and runs them into one another most felici¬ is what we say about them, and when we say
tously and expediently. that they have come, truth is satisfied by the
This new idea is then adopted as the true plain additive formula.
one. It preserves the older stock of truths with But often the day's contents oblige a re-ar-
a minimum of modification, stretching them rangement. If I should now utter piercing
just enough to make them admit the novelty, shrieks and act like a maniac on this plat-
What Pragmatism Means 135
form, it would make many of you revise your were novel observations. Purely objective
ideas as to the probable worth of my philoso¬ truth, truth in whose establishment the func¬
phy ‘Radium' came the other day as part of tion of giving human satisfaction in marrying
the day's content, and seemed for a moment previous parts of experience with newer parts
to contradict our ideas of the whole order of played no role whatever, is nowhere to be
nature, that order having come to be identi¬ found. The reason why we call things true is
fied with what is called the conservation of the reason why they are true, for ‘to be true'
energy The mere sight of radium paying heat means only to perform this marriage-func¬
away indefinitely out of its own pocket tion.
seemed to violate that conservation. What to The trail of the human serpent is thus over
think? If the radiations from it were nothing everything. Truth independent; truth that we
but an escape of unsuspected ‘potential' en¬ find merely; truth no longer malleable to hu¬
ergy, pre-existent inside of the atoms, the man need; truth incorrigible, in a word; such
principle of conservation would be saved. truth exists indeed superabundantly—or is
The discovery of ‘helium' as the radiation's supposed to exist by rationalistically minded
outcome, opened a way to this belief. So thinkers; but then it means only the dead
Ramsay's view is generally held to be true, heart of the living tree, and its being there
because, although it extends our old ideas of means only that truth also has its paleontol¬
energy, it causes a minimum of alteration in ogy, and its ‘prescription,' and may grow stiff
their nature. with years of veteran service and petrified in
I need not multiply instances. A new opin¬ men’s regard by sheer antiquity. But how
ion counts as ‘true' just in proportion as it plastic even the oldest truths nevertheless re¬
gratifies the individual's desire to assimilate ally are has been vividly shown in our day by
the novel in his experience to his beliefs in the transformation of logical and mathemati¬
stock. It must both lean on old truths and cal ideas, a transformation which seems even
grasp new fact; and its success (as I said a to be invading physics. The ancient formulas
moment ago) in doing this, is a matter for the are reinterpreted as special expressions of
individual's appreciation. When old truth much wider principles, principles that our
grows, then, by new truth's addition, it is for ancestors never got a glimpse of in their pre¬
subjective reasons. We are in the process and sent shape and formulation. . . .
obey the reasons. That new idea is truest
which performs most felicitously its function Endnote
of satisfying our double urgency. It makes
itself true, gets itself classed as true, by the 1. 'Theorie und Praxis,’ Zeitsch. des Oester-
way it works; grafting itself then upon the reichischen Ingenieur u. Architecten-Vereines,
ancient body of truth, which thus grows 1905, Nr. 4 u. 6.1 find a still more radical prag¬
much as a tree grows by the activity of a new matism than Ostwalds in an address by Pro¬
fessor W. S. Franklin: “I think that the
layer of cambium.
sickliest notion of physics, even if a student
Now Dewey and Schiller proceed to gener¬ gets it, is that it is ‘the science of masses,
alize this observation and to apply it to the molecules, and the ether.' And I think that the
most ancient parts of truth. They also once healthiest notion, even if a student does not
were plastic. They also were called true for wholly get it, is that physics is the science of
human reasons. They also mediated between the ways of taking hold of bodies and pushing
still earlier truths and what in those days them!” (Science, January 2, 1903.) ♦
136 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ V. Voices Outside the Discipline
the heathen religions. For it was very closely technical progress is without value for the
related to the low estimation put upon economics of our happiness. One would like
earthly life by the Christian doctrine. The last to ask: is there, then, no positive gain in plea¬
but one of these occasions was when the sure, no unequivocal increase in my feeling
progress of voyages of discovery led to con¬ of happiness, if I can, as often as I please, hear
tact with primitive peoples and races. In con¬ the voice of a child of mine who is living hun¬
sequence of insufficient observation and a dreds of miles away or if I can learn in the
mistaken view of their manners and customs, shortest possible time after a friend has
they appeared to Europeans to be leading a reached his destination that he has come
simple, happy life with few wants, a life such through the long and difficult voyage un¬
as was unattainable by their visitors with harmed? Does it mean nothing that medicine
their superior civilization. Later experience has succeeded in enormously reducing infant
has corrected some of those judgements. In mortality and the danger of infection for
many cases the observers had wrongly attri¬ women in childbirth, and, indeed, in consid¬
buted to the absence of complicated cultural erably lengthening the average life of a civi¬
demands what was in fact due to the bounty lized man? And there is a long list that might
of nature and the ease with which the major be added to benefits of this kind which we
human needs were satisfied. The last occa¬ owe to the much-despised era of scientific
sion is especially familiar to us. It arose when and technical advances. But here the voice of
people came to know about the mechanism pessimistic criticism makes itself heard and
of the neuroses, which threaten to under¬ warns us that most of these satisfactions fol¬
mine the modicum of happiness enjoyed by low the model of the 'cheap enjoyment' ex¬
civilized men. It was discovered that a person tolled in the anecdote—the enjoyment ob¬
becomes neurotic because he cannot tolerate tained by putting a bare leg from under the
the amount of frustration which society im¬ bedclothes on a cold winter night and draw¬
poses on him in the service of its cultural ing it in again. If there had been no railway
ideals, and it was inferred from this that the to conquer distances, my child would never
abolition or reduction of those demands have left his native town and I should need
would result in a return to possibilities of no telephone to hear his voice; if travelling
happiness. across the ocean by ship had not been intro¬
There is also an added factor of disap¬ duced, my friend would not have embarked
pointment. During the last few generations on his sea-voyage and I should not need a
mankind has made an extraordinary advance cable to relieve my anxiety about him. What
in the natural sciences and in their technical is the use of reducing infantile mortality
application and has established his control when it is precisely that reduction which im¬
over nature in a way never before imagined. poses the greatest restraint on us in the be¬
The single steps of this advance are common getting of children, so that, taken all round,
knowledge and it is unnecessary to enumer¬ we nevertheless rear no more children than
ate them. Men are proud of those achieve¬ in the days before the reign of hygiene, while
ments, and have a right to be. But they seem at the same time we have created difficult
to have observed that this newly-won power conditions for our sexual life in marriage,
over space and time, this subjugation of the and have probably worked against the bene¬
forces of nature, which is the fulfilment of a ficial effects of natural selection? And, finally,
longing that goes back thousands of years, what good to us is a long life if it is difficult
has not increased the amount of pleasurable and barren of joys, and if it is so full of misery
satisfaction which they may expect from life that we can only welcome death as a deliv¬
and has not made them feel happier. From erer?
the recognition of this fact we ought to be It seems certain that we do not feel com¬
content to conclude that power over nature fortable in our present-day civilization, but it
is not the only precondition of human happi¬ is very difficult to form an opinion whether
ness, just as it is not the only goal of cultural and in what degree men of an earlier age felt
endeavour; we ought not to infer from it that happier and what part their cultural condi-
138 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ V. Voices Outside the Discipline
tions played in the matter. We shall always inner discernments which still defy expres¬
tend to consider people’s distress objec¬ sion in abstract terms.
tively—that is, to place ourselves, with our The first stage is easy. We recognize as cul¬
own wants and sensibilities, in their condi¬ tural all activities and resources which are
tions, and then to examine what occasions we useful to men for making the earth service¬
should find in them for experiencing happi¬ able to them, for protecting them against the
ness or unhappiness. This method of looking violence of the forces of nature, and so on. As
at things, which seems objective because it regards this side of civilization, there can be
ignores the variations in subjective sensibil¬ scarcely any doubt. If we go back far enough,
ity, is, of course, the most subjective possible, we find that the first acts of civilization were
since it puts one’s own mental states in the the use of tools, the gaining of control over
place of any others, unknown though they fire and the construction of dwellings.
may be. Happiness, however, is something Among these, the control over fire stands out
essentially subjective. No matter how much as a quite extraordinary and unexampled
we may shrink with horror from certain situ¬ achievement,4 while the others opened up
ations—of a galley-slave in antiquity, of a paths which man has followed ever since,
peasant during the Thirty Years’ War, of a and the stimulus to which is easily guessed.
victim of the Holy Inquisition, of a Jew await¬ With every tool man is perfecting his own
ing a pogrom—it is nevertheless impossible organs, whether motor or sensory, or is re¬
for us to feel our way into such people—to moving the limits to their functioning. Motor
divine the changes which original obtuseness power places gigantic forces at his disposal,
of mind, a gradual stupefying process, the which, like his muscles, he can employ in any
cessation of expectations, and cruder or direction; thanks to ships and aircraft neither
more refined methods of narcotization have water nor air can hinder his movements; by
produced upon their receptivity to sensations means of spectacles he corrects defects in the
of pleasure and unpleasure. Moreover, in the lens of his own eye; by means of the telescope
case of the most extreme possibility of suffer¬ he sees into the far distance; and by means of
ing, special mental protective devices are the microscope he overcomes the limits of
brought into operation. It seems to me un¬ visibility set by the structure of his retina. In
profitable to pursue this aspect of the prob¬ the photographic camera he has created an
lem any further. instrument which retains the fleeting visual
It is time for us to turn our attention to the impressions, just as a gramophone disc re¬
nature of this civilization on whose value as tains the equally fleeting auditory ones; both
a means to happiness doubts have been are at bottom materializations of the power
thrown. We shall not look for a formula in he possesses of recollection, his memory.
which to express that nature in a few words, With the help of the telephone he can hear at
until we have learned something by examin¬ distances which would be respected as unat¬
ing it. We shall therefore content ourselves tainable even in a fairy tale. Writing was in
with saying once more that the word 'civili¬ its origin the voice of an absent person; and
zation’2 describes the whole sum of the the dwelling-house was a substitute for the
achievements and the regulations which dis¬ mother’s womb, the first lodging, for which
tinguish our lives from those of our animal in all likelihood man still longs, and in which
ancestors and which serve two purposes— he was safe and felt at ease.
namely to protect men against nature and to These things that, by his science and tech¬
adjust their mutual relations.3 In order to nology, man has brought about on this earth,
learn more, we will bring together the various on which he first appeared as a feeble animal
features of civilization individually, as they organism and on which each individual of his
are exhibited in human communities. In do¬ species must once more make its entry ('oh
ing so, we shall have no hesitation in letting inch of nature!’5) as a helpless suckling—
ourselves be guided by linguistic usage or, as these things do not only sound like a fairy
it is also called, linguistic feeling, in the con¬ tale, they are an actual fulfillment of every—
viction that we shall thus be doing justice to or of almost every—fairy-tale wish. All these
Civilization and Its Discontents 139
assets he may lay claim to as his cultural ac¬ countries. As though we were seeking to re¬
quisition. Long ago he formed an ideal con¬ pudiate the first demand we made, we wel¬
ception of omnipotence and omniscience come it as a sign of civilization as well if we
which he embodied in his gods. To these gods see people directing their care too to what has
he attributed everything that seemed unat¬ no practical value whatever, to what is use¬
tainable to his wishes, or that was forbidden less—if for instance, the green spaces neces¬
to him. One may say, therefore, that these sary in a town as playgrounds and as reser¬
gods were cultural ideals. To-day he has come voirs of fresh air are also laid out with flower¬
very close to the attainment of this ideal, he beds, or if the windows of the houses are
has almost become a god himself. Only, it is decorated with pots of flowers. We soon ob¬
true, in the fashion in which ideals are usu¬ serve that this useless thing which we expect
ally attained according to the general judge¬ civilization to value is beauty. We require civ¬
ment of humanity. Not completely; in some ilized man to reverence beauty wherever he
respects not at all, in others only half way. sees it in nature and to create it in the objects
Man has, as it were, become a kind of pros¬ of his handiwork so far as he is able. But this
thetic6 God. When he puts on all his auxiliary is far from exhausting our demands on civi¬
organs he is truly magnificent; but those or¬ lization. We expect besides to see the signs of
gans have not grown on to him and they still cleanliness and order. We do not think highly
give him much trouble at times. Never¬ of the cultural level of an English country
theless, he is entitled to console himself with town in Shakespeare's time when we read
the thought that this development will not that there was a big dungheap in front of his
come to an end precisely with the year 1930 fathers house in Stratford; we are indignant
A.D. Future ages will bring with them new and call it 'barbarous' (which is the opposite
and probably unimaginably great advances of civilized) when we find the paths in the
in this field of civilization and will increase Wiener Wald7 littered with paper. Dirtiness of
mans likeness to God still more. But in the any kind seems to us incompatible with civi¬
interests of our investigations, we will not lization. We extend our demand for cleanli¬
forget that present-day man does not feel ness to the human body too. We are
happy in his Godlike character. astonished to learn of the objectionable smell
We recognize, then, that countries have at¬ which emanated from the Roi Soleil;8 and we
tained a high level of civilization if we find shake our heads on the Isola Bella9 when we
that in them everything which can assist in are shown the tiny wash-basin in which Na¬
the exploitation of the earth by man and in poleon made his morning toilet. Indeed, we
his protection against the forces of nature— are not surprised by the idea of setting up the
everything, in short, which is of use to him— use of soap as an actual yardstick of civiliza¬
is attended to and effectively carried out. In tion. The same is true of order. It, like clean¬
such countries rivers which threaten to flood liness, applies solely to the works of man. But
the land are regulated in their flow, and their whereas cleanliness is not to be expected in
water is directed through canals to places nature, order, on the contrary, has been imi¬
where there is a shortage of it. The soil is tated from her. Man's observation of the great
carefully cultivated and planted with the astronomical regularities not only furnished
vegetation which it is suited to support; and him with a model for introducing order into
the mineral wealth below ground is assidu¬ his life, but gave him the first points of depar¬
ously brought to the surface and fashioned ture for doing so. Order is a kind of compul¬
into the required implements and utensils. sion to repeat which, when a regulation has
The means of communication are ample, been laid down once and for all, decides
rapid and reliable. Wild and dangerous ani¬ when, where and how a thing shall be done,
mals have been exterminated, and the breed¬ so that in every similar circumstance one is
ing of domesticated animals flourishes. But spared hesitation and indecision. The bene¬
we demand other things from civilization be¬ fits of order are incontestable. It enables men
sides these, and it is a noticeable fact that we to use space and time to the best advantage,
hope to find them realized in these same while conserving their psychical forces. We
140 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ V. Voices Outside the Discipline
should have a right to expect that order wards the two confluent goals of utility and
would have taken its place in human activi¬ a yield of pleasure, we must suppose that this
ties from the start and without difficulty; and is also true of the manifestations of civiliza¬
we may well wonder that this has not hap¬ tion which we have been discussing here, al¬
pened—that, on the contrary, human beings though this is easily visible only in scientific
exhibit an inborn tendency to carelessness, and aesthetic activities. But it cannot be
irregularity and unreliability in their work, doubted that the other activities, too, corre¬
and that a laborious training is needed before spond to strong needs in men—perhaps to
they learn to follow the example of their ce¬ needs which are only developed in a minority.
lestial models. Nor must we allow ourselves to be misled by
Beauty, cleanliness and order obviously judgements of value concerning any particu¬
occupy a special position among the require¬ lar religion, or philosophic system, or ideal.
ments of civilization. No one will maintain Whether we think to find in them the highest
that they are as important for life as control achievements of the human spirit, or whether
over the forces of nature or as some other we deplore them as aberrations, we cannot
factors with which we shall become ac¬ but recognize that where they are present,
quainted. And yet no one would care to put and, in especial, where they are dominant, a
them in the background as trivialities. That high level of civilization is implied.
civilization is not exclusively taken up with The last, but certainly not the least impor¬
what is useful is already shown by the exam¬ tant, of the characteristic features of civiliza¬
ple of beauty, which we decline to omit from tion remains to be assessed: the manner in
among the interests of civilization. The use¬ which the relationships of men to one an¬
fulness of order is quite evident. With regard other, their social relationships, are regu¬
to cleanliness, we must bear in mind that it lated—relationships which affect a person as
is demanded of us by hygiene as well, and we a neighbour, as a source of help, as another
may suspect that even before the days of sci¬ persons sexual object, as a member of a fam¬
entific prophylaxis the connection between ily and of a State. Here it is especially difficult
the two was not altogether strange to man. to keep clear of particular ideal demands and
Yet utility does not entirely explain these ef¬ to see what is civilized in general. Perhaps we
forts; something else must be at work be¬ may begin by explaining that the element of
sides. civilization enters on the scene with the first
No feature, however, seems better to char¬ attempt to regulate these social relationships.
acterize civilization than its esteem and en¬ If the attempt were not made, the relation¬
couragement of mans higher mental activi¬ ships would be subject to the arbitrary will of
ties—his intellectual, scientific and artistic the individual: that is to say, the physically
achievements—and the leading role that it stronger man would decide them in the sense
assigns to ideas in human life. Foremost of his own interests and instinctual impulses.
among those ideas are the religious systems, Nothing would be changed in this if this
on whose complicated structure I have en¬ stronger man should in his turn meet some¬
deavoured to throw light elsewhere.10 Next one even stronger than he. Human life in
come the speculations of philosophy; and fi¬ common is only made possible when a ma¬
nally what might be called man’s 'ideals'—his jority comes together which is stronger than
ideas of a possible perfection of individuals, any separate individual, and which remains
or of peoples or of the whole of humanity, and united against all separate individuals. The
the demands he sets up on the basis of such power of this community is then set up as
ideas. The fact that these creations of his are ‘right’ in opposition to the power of the indi¬
not independent of one another, but are on vidual, which is condemned as ‘brute force’.
the contrary closely interwoven, increases This replacement of the power of the individ¬
the difficulty not only of describing them but ual by the power of a community constitutes
of tracing their psychological derivation. If the decisive step of civilization. The essence
we assume quite generally that the motive of it lies in the fact that the members of the
force of all human activities is a striving to¬ community restrict themselves in their pos-
Civilization and Its Discontents 141
sibilities of satisfaction, whereas the individ¬ means of some particular form of civilization
ual knew no such restrictions. The first req¬ or whether this conflict is irreconcilable.
uisite of civilization, therefore, is that of jus¬ By allowing common feeling to be our
tice—that is, the assurance that a law once guide in deciding what features of human life
made will not be broken in favour of an indi¬ are to be regarded as civilized, we have ob¬
vidual. This implies nothing as to the ethical tained a clear impression of the general pic¬
value of such a law. The further course of ture of civilization; but it is true that so far
cultural development seems to tend towards we have discovered nothing that is not uni¬
making the law no longer an expression of versally known. At the same time we have
the will of a small community—a caste or a been careful not to fall in with the prejudice
stratum of the population or a racial group— that civilization is synonymous with perfect¬
which, in its turn, behaves like a violent indi¬ ing, that it is the road to perfection pre-or¬
vidual towards other, and perhaps more nu¬ dained for men. But now a point of view pre¬
merous, collections of people. The final out¬ sents itself which may lead in a different di¬
come should be a rule of law to which all— rection. The development of civilization ap¬
except those who are not capable of entering pears to us as a peculiar process which man¬
a community—have contributed by a sacri¬ kind undergoes, and in which several things
fice of their instincts, and which leaves no strike us as familiar. We may characterize
one—again with the same exception—at the this process with reference to the changes
mercy of brute force. which it brings about in the familiar instinc¬
The liberty of the individual is no gift of tual dispositions of human beings, to satisfy
civilization. It was greatest before there was which is, after all, the economic task of our
any civilization, though then, it is true, it had lives. A few of these instincts are used up in
for the most part no value, since the individ¬ such a manner that something appears in
ual was scarcely in a position to defend it. The their place which, in an individual, we de¬
development of civilization imposes restric¬ scribe as a character-trait. The most remark¬
tions on it, and justice demands that no one able example of such a process is found in the
shall escape those restrictions. What makes anal erotism of young human beings. Their
itself felt in a human community as a desire original interest in the excretory function, its
for freedom may be their revolt against some organs and products, is changed in the course
existing injustice, and so may prove favour¬ of their growth into a group of traits which
able to a further development of civilization; are familiar to us as parsimony, a sense of
it may remain compatible with civilization. order and cleanliness—qualities which,
But it may also spring from the remains of though valuable and welcome in themselves,
their original personality, which is still un¬ may be intensified till they become markedly
tamed by civilization and may thus become dominant and produce what is called the anal
the basis in them of hostility to civilization. character. How this happens we do not know,
The urge for freedom, therefore, is directed but there is no doubt about the correctness
against particular forms and demands of civi¬ of the finding.11 Now we have seen that order
lization or against civilization altogether. It and cleanliness are important requirements
does not seem as though any influence could of civilization, although their vital necessity
induce a man to change his nature into a is not very apparent, any more than their suit¬
termites. No doubt he will always defend his ability as sources of enjoyment. At this point
claim to individual liberty against the will of we cannot fail to be struck by the similarity
the group. A good part of the struggles of between the process of civilization and the
mankind centre round the single task of find¬ libidinal development of the individual.
ing an expedient accommodation—one, that Other instincts [besides anal erotism] are in¬
is, that will bring happiness—between this duced to displace the conditions for their sat¬
claim of the individual and the cultural isfaction, to lead them into other paths. In
claims of the group; and one of the problems most cases this process coincides with that of
that touches the fate of humanity is whether the sublimation (of instinctual aims) with
such an accommodation can be reached by which we are familiar, but in some it can be
142 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ V. Voices Outside the Discipline
differentiated from it. Sublimation of in¬ of this human feat. It is as though primal man
stinct is an especially conspicuous feature of had the habit, when he came in contact with
cultural development; it is what makes it pos¬ fire, of satisfying an infantile desire con¬
nected with it, by putting it out with a stream
sible for higher psychical activities, scien¬
of his urine. The legends that we possess
tific, artistic or ideological, to play such an
leave no doubt about the originally phallic
important part in civilized life. If one were to view taken of tongues of flame as they shoot
yield to a first impression, one would say that upwards. Putting out fire by micturating—a
sublimation is a vicissitude which has been theme to which modern giants, Gulliver in
forced upon the instincts entirely by civiliza¬ Lilliput and Rabelais' Gargantua, still hark
tion. But it would be wiser to reflect upon this back—was therefore a kind of sexual act with
a little longer. In the third place,12 finally, and a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a
this seems the most important of all, it is homosexual competition. The first person to
impossible to overlook the extent to which renounce this desire and spare the fire was
able to carry it off with him and subdue it to
civilization is built up upon a renunciation of
his own use. By damping down the fire of his
instinct, how much it presupposes precisely
own sexual excitation, he had tamed the
the non-satisfaction (by suppression, repres¬ natural force of fire. This great cultural con¬
sion or some other means?) of powerful in¬ quest was thus the reward for his renuncia¬
stincts. This 'cultural frustration' dominates tion of instinct. Further, it is as though
the large field of social relationships between woman had been appointed guardian of the
human beings. As we already know, it is the fire which was held captive on the domestic
cause of the hostility against which all civili¬ hearth, because her anatomy made it impos¬
zations have to struggle. It will also make sible for her to yield to the temptation of this
severe demands on our scientific work, and desire. It is remarkable, too, how regularly
we shall have much to explain here. It is not analytic experience testifies to the connec¬
tion between ambition, fire and urethral
easy to understand how it can become possi¬
erotism.—[Freud had pointed to the connec¬
ble to deprive an instinct of satisfaction. Nor
tion between urination and fire as early as in
is doing so without danger. If the loss is not the 'Dora' case history (1905c [1901]). The
compensated for economically, one can be connection with ambition came rather later.
certain that serious disorders will ensue. A full list of references will be found in the
But if we want to know what value can be Editor’s Note to the later paper on the sub¬
attributed to our view that the development ject, 'The Acquisition and Control of Fire'
of civilization is a special process, compar¬ (1932a).]
able to the normal maturation of the individ¬ 5. [In English in the original. This very Shake¬
ual, we must clearly attack another problem. spearean phrase is not in fact to be found in
We must ask ourselves to what influences the the canon of Shakespeare. The words 'Poore
development of civilization owes its origin, inch of Nature' occur, however, in a novel by
how it arose, and by what its course has been George Wilkins, The Painfull Adventures of
determined. . . . Pericles Prince of Tyre, where they are ad¬
dressed by Pericles to his infant daughter.
This work was first printed in 1608, just after
Endnotes
the publication of Shakespeare’s play, in
which Wilkins has been thought to have had
1. [Freud had discussed this question at con¬
a hand. Freud's unexpected acquaintance
siderable length two years earlier, in the
with the phrase is explained by its appear¬
opening chapters of The Future of an Illu¬
sion (1927c).] ance in a discussion of the origins of Pericles
in Georg Brandes’s well-known book on
2. ‘Kultur.’ For the translation of this word see Shakespeare, a copy of the German transla¬
the Editor’s Note to The Future of an Illu¬ tion of which had a place in Freud's library
sion. (Brandes, 1896). He is known to have greatly
3. See The Future of an Illusion. admired the Danish critic (cf. Jones, 1957,
4. Psycho-analytic material, incomplete as it 120), and the same book is quoted in hi; pa¬
is and not susceptible to clear interpreta¬ per on the three caskets (1913/)].
tion, nevertheless admits of a conjecture—a 6. [A prosthesis is the medical term for an arti¬
fantastic-sounding one—about the origin ficial adjunct to the body, to make up for
Civilization and Its Discontents 143
some missing or inadequate part: e.g. false 10. [Cf. The Future of an Illusion (1927c).]
teeth or a false leg.]
11. Cf. my ‘Character and Anal Erotism’ (1908h),
7. [The wooded hills on the outskirts of Vi¬ and numerous further contributions, by Er¬
enna.] nest Jones [1918] and others.
8. [Louis XIV of France.] 12. [Freud had already mentioned two other
9. [The well-known island in Lake Maggiore, factors playing a part in the 'process’ of
visited by Napoleon a few days before the bat¬ civilization: character-formation and sub¬
tle of Marengo.] limation.] ♦
144 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ V. Voices Outside the Discipline
Ones interest is the interest of all. There is religion arises. The social situation is spread
complete identification of individuals. Within over the entire world.
the individual there is a fusion of the “me” It may be only on certain days of the week
with the "I.” and at certain hours of that day that we can
The impulse of the “I” in this case is neigh¬ get into that attitude of feeling at one with
borliness, kindliness. One gives bread to the everybody and everything about us. The day
hungry. It is that social tendency which we all goes around; we have to go into the market
have in us that calls out a certain type of to compete with other people and to hold our
response: one wants to give. When one has a heads above the water in a difficult economic
limited bank account, one cannot give all he situation. We cannot keep up the sense of
has to the poor. Yet under certain religious exaltation, but even then we may still say that
situations, in groups with a certain back¬ these demands of life are only a task which is
ground, he can get the attitude of doing just put on us, a duty which we must perform in
that. Giving is stimulated by more giving. He order to get at particular moments the reli¬
may not have much to give, but he is ready to gious attitude. When the experience is at¬
give himself completely. There is a fusion of tained, however, it comes with this feeling of
the “I” and the “me.” The time” is not there complete identification of the self with the
to control the "I,” but the situation has been other.
so constructed that the very attitude aroused It is a different, and perhaps higher, atti¬
in the other stimulates one to do the same tude of identification which comes in the
thing. The exaltation in the case of patriotism form of what I have referred to as “team
presents an analogous instance of this fusion. work.” Here one has the sort of satisfaction
From the emotional standpoint such situ¬ which comes from working with others in a
ations are peculiarly precious. They involve, certain situation. There is, of course, still a
of course, the successful completion of the sense of control; after all, what one does is
social process. I think that the religious atti¬ determined by what other persons are doing;
tude involves this relation of the social stimu¬ one has to be keenly aware of the positions of
lus to the world at large, the carrying-over of all the others; he knows what the others are
the social attitude to the larger world. I think going to do. But he has to be constantly
that that is the definite field within which the awake to the way in which other people are
religious experience appears. Of course, responding in order to do his part in the team
where one has a clearly marked theology in work. That situation has its delight, but it is
which there are definite dealings with the de¬ not a situation in which one simply throws
ity, with whom one acts as concretely as with himself, so to speak, into the stream where
another person in the room, then the conduct he can get a sense of abandonment. That ex¬
which takes place is simply of a type which is perience belongs to the religious or patriotic
comparable to the conduct with reference to situation. Team work carries, however, a con¬
another social group, and it may be one tent which the other does not carry. The reli¬
which is lacking in that peculiar mystical gious situation is abstract as far as the con¬
character which we generally ascribe to the tent is concerned. How one is to help others
religious attitude. It may be a calculating at¬ is a very complicated undertaking. One who
titude in which a person makes a vow, and undertakes to be a universal help to others is
carries it out providing the deity gives him a apt to find himself a universal nuisance.
particular favor. Now, that attitude would There is no more distressing person to have
normally come under the general statement about than one who is constantly seeking to
of religion, but in addition it is generally rec¬ assist everybody else. Fruitful assistance has
ognized that the attitude has to be one that to be intelligent assistance. But if one can get
carries this particular extension of the social the situation of a well-organized group doing
attitude to the universe at large. I think it is something as a unit, a sense of the self is
that which we generally refer to as the reli¬ attained which is the experience of team
gious experience, and that this is the situ¬ work, and this is certainly from an intellec¬
ation out of which the mystical experience of tual standpoint higher than mere abstract
146 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ V. Voices Outside the Discipline
neighborliness. The sense of team work is The "me," I have said, presents the situ¬
found where all are working toward a com¬ ation within which conduct takes place, and
mon end and everyone has a sense of the the "I" is the actual response to that situation.
common end interpenetrating the particular This twofold separation into situation and re¬
function which he is carrying on. sponse is characteristic of any intelligent act
The frequent attitude of the person in so¬ even if it does not involve this social mecha¬
cial service who is trying to express a funda¬ nism. There is a definite situation which pre¬
mental attitude of neighborliness1 may be sents a problem, and then the organism re¬
compared with the attitude of the engineer, sponds to that situation by an organization
the organizer, which illustrates in extreme of the different reactions that are involved.
form the attitude of team work. The engineer There has to be such an organization of ac¬
has the attitudes of all the other individuals tivities in our ordinary movements among
in the group, and it is because he has that different articles in a room, or through a for¬
participation that he is able to direct. When est, or among automobiles. The stimuli pre¬
the engineer comes out of the machine shop sent tend to call out a great variety of re¬
with the bare blue print, the machine does sponses; but the actual response of the organ¬
not yet exist; but he must know what the peo¬ ism is an organization of these tendencies,
ple are to do, how long it should take them, not a single response which mediates all the
how to measure the processes involved, and others. One does not sit down in a chair, one
how to eliminate waste. That sort of taking does not take a book, open a window, or do a
the attitudes of everyone else as fully and great variety of things to which in a certain
completely as possible, entering upon ones sense the individual is invited when he enters
own action from the standpoint of such a a room. He does some specific thing; he per¬
complete taking of the role of the others, we haps goes and takes a sought paper out of a
may perhaps refer to as the "attitude of the desk and does not do anything else. Yet the
engineer." It is a highly intelligent attitude; objects exist there in the room for him. The
and if it can be formed with a profound in¬ chair, the windows, tables, exist as such be¬
terest in social team work, it belongs to the cause of the uses to which he normally puts
high social processes and to the significant these objects. The value that the chair has in
experiences. Here the full concreteness of the his perception is the value which belongs to
"me" depends upon a mans capacity to take his response; so he moves by a chair and past
the attitude of everybody else in the process a table and away from a window. He builds
which he directs. Here is gained the concrete up a landscape there, a scene of objects which
content not found in the bare emotional iden¬ make possible his actual movement to the
tification of ones self with everyone else in drawer which contains the paper that he is
the group. after. This landscape is the means of reaching
These are the different types of expres¬ the goal he is pursuing; and the chair, the
sions of the “I" in their relationship to the table, the window, all enter into it as objects.
"me" that I wanted to bring out in order to The physical object is, in a certain sense,
complete the statement of the relation of the what you do not respond to in a consumma-
"I" and the "me." The self under these circum¬ tory fashion. If the moment you step into a
stances is the action of the "I" in harmony room, you drop into a chair you hardly do
with the taking of the role of others in the more than direct your attention to the chair;
"me." The self is both the "I" and the "me"; you do not view it as a chair in the same sense
the "me" setting the situation to which the "I” as when you just recognize it as a chair and
responds. Both the "I" and "me" are involved direct your movement toward a distant ob¬
in the self, and here each supports the other. ject. The chair that exists in the latter case is
I wish now to discuss the fusion of the "I" not one you are sitting down in; but it is a
and the "me" in terms of another approach, something that will receive you after you do
namely, through a comparison of the physi¬ drop into it, and that gives it the character of
cal object with the self as a social object. an object as such.
The Fusion of the (T and the ‘Me’ in Social Activities 147
Such physical objects are utilized in build¬ sense a problem; only the peculiar character
ing up the field in which the distant object is of it lies in the fact that it is a social situation
reached. The same result occurs from a tem¬ and that this social situation involves the ap¬
poral standpoint when one carries out a more pearance of the "me" and the "I" which are
distant act by means of some precedent act essentially social elements. I think it is con¬
which must be first carried through. Such sistent to recognize this parallelism between
organization is going on all the time in intel¬ what we call the "physical object" over
ligent conduct. We organize the field with against the organism, and the social object
reference to what we are going to do. There over against the self. The "me" does definitely
is now, if you like, a fusion of the getting of answer to all the different reactions which
the paper out of the drawer and the room the objects about us, tend to call out in us. All
through which we move to accomplish that such objects call out responses in ourselves,
end, and it is this sort of fusion that I referred and these responses are the meanings or the
to previously, only in such instances as reli¬ natures of the objects: the chair is something
gious experiences it takes place in the field of we sit down in, the window is something that
social mediation, and the objects in the we can open, that gives us light or air. Like¬
mechanism are social in their character and wise the "me" is the response which the indi¬
so represent a different level of experience. vidual makes to the other individuals in so far
But the process is analogous: we are what we as the individual takes the attitude of the
are in our relationship to other individuals other. It is fair to say that the individual takes
through taking the attitude of the other indi¬ the attitude of the chair. We are definitely in
viduals toward ourselves so that we stimulate that sense taking the attitude of the objects
ourselves by our own gesture, just as a chair about us; while normally this does not get
is what it is in terms of its invitation to sit into the attitude of communication in our
down; the chair is something in which we dealing with inanimate objects, it does take
might sit down, a physical "me," if you like. that form when we say that the chair invites
In a social "me" the various attitudes of all us to sit down, or the bed tempts us to lie
the others are expressed in terms of our own down. Our attitude under those circum¬
gesture, which represents the part we are car¬ stances is, of course, a social attitude. We
rying out in the social cooperative activity. have already discussed the social attitude as
Now the thing we actually do, the words we it appears in the poetry of nature, in myths,
speak, our expressions, our emotions, those rites, and rituals. There we take over the so¬
are the "I"; but they are fused with the "me" cial attitude toward nature itself. In music
in the same sense that all the activities in¬ there is perhaps always some sort of a social
volved in the articles of furniture of the room situation, in terms of the emotional response
are fused with the path followed toward the involved; and the exaltation of music would
drawer and the taking out of the actual paper. have, I suppose, reference to the complete¬
The two situations are identical in that sense. ness of the organization of the response that
The act itself which I have spoken of as the answers to those emotional attitudes. The
"I" in the social situation is a source of unity idea of the fusion of the "I" and the "me" gives
of the whole, while the "me" is the social situ¬ a very adequate basis for the explanation of
ation in which this act can express itself. I this exaltation. I think behavioristic psychol¬
think that we can look at such conduct from ogy provides just the opportunity for such
the general standpoint of intelligent conduct; development of aesthetic theory. The signifi¬
only, as I say, conduct is taking place here in cance of the response in the aesthetic experi¬
this social field in which a self arises in the ence has already been stressed by critics of
social situation in the group, just as the room painting and architecture.
arises in the activity of an individual in get¬ The relationship of the "me" to the "I" is
ting to this particular object he is after. I think the relationship of a situation to the organ¬
the same view can be applied to the appear¬ ism. The situation that presents the problem
ance of the self that applies to the appearance is intelligible to the organism that responds
of an object in a field that constitutes in some to it, and fusion takes place in the act. One
148 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ V. Voices Outside the Discipline
can approach it from the “I" if one knows Whether looked at from the viewpoint of a
definitely what he is going to do. Then one problem which has to be solved or from the
looks at the whole process simply as a set of position of an “V which in a certain sense
means for reaching the known end. Or it can determines its field by its conduct, the fusion
be approached from the point of view of the takes place in the act itself in which the
means and the problem appears then as a means expresses the end.
decision among a set of different ends. The
attitude of one individual calls out this re¬ Endnote
sponse, and the attitude of another individual
calls out another response. There are varied 1. [“Philanthropy from the Point of View of Eth¬
tendencies, and the response of the “I” will be ics,” Intelligent Philanthropy, edited by Faris,
one which relates all of these together. Lane, and Dodd.] ♦
The Conservation of Races 149
Many criteria of race differences have in the a short way toward explaining the different
past been proposed, as color, hair, cranial roles which groups of men have played in
measurements and language. And mani¬ Human Progress, yet there are differences—
festly, in each of these respects, human be¬ subtle, delicate and elusive, though they may
ings differ widely. They vary in color, for in¬ be—which have silently but definitely sepa¬
stance, from the marble-like pallor of the rated men into groups. While these subtle
Scandinavian to the rich, dark brown of the forces have generally followed the natural
Zulu, passing by the creamy Slav, the yellow cleavage of common blood, descent and
Chinese, the light brown Sicilian and the physical peculiarities, they have at other
brown Egyptian. Men vary, too, in the texture times swept across and ignored these. At all
of hair from the obstinately straight hair of times, however, they have divided human be¬
the Chinese to the obstinately tufted and friz¬ ings into races, which, while they perhaps
zled hair of the Bushman. In measurement transcend scientific definition, nevertheless,
of heads, again, men vary; from the broad¬ are clearly defined to the eye of the Historian
headed Tartar to the medium-headed Euro¬ and Sociologist.
pean and the narrow-headed Hottentot; or, If this be true, then the history of the world
again in language, from the highly-inflected is the history, not of individuals, but of
Roman tongue to the monosyllabic Chinese. groups, not of nations, but of races, and he
All these physical characteristics are patent who ignores or seeks to override the race idea
enough, and if they agreed with each other it in human history ignores and overrides the
would be very easy to classify mankind. Un¬ central thought of all history. What, then, is
fortunately for scientists, however, these cri¬ a race? It is a vast family of human beings,
teria of race are most exasperatingly inter¬ generally of common blood and language, al¬
mingled. Color does not agree with texture of ways of common history, traditions and im¬
hair, for many of the dark races have straight pulses, who are both voluntarily and involun¬
hair; nor does color agree with the breadth of tarily striving together for the accomplish¬
the head, for the yellow Tartar has a broader ment of certain more or less vividly conceived
head than the German; nor, again, has the ideals of life.
science of language as yet succeeded in clear¬ Turning to real history, there can be no
ing up the relative authority of these various doubt, first, as to the widespread, nay, univer¬
and contradictory criteria. The final word of sal, prevalence of the race idea, the race
science, so far, is that we have at least two, spirit, the race ideal, and as to its efficiency
perhaps three, great families of human be¬ as the vastest and most ingenious invention
ings—the whites and Negroes, possibly the for human progress. We, who have been
yellow race. That other races have arisen reared and trained under the individualistic
from the intermingling of the blood of these philosophy of the Declaration of Inde¬
two. This broad division of the worlds races pendence and the laisser-faire philosophy of
which men like Huxley and Raetzel have in¬ Adam Smith, are loath to see and loath to
troduced as more nearly true than the old acknowledge this patent fact of human his¬
five-race scheme of Blumenbach, is nothing tory. We see the Pharoahs, Caesars, Tous-
more than an acknowledgment that, so far as saints and Napoleons of history and forget
purely physical characteristics are con¬ the vast races of which they were but epito¬
cerned, the differences between men do not mized expressions. We are apt to think in our
explain all the differences of their history. It American impatience, that while it may have
declares, as Darwin himself said, that great been true in the past that closed race groups
as is the physical unlikeness of the various made history, that here in conglomerate
races of men their likenesses are greater, and America nous avons changer tout cela—we
upon this rests the whole scientific doctrine have changed all that, and have no need of
of Human Brotherhood. this ancient instrument of progress. This as¬
Although the wonderful developments of sumption of which the Negro people are es¬
human history teach that the grosser physi¬ pecially fond, can not be established by a
cal differences of color, hair and bone go but careful consideration of history.
The Conservation of Races 151
We find upon the world s stage today eight nitely transcending them. The forces that
distinctly differentiated races, in the sense in bind together the Teuton nations are, then,
which History tells us the word must be used. first, their race identity and common blood;
They are, the Slavs of eastern Europe, the secondly, and more important, a common
Teutons of middle Europe, the English of history, common laws and religion, similar
Great Britain and America, the Romance na¬ habits of thought and a conscious striving
tions of Southern and Western Europe, the together for certain ideals of life. The whole
Negroes of Africa and America, the Semitic process which has brought about these race
people of Western Asia and Northern Africa, differentiations has been a growth, and the
the Hindoos of Central Asia and the Mon¬ great characteristic of this growth has been
golians of Eastern Asia. There are, of course, the differentiation of spiritual and mental dif¬
other minor race groups, as the American ferences between great races of mankind and
Indians, the Esquimaux and the South Sea the integration of physical differences.
Islanders; these larger races, too, are far from The age of nomadic tribes of closely re¬
homogeneous; the Slav includes the Czech, lated individuals represents the maximum of
the Magyar, the Pole and the Russian; the physical differences. They were practically
Teuton includes the German, the Scandina¬ vast families, and there were as many groups
vian and the Dutch; the English include the as families. As the families came together to
Scotch, the Irish and the conglomerate form cities the physical differences lessened,
American. Under Romance nations the purity of blood was replaced by the require¬
widely-differing Frenchman, Italian, Sicilian
ment of domicile, and all who lived within the
and Spaniard are comprehended. The term
city bounds became gradually to be regarded
Negro is, perhaps, the most indefinite of all,
as members of the group; i.e., there was a
combining the Mulattoes and Zamboes of
slight and slow breaking down of physical
America and the Egyptians, Bantus and
barriers. This, however, was accompanied by
Bushmen of Africa. Among the Hindoos are
an increase of the spiritual and social differ¬
traces of widely differing nations, while the
ences between cities. This city became hus¬
great Chinese, Tartar, Corean and Japanese
bandmen, this, merchants, another warriors,
families fall under the one designation—
and so on. The ideals of life for which the
Mongolian.
different cities struggled were different.
The question now is: What is the real dis¬
When at last cities began to coalesce into na¬
tinction between these nations? Is it the
tions there was another breaking down of
physical differences of blood, color and cra¬
nial measurements? Certainly we must all ac¬ barriers which separated groups of men. The
knowledge that physical differences play a larger and broader differences of color, hair
great part, and that, with wide exceptions and physical proportions were not by any
and qualifications, these eight great races of means ignored, but myriads of minor differ¬
to-day follow the cleavage of physical race ences disappeared, and the sociological and
distinctions; the English and Teuton repre¬ historical races of men began to approximate
sent the white variety of mankind; the Mon¬ the present division of races as indicated by
golian, the yellow; the Negroes, the black. Be¬ physical researches. At the same time the
tween these are many crosses and mixtures, spiritual and physical differences of race
where Mongolian and Teuton have blended groups which constituted the nations be¬
into the Slav, and other mixtures have pro¬ came deep and decisive. The English nation
duced the Romance nations and the Semites. stood for constitutional liberty and commer¬
But while race differences have followed cial freedom; the German nation for science
mainly physical race lines, yet no mere physi¬ and philosophy; the Romance nations stood
cal distinctions would really define or explain for literature and art, and the other race
the deeper differences—the cohesiveness and groups are striving, each in its own way, to
continuity of these groups. The deeper differ¬ develope for civilization its particular mes¬
ences are spiritual, psychical, differences— sage, its particular ideal, which shall help to
undoubtedly based on the physical, but infi¬ guide the world nearer and nearer that per-
152 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ VI. Neglected Voices
fection of human life for which we all long, white Americans. That if in America it is to
that “one far off Divine event." be proven for the first time in the modern
This has been the function of race differ¬ world that not only Negroes are capable of
ences up to the present time. What shall be evolving individual men like Toussaint, the
its function in the future? Manifestly some of Saviour, but are a nation stored with wonder¬
the great races of today—particularly the Ne¬ ful possibilities of culture, then their destiny
gro race—have not as yet given to civilization is not a servile imitation of Anglo-Saxon cul¬
the full spiritual message which they are ca¬ ture, but a stalwart originality which shall
pable of giving. I will not say that the Negro unswervingly follow Negro ideals.
race has as yet given no message to the world, It may, however, be objected here that the
for it is still a mooted question among scien¬ situation of our race in America renders this
tists as to just how far Egyptian civilization attitude impossible; that our sole hope of sal¬
was Negro in its origin; if it was not wholly vation lies in our being able to lose our race
Negro, it was certainly very closely allied. Be identity in the commingled blood of the na¬
that as it may, however the fact still remains tion; and that any other course would merely
that the full, complete Negro message of the increase the friction of races which we call
whole Negro race has not as yet been given race prejudice, and against which we have so
to the world: that the messages and ideal of long and so earnestly fought.
the yellow race have not been completed, and Here, then, is the dilemma, and it is a puz¬
that the striving of the mighty Slavs has but zling one, I admit. No Negro who has given
begun. The question is, then: How shall this
earnest thought to the situation of his people
message be delivered; how shall these various
in America has failed, at some time in life, to
ideals be realized? The answer is plain: By the
find himself at these cross-roads; has failed
development of these race groups, not as in¬
to ask himself at some time: What, after all,
dividuals, but as races. For the development
am I? Am I an American or am I a Negro?
of Japanese genius, Japanese literature and
Can I be both? Or is it my duty to cease to be
art, Japanese spirit, only Japanese, bound
a Negro as soon as possible and be an Ameri¬
and welded together, Japanese inspired by
can? If I strive as a Negro, am I not perpetu¬
one vast ideal, can work out in its fullness the
wonderful message which Japan has for the ating the very cleft that threatens and sepa¬
nations of the earth. For the development of rates Black and White America? Is not my
Negro genius, of Negro literature and art, of only possible practical aim the subduction of
Negro spirit, only Negroes bound and welded all that is Negro in me to the American? Does
together, Negroes inspired by one vast ideal, my black blood place upon me any more ob¬
can work out in its fullness the great message ligation to assert my nationality than Ger¬
we have for humanity. We cannot reverse his¬ man, or Irish or Italian blood would?
tory; we are subject to the same natural laws It is such incessant self-questioning and
as other races, and if the Negro is ever to be the hesitation that arises from it, that is mak¬
a factor in the world s history—if among the ing the present period a time of vacillation
gaily-colored banners that deck the broad and contradiction for the American Negro;
ramparts of civilization is to hang one un¬ combined race action is stifled, race respon¬
compromising black, then it must be placed sibility is shirked, race enterprises languish,
there by black hands, fashioned by black and the best blood, the best talent, the best
heads and hallowed by the travail of energy of the Negro people cannot be mar¬
200,000,000 black hearts beating in one glad shalled to do the bidding of the race. They
song of jubilee. stand back to make room for every rascal and
For this reason, the advance guard of the demagogue who chooses to cloak his selfish
Negro people—the 8,000,000 people of Negro deviltry under the veil of race pride.
blood in the United States of America—must Is this right? Is it rational? Is it good pol¬
soon come to realize that if they are to take icy? Have we in America a distinct mission as
their just place in the van of Pan-Negroism, a race—a distinct sphere of action and an
then their destiny is not absorption by the opportunity for race development, or is self-
The Conservation of Races 153
obliteration the highest end to which Negro gro newspapers, Negro business organiza¬
blood dare aspire? tions, a Negro school of literature and art,
If we carefully consider what race preju¬ and an intellectual clearing house, for all
dice really is, we find it, historically, to be these products of the Negro mind, which we
nothing but the friction between different may call a Negro Academy. Not only is all this
groups of people; it is the difference in aim, necessary for positive advance, it is abso¬
in feeling, in ideals of two different races; if, lutely imperative for negative defense. Let us
now, this difference exists touching territory, not deceive ourselves at our situation in this
laws, language, or even religion, it is manifest country. Weighted with a heritage of moral
that these people cannot live in the same ter¬ iniquity from our past history, hard pressed
ritory without fatal collision; but if, on the in the economic world by foreign immigrants
other hand, there is substantial agreement in and native prejudice, hated here, despised
laws, language and religion; if there is a sat¬ there and pitied everywhere; our one haven
isfactory adjustment of economic life, then of refuge is ourselves, and but one means of
there is no reason why, in the same country advance, our own belief in our great destiny,
and on the same street, two or three great our own implicit trust in our ability and
national ideals might not thrive and develop, worth. There is no power under Gods high
that men of different races might not strive
heaven that can stop the advance of eight
together for their race ideals as well, perhaps
thousand thousand honest, earnest, inspired
even better, than in isolation. Here, it seems
and united people. But—and here is the
to me, is the reading of the riddle that puzzles
rub—they must be honest, fearlessly criticis¬
so many of us. We are Americans, not only by
ing their own faults, zealously correcting
birth and by citizenship, but by our political
them; they must be earnest. No people that
ideals, our language, our religion. Farther
laughs at itself, and ridicules itself, and
than that, our Americanism does not go. At
wishes to God it was anything but itself ever
that point, we are Negroes, members of a vast
wrote its name in history; it must be inspired
historic race that from the very dawn of cre¬
with the Divine faith of our black mothers,
ation has slept, but half awakening in the
dark forests of its African fatherland. We are that out of the blood and dust of battle will
the first fruits of this new nation, the harbin¬ march a victorious host, a mighty nation, a
ger of that black to-morrow which is yet des¬ peculiar people, to speak to the nations of
tined to soften the whiteness of the Teutonic earth a Divine truth that shall make them
to-day. We are that people whose subtle sense free. And such a people must be united; not
of song has given America its only American merely united for the organized theft of po¬
music, its only American fairy tales, its only litical spoils, not united to disgrace religion
touch of pathos and humor amid its mad with whoremongers and ward-heelers; not
money-getting plutocracy. As such, it is our united merely to protest and pass resolutions,
duty to conserve our physical powers, our but united to stop the ravages of consump¬
intellectual endowments, our spiritual ideals; tion among the Negro people, united to keep
as a race we must strive by race organization, black boys from loafing, gambling and crime;
by race solidarity, by race unity to the reali¬ united to guard the purity of black women
zation of that broader humanity which freely and to reduce that vast army of black prosti¬
recognizes differences in men, but sternly tutes that is today marching to hell; and
deprecates inequality in their opportunities united in serious organizations, to determine
of development. by careful conference and thoughtful inter¬
For the accomplishment of these ends we change of opinion the broad lines of policy
need race organizations: Negro colleges, Ne¬ and action for the American Negro. . . . ♦
154 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ VI. Neglected Voices
each is entitled to fair pay for services ren¬ duties and services of the mother entitle her
dered. to support.
To take this ground and hold it honestly, If this is so, if motherhood is an exchange¬
wives, as earners through domestic service, able commodity given by women in payment
are entitled to the wages of cooks, house¬ for clothes and food, then we must of course
maids, nursemaids, seamstresses, or house¬ find some relation between the quantity or
keepers, and to no more. This would of quality of the motherhood and the quantity
course reduce the spending money of the and quality of the pay. This being true, then
wives of the rich, and put it out of the power the women who are not mothers have no eco¬
of the poor man to “support” a wife at all, nomic status at all; and the economic status
unless, indeed, the poor man faced the situ¬ of those who are must be shown to be relative
ation fully, paid his wife her wages as house to their motherhood. This is obviously ab¬
servant, and then she and he combined their surd. The childless wife has as much money
funds in the support of their children. He as the mother of many—more; for the chil¬
would be keeping a servant: she would be dren of the latter consume what would other¬
helping keep the family. But nowhere on wise be hers; and the inefficient mother is no
earth would there be “a rich woman” by these less provided for than the efficient one. Vis¬
means. Even the highest class of private ibly, and upon the face of it, women are not
housekeeper, useful as her services are, does maintained in economic prosperity propor¬
not accumulate a fortune. She does not buy tioned to their motherhood. Motherhood
diamonds and sables and keep a carriage. bears no relation to their economic status.
Things like these are not earned by house Among primitive races, it is true,—in the pa¬
service. triarchal period, for instance,—there was
But the salient fact in this discussion is some truth in this position. Women being of
that, whatever the economic value of the do¬ no value whatever save as bearers of children,
mestic industry of women is, they do not get their favor and indulgence did bear direct
it: The women who do the most work get the relation to maternity; and they had reason to
least money, and the women who have the exult on more grounds than one when they
most money do the least work. Their labor is could boast a son. To-day, however, the main¬
neither given nor taken as a factor in eco¬ tenance of the woman is not conditioned
nomic exchange. It is held to be their duty as upon this. A man is not allowed to discard his
women to do this work; and their economic wife because she is barren. The claim of
status bears no relation to their domestic la¬ motherhood as a factor in economic ex¬
bors, unless an inverse one. Moreover, if they change is false to-day. But suppose it were
were thus fairly paid,—given what they true. Are we willing to hold this ground, even
earned, and no more,—all women working in in theory? Are we willing to consider moth¬
this way would be reduced to the economic erhood as a business, a form of commercial
status of the house servant. Few women—or exchange? Are the cares and duties of the
men either—care to face this condition. The mother, her travail and her love, commodi¬
ground that women earn their living by do¬ ties to be exchanged for bread?
mestic labor is instantly forsaken, and we are It is revolting so to consider them; and, if
told that they obtain their livelihood as moth¬ we dare face our own thoughts, and force
ers. This is a peculiar position. We speak of it them to their logical conclusion, we shall see
commonly enough, and often with deep feel¬ that nothing could be more repugnant to hu¬
ing, but without due analysis. man feeling, or more socially and individu¬
In treating of an economic exchange, ask¬ ally injurious, than to make motherhood a
ing what return in goods or labor women trade. Driven off these alleged grounds of
make for the goods and labor given them,— womens economic independence; shown
either to the rate collectively or to their hus¬ that women, as a class, neither produce nor
bands individually,—what payment women distribute wealth; that women, as individu¬
make for their clothes and shoes and furni¬ als, labor mainly as house servants, are not
ture and food and shelter, we are told that the paid as such, and would not be satisfied with
156 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ VI. Neglected Voices
such an economic status if they were so paid; enough remains to devote to the individual
that wives are not business partners or co¬ interests of the mother.
producers of wealth with their husbands, un¬ Such a condition, did it exist, would of
less they actually practise the same profes¬ course excuse and justify the pitiful depen¬
sion; that they are not salaried as mothers, dence of the human female, and her support
and that it would be unspeakably degrading by the male. As the queen bee, modified en¬
if they were,—what remains to those who tirely to maternity, is supported, not by the
deny that women are supported by men? This male, to be sure, but by her co-workers, the
(and a most amusing position it is),—that the 'old maids," the barren working bees, who
function of maternity unfits a woman for eco¬ labor so patiently and lovingly in their branch
nomic production, and, therefore, it is right of the maternal duties of the hive, so would
that she should be supported by her husband. the human female, modified entirely to ma¬
The ground is taken that the human fe¬ ternity, become unfit for any other exertion,
male is not economically independent, that and a helpless dependant.
she is fed by the male of her species. In denial Is this the condition of human mother¬
of this, it is first alleged that she is econom¬ hood? Does the human mother, by her moth¬
ically independent,—that she does support erhood, thereby lose control of brain and
herself by her own industry in the house. It body, lose power and skill and desire for any
being shown that there is no relation between other work? Do we see before us the human
the economic status of woman and the labor race, with all its females segregated entirely
to the uses of motherhood, consecrated, set
she performs in the home, it is then alleged
apart, specially developed, spending every
that not as house servant, but as mother, does
power of their nature on the service of their
woman earn her living. It being shown that
children?
the economic status of woman bears no rela¬
We do not. We see the human mother
tion to her motherhood, either in quantity or
worked far harder than a mare, laboring her
quality, it is then alleged that motherhood
life long in the service, not of her children
renders a woman unfit for economic produc¬
only, but of men; husbands, brothers, fathers,
tion, and that, therefore, it is right that she be
whatever male relatives she has; for mother
supported by her husband. Before going far¬
and sister also; for the church a little, if she
ther, let us seize upon this admission,—that
is allowed; for society, if she is able; for char¬
she is supported by her husband.
ity and education and reform,—working in
Without going into either the ethics or the
many ways that are not the ways of mother¬
necessities of the case, we have reached so
hood.
much common ground: the female of genus
It is not motherhood that keeps the house¬
homo is supported by the male. Whereas, in
wife on her feet from dawn till dark; it is
other species of animals, male and female
house service, not child service. Women work
alike graze and browse, hunt and kill, climb,
longer and harder than most men, and not
swim, dig, run, and fly for their livings, in our
solely in maternal duties. The savage mother
species the female does not seek her own liv¬ carries the burdens, and does all menial ser¬
ing in the specific activities of our race, but vice for the tribe. The peasant mother toils in
is fed by the male. the fields, and the workingmans wife in the
Now as to the alleged necessity. Because of home. Many mothers, even now, are wage-
her maternal duties, the human female is earners for the family, as well as bearers and
said to be unable to get her own living. As the rearers of it. And the women who are not so
maternal duties of other females do not unfit occupied, the women who belong to rich
them for getting their own living and also the men,—here perhaps is the exhaustive devo¬
livings of their young, it would seem that the tion to maternity which is supposed to justify
human maternal duties require the segrega¬ an admitted economic dependence. But we
tion of the entire energies of the mother to do not find it even among these. Women of
the service of the child during her entire adult ease and wealth provide for their children
life, or so large a proportion of them that not better care than the poor woman can; but
The Dependence of Women 157
they do not spend more time upon it them¬ hood are surely not alleged as preventing eco¬
selves, nor more care and effort. They have nomic independence.
other occupation. The working power of the mother has al¬
In spite of her supposed segregation to ma¬ ways been a prominent factor in human life.
ternal duties, the human female, the world She is the worker par excellence, but her work
over, works at extra-maternal duties for is not such as to affect her economic status.
hours enough to provide her with an inde¬ Her living, all that she gets,—food, clothing,
pendent living, and then is denied inde¬ ornaments, amusements, luxuries,—these
pendence on the ground that motherhood bear no relation to her power to produce
prevents her working!
wealth, to her services in the house, or to her
If this ground were tenable, we should find
motherhood. These things bear relation only
a world full of women who never lifted a fin¬
to the man she marries, the man she depends
ger save in the service of their children, and
on,—to how much he has and how much he
of men who did all the work besides, and
is willing to give her. The women whose
waited on the women whom motherhood
prevented from waiting on themselves. The splendid extravagance dazzles the world,
ground is not tenable. A human female, whose economic goods are the greatest, are
healthy, sound, has twenty-five years of life often neither house workers nor mothers, but
before she is a mother, and should have simply the women who hold most power over
twenty-five years more after the period of the men who have the most money. The fe¬
such maternal service as is expected of her male of genus homo is economically depen¬
has been given. The duties of grandmother- dent on the male. He is her food supply. ♦
158 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ VI. Neglected Voices
they have an opportunity, may we not say that tion in civic life would bring to them, but they
city housekeeping has failed partly because are losing what they have always had. From
women, the traditional housekeepers, have the beginning of tribal life women have been
not been consulted as to its multiform activi¬ held responsible for the health of the commu¬
ties? The men of the city have been carelessly nity, a function which is now represented by
indifferent to much of this civic housekeep¬ the health department; from the days of the
ing, as they have always been indifferent to cave dwellers, so far as the home was clean
the details of the household. They have totally and wholesome, it was due to their efforts,
disregarded a candidate s capacity to keep the which are now represented by the bureau of
streets clean, preferring to consider him in tenement-house inspection; from the period
relation to the national tariff or to the neces¬ of the primitive village, the only public
sity for increasing the national navy, in a pure sweeping performed was what they under¬
spirit of reversion to the traditional type of took in their own dooryards, that which is
government which had to do only with ene¬ now represented by the bureau of street
mies and outsiders. cleaning. Most of the departments in a mod¬
It is difficult to see what military prowess em city can be traced to womans traditional
has to do with the multiform duties, which, activity, but in spite of this, so soon as these
in a modem city, include the care of parks old affairs were turned over to the care of the
and libraries, superintendence of markets, city, they slipped from womans hands, ap¬
sewers’ and bridges, the inspection of provi¬ parently because they then became matters
sions and boilers, and the proper disposal of for collective action and implied the use of
garbage. Military prowess has nothing to do the franchise. Because the franchise had in
with the building department which the city the first instance been given to the man who
maintains to see to it that the basements be could fight, because in the beginning he
dry, that the bedrooms be large enough to alone could vote who could carry a weapon,
afford the required cubic feet of air, that the the franchise was considered an improper
plumbing be sanitary, that the gas-pipes do thing for a woman to possess. . . .
not leak, that the tenement-house court be ... It is so easy to believe that things that
large enough to afford light and ventilation, used to exist still go on long after they are
and that the stairways be fireproof. The abil¬ passed; it is so easy to commit irreparable
ity to carry arms has nothing to do with the blunders because we fail to correct our theo¬
health department maintained by the city, ries by our changing experience. So many of
which provides that children be vaccinated, the stumbling-blocks against which we fail
that contagious diseases be isolated and pla¬ are the opportunities to which we have not
carded, that the spread of tuberculosis be adjusted ourselves. Because it shocks an ob¬
curbed, and that the water be free from ty¬ solete ideal, we keep hold of a convention
phoid infection. Certainly the military con¬ which no longer squares with our genuine
ception of society is remote from the func¬ insight, and we are slow to follow a clue
tions of the school boards, whose concern it which might enable us to solace and improve
is that children be educated, that they be sup¬ the life about us.
plied with kindergartens and be given a de¬ Why is it that women do not vote upon the
cent place in which to play. The very multi¬ matters which concern them so intimately?
fariousness and complexity of a city govern¬ Why do they not follow these vital affairs and
ment demands the help of minds accustomed feel responsible for their proper adminis¬
to detail and variety of work, to a sense of tration, even though they have become mu¬
obligation for the health and welfare of nicipalized? What would the result have been
young children, and to a responsibility for the could women have regarded the suffrage, not
cleanliness and comfort of others. as a right or a privilege, but as a mere piece
Because all these things have traditionally of governmental machinery without which
been in the hands of women, if they take no they could not perform their traditional func¬
part in them now, they are not only missing tions under the changed conditions of city
the education which the natural participa¬ life? Could we view the whole situation as a
160 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ VI. Neglected Voices
matter of obligation and of normal develop¬ under the age of twenty-five years. This in¬
ment, it would be much simplified. We are at crease in the number of young girls in indus¬
the beginning of a prolonged effort to incor¬ try is the more striking when taken in con¬
porate a progressive developing life founded nection with the fact that industries of to-day
upon a response to the needs of all the people, differ most markedly from those of the past
into the requisite legal enactments and civic in the relentless speed which they require.
institutions. To be in any measure successful, This increase in speed is as marked in the
this effort will require all the intelligent pow¬ depths of sweat-shop labor as in the most
ers of observation, all the sympathy, all the advanced New England mills, where the
common sense which may be gained from eight looms operated by each worker have
the whole adult population. . . . increased to twelve, fourteen, and even six¬
It is questionable whether women to-day, teen looms. This speed, of course, brings a
in spite of the fact that there are myriads of new strain into industry and tends inevitably
them in factories and shops, are doing their to nervous exhaustion. Machines may be re¬
full share of the world s work in the lines of volved more and more swiftly, but the girl
production which have always been theirs. workers have no increase in vitality respond¬
Even two centuries ago they did practically ing to the heightened pressure. An ampler
all the spinning, dyeing, weaving, and sew¬ and more far-reaching protection than now
ing. They carried on much of the brewing and exists, is needed in order to care for the health
baking and thousands of operations which and safety of woman in industry. Their youth,
have been pushed out of the domestic system their helplessness, their increasing numbers,
into the factory system. But simply to keep the conditions under which they are em¬
on doing the work which their grandmothers ployed, all call for uniform and enforceable
did, was to find themselves surrounded by statutes. The elaborate regulations of danger¬
conditions over which they have no control. ous trades, enacted in England and on the
Sometimes when I see dozens of young Continent for both adults and children, find
girls going into the factories of a certain bis¬ no parallel in the United States. The injurious
cuit company on the West Side of Chicago, effects of employments involving the use of
they appear for the moment as a mere cross- poisons, acids, gases, atmospheric extremes,
section in the long procession of women who or other dangerous processes, still await ade¬
have furnished the breadstuffs from time im¬ quate investigation and legislation in this
memorial, from the savage woman who country. How shall this take place, save by the
ground the meal and baked a flat cake, concerted efforts of the women themselves,
through innumerable cottage hearths, kitch¬ those who are employed, and those other
ens, and bake ovens, to this huge concern in women who are intelligent as to the workers
which they are still carrying on their tradi¬ needs and who possess a conscience in re¬
tional business. But always before, during gard to industrial affairs? . . .
the ages of this unending procession, women So far as women have been able, in Chi¬
themselves were able to dictate concerning cago at least, to help, the poorest workers in
the hours and the immediate conditions of the sweatshops, it has been accomplished by
their work; even grinding the meal and bak¬ women organized into trades unions. The or¬
ing the cake in the ashes was diversified by ganization of Special Order Tailors found
many other activities. But suddenly, since the that it was comparatively simple for an em¬
application of steam to the processes of ployer to give the skilled operatives in a cloth¬
kneading bread and of turning the spindle, ing factory more money by taking it away
which really means only a different motor from the wages of the seam-sewer and but¬
power and not in the least an essential change ton-holer. The fact that it resulted in one set
in her work, she has been denied the privilege of workers being helped at the expense of
of regulating the conditions which immedi¬ another set did not appeal to him, so long as
ately surround her. . . . he was satisfying the demand of the union
Practically one-half of the working women without increasing the total cost of produc¬
in the United States are girls—young women tion. But the Special Order Tailors, at the sac-
Utilization of Women in City Government 161
rifice of their own wages and growth, made and upon this basis he prospered for several
a determined effort to include even the sweat¬ months.
shop workers in the benefits they had slowly Whether the organizer was “fixed” or not,
secured for themselves. By means of the use the investigation did not make clear; for, al¬
of the label they were finally able to insist that though the “Nursery Mother,” with her fel¬
no goods should be given out for home-fin¬ low-workers, had paid their union dues regu¬
ishing save to women presenting union larly, the employer was not compelled to pay
cards, and they raised the wages from nine the union scale of wages, but continued to
and eleven cents a dozen for finishing gar¬ pay the same wages as before. At the end of
ments, to the minimum wage of fifteen cents. three months his employees discovered that
They also made a protest against the exces¬ they were not being paid the union scale, and
sive subdivision of the labor upon garments, demanded that their wages be raised to that
a practice which enables the manufacturer to amount. The employer, in the meantime hav¬
use children and the least skilled adults. ing extensively advertised his use of the label,
Thirty-two persons are commonly employed concluded that his purpose had been served,
upon a single coat, and it is the purpose of and that he no longer needed the union. He
the Special Order Tailors to have all the ma¬ refused, therefore, to pay the union scale, and
chine work performed by one worker, thus a strike ensued. The “Nursery Mother” went
reducing the number working on one coat to out with the rest, and within a few days found
work in another shop, a union shop doing a
twelve or fourteen. As this change will at the
lower grade of manufacturing. At that time
same time demand more skill on the part of
there was no uniform scale in the garment
the operator, and will increase the variety and
trades, and although a trade unionist work¬
interest in his work, these garment-makers
ing for union wages, she received lower
are sacrificing both time and money for the
wages than she had under the non-union con¬
defence of Ruskinian principles—one of the
ditions in the overall factory. She was natu¬
few actual attempts to recover the “joy of
rally much confused and, following her in¬
work/'. . . The poorest women are often but
stinct to get the best wages possible, she went
uncomprehending victims of this labor
back to her old place. Affairs ran smoothly
movement of which they understand so little,
for a few weeks, until the employer discov¬
and which has become so much a matter of
ered that he was again losing trade because
battle that helpless individuals are lost in the
his goods lacked the label, whereupon he
conflict. once more applied to have his shop union¬
A complicated situation occurs to me in ized. The organizer, coming back, promptly
illustration. A woman from the Hull-House discovered the recreant “Nursery Mother,”
Day Nursery came to me two years ago ask¬ and, much to her bewilderment, she was
ing to borrow twenty-five dollars, a sum her fined twenty-five dollars. She understood
union had imposed as a fine. She gave such nothing clearly, nor could she, indeed, be
an incoherent account of her plight that it made to understand so long as she was in the
was evident that she did not in the least midst of this petty warfare. Her labor was a
understand what it was all about. A little in¬ mere method of earning money quite de¬
vestigation disclosed the following facts: The tached from her European experience, and
“Nursery Mother/’ as I here call her for pur¬ failed to make for her the remotest connec¬
poses of identification, had worked for a long tion with the community whose genuine
time in an unorganized overall factory, where needs she was supplying. No effort had been
the proprietor, dealing as he did in goods pur¬ made to show her the cultural aspect of her
chased exclusively by workingmen, found it work, to give her even the feeblest under¬
increasingly difficult to sell his overalls be¬ standing of the fact that she was supplying a
cause they did not bear the union label. He genuine need of the community, and that she
finally made a request to the union that the was entitled to respect and a legitimate in¬
employees in his factory be organized. This dustrial position. It would have been neces¬
was done, he was given the use of the label, sary to make such an effort from the historic
162 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ VI. Neglected Voices
standpoint, and this could be undertaken women of the age; that they are those who are
only by the community as a whole and not by fighting conditions which limit their free¬
any one class in it. Protective legislation dom, and although they are doing it blindly,
would be but the first step toward making her at least they are demanding avenues of self-
a more valuable producer and a more intelli¬ expression outside their work; and that this
gent citizen. The whole effort would imply a struggle from conditions detrimental to their
closer connection between industry and gov¬ highest life is the ever-recurring story of the
ernment, and could be accomplished intelli¬ emancipation of first one class and then an¬
gently only if women were permitted to exer¬ other. It was further contended that in this
cise the franchise. effort to become sufficiently educated to be
A certain healing and correction would able to understand the needs of an educated
doubtless ensue could we but secure for the employer from an independent standpoint,
protection and education of industrial work¬ they are really doing the community a great
ers that nurture of health and morals which service, and did they but receive co-operation
women have so long reserved for their own instead of opposition, domestic service
families and which has never been utilized as would lose its social ostracism and attract a
a directing force in industrial affairs. more intelligent class of women. And yet this
When the family constituted the industrial effort, perfectly reasonable from the stand¬
organism of the day, the daughters of the point of historic development and demo¬
household were carefully taught in reference cratic tradition, receives little help from the
to the place they would take in that organism, employing housekeepers, because they know
but as the household arts have gone outside nothing of industrial development. . . .
the home, almost nothing has been done to ... If American women could but obtain a
connect the young women with the present liberating knowledge of that history of indus¬
great industrial system. This neglect has been try and commerce which is so similar in every
equally true in regard to the technical and country of the globe, the fact that so much
cultural sides of that system. factory labor is performed by immigrants
The failure to fit the education of women would help to bring them nearer to the immi¬
to the actual industrial life which is carried grant woman. Equipped with "the informing
on about them has had disastrous results in mind" on the one hand and with experience
two directions. First, industry itself has on the other, we could then walk together
lacked the modification which women might through the marvelous streets of the human
have brought to it had they committed the city, no longer conscious whether we are na¬
entire movement to that growing concern for tives or aliens, because we have become ab¬
a larger and more satisfying life for each sorbed in a fraternal relation arising from a
member of the community, a concern which common experience.
we have come to regard as legitimate. Sec¬ And this attitude of understanding and re¬
ond, the more prosperous women would spect for the worker is necessary, not only to
have been able to understand and adjust their appreciate what he produces, but to preserve
own difficulties of household management in his power of production, again showing the
relation to the producer of factory products, necessity for making that substitute for
as they are now utterly unable to do. war—human labor—more aggressive and
As the census of 1900 showed that more democratic. We are told that the conquered
than half of the women employed in "gainful races everywhere, in their helplessness, are
occupations" in the United States are en¬ giving up the genuine practise of their own
gaged in households, certainly their condi¬ arts. In India, for instance, where their arts
tions of labor he largely in the hands of have been the blossom of many years of labor,
women employers. At a conference held at the conquered races are casting them aside
Lake Placid by employers of household labor, as of no value in order that they may conform
it was contended that future historical review to the inferior art, or rather, lack of art, of
may show that the girls who are to-day in their conquerors. Morris constantly la¬
domestic service are the really progressive mented that in some parts of India the native
Utilization of Women in City Government 163
arts were quite destroyed, and in many others her old place in industry, the modern woman
nearly so; that in all parts they had more or must needs fit her labors to the present indus¬
less begun to sicken. This lack of respect and trial organization as the simpler woman fit¬
understanding of the primitive arts found ted hers to the more simple industrial order.
among colonies of immigrants in a modern It has been pointed out that woman lost her
cosmopolitan city, produces a like result in earlier place when man usurped the indus¬
that the arts languish and disappear. We have trial pursuits and created wealth on a scale
made an effort at Hull-House to recover unknown before. Since that time women
something of the early industries from an im¬ have been reduced more and more to a state
migrant neighborhood, and in a little exhibit of dependency, until we see only among the
called a labor museum, we have placed in European peasant women as they work in the
historic sequence and order methods of spin¬ fields, 'The heavy, strong, enduring, patient,
ning and weaving from a dozen nationalities economically functional representative of
in Asia Minor and Europe. The result has what the women of our day used to be.”
been a striking exhibition of the unity and Cultural education as it is at present car¬
similarity of the earlier industrial processes. ried on in the most advanced schools, is to
Within the narrow confines of one room, the some extent correcting the present detached
Syrian, the Greek, the Italian, the Russian, relation of women to industry but a sense of
the Norwegian, the Dutch, and the Irish find responsibility in relation to the development
that the differences in their spinning have of industry would accomplish much more. As
been merely putting the distaff upon a frame
men earned their citizenship through their
or placing the old hand-spindle in a horizon¬
readiness and ability to defend their city, so
tal position. A group of women representing
perhaps woman, if she takes a citizen s place
vast differences in religion, in language, in
in the modern industrial city, will have to
tradition, and in nationality, exhibit practi¬
earn it by devotion and self-abnegation in the
cally no difference in the daily arts by which,
service of its complex needs.
for a thousand generations, they have clothed
The old social problems were too often
their families. When American women come
made a cause of war in the belief that all
to visit them, the quickest method, in fact
difficulties could be settled by an appeal to
almost the only one of establishing a genuine
arms. But certainly these subtler problems
companionship with them, is through this
which confront the modern cosmopolitan
same industry, unless we except that still
city, the problems of race antagonisms and
older occupation, the care of little children.
Perhaps this experiment may claim to have economic adjustments, must be settled by a
made a genuine effort to find the basic expe¬ more searching and genuine method than
riences upon which a cosmopolitan commu¬ mere prowess can possibly afford. The first
nity may unite at least on the industrial step toward their real solution must be made
side. . . . upon a past experience common to the citi¬
Can we learn our first lesson in modern zens as a whole and connected with their
industry from these humble peasant women daily living. As moral problems become more
who have never shirked the primitive labors and more associated with our civic and in¬
upon which all civilized life is founded, even dustrial organizations, the demand for en¬
as we must obtain our first lessons in social larged activity is more exigent. If one could
morality from those who are bearing the connect the old maternal anxieties, which are
brunt of the overcrowded and cosmopolitan really the basis of family and tribal life, with
city which is the direct result of modem in¬ the candidates who are seeking offices, it
dustrial conditions? If we contend that the would never be necessary to look about for
franchise should be extended to women on other motive powers, and if to this we could
the ground that less emphasis is continually add maternal concern for the safety and de¬
placed upon the military order and more fence of the industrial worker, we should
upon the industrial order of society, we have an increasing code of protective legisla¬
should have to insist that, if she would secure tion.
164 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ VI. Neglected Voices
We certainly may hope for two results if ticipation in actual affairs always brings. As
women enter formally into municipal life. we believe that woman has no right to allow
First, the opportunity to fulfill their old du¬ what really belongs to her to drop away from
ties and obligations with the safeguard and her, so we contend that ability to perform an
the consideration which the ballot alone can obligation comes very largely in proportion
secure for them under the changed condi¬ as that obligation is conscientiously as¬
tions, and, second, the education which par¬ sumed. ♦
Feminism and Conventionality 165
day, many a suffragist, however ardent, is un¬ ing been in the home, her acquaintances have
possessed of this insight. Anxious beyond been restricted to the family circle and to the
measure for the vote, she is wholly unpertur¬ segments of the other family circles it over¬
bed by the constraints of her daily life. Loath laps. And with these friends and relatives her
to be wholly dependent upon men in the lim¬ intercourse is unbroken and more or less in¬
ited number of matters which make up gov¬ cessant. The womanly woman has ever been
ernment, she is willing enough to be depen¬ an available woman, "always there when you
dent upon them and upon women too in wanted her." From such "home life” there
those endless details of daily life any woman have been for all women two prime out¬
might be expected to determine for herself. I comes. The unfamiliar person, the stranger,
recently attended a political convention at has been feared and shunned, more feared
Saratoga where several women were lobby¬ and shunned by women even than by men.
ing for suffrage. One evening one of them Women in other words are peculiarly appre¬
wanted to go with a man to a dance, but she hensive of people of other localities, of other
would not go, I overheard her declare, unless tribes or nations, of other castes, of other
another woman went with them. The follow¬ sets; and with such outlanders or outsiders
ing afternoon another suffragist who had they have as little to do as possible. Women
started to motor to New York took the train are "inhospitable." They are "snobs." They
at Albany because, thanks to an unforeseen are "full of prejudices." They are not "good
emergency, one of the two men motoring mixers."
with her had to remain in Albany. "I couldn't But to this characteristic tendency of
think of getting into New York after midnight women to keep to themselves, there are two
with only one man. ..." Is not chaperonage exceptions. Within the home itself women as¬
a more important question for women, I sociate with strangers, i.e., with those unlike
wonder, than suffrage? themselves, unlike in age and in sex, and sel¬
Comparative inability to choose either dom, too, are the times when women do not
solitariness or their company is not charac¬ have to put up with this association. Being
teristic merely of modern women. In no cul¬ "home bodies," they cannot get away, like
ture have women shown desire to do any¬ men, from their children or their parents,
thing which requires running the risks of be¬ they have to make the best of their brothers
ing alone. Women hermits are extremely or their husbands. Face to face with these
scarce, there are few women explorers, there heterogeneities of sex or age, women have
are no women vagabonds, even the licensed raised up barriers against them, carefully
adventuress, too restricted in her activity for regulating their relations with their juniors
any real adventure, is outcasted in a group. and seniors and with the other sex. Their at¬
Rarely indeed do women go off by them¬ titude is very conventional with members of
selves—into the comer of a ballroom, into the different age classes and with men, more con¬
wilderness, to the play, to the sacred high ventional, I mean, than that of men with
places of the earth or to the Islands of the women or with those unlike in age—and this
Blessed. Penelope stays at home. Her reasons is the second important outcome for women
for staying at home vary, of course. She has of their home life. Upon women age and sex
to help her mother; she will be raped by a taboos are heavier than upon men. And it is
licentious male, a man or perhaps a god; she they who are the foremost teachers of the
owes obedience to her parents; she will lose proprieties, of politeness, of good manners,
her reputation; she will give birth to a mon¬ of the amenities—all rules of conduct for life
ster or her baby will die; she has to get the with others more or less unlike yourself and
dinner ready; she has to look after the baby; yet not to be avoided.
she will bring disgrace to her family, dishonor With beings unlike yourself the alternative
to her husband, shame upon her children, to conventionality is avoidance. And that al¬
disaster to her clan. ternative is taken on the whole by men in
Whatever the sanctions, whatever the ne¬ relation both to their juniors and seniors2 and
cessities or the excuses, womans place hav¬ to women. More or less unconsciously they
Feminism and Conventionality 167
avoid women and more or less deliberately fast. Throughout the first night of an initia¬
they exclude them from their interests and tion Mita-Koodi women are expected to wail.
their places of assembly—from their eco¬ The kinswomen of an Euahlayi initiate are
nomic pursuits, from their learned profes¬ supposed to be so much in need of comfort¬
sions, from their games and pastimes, from ing that the old men bring them presents of
their club-houses, churches,3 forums, coun¬ food. In other Australian tribes we find rites
cil halls, universities, and play-houses. Even to symbolize the separation imminent be¬
the initiative in the avoidance practiced tween the initiate and his kinswomen.
within the family group is taken, I surmise, Among the Kurnai he sprinkles his mother
by men.4 At home and away from it such se- with water, among the Arunta he throws his
clusiveness and exclusiveness in men result, boomerang towards her spirit camp to show
of course, in increasing the differences be¬ her, the ethnographers suggest, that all is at
tween them and women. Increased differ¬ an end between them.8 But the initiates are
ences stimulate to greater seclusiveness or turning their backs on their mother only to
exclusiveness; we get a closed circle. turn their faces towards their father and their
For the moment let us turn away from this fathers friends. For these seniors, upon tak¬
closed circle to consider certain sex differen¬ ing into their life youthful participants, an
tiations in customs at times of crisis. We adjustment is necessary, and it is for them to
noted that the heterogeneities of sex and of get it over with as quickly and easily as pos¬
age are more constantly under the noses of sible. Naturally they resort to the usual social
women, so to speak, than of men. Women are method, the method of ceremonial. It is plain
closer to life, we sometimes say, meaning that enough why men figure rather than women
they are face to face with birth and growth, in the puberty or initiation rites to celebrate
decay and death. And so it is to be expected a boys growing up.
that they, rather than men, will play the lead¬ But there are other conditions in the life of
ing parts in the policy human beings have men besides an adjustment to their juniors to
chosen to meet the changes of life—the policy be met with ceremonial or with convention¬
of ignoring the change until it is inevitable ality. Their contacts with all their non-famil-
and then mitigating the shock of it through ial groups, the groups they resort to when
the diversion of ceremonial.5 And women do they leave home, when they go out “to meet
play in the ceremonial of crisis the more a man,” all these associations have to be en¬
prominent or lasting roles. Mourning obser¬ tered upon with ceremonial and, their mem¬
vances are far more elaborate for women bership never entirely homogeneous, safe¬
than for men and far more prolonged. So are guarded with conventionalities. Hence pre¬
wedding and honeymoon observances, al¬ sentations and introductions of all kinds, the
though in them of course the character of conferring of orders or degrees, the induction
duality must preclude any great differentia¬ into office, “treating” and the “sacred laws of
tion.6 As for puberty or initiation ceremonial, hospitality.” Hence tribal or patriotic stan¬
that curious means of breaking the shock of dards, professional etiquette, chivalry, the
realizing that the young have grown up, if code of a gentleman, and many other caste
women appear to take a less important part taboos or rules. In all these matters women
in it than men, reasons consistent with our figure far less than men, of course, for the
general interpretation are not hard to find. simple enough reason that they are out of
The initiation of boys means they are leaving touch with the different groups concerned.
home. No amount of ceremonial can disguise They have avoided them or they have been
that break. Were they to stay on at home in a excluded from them. Then when they do be¬
different relation to it, then the women might gin to seek admission into these non-familial
enter more strikingly into their man-making groups we may note that very often they ride
rites.7 As it is, all women can do is to express roughshod over their conventionalities,9
ceremonially their distress at “losing” their breaking their rules, either because they are
boys. Andamanese women “weep over” an ignorant of them or because they see in them
initiate the morning after he breaks his turtle little or no value. This procedure, whatever
168 Part One: The Roots—Classical Social Theory ♦ VI. Neglected Voices
its explanation, is very disturbing to men, dis¬ that fear, whether of change wrought by life
tasteful to them and even abhorrent. And or of change threatened by the stranger, that
often enough it is the more or less uncon¬ great fear, is passing. With it are bound to go
scious anticipation of such violations by the devices of self-protection it prompted—
women, of such misbehaviour, that sets men ceremonial, conventionality, and segrega¬
so bitterly against opening the doors to them. tion. In this general movement of the human
Merely to lessen masculine apprehensiveness spirit feminism was bom; upon its march the
and to overcome masculine antagonism hopes of feminism ultimately must depend.
women might do well to adopt quickly and
unquestioningly masculine conventionali¬ Endnotes
ties.
1. Not all; feministic discussion must confine it¬
But even if women develop a sense of self, for example, to the exclusiveness of men,
honor and a respect for masculine routine, trusting that the exclusiveness of women will
even if they shear their hair and dress like some day be a matter for hominist agitation.
men, even if they keep mens hours, and work The farseeing feminist trusts, too, that the legal
and play like men, even if they smoke and rights of men will cease to be neglected—in¬
swear and get drunk like men, even if they equalities before the law in responsibility for
succeed in getting from the outside the loy¬ crime, for example, and in matters of property
alty and esprit du corps that usually come (damages for breach of promise, alimony, or
any legal obligation to support women).
only with participation in the life of the
group, learning to swim, in other words, 2. Although classification by age is characteristic
of every society, our specific data on age classes
without going near the water, even if they
are scant and very scattered; but from what I
conform in all these ways, differences will
have from others and have observed at first
still exist between them and men, natural dif¬ hand I am inclined to believe that seniority is
ferences, urges the anti-feminist, and should more of a bar in daily intercourse between adult
not these natural differences receive appre¬ men than between women. The fact that men
ciation and be given social expression? How¬ see comparatively little of children hardly needs
ever we may answer this question, it does not mention. Seeing them seldom, they can afford,
quite meet the point of masculine exclusive¬ they feel, to treat them as contemporaries. This
ness. It is apprehension of difference rather is a reason why children “take to men” and not,
than actual difference which bulks so large as a fond mother sometimes alleges, because
men are novelties. Children, like women, dread
now and always in the social regulation of
the Stranger.
sex. It is fear of the unlike rather than the fact
3. From religious exclusiveness almost all other
of it. The anti-feminist wishes to keep women
forms of exclusiveness can be traced just as
apart from men not because he values sex
all the professions were differentiated from
differences, but because he fears them. He or the priesthood and as games and the arts had
she is not so anxious to preserve them as to religious origins. But the exclusion of women
get away from them, to be protected from the from the derivatives of ecclesiasticism is no
danger of being disturbed by them. Differ¬ mere historical sequence or survival. History
ences in age, in caste, in family, and in race, gives it the sanction of the past in given cases,
have filled mankind with analogous appre¬ but it has an ever fresh psychological spring.
hensions and prompted analogous methods 4. Among us it is the son-in-law who avoids his
and plans of self-protection. mother-in-law and there appears to be no evi¬
Age-class, caste group, family, and race, dence that it is the other way round among
each has its own closed circle—from unlike¬ savages where this practice is more formal.
At any rate it is the father-in-law in every so¬
ness to exclusion or seclusion, from exclu¬
ciety who avoids his daughter-in-law and not
sion or reclusion to unlikeness—but each of
vice versa. Everywhere, too, it is “up to” the
these vicious circles the modern spirit has boy to stop “hanging round” his mother and
begun to invade and break down. In the spirit playing with his sisters.
of our time fear of the unlike is waning, and 5. Under the rubric of Ceremonial Reluctance I
pari passu intolerance. Fear of the unlike and am preparing a fuller statement of this shock
intolerance are due to fear of change, and absorber theory of ceremonial.
Feminism and Conventionality 169
6. The veiling of the bride and her seclusiveness 8. The rigid separation of initiates from females
before and after the wedding are the most no¬ is also more of a symbol of sex segregation, I
table. But the bridal couple apart, the women think, than a practical measure against sexual
of the family are more concerned with the intercourse. It is a concentration rite, a syn¬
marriage ceremonial than the men. opsis, so to speak, of the life ahead of them,
7. As they do at the nubility of girls; for the “com¬ life apart from women.
ing out” rites of girls do not mean a break with 9. An infraction we recognize when we say, for
family life. example, that women have no sense of honor,
or that women dislike “red tape.” ♦
Part Two
The Branches—Contemporary
Social Theory
171
172 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VII. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism
with their integration into a coherent system considered as irrelevant. Psychological con¬
of action (though some reference will be siderations of the source or origin of motives,
made to the latter). This limitation is pre¬ aTtHougK imdoubtedly important for a~more
scribed by expediency; a treatment of sys¬ coTnplete understanding of the mechanisms
tems of action would introduce further un¬ involved in the development of unexpected
manageable complications. Furthermore, consequences ofconduct, wilf be ignored.
unforeseen consequences should not be iden¬ ^Moreover, it is not assumed that social ac-
tified with consequences which are necessar¬ tion always involves clear-cut, explicit pur¬
ily undesirable (from the standpoint of the pose. Such awareness of purpose may be un¬
actor). For though these results are unin¬ usual, the aim of action more often than not
tended, they are not upon their occurrence being nebulous and hazy. This is certainly the
always deemed axiologically negative. In case with habitual action which, though it
short, undesired effects are not always unde¬ may originally have been induced by con¬
sirable effects. The intended and anticipated scious purpose, is characteristically per¬
outcomes of purposive action, however, are formed without such awareness. The signifi¬
always, in the very nature of the case, rela¬ cance of habitual action will be discussed
tively desirable to the actor, though they may later.
seem axiologically negative to an outside ob¬ Above all, it must not be inferred that pur¬
server. This is true even in the polar instance posive action implies “rationality” of human
where the intended result is “the lesser of two action (that persons always use the objec¬
evils” or in such cases as suicide, ascetic mor¬ tively most adequate means for the attain¬
tification and self-torture which, in given ment of their end).7 In fact, part of my analy¬
situations, are deemed desirable relative to sis is devoted to identifying those elements
other possible alternatives. which account for concrete deviations from
Rigorously speaking, the consequences of rationality of action. Moreover, rationality
purposive action are limited to those ele¬ and irrationality are not to be identified with
ments in the resulting situation that are ex¬ the success and failure of action, respectively.
clusively the outcome of the action, that is, For in a situation where the number of pos¬
that would not have occurred had the action sible actions for attaining a given end is se¬
not taken place. Concretely, however, the con¬ verely limited, one acts rationally by selecting
sequences result from the interplay of the ac¬ the means which, on the basis of the available
tion and the objective situation, the condi¬ evidence, has the greatest probability of at¬
tions of action.4 We shall be primarily con- taining this goal8 even though the goal may
cemed with a pattern of results of action un- actually not be attained. . .. Contrariwise, an
tfercertain conditions. This still invotvesTFe end may be attained by action that, on the
problems of^causaTimputation (of which basis of the knowledge available to the actor,
more later) though to a less pressing degree is irrational (as in the case of “hunches”).
than consequences in the rigorous sense. Turning now to action, we differentiate
These relatively concrete consequences may this into two kinds: unorganized and for¬
be differentiated into (a) consequences to the mally organized. The first refers to actions of
actor(s), (b) consequences to other persons individuals considered distributively out of
mediated through the social structure, the which may grow the second when like-
culture, and the civilization.5 minded individuals form an association in
In considering purposive action, we are order to achieve a common purpose. Unan¬
concerned with “conduct” as distinct from ticipated consequences follow both types of
“behavior,” that is, with action that involves action, although the second type seems to
motives and consequently a choice between afford a better opportunity for sociological
alternatives.6 For the time being, we take pur¬ analysis since the processes of formal orga¬
poses as given, so that any theories that “re¬ nization more often make for explicit state¬
duce” purpose to conditioned reflexes or tro- ments of purpose and procedure.
pisms, which assert that motives are simply Before turning to the actual analysis of the
compounded of instinctual drives, may be problem it is advisable to indicate two meth-
174 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VII. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism
odological pitfalls that are, moreover, com¬ Last, a frequent source of misunderstand¬
mon to all sociological investigations of pur¬ ing will be eliminated at the outset if it is
posive action. The first involves the problem realized that the factors involved in unantici¬
of causal imputation, the problem of ascer¬ pated consequences are—precisely—factors,
taining the extent to which “consequences" and that none of these serves by itself to ex¬
can justifiably be attributed to certain ac¬ plain any concrete case.
tions. For example, to what extent has the
recent increase in economic production in Sources of
this country resulted from governmental Unanticipated Consequences
measures? To what extent can the spread of
organized crime be attributed to Prohibi¬ The most obvious limitation to a correct
tion? This ever-present difficulty of causal anticipation of consequences of action is pro¬
imputation must be solved for every empiri¬ vided by the existing state of knowledge. The
cal case. extent of this limitation can be best appreci¬
The second problem is that of ascertaining ated by assuming the simplest case where the
the actual purposes of a given action. There lack of adequate knowledge is the sole barrier
is the difficulty, for instance, of discriminat¬ to a correct anticipation.10 Obviously, a very
ing between rationalization and truth in large number of concrete reasons for inade¬
those cases where apparently unintended quate knowledge may be found, but it is also
consequences are ex post facto declared to possible to summarize several classes of fac¬
have been intended.9 Rationalizations may tors that are most important.
occur in connection with nation-wide social
Ignorance
planning just as in the classical instance of
the horseman who, on being thrown from his The first class derives from the type of
steed, declared that he was “simply dis¬ knowledge—usually, perhaps exclusively—
mounting." This difficulty, though not com¬ attained in the sciences of human behavior.
pletely obviated, is significantly reduced in The social scientist usually finds stochastic,
cases of organized group action since the cir¬ not functional relationships.11 This is to say,
cumstance of organized action customarily in the study of human behavior, there is
demands explicit (though not always “true") found a set of different values of one variable
statements of goal and procedure. Further¬ associated with each value of the other vari¬
more, it is easily possible to exaggerate this able^), or in less formal language, the set of
consequences of any repeated act is not con¬
difficulty since in many, if indeed not in most,
stant but there is a range of possible conse¬
cases, the observers own experience and
quences, any one of which may follow the act
knowledge of the situation enables him to
in a given case. In some instances, we have
arrive at a solution. Ultimately, the final test
sufficient knowledge of the limits of the
is this: does the juxtaposition of the overt ac¬
range of possible consequences, and even
tion, our general knowledge of the actor(s)
adequate knowledge for ascertaining the sta¬
and the specific situation and the inferred or
tistical (empirical) probabilities of the vari¬
avowed purpose “make sense," is there be¬
ous possible consequences, but it is impossi¬
tween these, as Weber puts it, a “ver-
ble to predict with certainty the results in any
standliche Sinnzusammenhang?" If the ana¬ particular case. Our classifications of acts
lyst self-consciously subjects these elements and situations never involve completely ho¬
to such probing, conclusions about purpose mogeneous categories nor even categories
can have evidential value. The evidence avail¬ whose approximate degree of homogeneity is
able will vary, and the probable error of the sufficient for the prediction of particular
imputation of purpose will likewise vary. events.12 We have here the paradox that
Although these methodological difficulties whereas past experiences are the guide to our
are not discussed further in this paper, an expectations on the assumption that certain
effort has been made to take them into ac¬ past, present and future acts are sufficiently
count in the substantive analysis. alike to grouped in the same category, these
The Unanticipated Consequences of Social Action 175
experiences are in fact different. To the extent aspects of the situation and will the more
that these differences are pertinent to the out¬ likely bring about unexpected results.
come of the action and appropriate correc¬ Even when immediate action is not re¬
tions for these differences are not adopted, quired there is the economic problem of dis¬
the actual results will differ from the ex¬ tributing our fundamental resources, time
pected. As Poincare has put it, "... small and energy. Time and energy are scarce
differences in the initial conditions produce means and economic behavior is concerned
very great ones in the final phenomena. . . . with the rational allocation of these means
Prediction becomes impossible, and we have among alternative wants, only one of which
the fortuitous phenomenon."13 is the anticipation of consequences of ac¬
However, deviations from the usual conse¬ tion.16 An economy of social engineers is no
quences of an act can be anticipated by the more practicable than an economy of laun-
actor who recognizes in the given situation drymen. It is the fault of the extreme anti-
some differences from previous similar situ¬ noetic activists who promote the idea of ac¬
ations. But insofar as these differences can tion above all else to exaggerate this limit and
to claim (in effect) that practically no re¬
themselves not be subsumed under general
sources be devoted to the acquisition of
rules, the direction and extent of these devia¬
knowledge. On the other hand, the grain of
tions cannot be anticipated.14 It is clear, then,
truth in the anti-intellectualist position is
that the partial knowledge in the light of
that there are decided economic limits to the
which action is commonly carried on permits
advisability of not acting until uncertainty is
a varying range of unexpected outcomes of
eliminated, and also psychological limits
conduct.
since, after the manner of Hamlet, excessive
Although we do not know the amount of “forethought" of this kind precludes any ac¬
knowledge necessary for foreknowledge, one tion at all.
may say in general that consequences are for¬
tuitous when an exact knowledge of many Error
details and facts (as distinct from general
principles) is needed for even a highly ap¬ A second major factor in unexpected con¬
proximate prediction. In other words, sequences of conduct, perhaps as pervasive
“chance consequences" are those occasioned as ignorance, is error. Error may intrude it¬
self, of course, in any phase of purposive ac¬
by the interplay of forces and circumstances
tion: we may err in our appraisal of the pre¬
that are so numerous and complex that pre¬
sent situation, in our inference from this to
diction of them is quite beyond our reach.
the future, objective situation, in our selec¬
This area of consequences should perhaps be
tion of a course of action, or finally in the
distinguished from that of “ignorance," since
execution of the action chosen. A common
it is related not to the knowledge actually in
fallacy is frequently involved in the too-ready
hand but to knowledge that can conceivably
assumption that actions which have in the
be obtained.15
past led to the desired outcome will continue
The importance of ignorance as a factor is to do so. This assumption is often fixed in the
enhanced by the fact that the exigencies of mechanism of habit and there often finds
practical life frequently compel us to act with pragmatic justification. But precisely be¬
some confidence even though it is manifest cause habit is a mode of activity that has pre¬
that the information on which we base our viously led to the attainment of certain ends,
action is not complete. We usually act, as it tends to become automatic and undelibera-
Knight has properly observed, not on the ba¬ tive through continued repetition so that the
sis of scientific knowledge, but on that of actor fails to recognize that procedures
opinion and estimate: Thus, situations that which have been successful in certain circum¬
demand (or what is for our purposes tanta¬ stances need not be so under any and all con¬
mount to the same thing, that appear to the ditions.17 Just as rigidities in social organiza¬
actor to demand) immediate action of some tion often balk and block the satisfaction of
sort, will usually involve ignorance of certain new wants, so rigidities in individual behav-
176 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VII. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism
ior block the satisfaction of old wants in a that intense interest often tends to preclude
changing social environment. such analysis precisely because strong con¬
Error may also be involved in instances cern with the satisfaction of the immediate
where the actor attends to only one or some interest is a psychological generator of emo¬
of the pertinent aspects of the situation that tional bias, with consequent lopsidedness or
influence the outcome of the action. This failure to engage in the required calculations.
may range from the case of simple neglect It is as much a fallacious assumption to hold
(lack of thoroughness in examining the situ¬ that interested action necessarily entails a
ation) to pathological obsession where there rational calculation of the elements in the
is a determined refusal or inability to con¬ situation18 as to deny rationality any and all
sider certain elements of the problem. This influence over such conduct. Moreover, ac¬
last type has been extensively dealt with in tion in which the element of immediacy of
the psychiatric literature. In cases of wish- interest is involved may be rational in terms
fulfilment, emotional involvements lead to a of the values basic to that interest but irra¬
distortion of the objective situation and of the tional in terms of the life organization of the
probable future course of events; action individual. Rational, in the sense that it is an
predicated upon imaginary conditions must action which may be expected to lead to the
have unexpected consequences. attainment of the specific goal; irrational, in
the sense that it may defeat the pursuit or
Imperious Immediacy of Interest attainment of other values not, at the mo¬
ment, paramount but which nonetheless
A third general type of factor, the "imperi¬
form an integral part of the individuals scale
ous immediacy of interest," refers to in¬
of values. Thus, precisely because a particular
stances where the actors paramount concern
with the foreseen immediate consequences
action is not carried out in a psychological or
excludes consideration of further or other
social vacuum, its effects will ramify into other
consequences of the same act. The most spheres of value and interest. For example, the
prominent elements in such immediacy of practice of birth control for "economic rea¬
interest range from physiological needs to sons" influences the age-composition and
basic cultural values. Thus, Vicos imagina¬ size of sibships with profound consequences
tive example of the "origin of the family," of a psychological and social character and,
which derived from the practice of men car¬ in larger aggregations, of course, affects the
rying their mates into caves to satisfy their rate of population growth.
sex drive out of the sight of God, might serve
Basic Values
as a somewhat fantastic illustration of the
first. Another kind of example is provided by Superficially similar to the factor of imme¬
that doctrine of classical economics in which diacy of interest, but differing from it in a
the individual endeavoring to employ his significant theoretical sense, is that of basic
capital where most profitable to him and values. This refers to instances where further
thus tending to render the annual revenue of consequences of action are not considered
society as great as possible is, in the words of because of the felt necessity of the action en¬
Adam Smith, led "by an invisible hand to pro¬ joined by fundamental values. The classical
mote an end which was no part of his inten¬ analysis is Webers study of the Protestant
tion." Ethic and the spirit of capitalism. He has
However, after the acute analysis by Max properly generalized this case, saying that ac¬
Weber, it goes without saying that action mo¬ tive asceticism paradoxically leads to its own
tivated by interest is not antithetical to an decline through the accumulation of wealth
intensive investigation of the conditions and and possessions entailed by the conjunction
means of successful action. On the contrary, of intense productive activity and decreased
it would seem that interest, if it is to be satis¬ consumption.
fied, requires objective analysis of situation The process contributes much to the dy¬
and instrumentality, as is assumed to be char¬ namic of social and cultural change, as has
acteristic of "economic man." The irony is been recognized with varying degrees of co-
The Unanticipated Consequences of Social Action 177
gency by Hegel, Marx, Wundt, and many oth¬ which, made conscious of its unfavorable
ers. The empirical observation is incon¬ bargaining position in cases of individual
testable: activities oriented toward certain contract, organized to enjoy the advantages
values release processes that so react as to of collective bargaining, thus slowing up, if
change the very scale of values which precipi¬ not eliminating, the developments that Marx
tated them. This process can come about had predicted.19
when a system of basic values enjoins certain Thus, to the extent that the predictions of
specific actions, and adherents are concerned social scientists are made public and action
not with the objective consequences of these proceeds with full cognizance of these pre¬
actions but with the subjective satisfaction of dictions, the “other-things-being-equal” con¬
duty well performed. Or, action in accord¬ dition tacitly assumed in all forecasting is not
ance with a dominant set of values tends to fulfilled. Other things will not be equal just
be focused upon that particular value-area. because the scientist has introduced a new
But with the complex interaction that consti¬ “other thing”—his prediction.20 This contin¬
tutes society, action ramifies. Its conse¬ gency may often account for social move¬
quences are not restricted to the specific area ments developing in utterly unanticipated di¬
in which they are intended to center and oc¬ rections, and it hence assumes considerable
cur in interrelated fields explicitly ignored at importance for social planning.
the time of action. Yet it is because these The foregoing discussion represents no
fields are in fact interrelated that the further more than the briefest exposition of the ma¬
consequences in adjacent areas tend to react jor elements involved in one fundamental so¬
upon the fundamental value-system. It is this cial process. It would take us too far afield,
usually unlooked-for reaction that consti¬ and certainly beyond the compass of this pa¬
tutes a most important element in the pro¬ per, to examine exhaustively the implications
cess of secularization, of the transformation of this analysis for social prediction, control,
or breakdown of basic value-systems. Here is and planning. We may maintain, however,
the essential paradox of social action—the even at this preliminary juncture, that no
“realization” of values may lead to their re¬ blanket statement categorically affirming or
nunciation. We may paraphrase Goethe and denying the practical feasibility of all social
speak of “Die Kraft, die stets das Gute will, planning is warranted. Before we may in¬
und stets das Bose schafft.” dulge in such generalizations, we must exam¬
ine and classify the types of social action and
Self-Defeating Predictions organization with reference to the elements
here discussed and then refer our generaliza¬
There is one other circumstance, peculiar
tions to these essentially different types. If the
to human conduct, that stands in the way of
present analysis has served to set the prob¬
successful social prediction and planning.
lem, even in only its paramount aspects, and
Public predictions of future social develop¬
to direct attention toward the need for a sys¬
ments are frequently not sustained precisely
tematic and objective study of the elements
because the prediction has become a new ele¬
involved in the development of unanticipated
ment in the concrete situation, thus tending
consequences of purposive social action, the
to change the initial course of developments.
treatment of which has for much too long
This is not true of prediction in fields that do
been consigned to the realm of theology and
not pertain to human conduct. Thus the pre¬
speculative philosophy, then it has achieved
diction of the return of Halleys comet does
its avowed purpose.
not in any way influence the orbit of that
comet; but, to take a concrete social example,
Endnotes
Marx' prediction of the progressive concen¬
tration of wealth and increasing misery of the 1. Some of the theorists, though their contribu¬
masses did influence the very process pre¬ tions are by no means of equal importance,
dicted. For at least one of the consequences are: Machiavelli, Vico, Adam Smith (and
of socialist preaching in the nineteenth cen¬ some later classical economists), Marx,
tury was the spread of organization of labor, Engels, Wundt, Pareto, Max Weber, Graham
178 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VII. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism
Wallas, Cooley, Sorokin, Gini, Chapin, von sociologiegenerale (Paris: Payot, 1917), II, par.
Schelting. 1977.
2. This problem has been related to such hetero¬ 10. Most discussions of unanticipated conse¬
geneous subjects as: the problem of evil quences limit the explanation of unantici¬
(theodicy), moral responsibility, free will, pre¬ pated consequences to this one factor of ig¬
destination, deism, teleology, fatalism, logi¬ norance. Such a view either reduces itself to
cal, illogical and non-logical behavior, social a sheer tautology or exaggerates the role of
prediction, planning and control, social cy¬ only one of many factors. In the first instance,
cles, the pleasure- and reality principles, and the argument runs in this fashion: “if we had
historical “accidents.” only known enough, we could have antici¬
pated the consequences which, as it happens,
3. Some of the terms by which the whole or cer¬
were unforeseen.” The evident fallacy in this
tain aspects of the process have been known
post mortem argument rests in the word
are: Providence (immanent or transcenden¬
“enough” which is implicitly taken to mean
tal), Moira, Paradoxie der Folgen, Schicksal,
“enough knowledge to foresee” the conse¬
social forces, heterogony of ends, immanent
quences of our action. It is then no difficult
causation, dialectical movement, principle of
matter to uphold the contention. This view¬
emergence and creative synthesis.
point is basic to several schools of educa¬
4. Cf. Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and tional theory, just as it was to Comte's dictum,
Profit (Boston and New York: Houghton Mif¬ savoirpourprevoir, prevoirpourpouvoir. This
flin Co., 1921), pp. 201-2. Professor Knight's intellectualist stand has gained credence
doctoral dissertation represents by far the partly because of its implicit optimism and
most searching treatment of certain phases of because of the indubitable fact that sheer ig¬
this problem that I have yet seen. norance does actually account for the occur¬
5. For the distinction between society, culture rence of some unforeseen consequences in
and civilization, see Alfred Weber, “Prin- some cases.
zipielles zur Kultursoziologie: Gesellschaft- 11. Cf. A. A. Tschuprow, Grundbegriffe und Grund-
sprozess, Civilisationsprozess und Kultur- problemederKorrelationstheorie (Leipzig: B. G.
bewegung,” Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Teubner, 1925), pp. 20 ff., where he intro¬
Sozialpolitik, 47, 1920, pp. 1-49; R. K. Mer¬ duces the term “stochastic.” It is apparent
ton, “Civilization and Culture,” Sociology and that stochastic associations are obtained be¬
Social Research 21 (1936), pp.103-13. cause we have not ascertained, or having as¬
6. Knight, op. cit, p. 52. certained, have not controlled the other vari¬
ables in the situation that influence the final
7. Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft
result.
(Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1925), pp. 3 ff.
12. A classification into completely homogene¬
8. See J. Bertrand, Calcul des probabilites (Paris,
ous categories would, of course, lead to func¬
1889), pp. 90 ff.; J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on
tional associations and would permit suc¬
Probability (London: The Macmillan Co.,
cessful prediction, but the aspects of social
1921), Chap. XXVI.
action which are of practical importance are
9. This introduces the problem of “chance,” too varied and numerous to permit such ho¬
which will be treated in another connection. mogeneous classification.
It should be realized that the aim of an action
13. Henri Poincare, Calcul des probabilites (Paris,
and the circumstances that actually ensue
1912), p. 2.
may coincide without the latter being a con¬
sequence of the action. Moreover, the longer 14. The actor's awareness of his ignorance and its
the interval of time between the action and implications is perhaps most acute in the type
the circumstances in view, the greater the of conduct which Thomas and Znaniecki at¬
probability (in the absence of contrary evi¬ tribute to the wish for “new experience.” This
dence) that these circumstances have hap¬ is the case where unforeseen consequences
pened “by chance." Lastly, if this interval is actually constitute the purpose of action, but
greatly extended, the probability that the de¬ there is always the tacit assumption that the
sired circumstances will occur fortuitously consequences will be desirable.
may increase until virtually the point of cer¬ 15. Cf. Keynes, op. cit., p. 295. This distinction
tainty. This reasoning is perhaps applicable to corresponds to that made by Keynes between
the case of governmental action “restoring “subjective chance” (broadly, ignorance) and
prosperity.” Compare V. Pareto, Traite de “objective chance” (where even additional
The Unanticipated Consequences of Social Action 179
wide knowledge of general principles would Personality,” in Merton, Social Theory and So¬
not suffice to foresee the consequences of a cial Structure (New York: The Free Press,
particular act). Much the same distinction ap¬ 1968, enlarged ed.), pp. 249-60.]
pears in the works of Poincare and Venn,
18. The assumption is tenable only in a norma¬
among others.
tive sense. Obviously such calculation,
16. Cf. Knight, op. cit., p. 348. The reasoning is within the limits specified in our previous
also applicable to cases where the occupation
discussion, should be made if the prob¬
of certain individuals (e.g., social engineers
ability of satisfying the interest is to be at a
and scientists) is devoted solely to such ef¬
maximum. The error lies in confusing norm
forts, since then it is a correlative question of
the distribution of the resources of society. with actuality.
Furthermore, there is the practical problem 19. Corrado Gini, Prime linee di patologia eco¬
of the communicability of knowledge so ob¬ nomica (Milan: A. Giuffe, 1935), pp. 72-75.
tained, since it may be very complex; the ef¬ John Venn uses the picturesque term “sui¬
fort to assimilate such knowledge leads back cidal prophecies” to refer to this process
to the same problem of distribution of re¬ and properly observes that it represents a
sources [and costs of information].
class of considerations which have been
17. Similar fallacies in the field of thought have much neglected by the various sciences of
been variously designated as “the philosophi¬ human conduct. See his Logic of Chance
cal fallacy” (Dewey), the “principle of limits” (London, 1888), pp. 225-26.
(Sorokin, Bridgman) and, with a somewhat
different emphasis, “the fallacy of misplaced 20. [For the correlative process, see the paper,
concreteness” (Whitehead). [For an applica¬ “The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy” first published
tion of the general idea to the case of organi¬ a dozen years after this one, and reprinted in
zations, see . . . “Bureaucratic Structure and Merton, op.cit., 1968, pp. 475-90.] ♦
180 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VII. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism
bility or orderly development. These prob¬ patterns of social action in the face of it, and
lems may be briefly taken up in turn. hence the less energy will be available for
We have tried to make clear that there is other purposes. At certain points for certain
no simple relation between personalities and individuals or classes of them then the pres¬
social systems. Because of this fact, in the sure may become too great and the spring
present state of knowledge it is not possible may break—such persons no longer partici¬
to define precisely what are the minimum pate in the interactive system of personality
needs of individual actors, so only certain and social system.3
rather general things can be said. From the The obverse of the functional prerequisite
point of view of functioning of the social sys¬ of meeting a minimum proportion of the
tem, it is not the needs of all the participant needs of the individual actors, is the need to
actors which must be met, nor all the needs secure adequate participation of a sufficient
of any one, but only a sufficient proportion proportion of these actors in the social sys¬
for a sufficient fraction of the population. It tem, that is to motivate them adequately to
is indeed a very general phenomenon that the performances which may be necessary if
social forces are directly responsible for in¬ the social system in question is to persist or
jury to or destruction of some individuals and develop. Indeed it is because it is a condition
some of the wants or needs of all individuals, of this that the need to satisfy minimum
and though this may be reduced it is highly needs of actors is a prerequisite at all.
probable that it cannot be eliminated under The prerequisite of adequate motivation in
realistic conditions. To cite a very simple turn subdivides into two main aspects, a
case, a war cannot be won without casualties, negative and a positive. The negative is that
and acceptance of war is sometimes a condi¬ of a minimum of control over potentially dis¬
tion of survival of a social system as a distinc¬ ruptive behavior. This means action which
tive system. interferes with the action of others in their
The elements of this class of functional roles in the social system. It may involve
prerequisites may be said to begin with the either aggressive action toward others or
biological prerequisites of individual life, like merely action which has deleterious conse¬
nutrition and physical safety. They go on to quences for others or for an aspect of the
the subtler problems of the conditions of system, without aggressive intent.
minimum stability of personality. It seems to The field is highly complex but perhaps
be reasonably well established that there are one particular aspect of it may be singled out
minimum conditions of socialization with re¬ for special mention. This is that in terms of
spect for instance to the relation between af- functional significance relative to the social
fectional support and security, without which system, the significance of an action or class
a functioning personality cannot be built up. of them is to be understood not directly and
The present task is not to attempt to analyze primarily in terms of its motivation but of its
these borderline problems, but only to make actual or probable consequences for the sys¬
clear where they fit in relation to the theory tem. In this sense the pursuit of “private in¬
of the social system. These minimum needs terests” may be highly disruptive under cer¬
of individual actors constitute a set of condi¬ tain circumstances even though the content
tions to which the social system must be of the interests, for example in religious
adapted. If the variation of the latter goes too terms, may be such as to be rather generally
far in a given direction this will tend to set up ethically approved. Similarly conflict as such
repercussions which will in turn tend to pro¬ may be highly disruptive. If it becomes suffi¬
duce deviant behavior in the actors in ques¬ ciently severe the functional problem for the
tion, behavior which is either positively dis¬ system becomes the control of the conflict as
ruptive or involves withdrawal from func¬ such. In such a case the merits of the “case”
tionally important activities. Such a need, as of one or the other of the parties may become
a functional prerequisite, may be likened to of quite secondary importance.
a spring. The less adequately it is met, the In general terms the functional problem
more “pressure” it will take to realize certain for a social system of minimizing potentially
182 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory + VII. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism
disruptive behavior and the motivation to it, cause people are dependent on each others
may be called the “motivational problem of performances, simple withdrawal from ful¬
order.” Because of certain further features of fillment of expectations may, motivationally
social systems . . . the present discussion speaking, be a highly aggressive act, and may
should lead up to consideration of certain in fact injure the other severely. But in part
relatively specific classes of potential disrup¬ precisely because it does not correspond to
tion, notably the problem of opportunity, the the motivational distinction the functional
problem of prestige allocation, and the prob¬ distinction is highly significant as will be¬
lem of power. There is, that is to say, an im¬ come evident. It provides a point of reference
mense variety of particular acts which are for the analysis of the directions of deviant
disruptive in that they interfere with the role- behavior and hence places such behavior in
performance of one or more other actors. So relation to problems of the mechanisms of
long, however, as they remain nearly ran¬ operation of the social system.
domly distributed they may reduce the effi¬ The prerequisite of adequate motivation
ciency of the system by depressing levels of gives us one of the primary starting points for
role performance, but still not constitute a building up to the concepts of role and of
threat to its stability. This latter may develop institutionalization. Fundamentally the prob¬
when disruptive tendencies become orga¬ lem is, will the personalities developed within
nized as a sub-system in such a way as to a social system, at whatever stage in the life
impinge on strategic points in the social sys¬ cycle, “spontaneously” act in such ways as to
tem itself. It is as such strategic points that fulfill the functional prerequisites of the so¬
the problems of opportunity, prestige and cial systems of which they are parts, or is it
power will be treated below.4 necessary to look for relatively specific
The distinction between the negative and mechanisms, that is, modes of organization
the positive aspects of the problem of ade¬ of the motivational systems of personalities,
quate motivation is relative and gradual. which can be understood in direct relation to
Both present functional problems in terms of the socially structured level or role behavior?
the operation of the social system, which fo¬ The older “psychological” view that societies
cus attention on the mechanisms which fit are resultants of the independently deter¬
into the relevant context. But in spite of this mined “traits” of individuals would take the
relativity there is an important distinction be¬ first alternative. The modern sociological
tween action which is positively disruptive of view tends to emphasize the second.
a going system of social relationships, and Statement of the problem of adequate mo¬
simple withdrawal of the individual from tivation not only poses in general the prob¬
performance of his obligations. The principal lems of the mechanisms of socialization and
criterion would be that in the latter case the of social control and their relation to the dy¬
only interference with others would consist namics of the social system, but it provides
in forcing them to do without the benefits the setting for an approach to the analysis of
expected from a persons actions. The possi¬ the relevant mechanisms. Personality psy¬
bility of withdrawal in fact defines one of the chology, as we have seen, is becoming highly
most important directions of deviant behav¬ oriented to the actors relational system, that
ior, and enters as we shall see in most impor¬ is, his orientation to objects. When this fact
tant ways into the structure of the problems is combined with the fundamental place of
and mechanisms of social control. Illness is the concept of expectations in the theory of
for example one of the most important types action, it becomes clear that one central as¬
of withdrawal behavior in our society. . . . pect of the general and especially the cathec-
Again in relation to withdrawal as a type tic orientation of the actor is his set of need-
of failure to be motivated to adequate role dispositions toward the fulfillment of role ex¬
performance, it must be made clear that the pectations, in the first place those of other
negative aspect of withdrawal is not defined significant actors but also his own. There is,
in motivational terms but in functional terms in the personality structure of the individual
relative to the social system. Precisely be¬ actor a “conformity-alienation” dimension in
The Functional Prerequisites of Social Systems 183
the sense of a disposition to conform with the for a functioning social system would not be
expectations of others or to be alienated from possible. It is highly probable that one of the
them. When these relevant expectations are principal limitations on the social potentiali¬
those relative to the fulfillment of role-obli¬ ties of animals on other than an instinct ba¬
gations, this conformity-alienation balance, sis, lies in the absence or weakness of this
in general or in particular role contexts, be¬ lever. The physiological dependency of the
comes a central focus of the articulation of human infant is associated with its capacity
the motivational system of the personality for developing emotional dependency which
with the structure of the social system. in turn is an essential condition of much of
It is furthermore in the present context of social learning.
the problem of adequate motivation of role- It has not been common in discussions of
expectation fulfillment that the basic signifi¬ the functional prerequisites of social systems
cance for the social system of two fundamen¬ foTncIude explicit treatmenTof cultural preT
tal properties of biological "human nature” requisites, but the need to do so seems to
may best be briefly brought to attention. The follow directly from the major premises of
first of these is the much discussed "plastic¬ action theory as set forth above. The integra¬
ity” of the human organism, its capacity to tion of cultural patterns as well as their spe¬
learn any one of a large number of alternative cific content involve factors which at any
patterns of behavior instead of being bound given time are independent of the other ele¬
by its genetic constitution to a very limited ments for the action system and yet must be
range of alternatives. It is of course within the articulated with them. Such integration im¬
limits of this plasticity that the independent poses "imperatives” on the other elements
determinant significance of cultural and so¬ just as truly as is the case the other way
cial factors in action must be sought. The around. This major functional problem area
clear demonstration of determination in of the social system may be subdivided along
terms of the genes automatically narrows the the same lines as in the case of the motiva¬
range of relevance of the factors which are of tional problem.
theoretical interest in the sciences of action, In the first place there are minimum social
except for their possible bearing on the prob¬ conditions necessary for the production,
lems of assortative mating which influence maintenance and development of cultural
the processes of combination and recombi¬ systems in general and of particular types of
nation of genetic strains. The limits of plas¬ cultural system. It may be presumed that dis¬
ticity are for the most part still unknown.5 ruption of the communication system of a
The second characteristic of human na¬ society is ultimately just as dangerous as dis¬
ture in the biological sense is what may be ruption of its system of order in the above
called "sensitivity.” By this is meant the ac¬ sense of motivational integration. This is an
cessibility of the human individual to influ¬ aspect of "anomie” which deserves much
ence by the attitudes of others in the social more explicit analysis than it has received.
interaction process, and the resulting depen¬ Perhaps the most obvious specific example is
dence on receiving relatively particular and provided by the role of language. We know
specific reactions. What this provides essen¬ quite definitely that the individual does not
tially is the motivational basis for accessibil¬ develop language spontaneously without
ity to influence in the learning process. Thus undergoing a socially structured learning
the attitudes of others are probably of first process in relation to others. It is quite defi¬
rate importance in all human learning, but nite that this process must be part of a system
are particularly crucial in motivating the ac¬ of social relations which is orderly within cer¬
ceptance of value-orientation patterns, with tain limits, however difficult it may be to
their legitimation of the renunciations which specify the limits in detail. It is altogether
are essential to the achievement of a disci¬ probable that many protohuman groups
plined integration of personality. Without failed to make the transition to the human
this discipline the stability of expectations in sociocultural level of action because of fail¬
relation to their fulfillment which is essential ure to fulfill the prerequisites of the emer-
184 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VII. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism
gence of language or of some other function¬ with other human beings no human society
ally essential aspects of culture. would be possible. This in turn presupposes
Thus a social system in the present sense language. But similar considerations also ap¬
is not possible without language, and without ply to the other departments of culture, to
certain other minimum patterns of culture, non-empirical existential ideas, to expressive
such as empirical knowledge necessary to symbol systems and above all to patterns of
cope with situational exigencies, and suffi¬ value-orientation about which much will
ciently integrated patterns of expressive sym¬ have to be said in what follows.
bolism and of valueOrientation. A social sys¬ It was pointed out above that tendencies
tem which leads to too drastic disruption of to deviant behavior on the part of the compo¬
itTcufture, For e5^mpTeThTough blockmglHF nent actors pose functional “problems” for
processes^of its acquisl tion^would hc-ex- the social system in the sense that they must
posed to social as well as cultural disintegra¬ be counteracted by “mechanisms of control”
tion./' unless dysfunctional consequences are to en¬
We do not accurately know the cultural sue. The parallel on the cultural side is the
limits of “human society/’ so exactly what the case where the maintenance of certain cul¬
above limits may be remains to be deter¬ tural patterns as integral parts of the going
mined. With respect to certain more specific system of action imposes certain strains. This
types of cultural pattern, however, we have may be true both on the personality and the
relatively detailed knowledge—we shall, for social system levels. The most obvious cases
example, discuss modem science from this are those of a value-orientation pattern and
point of view below. In any case the determi¬
of cognitive beliefs which are motivationally
nation of these conditions is an important
difficult to conform with. Such difficulty
field of sociological research.
might be attributable to a conflict with real¬
One final remark in orientation to the gen¬
ity. Thus within the area covered by well es¬
eral problem. Culture may of course be “em¬
tablished medical science the maintenance
bodied” in physical form independently of
of and action upon some beliefs of Christian
particular actors, e.g., knowledge in books,
Science may impose a serious strain on the
but it is a cardinal principle of the theory of
actor especially where he cannot escape
action that culture is not merely “situational”
relative to action but becomes directly con¬ knowing the medical views. Or it may be a
stitutive of personalities as such through matter of difficulty in attaining conformative
what personality psychologists now tend to motivation, as in the case where certain types
call “internalization.” The minimum cultural of socialization tend to generate deeply anti¬
prerequisites of a social system may thus be authoritarian sentiments so that at least
said to operate at least in part through the some kinds of authority cannot be tolerated
functions of culture for personality. Without by some people. In particular a utopian ideal
the requisite cultural resources to be assimi¬ if accepted and institutionalized imposes
lated through internalization it is not possi¬ strains on the social system.
ble for a human level of personality to emerge Though the limits in this as in the other
and hence for a human type of social system cases are in general not known, it is safe to
to develop. say not only that the social system must be
The other aspect of the problem of prereq¬ able to keep a minimum of culture going, but
uisites on the cultural side is that of adequate vice versa, any given culture must be compat¬
cultural resources and organization for the ible with a social system to a minimum de¬
maintenance of the social system. This has gree if its patterns are not to become extinct,
already been touched upon in the discussions and if the latter is to continue functioning
above, but a few additional remarks may be unchanged. Analysis of the mediating
made. Perhaps the most obvious type of case mechanisms between the cultural patterns
is instrumental knowledge. Without a mini¬ and the concrete action systems in its moti¬
mum of technical lore which makes it possi¬ vational aspect constitutes one of the most
ble to deal with the physical environment and important problem areas of action theory
The Functional Prerequisites of Social Systems 185
and specifically of the theory of social sys¬ such conditioning factors and of internal so¬
tems. . . . cial processes are in general terms fully estab¬
lished. But the general formulae do not solve
Endnotes the specific problems. The task is to unravel
the complex patterns of interaction between
1. An orderly process in this sense is contrasted the two classes of factors.
with the disintegration of a system. Disinte¬ 4. It is in this kind of a context that the distinc¬
gration in this sense means disappearance of
tion between manifest and latent function be¬
the boundaries of the system relative to its
comes significant. In general only within lim¬
environment. Cf. Values, Motives, and Sys¬
ited ranges and to a limited extent are the con¬
tems of Action, Chapter I.
sequences which the sociologist takes as his
2. And also in a different sense about the non¬ standard for the analysis of the systemic sig¬
action environment, the physical aspects of nificance of actions explicitly intended by the
the situation. actor, individual or collective. It is these un¬
3. It is, of course, highly important not to invent intended consequences which constitute the
ad hoc generalizations about these prereq¬ latent functions or dysfunctions of the ac¬
uisites which allegedly explain certain classes tions. Cf. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and
of concrete social phenomena. This proce¬ Social Structure, Chapter I.
dure is especially tempting because such an
5. From the point of view of action theory and
ad hoc hypothesis can serve to absolve the in¬
vestigator from the difficult analysis of the in¬ specifically that of the social system it may be
ternal balances and processes of the social said that the burden of proof rests upon him
system itself. In its cruder forms this proce¬ who would assert that what has been consid¬
dure has played a very prominent part in the ered an action theory problem is adequately
history of social thought, as in the currency solved by invoking the role of such sub-action
of theories that virtually all social phenomena determinants of behavior. This will often turn
were determined by the genetic constitution out to be the case, but resort to ad hoc hy¬
of populations or their geographical environ¬ potheses on this level which have failed to
ments. It is an index of the increasing matur¬ stand up under criticism and further investi¬
ity of our science that such sweeping formu¬ gation, has been so prominent in the history
lae are no longer considered to merit even se¬ of social science that we must insist on this
rious discussion. Both the positive role of burden of proof maxim. ♦
186 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VII. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism
nations in terms of capitalism, bureaucracy terms of the religious system s selective cod¬
or complexity. With the help of a theory of ing.
system differentiation it is evident, however, This systems-theoretical analysis high¬
that every formation of a subsystem is noth¬ lights the significance and the preference of
ing more than a new expression for the unity modem society for institutions like the mar¬
of the whole system.2 Every formation of a ket or democracy. Such descriptions symbol¬
subsystem breaks the unity of the whole sys¬ ize the unity of closure and openness, of func¬
tem down into a specific difference of system tional logic and sensibility. Of course, the
and environment, i.e., of the subsystem and market is not a real one (as it could be seen
its environment within the encompassing to be from the cousins comer window)3 and
system. Every subsystem therefore, can use democracy no longer means that the people
such a boundary line to reflect the entire sys¬ mle. This is a matter of a semantic coding of
tem, in its own specific way; one that leaves an ultimately paradoxical state of affairs. It
other possibilities of subsystem formation explains the meaning and the illusionary
open. For example, a political system can in¬ components of these concepts, explains the
terpret society as the relation of consensus weakness of the corresponding theories and
and the exercise of force and then attempt to explains why, since the beginning of the
optimize its own relation to these conditions. eighteenth century, a kind of self-critique has
On one hand, consensus and force are spe¬ accompanied this.
cific operations, but on the other, they are Yet the unity of this order is already neces¬
also all-encompassing formulas and hori¬ sarily given by evolution, i.e., through the
zons for social conditions and consequences continual adjustment of possibilities. Evolu¬
that can never be made completely transpar¬ tion does not guarantee either the selection
ent in the political subsystem. of the best of all possible worlds nor 'prog¬
Every function system, together with its ress' in any sense. At first evolutionary selec¬
environment, reconstructs society. There¬ tion produces a very improbable, highly com¬
fore, every function system can plausibly pre¬ plex order. It transforms an improbable order
sume to be society for itself, if and in so far as into a probable (functional) one. This is ex¬
it is open to its own environment. With the actly what concepts like negentropy or com¬
closure of its own autopoiesis it serves one plexity intend. But it does not mean that the
function of the societal system (society). With improbability disappears or is inactualized
openness to environmental conditions and as prehistory. It is co-transformed and ‘aufge-
changes it realizes that this has to occur in hoben ’ in Hegel’s famous sense. It remains a
the societal system because society cannot structurally precipitated risk that cannot be
specialize itself to one function alone. This is negated.
a matter of the operationalization of a para¬ Stratified societies already had to deal
dox. Presented as the difference of system with problematical consequences of their
and environment the function system is and own structural decisions. These were ex¬
is not society at the same time. It operates pressed, for example, as the constant conflict
closed and open at the same time and confers between inherited honors and distinctions
exclusivity on its own claim to reality, even if and new ones, as the unfulfillable obligation
only in the sense of a necessary, operative to prescribe a class-specific endogamy and
illusion. It confers bivalence upon its own not least of all as the conflicts that result from
code and excludes third values that lurk in centralizing the control of access to scarce
the environments opacity and the suscepti¬ resources, above all of the ownership of land.
bility to surprise. In this way society repro¬ Compared to modem society these are rela¬
duces itself as unity and difference at the tively harmless problems for which histori¬
same time. Of course, this does not eliminate cally stable solutions were found in many
the paradox of unitas multiplex. It reappears cases. The transition to primarily functional
within the system as opacities, illusions, dis¬ differentiation leads to a completely different
turbances and the need for screening-off—as constellation with higher risks and more in¬
transcendence in immanence, to put it in tensified problems resulting from structural
188 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VII. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism
itself to environmental changes as well as sys¬ (for example, about the number of deaths
tems that are constructed more simply al¬ from accidents or about the increase of the
though it increasingly initiates concomitant rate of unemployment) decisions are still
environmental changes. But this is only part necessary to redress these unsatisfactory
of the truth. For, through abstract coding and conditions. To require decisions means to ap¬
the functional specification of subsystems, peal to values, explicitly or implicitly. Conse¬
functional differentiation makes a large mea¬ quently, structural contingency generates an
sure of sensibility and learning possible on order of values without considering the pos¬
this level. This state of affairs becomes quite sibilities of concretely causing effects, i.e.,
complicated when many system levels have without considering the attainability of the
to be kept in view at the same time. Society's corresponding conditions.
rejection of redundancy is compensated on It is probable that ecological communica¬
the level of subsystems, and the problem is tion will intensify this inflation of values even
that this is the only place that this can occur. more. For if society has to ascribe environ¬
Family households, moralities and religious mental changes to itself then it is quite natu¬
cosmologies are replaced by an arrangement ral to reduce them to decisions that would
in which highly organized capacities for sub¬ have to be corrected: decisions about emis¬
stitution and recuperation remain bound to sions quotas, total consumption amounts,
specific functions that operate at the cost of new technologies whose consequences are
ignoring other functions. Because of this the still unknown, etc. . . . [Sjuch ascriptions are
consequences of adaptive changes are situ¬ based on simplifying, illuminating and ob¬
ated within a complex net of dependencies scuring causal attributions. This does not
and independencies. In part, they lead to un¬ prevent them from being carried out and
foreseen extensions, in part they are ab¬ communicated, but, if nothing else, it per¬
sorbed. In such cases simple estimations and mits values to surface.7
simple comparisons of the efficiency of dif¬ At first, one might think that the value of
ferent social formations are insufficient and clean air and water, trees and animals could
inadvisable. be placed alongside the values of freedom
A further consequence of functional differ¬ and equality, and since this is only a matter
entiation resides in the intensification of ap¬ of lists we could include pandas, Tamils,
parent contingencies on the structural level women, etc. But viewed essentially and in the
of all function systems. Examples of this are long run this would be much too simple an
the replacement of natural by positive law, answer. The problematic of the inflation of
the democratic change of governments, the values as a symbolically generalized medium
still merely hypothetical character of the va¬ of communication—an idea of Parsons's8—
lidity of theories, the possibility of the free results from its influence on society's obser¬
choice of a spouse and not least of all every¬ vation and description of itself.
thing that is experienced as ‘a market deci¬ Actually the descriptions of society are
sion' (with whoever or whatever may decide) steered by the problems that result from
and is subjected to criticism. The result is structural decisions and, therefore, they have
that much of what was previously experi¬ a tendency to evoke values and see 'crises'.
enced as nature is presented as a decision and Contrary to the mature phase of bourgeois-
needs justification. Thus a need arises for socialist theories in the first two-thirds of the
new 'inviolate levels'. . . . for a more rational nineteenth century disadvantages are de¬
and justifiable a priori or, finally, for Values'.6 ferred for a time, are read off in values and
Evidently, the strangely non-binding compul¬ are understood as the indefinite obligation to
sion of values correlates to a widespread dis¬ act. In any event, they are no longer under¬
content with contingencies as much as to the stood as digressions of the spirit or matter on
fact that decisions become more exposed to the way to perfection. Instead, they are the
criticism through structural critique and sta¬ inescapable result of evolution. According to
tistical analyses than facts. Indeed, even if we the theory proposed here, they are conse¬
cannot determine that someone has decided quences of the principle of system differen-
190 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VII. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism
tiation and of its making probable what is ated according to center/periphery or rank,
improbable. positions could be established where it was
Moreover, the critical self-observation and possible, as it never has been since, to repre¬
description that constantly accompanies so¬ sent the systems unity, i.e., in the center or at
ciety has to renounce moral judgements or the apex of the hierarchy. The transition to
end up getting lost in a factional morass.9 functional differentiation destroys this possi¬
Instead, a new kind of schematism, namely, bility when it leaves it to the many function
manifest or latent (conscious or uncon¬ systems to represent the unity of society
scious, intentional or unintentional) takes its through their respective subsystem/environ-
place. Only manifest functions can be used to ment differences and exposes them in this
differentiate and specify because only these respect to competition among themselves
can be transformed into points of compari¬ while there is no superordinate standpoint of
son or goal-formulas. This means that the representation for them all. To be sure, one
critique is formed as a scheme of difference can observe and describe this too. But the
that also illuminates the other side, the coun¬ unity of society is nothing more than this dif¬
terpart. Straightforward striving toward a ference of function systems. It is nothing
goal is viewed as naive. This even undermines more than their reciprocal autonomy and
the straightforward intention of enlighten¬ non-substitutability; nothing more than the
ment.10 A mirror is, as it were, held up to transformation of this stmcture into a to¬
society, assuming that it cannot look through getherness of inflated independence and de¬
it because that which is latent can fulfill its pendence. In other words, it is the resulting
function only latently. This is the way sociol¬ complexity, which is highly improbable evo-
ogy, too, pursues 'enlightenment' \Aufk- lutionarily.
larung\ and explains its ineffectuality in the
same process.11 In this sense ideology, the Endnotes
unconscious, latent structures and functions
1. Cf., among others Jeffrey L. Pressman/Aaron
and unintended side-effects all become Wildavsky, Implementation: How Great Ex¬
themes without a clarification of the status of pectations in Washington are Dashed in Oak¬
this shadow world—note especially the rever¬ land, Berkeley Ca. 1973.
sal of Platonic metaphysics. One can there¬ 2. Cf., Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Systeme, Frank¬
fore use this distinction only to discover that furt 1984, pp. 37ff.
society enlightens itself about itself. 3. According to E. T. A. Hoffmann, ‘Des Vetters
The problem of reintroducing the unity of Eckfenster', Werke, Berlin-Leipzig, no date,
society within society or even of expressing it vol. 12, pp. 142-64.
in it is extended to the forms of the system s 4. Cf., for a historico-semantic context Niklas
critical self-description. Equally sympto¬ Luhmann, 'Temporalisierung von Komplexi-
matic are all attempts at judging and con¬ taet: Zur Semantik neuzeitlicher Zeitbe-
demning society from the exalted standpoint griffe', in Luhmann, Gesellschaftsstruktur
of the subject, i.e., ab extra. This signifies und Semantik, vol. 1, Frankfurt 1980, pp.
nothing more than placing the unity of soci¬ 235-300.
ety in a principle outside itself.12 A systems- 5. Cf., Andre Bejin, ‘Differenciation, complexifi-
theoretical analysis of such attempts, how¬ cation, evolution des societes’, in Communi¬
ever, enjoys the advantage of being able to cations, vol. 22 (1974), pp. 109-18 (114) in
retrace this problematic back to the structure connection with Henri Atlan, L’Organisation
biologique et la theorie de Vinformation, Paris
of modem society (which changes nothing
1972, pp. 270ff.
about the fact that this must occur in soci¬
ety). 6. The still unclear semantic career of the con¬
cept of value (especially prior to the middle
Essentially, every attempt within the sys¬
of the nineteenth century) might have one of
tem to make the unity of the system the object its sources here. To be sure, it is incorrect to
of a system operation encounters a paradox say that the concept of value was appropri¬
because this operation must exclude and in¬ ated by morality, literature, aesthetics and
clude itself. As long as society was differenti¬ philosophy from economics only in the mid-
Functional Differentiation 191
die of the nineteenth century. (The Abbe Abbeville 1764; Peter Villaume, Uber das
Morellet, Prospectus d’un nouveau diction- Verhaltnis der Religion zur Moral und z.um
naire de commerce, Paris 1769, reprint Mu¬ Staate, Libau 1791, and of course, the wide¬
nich 1980, pp. 98ff., observes a restriction to spread critique of the French Revolution as
economic profit. But the entire eighteenth the outbreak of a naive faith in principles.
century used it in a much more general 11. This led many to the conclusion of ‘revolu¬
sense). It is equally clear, however, that the tion’—with very little support for possibilities
concept of value has been used as an ultimate and consequences. One finds typically that
guarantee for meaning and therefore non- the manifest/latent schema is introduced
contradictably in the last hundred years. without further reflection as a description of
7. This happens in any event. But it is also re¬ facts and forms the basis for analyses. This
quired in many respects and viewed as the has been the case especially since Robert K.
precondition for the solutions of problems. Merton, ‘The Unanticipated Consequences of
Cf., Karl-Heinz Hillmann, Umweltkrise und Purposive Social Action’, in American Socio¬
Wertwandel: Die Umwertung der Werte als logical Review, vol. 1, (1936), pp. 894-904.
Strategie des Uberlebens, Frankfurt-Bem
1981. 12. Jurgen Habermas judges much more sharply
and leaves more room for hope. He views this
8. Cf., Talcott Parsons, 'On the Concept of Value-
as the theory-immanent problem of the En¬
Commitments’, in Sociological Inquiry, vol.
lightenment’s erroneous semantic guidance
38 (1968), pp. 135-60 (153ff.).
by the theory of the subject and its object and
9. For a comparison: the self-description of therefore sees the solution of the problem in
stratified societies had always used a moral the transition to a new paradigm of intersub-
schematism—whether in the direct moral jective agreement. Cf., Der philosophische
criticism of typical behavior in the individual Diskurs der Modeme: Zwolf Vorlesungen,
strata or in the formulation of types of perfec¬ Frankfurt 1985. To make this useful socio¬
tion from which everyone could measure logically, one must still clarify how this erro¬
their distance. neous guidance and the possibility of correct¬
10. Cf., for example, Simon-Nicolas-Henri Lin- ing it are connected with the structure of
quet, Le Fanatisme des philosophes, London- modem society. ♦
192 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VII. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism
Yet to answer the central question about patterns. They insist, however, that these pat¬
action is not enough. A second major issue terns are the result of individual negotiation.
needs to be presupposed as well. I refer here They believe not simply that structure is “car¬
to the famous “problem of order/' although I ried" by individuals but that it is actually pro¬
will define it somewhat differently than has duced by the carriers in the course of their
typically been the case. Sociologists are individual interactions. The assumption is
sociologists because they believe there are that individuals can alter the fundaments of
patterns to society, structures somehow sepa¬ order at each successive moment in histori¬
rate from the actors who compose it. Yet, cal time. Individuals, in this view, do not
while all sociologists believe such patterns carry order inside of them. Rather, they fol¬
exists, they often disagree sharply about how low or rebel against social order—even the
such an order is actually produced. Once values that they hold within themselves—ac¬
again, I will cast these disagreements in cording to their individual desires.
terms of dichotomous ideal types because it Once again, whether it is possible to com¬
is just this agglomerated antipathy that has bine some elements of this contingent posi¬
characterized the empirical and discursive tion with a more collectivist emphasis is a
history of social thought (see Ekeh 1974, Le¬ matter I will take up in the following discus¬
wis and Smith 1980). This dichotomy refers sion. What I wish to emphasize at this point
to the opposition between individualistic and is that the problems of action and order are
collectivist positions. not optional. Every theory must take some
If thinkers presuppose a collectivist posi¬ position on both. The logical permutations
tion, they see social patterns as existing prior among these presuppositions form the fun¬
to any specific individual act, as in a sense the damental traditions of sociology. As such,
product of history. Social order confronts they form the most important axes around
newborn individuals as an established fact which social science discourse revolves.
outside of them. If the confusion aroused by Presuppositions are so central to dis¬
Durkheims (1937/1895) early formulations course because they have implications that
of this position is to be avoided, and if the go well beyond the explanatory concerns I
necessity for “correcting" Durkheims errors have just defined. The study of society re¬
by developing equally one-sided discursive volves around the questions of freedom and
justifications on the other side is to be order, and every theory is pulled between
avoided as well, certain codas to this defini¬ these poles. Modem men and women believe
tion of collectivism must immediately be that individuals have free will and that, be¬
made.2 If they are writing about adults, col¬ cause of this capacity, individuals can be
lectivists may well acknowledge that social tmsted to act in responsible ways. To one
order exists as much inside the individual as degree or another, this belief has been insti¬
without; this is, in fact, an important qualifi¬ tutionalized in Western societies. Individuals
cation to which we will return. Whether it is have been set apart as privileged political and
conceptualized as inside or outside an actor, cultural units. Elaborate legal efforts have
however, the collectivist position does not been made to protect them from the group,
view order as the product of purely this-in- from the state, and from other coercive or¬
stant, this-moment considerations. Accord¬ gans like an established church.
ing to collectivist theory every individual ac¬ Sociological theorists, whether individual¬
tor is pushed in the direction of preexisting ist or collectivist, are likely to be as commit¬
structure; whether this direction remains ted to the autonomy of the individual as other
only a probability or a determined fate de¬ citizens. Indeed, sociology emerged as a dis¬
pends on refinements in the collectivist posi¬ cipline as a result of this differentiation of the
tion I will take up below. individual in society, for it was the inde¬
Individualistic theories often acknowledge pendence of the individual and the growth of
that there do appear to be such extraindi¬ his or her powers to think freely about society
vidual structures in society, and they cer¬ that allowed society itself to be conceived of
tainly recognize that there are intelligible as an independent object of study. It is the
194 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VII. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism
narrow, technically efficient forms of ratio¬ rhetoric and idealistic justifications. As such,
nality. If such an assumption is made, then it often underestimates the ever-present ten¬
collective structures must be portrayed as if sion between even the socialized individual
they were external to individuals and entirely and his or her social environment. This ten¬
unresponsive to their will. Political or eco¬ sion, of course, is most obvious when the
nomic institutions, for example, are said to theorist must consider an environment that
control the actors from without, whether is material in form, a possibility that cannot
they like it or not. They do so by arranging be conceptualized when collectivist theory is
punitive sanctions and positive rewards for formulated in a one-sidedly normative way.
actors who are reduced—whatever the spe¬ In the discussion of recent theoretical dis¬
cific nature of their personal goals—to calcu¬ course that follows, I will focus on how pre-
lators of pleasure and pain. Because such ac¬ suppositional commitments have shaped
tors are assumed to respond rationally to this sociological debate since the early 1960s.
external situation, motives are eliminated as They have exerted their influence, of course,
a theoretical concern. Such theorizing as¬ even if no attempt has been made discur¬
sumes that the actors response can be pre¬ sively to justify them. The central figures in
dicted from analysis of the external environ¬ these debates, however, have sought such dis¬
ment alone. Rational-collectivist theories, cursive justification. This, indeed, is what
then, explain order only by sacrificing the made them influential theorists. Through
subject. In effect, they dispense with the very their discourse these theorists developed
notion of an autonomous self. In classical claims about the scope and implications of
sociology, orthodox Marxism presents the their theories, claims that stipulated “truth
most formidable example of this develop¬ criteria" at a supraempirical level. In the pre¬
ment, and the coercive implications that sur¬ sent section I have laid out my own concep¬
round its discourse—as revealed, for exam¬ tion of what such criteria should be. When I
ple, in recurring references to the “dictator¬ apply these criteria to recent theoretical de¬
ship of the proletariat" and the “laws of his¬ bate, I will often be arguing in opposition to
tory"—have generated intense critical re¬ the truth claims of the principal participants
sponse (e.g., Van den Berg 1988). The same in these debates. This, of course, is the very
tendency to justify a discourse without a sub¬ stuff of which social science discourse is
ject permeates every neoclassical theory that made.
has collective ambitions, and Webers sociol¬
ogy as well, as the controversy over the status Reconsidering Micro and
of “domination" in the Weberian corpus dem¬ Macro Theory
onstrates.
If, by contrast, collectivist theory allows It is perhaps because of the discipline’s
that action may be nonrational, it perceives methodological and empirical focus that the
actors as guided by ideals and emotion. This massive renewal of individualistic theorizing
internal realm of subjectivity is initially in sociology has been seen as a revival of “mi¬
structured, it is true, by encounters with ex¬ crosociology."4 For, strictly speaking, micro
ternal objects—with parents, teachers, sib¬ and macro are thoroughly relativistic terms,
lings, and books. In the process of socializa¬ referring to part/whole relationships at every
tion, however, such extraindividual struc¬ level of social organization. In the language
tures become internal to the self. Only if this of recent social science, however, they have
phenomenon of internalization is accepted been identified with the distinction between
can subjectivity become a topic for collectiv¬ taking individual interaction as an empirical
ist theory. According to this view, individual focus, on the one hand, and taking an entire
interaction becomes a negotiation between social system as ones empirical focus, on the
two “social selves." The dangers that such other.
theorizing encounters are quite the opposite When Homans (1958, 1961) introduced
from collectivist theories of a more ratio¬ exchange theory, he was renewing the very
nalistic kind. It tends to engage in moralistic utilitarian position that had constituted the
196 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VII. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism
basis of Parsons’ (1937) earliest and most Blumer insisted that meaning is determined
powerful critique. Not only did Homans re¬ by individual negotiation—indeed, by the re¬
ject the collective tradition in classical and action of others to the individual’s act. The
contemporary sociology, but the interpretive actor is not seen as bringing some previously
strand of individualistic theorizing as well. defined collective order into play. It is imme¬
He insisted that the elementary forms of so¬ diate situational-relevance, not internaliza¬
cial life were not extraindividual elements tion, that defines attitudes. Through "self-in¬
such as symbol systems but individual actors dication” actors make objects even out of
of an exclusively rationalist bent. He focused their own selves. It is the temporally rooted
on what he called sub-institutional behavior, "I” of the actor, not the more societally fo¬
the behavior of "actual individuals,” which he cused "me,” that determines the pattern of
believed to be entirely independent of so¬ social order described in Blumer’s work.
cially specified norms. The procedures Though powerful, Blumer’s most influen¬
through which individuals make calculations tial writing was almost entirely discursive in
occupied Homans’ attention. So did the bal¬ form; even when it was programmatic, more¬
ance of supply and demand in the actor’s ex¬ over, it focused more on promoting the
ternal environment. In Homans’ rationalistic methodology of direct observation than on
perspective the social forces impinging on ac¬ elaborating theoretical concepts. It is Goff-
tors could only be conceived in an objectified man who must be seen as the most important
and external way. empirical theorist of the symbolic inter-
Exchange theory became enormously in¬ actionist movement. To most contemporar¬
fluential in reviving the case for microsociol¬ ies, Goffman’s work appeared merely to point
ogy. Its simple and elegant model facilitated interactionist theory in a more problem-spe¬
predictions; its focus on individuals made it cific and dramaturgic direction. Certainly his
empirically operational. It also caught hold early work tends to support this reading. In
of a fundamental insight that Parsons and, contrast to the clear collectivist strains that
indeed, collectivist theorists of every stripe emerged in his later theorizing, Goffman
had ignored: It is through individual actors (e.g., 1959) emphasized individuals’ desires
making decisions about the costs of contin¬ to manipulate the presentation of self in op¬
gent exchange that "objective social condi¬ position to socially structured roles, and he
tions” become articulated vis-a-vis the every¬ tried (1963) to explain institutional behavior
day life of individuals, institutions, and as emerging from face-to-face interaction.
groups.5 The price for such insights was high, Ethnomethodology, and phenomenologi¬
however, even for theorists inside the para¬ cal work more generally, presents a more
digm itself. For example, Homans (1961, pp. complicated story. Garfinkel was a student
40, 54-5) was never able to define the "value” not only of Schutz but also of Parsons, and
of a commodity in anything but a circular his earliest work (e.g., 1963) accepts the cen¬
way; he was compelled to argue that it trality of internalization. What Garfinkel ex¬
stemmed from reinforcing an orientation plored in this early writing was how actors
that was already in place. His conception of make social norms their own; he explored,
distributive justice showed similar strains that is, their "ethno” methodology. Empha¬
(1961 chapter 12); he was forced to refer to sizing the constructed character of action, he
"irrational” solidarity in order to decide just described how, through cognitive techniques
what the definition of an equitable "rational” like “ad hoeing” (Garfinkel 1967), individuals
exchange might be. conceived of contingent and unique events as
The other major strands of microtheoriz¬ representations, or "indexes,” of socially
ing have taken up the interpretive side. structured rules. In the process, he showed,
Blumer (1969) was the general theorist most these rules were in actuality not simply speci¬
responsible for the revival of Meadian theory, fied but modified and changed.
although the tradition that Blumer (1937) la¬ As ethnomethodology became a major
beled symbolic interactionism took up prag¬ theoretical movement, it was forced to justify
matism only in its radically contingent form.6 itself in general and discursive ways. In the
After Neofunctionalism 197
process, its concepts became more one¬ tions of fundamental structural principles.
sided. Presenting itself as committed to an Rather than starting with the empirical and
alternative sociology, ethnomethodology em¬ phenomenal diversity of social actions and
phasized “members' own practices" over and lifeworlds, as contemporary microtheorists
against structure. That constitutive tech¬ advised, these Marxist structuralists gave on¬
niques like indexicality were omnipresent, it tological and methodological primacy to the
was now argued, should be seen as evidence “totality." Although individual actions may
that order is completely emergent, and the deviate from structural imperatives, the ob¬
endlessly resourceful practice of orderly ac¬ jective consequences of these actions are de¬
tivity came to be identified (Garfinkel et al. termined by structures that exist beyond the
1981) with social order itself. That this kind actors' control.
of individualistic reduction is somehow in¬ While just as deterministic, this structural
herent in a phenomenological approach is Marxism was less directly economic than
belied, however, by other strains that other variants. It emphasized the political
emerged from the ethnomethodological mediation of productive forces rather than
school. Conversational analysis (Sacks et al. their direct control (e.g., Poulantzas 1972).
1974), for example, viewed speech as subject This discourse about mediation and struc¬
to strong structural constraints even if it did tural “overdetermination" set the stage for
not usually conceptualize these constraints Marxist theorizing with a distinctively We¬
in a systematic way. berian cast. Critical political economists like
It is certainly an ironic demonstration of Offe (1984/1972) and O'Connor (1978) fo¬
the lack of linear accumulation in sociology cused on the function of the state in capitalist
that, concurrent with this resurgence of mi¬ accumulation and tried to derive social prob¬
cro-theorizing, there emerged a strong move¬ lems and crises from “inevitable" state inter¬
ment toward equally one-sided kinds of vention.
macro, collectivist work. This movement be¬ While the most important discursive justi¬
gan when “conflict theorists" justified them¬ fications for the new structural theory have
selves by defining Parsonian work as “order come from Europe, its influence in America
theory." Like the new microsociologists, has depended on a series of influential argu¬
these theorists, too, denied the centrality of ments at the middle range. Moore's (1966)
internalization and the link between action major work on the class origins of state for¬
and culture that concept implies. Rather than mations provided the major impetus for this
emphasizing individual consciousness as the work, though it was much more classically
basis of collective order, however, conflict Marxist than the neo-Weberian structuralist
theorists severed the link between conscious¬ work that followed in its wake. The most im¬
ness and structural processes altogether. Da- posing single work that followed Moore’s was
hrendorf (1959) gave to administrative power Skocpol's (1979). Skocpol not only provided
positions the central ordering role. Rex what appeared to be a powerful new covering
(1961) emphasized the allocative economic law to explain revolutions but offered a
processes that gave power to the ruling class. widely persuasive polemic against subjective
While conflict arguments certainly pro¬ and voluntaristic theories of revolution (in
vided the most powerful justifications for the name of her structural theory). Wright's
structural theorizing in its initial phase, it (1978) class analysis takes up the same an¬
was the Marxism of Althusser and his stu¬ timicro theme, arguing that ambiguities in a
dents (Althusser and Balibar 1970, Godelier group's class consciousness come from “con¬
1967) that formulated the most sophisticated tradictory class locations." Treiman (1977)
and influential discourse in its later phase. similarly produced what he called a “struc¬
Drawing from Spinoza and as well as from tural theory of prestige" that converted cul¬
modern linguistic and anthropological the¬ tural into organizational control and denied
ory, this so-called structural Marxism ana¬ to subjective understandings of stratification
lyzed historical developments as particular any independent causal role. In still another
variations, transformations, and incarna¬ influential work, Lieberson (1980) put his ex-
198 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VII. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism
planation for racial inequality in the terms of in a purely discursive way, in his highly pub¬
this same highly persuasive discourse. He licized presidential address to the American
Sociological Association. In the major intro¬
identified “structures of opportunity” with
duction to his collection of essays (Homans
material environment and justified this by
1962), he developed new modes of biographi¬
dismissing the focus on subjective volition as cal and ideological discourse to justify ex¬
conservative and idealist. change theorizing. His remarkable dedica¬
tion to developing discursive justifications
Endnotes for exchange theory continued to be revealed
in his autobiography (Homans 1984), which,
1. The claim that rational and nonrational have, I have argued elsewhere (Alexander 1987b),
in fact, informed broadly distinctive tradi¬ creates a series of not entirely accurate frame¬
tions in the history of social thought has been works through which the exchange perspec¬
advanced by a wide range of different writers, tive is presented as psychologically, morally,
for example, Parsons (1937), Hughes (1958), scientifically, and historically inevitable.
and Habermas (1971).
6. Lewis and Smith (1980) demonstrate this
2. It is just such an overreaction against the point in a powerful and systematic way in
standard misreading of Durkheim s position their brilliant reinterpretation of the history
that marks Giddens' position (e.g., Giddens of pragmatic social theory in America. That
1976). This overreaction has led him to an upon its publication this book became extra¬
overly individualistic position on the order ordinarily controversial points, in my view, to
question. the danger its argument posed to the discur¬
3. In his subtle essay on the origins of modern sive justifications of symbolic interactionism
economic theory, Hirschman (1977) has in its Blumerian mode.
shown that contract theories that empha¬
sized market exchanges originated as part of References
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-. 1961, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. Treiman, D. 1977, Occupational Prestige in Com¬
New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. parative Perspective. New York: John Wiley.
-. (ed.) 1962, Introduction. In G. Homans, Van den Berg, A. 1988, The Immanent Utopia:
Sentiments and Activities. New York: Free From Marxism on the State to the State of Marx¬
Press. ism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
-. 1984, Coming to My Senses. New Bruns¬ Wright, E. O. 1978, Class, Crisis, and the State.
wick, NJ: Transaction. London: New Left Books. ♦
200 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VIII. Conflict Theory
intensified through frequency of inter¬ their members so that internal conflict would
action), the acting out of such feelings is tend to mobilize all energies and affects of the
sensed as a danger to such intimate relation¬ members. Hence such groups are unlikely to
ships, and hence there is a tendency to sup¬ tolerate more than limited departures from
press rather than to allow expression of hos¬ the group unity. In such groups there is a
tile feelings. In close-knit groups, feelings of tendency to suppress conflict, where it oc¬
hostility tend, therefore, to accumulate and curs, it leads the group to break up through
hence to intensify. If conflict breaks out in a splits or through forced withdrawal of dis¬
group that has consistently tried to prevent senters.
expression of hostile feelings, it will be par¬ Groups which are not involved in contin¬
ticularly intense for two reasons: First, be¬ ued struggle with the outside are less prone
cause the conflict does not merely aim at re¬ to make claims on total personality involve¬
solving the immediate issue which led to its ment of the membership and are more likely
outbreak; all accumulated grievances which to exhibit flexibility of structure. The multi¬
were denied expression previously are apt to ple internal conflicts which they tolerate may
emerge at this occasion. Second, because the in turn have an equilibrating and stabilizing
total personality involvement of the group impact on the structure.
members makes for mobilization of all senti¬ In flexible social structures, multiple con¬
ments in the conduct of the struggle. flicts crisscross each other and thereby pre¬
Hence, the closer the group, the more in¬ vent basic cleavages along one axis. The mul¬
tense the conflict. Where members partici¬ tiple group affiliations of individuals makes
pate with their total personality and conflicts them participate in various group conflicts so
are suppressed, the conflict, if it breaks out that their total personalities are not involved
nevertheless, is likely to threaten the very in any single one of them. Thus segmental
root of the relationship. participation in a multiplicity of conflicts
In groups comprising individuals who par¬ constitutes a balancing mechanism within
ticipate only segmentally, conflict is less the structure.
likely to be disruptive. Such groups are likely In loosely structured groups and open so¬
to experience a multiplicity of conflicts. This cieties, conflict, which aims at a resolution of
in itself tends to constitute a check against tension between antagonists, is likely to have
the breakdown of consensus: the energies of stabilizing and integrative functions for the
group members are mobilized in many direc¬ relationship. By permitting immediate and
tions and hence will not concentrate on one direct expression of rival claims, such social
conflict cutting through the group. Moreover, systems are able to readjust their structures
where occasions for hostility are not permit¬ by eliminating the sources of dissatisfaction.
ted to accumulate and conflict is allowed to The multiple conflicts which they experience
occur wherever a resolution of tension seems may serve to eliminate the causes for disso¬
to be indicated, such a conflict is likely to ciation and to re-establish unity. These sys¬
remain focused primarily on the condition tems avail themselves, through the toleration
which led to its outbreak and not to revive and institutionalization of conflict, of an im¬
blocked hostility; in this way, the conflict is portant stabilizing mechanism.
limited to "the facts of the case/' One may In addition, conflict within a group fre¬
venture to say that multiplicity of conflicts quently helps to revitalize existent norms; or
stands in inverse relation to their intensity. it contributes to the emergence of new
So far we have been dealing with internal norms. In this sense, social conflict is a
social conflict only. At this point we must turn mechanism for adjustment of norms ade¬
to a consideration of external conflict, for the quate to new conditions. A flexible society
structure of the group is itself affected by con¬ benefits from conflict because such behavior,
flicts with other groups in which it engages by helping to create and modify norms, as¬
or which it prepares for. Groups which are sures its continuance under changed condi¬
engaged in continued struggle tend to lay tions. Such mechanism for readjustment of
claim on the total personality involvement of norms is hardly available to rigid systems: by
202 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VIII. Conflict Theory
suppressing conflict, the latter smother a use¬ and every antagonistic claim is allowed im¬
ful warning signal, thereby maximizing the mediate expression. Societies dispose of
danger of catastrophic breakdown. mechanisms to channel discontent and hos¬
Internal conflict can also serve as a means tility while keeping intact the relationship
for ascertaining the relative strength of an¬ within which antagonism arises. Such
tagonistic interests within the structure, and mechanisms frequently operate through
in this way constitute a mechanism for the "safety-valve" institutions which provide sub¬
maintenance or continual readjustment of stitute objects upon which to displace hostile
the balance of power. Since the outbreak of sentiments as well as means of abreaction of
the conflict indicates a rejection of a previous aggressive tendencies.
accommodation between parties, once the Safety-valve institutions may serve to
respective power of the contenders has been maintain both the social structure and the
ascertained through conflict, a new equilib¬ individuals security system, but they are in¬
rium can be established and the relationship completely functional for both of them. They
can proceed on this new basis. Consequently, prevent modification of relationships to meet
a social structure in which there is room for changing conditions and hence the satisfac¬
conflict disposes of an important means for tion they afford the individual can be only
avoiding or redressing conditions of dise¬ partially or momentarily adjustive. The hy¬
quilibrium by modifying the terms of power pothesis has been suggested that the need for
relations. safety-valve institutions increases with the ri¬
Conflicts with some produce associations gidity of the social structure, i.e., with the
or coalitions with others. Conflicts through degree to which it disallows direct expression
such associations or coalitions, by providing of antagonistic claims.
a bond between the members, help to reduce Safety-valve institutions lead to a displace¬
social isolation or to unite individuals and ment of goal in the actor: he need no longer
groups otherwise unrelated or antagonistic aim at reaching a solution of the unsatisfac¬
to each other. A social structure in which tory situation, but merely at releasing the ten¬
there can exist a multiplicity of conflicts con¬ sion which arose from it. Where safety-valve
tains a mechanism for bringing together institutions provide substitute objects for the
otherwise isolated, apathetic or mutually displacement of hostility, the conflict itself is
hostile parties and for taking them into the channeled away from the original unsatisfac¬
field of public social activities. Moreover, tory relationship into one in which the actor s
such a structure fosters a multiplicity of as¬ goal is no longer the attainment of specific
sociations and coalitions whose diverse pur¬ results, but the release of tension.
poses crisscross each other, we recall, thereby This affords us a criterion for distinguish¬
preventing alliances along one major line of ing between realistic and nonrealistic con¬
cleavage. flict.
Once groups and associations have been Social conflicts that arise from frustra¬
formed through conflict with other groups, tions of specific demands within a relation¬
such conflict may further serve to maintain ship and from estimates of gains of the par¬
boundary lines between them and the sur¬ ticipants, and that are directed at the pre¬
rounding social environment. In this way, so¬ sumed frustrating object, can be called real¬
cial conflict helps to structure the larger so¬ istic conflicts. Insofar as they are means to¬
cial environment by assigning position to the ward specific results, they can be replaced by
various subgroups within the system and by alternative modes of interaction with the
helping to define the power relations be¬ contending party if such alternatives seem to
tween them. be more adequate for realizing the end in
Not all social systems in which individuals view.
participate segmentally allow the free expres¬ Nonrealistic conflicts, on the other band,
sion of antagonistic claims. Social systems are not occasioned by the rival ends of the
tolerate or institutionalize conflict to differ¬ antagonists, but by the need for tension re¬
ent degrees. There is no society in which any lease of one or both of them. In this case the
Functions of Conflict 203
conflict is not oriented toward the attainment to occur as a consequence of rigidity present
of specific results. Insofar as unrealistic con¬ in the social structure.
flict is an end in itself, insofar as it affords Our discussion of the distinction between
only tension release, the chosen antagonist types of conflict, and between types of social
can be substituted for by any other “suitable” structures, leads us to conclude that conflict
target. tends to be dysfunctional for a social struc¬
In realistic conflict, there exist functional ture in which there is no or insufficient tol¬
alternatives with regard to the means of car¬ eration and institutionalization of conflict.
rying out the conflict, as well as with regard The intensity of a conflict which threatens to
to accomplishing desired results short of con¬ “tear apart,” which attacks the consensual
flict; in nonrealistic conflict, on the other basis of a social system, is related to the ri¬
hand, there exist only functional alternatives gidity of the structure. What threatens the
in the choice of antagonists. equilibrium of such a structure is not conflict
Our hypothesis, that the need for safety- as such, but the rigidity itself which permits
valve institutions increases with the rigidity hostilities to accumulate and to be channeled
of the social system, may be extended to sug¬ along one major line of cleavage once they
gest that unrealistic conflict may be expected break out in conflict. ♦
204 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VIII. Conflict Theory
Politics I
C. Wright Mills , These two ideologies came out of The En¬
lightenment, and they have had in common
many assumptions and two major values: in
C. Wright Mills (1916-1962), who has been both, freedom and reason are supposed to
referred to as “the angry Texan, ” is in many re¬ coincide: increased rationality is held to be
spects the heir of Marx and Weber. Writing dur¬ the prime condition of increased freedom.
ing the Cold War of the 1950s, Mills was a vocal Those thinkers who have done the most to
and persistent critic of those figures in the so¬ shape our ways of thinking have proceeded
cial scientific community who thought we had under this assumption; these values lie under
entered a new age in which the old conflicts of every movement and nuance of the work of
the preceding era had been overcome. One of Freud: to be free, the individual must become
the first sociological theorists to use the term more rationally aware; therapy is an aid to
“post-modern,” Mills contends that we have giving reason its chance to work freely in the
entered a new and dangerous age characterized course of an individuals life. These values
by large unresolved questions in the economic underpin the main line of Marxist work: men,
and political realms and by the threat of future caught in the irrational anarchy of produc¬
large-scale violence at a time of continual war tion, must become rationally aware of their
preparedness. position in society; they must become "class
conscious”—the Marxian meaning of which
is as rationalistic as any term set forth by
We are at the ending of what is called The Bentham.
Modem Age. Just as Antiquity was followed Liberalism has been concerned with free¬
by several centuries of Oriental ascendancy dom and reason as supreme facts about the
which Westerners provincially call The Dark individual; Marxism as supreme facts about
Ages, so now The Modern Age is being suc¬ mans role in the political making of history.
ceeded by a post-modern period. Perhaps we But what has been happening in the world
may call it: The Fourth Epoch. makes evident, I believe, why the ideas of
The ending of one epoch and the begin¬ freedom and of reason now so often seem so
ning of another is, to be sure, a matter of ambiguous in both the capitalist and the
definition. But definitions, like everything so¬ communist societies of our time: why Marx¬
cial, are historically specific. And now our ism has so often become a dreary rhetoric of
basic definitions of society and of self are bureaucratic defense and political abuse; and
being overtaken by new realities. I do not liberalism, a trivial and irrelevant way of
mean merely that we feel we are in an epochal masking social reality. The major develop¬
kind of transition. I mean that too many of ments of our time can be adequately under¬
our explanations are derived from the great stood in terms of neither the liberal nor the
historical transition from the Medieval to the Marxian interpretation of politics and cul¬
Modern Age; and that when they are general- ture. These ways of thought, after all, arose
as guide-lines to reflection about types of so¬
culture & Politics: The Fourth Epoch” from Power,
ciety which do not now exist. John Stuart Mill
Politics, and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills
by C. Wright Mills, edited by Irving Louis Horowitz. never examined the kinds of political econ¬
Copyright © 1963 by the Estate of C. Wright Mills. omy now arising in the capitalist world. Karl
Used by permission of Oxford University Press, Inc. Marx never analyzed the kinds of society now
Culture and Politics 205
arising in the Communist bloc. And neither of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? And did it not
of them ever thought through the problems prevail, too, among fighter pilots in Korea,
of the so-called underdeveloped countries in with their petroleum-jelly broiling of chil¬
which seven out of ten men are trying to exist dren and women and men? Auschwitz and
today. Hiroshima—are they not equally features of
The ideological mark of The Fourth Ep¬ the highly rational moral-insensibility of The
och—that which sets it off from The Modem Fourth Epoch? And is not this lack of moral
Age—is that the ideas of freedom and of rea¬ sensibility raised to a higher and technically
son have become moot; that increased ratio¬ more adequate level among the brisk gener¬
nality may not be assumed to make for in¬ als and gentle scientists who are now ratio¬
creased freedom. nally—and absurdly—planning the weapons
and the strategy of the third world war?
These actions are not necessarily sadistic;
II they are merely businesslike; they are not
emotional at all; they are efficient, rational,
The underlying trends are well known.
technically clean-cut. They are inhuman acts
Great and rational organizations—in brief,
because they are impersonal.
bureaucracies—have indeed increased, but
the substantive reason of the individual at
large has not. Caught in the limited milieux Ill
of their everyday lives, ordinary men often
cannot reason about the great structures— In the meantime, ideology and sensibility
rational and irrational—of which their mi¬ quite apart, the compromises and exploita¬
lieux are subordinate parts. Accordingly, they tions by which the nineteenth-century world
often carry out series of apparently rational was balanced have collapsed. In this sixth
actions without any ideas of the ends they decade of the twentieth century the structure
serve, and there is the increasing suspicion of a new world is indeed coming into view.
that those at the top as well—like Tolstoys The ascendancy of the USA, along with
generals—only pretend they know. That the that of the USSR, has relegated the scatter of
techniques and the rationality of science are European nations to subsidiary status. The
given a central place in a society does not world of The Fourth Epoch is divided. On
mean that men live reasonably and without either side, a superpower now spends its
myth, fraud and superstition. Science, it most massive and co-ordinated effort in the
turns out, is not a technological Second Com¬ highly scientific preparation of a third world
ing. Universal education may lead to techno¬ war.
logical idiocy and nationalist provinciality, Yet, for the first time in history, the very
rather than to the informed and independent idea of victory in war has become idiotic. As
intelligence. Rationally organized social ar¬ war becomes total, it becomes absurd. Yet in
rangements are not necessarily a means of both the superstates, virtually all policies and
increased freedom—for the individual or for actions fall within the perspective of war; in
the society. In fact, often they are a means of both, elites and spokesmen—in particular, I
tyranny and manipulation, a means of expro¬ must say, those of the United States—are pos¬
priating the very chance to reason, the very sessed by the military metaphysic, according
capacity to act as a free man. to which all world reality is defined in mili¬
The atrocities of The Fourth Epoch are tary terms. By both, the most decisive fea¬
committed by men as “functions" of a ratio¬ tures of reality are held to be the state of
nal social machinery—men possessed by an violence and the balance of fright.
abstracted view that hides from them the hu¬ Back of this struggle there is the world-en¬
manity of their victims and as well their own counter of two types of political economy,
humanity. The moral insensibility of our and in this encounter capitalism is losing.
times was made dramatic by the Nazis, but Some higher capitalists of the USA are be¬
is not the same lack of human morality re¬ coming aware of this, and they are very much
vealed by the atomic bombing of the peoples frightened. They fear, with good justification,
206 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VIII. Conflict Theory
that they are going to become an isolated and tively, by the maintenance of conspicuous
a second-rate power. They represent utopian production; individually, by the frenzied pur¬
capitalism in a world largely composed of suit and maintenance of commodities.
people whose experiences with real capital¬ Around these fetishes, life, labor and leisure
ism, if any, have been mostly brutal. They are increasingly organized. Focused upon
profess “democracy" in a nation where it is these, the struggle for status supplements the
more a formal outline than an actuality, and struggle for survival; a panic for status re¬
in a world in which the great majority of peo¬ places the proddings of poverty.
ple have never experienced the bourgeois In underdeveloped countries, industriali¬
revolutions, in a world in which the values zation, however harsh, may be seen as man
deposited by the Renaissance and the Refor¬ conquering nature and so freeing himself
mation do not restrain the often brutal thrust from want. But in the overdeveloped nation,
to industrialize. as industrialization proceeds, the economic
United States foreign policy and lack of emphasis moves from production to mer¬
foreign policy is firmly a part of the absurdity chandizing, and the economic system which
of this world scene, and it is foremost among makes a fetish of efficiency becomes highly
the many defaults of the Western societies. inefficient and systematically wasteful. The
During the last few years, confronting the pivotal decade for this shift in the United
brinks, I have often suspected that the world States was the twenties, but it is since the
is not at the third world war largely because ending of the second world war that the over¬
of the calculation and the forbearance of the developed economy has truly come to flour¬
Soviet elite. ish.
Surely there is no need to elaborate this
theme in detail; since Thorstein Veblen for¬
IV
mulated it, it has been several times “afflu¬
What kind of a society is the USA turning ently" rediscovered. Society in brief has be¬
out to be in the middle of the twentieth cen¬ come a great sales-room—and a network of
tury? Perhaps it is possible to characterize it rackets: the gimmick of success becomes the
as a prototype of at least “The West." To locate yearly change of model, as in the mass-soci¬
it within its world context in The Fourth Ep¬ ety fashion becomes universal. The market¬
och, perhaps we may call it The Overdevel¬ ing apparatus transforms the human being
oped Society. into the ultimately-saturated man—the
The Underdeveloped Country as you know, cheerful robot—and makes “anxious obsoles¬
is one in which the focus of life is necessarily cence" the American way of life.
upon economic subsistence; its industrial
equipment is not sufficient to meet Western V
standards of minimum comfort. Its style of
life and its system of power are dominated by But all this—although enormously impor¬
the struggle to accumulate the primary tant to the quality of life—is, I suppose,
means of industrial production. merely the obvious surface. Beneath it there
In a Properly Developing Society, one might are institutions which in the United States
suppose that deliberately cultivated styles of today are as far removed from the images of
life would be central; decisions about stan¬ Tocqueville as is Russia today from the clas¬
dards of living would be made in terms of sic expectations of Marx.
debated choices among such styles; the in¬ The power structure of this society is
dustrial equipment of such a society would based upon a privately incorporated econ¬
be maintained as an instrument to increase omy that is also a permanent war economy.
the range of choice among styles of life. Its most important relations with the state
But in The Overdeveloped Nation, the stan¬ now rest upon the coincidence of military
dard of living dominates the style of life; its and corporate interests—as defined by gen¬
inhabitants are possessed, as it were, by its erals and businessmen, and accepted by poli¬
industrial and commercial apparatus: collec¬ ticians and publics. It is an economy domi-
Culture and Politics 207
nated by a few hundred corporations, eco¬ In neither of these superpowers are there,
nomically and politically interrelated, which as central facts of power, voluntary associa¬
together hold the keys to economic decision. tions linking individuals, smaller communi¬
These dominating corporation-hierarchies ties and publics, on the one hand, with the
probably represent the highest concentration state, the military establishment, the eco¬
of the greatest economic power in human nomic apparatus on the other. Accordingly, in
history, including that of the Soviet Union. neither are there readily available vehicles for
They are firmly knit to political and military reasoned opinions and instruments for the
institutions, but they are dogmatic—even national exertion of public will. Such volun¬
maniacal—in their fetish of the “freedom" of tary associations are no longer a dominant
their private and irresponsible power. feature of the political structure of the over¬
I should like to put this matter in terms of developed society.
certain parallel developments in the USA and The classic conditions of democracy, in
the USSR. The very terms of their world an¬ summary, do not exactly flourish in the over¬
tagonism are furthering their similarities. developed society; democratic formations
Geographically and ethnically both are su¬ are not now ascendant in the power structure
persocieties; unlike the nations of Europe, of the United States or of the Soviet Union.
each has amalgamated on a continental do¬ Within both, history-making decisions and
main great varieties of peoples and cultures.
lack of decisions are virtually monopolized
The power of both is based upon technologi¬
by elites who have access to the material and
cal development. In both, this development
cultural means by which history is now pow¬
is made into a cultural and a social fetish,
erfully being made.
rather than an instrument under continual
public appraisal and control. In neither is
there significant craftsmanship in work or VI
significant leisure in the non-working life. In
I stress these parallels, and perhaps exag¬
both, men at leisure and at work are sub¬
gerate them, because of the great nationalist
jected to impersonal bureaucracies. In nei¬
emphasis upon the differences between the
ther do workers control the process of pro¬
two world antagonists. The parallels are, of
duction or consumers truly shape the process
course, due in each case to entirely different
of consumption. Workers' control is as far
sources; and so are the great differences. In
removed from both as is consumers' sover¬
the capitalist societies the development of the
eignty.
means of power has occurred gradually, and
In both the United States and the Soviet
Union, as the political order is enlarged and many cultural traditions have restrained and
centralized, it becomes less political and shaped them. In most of the Communist so¬
more bureaucratic; less the locale of a strug¬ cieties they have happened rapidly and bru¬
gle than an object to be managed. In neither tally and from the beginning under tightly
are there nationally responsible parties centralized authority; and without the cul¬
which debate openly and clearly the issues tural revolutions which in the West so greatly
which these nations, and indeed the world, strengthened and gave political focus to the
now so rigidly confront. Under some condi¬ idea of human freedom.
tions, must we not recognize that the two- You may say that all this is an immoderate
party state can be as irresponsible as is a one- and biased view of America, that America
party state? also contains many good features. Indeed
In neither the USA nor the USSR is there— that is so. But you must not expect me to
a senior civil service firmly linked to the provide A Balanced View. I am not a socio¬
world of knowledge and sensibility and com¬ logical bookkeeper. Moreover, “balanced
posed of skilled men who, in their careers and views" are now usually surface views which
in their aspirations, are truly independent— rest upon the homogeneous absence of
in the USA of corporation interests, in the imagination and the passive avoidance of re¬
USSR of party dictation. flection. A balanced view is usually, in the
208 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VIIL Conflict Theory
phrase of Royden Harrison, merely a vague uniquely available? Elites of power in charge
point of equilibrium between platitudes. of these means do now make history—to be
I feel no need for, and perhaps am incapa¬ sure, "under circumstances not of their own
ble of arranging for you, a lyric upsurge, a choosing”—but compared to other men and
cheerful little pat on the moral back. Yet per¬ other epochs, these circumstances them¬
haps, by returning to my point of beginning, selves certainly do not appear to be over¬
I can remind you of the kinds of problems whelming.
you might want to confront. I must make two And surely here is the paradox of our im¬
points only: one about fate and the making of mediate situation: the facts about the newer
history; the other about the roles many intel¬ means of history-making are a signal that
lectuals are now enacting. men are not necessarily in the grip of fate,
Fate has to do with events in history that that men can now make history. But this fact
are the summary and unintended results of stands ironically alongside the further fact
innumerable decisions of innumerable men. that just now those ideologies which offer
Each of their decisions is minute in conse¬ men the hope of making history have de¬
quence and subject to cancellation or re¬ clined and are collapsing in the overdevel¬
inforcement by other such decisions. There oped nation of the United States. That col¬
is no link between any one mans intention lapse is also the collapse of the expectations
and the summary result of the innumerable of the Enlightenment, that reason and free¬
decisions. Events are beyond human deci¬ dom would come to prevail as paramount
sions: history is made, behind mens backs. forces in human history. It also involves the
So conceived, fate is not a universal fact; abdication of many Western intellectuals.
it is not inherent in the nature of history or
in the nature of man. In a society in which VII
the ultimate weapon is the rifle; in which the
typical economic unit is the family farm and In the overdeveloped society, where is the
shop; in which the national-state does not yet intelligentsia that is carrying on the big dis¬
exist or is merely a distant framework; and in course of the Western world and whose work
which communication is by word of mouth, as intellectuals is influential among parties
handbill, pulpit—in such a society, history is and publics and relevant to the great deci¬
indeed fate. sions of our time? Where are the mass media
But consider now the major clue to our open to such men? Who among those in
condition, to the shape of the overdeveloped charge of the two-party state and its ferocious
society in The Fourth Epoch. In modem in¬ military machines are alert to what goes on
dustrial society the means of economic pro¬ in the world of knowledge and reason and
duction are developed and centralized, as sensibility? Why is the free intellect so di¬
peasants and artisans are replaced by private vorced from decisions of power? Why does
corporations and government industries. In there now prevail among men of power such
the modem nation-state the means of vio¬ a higher and irresponsible ignorance?
lence and of administration undergo similar In The Fourth Epoch, must we not face the
developments, as kings control nobles and possibility that the human mind, as a social
self-equipped knights are replaced by stand¬ fact might be deteriorating in quality and cul¬
ing armies and now by fearful military ma¬ tural level, and yet not many would notice it
chines. The post-modern climax of all three because of the overwhelming accumulation
developments—in economics, in politics, of technological gadgets? Is not that the
and in violence—is now occurring most dra¬ meaning of rationality without reason? Of
matically in the USA and the USSR. In the human alienation? Of the absence of any role
polarized world of our time, international as for reason in human affairs? The accumula¬
well as national, means of history-making are tion of gadgets hides these meanings: those
being centralized. Is it not thus clear that the who use them do not understand them; those
scope and the chance for conscious human who invent and maintain them do not under¬
agency in history-making are just now stand much else. That is why we may not,
Culture and Politics 209
without great ambiguity, use technological man making. The threat to that ideal is two¬
abundance as the index of human quality and fold: On the one hand, history-making may
cultural progress. well go by default, men may continue to ab¬
dicate its willful making, and so merely drift.
VIII On the other hand, history may indeed be
made—but by narrow elite circles without
To formulate any problem requires that we effective responsibility to those who must try
state the values involved and the threat to
to survive the consequences of their decisions
these values. For it is the felt threat to cher¬
and of their defaults.
ished values—such as those of freedom and
I do not know the answer to the question
reason—that is the necessary moral sub¬
of political irresponsibility in our time or to
stance of all significant problems of social
inquiry, and as well of all public issues and the cultural and political question of The
private troubles. Cheerful Robot; but is it not clear that no
The values involved in the cultural prob¬ answers will be found unless these problems
lem of freedom and individuality are conven¬ are at least confronted? Is it not obvious that
iently embodied in all that is suggested by the the ones to confront them, above all others,
ideal of The Renaissance Man. The threat to are the intellectuals, the scholars, the minis¬
that ideal is the ascendancy among us of The ters, the scientists of the rich societies? That
Cheerful Robot, of the man with rationality many of them do not now do so, with moral
but without reason. The values involved in passion, with intellectual energy, is surely the
the political problem of history-making are greatest human default being committed by
embodied in the Promethean ideal of its hu¬ privileged men in our times. ♦
210 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VIIL Conflict Theory
terminology of the integration theory of soci¬ the stability of social systems. There seems
ety (for which see my italics): little doubt, however, that from this point of
view we can barely begin to understand the
Conflict may serve to remove dissociating
phenomenon of group conflicts. Were it only
elements in a relationship and to re-estab¬
lish unity Insofar as conflict is the resolu¬ for its “positive functions," for which Coser
tion of tension between antagonists it has found so many telling synonyms, class con¬
stabilizing functions and becomes an inte¬ flict would continue to be rather a nuisance
grating component of the relationship. How¬ which the sociologist would prefer to dis¬
ever, not all conflicts are positively func¬ pense with since it may, after all, “endanger
tional for the relationship. . . . Loosely basic consensus." So far as the present study
structured groups, and open societies, by is concerned, “continuing group conflict"
allowing conflicts, institute safeguards will be regarded as “an important way of giv¬
against the type of conflict which would
ing direction to social change" (Dubin, 2, p.
endanger basic consensus and thereby
minimize the danger of divergences touch¬ 194). Societies are essentially historical crea¬
ing core values. The interdependence of tures, and, because they are, they require the
antagonistic groups and the crisscrossing motive force of conflict—or, conversely, be¬
within such societies of conflicts, which cause there is conflict, there is historical
serve to ‘sew the social system together’ by change and development. The dialectics of
cancelling each other out, thus prevent conflict and history provide the ultimate rea¬
disintegration along one primary line of son of our interest in this phenomenon and
cleavage (4, p. 80). at the same time signify the consequences of
On the other hand, Coser follows Sorel in social conflict with which we are concerned.
postulating “the idea that conflict . . . pre¬ Dubin s observation that conflict is a stub¬
vents the ossification of the social system by born fact of social life is undoubtedly justi¬
exerting pressure for innovation and creativ¬ fied. Earlier, we have made the assertion ex¬
ity" and states: plicit that social conflict is ubiquitous; in
fact, this is one of the premises of our analy¬
This conception seems to be more gener¬ sis. Possibly, this premise permits even fur¬
ally applicable than to class struggle alone. ther generalization. There has been in recent
Conflict within and between groups in a
years some amount of interdisciplinary re¬
society can prevent accommodations and
habitual relations from progressively im¬ search on problems of conflict. In specific
poverishing creativity. The dash of values features the results of these interdisciplinary
and interests, the tension between what is efforts remain as yet tentative; but one con¬
and what some groups feel ought to be, clusion has been brought out by them with
the conflict between vested interests and impressive clarity: it appears that not only in
new strata and groups demanding their social life, but wherever there is life, there is
share of power, wealth and status, have conflict.1 May we perhaps go so far as to say
been productive of vitality (3, pp. 197 f.). that conflict is a condition necessary for life
Conflict may, indeed, from a Utopian point to be possible at all? I would suggest, in any
of view, be conceived as one of the patterns case, that all that is creativity, innovation,
contributing to the maintenance of the status and development in the life of the individual,
quo. To be sure, this holds only for regulated his group, and his society is due, to no small
conflicts, some of the conditions of which we extent, to the operation of conflicts between
shall try to explore presently. Coser s analysis group and group, individual and individual,
of Simmel (4) has convincingly demonstrated emotion and emotion within one individual.
that there is no need to abandon the integra¬ This fundamental fact alone seems to me to
tion theory of society simply because the phe¬ justify the value judgment that conflict is es¬
nomenon of conflict “cannot be wished sentially “good” and “desirable."
away" but is a fact of observation. In this If I here assume social conflict, and the
sense, conflict joins role allocation, socializa¬ particular type of group conflict with which
tion, and mobility as one of the “tolerable" we are concerned in the present study, to be
processes which foster rather than endanger ubiquitous, I want this statement to be
212 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VIII. Conflict Theory
understood more rigidly than is usual. At an shall distinguishes more specifically “conflict
earlier point I have intimated what I mean by that arises out of the division of labor, con¬
rigidity in this sense. One or two remarks in flict, that is to say, over the terms on which
addition to these earlier hints seem in order. cooperation is to take place, as illustrated by
In summarizing earlier research, Mack and a wage dispute between employer and em¬
Snyder state with some justice that by most ployed," from “conflict over the system itself
authors “competition is not regarded as con¬ upon which the allocation of functions and
flict or a form of conflict" (2, p. 217). The the distribution of benefits are based" (1, p.
alleged difference between the two is identi¬ 99). Thinking in terms of inclusive epochs
fied differently by different authors. T. H. like “feudalism" and “capitalism" as well as
Marshall emphasizes common interests, in terms of the existence of political parties
rather than divergent interests, as charac¬ that propose to change “the whole system"
teristic of states of competition or conflict (1, can probably explain the widespread feeling
p. 99). For Mack and Snyder, “competition that a distinction between “changes within"
involves striving for scarce objects . . . ac¬ and “changes of" is necessary. But apart from
cording to established rules which strictly these, it is surely no coincidence that it was
limit what the competitors can do to each Parsons who emphasized that “it is necessary
other in the course of striving; the chief ob¬ to distinguish clearly between the processes
jective is the scarce object, not the injury or within the system and processes of change of
destruction of an opponent per se" (2, p. 217). the system." This very distinction betrays
It seems to me, however, that it is not acci¬
traces of the integration approach to social
dental if Mack and Snyder state a little later
analysis. If conflict and change are assumed
that “conflict arises from 'position scarcity’
to be ubiquitous, there is no relevant differ¬
and 'resource scarcity,’ " and that therefore
ence between “changes within" and “changes
“conflict relations always involve attempts to
of," because the “system" is no longer the
gain control of scarce resources and posi¬
frame of reference. It may be useful to distin¬
tions" (pp. 218 f.). Despite terminological tra¬
guish more or less intense or violent conflicts
ditions, I can see no reason why a conceptual
and major and minor changes, but these are
distinction between competition and conflict
gradations to be accounted for in terms of
should be necessary or, indeed, desirable.2
intervening variables of an empirical nature.
Like competition, conflict involves a striving
for scarce resources. From the point of view In the present study, no assumption is im¬
of linguistic usage, it is perfectly proper to say plied as to the type of change or conflict ef¬
that conflicting interest groups compete for fected by the antagonism of conflict groups.
power. As far as the “established rules" of com¬ Wage disputes as well as political conflicts
petition are concerned, they emphasize but one “over the system itself" will be regarded as
type of conflict, namely, regulated conflict. In manifestations of class conflict, i.e., of
the present study, the notion of conflict is in¬ clashes of interest arising out of and con¬
tended to include relations such as have been cerned with the distribution of authority in
described by many other authors as competi¬ associations.
tive. As with the theory of class formation, the
Another distinction almost general in the real problems of the theory of class conflict
literature is that between changes “within" consist in the identification of the empirical
and changes “of" or conflicts “within" and variables delimiting the range of variability
conflicts “about" the system. Many authors of forms and types. Change and conflict are
have been at pains to define these differences. equally universal in society. But in historical
Coser, e.g., proposes “to talk of a change of reality we always encounter particular
system when all major structural relations, changes and specific conflicts, and these,
its basic institutions and its prevailing value even in the more limited sphere of class con¬
system have been drastically altered," but ad¬ flict, present a varied picture of manifold
mits that “in concrete historical reality, no types and forms. Assuming the ubiquity of
clear-cut distinctions exist" (3, p. 202). Mar¬ conflict and change, we have to try to dis-
Conflict Groups and Group Conflicts 213
cover some of the factors that influence its important difference between them, as Sim-
concrete shapes. mel knew when he said: “It is almost inevita¬
ble that an element of commonness injects
Intensity and Violence: The itself into . . . enmity once the stage of open
violence yields to another relationship, even
Variability of Class Conflict though this new relation may contain a com¬
The substance of the theory of class action, pletely undiminished sum of animosity be¬
or class conflict, can be summarized in one tween the two parties” (see 4, p. 121). That
statement: conflict groups in the sense of this conflict is variable means that its intensity
study, once they have organized themselves, and violence are variable; but the two may
engage in conflicts that effect structure vary independently and are, therefore, dis¬
changes. The theory of class action presup¬ tinct aspects of any conflict situation.3
poses the complete formation of conflict The category of intensity refers to the en¬
groups and specifies their interrelations. ergy expenditure and degree of involvement
However, this tautological statement is evi¬ of conflicting parties. A particular conflict
dently not all that can be said about group may be said to be of high intensity if the cost
conflicts, nor is it all that one would expect a of victory or defeat is high for the parties
theory of group conflict to provide. Beyond a concerned. The more importance the individ¬
basic assumption of this kind, a theory of ual participants of a conflict attach to its is¬
class conflict has to identify and systemati¬ sues and substance, the more intense is this
cally interrelate those variables that can be conflict. For class conflict a continuum
shown to influence patterns of intergroup might be constructed ranging, e.g., from a
conflict. In the present chapter several such conflict within a chess club which involves
variables will be discussed in some detail, but a small segment of the individual person¬
their selection being guided by the signifi¬ alities concerned to the overriding class con¬
cance they suggest for the course and out¬ flict, in Marx’s analyses, in which individuals
come of class conflict. Before we embark are engaged with almost their entire person¬
upon this discussion, however, there is one alities. In operational terms, the cost aspect
preliminary question that has to be settled. is here crucial. Members of a group that
The statement that class conflicts are empiri¬ strives to upset the authority structure of a
cally variable is sufficiently vague to be al¬
chess club stand to lose less in case of defeat
most meaningless. What is it—we must ask—
than members of a trade union who endeavor
about class conflicts that is variable and
to change the authority structure of the en¬
therefore subject to the influence of factors
terprise (or their own social conditions by
to be identified? In this question, the catego¬
way of this authority structure).4 The cost of
ries of intensity and violence are essential. In
defeat, and with it the intensity of conflict,
some connection or other, the terms '‘inten¬
differs in these cases.
sity' and “violence” can be found present in
By contrast to its intensity, the violence of
any discussion of conflict. Here is one exam¬
ple. Mack and Snyder, in their summary of conflict relates rather to its manifestations
earlier research, on the one hand derive the than to its causes; it is a matter of the weap¬
proposition “a high degree of intimacy be¬ ons that are chosen by conflict groups to ex¬
tween the parties, as contrasted with a high press their hostilities. Again, a continuum
degree of functional interdependence, will can be constructed ranging from peaceful
intensify conflict” (2, p. 225), while, on the discussions to militant struggles such as
other hand, they suggest “the more inte¬ strikes and civil wars. Whether or not class
grated into the society are the parties to con¬ conflict expresses itself in militant dashes of
flict, the less likely will conflict be violent” (p. interest is in principle independent of the in¬
227). The distinction between the two con¬ tensity of involvement of the parties. The
cepts is not perhaps entirely clear from these scale of degree of violence, including discus¬
statements, and, indeed, many authors use sion and debate, contest and competition,
them almost synonymously. Yet there is an struggle and war, displays its own patterns
214 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VIII. Conflict Theory
and regularities.5 Violent class struggles, or versely, any given association can be ana¬
class wars, are but one point on this scale. lyzed in terms of the conflicts to which it
While violence and intensity of conflict gives rise. In theory, this approach would sug¬
vary independently, several of the factors gest that inclusive societies present the pic¬
shortly to be discussed affect both. This fact ture of a multitude of competing conflicts
can be illustrated with reference to one factor and conflict groups. The two-class model ap¬
which has been mentioned already and plies not to total societies but only to specific
which need not therefore be discussed again associations within societies (including, of
at any length. . . . [T]he conditions of organi¬ course, the inclusive association of the state,
zation of interest groups continue to affect i.e., the whole society in its political aspect).
group conflict even after the complete forma¬ If, in a given society, there are fifty associa¬
tion of conflict groups. They are, in this tions, we should expect to find a hundred
sense, a factor which, among others, ac¬ classes, or conflict groups in the sense of the
counts for variations of intensity and vio¬ present study. Apart from these, there may be
lence. With respect to the intensity of class an undetermined number of conflict groups
conflict, the political conditions of organiza¬ and conflicts arising from antagonisms other
tion appear especially relevant. It may be sug¬ than those based on the authority structure
gested that, for the individuals concerned, in¬ of associations. In fact, of course, this ex¬
volvement in conflicts decreases as the legiti¬ treme scattering of conflicts and conflict
macy of conflicts and, by implication, their groups is rarely the case. Empirical evidence
issues become recognized. However, in the shows that different conflicts may be, and
ensemble of factors affecting intensity of con¬ often are, superimposed in given historical
flict, the specific weight of the conditions of societies, so that the multitude of possible
organization is probably not very great. By conflict fronts is reduced to a few dominant
contrast, it is considerable among the vari¬ conflicts. I suggest that this phenomenon has
ables involved in determining the violence of considerable bearing on the degree of inten¬
conflict manifestations. As soon as conflict sity and violence of empirical conflicts.
groups have been permitted and been able to The pluralism-superimposition scale which
organize themselves, the most uncon¬ might thus be constructed has two distinct di¬
trollably violent form of conflict, that of guer¬ mensions. One of these relates to the separa¬
rilla warfare, is excluded. Moreover, the very tion or combination of conflicts of the class
fact of organization presupposes some de¬ type in different associations. Let us restrict
gree of recognition which in turn makes the ourselves, for purposes of illustration, to the
most violent forms of conflict unnecessary three associations of the state, industry, and
and, therefore, unlikely. This is not to say, of the church in countries in which one church
course, that conflicts between organized dominates the sphere of religious institu¬
groups cannot be highly intense and violent. tions. It is conceivable that the ruling and the
The conditions of organization are but one, subjected groups of each of these associa¬
and not the most important, factor among
tions are largely separate aggregations. The
many. Of these I have selected four which
dignitaries of the church may be mere citi¬
seem to me of particular importance and
zens of the state and may have no industrial
which will be dealt with separately in the fol¬
property or authority. Similarly, the citizens
lowing sections of this chapter.
of the state may be church dignitaries or in¬
dustrial managers. This is the kind of situ¬
Pluralism Versus Superimposition: ation here described as pluralistic. Within
Contexts and Types of Conflict each of the three associations there are
(class) conflicts, but, as between these, there
One of the crucial elements of the theory is dissociation rather than congruence. Evi¬
of group conflict consists in the strict relation dently, complete dissociation and pluralism
of conflicts to particular associations. Any are, in the case mentioned, empirically rather
given conflict can be explained only in terms unlikely. It is more probable that the workers
of the association in which it arose and, con¬ of industry are at the same time mere mem-
Conflict Groups and Group Conflicts 215
bers of the church and mere citizens of the class conflict. The proposition seems plausi¬
state. One might expect that the dignitaries ble that there is a close positive correlation
of the church are in some ways connected between the degree of superimposition of
with the rulers of the state and possibly even conflicts and their intensity. When conflict
with the owners or managers of industry If groups encounter each other in several asso¬
this is the case, (class) conflicts of different ciations and in several clashes, the energies
associations appear superimposed; i.e., the expended in all of them will be combined and
opponents of one association meet again— one overriding conflict of interests will
with different tides, perhaps, but in identical emerge. The situation with which Marx dealt
relations—in another association. In this is a case in point. If incumbents of subjected
case, the personnel of the conflict groups of positions in industry are also subjected in all
different associations is the same. other associations; if they are, moreover,
Such congruence may also occur with con¬ identical with conflict groups other than
flict groups of different types. Again, a realis¬ those determined by authority relations, a
tic example may serve to illustrate the point. “division of society into two large hostile
We might suppose that in a given country classes" may indeed result—a situation, that
there are three dominant types of social con¬ is, in which one inclusive conflict dominates
flict: conflict of the class type, conflict be¬ the picture of the total society. If, on the other
tween town and country, and conflict be¬ hand, the inevitable pluralism of associations
tween Protestants and Catholics. It is of is accompanied by a pluralism of fronts of
course conceivable that these lines of conflict conflict, none of these is likely to develop the
cut across each other in a random fashion, so intensity of class conflicts of the Marxian
that, e.g., there are as many Protestants type. There is in this case, for every member
among the ruling groups of the state as there of the subjected class of one association, the
are Catholics and as many townspeople in promise of gratification in another associa¬
either denomination as there are countrypeo- tion. Every particular conflict remains con¬
ple. However, here, too, we might suspect fined to the individual in one of his many
that dissociation and pluralism are empiri¬ roles and absorbs only that part of the indi¬
cally rather unlikely to occur. One would not vidual s personality that went into this role.6
be surprised to find that most Protestants live The empirical analysis of pluralism and su¬
in towns and most Catholics in the country, perimposition of contexts and types of con¬
or that only one of the denominations com¬ flict is one of the important problems sug¬
mands the instruments of political control. If gested by the theory of social classes and
this is so, we are again faced with a phenome¬ class conflicts.
non of superimposition in the sense of the
same people meeting in different contexts
Pluralism Versus Superimposition:
but in identical relations of conflict.
With respect to the violence of manifesta¬ Authority and the Distribution of
tions of conflict, the pluralism-superimposi- Rewards and Facilities
tion scale is not likely to be a factor of great
significance. While there is a possible (nega¬ ... It is evident that in the context of a
tive) correlation between the degree of plu¬ theory of group conflict of the type under
ralism and the violence of conflicts in a given discussion, “class situation" is an unneces¬
society, there is little reason to believe that sary concept. It means no more than what we
dissociation of types and contexts of conflict have described as the authority position of
makes industrial strikes, for example, impos¬ aggregates in associations. The condition of
sible. Only in the inclusive association of the a quasi-group in terms of the distribution of
state would there seem to be a probability of authority signifies the “situation" that under¬
pluralism reducing and superimposition in¬ lies class conflict. However, the traditional
creasing the violence of interest clashes. concept of class situation includes a number
At the same time, this scale is of the utmost of elements which, while irrelevant for the
importance for variations in the intensity of formation of social classes, affect their pat-
216 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VIII. Conflict Theory
terns of conflict in ways to be defined. Prop¬ ety, which constitutes one of the critical facts
erty, economic status, and social status are no of class analysis.
determinants of class, but they do belong to Divergences of position are even more evi¬
the factors influencing the empirical course dent if we contrast authority positions with
of clashes of interest between conflict people s social status in the sense of the pres¬
groups. tige attached to their position by themselves
As with contexts and types of conflict, the and by others in relevant universes of rank¬
problem of rewards and facilities can be seen ing. The prestige of power is a highly precari¬
in terms of a contrast between divergence ous quantity in all societies. Unless all exist¬
and parallelism, or pluralism and superim¬ ing studies are wrong in their findings, there
position. Thus, property can, but need not, be would in fact seem to be, for persons in the
associated with the exercise of authority It is upper ranges of the status scale, an inverse
conceivable that those who occupy positions relation between the authority and the pres¬
of domination in industry do not own indus¬ tige. The judge (United States), the doctor
trial property—and, indeed, that those in po¬ (Britain), and the university professor (Ger¬
sitions of subjection do own such property. many) enjoy a markedly higher prestige than
The separation of ownership and control, the cabinet minister or the large-scale entre¬
and certain systems of the distribution of preneur.7 Probably, the theory of class con¬
shares to industrial workers, are cases in flict with its assumption of opposing role in¬
point. While neither of these structural ar¬ terests would account for this phenomenon.
rangements eliminates the causes of (indus¬ On the other hand, there are and have been
trial) conflict, they have an impact on its in¬ associations in which the division of author¬
tensity and violence. Once again, a certain ity and the scale of prestige followed identical
parallelism between authority and property lines. In the industrial enterprise, this would
ownership may seem more probable, but it is still seem to be the case in most countries
not necessary. (and with the possible exception of scientifi¬
The same holds for the economic status of cally trained staff members). Thus, we also
persons in different authority positions. By find here an empirically variable relation that
economic status I shall here understand is likely to affect the course of class conflict.
status in terms of strictly occupational re¬ All examples chosen in the preceding para¬
wards such as income, job security, and gen¬ graphs serve to illustrate the phenomenon of
eral social security as it accrues from occu¬ relative deprivation, i.e., the situation in
pational position. It is both possible and rea¬ which those subjected to authority are at the
sonably probable that those in positions of same time relatively worse placed in terms of
domination enjoy a somewhat higher eco¬ socioeconomic status. However, in nine¬
nomic status, and that these two attributes of teenth-century Europe, and in some coun¬
social position are in this sense superim¬ tries even today, we encounter what by con¬
posed. But numerous illustrations could also trast may be called an absolute deprivation
be given for divergences between the two. In of groups of people in socioeconomic terms.
the early labor unions, and for many shop If the social condition of industrial workers,
stewards and local union secretaries today, who are as such excluded from authority,
authority involves a comparative loss of in¬ falls below a physiological subsistence mini¬
come and security. In the Roman Catholic mum or “poverty line/’ the effects of such
church, authority is supposed, in theory if not deprivation are likely to be different in kind
in practice, to be accompanied by low eco¬ from those of relative deprivation. I would
nomic status. In totalitarian countries, politi¬ suggest that in this case, and in this case only,
cal authority usually conveys high incomes the superimposition of scales of status and
but also a high degree of insecurity which the distribution of authority is likely to in¬
lowers the economic status of dominant crease the violence of class conflict. This is a
groups. Such divergences of authority posi¬ subtle and complex relation. So far as we
tion and economic status make for a plurality know, oppression and deprivation may reach
of noncongruent scales of position in a soci¬ a point at which militant conflict motivation
Conflict Groups and Group Conflicts 217
gives way to apathy and lethargy Short of this 3. All italics in the quotations of this paragraph
point, however, there is reason to believe that are mine.
absolute deprivation coupled with exclusion 4. I have as yet not given a systematic exposition
from authority makes for greater violence in of the patterns of change effected by class
conflict relations. conflict; the formulation in the text may
Relative deprivation, on the other hand, therefore give rise to misunderstandings. . . .
tends to affect the intensity of conflict rather 5. In terms of the distinction thus introduced,
than its violence. If incumbents of positions we are now able to reformulate the contrast
of subjection enjoy the countervailing grati¬ between the conception of conflict here as¬
fication of a relatively high socioeconomic sumed and that of several other authors. The
status, they are unlikely to invest as much latter tend to confine the term "conflict" to
one point on the scale of degree of violence,
energy in class conflicts arising out of the
namely, highly violent clashes. In the present
authority structure of associations as they
study, however, conflict is conceived as in¬
would if they were deprived of both authority cluding the whole scale, i.e., any clash of in¬
and socioeconomic status. Dominant groups terest independent of the violence of its ex¬
are correspondingly not so likely to be as in¬ pressions.
volved in the defense of their authority unless
6. This type of analysis seems to me to provide
their high socioeconomic status is simultane¬ one of the answers to the question why there
ously involved. In terms of the intensity of is no socialism in the United States. Through¬
conflict, pluralism would again seem to make out her history, the pluralism of associations
for a decrease, and superimposition or con¬ and conflicts has made inclusive conflict
gruence for an increase:8 the lower the corre¬ groups held together by quasi-religious ide¬
lation is between authority position and ologies unnecessary. There has been no single
other aspects of socioeconomic status, the group that enjoyed universal privilege or suf¬
less intense are class conflicts likely to be, fered universal alienation.
and vice versa. . . . 7. For relevant data, cf. the studies by the Na¬
tional Opinion Research Center (120), Glass
Endnotes (107), and Bolte (103).
8. This proposition must be opposed to the as¬
1. This and numerous other statements in the sumption of integration theorists that the
present chapter are based on discussions
congruence of different scales of social posi¬
with and publications of psychologists, an¬ tion is a requisite of stable, integrated socie¬
thropologists, lawyers, and social psycholo¬ ties (cf. Parsons, in 35). The exact opposite
gists at the Center for Advanced Study in the seems true, even from the point of view of in¬
Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California. tegration theory. I cannot help feeling that
John Bowl by, M.D., and Professor Frank this is one of the points at which integration
Newman, LL.D., have been particularly help¬
theorists display—unwillingly, to be sure—al¬
ful in making suggestions. In support of the
most totalitarian convictions.
statement in the text I might also refer, how¬
ever, to the symposium published in Conflict
Resolution (2), which includes contributions References
by economists, sociologists, social psycholo¬
gists, anthropologists, and psychologists, and 1. T. H. Marshall, The Nature of Class Conflict, in
strongly supports my point. Class Conflict and Social Stratification, T. H.
2. At least, no such reason has been put forward. Marshall, ed., London, 1938.
It might be argued, of course, that the concept 2. "Approaches to the Study of Social Conflict:
of competition employed in economic theory A Colloquium,” Conflict Resolution, Vol. I,
is rather different from that defined by Mar¬ No. 2 (June 1957)
shall or Mack and Snyder, and does not carry
3. L. A. Coser, "Social Conflict and Social
any conflict connotation. I am not entirely
Change," British Journal of Sociology, Vol.
sure that this argument is justified, but for
VII, No. 3 (September 1957).
purposes of the present analysis competition
in a technical economic sense will be ex¬ 4. -. The Functions of Social Conflict. Lon¬
cluded. don, 1956. ♦
218 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VIIL Conflict Theory
2. The material conditions for mobiliza¬ Weber comes to an insight parallel to those
tion as a coherent, intercommunicating of Durkheim, Freud, and Nietzsche: not only
group also vary among social classes; by that man is an animal with strong emotional
implication, another major difference desires and susceptibilities, but that particu¬
among class lifestyles stems from the lar forms of social interaction designed to
differing organization of their commu¬ arouse emotions operate to create strongly
nities and their differing experience held beliefs and a sense of solidarity within
with the means of social communica¬ the community constituted by participation
tion. in these rituals. I have put this formulation
in a much more Durkheimian fashion than
3. Classes differ in their control of the
Weber himself, for Durkheim's analysis of
means of mental production; this pro¬
rituals can be incorporated at this point to
duces yet another difference in class cul¬
show the mechanisms by which emotional
tures—some are more articulated sym¬
bonds are created. There involves especially
bolically than others, and some have the
the emotional contagion that results from
symbolic structures of another class im¬
physical copresense, the focusing of atten¬
posed upon them from outside.
tion on a common object, and the coordina¬
These Marxian principles, with certain tion of common actions or gestures. To in¬
modifications, provide the basis for a conflict voke Durkheim also enables me to bring in
theory of stratification. Weber may be seen the work of Goffman (1959,1967), which car¬
as developing this line of analysis: adding ries on his microlevel analysis of social ritu¬
complexity to Marx's view of conflict, show¬ als, with an emphasis on the materials and
ing that the conditions involved in mobiliza¬ techniques of stage-setting that determine
tion and “mental production" are analytically the effectiveness of appeals for emotional
distinct from property, revising the funda¬ solidarity.
mentals of conflict, and adding another ma¬ Durkheim and Goffman are to be seen as
jor set of resources. Again making principles amplifying our knowledge of the mecha¬
more explicit than they are in the original nisms of emotional production, but within
presentation, we may summarize Weber as the framework of Webers conflict theory. For
showing several different forms of property Weber retains a crucial emphasis: The cre¬
conflict coexisting in the same society, and ation of emotional solidarity does not sup¬
hence, by implication, the existence of mul¬ plant conflict, but is one of the main weapons
tiple class divisions; elaborating the princi¬ used in conflict. Emotional rituals can be
ples of organizational intercommunication used for domination within a group or orga¬
and control in their own right, thereby add¬ nization; they are a vehicle by which alliances
ing a theory of organization and yet another are formed in the struggle against other
sphere of interest conflict, this time intraor- groups; and they can be used to impose a
ganizational factions; emphasizing that the hierarchy of status prestige in which some
violent coercion of the state is analytically groups dominate others by providing an ideal
prior to the economy, and thus transferring to emulate under inferior conditions. Webers
the center of attention to the control of the theory of religion incorporates all of these
material means of violence. aspects of domination through the manipu¬
Weber also opens up yet another area of lation of emotional solidarity, and thereby
resources in these struggles for control, what provides an archetype for the various forms
might be called the “means of emotional pro¬ of community stratification. Caste, ethnic
duction." It is these that underlie the power group, feudal Estate (Stand), educational-
of religion and make it an important ally of cultural group, or class “respectability" lines
the state; that transform classes into status are all forms of stratified solidarities, de¬
groups, and do the same to territorial com¬ pending on varying distributions of the re¬
munities under particular circumstances sources for emotional production. The basic
(ethnicity); and that make “legitimacy" a cru¬ dynamics are captured in the hierarchy im¬
cial focus for efforts at domination. Here, plicit in any religion between ritual leaders,
220 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ VIII. Conflict Theory
ritual followers, and nonmembers of the come as no surprise to readers of George Her¬
community. bert Mead or Erving Goffman. Add to this an
From this analytical version of Weber, in¬ emphasis from conflict theories: that each
corporating the relevant principles of Marx, individual is basically pursuing his own in¬
Durkheim, and Goffman, we can move into terests and that there are many situations,
an explicit theory of stratification. It should notably ones where power is involved, in
be apparent that there are innumerable pos¬ which those interests are inherently antago¬
sible types of stratified societies; our aim is nistic. The basic argument, then, has three
not to classify them, but to state the set of strands: that men live in self-constructed sub¬
causal principles that go into various empiri¬ jective worlds; that others pull many of the
cal combinations. Our emphasis is on the strings that control ones subjective experi¬
cutting tools of a theory, whatever the com¬ ence; and that there are frequent conflicts
plexity of their application in the historical over control. Life is basically a struggle for
world. status in which no one can afford to be oblivi¬
For conflict theory, the basic insight is that ous to the power of others around him. If we
human beings are sociable but conflict-prone assume that everyone uses what resources
animals. Why is there conflict? Above all else, are available to have others aid him in putting
there is conflict because violent coercion is on the best possible face under the circum¬
always a potential resource, and it is a zero- stances, we have a guiding principle to make
sum sort. This does not imply anything about sense out of the myriad variations of stratifi¬
the inherence of drives to dominate; what we cation. 1
do know firmly is that being coerced is an The general principles of conflict analysis
intrinsically unpleasant experience, and may be applied to any empirical area. (2)
hence that any use of coercion, even by a Think through abstract formulations to a
small minority, calls forth conflict in the form sample of the typical real-life interactions in¬
of antagonism to being dominated. Add to volved. Think of people as animals maneu¬
this the fact that coercive power, especially as vering for advantage, susceptible to emo¬
represented in the state, can be used to bring tional appeals, but steering a self-interested
one economic goods and emotional gratifica¬ course toward satisfactions and away from
tion—and to deny them to others—and we dissatisfactions. (2) Look for the material ar¬
can see that the availability of coercion as a rangements that affect interaction: the physi¬
resource ramifies conflicts throughout the cal places, the modes of communication, the
entire society. The simultaneous existence of supply of weapons, devices for staging one’s
emotional bases for solidarity—which may public impression, tools, and goods. Assess
well be the basis of cooperation, as Durkheim the relative resources available to each indi¬
emphasized—only adds group divisions and vidual: their potential for physical coercion,
tactical resources to be used in these con¬ their access to other persons with whom to
flicts. negotiate, their sexual attractiveness, their
The same argument may be transposed store of cultural devices for invoking emo¬
into the realm of social phenomenology. tional solidarity, as well as the physical ar¬
Every individual maximizes his subjective rangements just mentioned. (3) Apply the
status according to the resources available to general hypothesis that inequalities in re¬
him and to his rivals. This is a general prin¬ sources result in efforts by the dominant
ciple that will make sense out of the variety party to take advantage of the situation; this
of evidence. By this I mean that ones subjec¬ need not involve conscious calculation but a
tive experience of reality is the nexus of social basic propensity of feeling ones way toward
motivation; that everyone constructs his own the areas of greatest immediate reward, like
world with himself in it; but this reality con¬ flowers turning to the light. Social structures
struction is done primarily by communica¬ are to be explained in terms of the behavior
tion, real or imaginary, with other people; following from various lineups of resources,
and hence people hold the keys to each social change from shifts in resources result¬
others identities. These propositions will ing from previous conflicts. (4) Ideals and
The Basics of Conflict Theory 221
sorts of social distinctions and conflicts of tinctions; but on the basis of where one
interest appear among various levels of the stands when orders are given.
occupational hierarchy. As Dahrendorf points Upper middle class and lower middle class
out, Marx mistook an historically limited correspond to relative positions within the
form of power for power relations in general; middle group, based on the ratio of order-giv¬
his theory of class divisions and class conflict ing to order-taking. Lower class can be dis¬
can be made useful for a wider range of situ¬ tinguished from working class as a marginal
ations if we seek its more abstract form.2 group who work only occasionally and at the
Max Weber (1968:53) defined power as the most menial positions. Farmers and farm la¬
ability to secure compliance against some¬ borers can be fitted into this categorization
one's will to do otherwise. This is not the only at a variety of middle-class and working-class
possible use of the word "power," but it is the levels. Prosperous farmers are similar to
most useful one if we are looking for ways to
other businessmen; tenant farmers and la¬
explain people's outlooks. There is power like
borers are not unlike the urban working
the engineers over inanimate objects; there
class, with differences attributable to the dif¬
is power like the scholar's over ideas and
ferent community structure rather than to
words; there is the power of the planner to
affect future events. But, since men encoun¬ occupational conditions per se. The power
tering men is the whole observable referent situation is similar, too, if one understands
of "social causation," a social power that will that the people who give orders are not nec¬
directly affect someone's behavior is that of a essarily all in the same organization and that
man giving orders to another. It affects the one need not be an actual employee to be a
behavior of the man who gives orders, for he subordinate; the small farmer or business¬
must take a certain bearing, think certain man meets the banker with much the same
thoughts, and speak certain formulas. It af¬ face as the foreman meets his supervisor.
fects the man who must listen to orders, even There are some differences too, of course.
though he may not accept too many of them First, I want to show that the most powerful
or carry them out, for he accepts at least one effects on a man's behavior are the sheer vol¬
thing—to put up with standing before some¬ ume of occupational deference he gives and
one who is giving him orders and with defer¬ gets. Then I will show how some different
ring to him at least for the moment. One ani¬ types of situations at about the same class
mal cows another to its heels: That is the level can add variations on the pattern.
archetypal situation of organizational life Dahrendorf's (1959) revision of Marx con¬
and the shaper of classes and cultures. verges here with Weber's emphasis on power
The situations in which authority is acted relations. It should be noted that this formu¬
out are the key experiences of occupational
lation brings us into the universe of Durkhe-
life. Since one cannot avoid having an occu¬
imian sociology as well, at least in its Goff-
pation or being cared for by someone who
manian variant. If the successful application
does, it influences everyone. On this basis,
of power is a matter of personal bearing (in
three main classes can be distinguished:
which sanctions are implied but not called
those who take orders from few or none, but
give orders to many; those who must defer to upon), Goffman's analysis of the ritual
some people, but can command others; and dramatization of status provides us with de¬
those who are order-takers only. The readily tailed evidence on the mechanism. In a sense,
understood continuum from upper class the apocryphal Weberian principle of the
through middle class to working class corre¬ "means of emotional production" applies not
sponds to this dimension. This is especially only in the realm of community formation
clear if we note how the middle-class-work- but in the heart of the occupational relation¬
ing-class break is commonly assigned: not so ship. Hence, it happens that Weber's histori¬
much on the basis of the cleanliness of the cal summary of the religious propensities of
work, or of the income derived from it; cer¬ various classes epitomizes later evidence on
tainly not, today, on the basis of property dis¬ class cultures.
The Basics of Conflict Theory 223
used to force others to do the harder and to retain both levels of analysis. Differences
more unpleasant labor. But physical de¬ in power position, in whatever kind of orga¬
mands do influence lifestyle, making the nization, are the most fundamental determi¬
nant of mens' outlooks, and hence of where
lower classes more immured to hardship and
solidarity groups will form. Within the same
dirt, and allowing the upper to be more effete
general level of power, differences in the or¬
and fastidious. Physical demands also vary ganizational basis of power—different forms
independently of class power, and help ac¬ of economic property or government organi¬
count for variations between more military zation—result in different political and ideo¬
and more pacific eras and occupations, and logical commitments. Men of power all re¬
between rural and urban milieux. . . . semble each other in general, but the specific
source of power makes for some specific dif¬
Endnotes ferences in political culture and creates defi¬
nite political factions.
1. The proposition that individuals maximize 3. Patrimonial organization, most characteristic
their subjective status appears to contradict of traditional societies, centers around families,
March and Simon’s (1958) organizational patrons and their clients, and other personalis-
principle that men operate by satisficing— tic networks. The emphasis is on traditional
setting minimal levels of payoff in each area rituals that demonstrate the emotional bonds
of concern, and then troubleshooting where among men; the world is divided into those
crises arise. The contradiction is only appar¬ whom one can trust because of strongly legiti¬
ent. Satisficing refers to a strategy for dealing mated personal connections, and the rest of the
with the cognitive problem produced by in¬ world from whom nothing is to be expected that
herent limits on the human capacity for pro¬ cannot be exacted by cold-blooded bargaining
cessing information. The principle of maxi¬ or force. In modem bureaucratic organization,
mizing subjective status is a motivational by contrast, personal ties are weaker, less ritu¬
principle, telling us what are the goals of be¬ alized, and emotionally demonstrative; in their
havior. Any analysis of cognitive strategies is place is the allegiance to a set of abstract rules
incomplete without some motivational prin¬ and positions. The different class cultures in
ciple such as the latter to tell us what are the patrimonial and bureaucratic organizations
purposes of action, and what areas of concern are accordingly affected. Patrimonial elites are
are most emphasized. In other words, it is one more ceremonious and personalistic. Bureau¬
thing to predict what goals someone will pur¬ cratic elites emphasize a colder set of ideals.
sue, another to predict what strategies he will The contrast is not merely an historical one.
use in pursuing them, given the inability to There are many elements of bureaucracy in
see very far into the future or deal with very premodern societies, notably in China; in
many things at once. Europe, bureaucracy gradually set in within
2. This is not to say that Dahrendorfs (1959) po¬ the heart of the aristocracy, especially in
sition is completely satisfactory. Power orga¬ France and Germany, around the seventeenth
nized as property, and power organized century. Patrimonial forms of organization
within a government or corporate structure, exist in modem society as well, alongside and
are not entirely equivalent. Men whose power within bureaucracies. They are prominent in
depends on one of these forms are likely to be the entrepreneurial sector of modem busi¬
politically committed to maintaining it. The ness, especially in volatile areas like enter¬
political differences among capitalists and tainment, construction, real estate, specula¬
socialists remain, even though the elites of tive finance, and organized crime, as well as
both systems may have similar outlooks, M in the politics of a complex, federated govern¬
much the same way as holders of landed and mental system like the United States. Weber
industrial property have fought bitter politi¬ (1958: 57-58) caught the contrast between
cal battles over whose organizational form the two ways of doing business when he
should dominate. Dahrendorfs formulation pointed out two kinds of business ethos
is a product of the period of Cold War liber¬ throughout history. One has existed in all ma¬
alism; he argued for decreasing international jor societies: it emphasizes trickery, clever¬
hostilities by focusing on those things that ness, and speculation aimed at making the
might be taken as structural convergence greatest possible immediate profit. A second
among all modern societies. form is rationalistic, ascetic capitalism, which
Ideological considerations aside, it is useful approaches business in a methodical and routi-
The Basics of Conflict Theory 225
nized fashion. Work and production are more Goffman, Erving. 1959. The presentation of self in
ends in themselves, a way of life, rather than everyday life. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
a means to get rich quick. In Webers famous
theory, capitalism developed in Europe pre¬ -. 1967. Interaction ritual. Garden City, NY:
cisely because business was dominated not Doubleday.
merely by the entrepreneurial ethic, as in an¬
cient and oriental societies, but by a sizable March, J. G., and H. A. Simon. 1958. Organiza¬
tions. New York: Wiley.
group holding the ascetic business ethic. The
entrepreneurial type does not disappear once
Marx, K. 1963. The eighteenth brumaire of Louis
the modem economy is established, of
Napoleon. New York: International Publishers
course. He survives to skim the cream off of (Originally published 1852).
a system he could not have created.
Weber, M. 1958. The Protestant ethic and the spirit
References of capitalism. New York: Scribner's (Originally
published 1904-1905).
Dahrendorf, R. 1959. Class and class conflict in
industrial society. Stanford, California: Stan¬ -. 1968. Economy and Society. New York: Bed-
ford Univ. Press. minster Press (Originally published 1922). ♦
226 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ IX. Symbolic Interactionism
the concepts themselves—for the members white? These are not extreme cases, for mem¬
of a nation conceive of themselves as occupy¬ bership and allegiance often are just that elu¬
ing a common territory and sometimes as sive.
stemming from a common ancestry. But Sometimes social scientists draw distinc¬
groups exist as such only because of the com¬ tions between “membership” and “reference”
mon symbolizations of their members. Many groups, attempting to take into account two
or most groups are easily visualized in purely situations: membership without much par¬
symbolic terms since they are less directly ticipation, and participation without mem¬
connected with geography and biology than bership. Thus Sherif has defined a member¬
are nation and family. ship group as one in which an individual “is
The symbolic nature of groups raises intri¬ an actual member” and a reference group as
cate questions concerning membership. If one from which
one takes membership to mean only formal
'joining,” no great question arises concern¬ the individuals standards, attitudes and
status aspiration stem. ... In many cases
ing membership in certain kinds of groups.
his reference groups are groups of which
You either are, or are not, a Rotarian or a he is an actual member. . . . But this is not
Senator. But clearly the formal criteria are always so. He may be actually a member
not sufficient. In a more subtle sense, you of one group, but through his contact with
may belong but not have much allegiance, the attitudes and aspirations of another he
not participate much, and you may not actu¬ may do his best to relate himself, his stan¬
ally belong but participate a good deal. To dards, his aspirations to that group.3
ticket a man as formally holding membership
The phrase “groups of which he is an actual
in such and such groups barely suggests the
member” can signify only formal member¬
nature and quality of his allegiances.
ship, or membership in a group so well
When a group is small, it is usually possi¬
structured that its members know of each
ble to determine the outer limits of its mem¬
other. Membership group and reference
bership, although even then difficulties may
group are, in fact, such an oversimplifica¬
be encountered. But when a group is large,
tion of the facts of social life that it is possi¬
and especially when it is not territorially
ble to find one writer (Sherif) sharply
fixed, then genuine practical and theoretical
criticizing others (Merton and Kitt) for writ¬
questions arise concerning who really does
ing that enlisted men in the Army were
belong and upon whom the group may rely
“positively oriented to the norms of a group
for what. Is a man a Lutheran if he has not
of which they were not members, that is the
been to church for twenty years? Is a man
norms of the officers.” Sherif has main¬
always a Catholic in some sense, even though
tained that “the army organization and its
he may have been excommunicated (a sig¬
officers serve as a reference group for such
nificant word) or have left the Church? If a
enlisted men and not the informal groups
gentile woman marries a Jew and embraces
that emerged among their fellow enlisted
his faith, is she or is she not a Jewess? Sup¬
men.”4 Merton and Kitt, though committed
pose that she divorces him but continues to
to the distinction, themselves write that
attend synagogue services regularly and
raises her children as Jews, is she still Jew¬ There is nothing fixed about the bounda¬
ish? If he in turn grows unreligious and asso¬ ries separating . . . membership-groups
ciates with fewer Jewish people than she from non-membership groups. These
does, who is the more Jewish or the more change with the changing situation. Vis-a-
truly Jewish of the two? Likewise, if a Negro vis civilians . . . men in the Army may re¬
gard themselves and be regarded as mem¬
passes for a number of years as white, is he
bers of an in-group; yet, in another con¬
still a Negro, particularly if he now names or text, enlisted men may regard themselves
identifies himself as white? If a “white” mixes and be regarded as an in-group in distinc¬
with Negroes to the extent that he thinks tion to the out-group of officers. Since
about most racial issues as they do, to what these concepts are relative to the situ¬
extent is he still, conventionally speaking, ation, rather than absolute, there is no
228 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ IX. Symbolic Interactionism
paradox in referring to the officers as an they note that many men seem to be able to
out-group for enlisted men in one context, “disassociate" or keep in watertight compart¬
and as members of the more inclusive in¬ ments the different “role demands." To ask
group in another context.5 whether someone is more an immigrant than
a member of the avant garde, or whether he
The last sentence in the Merton-Kitt quota¬
is more a businessman than a Christian, is to
tion, particularly, suggests the entirely sym¬
raise pointless questions. When a man buys
bolic character of membership; but at the
a modern house, he is acting as would others
same time the quotation illustrates how
who share his terminology of perception and
blunt an instrument is the membership-ref¬
judgment. When he tells his wife not to ex¬
erence distinction for handling intricacies of
periment with the “American" recipes that
group belonging. Another term, “multiple
stud the same magazines from whence he
group membership," has also been coined to
derived some of his best architectural ideas,
describe the evident fact that each of us be¬
then he is acting as do others who share his
longs simultaneously to many groups. This
discriminations in food.
term also reflects the layman's and the scien¬
The members of any group necessarily ex¬
tist's difficulties in assessing motivation.
perience certain areas of conceptual dis¬
Since people do belong to many groups, a
agreement as well as non-communication.
problem arises about any given situation: “as
Groups are composed of individuals who, af¬
a member of which group is he acting now,
ter all, bring with them to their participation
or was he acting, or will he act?" This is, of
in cooperative activity a body of symboliza¬
course, simply another way of inquiring
tion derived from their other memberships.
about situational identity.
These symbols brought to the group from the
“Multiple group membership," “reference
outside contribute to the inevitable forma¬
group membership," judgments “anchored
tion of subgroups, as for instance cliques
in group standards and frames of refer¬
among school teachers or those charac¬
ence"—such terms come close to but do not
teristic groupings of family quarrels that
directly focus on what, I would maintain, is
form along sex and age lines. Just because
the heart of membership: that is, its symbolic
there exists within any group a divergency of
character. When we participate in coopera¬
concepts (whether imported or developed)
tive activities we learn, and develop, certain
there is frequent, not to say continual, forma¬
terminologies. Insofar as the perspectives of
tion and dissolution of coalitions, splinter
various groups are similar, we are able to par¬
groups, cliques, and other sub-groupings.
ticipate simultaneously or successively in
Symbols, we may conclude, are pregnant
them without experiencing the need to rec¬
with possibilities for convergence and diver¬
oncile conflicting terminologies. Some of
gence, for combination and permutation.
these terminologies are, as a host of writers
Meanings, to quote John Dewey again,
have observed, logically contradictory; yet we
“breed new meanings.". . .
who act in accordance with them may not be
aware of our inconsistency. A man may pur¬
chase a “modern home," having developed History: Heritage, Memorialization,
his architectural tastes through discussions and Creation
with artists, other modern art enthusiasts,
and his reading of magazines; but may expect . . . [Ojne ought not to speak of group
his wife to cook the foods he and she learned membership without painstakingly seeking
to like while living in slum tenements as to take history into account. Identities imply
members of immigrant families. Different not merely personal histories but also social
standards apply to home and food consump¬ histories. The preceding statement follows
tion. House buying and home living, in fact, rather simply from this: individuals hold
are not widely regarded as consumption. In memberships in groups that themselves are
similar vein, sociologists sometimes use the products of a past. If you wish to understand
example of a man acting as a Christian on persons—their development and their rela¬
Sunday and a businessman on Monday, and tions with significant others—you must be
Membership and History 229
prepared to view them as embedded in his¬ not realize, that three of his children were to
torical context. Psychological and psychiat¬ become recognized as among Great Britain's
ric theory at least of the American variety most celebrated writers; but Sir Osbert him¬
underplay this context; and those socio¬ self is concerned, in the autobiography, with
logists and anthropologists who are inter¬ the very question of how this was to come
ested in personal identity tend to treat his¬ about.
torical matters more as stage settings, or
backdrops, than as crucial to the study of Who knows whence come the various
persons. This is an oversimplification, I am traits of sensibility? Ancestors stretch be¬
certain, of the use and lack of use that is made hind a man and his nature like a fan, or
of historical materials in social psychology. the spread tail of a peacock. At every turn,
Nevertheless it allows me to state forthrightly in the very gesture and look, in every de¬
cision he takes, he draws on the reserves
a view of history that is implicit throughout
or deficits of the past.
this essay.
A man must be viewed as embedded in a Naturally he has countless ancestors. He
temporal matrix not simply of his own mak¬ makes no claim that all are important to his
ing, but which is peculiarly and subtly related own character and personal history: but he
to something of his own making—his con¬ has taken the trouble to record, through
ception of the past as it impinges on himself. some seventy pages, fact and anecdote about
I take the liberty here of using some autobio¬ various of his father's and mother's ancestors.
graphical comments by Sir Osbert Sitwell to They may possibly be relevant to his autobi¬
make this proposition especially vivid. Do not ography. What is more, it is apparent that Sir
be deceived by these comments: they are un¬ Osbert is versed in their lives. Aristocratic
usual merely because Sir Osbert belongs to families leave records, letters, and diaries to
an aristocratic world and thereby seems in¬ their descendants, and appear on the pages
credibly affected by his sense of an impinging and in the memoirs of contemporary authors
and lively past. and acquaintances. Sir Osbert knows his
The first volume of his autobiography many ancestors as others know their imme¬
bears the title of Left Hand, Right Hand6 diate relatives. He is writing with restraint:
which Sir Osbert is at pains to explain is he could write volumes about his kin. Once
through these introductory pages, and un¬
because, according to the palmists, the
leashed upon the actual story of his life, Sir
lines of the left hand are incised inalter-
ably at birth, while those of the right hand Osbert brings into his narrative his living kin;
are modified by our actions and environ¬ displaying a keen sense of what was happen¬
ment, and the life we lead. ing to them, during the specific period that
he, as a youth, was meeting and experiencing
The left hand theme is encountered on the them. Personal relations are hardly ever de¬
initial pages, which portray his father walk¬ scribed merely as personal, they are embroi¬
ing over the ancestral grounds, upon or near dered into an historic tapestry. In his own
which the family has lived for seven centu¬ words: he is writing of his elders and of "peo¬
ries. For his father the Middle Ages "are the ple who died before I was born, but who still
model for all life to follow, and his life was influence me, perhaps, in ways I do not know
largely devoted to living out that model." as well as in ways to be recognized."
Like others of the British aristocracy at the You may exclaim that this is a very particu¬
turn of the century "he was interested more lar kind of memory, valued and possessed
in ancestors and descendants than in sons only by certain kinds of people and popula¬
and fathers." During a walk—the book opens tions. This is not the point. Even when a man
with a description of it—the father remarks lacks knowledge of kinship history, this has
to Osbert, "It's quite evident, if you read the bearing upon the fact and sense of his iden¬
family letters, that we've been working up tity: to his name both in the literal sense and
toward something for a long time, for well in the reputational sense. America was set¬
over a century.” He did not mean, and did tled by immigrants who thereby cut off their
230 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ IX. Symbolic Interactionism
children from extensive memories; memory emerging collective acts, will be rationalized
stopping, so to speak, at our shores and in terms of a symbolic past as well as a real¬
reaching no further back than the ancestor istic present.
who migrated. The discrepancy between the This leads me to a second point that actu¬
sons of migrants and those inheritors of ally none of this is very different than occurs
longer American genealogies—with heir¬ in the more humdrum histories of less dra¬
looms, histories, and prestige to match—is matically changing groups and organiza¬
still noticeable on the American scene. The tions. Each generation perceives the past in
attempts to maintain, repudiate and acquire new terms, and rewrites its own history. In¬
such symbolic genealogies are, as is well sofar as there are shared group-perspectives
known, important endeavors of some of our bearing upon the past, the selves of the com¬
citizens. Kinship is so entwined with social ponent members are vitally affected. Certain
class that a deficiency of kinship memories groups and organizations have immensely
means also deficiency of class memories. long histories, and strong vested interests, in
American fiction and autobiography have re¬ preserving and reviewing their histories. An
corded the quashing of old class memories by American thinks immediately of the South
upwardly mobile persons, and the sometimes since the Civil War. Even the writings of pro¬
frantic acquisition of historical and anecdo¬ fessional historians, white and Negro, are a
tal knowledge of the social class into which reflection of each generations successively
they are moving. revised posture toward the past and a contri¬
But the impact of history upon identity bution toward what is known and felt about
involves much more than consciousness of that past.
kinship and placement in a social class. . . . In Europe, collective memories are longer,
[I]t will pay to note two further aspects of the and so identities may be linked with concep¬
relation between history and personal iden¬ tions of ancient eras. The citizens of Nurem¬
tity. The first is this: a people may create an berg have an urban history which includes a
historical past which they do not possess, or glorious sixteenth century. The signs of it are
discard a past and then create a new one. visible in the churches, in the houses, in the
Thus, in the development of nationalistic very street plan of the central city; so that
movements, and in the nationalism of na¬ when the center of the city was badly de¬
tions, the past may be recreated in the image stroyed during the war, little or no question
of the desired present and future. Many his¬ was raised afterwards whether it should be
torians have documented, Carleton Hayes reconstructed in modem styles. It was delib¬
among them,7 that these imagined and glori¬ erately rebuilt to recapture, if possible, some¬
ous pasts are laboriously and carefully cre¬ thing of the atmosphere of the past, and an¬
ated through the various mass media. This cient public buildings were sometimes re¬
has led George Orwell to depict the ultimate built from the ground up at great cost. This
in totalitarian control, in his reverse Utopia, is not to say that the identities of all citizens
Nineteen Eighty-Four,8 where history was of Nuremberg are equally involved with the
completely rewritten through the creation of city’s past, nor in the same ways: but Nurem¬
“newspeak,” a special language which per¬ berg’s past hovers over the city visibly, gets
mitted only certain limited ideas to be con¬ into the press and into conversation; and
ceived. E. C. Hughes9 has written of another must be taken into account even by those
nationalistic tendency: he suggests that un¬ who spurn or fight it. Nuremberg’s bustling
der conditions of tribal disintegration as in business men have recently published a book
Africa, when nationalistic movements form, about their city, advertising its great indus¬
they and the countries which emerge from trial capacity and potential. They necessarily
them must quite literally create new mythical had to couch their slogans in opposition to
national histories. They must do this in order the city’s past, for even the outside world
that their heterogeneous populations be thinks of Nuremberg first and foremost as a
brought together under one banner. Thus the treasure house of German medieval art,
emerging territorial boundaries, and the rather than as a progressive industrial city.
Membership and History 231
“We are happy to present at this time a city 4. M. Sherif and C. Sherif, Groups in Harmony
in the bloom of a new youth. Its title [the and Tension (New York: Harper, 1953), p. 164.
book] might well be 'Nuremburg the living 5. Robert K. Merton and Alice S. Kitt, “Contri¬
city.' "10. . . butions to the Theory of Reference Group Be¬
havior,” in R. K. Merton and R Lazarsfeld
(eds.), Continuities in Social Research (Glen¬
Endnotes coe: The Free Press, 1950), pp. 86-87.
1. Much of this section is taken from a paper 6. Osbert Sitwell, Left Hand, Right Hand! (Bos¬
ton: Little and Brown, 1944).
titled “Concepts, Communication, Groups,”
published in M. Sherif and M. Wilson (eds.), 7. Carleton J. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism
Social Relations at the Crossroads (New York: (New York: Macmillan, 1926).
Harper, 1953), pp. 99-105. 8. George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (New
2. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: York: Harcourt Brace, 1949).
Open Court, 1925). 9. Everett C. Hughes, in conversation.
3. M. Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology 10. Stadtrat zu Niimberg, Lebendiges Niimberg
(New York: Harper, 1948), p. 105. (Niimberg: Ulrich, 1953), p. 8. ♦
232 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ IX. Symbolic Interactionism
so important for an understanding of human self that the action has this or that meaning
group life that I wish to spell them out, even or character.
though briefly. Now, according to Mead, the significance
The key feature in Meads analysis is that of making indications to oneself is of para¬
the human being has a self. This idea should mount importance. The importance lies
not be cast aside as esoteric or glossed over along two lines. First, to indicate something
as something that is obvious and hence not is to extricate it from its setting, to hold it
worthy of attention. In declaring that the hu¬ apart, to give it a meaning or, in Meads lan¬
man being has a self, Mead had in mind guage, to make it into an object. An object—
chiefly that the human being can be the ob¬ that is to say, anything that an individual in¬
ject of his own actions. He can act toward dicates to himself—is different from a stimu¬
himself as he might act toward others. Each lus; instead of having an intrinsic character
of us is familiar with actions of this sort in which acts on the individual and which can
which the human being gets angry with him¬ be identified apart from the individual, its
self, rebuffs himself, takes pride in himself, character or meaning is conferred on it by the
argues with himself, tries to bolster his own individual. The object is a product of the in¬
courage, tells himself that he should “do this” dividuals disposition to act instead of being
or not “do that,” sets goals for himself, makes an antecedent stimulus which evokes the act.
compromises with himself, and plans what Instead of the individual being surrounded
he is going to do. That the human being acts by an environment of pre-existing objects
toward himself in these and countless other which play upon him and call forth his be¬
ways is a matter of easy empirical observa¬ havior, the proper picture is that he con¬
tion. To recognize that the human being can structs his objects on the basis of his on-going
act toward himself is no mystical conjura¬ activity. In any of his countless acts—whether
tion. minor, like dressing himself, or major, like
Mead regards this ability of the human be¬ organizing himself for a professional ca¬
ing to act toward himself as the central reer—the individual is designating different
mechanism with which the human being objects to himself, giving them meaning,
faces and deals with his world. This mecha¬ judging their suitability to his action, and
nism enables the human being to make indi¬ making decisions on the basis of the judg¬
cations to himself of things in his surround¬ ment. This is what is meant by interpretation
ings and thus to guide his actions by what he or acting on the basis of symbols.
notes. Anything of which a human being is The second important implication of the
conscious is something which he is indicat¬ fact that the human being makes indications
ing to himself—the ticking of a clock, a knock to himself is that his action is constructed or
at the door, the appearance of a friend, the built up instead of being a mere release.
remark made by a companion, a recognition Whatever the action in which he is engaged,
that he has a task to perform, or the realiza¬ the human individual proceeds by pointing
tion that he has a cold. Conversely, anything out to himself the divergent things which
of which he is not conscious is, ipso facto, have to be taken into account in the course
something which he is not indicating to him¬ of his action. He has to note what he wants
self. The conscious life of the human being, to do and how he is to do it; he has to point
from the time that he awakens until he falls out to himself the various conditions which
asleep, is a continual flow of self-indica¬ may be instrumental to his action and those
tions—notations of the things with which he which may obstruct his action; he has to take
deals and takes into account. We are given, account of the demands, the expectations,
then, a picture of the human being as an or¬ the prohibitions, and the threats as they may
ganism which confronts its world with a arise in the situation in which he is acting.
mechanism for making indications to itself. His action is built up step by step through a
This is the mechanism that is involved in in¬ process of such self-indication. The human
terpreting the actions of others. To interpret individual pieces together and guides his ac¬
the actions of another is to point out to one¬ tion by taking account of different things and
234 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ IX. Symbolic Interactionism
interpreting their significance for his pro¬ that the human being constructs his con¬
spective action. There is no instance of con¬ scious action.
scious action of which this is not true. Now Mead recognizes that the formation
The process of constructing action of action by the individual through a process
through making indications to oneself can¬ of self-indication always takes place in a so¬
not be swallowed up in any of the conven¬ cial context. Since this matter is so vital to an
tional psychological categories. This process understanding of symbolic interaction it
is distinct from and different from what is needs to be explained carefully. Fundamen¬
spoken of as the “ego"—just as it is different tally, group action takes the form of a fitting
from any other conception which conceives together of individual lines of action. Each
of the self in terms of composition or organi¬ individual aligns his action to the action of
zation. Self-indiction is a moving communi¬ others by ascertaining what they are doing or
cative process in which the individual notes what they intend to do—that is, by getting the
things, assesses them, gives them a meaning, meaning of their acts. For Mead, this is done
and decides to act on the basis of the mean¬ by the individual “taking the role" of others—
ing. The human being stands over against the either the role of a specific person or the role
world, or against “alters," with such a process of a group (Meads “generalized other"). In
and not with a mere ego. Further, the process taking such roles the individual seeks to as¬
of self-indication cannot be subsumed under certain the intention or direction of the acts
the forces, whether from the outside or in¬ of others. He forms and aligns his own action
side, which are presumed to play upon the on the basis of such interpretation of the acts
individual to produce his behavior. Environ¬ of others. This is the fundamental way in
mental pressures, external stimuli, organic which group action takes place in human so¬
drives, wishes, attitudes, feelings, ideas, and ciety.
their like do not cover or explain the process The foregoing are the essential features, as
of self-indication. The process of self-indica¬ I see them, in Mead s analysis of the bases of
tion stands over against them in that the in¬ symbolic interaction. They presuppose the
dividual points out to himself and interprets following: that human society is made up of
the appearance or expression of such things, individuals who have selves (that is, make
noting a given social demand that is made on indications to themselves); that individual
him, recognizing a command, observing that action is a construction and not a release,
he is hungry, realizing that he wishes to buy being built up by the individual through not¬
something, aware that he has a given feeling, ing and interpreting features of the situations
conscious that he dislikes eating with some¬ in which he acts; that group or collective ac¬
one he despises, or aware that he is thinking tion consists of the aligning of individual ac¬
of doing some given thing. By virtue of indi¬ tions, brought about by the individuals' inter¬
cating such things to himself, he places him¬ preting or taking into account each others
self over against them and is able to act back actions. Since my purpose is to present and
against them, accepting them, rejecting not to defend the position of symbolic inter¬
them, or transforming them in accordance action I shall not endeavor in this essay to
with how he defines or interprets them. His advance support for the three premises
behavior, accordingly, is not a result of such which I have just indicated. I wish merely to
things as environmental pressures, stimuli, say that the three premises can be easily veri¬
motives, attitudes, and ideas but arises in¬ fied empirically. I know of no instance of hu¬
stead from how he interprets and handles man group action to which the three prem¬
these things in the action which he is con¬ ises do not apply. The reader is challenged to
structing. The process of self-indication by find or think of a single instance which they
means of which human action is formed can¬ do not fit. I wish now to point out that socio¬
not be accounted for by factors which pre¬ logical views of human society are, in gen¬
cede the act. The process of self-indication eral, markedly at variance with the premises
exists in its own right and must be accepted which I have indicated as underlying sym¬
and studied as such. It is through this process bolic interaction. Indeed, the predominant
Society as Symbolic Interaction 235
number of such views, especially those in nize that the individuals who compose it have
vogue at the present time, do not see or treat selves in the sense spoken of.
human society as symbolic interaction. Wed¬ Correspondingly, such sociological con¬
ded, as they tend to be, to some form of socio¬ ceptions do not regard the social actions of
logical determinism, they adopt images of individuals in human society as being con¬
human society, of individuals in it, and of structed by them through a process of inter¬
group action which do not square with the pretation. Instead, action is treated as a prod¬
premises of symbolic interaction. I wish to uct of factors which play on and through in¬
say a few words about the major lines of vari¬ dividuals. The social behavior of people is not
ance. seen as built up by them through an interpre¬
Sociological thought rarely recognizes or tation of objects, situations, or the actions of
treats human societies as composed of indi¬ others. If a place is given to “interpretation,"
viduals who have selves. Instead, they as¬ the interpretation is regarded as merely an
sume human beings to be merely organisms expression of other factors (such as motives)
with some kind of organization, responding which precede the act, and accordingly dis¬
to forces which play upon them. Generally, appears as a factor in its own right. Hence,
although not exclusively, these forces are the social action of people is treated as an
lodged in the make-up of the society, as in the outward flow or expression of forces playing
case of “social system," “social structure," on them rather than as acts which are built
“culture," “status position," “social role," up by people through their interpretation of
the situations in which they are placed.
“custom," “institution," “collective repre¬
These remarks suggest another significant
sentation," “social situation," “social norm,"
line of difference between general socio¬
and “values." The assumption is that the be¬
logical views and the position of symbolic
havior of people as members of a society is an
interaction. These two sets of views differ in
expression of the play on them of these kinds
where they lodge social action. Under the
of factors or forces. This, of course, is the
perspective of symbolic interaction, social
logical position which is necessarily taken
action is lodged in acting individuals who fit
when the scholar explains their behavior or
their respective lines of action to one another
phases of their behavior in terms of one or
through a process of interpretation; group
another of such social factors. The individu¬
action is the collective action of such indi¬
als who compose a human society are treated viduals. As opposed to this view, sociological
as the media through which such factors op¬ conceptions generally lodge social action in
erate, and the social action of such individu¬ the action of society or in some unit of soci¬
als is regarded as an expression of such fac¬ ety. Examples of this are legion. Let me cite
tors. This approach or point of view denies, a few. Some conceptions, in treating societies
or at least ignores, that human beings have or human groups as “social systems," regard
selves—that they act by making indications group action as an expression of a system,
to themselves. Incidentally, the “self" is not either in a state of balance or seeking to
brought into the picture by introducing such achieve balance. Or group action is con¬
items as organic drives, motives, attitudes, ceived as an expression of the “functions" of
feelings, internalized social factors, or psy¬ a society or of a group. Or group action is
chological components. Such psychological regarded as the outward expression of ele¬
factors have the same status as the social fac¬ ments lodged in society or the group, such as
tors mentioned: they are regarded as factors cultural demands, societal purposes, social
which play on the individual to produce his values, or institutional stresses. These typical
action. They do not constitute the process of conceptions ignore or blot out a view of
self-indication. The process of self-indication group life or of group action as consisting of
stands over against them, just as it stands the collective or concerted actions of indi¬
over against the social factors which play on viduals seeking to meet their life situations.
the human being. Practically all sociological If recognized at all, the efforts of people to
conceptions of human society fail to recog¬ develop collective acts to meet their situ-
236 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ IX. Symbolic Interactionism
ations are subsumed under the play of under¬ ation in which it takes place. This leads to the
lying or transcending forces which are lodged recognition of a second major condition,
in society or its parts. The individuals com¬ namely, that the action is formed or con¬
posing the society or the group become “car¬ structed by interpreting the situation. The
riers/’ or media for the expression of such acting unit necessarily has to identify the
forces; and the interpretative behavior by things which it has to take into account—
means of which people form their actions is tasks, opportunities, obstacles, means, de¬
merely a coerced link in the play of such mands, discomforts, dangers, and the like; it
forces. has to assess them in some fashion and it has
The indication of the foregoing lines of to make decisions on the basis of the assess¬
variance should help to put the position of ment. Such interpretative behavior may take
symbolic interaction in better perspective. In place in the individual guiding his own ac¬
the remaining discussion I wish to sketch tion, in a collectivity of individuals acting in
somewhat more fully how human society ap¬ concert, or in “agents” acting on behalf of a
pears in terms of symbolic interaction and to group or organization. Group life consists of
point out some methodological implications. acting units developing acts to meet the situ¬
Human society is to be seen as consisting ations in which they are placed.
of acting people, and the life of the society is Usually, most of the situations encoun¬
to be seen as consisting of their actions. The tered by people in a given society are defined
acting units may be separate individuals, col¬ or “structured” by them in the same way.
lectivities whose members are acting to¬ Through previous interaction they develop
gether on a common quest, or organizations and acquire common understandings or defi¬
acting on behalf of a constituency. Respective nitions of how to act in this or that situation.
examples are individual purchasers in a mar¬ These common definitions enable people to
ket, a play group or missionary band, and a act alike. The common repetitive behavior of
business corporation or a national profes¬ people in such situations should not mislead
sional association. There is no empirically the student into believing that no process of
observable activity in a human society that interpretation is in play; on the contrary, even
does not spring from some acting unit. This though fixed, the actions of the participating
banal statement needs to be stressed in light people are constructed by them through a
of the common practice of sociologists of re¬ process of interpretation. Since ready-made
ducing human society to social units that do and commonly accepted definitions are at
not act—for example, social classes in mod¬ hand, little strain is placed on people in guid¬
em society. Obviously, there are ways of view¬ ing and organizing their acts. However, many
ing human society other than in terms of the other situations may not be defined in a sin¬
acting units that compose it. I merely wish to gle way by the participating people. In this
point out that in respect to concrete or em¬ event, their lines of action do not fit together
pirical activity human society must necessar¬ readily and collective action is blocked. Inter¬
ily be seen in terms of the acting units that pretations have to be developed and effective
form it. I would add that any scheme of hu¬ accommodation of the participants to one
man society claiming to be a realistic analysis another has to be worked out. In the case of
has to respect and be congruent with the em¬ such “undefined” situations, it is necessary to
pirical recognition that a human society con¬ trace and study the emerging process of defi¬
sists of acting units. nition which is brought into play.
Corresponding respect must be shown to Insofar as sociologists or students of hu¬
the conditions under which such units act. man society are concerned with the behavior
One primary condition is that action takes of acting units, the position of symbolic inter¬
place in and with regard to a situation. What¬ action requires the student to catch the pro¬
ever be the acting unit—an individual, a fam¬ cess of interpretation through which they
ily, a school, a church, a business firm, a labor construct their actions. This process is not to
union, a legislature, and so on—any particu¬ be caught merely by turning to conditions
lar action is formed in the light of the situ¬ which are antecedent to the process. Such
Society as Symbolic Interaction 237
antecedent conditions are helpful in under¬ are so strongly entrenched today, leap over
standing the process insofar as they enter the acting units of a society and bypass the
into it, but as mentioned previously they do interpretative process by which such acting
not constitute the process. Nor can one catch units build up their actions.
the process merely by inferring its nature These respective concerns with organiza¬
from the overt action which is its product. To tion on one hand and with acting units on the
catch the process, the student must take the other hand set the essential difference be¬
role of the acting unit whose behavior he is tween conventional views of human society
studying. Since the interpretation is being and the view of it implied in symbolic inter¬
made by the acting unit in terms of objects action. The latter view recognizes the pres¬
designated and appraised, meanings ac¬ ence of organization to human society and
quired, and decisions made, the process has respects its importance. However, it sees and
to be seen from the standpoint of the acting treats organization differently. The difference
unit. It is the recognition of this fact that is along two major lines. First, from the
makes the research work of such scholars as standpoint of symbolic interaction the orga¬
R.E. Park and W.I. Thomas so notable. To try nization of a human society is the framework
to catch the interpretative process by remain¬ inside of which social action takes place and
ing aloof as a so-called "objective” observer is not the determinant of that action. Second,
and refusing to take the role of the acting unit such organization and changes in it are the
is to risk the worst kind of subjectivism—the product of the activity of acting units and not
objective observer is likely to fill in the pro¬ of "forces” which leave such acting units out
cess of interpretation with his own surmises of account. Each of these two major lines of
in place of catching the process as it occurs difference should be explained briefly in or¬
in the experience of the acting unit which der to obtain a better understanding of how
uses it. human society appears in terms of symbolic
By and large, of course, sociologists do not interaction.
study human society in terms of its acting From the standpoint of symbolic inter¬
units. Instead, they are disposed to view hu¬ action, social organization is a framework in¬
man society in terms of structure or organi¬ side of which acting units develop their ac¬
zation and to treat social action as an expres¬ tions. Structural features, such as "culture,”
sion of such structure or organization. Thus, "social systems,” "social stratification,” or
reliance is placed on such structural catego¬ "social roles,” set conditions for their action
ries as social system, culture, norms, values, but do not determine their action. People—
social stratification, status positions, social that is, acting units—do not act toward cul¬
roles and institutional organization. These ture, social structure or the like; they act to¬
are used both to analyze human society and ward situations. Social organization enters
to account for social action within it. Other into action only to the extent to which it
major interests of sociological scholars cen¬ shapes situations in which people act, and to
ter around this focal theme of organization. the extent to which it supplies fixed sets of
One line of interest is to view organization in symbols which people use in interpreting
terms of the functions it is supposed to per¬ their situations. These two forms of influence
form. Another line of interest is to study so¬ of social organization are important. In the
cietal organization as a system seeking equi¬ case of settled and stabilized societies, such
librium; here the scholar endeavors to detect as isolated primitive tribes and peasant com¬
mechanisms which are indigenous to the sys¬ munities, the influence is certain to be pro¬
tem. Another line of interest is to identify found. In the case of human societies, par¬
forces which play upon organization to bring ticularly modem societies, in which streams
about changes in it; here the scholar endeav¬ of new situations arise and old situations be¬
ors, especially through comparative study, to come unstable, the influence of organization
isolate a relation between causative factors decreases. One should bear in mind that the
and structural results. These various lines of most important element confronting an act¬
sociological perspective and interest, which ing unit in situations is the actions of other
238 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ IX. Symbolic Interactionism
acting units. In modem society, with its in¬ up in the change—the change appears in the
creasing criss-crossing of lines of action, it is form of new situations in which people have
common for situations to arise in which the to construct new forms of action. Also, in line
actions of participants are not previously with what has been said previously, interpre¬
regularized and standardized. To this extent, tations of new situations are not predeter¬
existing social organization does not shape mined by conditions antecedent to the situ¬
the situations. Correspondingly, the symbols ations but depend on what is taken into ac¬
or tools of interpretation used by acting units count and assessed in the actual situations in
in such situations may vary and shift consid¬ which behavior is formed. Variations in inter¬
erably. For these reasons, social action may pretation may readily occur as different act¬
go beyond, or depart from, existing organiza¬ ing units cut out different objects in the situ¬
tion in any of its structural dimensions. The ation, or give different weight to the objects
organization of a human society is not to be which they note, or piece objects together in
identified with the process of interpretation different patterns. In formulating proposi¬
used by its acting units; even though it affects tions of social change, it would be wise to
that process, it does not embrace or cover the recognize that any given line of such change
process. is mediated by acting units interpreting the
Perhaps the most outstanding conse¬ situations with which they are confronted.
quence of viewing human society as organi¬ Students of human society will have to
zation is to overlook the part played by acting face the question of whether their preoccu¬
units in social change. The conventional pro¬
pation with categories of structure and orga¬
cedure of sociologists is (a) to identify human
nization can be squared with the interpreta¬
society (or some part of it) in terms of an
tive process by means of which human be¬
established or organized form, (b) to identify
ings, individually and collectively, act in hu¬
some factor or condition of change playing
man society. It is the discrepancy between the
upon the human society or the given part of
two which plagues such students in their ef¬
it, and (c) to identify the new form assumed
forts to attain scientific propositions of the
by the society following upon the play of the
sort achieved in the physical and biological
factor of change. Such observations permit
sciences. It is this discrepancy, further, which
the student to couch propositions to the ef¬
fect that a given factor of change playing is chiefly responsible for their difficulty in
upon a given organized form results in a fitting hypothetical propositions to new ar¬
given new organized form. Examples ranging rays of empirical data. Efforts are made, of
from crude to refined statements are legion, course, to overcome these shortcomings by
such as that an economic depression in¬ devising new structural categories, by formu¬
creases solidarity in the families of working¬ lating new structural hypotheses, by develop¬
men or that industrialization replaces ex¬ ing more refined techniques of research, and
tended families by nuclear families. My con¬ even by formulating new methodological
cern here is not with the validity of such schemes of a structural character. These ef¬
propositions but with the methodological po¬ forts continue to ignore or to explain away
sition which they presuppose. Essentially, the interpretative process by which people
such propositions either ignore the role of the act, individually and collectively, in society.
interpretive behavior of acting units in the The question remains whether human soci¬
given instance of change, or else regard the ety or social action can be successfully ana¬
interpretative behavior as coerced by the fac¬ lyzed by schemes which refuse to recognize
tor of change. I wish to point out that any line human beings as they are, namely, as persons
of social change, since it involves change in constructing individual and collective action
human action, is necessarily mediated by in¬ through an interpretation of the situations
terpretation on the part of the people caught which confront them. ♦
Bases of Fun 239
the interests of both the play and the gaming possible display of externally relevant attri¬
encounter. butes.
To speak of the outcome as problematic, This dual theme makes some sense. A good
however, is, in effect, to say that one must player who is unopposed in displaying his
look to the play itself in order to discover how powers may give the impression of too openly
things will turn out. The developing line built making claims; he would be acting contrary
up by the alternating, interlocking moves of to the rules of irrelevance which require him
the players can thus maintain sole claim to forego attending to many of his externally
upon the attention of the participants, relevant social attributes. But as long as his
thereby facilitating the game's power to con¬ efforts are called forth in the heat of close
stitute the current reality of its players and to competition, they are called forth by the
engross them. We can thus understand one interaction itself and not merely for show.
of the social reasons why cheaters are re¬ Uncertainty of outcome gives the player a
sented; by locating the power of determining shield behind which he can work into the
the outcome of the play in the arrangements interaction attributes that would threaten the
made by one player, cheating, like mismatch¬ membrane surrounding the encounter if
ing, destroys the reality-generating power of openly introduced.
the game.1 (Of course, whereas the mis¬ How far can we generalize this explana¬
matching of teams prevents a play world tion? First we must see that this conception
from developing, the discovery that someone of a dual principle leads us back to a consid¬
is cheating punctures and deflates a world eration of betting games and the efforts of
that has already developed.) those around a table to locate a euphoria
But this analysis is surely not enough. In function. If the participants perceive that the
games of pure chance, such as flipping coins, betting is very low relative to their financial
there would never be a problem of balancing capacities, then interest in money itself can¬
sides, yet, unless such other factors as money not penetrate the encounter and enliven it.
bets are carefully added, mere uncertainty of Interest in the game may flag; participants
outcome is not enough to engross the players. may fail to “take it seriously." On the other
Another possibility is that games give the hand, if the players feel that the betting is
players an opportunity to exhibit attributes high in relation to their income and re¬
valued in the wider social world, such as dex¬ sources, then interest may be strangled, a
terity, strength, knowledge, intelligence, participant in a play flooding out of the gam¬
courage, and self-control. Externally relevant ing encounter into an anxious private con¬
attributes thus obtain official expression cern for his general economic welfare.2 A
within the milieu of an encounter. These at¬ player in these circumstances is forced to
tributes could even be earned within the en¬ take the game “too seriously."
counter, to be claimed later outside it. When players at the beginning of play give
Again, this alone is not enough, for mis¬ thought to an appropriate scale of stakes,
matched teams allow the better player to ex¬ they are seeking for that kind of screen be¬
hibit all kinds of capacities. He, at least, hind which an interest in money can seep
should be satisfied. Still, we know that, what¬ into the game. This is one reason for restrict¬
ever his actual feelings, he is not likely to ing the game to persons who, it is felt, can
admit to getting much satisfaction out of this afford to lose roughly the same amount. We
kind of gaming and is, in fact, quite likely to can similarly understand the tendency for the
find himself bored and unengrossed in the level of bets to be raised part way through the
play. gaming, since by then the game itself has had
But if we combine our two principles— a chance to grasp the players and inure them
problematic outcome and sanctioned dis¬ against what they previously considered too
play—we may have something more valid. A worrisome a loss.
successful game would then be one which, We also see that the notion of taking a
first, had a problematic outcome and then, game too seriously or not seriously enough
within these limits, allowed for a maximum does not quite fit our notions of the contrast
Bases of Fun 241
between recreational “unserious” activity great that they would rather not play. In
and workaday “serious” activity The issue fact, some of the mechanisms of games
apparently is not whether the activity belongs seem to be built to guarantee gratification,
to the recreational sphere or the work sphere, but they also guarantee security against
but whether external pulls upon ones interest ones own superego pressures or against
the outside dangers. Again, a game breaks
can be selectively held in check so that one
down when the “as if” character cannot be
can become absorbed in the encounter as a
maintained, or when the reality proximity
world in itself. The problem of too-serious or is too great, and this may vary' from game
not-serious-enough arises in gaming encoun¬ to game. There are some games that stop
ters not because a game is involved but be¬ being fun when they get too fantastic and
cause an encounter is involved. there is not enough similarity to a real
Financial status is not the only fundamen¬ competitive situation; there are other
tal aspect of a persons life which can enter games which stop being fun the other way
through the membrane of an encounter and around. If one comes too close to reality,
enliven or spoil the proceedings. Physical then the activity may lose its game char¬
safety, for example, seems to be another. In acter, as do some games that are too far
from reality. Where is too far away or too
childrens play activities, risk to the physical
close? This is the question for which I do
integrity of the body is often introduced,
not know the answer.4
again on a carefully graded not-too-much-
not-too-little basis. For example, slides must It is possible to go on and see in games a
be steep enough to be a challenge, yet not so means of infusing or integrating into gaming
steep as to make an accident too likely: a little encounters many different socially signifi¬
more risk than can be easily handled seems cant externally based matters. This seems to
to do the trick. (Adult sports such as skiing be one reason why different cultural milieu
seem to be based on the same principle—a favor different kinds of games, and some his¬
means of creating tension in regard to physi¬ torical changes in the equipment of a game
cal safety is here integrated into the play ac¬ appear to respond to social changes in the
tivity, giving rise to merriment.)3 All of this milieu in which the game is playedc And
has been stated by Fritz Redl in his discus¬ apart from the equipment itself, there is the
sion of the “ego-supporting” functions of suc¬ issue of the wider social position of the con¬
cessful games: tending players. Thus, for example, the clash
I would like to list a few of the things that of football teams on a playing field can pro¬
must happen for a “game” to “break vide a means by which the antagonism be¬
down.” It breaks down if it is not fun any tween the two groups represented by the
more; that means if certain gratification teams may be allowed to enter an encounter
guarantees, for the sake of which indi¬ in a controlled manner and to be given ex¬
viduals were lured into it, stop being grati¬ pression.6 We can then predict that, at least
fying. There are many reasons why that as far as spectators are concerned, two teams
may happen. It breaks down, too, if it is
drawn from the same social grouping may
not safe any more, that is, when the risks
or the dangers an individual exposes him¬ produce a conflict that falls flat, and two
self to in the game outweigh whatever teams drawn from groupings openly opposed
gratification he may derive from it. By to each other may provide incidents during
safe, I mean internally and externally. The which so much externally based hostility
actual risks and the physical strain or the flows into the mutual activity of the sporting
fear of hurt may become too great or the encounter as to burst the membrane sur¬
fear of ones own passivity may become rounding it, leading to riots, fights, and other
too great. This is why, by choice, children
signs of a breakdown in order. All this is sug¬
sometimes do not allow themselves to
play certain games, because they are gested by Max Gluckman in his discussion of
afraid of their own excitation or they British football, where he attempts to explain
know that the danger of loss of self-con¬ why league teams can represent different
trol in this activity is so seductive and so schools, towns, and regions, but with much
242 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ IX. Symbolic Interactionism
more difficulty different religious groupings worship among the Pueblo Indians of
and different social classes: New Mexico; this does not prevent the
same adults who worship them and incar¬
A similar situation might be found in nate them in their masked dances from
school matches. We know that the unity making dolls resembling them for the
and internal loyalty of schools is largely amusement of their sons. Similarly, in
built up by formalized competition in Catholic countries, children currently
games with other schools—and I should play at going to Mass, at being confirmed,
expect this system to work well as long as at marriage and funerals. Parents permit
each school mainly played other schools this at least as long as the imitation re¬
of the same type as itself. What would hap¬ mains a respectful one. In black Africa the
pen if public schools became involved in children make masks and rhombs in the
contests with secondary modem schools? same way and are punished for the same
Would the whole national background of reasons, if the imitation goes too far and
divergence in opportunity, prospects, and becomes too much of a parody or a sacri¬
privilege, embitter the game till they lege.8
ceased to serve their purpose of friendly
rivalry? Is it only because Oxford and It seems, then, that in games and similar
Cambridge can produce better teams than activities disguises must be provided which
the provincial universities that they con¬ check, but do not stop, the flow of socially
fine their rivalry in the main to contests significant matters into the encounter. All
between themselves?7 this goes beyond my earlier statement that
the material character of game equipment is
The social differences, then, between the
not relevant. The game-relevant meanings of
two supporting audiences for the teams must
the various, pieces of the game equipment
be of the kind that can be tapped without
are in themselves a useful disguise, for be¬
breaking the barrel. It may be, however, that
hind these meanings the sentimental, mate¬
the same can be said about any major exter¬
rial, and esthetic value of the pieces can steal
nally based experience common to members
into the interaction, infusing it with tones of
of an audience. A stage play that does not
meaning that have nothing to do with the
touch on issues relevant to the audience is
logic of the game but something to do with
likely to fall flat, and yet staged materials can
the pleasure of the gaming encounter; the tra¬
be pressed to a point where they insuffi¬
ditional concern in Japan about the quality
ciently disguise the realities on which they
of equipment used to play Go is an extreme
dwell, causing the audience to be moved too
example. In this way, too, perhaps, the con¬
much. Thus, realistic plays put on for unso¬
versation and cuisine in a restaurant can, if
phisticated audiences are felt by some to be
good enough, not only blot out a humble set¬
in bad taste, to "go too far,” or to "come too
ting, but also, in elegant establishments, al¬
close to home”—as was the feeling, so I was
low us a deepened identification with the cost
informed, when Riders to the Sea was staged
of the decor, the command in the service, and
for a Shetland audience. What has been
the social status of groups at the other ta¬
called "symbolic distance” must be assured.
bles—an identification we would not allow
A membrane must be maintained that will
ourselves were the process not disguised.
control the flow of externally relevant senti¬
And it seems that the malleability of game
ments into the interaction. Interestingly
arrangements—choice of games, sides,
enough, the same effect can be seen in the
handicaps, bets—allows for the fabrication
judgment adult audiences make in watching
of exactly the right amount of disguise.
their children use sacred materials for pur¬
poses of play, as Caillois points out in discuss¬ But here we have a theme that echoes the
ing the fact that games are not merely current doctrine that has been built around projec¬
residues of past realities: tive testing, namely, that the ambiguity and
malleability of test material allows subjects
These remarks are no less valid for the to structure it according to their own propen¬
sacred than for the profane. The katcinas sity, to express quite personal “loaded”
are semidivinites, the principal objects of themes because the materials are sufficiently
Bases of Fun 243
removed from reality to allow the subject to her fingers, and she asked me by gestures
avoid seeing what he is doing with them. A to respond in kind. We continued with this
discontinuity with the world is achieved even finger conversation for one or two weeks,
while a connection with it is established. Of and as we did so, her anxious tension be¬
gan to decrease and she began to break
course, these tests are usually directed to one
through her noncommunicative isolation;
subject and his world, as opposed to an en¬
and subsequently she emerged altogether
counter with many individuals in it, but the from her loneliness.10
presence of the tester focusing his attention
on the subject s response does in a way supply In both these cases what we see is an individ¬
the conditions of a two-person encounter. ual himself determining the kind of veil that
A glance at the literature on projective de¬ will be drawn over his feelings while in com¬
vices encourages us to continue along this munication with another. The system of eti¬
tack. Take for example the beautiful work of quette and reserve that members of every
Erikson on play therapy published in 1937.9 group employ in social intercourse would
He describes children who cannot bring seem to function in the same way, but in this
themselves to talk about their troubles—in case the disguise is socially standardized; it
fact, may even be too young to do so. The is applied by the individual but not tailored
affect attached to the suppressed and re¬ by himself to his own particular needs.
pressed materials would rupture any mem¬
In psychotherapeutic intervention with
brane around any mutual or individual activ¬
greatly withdrawn patients, the therapist
ity that alluded to this material. In some cases
may have to agree to the patient s using a very
these constraints block any verbal communi¬
heavy disguise, but in psychotherapy with
cation. But by allowing the child to construct
“neurotics,” we may see something of the op¬
play configurations out of doll-like objects
posite extreme. In the psychoanalytical doc¬
that are somewhat removed from the reality
trine of transference and the psychoanalyti¬
projected on them, the child feels some relief,
cal rule of free association, we meet the no¬
some ease; and he does so through the pro¬
tion that a membrane can be established that
cess of infusing his painful concerns into the
is so diaphanous and yet so tough that any
local situation in a safely transformed man¬
externally related feeling on the part of the
ner.
patient can be activated and infused into the
Once the special relevance of projective encounter without destroying the doctor-pa¬
testing is granted, we need not be bound by tient encounter. This is facilitated, of course,
formal test materials, but can include any by the professional arrangement that sepa¬
situation where an individual can permit rates the analytical couch from home life and
himself to interact by virtue of a disguise, in home authorities.11 The extension of this tell-
fact, transformation rules that he is allowed all doctrine to group psychotherapy merely
to create. Fromm-Reichmann provides an ex¬ moves matters more in the direction of the
ample: kind of encounter considered in this paper.
Perhaps my interest began with the young This view of the function of disguise allows
catatonic woman who broke through a pe¬ us to consider the phenomenon of “subver¬
riod of completely blocked communica¬ sive ironies.” One of the most appealing ways
tion and obvious anxiety by responding in which situations are “made” can be found
when I asked her a question about her in times and places of stress where matters
feeling miserable: She raised her hand that are extremely difficult to bear and typi¬
with her thumb lifted, the other four fin¬ cally excluded by the official transformation
gers bent toward her palm, so that I could rules are introduced lightly and ironically.
see only the thumb, isolated from the four
The classic case is “gallows humor.” In con¬
hidden fingers. I interpreted the signal
with, “That lonely?” in a sympathetic tone centration camps, for example, turnips were
of voice. At this, her facial expression loos¬ sometimes called “German pineapples,”12 fa¬
ened up as though in great relief and grati¬ tigue drill, “geography.”13 In a mental hospi¬
tude, and her fingers opened. Then she tal, a patient may express to other patients
began to tell me about herself by means of his feelings about the place by referring to the
244 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ IX. Symbolic Interactionism
medical and surgical building with conscious social horizons through, for example, sexual
irony as the “hospital," thereby establishing bond-formation, informality with those of
the rest of the institution as a different kind high rank, or extending ones invitation cir¬
of place.14 In general, these subversive iro¬ cle. Where boundaries have already been ten¬
nies would seem to “come off" when they tatively widened, parties can function to con¬
open the way for some expression of feeling firm and consolidate work begun elsewhere.
that is generated in the institutional situation Thus defined, a party presents us with a
at large but disguise what is being expressed double set of requirements and, behind
sufficiently to ensure the orderliness of the these, another illustration of our double
particular encounter. theme. On one hand, we can look to the com¬
Within the same perspective, we can con¬ mon rationalizations and causes of social en¬
sider the functions of indirection in informal dogamy, the rule that only equals be invited
social control. For example, when a member to a sociable gathering. When we ask persons
of a work group begins to threaten informal about their exclusiveness, they tend to claim
work quotas by producing too much, we can that they would not have “anything in com¬
follow the actions of his fellow workers who, mon" with those not invited and that mixing
perhaps unwilling to express directly their different classes of persons makes everyone
resentment and their desire for control, may “uncomfortable." Presumably, what they
employ a game of “binging" or “piling" mean here is that officially irrelevant attri¬
through which the non-conformist is brought butes would obtrude upon the occasion, de¬
back into line under the guise of being the butt stroying the identities upon which the socia¬
of a joke.15 bility was organized and killing spontaneous
Whatever the interaction, then, there is involvement in the recreation at hand.
this dual theme: the wider world must be in¬ But precisely the opposite concern will be
troduced, but in a controlled and disguised felt, too. Often, sociable conversations and
manner. Individuals can deal with one an¬ games fail not because the participants are
other face to face because they are ready to insufficiently close socially but because they
abide by rules of irrelevance, but the rules are not far enough apart. A feeling of bore¬
seem to exist to let something difficult be qui¬ dom, that nothing is likely to happen, can
etly expressed as much as to exclude it en¬ arise when the same persons spend all their
tirely from the scene. Given the dangers of sociable moments together. Social horizons
expression, a disguise may function not so cannot be extended. One hears the phrases:
much as a way of concealing something as a “The same old people," “the same old thing,
way of revealing as much of it as can be tol¬ lets not go." The speakers, in fact, usually go,
erated in an encounter. We fence our encoun¬ but not hopefully.
ters in with gates; the very means by which So we find that the euphoria function for
we hold off a part of reality can be the means a sociable occasion resides somewhere be¬
by which we can bear introducing it. tween little social difference and much social
As a final step, I would like to trace the difference. A dissolution of some externally
same dual theme in sociability, in occasions based social distance must be achieved, a
such as parties, which form a structured set¬ penetration of ego-boundaries, but not to an
ting for many comings-together during an extent that renders the participants fearful,
evening. threatened, or self-consciously concerned
It can be argued that informal social par¬ with what is happening socially. Too much
ticipation is an ultimate validation of rela¬ potential loss and gain must be guarded
tionships of intimacy and equality with those against, as well as too little.
with whom one shares this activity.16 A party, Too much or too little of this “working
then, is by way of being a status blood bath, through” will force participants to look di¬
a leveling up and leveling down of all present, rectly at the kind of work that parties are
a mutual contamination and sacralization. expected to do and at the impulses that cause
Concretely phrased, a party is an opportunity persons to attend or stay away—impulses
to engage in encounters that will widen ones that ought to be concealed in what is done at
Bases of Fun 245
parties even while providing the energy for Macy, Jr. Foundation, 1956), pp. 212-213. See
doing it. Sociologically speaking, a very deco¬ also Redl’s “The Impact of Game-Ingredients
rous party, as well as an indecorous one, can on Children's Play Behavior,” in Bertram
Schaffner, ed., Group Processes, Transactions
become obscene, exposing desires out of the
of the Fourth (1957) Conference (New York:
context in which they can be clothed by lo¬
The Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, 1959), pp.
cally realized events. 33-81.
From this, it follows, of course, that what
5. See, for example, K. M. Colby's treatment of
is a successful and happy occasion for one
the changing character of chessmen in “Gen¬
participant may not be such for another. Fur¬ tlemen, The Queen!” Psychoanalytic Review,
ther, it follows that if the many are to be 40 (1953), pp. 144-148.
pleased, then the few may have to sacrifice
6. In this connection, see the functional inter¬
themselves to the occasion, allowing their
pretation of North Andamanese peace-mak¬
bodies to be cast into the blend to make the ing ceremonies in A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, The
bell sound sweet. Perhaps they rely at such Andaman Islanders (Glencoe: The Free Press,
times on other kinds of pleasures. 1948), pp. 134-135, 238 ff.
7. Max Gluckman, “How Foreign Are You?” The
Endnotes Listener, Jan. 15, 1959, p. 102. Of course, the
Olympic games bring teams of different na¬
1. Harvey Sacks has suggested to me that game tionalities against each other, but the heavy
etiquette may oblige those who discover a institutionalization of these competitions
cheater to warn him secretly so that he is en¬ seems to be exactly what is needed to
abled to desist or withdraw without totally strengthen the membrane within which these
breaking up the play. Presumably, an open ac¬ games are played; and, in spite of the dire im¬
cusation of cheating would be even more de¬ plication, opposing Olympic teams do occa¬
structive of the play than the knowledge on sionally fight. P. R. Reid (pp. cit., p. 64), sug¬
the part of some of the players that cheating gests a similar argument in his discussion of
is occurring. That which is threatened by the wall games played by British prisoners of
cheating is that which determines the form war at Colditz:
that control of cheating can take.
2. It is interesting that in daily life when indi¬ The Poles, and later the French when
viduals personally convey or receive what is they arrived, were always interested
for them large amounts of money they often spectators. Although we had no monop¬
make a little joke about money matters. Pre¬ oly of the courtyard, they naturally took
sumably, the integrity of the exchange en¬ to their rooms and watched the game
counter is threatened by concern about the from the windows. They eventually put
up sides against the British and games
funds, and the joke is an effort to assimilate
were played against them, but these
this source of distraction to the interaction in were not a success. Tempers were lost
progress, thereby (hopefully) reducing ten¬ and the score became a matter of im¬
sion. In any case, to demonstrate that the portance, which it never did in an “all-
money is not being treated "seriously” is pre¬ British” game.
sumably to imply that the encounter itself is
the important thing. See also George Orwell, “The Sporting
Spirit,” in Shooting an Elephant (New York:
3. Roger Caillois, op. cit., p. 107, speaks here of Harcourt, Brace, 1950), pp. 151-155
“games based on the pursuit of vertigo.” He
says, “The question is less one of overcoming 8. Caillois, “Unity of Play,” p. 97.
fear than of voluptuously experiencing fear, a
9. Erik Homburger [Erikson], “Configurations
shudder, a state of stupor that momentarily
in Play—Clinical Notes,” The Psychoanalytic
causes one to lose self-control.” See also his
Quarterly, 6 (1937), pp. 139-214.
Les Jeux et les Hommes (Paris: Gallimard,
1958), pp. 45-51, where he elaborates his dis¬ 10. Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, “Loneliness,” Psy¬
cussion of games based on “ilinx.” chiatry, 22 (1959), p. 1.
4. Fritz Redl, discussing Gregory Batesons “The 11. See Melanie Klein, “The Psycho-Analytic Play
Message 'This is Play,' ” in Bertram Schaffner, Technique: its history and significance,” in
ed., Group Processes, Transactions of the Sec¬ Klein, et al., New Directions in Psycho-Analy¬
ond (1955) Conference (New York: The Josiah sis (London: Tavistock, 1955), p. 6:
246 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ IX. Symbolic Interactionism
More important still, I found that the in a medical hospital: Edwin Weinstein and
transference situation—the backbone Robert Kahn, Denial of Illness (Springfield:
of the psycho-analytic procedure—can Charles Thomas, 1955), Chap. 16, “The Lan¬
only be established and maintained if guage of Denial.”
the patient is able to feel that the con¬
sulting-room or the play-room, indeed 15. See F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson,
the whole analysis, is something sepa¬ Management and the Worker (Cambridge:
rate from his ordinary home life. For Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 420, and
only under such conditions can he over¬ the interesting paper by Lloyd Street, “Game
come his resistances against experienc¬ Forms in the Factory Group,” Berkeley Pub¬
ing and expressing thoughts, feelings, lications in Society and Institutions, 4 (1958),
and desires, which are incompatible esp. pp. 48-50:
with convention, and in the case of chil¬
dren felt to be in contrast to much of
what they have been taught. Piling consisted of passing to the “speed
Perhaps, then, an ocean voyage is artist” or “ratebuster” a greater number
fun not because it cuts us off from or¬ of units than he could possibly assem¬
dinary life but because in being appar¬ ble. The rules of the game were to em¬
ently cut off from ordinary life, we can barrass and ridicule the fast worker
afford to experience certain aspects of without hurting any of the members of
it. the line. Typically it was necessary to
pile the “ratebuster” but once or twice
12. Eugen Kogon, The Theory and Practice of Hell in order to bring him into line with the
(New York: Berkley Publishing Corp., n.d.), p. production norms, (p. 48).
108.
16. This view of sociability derives from W. L.
13. Ibid., p. 103. Warner. He seems to have been the first
14. Writer’s study of a mental hospital. A system¬ American sociologist to have appreciated and
atic treatment of patient joking in mental hos¬ studied this structural role of informal social
pitals can be found in Rose Coser, “Some So¬ life. For a recent treatment of sociability that
cial Functions of Laughter,” Human Rela¬ deals with many of the themes discussed in
tions, 12 (1959), pp. 171-182. Somewhat this paper, see D. Riesman, R. J. Potter, and J.
similar practices are reported at length in a Watson, “Sociability, Permissiveness, and
study of brain-damage cases held for surgery Equality,” Psychiatry, 23(1960), pp. 323-340. ♦
The Drama in the Routine: A Prolegomenon to a Praxiological Sociology 247
tions, their carefully formulated modes of ac¬ gart,11 and Victor Turner12 have shown, what
tion, their characteristic rhetorics, and their is here being called a dramatistic approach
moves on the stages of everyday life, they are to social change stands in sharp contrast to,
inherently dramatic—but they are equally in¬ and in critical refutation of, the predominant
herently devoid of histrionics, melodrama, or developmentalist theories of sociocultural
theatrics. Their drama resides precisely in change that take their point of departure
their dullness. They do not stimulate the from Comte and owe their origins to Aris¬
imagination; rather, they effect the unre¬ totle's conception of physis. Against the illu¬
flexive praxis. sion that social change occurs slowly, orderly,
Habitual routines are the stages from continuously, and teleologically, the dull
which the far more theatrical dramas of so¬ drama in the routine is that established ob¬
cial change occur. Indeed, true, or fundamen¬ durate reality, that body of all-too-familiar
tal, social changes—as opposed to those that performances against which the theatrical
occur in and as part of the longue duree— dramas of reform, rebellion, and revolution
may be understood as occurring in an assault are enacted on an irregular and surely non¬
on established habits of life in the name of a linear time track. The success of a reform,
proposed instauration of a new set of habits rebellion, or revolution is ultimately repre¬
(or, to be more precise, habits-to-be). This sented by the routinization of its once char¬
perspective on social change offers a compre¬ ismatic, awesome, or outlandish ideas about
hensive dramatism, one that distinguishes conduct appropriate for everyday life. The
the theatrical aspects of social life from those theatrical drama has then become trans¬
that are commonplace. The former are fewer formed into a nontheatrical play, a feature of
in number, but greater in respect, and they the taken-for-granted Umwelt of its practi¬
make up the content of history and ideology. tioners.
The latter are the more frequent, the less-no¬
ticed, the taken-for-granted, but, like their Routines as Habits
more remarkable counterparts, they partake
of the entire panoply of the Burkean pentad: The ethologist Konrad Lorenz believes
They occur as acts, in scenes, committed by that the formation of habits among human
persons who know how to do (or perform) groups occurs as part of a process that he
them, and they serve a knowable purpose. calls “cultural ritualization.’’13 Such habitual
What distinguishes them from theatrical dra¬ behaviors may arise for highly specific pur¬
mas is their remarkable unremarkability. poses in the early history of a group—for ex¬
How do routines come to be such? A ample, the collectively enforced prohibition
dramatistic sociology of social change con¬ on eating pork among contemporary obser¬
ceives of this as a by-no-means predeter¬ vant Jews might have originated as part of a
mined metamorphosis from innovatively theocratically legislated health plan designed
theatrical to familiar and ordinary perfor¬ to prevent trichinosis from debilitating the
mances. Cultural phenomena partake of fighting strength of the ancient Hebrew set¬
such a transformation, as the studies of Nor- tlers of Canaan—but ultimately they achieve
bert Elias have documented so well.7 Indeed, both autonomy—that is, transcendence from
as Elias's studies seem to suggest, those ele¬ the originally impelling reason for the con¬
mentary forms of everyday life, for example, duct—and routinization—that is, taken-for-
the tie-signs that Erving Goffman showed to grantedness that is accompanied by a vague
be foundations of a modem civic social or¬ but powerful feeling that to do otherwise is
der,8 had once been innovative and perhaps fearsome, tantamount to courting danger, or
bizarre forms of conduct that had to over¬ unpleasant, inviting at the very least an un¬
come their original designation as strange desirable degree of discomfort. As autono¬
behavior and to become legitimate ways to mous and routinized modes of conduct, the
shore up a sagging social relationship.9 habits become the fundamental stuff, the
Moreover, as the separate and independent “text", to use language familiar to students of
works of W. I. Thomas,10 Frederick J. Teg- society perceived in this manner, of a people's
The Drama in the Routine: A Prolegomenon to a Praxiological Sociology 249
everyday life. Habits are, hence, the praxes action ritual, the actors would suffer from
against which, and with respect to which, de¬ inordinate amounts of stage fright.17 In con¬
viance, is observed and measured. And devi¬ temporary America, it appears to be suffi¬
ant conduct is, in effect, would-be or poten¬ cient for maintaining social order that, in the
tial praxis. rituals that make up the routines of everyday
In effect, we may observe a theorem at life, the individual show proper deference,
work here: no praxes, no deviance; no devi¬ that is, the "appreciation an individual shows
ance, no new praxis. And through this theo¬ of another to that other,” and an appropriate
rem we have part of the answer to the Hob- demeanor, that is, "ceremonial behavior typi¬
besian question that became the basis for so¬ cally conveyed through deportment, dress,
ciology as a discipline. That question—how and bearing which serves to express to those
is society possible?—is answered thus: Soci¬ in his [or her] immediate presence that he [or
ety is possible because people have somehow she] is a person of certain . . . qualities.”18
come to agree upon conformity to a body of Goffman lists the basic attributes of these
habits. As Lorenz saw the matter, cultural ri- qualities as "discretion and sincerity; mod¬
tualization performs a triple function—"sup¬ esty in claims regarding self; sportsmanship;
pressing fighting within the group, . . . hold¬ command of speech and physical move¬
ing the group together, and . . . setting it off, ments; self-control over his [or her] emo¬
as an independent entity, against other simi¬ tions, ... appetites, and ... desires; poise un¬
lar units. . . .”14 The very formation of the der pressure; and so forth:”19 When a person
group in question, the formation of any true so comports him- or herself in a manner that
group (be it as small as Mead s self-reflective is taken to indicate a character that possesses
and internally interacting self, or as large as these attributes, there is created in the scene
a nation-state or a Gemeinschaft of confeder¬ wherein the conduct takes place the basic
ated states), is founded upon the estab¬ conditions of trust that undergird the social
lishment of such habits. As W. I. Thomas once contract. These conditions correspond to
observed, "The attitudes and values, or we those signs of probity that Max Weber no¬
may say, the attitudes toward values, which ticed were taken to be signaled when, in 1904
reflect the personality of the individual are in rural America, a person submitted to im¬
the result of a process of conditioning by the mersive baptism and to public acknowl¬
influences of the cultural milieu, eventuating edgment that he or she was a “born-again”
in a body of habits.”15 adherent to the Calvinist variant of the Prot¬
estant faith.20
Routines as Interaction Rituals The contents and qualities of perfor¬
mances necessary to create the conditions of
Routines are not only (or merely) habits. confidence that permit ongoing and unag-
They are also rituals whose expression is gressive human association might vary over
manifested in rites. These rites evoke in their time, place, and culture, but within the con¬
performers and in the audience that observes text of their own established and routinized
them an imperative of perfectly coordinated codes, they constitute a mode of conduct that
and precisely executed actions. As Florian has all the qualities and confers all the quali¬
Znaniecki once observed, "The attitude of a fications of a religious ritual. Nevertheless,
collectivity toward its moral order shows the again within the circumscribed code, less-
same primary desire for integral perfection than-perfect performance is often tolerated.
which is illustrated in all the rituals of the Taking note of this aspect of conduct in the
world. Just as magical or religious rites ac¬ context of a larger discussion of the repres¬
quire their proper virtue only when they are sion of crime, Znaniecki called attention to
perfectly performed, so moral norms sanc¬ the fact that "an objective observation of in¬
tioned by a community or a group need to be dividual conduct would show at every step
perfectly followed to be completely valid.”16 deviations from the standard of perfection;
However, if perfection were really demanded but communities and groups do not observe
for every routine performance of an inter¬ their insiders objectively. Having a funda-
250 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ IX. Symbolic Interactionism
mentally positive, lasting prejudice toward those being moved in accordance with a
them, they either ignore or explain away their cultural script were liberated from nor¬
innumerable omissions and peccadillos.”21 mative demands, when they were, indeed,
betwixt and between successive lodg¬
Hence, departures from ritual perfection are
ments in jural political systems. In this
not uncommon, and they usually do not gap between ordered worlds almost any¬
shred the social fabric. And, as Znaniecki thing may happen.25
concludes on this point, "a collectivity may
for a long time live under a half-voluntary Gramsci, as interpreted by Dick Howard,
illusion of the essential perfection of its perceived society to be “articulation” within
moral order. . . .”22 The continued perfor¬ a field of discursive politics. As Howard ob¬
mance of routine dramas—that is, the dra¬ serves, “it constantly subverts itself, releas¬
mas that are devoid of awesomeness, cha¬ ing the floating signifiers which present the
risma, melodrama, histrionics, or theatrical¬ possibility of new articulations.” Moreover,
ity—make up the everyday life process and, “Articulation can—but need not—produce
by their very unremarkabilty, sew together hegemonic practice:” In Gramsci's terms,
the social fabric. which without too much difficulty can be
transposed into a dramatistic discourse, “the
The Theatricalization of Routines constitution of an 'historical bloc'... is pos¬
sible when the old civilisation loses its co¬
A single line of thought unites the other¬
herence, setting free elements which can be
wise quite disparate sociologies of Thomas,
recombined in a new civilisation.” ° Large-
Teggart, Turner, Gramsci, Schutz, Goffman,
scale social change is constituted by ringing
and Garfinkel. Taking notice of the signifi¬
up the curtain on a new civilizational drama
cance of what they variously refer to as hab¬
in the hopes that its performance will reoc¬
its, routines, ritualized performances, behav¬
cur continuously on the stage of future his¬
ioral presentations of self in public and pri¬
tory.
vate places, the Lebenswelt, the taken-for-
Whereas Thomas, Teggart, Turner, and
granted world, and the old civilization, these
Gramsci perceived these moments of disrup¬
students of social order and its changes cor¬
tion, liberation, and reformation of the
rectly perceived that the routinized charisma
scripts of life as macroevents, sociocultural,
of everyday life, that is, the drama in the rou¬
historical, or civilizational in scope, Goffman
tine, was protected against any easy banish¬
and Schutz noticed the microecological
ment from the stage of the legitimate theater
counterparts of similar disjunctions in the
of life by the familiarity and the comfort in
small routines of daily life. For Goffman,
the familiarity of its own scenario. For
these are the numerous slips, gaffes, perfor¬
Thomas, what was required to ring down the
mance failures, individual or team subver¬
curtain on the habitual performances of
sions, embarrassments, and nasty surprises
everyday life was a “crisis” so great as to force
that threaten to bring down the props and
the performers and their audience to come to
supports of that life and to reveal the terrors
“attention,”23 that is, to engage in a veritable
of its insanity of place; however, most of these
epoche of the dramas in the routine. Teggart
are repairable, so that the rituals of inter¬
also supposed that the onset of a crisis, in the
action persist and the conduct of daily life's
form of an irruptive intrusion onto the fixed
dull dramaturgy goes on without suffering a
stage of everyday life happenings, could, if
destructive discreditation.27 Schutz took spe¬
disturbing enough, bring about the release of
cial notice of those crises that disrupted the
the performers from their commitment to the
Lebenswelten of ordinary people, situations
text of habitual conduct.24 Victor Turner, tak¬
wherein they discovered that the recipes for
ing his point of departure from the studies of
living on which they had always relied no
Van Gennep, summarized the latters obser¬
longer produced the cake of customary re¬
vations on the matter thus:
sults for which they had in the past always
He insisted that in all ritualized move¬ been efficaciously employed. In reaction and
ment there was at least a moment when response to such moments, individuals are in
The Drama in the Routine: A Prolegomenon to a Praxiological Sociology 251
a position to perceive as it were for the first place the action in unprepossessing scenes,
time the sense- (and the nonsense-) struc¬ identify the performers as uninspiring
tures of their conscious life and to reconsider agents, employ unremarkable agencies of
their adherence to them. The structures be¬ achievement, and accomplish expected and
come visible as alterable scenarios and expectable outcomes. Theatrical dramas
texts.28 Although Garfinkel did not seem to arise when such scenes are desublimated,
take special note of the fact, his introduction their agents despoiled, their agencies de¬
of artificial disruptive intrusions into the prived of efficaciousness, and the outcomes
daily life routines of department store shop¬ frustrated or unanticipated. The liminality
pers, parents of college students, and partici¬ that finds theatricalized expression bids fair
pants in what appeared to be standardized to write a new drama of social reality, to mod¬
psychological tests generated crises that were ify but not tear up the conventional scripts
resolvable by forms of talk that functioned to toward which its exaggerated gestures, histri¬
elaborate upon, as well as to shore up, the onics, or melodramatics are directed, or to
only seemingly shaky props of modern rou¬ restore and, possibly, reinvigorate the drama
tine dramas.29 In all of this, however, there is in the routine that is under assault. Social
a raising of the consciousness to what Turner statics, that is, the drama in the routine, and
calls "liminality,” a sensory threshold.30 That social dynamics, that is, theatrical dramas,
threshold bids fair to introduce theatricality constitute the irregular dialectic, the warp
into the mundane drama in the routine. and woof of the historic process.
In a critique of Lymans and Scott's The
Drama of Social Reality, Elizabeth Burns The Future of the Dramas in
sought to take issue with the authors' claim
the Routine
that the social world is inherently dramatic
by pointing out that "most of life is routine, The characteristics of society since the ad¬
only punctuated by 'dramas.' "31 Burns's cri¬ vent of modernity and its successor, still so
tique fails in its intention, but it does call indescribable that it can only be designated
attention to the dialectic governing the rela¬ "postmodern,” make it possible to suggest a
tionship between theatrical and routine dra¬ possible future for dramas in the routine.
mas. That dialectic may be described as cir¬ Such suggestions are, at best, guesses based
cumscribing the transformative process by upon the probabilities of conventionality and
which mundane dramas in the routine are, its survival. It was Alfred Schutz who called
because of a sudden burst of liminality, re¬ attention to the fact that "the social world has
constituted as either "theatrical,” that is, as near and far zones: the surrounding world
those that proceed by means of exaggerated . . . , in which you and I experience one an¬
gestures and unexpected vocalizations; "his¬ other in spatial and temporal immediacy,
trionic,” that is, as those that employ deliber¬ may pass over into the world of my contem¬
ately affected or overdetermined motions, poraries, who are not given to me in spatial
movements, and tones; or "melodramatic,” immediacy; and in multiple transitions, [he
that is, those that rely on a heightened emo¬ also noted that] there are the worlds of both
tionalism and conventionally unconven¬ predecessors and successors.”32 To gauge the
tional stylistics. As a hypothesis central to the possibilities for routinized dramas, one must
validation of a dramatistic sociology of social first add a corollary to Schutz's perceptive
change, it may be suggested that theatrical- observation: Modernity is characterized, in¬
ism (i.e., theatrics, histrionics, or melodra- deed, formed and reformed by the greater
matics) arises in conduct when the routine likelihood that interpenetrations will occur
dramas of everyday life are interrupted, in¬ in these spatio-temporal zones. Thus, the
vaded, or intruded upon by forms of action Umwelt composed of my consociates is sub¬
that are unexpected, unwarranted, or unto¬ jected to threats emanating from its unex¬
ward with respect to the conventional text. pected collisions with the zones that contain
The dramas-in-the-routine are performed in my contemporaries as well as those that
accordance with scripts of everyday life that house the reconstitutable memories and his-
252 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ IX. Symbolic Interactionism
tories of my predecessors and those that tine drama is threatened and theatrically bids
promise a future for my successors. Such en¬ fair to become a routine in its own right.
hanced threats in turn evoke a greater prob¬ Mass societies are not necessarily just or
ability that theatricality will more and more democratic. They entail a struggle among
overcome mundane dramas as zonal colli¬ units—individuals and groups—for power
sions and conflicts undermine established and for the right to order the hierarchy of
societal texts and aroused liminalities release social status that will somehow always pre¬
aggressive self- and group-assertions. vail in one form or another. These conflicts
Modernity finds its societal expression in over power and status are dramas that de¬
the mass. Two characteristics of mass society velop their own routine dramatic forms as
are relevant for the dramatic modes of rou¬ well as their theatrical or untheatrical cease¬
tine life. As Herbert Blumer has pointed out, fires, and their histrionic, melodramatic, or
"In a mass society, the parts are not fused into unremarkable accommodations. Thus the vi¬
an organic whole. . . . Instead, because of the tal order that is found in mass societies
overabundance of parts, many of these . . . speaks not to “alienation," “anomie," “social
are far removed from one another/'33 One re¬ disorganization," or imminent dissolution,
sult of this unfused conglomeration of parts but rather to an interplay of dramas in the
is the relative autonomy of each. As autono¬ routine and theatrical performances vying
mous units in a nonintegrated society, these for hegemony and forming a metasocietal
units—which might be as small as a lone in¬ rhythm of macrosocial and microecological
dividual or as large as an organized conectiv- dynamics.
ity—are in a position to “write" their own
scripts of life, to develop what for each is its Endnotes
conventionalized drama in the routine. Mass
1. See, e.g., Marlis Buchmann, The Script of Life
society is thus something like those multiplex in Modem Society: Entry into Adulthood in a
theaters that are increasingly found in subur¬ Changing World (Chicago: University of Chi¬
ban malls—a number of dramas are going on cago Press, 1989).
at once. The difference is that the multiplex 2. This debt has been acknowledged in two re¬
theaters have walls to prevent the dramas cent publications: Joseph R. Gusfield, ed.,
from penetrating into one another. Mass so¬ Kenneth Burke an Symbols and Society (Chi¬
ciety guarantees no walls to separate its cago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); and
autonomous scenarios of mundane life. The Herbert W. Simons and Trevor Melia, eds.,
mutual adjustment of each to the other con¬ The Legacy of Kenneth Burke (Madison: Uni¬
stitutes a problem which is resolved in a versity of Wisconsin Press, 1989).
drama that overlays the discrete but inter¬ 3. Elizabeth Bums, Theatricality: A Study of
connecting routine dramas. Convention in the Theatre and in Social Life
A second characteristic feature of mass so¬ (London: Longman, 1972).
ciety is “that it is caught up in a world of 4. The phrase “drama in the routine" was intro¬
constant motion."34 Such motion is not nec¬ duced in Stanford M. Lyman, “Cherished Val¬
ues and Civil Rights” The Crisis: A Record of
essarily tantamount to change, but holds out
the Darker Races 71 (December 1964): pp.
the possibility, or for some, the threat, that it
645-54, 695.
might introduce an intrusion, a nasty sur¬
5. W. I. Thomas, “Introductory" in idem, Source
prise, or a contradiction that is so disturbing
Book for Social Origins: Ethnological Materi¬
as to convert routine plays into theatrical dra¬
als, Psychological Standpoint, Classified and
mas. More than societies founded upon Annotated Bibliographies for the Interpreta¬
castes, estates, or classes, mass societies tend tion of Savage Societies, 6th edition (Boston:
to engender competition and conflicts Richard G. Badger, 1909), pp. 3-28.
among their parts. Such a sense of fearful 6. Ibid., p. 21.
disunity undermines the general conditions
7. See the following works of Norbert Elias, The
of trust and order, encouraging intrigues, de¬ Civilizing Process: The History of Manners,
ceptions, and interactions that are strategic trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Urizen
rather than spontaneous. Hence, every rou¬ Books, 1978); Power and Civility: The Civiliz-
The Drama in the Routine: A Prolegomenon to a Praxiological Sociology 253
ing Process, vol. 2, trans. Edmund Jephcott 16. Florian Znaniecki, Social Actions (New York:
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1982); The Court Farrar and Rinehart, 1936), p. 383.
Society, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: 17. See Stanford M. Lyman and Marvin B. Scott,
Pantheon Books, 1983); Involvement and De¬ A Sociology of the Absurd, 2d ed. (Dix Hills,
tachment, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New New York: General Hall, 1989), pp. 69-89.
York: Basil Blackwell, 1987); What Is Sociol¬
18. Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays in
ogy?, trans. Stephen Mennell and Grace Mor¬
Face-to-Face Behavior (Chicago: Aldine Pub¬
rissey (New York: Columbia University Press,
lishing Co., 1967), p. 77.
1978), esp. pp. 134-74; The Loneliness of the
Dying, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: 19. Ibid.
Basil Blackwell, 1985); and Norbert Elias and 20. Max Weber, “The Protestant Sects and the
Eric Dunning, Quest for Excitement: Sport Spirit of Capitalism,” in From Max Weber: Es¬
and Leisure in the Civilizing Process (New says in Sociology, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth
York: Basil Blackwell, 1986). See also and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford Uni¬
Stephen Mennell, Norbert Elias: Civilization versity Press, 1946), pp. 302-22.
and the Human Self-image (New York: Basil 21. Znaniecki, Social Actions, p. 384.
Blackwell, 1989), pp. 29-112. 22. Ibid.
8. Erving Goffman, Relations in Public: Micro¬ 23. Thomas, Source Book for Social Origins, pp.
studies of the Public Order (New York: Basic 16-19.
Books, 1971), pp. 188-237.
24. Frederick J. Teggart, Theory of History (New
9. Cf. Stanford M. Lyman, "Civilization: Con¬ Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1925),
tents, Discontents, Malcontents,” a review es¬ pp.71-223.
say of Erving Goffman, Relations in Public: 25. Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors, p. 13.
Microstudies of the Public Order, Contempo¬
26. Dick Howard, Defining the Political (Minnea¬
rary Sociology 2:4 (July 1973): pp. 360-66.
polis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p.
10. See esp. W. I. Thomas and Dorothy Swaine 87.
Thomas, The Child in America: Behavior Prob¬ 27. Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on
lems and Programs (New York: Alfred A. the Organization of Experience (New York:
Knopf, 1928), pp. esp. 505-76; W. I. Thomas, Harper Colophon, 1974), pp. 300-77; Forms
Primitive Behavior: An Introduction to the So¬ of Talk (Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl¬
cial Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937), vania Press, 1981), pp. 1-123.
pp. esp. 1-48,610-747; Edmund H. Volkhart,
28. Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, vol. 3, Studies
ed., Social Behavior and Personality: Contri¬
in Phenomenological Philosophy, ed. I. Schutz
butions of W. I. Thomas to Theory and Social
(The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff,
Research (New York: Social Science Research
1966) , pp. 104-6, 116-32.
Council, 1951), esp. pp. 215-88; Morris
Janowitz, ed., W. I. Thomas on Social Organi¬ 29. Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodol-
zation and Social Personality (Chicago: Uni¬ ogy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall,
versity of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 37-56, 1967) .
231-56. 30. Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors, pp.
11. Frederick J. Teggart, The Theory and Processes 231-70.
of History (Berkeley: University of California 31. Elizabeth Bums, review of The Drama of So¬
Press, 1941). cial Reality by Stanford M. Lyman and Marvin
B. Scott, in Contemporary Sociology 1 (March
12. Victor Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors:
1978): p. 158.
Symbolic Action in Human Society (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974). 32. Alfred Schutz, “The Problem of Transcenden¬
tal Intersubjectivity in Husserl,” in his Col¬
13. Konrad Lorenz, “Habit, Ritual, and Magic," lected Papers vol. 3, p. 81.
trans. Marjorie Kenwilson, in Ritual, Play,
33. Herbert Blumer, “The Concept of Mass Soci¬
and Performance: Readings in the Social Sci¬
ety,” in Stanford M. Lyman and Arthur J.
ences/Theatre, ed. Richard Schechner and
Vidich, Social Order and the Public Philoso¬
Mady Schuman (New York: Seabury Press,
phy: An Analysis and Interpretation of the
1976), pp. 18-34.
Work of Herbert Blumer (Fayetteville: Univer¬
14. Ibid., p.30. sity of Arkansas Press, 1988), p. 341.
15. W. I. Thomas, Primitive Behavior, p. 1. 34. Ibid., p. 343. ♦
254 Part Two: The Branches—C.nn temp m-ary Social Theory ♦ X. Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology
-pOa)~S> Lt'TeA^ p
X. Phenomenology and
b'Wtov \.v . Ethnomethodology
WWe)
^KoaqJJ \/aXfA^/
I n none of them does the self of the other
Indirect Social
<-<N\£h'cA-pa A5*
pb.zs*
become accessible to the partner as a unity.
The other appears merely as a partial self, as
originator of these and those acts, which I do
Relationships not share in a vivid present. The shared vivid
present of the We-relation presupposes co¬
presence of the partners. To each type of de¬
AlfredSchutz - dowCl ;cT
rived social relationship belongs a particular
type of time perspective which is derived
from the vivid present. There is a particular
Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) was an Austrian
quasi-present in which I interpret the mere
emigre scholar who, after fleeing his native
outcome of the others communicating—the
land when the Nazis invaded, found a position
written letter, the printed book—without hav¬
at the New School for Social Research in New
ing participated in the ongoing process of
York City. From this institution, he became an
communicating acts. There are other time di¬
important sociological exponent of a pheno¬
mensions in which I am connected with con¬
menological theory derived primarily from the
temporaries I never met, or with predeces¬
work of the philosopher Edmund Husserl. In
sors or with successors; another, the histori¬
this essay, Schutz describes the characteristic
cal time, in which I experience the actual pre¬
features of social relationships other than
sent as the outcome of past events; and many
those that are direct or face to face. After dis¬
more. All of these time perspectives can be
cussing a spectrum of possible mediate rela¬
referred to a vivid present: my own actual or
tionships, such as moving from face-to-face
former one, or the actual or former vivid pre¬
encounters to telephone conversations and let¬
sent of my fellow-man with whom, in turn, I
ters, he turns to a range of types of relatedness
am connected in an originary or derived vivid
that include people one once encountered, peo¬
present and all this in the different modes of
ple one expects to encounter in the future, and
potentiality or quasi-actuality, each type hav¬
people one encounters not as individuals but
ing its own forms of temporal diminution
in the roles they play (e.g., the clerk in a store).
and augmentation and its appurtenant style
In understanding such types of relationships,
of skipping them in a direct move or “knight s
Schutz argues for the centrality of the concept
move." There are furthermore the different
of anonymity.
forms of overlapping and interpenetrating of
these different perspectives, their being put
into and out of operation by a shift from one
From The Phenomenology of the Social World by Alfred to the other and a transformation of one into
Schutz, translated by George Walsh and Frederick
the other, and the different types of synthe¬
Lehnert, published by Northwestern University Press
in 1967. Copyright © 1967 by Northwestern Univer¬ sizing and combining or isolating and disen¬
sity Press. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permis¬ tangling them. Manifold as these different
sion. time perspectives and their mutual relations
Indirect Social Relationships 255
are, they all originate in an intersection of changed through a third party. Here too we
duree and cosmic time. have a gradual progression from the world of
In and by our social life with the natural immediately experienced social reality to the
attitude they are apprehended as integrated world of contemporaries. In both examples
into one single supposedly homogeneous di¬ the total number of the other person s reac¬
mension of time which embraces not only the tions open to my observation is progressively
individual time perspectives of each of us diminished until it reaches a minimum point.
during his wide-awake life but which is com¬ It is clear, then, that the world of contempo¬
mon to all of us. We shall call it the civic or raries is itself a variant function of the face-
standard time. to-face situation. They may even be spoken
of as two poles between which stretches a
From Direct to Indirect continuous series of experiences. . . .
In everyday life there seems to be no prac¬
Social Experience tical problem of where the one situation
In the face-to-face situation, directness of breaks off and the other begins. This is be¬
experience is essential, regardless of whether cause we interpret both our own behavior
our apprehension of the Other is central or and that of others within contexts of meaning
peripheral and regardless of how adequate that far transcend the immediate here and
our grasp of him is. I am still “Thou-oriented” now. For this reason, the question whether a
even to the man standing next to me in the social relationship we participate in or ob¬
subway. When we speak of “pure” Thou-ori- serve is direct or indirect seems to be an aca¬
entation of “pure” We-relationship, we are or¬ demic one. But there is a yet deeper reason
dinarily using these as limiting concepts re¬ for our customary indifference to this ques¬
ferring to the simple givenness of the Other tion. Even after the face-to-face situation has
in abstraction from any specification of the receded into the past and is present only in
degree of concreteness involved. But we can memory, it still retains its essential charac¬
also use these terms for the lower limits of teristics, modified only by an aura of past¬
experience obtainable in the face-to-face re¬ ness. Normally we do not notice that our just-
lationship, in other words, for the most pe¬ departed friend, with whom we have a mo¬
ripheral and fleeting kind of awareness of the ment ago been interacting, perhaps affec¬
other person. tionately or perhaps in an annoyed way, now
We make the transition from direct to in¬ appears to us in a quite different perspective.
direct social experience simply by following Far from seeming obvious, it actually seems
this spectrum of decreasing vividness. The absurd that someone we are close to has
first steps beyond the realm of immediacy are somehow become “different” now that he is
marked by a decrease in the number of per¬ out of sight, except in the trite sense that our
ceptions I have of the other person and a nar¬ experiences of him bear the mark of pastness.
rowing of the perspectives within which I However, we must still sharply distinguish
view him. At one moment I am exchanging between such memories of face-to-face situ¬
smiles with my friend, shaking hands with ations, on the one hand, and an intentional
him, and bidding him farewell. At the next Act directed toward a mere contemporary, on
moment he is walking away. Then from the the other. The recollections we have of an¬
far distance I hear a faint good-by, a moment other bear all the marks of direct experience.
later I see a vanishing figure give a last wave, When I have a recollection of you, for in¬
and then he is gone. It is quite impossible to stance, I remember you as you were in the
fix the exact instant at which my friend left concrete We-relationship with me. I remem¬
the world of my direct experience and en¬ ber you as a unique person in a concrete situ¬
tered the shadowy realm of those who are ation, as one who interacted with me in the
merely my contemporaries. As another ex¬ mode of “mutual mirroring” described
ample, imagine a face-to-face conversation, above. I remember you as a person vividly
followed by a telephone call, followed by an present to me with a maximum of symptoms
exchange of letters, and finally messages ex¬ of inner life, as one whose experiences I wit-
256 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory + X. Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology
nessed in the actual process of formation. I postal employee who will process my letter);
remember you as one whom I was for a time then (5) those collective entities whose func¬
coming to know better and better. I remem¬ tion and organization I know while not being
ber you as one whose conscious life flowed able to name any of their members, such as
in one stream with my own. I remember you the Canadian Parliament; then (6) collective
as one whose consciousness was continu¬ entities which are by their very nature anony¬
ously changing in content. However, now mous and of which I could never in principle
that you are out of my direct experience, you have direct experience, such as "state” and
are no more than my contemporary, someone "nation”; then (7) objective configurations of
who merely inhabits the same planet that I meaning which have been instituted in the
do. I am no longer in contact with the living world of my contemporaries and which live
you, but with the you of yesterday. You, in¬ a kind of anonymous life of their own, such
deed, have not ceased to be a living self, but as the interstate commerce clause and the
you have a "new self' now; and, although I rules of French grammar; and finally (8) ar¬
am contemporaneous with it, I am cut off tifacts of any kind which bear witness to the
from vital contact with it. Since the time we subjective meaning-context of some un¬
were last together, you have met with new known person. The farther out we get into the
experiences and have looked at them from world of contemporaries, the more anony¬
new points of view. With each change of ex¬ mous its inhabitants become, starting with
perience and outlook you have become a the innermost region, where they can almost
slightly different person. But somehow I fail be seen, and ending with the region where
to keep this in mind as I go about my daily they are by definition forever inaccessible to
round. I carry your image with me, and it experience.
remains the same. But then, perhaps, I hear
that you have changed. I then begin to look Mediate Experience
upon you as a contemporary—not any con¬
of Contemporaries
temporary, to be sure, but one whom I once
knew intimately. My mere contemporary (or "contempo¬
Regions of anonymity We have been de¬ rary”) ... is one who I know coexists with me
scribing the intermediate zone between the in time but whom I do not experience imme¬
face-to-face situation and the situation in¬ diately. This kind of knowledge is, accord¬
volving mere contemporaries. Let us con¬ ingly, always indirect and impersonal. I can¬
tinue our journey. As we approach the outly¬ not call my contemporary "Thou” in the rich
ing world of contemporaries, our experience sense that this term has within the We-rela-
of others becomes more and more remote tionship. Of course, my contemporary may
and anonymous. Entering the world of con¬ once have been my consociate or may yet
temporaries itself, we pass through one re¬ become one, but this in no way alters his
gion after another: (I) the region of those present status.
whom I once encountered face to face and Let us now examine the ways in which the
could encounter again (for instance, my ab¬ world of contemporaries is constituted and
sent friend); then (2) comes the region of the modifications which the concepts "Other-
those once encountered by the person I am orientation” and "social relationship” un¬
now talking to (for instance, your friend, dergo in that world. These modifications are
whom you are promising to introduce to me); necessitated by the fact that the contempo¬
next (3) the region of those who are as yet rary is only indirectly accessible and that his
pure contemporaries but whom I will soon subjective experiences can only be known in
meet (such as the colleague whose books I the form of general types of subjective experi¬
have read and whom I am now on my way to ence.
visit); then (4) those contemporaries of That this should be the case is easy to
whose existence I know, not as concrete indi¬ understand if we consider the difference be¬
viduals, but as points in social space as de¬ tween the two modes of social experience.
fined by a certain function (for instance, the When I encounter you face to face I know you
Indirect Social Relationships 257
as a person in one unique moment of experi¬ ies derived from our own past experience,
ence. While this We-relationship remains un¬ direct or indirect, and of all the knowledge
broken, we are open and accessible to each we have acquired from others, whether
others intentional Acts. For a little while we through conversation or through reading. It
grow older together, experiencing each is clear, then, that indirect social experiences
others flow of consciousness in a kind of in¬ derive their original validity from the direct
timate mutual possession. mode of apprehension. But the instances
It is quite otherwise when I experience you cited above do not exhaust all the ways by
as my contemporary. Here you are not which I can come to know my contemporar¬
prepredicatively given to me at all. I do not ies. There is the whole world of cultural ob¬
even directly apprehend your existence
jects, for instance, including everything from
(.Dasein). My whole knowledge of you is me¬
artifacts to institutions and conventional
diate and descriptive. In this kind of knowl¬
ways of doing things. These, too, contain
edge your “characteristics” are established
within themselves implicit references to my
for me by inference. From such knowledge
contemporaries. I can “read” in these cultural
results the indirect We-relationship.
objects the subjective experiences of others
To become clear about this concept of “me-
diacy,” let us examine two different ways in whom I do not know. Even here, however, I
which I come to know a contemporary. The am making inferences on the basis of my pre¬
first way we have already mentioned: my vious direct experience of others. Let us say
knowledge is derived from a previous face-to- that the object before me is a finished prod¬
face encounter with the person in question. uct. Once, perhaps, I stood by the side of a
But this knowledge has since become medi¬ man who was manufacturing something just
ate or indirect because he has moved outside like this. As I watched him work, I knew ex¬
the range of my direct observation. For I actly what was going on in his mind. If it were
make inferences as to what is going on in his not for this experience I would not know
mind under the assumption that he remains what to make of the finished product of the
much the same since I saw him last, al¬ same kind that I now see. I might even fail to
though, in another sense, I know very well recognize it as an artifact at all and would
that he must have changed through absorb¬ treat it as just another natural object, like a
ing new experiences or merely by virtue of stone or a tree. For what we have called the
having grown older. But, as to how he has general thesis of the alter ego, namely, that
changed, my knowledge is either indirect or the Thou coexists with me and grows older
nonexistent. with me, can only be discovered in the We-re¬
A second way in which I come to know a lationship. Even in this instance, therefore, I
contemporary is to construct a picture of him
have only an indirect experience of the other
from the past direct experience of someone
self, based on past direct experiences either
with whom I am now speaking (for example,
of a Thou as such or of a particular Thou. My
when my friend describes his brother, whom
face-to-face encounters with others have
I do not know). This is a variant of the first
given me a deep prepredicative knowledge of
case. Here too I apprehend the contemporary
the Thou as a self. But the Thou who is merely
by means of a fixed concept, or type, derived
ultimately from direct experience but now my contemporary is never experienced per¬
held invariant. But there are differences. sonally as a self and never prepredicatively.
First, I have no concrete vivid picture of my On the contrary, all experience (Erfahrung) of
own with which to start: I must depend on contemporaries is predicative in nature. It is
what my friend tells me. Second, I have to formed by means of interpretive judgments
depend on my friend's assumption, not my involving all my knowledge of the social
own, that the contemporary he is describing world, although with varying degrees of ex¬
has not changed. plicitness.
These are the modes of constitution of all Now this is real Other-orientation, how¬
the knowledge we have of our contemporar¬ ever indirect it may be.
258 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ X. Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology
socially to my contemporaries conceived un¬ other self which is its object possesses a cor¬
der ideal types. responding higher degree of anonymity.
On occasions like these I am always ex¬ It is precisely this degree of anonymity
pecting others to behave in a definite way, which we now offer as the criterion for dis¬
whether it be postal employees, someone I tinguishing between the different levels of
am paying, or the police. My social relation¬ concretization and actualization that occur
ship to them consists in the fact that I interact in the They-orientation. The more anony¬
with them, or perhaps merely that, in plan¬ mous the personal ideal type applied in the
ning my actions, I keep them in mind. But They-orientation, the greater is the use made
they, on their part, never turn up as real peo¬ of objective meaning-contexts instead of sub¬
ple, merely as anonymous entities defined ex¬ jective ones, and likewise, we shall find, the
haustively by their functions. Only as bearers more are lower-level personal ideal types and
of these functions do they have any relevance objective meaning-contexts pregiven. (The
for my social behavior. How they happen to latter have in turn been derived from other
feel as they cancel my letter, process my stages of concretization of the They-orienta¬
check, or examine my income tax return— tion.)
these are considerations that never even en¬ Let us get clear as to just what we mean by
ter into my mind. I just assume that there are the anonymity of the ideal type in the world
“some people” who “do these things.” Their of contemporaries. The pure Thou-orienta¬
behavior in the conduct of their duty is from tion consists of mere awareness of the exis¬
my point of view defined purely through an
tence of the other person, leaving aside all
objective context of meaning. In other words,
questions concerning the characteristics of
when I am They-oriented, I have “types” for
that person. On the other hand, the pure
partners.
They-orientation is based on the presupposi¬
tion of such characteristics in the form of a
Anonymity of the Contemporary type. Since these characteristics are genu¬
The They-orientation is the pure form of inely typical, they can in principle be presup¬
understanding the contemporary in a predi¬ posed again and again. Of course, whenever
cative fashion, that is, in terms of his typical I posit such typical characteristics, I assume
characteristics. Acts of They-orientation are, that they now exist or did once exist. How¬
therefore, intentionally directed toward an¬ ever, this does not mean that I am thinking of
other person imagined as existing at the same them as existing in a particular person in a
time as oneself but conceived in terms of an particular time and place. The contemporary
ideal type. And just as in the cases of the alter ego is therefore anonymous in the sense
Thou-orientation and the We-relationship, so that its existence is only the individuation of
also with the They-orientation can we speak a type, an individuation which is merely sup-
of different stages of concretization and actu¬ posable or possible. Now since the very exis¬
alization. tence of my contemporary is always less than
In order to distinguish from one another certain, any attempt on my part to reach out
the various stages of concretization of the to him or influence him may fall short of its
We-relationship, we established as our crite¬ mark, and, of course, I am aware of this fact.
rion the degree of closeness to direct experi¬ The concept which we have been analyz¬
ence. We cannot use this criterion within the ing is the concept of the anonymity of the
They-orientation. The reason is that the latter partner in the world of contemporaries. It is
possesses by definition a high degree of re¬ crucial to the understanding of the nature of
moteness from direct experience, and the the indirect social relationship. ♦
Sequence 1
exchanges as follows. A series of persons who
called this place would not give their names.
The hospital's concern was, can anything be
Harvey Sacks done about it? One question I wanted to ad¬
dress was, where in the course of the conver¬
sation could you tell that somebody would
Harvey Sacks (1935-1975) studied sociology not give their name? So I began to look at the
with Goffman at Berkeley hut is generally materials. It was in fact on the basis of that
known as one of the earliest ethnomethodolo- question that I began to try to deal in detail
gists, and thus he is typically associated more with conversations.
with the work of Harold Garfinkel than with I found something that struck me as fairly
that of Goffman. This essay, put together post¬ interesting quite early. And that was that if
humously by former students from Sacks’ lec¬ the staff member used “This is Mr Smith may
ture notes, is a good example of the attention I help you” as their opening line, then over¬
ethnomethodologists pay to conversational whelmingly, any answer other than “Yes, this
analysis. In this particular case, Sacks is dis¬ is Mr Brown” (for example, “I can’t hear you,”
secting telephone conversations he recorded at “I don’t know,” “How do you spell your
a psychiatric hospital between staff and per¬ name?”) meant that you would have serious
sons calling from outside the facility. What he trouble getting the callers name, if you got
is attempting to get at—in a fairly provisional the name at all.
way—are the rules or “ethnomethods ” people I'm going to show some of the ways that
use to achieve orderly and stable interactional I’ve been developing of analyzing stuff like
exchanges. this. There will be series of ways fitted to each
other, as though one were constructing a
multi-dimensional jigsaw puzzle. One or an¬
Ill start off by giving some quotations. other piece can be isolated and studied, and
(1) A: Hello also the various pieces can be studied as to
B: Hello how they fit together. I’ll be focussing on a
variety of things, starting off with what I’ll
(2) A: This is Mr Smith may I help you call ‘rules of conversational sequence.’
B: Yes, this is Mr Brown
Looking at the first exchange compared to
(3) A: This is Mr Smith may I help you the second, we can be struck by two things.
B: I can’t hear you. First of all, there seems to be a fit between
A: This is Mr Smith. what the first person who speaks uses as their
B: Smith.
greeting, and what the person who is given
that greeting returns. So that if A says
These are some first exchanges in telephone “Hello,” then B tends to say “Hello.” If A says
conversations I collected at an emergency “This is Mr Smith may I help you,” B tends
to say “Yes, this is Mr Brown.” We can say
From Lectures on Conversation, vol. I, pp. 3-11, by
there's a procedural rule there, that a person
Harvey Sacks. Copyright © The Estate of Harvey Sacks who speaks first in a telephone conversation
1992, 1995. Reprinted by permission of Blackwell Pub¬ can choose their form of address, and in
lishers. choosing their form of address they can
Rules of Conversational Sequence 261
thereby choose the form of address the other to cut into these regularities by looking at
uses. what happens when “May I have your name?”
By ‘form' I mean in part that the exchanges is followed by “Why?” Then you get an ac¬
occur as units/ That is, "Hello” “Hello” is a count; for example, “I need something to call
unit, and “This is Mr Smith may I help you” you.” The other might then say, “I don't
“Yes, this is Mr Brown,” is a unit. They come mind.” Or you might get an account, “It's just
in pairs. Saying “This is Mr Smith may I help for our records.” To which the other might
you” thereby provides a 'slot' to the other say, “Well I'm not sure I want to do anything
wherein they properly would answer “Yes, with you, I just want to find out what you
this is Mr Brown.” The procedural rule would do”—so that the records are not relevant.
describe the occurrences in the first two ex¬ What we can see is that there are ways that
changes. It won't describe the third exchange, accounts seem to be dealable with. If a person
but well come to see what is involved in such offers an account, which they take it provides
materials. for the action in question being done—for
Secondly, if it is so that there is a rule that example, the caller's name being given—then
the person who goes first can choose their if the other can show that the interest of that
form of address and thereby choose the account can be satisfied without the name
others, then for the unit, “This is Mr Smith being given, the name doesn't have to be
may I help you” “Yes, this is Mr Brown,” if a given. That is, if the account is to control the
person uses “This is Mr Smith. . .” they have action, then if you can find a way that the
a way of asking for the others name—with¬
account controls the alternative action than
out, however, asking the question, “What is
it proposed to control, you can use it that way.
your name?” And there is a difference be¬
It seems to be quite important, then, who
tween saying “This is Mr Smith may I help
it is that offers the account. Because the task
you”—thereby providing a slot to the other
of the person who is offered the account can
wherein they properly would answer “Yes,
then be to, in some way, counter it. Where,
this is Mr Brown”—and asking the question
alternatively, persons who offer an account
“What is your name?” at some point in the
seem to feel that they're somehow committed
conversation. They are very different phe¬
to it, and if it turns out to be, for example,
nomena.
inadequate, then they have to stand by it.
For one, in almost all of the cases where
the person doesn't give their name originally, The fact that you could use questions—like
then at some point in the conversation they're “Why?”—to generate accounts, and then use
asked for their name. One way of asking is accounts to control activities, can be marked
just the question “Would you give me your down as, I think, one of the greatest discov¬
name?” To that, there are alternative returns, eries in Western civilization. It may well be
including “No” and “Why?” If a caller says that that is what Socrates discovered. With
“Why?” the staff member may say something his dialectic he found a set of procedures by
like, “I want to have something to call you” which this thing, which was not used system¬
or “It's just for our records.” If a caller says atically, could become a systematic device.
“No,” then the staff member says “Why?” and Socrates will constantly ask “Why?,” there
may get something like “I'm not ready to do will be an answer, and he'll go on to show that
that” or “I'm ashamed.” that can't be the answer. And that persons
Now, I'll consider many times the use of were terribly pained to go through this whole
“Why?” What I want to say about it just to business is clear enough from the Dialogues.
begin with, is that what one does with “Why?” And it's also clear in our own experiences.
is to propose about some action that it is an And in the materials I'll present.
'accountable action.' That is to say, “Why?” is We see, then, one dear difference between
a way of asking for an account. Accounts are providing a slot for a name, and asking for a
most extraordinary. And the use of accounts name. Asking for a name tends to generate
and the use of requests for accounts are very accounts and counters. By providing a slot
highly regulated phenomena. We can begin for a name, those activities do not arise.
262 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ X. Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology
We can also notice that, as a way of asking right to choose their form, they have the right
for the others name, “This is Mr Smith. . thereby to choose the other's. Here, where the
is, in the first place, not an accountable ac¬ rights are not clearly assigned, the caller
tion. By that I mean to say, its not required could move to speak first and thereby choose
that staff members use it and they don't al¬ the form. And when callers to this agency
ways use it, but when they do, the caller speak first, the form they choose is the unit
doesn't ask why. “This is Mr Smith. . gets “Hello" “Hello." Since such a unit involves no
its character as a non-accountable action exchange of names, they can speak without
simply by virtue of the fact that this is a place giving their name and be going about things
where, routinely, two persons speak who ha¬ in a perfectly appropriate way.
ven't met. In such places the person who Now, there are variant returns to “This is
speaks first can use that object. And we could Mr Smith may I help you?" one of which is
say about that kind of item that the matters in our set of three exchanges: “I can't hear
discriminated by its proper use are very re¬ you." I want to talk of that as an 'occasionally
stricted. That is to say, a call is made; the only usable’ device. That is to say, there doesn't
issue is that two persons are speaking who have to be a particular sort of thing preceding
presumably haven't met, and this object can it; it can come at any place in a conversation.
be used. Here is one from the middle of a conversa¬
Furthermore, the matters are discrimi¬ tion, from a different bunch of materials.
nated in different terms than those which the
A: Hey you got a cigarette Axum. I ain’t
agency is constructed for. That is, they are got, I ain't got a good cigarette, and I can’t
discriminated in terms of 'two people who roll one right now. Think you can afford it
haven't met' rather than, for example, that an maybe?
agency staff member is speaking to someone
B: I am not here to support your habits.
calling the agency for help. And where one
has some organization of activities which A: Huh? My helplessness?
sets out to do some task—and in this case it’s
important for the agency to get names—then
B: I am not responsible for supporting
your habits ( )
if you find a device which discriminates in
such a restricted fashion, you can use that A: My habits ((laughing))
device to do tasks for you.
Our third exchange from the psychiatric
Now, given the fact that such a greeting as
hospital has the device used at the beginning
“This, is Mr Smith. . ." provides for the other
of the conversation,
giving his own name as an answer, one can
see what the advantage of “Hello" is for some¬ A: This is Mr Smith may I help you
one who doesn't want to give their name. And
I found in the first instance that while some¬ B: I can't hear you.
times the staff members use “Hello" as their A: This is Mr Smith.
opening line, if it ever occurred that the per¬
sons calling the agency spoke first, they al¬ B: Smith.
ways said “Hello." What kind of a device is it? What you can
Persons calling could come to speak first see is this. When you say “I can't hear you,"
because at this agency, caller and staff mem¬ you provide that the other person can repeat
ber are connected by an operator. The opera¬ what they said. Now what does that repeti¬
tor says “Go ahead please" and now the two tion do for you? Imagine you're in a game.
parties are on an open line, and one can start One of the questions relevant to the game
talking or the other can start talking. This would be, is there a way in that game of skip¬
stands in contrast to, for example, calling ping a move? It seems that something like “I
someone’s home. There, the rights are clearly can’t hear you" can do such a job. If you in¬
assigned; the person who answers the phone troduce it you provide for the other to do
speaks first. If they speak first, they have the some version of a repeat following which you
right to choose their form. If they have the yourself can repeat. And then it’s the other’s
Rules of Conversational Sequence 263
turn to talk again. What we find is that the A: I see. Can you hear me, now?
slot where the return would go—your name
B: Barely. Where are you, in the womb?
in return to “This is Mr Smith...”—never oc¬
curs. A: Where are you calling from?
It is not simply that the caller ignores what B: Hollywood.
they properly ought to do, but something
rather more exquisite. That is, they have ways A: Hollywood.
of providing that the place where the return B: I can hear you a little better.
name fits is never opened. So that their name
is not absent. Their name would be absent if A: Okay. Uh I was saying my name is
they just went ahead and talked. But that very Smith and I’m with the Emergency Psy¬
chiatric Center.
rarely occurs. The rules of etiquette—if you
want to call them that, though we take eti¬ B: Your name is what?
quette to be something very light and unin¬
A: Smith.
teresting and to be breached as you please—
seem to be quite strong. Persons will use B: Smith?
ways to not ignore what they properly ought
A: Yes.
to do by providing that the place for them to
do it is never opened. A: Can I help you?
I hope it can also be seen that a device like B: I don’t know hhheh. . . I hope you can.
“I can't hear you"—the repeat device, provid¬
ing for a repetition of the thing that was first A: Uh hah. . . Tell me about your prob¬
said, which is then repeated by the person lems.
who said "I can't hear you"—is not necessar¬ B: I uh. . . Now that you're here I’m em¬
ily designed for skipping a move. It is not barrassed to talk about it. I don’t want you
specific to providing a way of keeping in the telling me I’m emotionally immature
conversation and behaving properly while 'cause I know I am.
not giving one's name. It can be used for other
I was very puzzled by “I don’t know" in re¬
purposes and do other tasks, and it can be
turn to “May I help you." I couldn't figure
used with other items. That's why I talk about
out what they were doing with it. And the
it as an 'occasional device.' But where that is
reason I was puzzled was that having lis¬
what one is trying to do, it's a rather neat
tened to so many of these things and having
device.
been through the scene so many times, I
Let me turn now to a consideration which
heard “May I help you" as something like an
deals with a variant return to “May I help
idiom. I'm going to call these idiom-like
you?" That is, not “Yes..." but “I don’t know."
things 'composites.' That means you hear
I'll show a rather elaborate exchange in
the whole thing as a form, a single unit. And
which the staff member opens with a version
as a single unit, it has a proper return. As a
of “This is Mr Smith may I help you" but the
composite, “May I help you" is a piece of eti¬
combination gets split. The name is dealt
quette; a way of introducing oneself as
with, and when the “can I help you" is offered,
someone who is in the business of helping
it occurs in such a way that it can be an¬ somebody, the answer to which is “Yes" and
swered independent of the name.2 then some statement of what it is one wants.
Op: Go ahead please We can consider this item in terms of what
I'll call the 'base environment’ of its use.
A: This is Mr Smith (B: Hello) of the Emer¬ By ‘base environment’ I mean, if you go
gency Psychiatric Center can I help you. into a department store, somebody is liable
to come up to you and say “May I help you."
B: Hello? And in business-type phone calls this item is
A: Hello routinely used. And if you come into a place
and you don’t know what it's like, and some¬
B: I can’t hear you. body comes up to you and uses such an item,
264 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ X. Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology
that's one way of informing you what kind of matter in a psychiatric hospital such that
a place it is. So, if a new institution is being those things come on as being the same, then
set up, then there are available in the society one needn't start off by producing one's cre¬
whole sets of ways that persons go about be¬ dentials at the beginning of the conversation.
ginning conversations, and one could, for ex¬ And in my materials, again and again, when
ample, adopt one or another of a series of “May I help you” is used the person calling
them as the ones that are going to be used in says “Yes” and begins to state their troubles.
this place. As a general matter, then, one can begin to
Now the thing about at least some com¬ look for kinds of objects that have a base en¬
posites is that they can be heard not only as vironment, that, when they get used in that
composites, but as ordinary sentences, which environment perform a rather simple task,
we could call 'constructives,' which are but that can be used in quite different envi¬
understood by taking the pieces and adding ronments to do quite other tasks. So, a matter
them up in some way. As a composite, “May like 'credentials' can be handled by this “May
I help you” is a piece of etiquette, a signal for I help you” device. There will be lots of other
stating your request—what you want to be devices which have a base environment,
helped with. Alternatively, as a constructive, which do some other task in some other en¬
“May I help you” is a question. If one hears it vironment.
as a question, the piece of etiquette and its Before moving off of “May I help you” I
work hasn't come up, and “I don't know” is a want to mention one other thing about it. If
perfectly proper answer. the base environment is something like a de¬
Further, “I don't know” may be locating a partment store, then, when it's used in other
problem which “May I help you” is designed, places—for example, a psychiatric hospital—
in the first place, to avoid. In its base environ¬ one of the pieces of information it seems to
ment, for example a department store, it's convey is that whatever it is you propose to
pretty much the case that for a customer, the do, you do routinely. To whomsoever that
question of whether some person “can help” calls. That is, it's heard as standardized utter¬
is a matter of the department store having ance. How is that relevant? It can be relevant
made them the person who does that. That is in alternative ways. First of all, it can be a very
to say, lots of things, like telling you whether reassuring thing to hear. Some persons feel
you can find lingerie in a certain size, is that they have troubles, and they don't know
something anybody can do, and as long as the if anybody else has those troubles; or, if oth¬
department store says this person is going to ers do have those troubles, whether anybody
do it, that's enough. But we're dealing with a knows about them. If someone knows about
psychiatric hospital. In a department store, them, then there may be a known solution to
being selected to do a job and having creden¬ them. Also and relatedly, a lot of troubles—
tials to do it are essentially the same thing. In like mental diseases—are things that persons
a psychiatric hospital and lots of other places, feel very ambivalent about. That is, they're
however, they are very different things. That not sure whether it's some defect of their
is, whether somebody can help you if you character, or something else. That, in part, is
have a mental disorder, is not solved or is not why they're hesitant to talk about it. And it
even presumptively solved by the fact that seems that one of the ways one begins to tell
they've been selected by somebody to do that people that they can talk, that you know what
job. The way it's solved in this society is by they have and that you routinely deal with
reference to such things as having been such matters, is to use manifestly organiza¬
trained in a particular fashion, having gotten tional talk.
degrees, having passed Board examinations, “May I help you,” then, can be a reassuring
etc. way to begin. It can alternatively be some¬
Now, in the base environment of the use of thing else. Consider the exchange I just
“May I help you?” there is, as I say, no differ¬ showed, in which such standardized utter¬
ence essentially between having credentials ances as “May I help you” and “Tell me about
and being selected. If one can formulate the your problems” are used.
Rules of Conversational Sequence 265
A: Can I help you? cause of their troubles. Then, what they come
to see is that they need the love of somebody
B: I don't know hhheh. . . I hope you can
else. And they can't get that from a therapist.
A: Uh hah. .. Tell me about your problems Because as soon as they don't pay, that's the
end of the relationship.
B: I uh. . . Now that you're here I'm em¬ Now let me just make a few general points.
barrassed to talk about it. I don't want you Clearly enough, things like "This is Mr
telling me I'm emotionally immature Smith,” "May I help you?” and “I can’t hear
'cause I know I am you” are social objects. And if you begin to
That is, the use of standardized, manifestly look at what they do, you can see that they,
organizational talk can provide for the per¬ and things like them, provide the makings of
son calling that they're going to get routine activities. You assemble activities by using
treatment. But routine’, for them, may not these things. And now when you, or I, or
be such a happy thing. Because, for exam¬ sociologists, watching people do things, en¬
ple, they've been through it before. But they gage in trying to find out what they do and
may have gone through it, as psychiatrists how they do it, one fix which can be used is:
would say, part way. For example, they were Of the enormous range of activities that peo¬
in analysis for three years and ran out of ple do, all of them are done with something.
money, or the psychiatrist wouldn't keep Someone says "This is Mr Smith” and the
them on, or they didn't want to stay. Part other supplies his own name. Someone says
way, they may have come to some point in "May I help you” and the other states his busi¬
the analysis where they 'knew what was ness. Someone says "Huh?” or "What did you
wrong with them.’ That is, they knew the di¬ say?” or "I can’t hear you,” and then the thing
agnostic term. But that diagnostic term may said before gets repeated. What we want then
have had a lay affiliate. By that I mean, if a to find out is, can we first of all construct the
psychiatrist says you're regressed, it's a tech¬ objects that get used to make up ranges of
nical term. But 'regressed' is also a lay term, activities, and then see how it is those objects
and as a lay term it doesn't have a great deal do get used.
of attractiveness. If one finds oneself living Some of these objects can be used for
with a lay understanding of such a term, whole ranges of activities, where for different
where the term is not a very nice thing to ones a variety of the properties of those ob¬
have in its lay sense, then when you hear jects will get employed. And we begin to see
someone using such an item as "May I help alternative properties of those objects. That's
you,” you can hear that some procedure will one way we can go about beginning to collect
be gone through, the upshot of which will be the alternative methods that persons use in
the discovery of what you 'already know’— going about doing whatever they have to do.
the knowing of which doesn’t do you any And we can see that these methods will be
good. reproducible descriptions in the sense that
Related to that are such things as, some any scientific description might be, such that
people seem to feel very much disturbed the natural occurrences that we're describing
about the fact that their relationship to a psy¬ can yield abstract or general phenomena
chiatrist or to other doctors is monetary. which need not rely on statistical observabil¬
What they want, they say, is a personal solu¬ ity for their abstractness or generality.
tion. Ask them what they want, "Well, that There was a very classical argument that
you don’t have to pay for it.” When they hear it would not be that way; that singular events
"May I help you,” they hear 'a professional.’ were singular events, given a historian’s sort
But they feel that the way you get cured is by of argument, that they just happen and they
getting an affiliation to somebody which is get more or less accidentally thrown together.
like the affiliations that they failed to get in But if we could find that there are analytically
their lives. That is, they may already have hard ways of describing these things—where,
come to learn from some other psychiatrist that is, we're talking about objects that can
that the failure of love by their parents is the be found elsewhere, that get placed, that have
266 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ X. Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology
ways of being used; that are abstract objects fast molecules do things. And they don’t have
which get used on singular occasions and, very good brains. So just let the materials fall
describe singular courses of activity—then as they may. Look to see how it is that persons
that’s something which is exceedingly non¬ go about producing what they do produce.
trivial to know.
One final note. When people start to ana¬ Endnotes
lyze social phenomena, if it looks like things
occur with the sort of immediacy we find in, 1. A combination of Fall 1964, tape 1, side 2 and
some of these exchanges, then, if you have to tape 2, side 1, with brief extract from Winter
make an elaborate analysis of it—that is to 1965, lecture (1)—the parenthesis indicate
say, show that they did something as involved that the original transcripts were unnum¬
bered, the current numbering likely but not
as some of the things I have proposed—then
certain—pp. 1 and 11-12 (transcriber un¬
you figure that they couldn’t have thought
known) and Spring 1965 ('64-65), lecture 3,
that fast. I want to suggest that you have to pp. 6-7 (transcriber unknown). . . .
forget that completely. Don’t worry about
how fast they’re thinking. First of all, don't
2. The fragment, of data is reproduced pretty
worry about whether they’re 'thinking.’ Just
much as Sacks transcribed it, preserving his
try to come to terms with how it is that the attempts to deal with simultaneous talk (i.e.,
thing comes off. Because you'll find that they A: This is Mr Smith (B: Hello) of the Emer¬
can do these things. Just take any other area gency Psychiatric Center) and silence (e.g., B:
of natural science and see, for example, how I uh... . Now that you're here. ...).... ♦
The Rational Properties of Scientific and Common Sense Activities 2 67
(1) Categorizing and comparing. It is com¬ only the fact that he "rehearses in imagina¬
monplace for a person to search his experi¬ tion” the various courses of action which will
ence for a situation with which to compare have occurred, but the care, attention, time,
the one he addresses. Sometimes rationality and elaborateness of analysis paid to alterna¬
refers to the fact that he searches the two tive courses of action are frequent references.
situations with regard to their comparability, With respect to the activity of "rehearsing in
and sometimes to his concern for making imagination,” the competing lines of actions-
matters comparable. To say that a person ad¬ that-will-have-been-completed, the clarity,
dresses the tasks of comparison is equivalent extent of detail, the number of alternatives,
to saying that he treats a situation or a person the vividness, and the amount of information
or a problem as an instance of a type. Thereby which fills out each of the schemata of com¬
the notion of a "degree of rationality” is en¬ peting lines of action are often the intended
countered for the extensiveness of a person's features in calling a person's actions "rational.”
concern with classification, the frequency of (5) Strategy. Prior to the actual occasion of
this activity, the success with which he en¬ choice a person may assign to a set of alter¬
gages in it are frequently the behaviors meant native courses of action the conditions under
by saying that one person's activities are which any one of them is to be followed. Von
more rational than another's. Neumann and Morgenstem have called the
(2) Tolerable error. It is possible for a per¬ set of such decisions a player's strategy.3 The
son to, "require” varying degrees of "good¬ set of such decisions can be called the strat¬
ness of fit” between an observation and a the¬ egy character of the actor's anticipations. A
ory in terms of which he names, measures, person whose anticipations are handled un¬
describes, or otherwise intends the sense of der the trust that his circumstances tomor¬
his observation as a datum. He may pay a row will be like those he has known in the
little or a lot of attention to the degree of fit. past is sometimes said to be acting with less
On one occasion he will allow a literary allu¬ rationality than the one who addresses alter¬
sion to describe what has occurred. On an¬ natively possible future states of his present
other occasion and for the same occurrences situation by the use of a manual of "what-to-
he may search for a mathematical model to do-in-case-ofs.”
order them. It is sometimes said, then, that (6) Concern for timing. When we say that a
one person is rational while another is not or person intends through his behaviors to real¬
is less so, by which is meant that one person ize a future state of affairs, we frequently
pays closer attention than does his neighbor mean by such an intention that the person
to the degree of fit between what he has ob¬ entertains an expectation of the scheduling
served and what he intends as his finding. of events. The concern for timing involves the
(3) Search for ‘means.’ Rationality is some¬ extent to which he takes a position with re¬
times used to mean that a person reviews gard to the possible ways in which events can
rules of procedure which in the past yielded temporally occur. A definite and restricted
the practical effects now desired. Sometimes frame of scheduled possibilities is compared
it is the fact that a person seeks to transfer with a "lesser rationality” that consists of the
rules of practice which had a pay-off in situ¬ person orienting the future fall of events un¬
ations of like character; sometimes it is the der the aspect of “anything can happen.”
frequency of this effort; at other times the (7) Predictability. Highly specific expecta¬
rational character of his actions refers to the tions of time scheduling can be accompanied
person's ability or inclination to employ in a by the person's paying concern to the predict¬
present situation techniques that worked in able characteristics of a situation. He may
other situations. seek preliminary information about it in or¬
(4) Analysis of alternatives and conse¬ der to establish some empirical constants or
quences. Frequently the term rationality is he may attempt to make the situation pre¬
used to call attention to the fact that a person dictable by examining the logical properties
in assessing a situation anticipates the altera¬ of the constructs he uses in "defining” it or by
tions which his actions will produce. Not reviewing the rules that govern the use of his
The Rational Properties of Scientific and Common Sense Activities 269
constructs. Accordingly, making the situ¬ treated by the person as correct grounds of
ation predictable means taking whatever further inference and action.
measures are possible to reduce “surprise." (b) Rational grounds sometimes refer to
Both the desire for “surprise in small such properties of a persons knowledge as
amounts" as well as the use of whatever mea¬ the “fine" or “gross" structure of the charac¬
sures yield it are frequently the behaviors in¬ terizations he uses, or whether the “inven¬
tended by the term rationality in conduct. tory" consists of a set of stories as compared
(8) Rules of procedure. Sometimes ratio¬ with universal empirical laws, or the extent
nality refers to rules of procedure and infer¬ to which the materials are codified, or
ence in terms of which a person decides the whether the corpus in use accords with the
correctness of his judgments, inferences, per¬ corpus of scientific propositions.
ceptions, and characterizations. Such rules (c) Insofar as the grounds of choice are the
define the distinct ways in which a thing may strategies of action, as was noted before in
be decided to be known—distinctions, for ex¬ point 5, another sense of rationality is in¬
ample, between fact, supposition, evidence, volved.
illustration, and conjecture. For our pur¬ (d) Grounds of a persons choice may be
poses two important classes of such rules of those which he quite literally finds, through
correct decisions may be distinguished: retrospectively interpreting a present out¬
“Cartesian" rules and “tribal" rules. Cartesian come. For example, a person may realize
rules propose that a decision is correct be¬ such grounds in the course of historicizing
cause the person followed the rules without an outcome in the effort to determine what
respect for persons, i.e., that the decider de¬ was “really" decided at a prior time. Thus, if
cided as “any man" would do when all mat¬ a present datum is treated as an-answer-to-
ters of social affiliation were treated as spe¬ some-question, the datum may motivate the
cifically irrevelant. By contrast, “tribal" rules question that the person seeks it to be the
provide that a decision is correct or not ac¬ answer to. Selecting, arranging, and unifying
cording to whether certain interpersonal soli¬ the historical context of an action after its
darities are respected as conditions of the de¬ occurrence so as to present a publicly accept¬
cision. The person counts his decision right able or coherent account of it is a familiar
or wrong in accordance with whom it is ref- meaning of “rationalization.”
erentially important that he be in agreement. (11) Compatibility of ends-means relation¬
The term rationality is frequently used to ships with principles of formal logic. A person
refer to the application of Cartesian rules of may treat a contemplated course of action as
decision. Because conventions may impose an arrangement of steps in the solution of a
constraints on such decision-making, the ex¬ problem. He may arrange these steps as a set
tent to which the constraints are suppressed, of “ends-means" relationships but count the
controlled, or rendered ineffective or irrelevant problem solved only if these relationships are
is another frequent meaning of rationality. accomplished without violating the ideal of
(9) Choice. Sometimes the fact that a person full compatibility with the principles of for¬
is aware of the actual possibility of exercising mal scientific logic and the rules of scientific
a choice and sometimes the fact that he procedure.5 The fact that he may do so, the
chooses are popular meanings of rationality. frequency with which he does so, his persis¬
(10) Grounds of choice. The grounds upon tence in treating problems in this way, or the
which a person exercises a choice among al¬ success that he enjoys in following such pro¬
ternatives as well as the grounds he uses to cedure are alternative ways of specifying the
legitimize a choice are frequently pointed out rationality of his actions.
as rational features of an action. Several dif¬ (12) Semantic clarity and distinctness. Ref¬
ferent behavioral meanings of the term erence is often made to a person s attempt to
“grounds" need to be discriminated. treat the semantic clarity of a construction as
(a) Rational grounds sometimes refer ex¬ a variable with a maximum value which must
clusively to the scientific corpus4 of informa¬ be approximated as a required step in solving
tion as an inventory of propositions which is the problem of constructing a credible defi-
270 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ X. Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology
Table 43-1
A Summary of the Propositions Relating the Rationalities to the Conditions
of Their Occurrence
For ail actions that are governed For all actions that are governed
by the rules of relevance of daily life by the rules of relevance of scientific theorizing
can the rationalities occur IF can the rationalities occur IF
Considered Considered Considered Considered
Considered as an as a Considered as an as a
as an ideal operative property as an ideal operative property
standard of standard of of actual standard of standard of of actual
action? action? practice? action? action? practice?
1. Categorizing and comparing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2. Tolerable error Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3. Search for “Means” Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4. Analysis of alternatives
and consequences Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
5. Strategy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
6. Concern for timing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
7. Predictability Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
8. Rules of procedure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
9. Choice Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
10. Grounds of choice Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
11. Compatibility of ends-means
relationships with formal logic No No No Yes Yes Yes
12. Semantic clarity and
distinctness No No No Yes Yes Yes
13. Clarity and distinctness “for
its own sake” No No No Yes Yes Yes
14. Compatibility of the definition
of a situation with scientific
knowledge No No No Yes Yes Yes
“Yes” is to be read, “Is empirically possible either as a stable property and/or a sanctionable ideal.”
“No” is to be read, “Is empirically possible only as an unstable property and/or an unsanctionable ideal.” By this is meant that attempts to stabilize
the feature or to compel adherence through systematic administration of rewards and punishments, are the operations required to multiply the
anomic features of the interaction.
What these propositions state for the rationalities when considered singly, they state as well for the set of them taken in any combination.
of the object and the intended object, as for tivities of everyday life, of course, permit the
example, a relationship of doubtful corre¬ actors doubt that the objects are as they ap¬
spondence between the two, the person ex¬ pear; but this doubt is in principle a doubt
pects that the presupposed undoubted corre¬ that is limited by the theorist s “practical con¬
spondence is the sanctionable one. He ex¬ siderations." Doubt for the practical theorist
pects that the other person employs the same is limited by his respect for certain valued,
expectancy in a more or less identical fash¬ more or less routine features of the social
ion, and expects that just as he expects the order as “seen from within," that he specifi¬
relationship to hold for the other person the cally does not and will not call into question.
other person expects it to hold for him. By contrast, the activities of scientific theo¬
In the activities of scientific theorizing rizing are governed by the strange ideal of
quite a different rule of interpretive proce¬ doubt that is in principle unlimited and that
dure is used. It provides that interpretation specifically does not recognize the normative
be conducted while holding a position of ‘'of¬ social structures as constraining conditions.
ficial neutrality" toward the belief that the ob¬ (2) Schutz refers to a second assumption
jects of the world are as they appear. The ac¬ as the persons practical interest in the events
The Rational Properties of Scientific and Common Sense Activities 273
of the world. The relevant features of events formed by its anticipations. Further, as of any
that his interest in them selects, carry along Here-and-Now, as well as over the succession
for the person as their invariant feature that of Here-and-Nows, the conversation for him
they can actually and potentially affect the has both its retrospective and prospective sig¬
actor's actions and can be affected by his ac¬ nificances. These include the Here and Now
tions. Under this presupposed feature of references to beginnings, duration, pacing,
events, the accuracy of his orderings of phasing, and termination. These determina¬
events is assumed by the person to be tested tions of the "inner time" of the stream of ex¬
and testable without suspending the rele¬ periences are coordinated with a socially em¬
vance of what he knows as fact, supposition, ployed scheme of temporal determinations.
conjecture, fantasy, and the like by virtue of He uses the scheme of standard time as a
his bodily and social positions in the real means of scheduling and coordinating his ac¬
world. Events, their relationships, their tions with those of others, of gearing his in¬
causal texture, are not for him matters of terests to those of others and of pacing his
theoretic interest. He does not sanction the actions to theirs. His interest in standard
notion that in dealing with them it is correct time is directed to the problems such specifi¬
to address them with the interpretive rule cations solve in scheduling and coordinating
that he knows nothing, or that he can assume interaction. He assumes too that the scheme
that he knows nothing “just to see where it of standard time is entirely a public enter¬
leads/' In everyday situations what he knows prise, a kind of "one big clock identical for
is an integral feature of his social compe¬ all."
tence. What he knows, in the way he knows There are other and contrasting ways of
it, he assumes personifies himself as a social temporally punctuating the stream of experi¬
object to himself as well as to others as a bona ence so as to produce a sensible array of
fide member of the group. He sanctions his events in the "outer world." When the actor
competence as a bona fide member of the is engaged in the activities of scientific theo¬
group as a condition for his being assured rizing, standard time is used as a device for
that his grasp of meanings of his everyday constructing one out of alternative empiri¬
affairs is a realistic grasp. cally possible worlds (assuming of course
By contrast, the interpretive rules of the that the theorizer is interested in matters of
attitude of scientific theorizing provide that fact). Thus, what would from his interests in
the sense and accuracy of a model is to be the mastery of practical affairs involve the
tested and decided while suspending judg¬ actor's use of time to gear his interests to the
ment on the relevance of what the theorizer conduct of others, is for his interests as a
knows by virtue of his social and bodily posi¬ scientific sociological theorist a "mere" de¬
tions in the real world. vice for solving his scientific problem which
(3) Schutz describes the time perspective consists of clearly formulating such pro¬
of daily life. In his everyday activities the per¬ grams of coordinated actions in the fashion
son reifies the stream of experience into of relationships of cause and effect. Another
"time slices." He does this with the use of a contrasting use of time occurs in appreciat¬
scheme of temporal relationships that he as¬ ing the events portrayed "within the theater
sumes he and other persons employ in an play." The interests in standard time are put
equivalent and standardized fashion. The aside as irrelevant. When he attends the so¬
conversation that he is having consists for cial structures portrayed in a novel like Ethan
him not only of the events of his stream of Frome, for example, he allows the lovers' fate
experience but of what was, or may be said to come before and as a condition for appre¬
at a time that is designated by the successive ciating the sequence of steps that led up to it.
positions of the hands of the clock. The (4) The person in managing his daily af¬
"sense of the conversation" is not only pro¬ fairs assumes a commonly entertained
gressively realized through a succession of scheme of communication in a different
realized meanings of its thus-far accom¬ manner than does the scientific theorist. The
plished course but every "thus-far" is in¬ man in daily life is informed as to the sense
274 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ X. Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology
grossest philosophical didacticism to say that “meanings” of rationality as (a) the individ¬
the viewer has seen “different aspects of the uals actions as well as (b) the “system s" char¬
same thing," or that the events of the story acteristics; (2) deciding on the ground of the
examination of experience rather than by an
are “nothing but" uncritically appreciated
election of theory which of the behavioral
events of the production.
designata go together; (3) deciding an alloca¬
tion of behavioral designata between defini¬
Endnotes tional and empirically problematical status;
(4) deciding the grounds for justifying any of
1. One definition that enjoys current favor is
the many possible allocations that he may fi¬
known as the rule of empirically adequate
nally choose to make; and (5) showing the
means. A persons actions are conceived by
consequences of alternative sets of decisions
the researcher as steps in accomplishing
for sociological theorizing and investigation.
tasks whose possible and actual accomplish¬
ment is empirically decidable. Empirical ade¬ 8. To avoid misunderstanding I want to stress
quacy is then defined in terms of the rules of that the concern here is with the attitude of
scientific procedure and the properties of the scientific theorizing. The attitude that in¬
knowledge that such procedure produces. forms the activities of actual scientific inquiry
is another matter entirely.
2. Alfred Schutz, "The Problem of Rationality in
the Social World,” Economica, Vol. 10, May, 9. Alfred Schutz, “The Stranger,” American Jour¬
1953. nal of Sociology, Vol. 49, May, 1944; “The
3. John von Neumann, and Oskar Morgenstem, Problem of Rationality in the Social World,”
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior Economica, Vol. 10, May 1943; “On Multiple
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, Realities,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
1947), p. 79. Research, Vol. 4: June, 1945; “Choosing
among Projects of Action,” Philosophy and
4. The concept of the corpus of knowledge is
Phenomenological Research, Vol. 12, Decem¬
taken from Felix Kaufmann, Methodology Of
ber, 1951; “Common Sense and Scientific In¬
the Social Sciences (New York: Oxford Univer¬
terpretation of Human Action,” Philosophy
sity Press, 1944), especially pp. 33-66.
and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 14, Sep¬
5. When treated as a rule for defining descrip¬ tember, 1953.
tive categories of action, this property is
10. In accordance with the program, attitude and
known as the rule of the empirical adequacy
method of Husserlian phenomenology he
of means.
sought the presuppositions and the corre¬
6. By “may” is meant available as one of a set of sponding environmental features intended by
alternatives. It does not mean likelihood. them that were invariant to the specific con¬
7. For the sociological theorist, the “problem of tents of actions and their objects. The list is
rationality” can be treated as consisting of not exhaustive. Further research should re¬
five tasks: (1) clarifying the various referents veal others. Like any product of observation
of the term “rationality” which includes stat¬ they have the provisional status of “so until
ing the behavioral correlates of the various demonstrated to be otherwise.” ♦
276 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ X. Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology
participate in the conference, who is not even pation, one seeks to "answer in advance” his
genuinely present, whose absence does not opponent, whose responses and counter¬
touch the course of the conference. Likewise, measures are foreseen and encountered such
being-together has the structure described that one tries to guide them in the desired, or
when one does not work together but acts in the least undesirable, direction. As a result,
against the other as, e.g., in a game of chess ones own comportment in the situation is
where each player orients his moves toward tuned in on the other and takes account of
those of his opponent, trying to guess his op¬ him. Here, as in the cases mentioned earlier,
ponent’s plans and combinations and to cor¬ one is related to his partner in one’s comport¬
rect his moves so that his opponent is ment while comporting oneself in view of his
thwarted, forestalled. partner and his partner’s comportment. One
This sort of comportment, namely, in view notices the presence of his partner in the
of that which is to be expected from ones common situation; precisely for that reason
partner such that one takes his own measures the situation in question is determined as
and "answers in advance” by anticipating his what it is.
partner, was worked out by Lowith as a gen¬ In the examples just mentioned, the "pres¬
eral structural moment of all mutual being sure of the external world” already obtains—
and speaking together.3 But this structure of a phenomenon to which, as is known, Dilthey
comportment only has its place in that di¬ had given special emphasis in his theory of
mension of fellow being-together pertaining the experience of reality.5 But most distinc¬
to the partner which we are now considering; tive is the experience of pressure and resis¬
the structure is grounded in what is consti¬ tance in that being-together for which the
tuted in this dimension by that which is es¬ existence of superordinate and subordinate
sentially in the encounters. It is lacking, relations are essential. The servant becomes
therefore, in the dimension of encounters of aware of the pressure of the master when he
others which is to be analyzed later. If the is together with him in a situation for which
anticipatory "answering in advance” is to be the relation of subordination holds.6 Accord¬
restricted to the being-together characterized ingly, he experiences his partner as the one
as partnership, then within this dimension for the sake of whose will he submits to this
the structure itself worked out and over-em¬ situation7 toward which he is directed and
phasized by Lowith really only appears in its which also has meaning for him when he ori¬
pregnance where the partners are together ents himself negatively to the master. In these
because they “will something from each last cases, the master experiences the resis¬
other,” e.g., when the one wills to convince or tance of the external world; he finds himself
persuade the other,4 or when they confer in in the common situations in which he is mas¬
order to agree. Should one make an agree¬ ter, precisely as master related to his servant
ment with his partner, or come to an under¬ and oriented to him and his comportment in
standing with him about a controversy on the a way that corresponds to his role as master.
basis of an already existing contract, then one As a consequence, it is essential that pressure
is together with him in a situation of negotia¬ and resistance be made apparent with re¬
tion and, more particularly, one is together spect to the situation itself and in the situ¬
with him for the sake of making an agree¬ ation-conforming comportment of the part¬
ment, for the sake of the controversy, and the ner.
like. While one confers with his partner, he No matter how characteristic and essen¬
faces the wishes, aims, and interests of the tial the experience of pressure, resistance,
partner which, even when not explicitly ex¬ and anticipatory "answering in advance”
pressed, are provided by the setting of the may be for some of the examples considered
things. In virtue of the partners comport¬ (as well as for the realm of encounters of
ment during the negotiations, his aims, mo¬ fellow human beings taken collectively), as
tivations, etc., can be discovered. One orients paradigmatic representatives of which each
his comportment with respect to the position example engaged our attention, we still have
disclosed by his partner; whereas, in antici¬ not designated the structure which persists
278 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ X. Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology
in all encounters of the dimension observed insufficient for the constitution of a partner¬
and which allows of being shown in all the ship-encounter when personal presence only
concrete cases belonging to it. Simultane¬ means a series of people residing in one and
ously exhibiting the viewpoint under which the same place. If many workers work at a
the encounters of the fellow human beings machine, and if all of them (though each for
involved belong together, this structure con¬ himself) produces the same thing, they are
sists of the being related to the partner that we then neither fellow workers nor are they to¬
have emphasized continuously. That we are gether with one another in any genuine and
in a common situation together with the part¬ pregnant sense. Because they work next to
ner, whose presence and comportment in it one another, the work of the one does not
produce an essential contribution to its con¬ itself become observable in the work of the
stitution, signifies that we encounter him not other—this, indeed, lies in the sense of being-
only in the common situation but that we next-to-one-another.
also encounter him in the sense of the situ¬
ation constituted in this way. Our being-to¬
Role-Encounters
gether is determined in its meaning by what
we do in the situation of encounter, how we The situational encounter-bonds of fellow
comport ourselves in it in relation to the part¬ human beings under consideration here only
ner and, conversely, how our partner com¬ reveal their full meaning when we ask as
ports himself toward us. The aims of the what the partner is encountered in his being-
comportment are, obviously, also constitu¬ together.
tive for the expression of the situation. One By appealing to what was previously dis¬
can describe perfectly the being-together of cussed with regard to becoming determined
this dimension by the circumstance that the by the situation,8 we may say that if I acquire
partner acts for the sake of a common con¬ the sense of my concrete being from the situ¬
cern. On the basis of the particular attitudes ation, then that signifies for the determina¬
of the partner to this common concern, the tion of my concrete being with respect to the
sense is determined in which each of them is other that I am also determined with regard
my partner. As a consequence, the encounter to one or many partners. Thus I am co-deter-
of fellow human beings within the dimension mined by the relationship that I have to my
to be discussed can be defined as a consociate partner. In my relationship to him I encoun¬
encounter [gebundene Begegnung]. ter him as the one for whom I am hie et nunc
On the basis of these situational bonds we and come into account; and he encounters
can see how far the personal presence of the me in exactly the same way. The relationship
partner is particularly necessary for being to¬ that each of us has to the other arises from
gether, although not sufficient for it. It is nec¬ the fact that we actually comport ourselves to
essary because the relation to a fellow human each other in a determinate way. How we
being comporting himself in the situation in comport ourselves, in which concrete sense
question, by which he becomes a partner, is we are partners, is, to be sure, determined by
constitutive for being-together. If the master the situation of our being together. Our rela¬
gives his instructions and then goes away, he tionship to one another is a founded relation¬
may thus still remain very “close” to the ser¬ ship insofar as it has its root in the situation
vant who now carries out the orders; even mentioned. In other words: the situation pre¬
when the servant, who is now alone, directs scribes a role to us which we take over as long
his comportment precisely in view of the ex¬ as we are in the situation in question. That
pected re-encounter with the master, we still we exist in such a place in the role assigned
have here only an extreme case of “ ‘being us and as such a role is indeed everywhere the
co-included’ nearby” and perhaps even a lim¬ sense of the situational determinedness of
iting case of “co-presence.” But, in any case, our concrete being. In relation to the situ¬
there is no being-together in the pregnant ations of being-together with a partner with
sense of doing-something-with-one-another. which we are concerned here, it is important
On the other hand, the personal presence is to note that the mutual role of the partner is
Partnership 279
already aimed at beforehand. The mutual he is.12 What I otherwise still know about my
roles are constitutive for the sense of this role partner is, insofar as it has no material bear¬
of ours which requires them according to its ing on the situation, irrelevant for his behav¬
meaning since they can only be meaningful ior toward me. Likewise, in the sense of our
in relation to this role of ours. Therefore we being together it makes no difference in what
always and necessarily have our role in view measure the roles are rooted in the reciprocal
of the role of the partner. In that fact are “life-unities” which each of us exhibits as in¬
grounded the relation and reference to the dividual. We are indeed together only in our
partner which . . . we developed as the char¬ roles, not as individuals. Accordingly, it also
acteristic of being together in a common situ¬ does not even follow that it is just the certain
ation. someone or other with whom I am now in
The partners encounter each other in their this concrete partnership. This someone or
partnership-situations in these roles consti¬ other can be substituted by anyone else inso¬
tuted by the relationship to one another, they far as he assumes the function and role de¬
encounter each as the ones who are what they termined by the situation. In this sense, one
are in the particular common situations, e.g., can say that my partner is “someone or other
as fellow workers, as buyers and sellers, as in this quite determinate role.” This is be¬
employees and employers, as masters and cause it does not signify any interference in
servants, and, more particularly, in just the the situation when someone takes over the
roles which they have in the concrete case— role of someone else.13
as the coachman who carries the passengers On various occasions we have considered
on a journey, etc. Hence I do not encounter Lowiths book, Das Individuum in der Rolle
an individual in this dimension with his indi¬ des Mitmenschen [The Individual in the Role
vidual properties accruing specifically to him of Fellow Human Being]. In that book, Lowith
that constitute him as this determinate indi¬ expresses the idea that people do not encoun¬
vidual. As a consequence, it can be accidental ter each other as individuals, that is to say, as
and irrelevant in a certain sense—especially encapsuled “monads”; instead, they encoun¬
if one seizes upon it as a “structured life- ter each other essentially in the “roles” they
unity” in Dilthey s sense—that the individual have in relation to each other and hence in
is now in this concrete situation and has pre¬ “relational determinedness.”
cisely this role in it.9 But we certainly do not Each of the others is thus determined
encounter an absolutely other person, as it above all precisely in himself in that he can
were, a second example of the genus to which have a relationship to a determinate other.
I belong and which I interpret by analogy or Fellow human beings do not encounter
empathy and only make comprehensible by each other as a plurality of individuals ex¬
the “transfer of my own livingness” and its isting for themselves but instead as perso¬
structure, of my own mental processes and nae who have a role within and for their
their concatenations such that I conceive it fellow world on the basis of which they
then are themselves determined as per¬
in an entirely determinate way as alter ego.10
sons.14
The other is rather encountered by me as
partner in just the concrete sense of partner¬ This idea of the determination of people by
ship in which he is my partner hie et nunc. their relational significance as “personae” is,
For me he is considered only as the role that in fact, central to Lowith’s investigations. It
he represents in the particular situation of is in this connection that Lowith arrives at
our being together on the ground of his func¬ the elaboration of the anticipatory “answer¬
tion in this situation and, in a sense to be ing in advance”:
explained, as the role that he also is.11 He
Ones own comportment is . . . not only
appears to me as one motivated by the situ¬ directed to the other, but also at the same
ation which prescribes a role and function to time according to the other; it regulates
him. Only in this role of his do I have some¬ itself before-hand according to the other.
thing to do with him. In this situation, his The primary ambiguity of ones own com¬
being is exhausted in the role whose bearer portment towards the other is thus re-
280 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ X. Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology
fleeted when one in his comportment (to¬ guage which he takes so seriously that he
wards the other) is related to the relation¬ tries to make assertions about phenomena
ship. To relate oneself in his comportment and concatenations of phenomena with re¬
towards the relationship signifies that I re¬ spect to investigations into the “material
late myself to another beforehand in view logic of language." Lowith allows himself to
of his possible comportment towards
be guided by the unquestioned obviousness
me.15
of language rather than examining by de¬
scription and explication the “affairs" in their
Here we also see the reason why Lowith
absolutizes this structure to the extent that differences, in their commonalities, and the
he holds it to be the governing structure with¬ founding and derivative relationships obtain¬
out restriction of all encounters with fellow ing between them, in terms of the phenome¬
human beings. Because he, furthermore, in¬ nal itself, so that clarity might be created con¬
troduces no difference among the different cerning them when the peculiarities of lin¬
dimensions of being-together, the encounter guistic use touch upon actual phenomena
with fellow human beings is not limited to and their concatenations and when linguistic
the realm in which only this sort of encounter use is exclusively present. Because he places
has its place and basis (‘ground"). By virtue on the same plane as equally justified exam¬
of this radicalization, being-together occurs ples of “relational determination" those of
in the sense that “the one allows of being the young and the old, of servants and mas¬
determined by the other in the measure that ters,20 it escapes Lowith that the word
his own being [.Dasein\ receives and loses its “Verhaltnis" [“relationship"] has a different
existential meaning primarily from the rela¬ meaning in each of these examples. The rela¬
tionship to the other."16 Accordingly, there tionship between master and servant is char¬
arises for him the problem of the “autonomy acterized by both of them coming together in
of the one for the other in the relationship concrete situations and having something to
itself as not simply an absolutized, but, in¬ do with one another, while the relationship
stead, as an absolute, relationship”—a prob¬ obtaining between old and young exhibits a
lem that leads back beyond Dilthey to Kant.17 relationship between ages which can be, and
No matter how fruitful, now, this idea at the most also is, entirely a phenomenal
proves to be in many respects (e.g., in the characteristic.
interpretation of the “moral qualities" of the That is to say, that a man “in his best years"
individual, say, “egoism" and “altruism" as is older than a youth who only by accident
“expressions of life," as ways of comportment sits next to him, and with whom he has noth¬
toward other people and not as “inner prop¬ ing at all to do is suggested without one even
erties of an individual substance which exist having to take recourse to the exact numeri¬
for themselves" because “I and the other are cal relationship of their ages. In the one case,
not objects indifferent to one another with the relationship is grounded in an actual
immanental. . .properties"18), it still is not comportment toward one another in con¬
sufficient to clarify the “relational signifi¬ crete, common situations. In the other case,
cance and determination" in its own peculi¬ the comporting-themselves-toward-one-an-
arity and in its full sense in a phenomenologi¬ other is not even present: it is, instead, exclu¬
cally satisfying way. The fault for this is also, sively an objective fact which exists inde¬
but not alone, the circumstance that Lowith pendently of whether or not, even acciden¬
overlooks the different dimensions of being- tally, the people in question encounter each
together of fellow human beings in their dif¬ other in common situations. For this reason
ference as well as in their own peculiarity in the relationship existing in the latter case will
every case.19 The essential deficiencies of be called an “external relationship” just be¬
Lowith s investigations rest on the fact that cause it is not grounded in having-to-do-
he did not carry out his ideas on the basis of within-one-another. The sense in which a fa¬
thorough analyses of concrete phenomena. ther “belongs” to his children is different
Here, as elsewhere ... he orients himself to from the sense in which an officer “belongs"
the peculiarities of the German use of lan¬ to the military, and it is different, again, from
Partnership 281
the sense in which “an old man does (not) concrete being inherent in this role. Thus we
belong to young people.” Only on the ground neither have in front of us—as the position
of distinguishing the relationships in which that is the starting point of the traditional
people interact from those that exist “objec¬ inquiry believes—a “piece of the external
tively,” i.e., without the compliance of his world”22 in which we empathize, etc., and
partner, can the “relational determination” only when we enliven it, or animate it, or the
be clarified in its sense. But this clarification like, by some form or other of the “transfer”
can only be accomplished in investigations of our own inwardness, do we then have pre¬
that analyze the phenomena themselves and sent another human being, someone elses
by returning to what any “standing in a situ¬ ego; nor do we prepare the way here for
ation” whatever means. In the same way, ad¬ something like the understanding of the indi¬
mittedly under inclusion of dimensional dif¬ viduality of someone else. In his posthu¬
ferences, the different sense in which we mously published fragments on “Das Verste-
speak of the “belongingness” of human be¬ hen andere Personen und Lebensau(3erun-
ings to one another must and can receive gen” [“The Understanding of Other Persons
their clarification. and Life-expressions”], Dilthey distinguishes
between “elementary” and “higher forms of
Mutual Understanding in the understanding.”23 Here we are truly con¬
cerned with what he calls “elementary forms
Common Situation of understanding,” i.e., with an under¬
standing that “arises out of the interests of
In situations of the surrounding world, life
practical life.” The situations of “practical
knows itself in “implicit” ways and contains
life” are comprehensible with respect to their
its rules for this knowledge, i.e., for knowl¬
bearing on us:
edge about the situation.21 As governed by an
inherent knowledge, this life is “circumspec¬
The elementary acts, by virtue of which
tive concern” in Heideggers sense. Obviously, connective activities are composed, such
the characteristic of this knowledge is not as picking up an object, letting the ham¬
altered if I am now alone in the situation, or mer fall, the sawing of wood by a saw, des¬
if the sense of the situation is constituted pre¬ ignate for us the presence of certain goals.
cisely by the fact that I encounter other peo¬ In this elementary understanding, there¬
ple. In the preceding analyses we have al¬ fore, there is no recurrence to the entire
ready made different use of this knowledge. nexus of life which the enduring subject
At its most pregnant, it came to light in the of life-expressions forms . . . we also need
anticipatory “answering in advance.” In fact, not.. . seize upon it as a method that goes
back from a given effect to some piece or
this is nothing else than an entirely determi¬
other of the life-context which makes the
nate sort of reacting to the partner guided by effect possible. Certainly this latter rela¬
knowledge about the situation and the other. tionship is contained in the affair-complex
Because it is thus a knowledge inherent in itself, and thus the passage from this into
“living in . . . ,” it illuminates the situation that is similarly always at the door: but it
precisely, hut also only precisely, as the situ¬ need not come in.24
ation comes into consideration for us. In the
“implicit” self-knowledge belonging to “liv¬ If we set Dilthey s ideas into the context of
ing in. . .” we understand that with which we our considerations, then we may say: The
deal as that which is of concern to itself. Al¬ knowledge immanent to the Being in the com¬
ready included therein is the own specific mon situations understands the partner in his
kind of understanding of the partner in the particular role with respect to the concrete situ¬
common situation since this understanding ation. The core of another person is either
represents a moment of “implicit” knowledge accessible to this understanding, nor does it
about the situation. disclose such things as the characteristic
In the common situations under discus¬ traits of fellow human beings; nor, finally,
sion here, we encounter the partner as a does it confront consciousness-processes,
bearer of roles. Understanding gears into the i.e., the cogitationes of another ego. What ex-
282 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ X. Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology
clusively comes into view here is the partner mous will simpliciter. Rather a human being
in the sense of partnership in which we have encounters me who comports himself in a
to deal with him in every case. Under¬ certain way in the situation in question, who
standing, therefore, concerns the way in is unfriendly or complaisant, who allows this
which the other plays the role assigned to and that purpose to clearly appear or even be
him by the situation. As a consequence, this explicitly expressed, who lets a certain posi¬
orientation characterizes this understanding tion toward the affair be known, etc. Even the
not primarily because it involves other peo¬ one asked to do something does not experi¬
ple but because it represents a moment in the ence anything like the “claim of the Thou”
knowledge about the immediately actual simpliciter.
situation-totality. This orientation grips fel¬ Where it is not a matter of asking for some¬
low human beings only insofar as it is a com¬ thing but instead involves a transaction, the
ponent of the situation. In other words, we being-together is nonetheless of a similar
are dealing with a functional understanding. structure. However, here the anticipatory
Accordingly, the partner is disclosed in exis¬ “answering in advance" emerges more dis¬
tence determined by the situation: in the role tinctly and occasionally governs our being
that he directly represents and “is." Ex¬ together. But such anticipation is only possi¬
pressed in all of this is the fact that this under¬ ble on the ground of “implicit" situational
standing of the partner disclosed forms of
understanding and is ruled by that under¬
comportment, of modes of “living in . . . ,"
standing. On that rests the fact that the de¬
but not the properties which accrue to a hu¬
mands of the other are provided in being to¬
man being as substance even when one seizes
gether and transacting. Ones own comport¬
upon this substance as a “structured life-
ment is oriented toward this knowledge
unity."
which is on the point of answering what is
It is in this manner that in and with respect
expected from the opposite side in a pur¬
to the common work I experience my fellow
posive way: just that makes up the anticipa¬
worker. If he is revealed to me as a worker
who is useful or clumsy, fit or unfit, then I tory “answering in advance."
need not reason back from the finished work In common situations the partner listens
to him as a person who shared in the produc¬ deliberately. While each plays his role, he di¬
tion. While standing in the common situation vines the purposes and tendencies of the
with the other, I overlook this and conceive other even when the other does not declare
him in terms of the situation; I always already them—as is clear from the example of the
“know" about the suitability or unsuitability chess player.
of his comportment. From that standpoint Expressive phenomena also arise in the
the sense of the fitness or unfitness of the encounters under consideration. While I am
fellow worker is determined: namely, with re¬ conversing with my partner, he shakes his
spect to the actual work in common. To be head or wrinkles his brow. Shaking the head
sure, the other is still disclosed only as a fel¬ and wrinkling the brow are not in themselves
low worker, what he might otherwise be, in unambiguous gestures, but they can mean
which sectors he might otherwise exist, in many things. One cannot simply infer what a
which sense he exists in them—all of this is gesture signifies in a concrete case; it is not
inaccessible to this understanding immanent “inscribed" as this determinate gesture.
in being-together. . . . The considerations Schelers notion25 that there is a “universal
about fellow workers hold in a corresponding grammar" “that obtains for all languages of
way for all forms of fellow being-together expression and is the highest foundation of
meant here. When I ask someone for some¬ comprehension for all kinds of mime and
thing, I then experience the way in which the pantomime of living things" is justified for a
person asked listens to me, enters into the certain realm. But those ordinary and daily
request, offers resistance, avoids the request, expressive phenomena, gestures, etc., that we
sets conditions, gives in, etc.; I do not experi¬ have in mind here will not be understood on
ence something like an alien and autono¬ the basis of that “universal grammar." Rather
Partnership 283
it is the case that we understand them by ation in question. In a carelessly made work
virtue of the whole of the common situation. the producer appears as a worker determined
Stated differently: the comprehension of as such and such, e.g., as a watchmaker, an
this and similar expressive phenomena architect, etc., who had lacked conscien¬
smoothly arises from knowledge about the tiousness, just as a scrupulous, skilled, indus¬
situation in which I am with others, and fits trious worker appears in a precision-made
into this knowledge as one of its moments. work. But it is always a matter of a person in
Even where I perceive that an expressive his role. Understanding is yielded here by vir¬
movement is not genuine, but purposively tue of the situation and is, therefore, limited
produced, and hence creates the suspicion to what is inherent in it.
that my partner wishes to deceive me, this Now, in his analysis of the understanding
assumption need not found a disturbance of of someone else's volitional activities,
the "essential connection" between mental Spranger27 refers to the fact that the "psychi¬
process and expression. In this situation and cal situation (the motive)" of the one who acts
its “co-included" backgrounds this reaction is "directly inaccessible" to the one who
of the other does not "fit" in. The not-fitting- understands; but insofar as "objective cogni¬
in, the not-being-in-order, and the like, are tions also arise in this inner situation," that
phenomenal properties of the expressive phe¬ is, insofar as the activity is oriented toward
nomenon under consideration . . . proper¬ determinate constellations ("situations" in
ties, indeed, that do not accrue to this phe¬ our sense of the term), the situation is "sub¬
nomenon in and of itself. Rather they are only sequently controllable" and contains a com¬
supplied by the total situation. In this total ponent which, as a "rational part of the activ¬
situation alone it becomes the expressive ity, is accessible to the other <scl. the one who
phenomenon that it is in concreto, by means understands as objectively legitimated." The
of it and from it the phenomenon receives its activity is comprehensible as activity in this
particular meaning. The "same" shaking of whole situation with respect to what is "sub¬
the head can, as we have seen, take on differ¬ sequently controllable"; on the basis of this
ent meanings in different situations, and in understanding of the situation, the on-looker
addition still be called genuine in the one understands this concrete activity28 and can
situation and artificial in the other. What an make a judgment about it with respect to its
expressive phenomenon is and signifies in a suitability. The specific limitation peculiar to
particular case becomes comprehensible to this understanding, which of essential neces¬
me in the whole of the present situation. By sity remains bound to the situation and its
means of and with respect to this situational horizons, becomes distinct precisely in this
understanding, I can penetrate behind the ac¬ understanding of the activity as activity in
tual reaction of my partner in a given case. which the "inner psychical situation" re¬
The understanding of expressive phenomena mains "directly inaccessible."29
is as understanding by virtue of relations to This understanding also possesses a cer¬
the situation of exactly the same sort as the tain meaning for the human sciences. When¬
understanding of what is totally present in ever it is a matter of a certain product, or of
the situation. But that signifies that a specific the concrete emergence of a historical figure,
problem of expressive phenomena is not these are to be conceived with respect to the
given in the realm of the being-together of situation. On its side, this situation fits into
fellow human beings under consideration an entirely determinate horizon of tissues of
here. references.30 As a consequence, the historical
The understanding of fellow human be¬ figure in question comes into view in his con¬
ings presented here has a meaning tran¬ crete role: Hence it is thus a matter not of
scending the being-together in a common closed and "structured life-unities," but
situation. When we turn from a work, as we rather of a particular concrete existence.31
can at any time,26 to the people engaged in it, Nonetheless, at the most the historian would
they likewise only come into view in the roles not be satisfied with this understanding of
which they have taken over in the work-situ¬ the particular situation and of the historical
284 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ X. Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology
person in his concrete roles; even when he present mind of someone else. We reproduce
has not aimed at historical figures in their “what is internal to someone else"; but this is
individuality, he asks about the underlying inseparable from “fellow feeling.” While our
“fellow feeling” arises by “reproducing and
reasons as much of the persons in their roles
reliving” “of events attentively perceived from
as he does of the situation itself. A new book
outside but relived by internal supplementa¬
of laws, for instance, serves the needs of a
tions,” we arrive at the “inner structure” of
certain time; the book of laws and the law¬ another person, at a “unity of life and will”
giver in his law-giving performance are to be which we experience in its independence and
understood in terms of the changed condi¬ in the core-quality of its “value-filled exis¬
tions of life, the altered economic system, etc. tence.” On the basis of the experience of the
But, as Dilthey noted,32 the historian can go independence of another person there arises
back from the book of laws to the “spirit of the respect for this independence: we recog¬
the times” and investigate it. This regression nize this other person “as a self-goal just as
does not depend on the whim of the histo¬ we ourselves are such a goal.” But we experi¬
rian; because of what Dilthey calls the “spirit ence the life-unity of someone else as like and
akin to us, as homogeneous with us (which
of the times,” the historian is required, con¬
otherwise also certainly cannot be different
sequently, to make comprehensible situ¬
since we can only acquire and seize upon the
ations as well as people in their roles in a “life-unity” of someone else by the “transfer
profound sense. But in this procedure of the of our own mental living”; see pp. 189f. and
historian it is no longer a question of an 249ff.), and therefore as having solidarity
understanding in terms of the situation. . . . with us. “Closed core realities, akin to our
own, bound up with ours in cooperation and
Endnotes solidarity, yet each <being> a seat of its own
will that limits us, form our social horizon.”
1. On the sense of this “someone or other/' see Let us disregard everything said before (e.g.,
§4. let us disregard the appeal to the inference by
2. We find here the essential and characteristic analogy and the apperception-processes, the
difference between a lecture and a discussion; “inseparability” of “reproducing what is in¬
for that reason, a discussion in which the par¬ ternal to someone else” from “fellow feeling”;
ticipant is not focused on the other, but rather let us further disregard the fact that the tradi¬
expresses his point of view in a monologue, tional concept of the world stands behind
gives the impression of chaos. Dilthey s theory and even in a sensualistic col¬
oration: “The concept of the object is condi¬
3. See Lowith, Das Individuum, §§20 and 27. tioned by the relation of sense-impressions to
4. Lowith correctly refers with special emphasis what is differentiated from the self and by the
in this connection to the phenomenon of connection of these impressions to a whole
“conversation.” which, therefore, lies independently over
5. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin, 1924), against the self”); let us heed instead just
Vol. V [“Der Glaube an die Realitat Anderer those dimensionally different kinds of being-
Personen”], pp. llOff. for our context. —Be¬ together of fellow human beings that Dilthey
cause the experience of pressure and resis¬ tries to draw up. Just because we stand in a
tance constitutes our “belief in reality” as “social relation” with other people, and a
much in “inanimate” physical things as in fel¬ “constantly faint interchange of pressure, re¬
low human beings, Dilthey still appeals to the sistance and demands allow us to feel that we
inference by analogy as the logical equivalent are not alone,” not every attitude toward fel¬
of “interlocking apperception-processes” for low human beings is legitimated in which we
what is involved in the experience of fellow wish to understand the “life-unity” in its
human beings in their particularity (“this par¬ structure which makes up its “core existence”
ticular class of objects”). The unification of as individuum. Even when we are together at
both these motives makes possible a one-di¬ one time with the “same” person in a situation
mensional theory of human encounters. In of partnership, in which we perceive his pres¬
the experience of resistance which forms “the sure, and another time direct to him the in¬
presupposition of each further experience,” tention to understand, we are nonetheless to¬
processes are attached by means of which we gether with the “same” person in two differ¬
attain to a knowledge about the concretely ent dimensions, and we can encounter the
Partnership 285
"same” person in still different dimensions. unity,” in what measure and in what sense
This in no way alters the fact that these dif¬ they are relevant, depends on which place
ferent kinds of being-together are not and what degree the situation in question and
founded in one another just because of their the role, as well as their type, occupy in the
dimensional differences; they must be con¬ structure of this “life-unity,” in addition to the
ceived instead as self-sufficient and in their concrete situation and role they are in the
own particular, specific characteristic. It is given case.
rather essential for the dimension of partner¬ 10. If, in the same situation, one were to say to his
ship that the fellow human being is not acces¬ partner that he "would do such and such in
sible in it as a "structured life-unity” (see §§4 your place,” this would signify that the situ¬
and 5). —The understanding of the other as ation demands a specific comportment,
"life-unity” also does not necessarily allow namely, "to do such and such,” at the place in
“consciousness of kinship and solidarity” to which the partner stands in his role assigned
arise. In a specific sense, admittedly not in¬ him by the situation at this place, it also sig¬
tended by Dilthey, solidarity is rooted in the nifies that the partner, while comporting him¬
dimension of community (see §21); but the self differently, does not completely take in
understanding implicit in and immanent to and understand the situation. But it has noth¬
this dimension does not, again, touch upon ing to do with what I myself confront as per¬
the individual "life-unity” (see pp. 143f.) son, individual, and "life-unity.”
which is also not seized upon in the being to¬
11. See below, pp. 116f.
gether in a "group” (§§26 and 27). In both of
these last-mentioned dimensions there is nei¬ 12. Because we encounter each other in our roles
ther respect for the independence of another's by being together in partnership and, more
individuality as a self-goal, nor is an accom¬ particularly, in the roles which have already
panying demand meaningful in the being-to¬ been mutually attuned beforehand, the struc¬
gether of this dimension. Rather the demand ture of anticipatory "answering in advance,”
for recognition and respect for another's in¬ worked out by Lowith, is at all possible and
dependence have their place in certain rela¬ governs many provinces of this dimension.
tions of partnership (see §21), for which rea¬ But for the same reasons this structure is also
son it is also completely legitimate that to be restricted to this, and only this, dimen¬
Lowith asks about the "autonomy of the one sion.
and the other ...” precisely "within personal 13. See Heidegger, op. cit., §22. The "They”
relationships” {op. cit., Chapter III). Although [“Man”] which Heidegger introduces in this
Lowith appeals to Dilthey and continues his connection is, however, not a univocal con¬
lines of thought, he grounds the autonomy in cept but rather a "predication by analogy” in
question not by recourse to seizing upon the the sense of Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book V,
structured "life-unity,” but instead by pene¬ Chapter 6,1016b34, which is differentiated in
trating into the relationship and, in this freely its particular meaning in accordance with the
effected retrospect, by recourse to the other dimensions of the being together of fellow hu¬
as an other of “equal rank.” For this reason man beings. Here "They” signifies the "some¬
Lowith's discussions also merge with an in¬ one or other” in a quite determinate and con¬
terpretation of Kant's doctrine of the auton¬ crete role (see pp. 130f).
omy of man. 14. Lowith, op. cit., p. 51.
6. We speak here only of a determinate province 15. Lowith, ibid., pp. 19f. "The essentially neces¬
of limited relations of subordination, but not sary structure of relationships consists of . . .
of specifically communal ones such as, e.g., the fact that the comporting of the one is co¬
the patriarchy. determined by the other, it is reflexive in co-
7. We must mention here the horizonal "knowl¬ reflexivity. Disregarding his relationship to
edge” that, outside of this being together with another, what one does and allows is incom¬
the master, one is free, i.e., one is his own prehensible since he does and allows, not as
master. See below, pp. 115f. an encapsuled individual, but rather as a per¬
sona, i.e., as one who has a 'role,' namely, the
8. Above, Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sym- role is eo ipso already assigned to him by his
pathie (Bonn, 1923) C, II [G. W. 7, pp. 228- relationship to another even when one does
232]. not at all speak and act explicitly in the sense
ri y yy
17. On this variation, see above, p. 182, note 20. 24. Ibid., pp. 207f. Just this circumstance legiti¬
18. Lowith, op. cit., p. 52; see also §3. —Here we mates for Dilthey (p. 212) the difference be¬
can only call attention to the question about tween the “elementary” and “higher forms” of
what then would be the ground and root of understanding. What “being at the door” sig¬
these “moral qualities” in the individual as a nifies will be clarified below, pp. 135f.
“structured life-unity”—qualities which not 25. See Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympa-
only arise and are manifested in being to¬ thie, pp. 7f. [G. W. 7, pp. 22f.].
gether with others, but to which, constitu-
tively, the view of such a being-together be¬ 26. It is always possible to make this turn because
longs. the work, just as work, refers to people in the
modes of their participation and, more par¬
19. This oversight is also noticeable in Lowith s
ticularly, in the sense of “co-inclusive” refer¬
analysis of Pirandello s Cosi e (se vi pare), ibid,
ences.
§8, where the point of the piece is just not
made apparent. The point consists of the fact 27. Eduard Spranger, “Zur Theorie des Verste-
that outsiders want to explore by interroga¬ hens und zur geisteswissenschaftlichen Psy¬
tion and confrontation three persons “living chologic,” Festschrift fiir Johannes Volkelt
in a closed world” without those persons be¬ (Miinchen, 1918), pp. 379f.
ing aware that they have to do with a “closed
world.” In this context, “closed world” signi¬ 28. In this connection, see Dilthey, Gesammelte
fies that each of the three have a common his¬ Schriften, Vol. VII, p. 321; Spranger, op. cit.,
tory by virtue of and motivated by which they p. 389: “All understanding presupposes a hav¬
stand in a determinate way with respect to ing understood.”
one another. Because the outsiders do not ap¬ 29. Spranger's thesis, “that we only understand
preciate the historicality of the “world of the the mental [Seelische] by the psychical [Geis-
three,” their curiosity scarcely reaches its tige\,” experiences here some concrete sup¬
goal. Although Lowith sees that only regress port. As “psyche” Spranger designates “the
to the history of the relationship would make ideal meeting place” of “isolated encapsuled
these themselves comprehensible, and al¬ egos” (op cit., pp. 371 and 398).
though he sees it as a weakness of the piece
that this history remains in the background, 30. See Spranger, ibid., pp. 389f.
he does not note what it means for the way of
31. The concrete existence of the “victor at Auster-
being-together of the three in their “closed
litz” is obviously not identically the same as
world,” namely, that this being-together is of
the “author of the Napoleonic Code.” For the
“historical obviousness.” Because their be¬
realm under consideration here it holds uni¬
ing-together is historically rooted, it is there¬
versally that, if the concrete existence of a per¬
fore directly characterized as a being-to¬
son is determined with respect to the situ¬
gether in the dimension of community (see
ation in which he has a role, then the identity
§8). As such, however, it is of essence articu¬
of the “individual” persisting throughout the
lated differently than the dimension of the en¬
different roles is, as identity, hardly an un¬
counter of “relational” roles attuned to one
questioned obviousness, and is a prob¬
another. Of course, this difference can only be
lem. . . .
made distinct in sufficiently detailed analysis.
20. Lowith, op. cit., pp. 50ff. 32. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. VII, pp.
21. See §1. . . . 320f. When Dilthey notes that “deeds happen
in the drive of the will in order to bring some¬
22. See above, p. 26. thing about, not in order to communicate
23. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. VII; see es¬ something to contemporaries or successors,”
pecially, pp. 207f. The complexity of even con¬ reference is therefore made to what we em¬
tradictory thought-motives is explained by phasized before as the necessity of a turn
the state of this unfinished fragment (see the from institutions, works, etc., to the persons
“Preface of the Editor,” pp. 348ff.). who, in certain ways, have a stake in them. ♦
Social Behavior as Exchange 287
The Problems of
45 Small-Group Research
though we may not be able to explain why the cumstances and with a most useful built-in
propositions should take the form they do. A numerical measure of value. What are the
great amount of work has been done, and laws of the general phenomenon of which
more appears every day, but what it all economic behavior is one class?
amounts to in the shape of a set of proposi¬ In what follows I shall suggest some rea¬
tions from which, under specified condi¬ sons for the usefulness of a theory of social
tions, many of the observational results behavior as exchange and suggest the nature
might be derived, is not at all clear—and yet of the propositions such a theory might con¬
to state such a set is the first aim of science. tain.
The third job is to begin to show how the
propositions that empirically hold good in
An Exchange Paradigm
small groups may be derived from some set
of still more general propositions. "Still more I start with the link to behavioral psychol¬
general” means only that empirical proposi¬ ogy and the kind of statement it makes about
tions other than ours may also be derived the behavior of an experimental animal such
from the set. This derivation would consti¬ as the pigeon.4 As a pigeon explores its cage
tute the explanatory stage in the science of in the laboratory, it happens to peck a target,
elementary social behavior, for explanation is whereupon the psychologist feeds it com.
derivation.1 (I myself suspect that the more The evidence is that it will peck the target
general set will turn out to contain the propo¬ again; it has learned the behavior, or, as my
sitions of behavioral psychology. I hold my¬ friend Skinner says, the behavior has been
self to be an "ultimate psychological reduc¬ reinforced, and the pigeon has undergone op¬
tionist,” but I cannot know that I am right so erant conditioning. This kind of psychologist
long as the reduction has not been carried is not interested in how the behavior was
out.) learned: "learning theory” is a poor name for
I have come to think that all three of these his field. Instead, he is interested in what de¬
jobs would be furthered by our adopting the termines changes in the rate of emission of
view that interaction between persons is an learned behavior; whether pecks at a target or
exchange of goods, material and non-mate- something else.
rial. This is one of the oldest theories of social The more hungry the pigeon, the less com
behavior, and one that we still use every day or other food it has gotten in the recent past,
to interpret our own behavior, as when we the more often it will peck. By the same to¬
say, "I found so-and-so rewarding”; or "I got ken, if the behavior is often reinforced, if the
a great deal out of him”; or, even, "Talking pigeon is given much corn every time it
with him took a great deal out of me.” But, pecks, the rate of emission will fall off as the
perhaps just because it is so obvious, this pigeon gets satiated. If, on the other hand, the
view has been much neglected by social sci¬ behavior is not reinforced at all, then, too, its
entists. So far as I know, the only theoretical rate of emission will tend to fall off, though a
work that makes explicit use of it is Marcel long time may pass before it stops altogether,
Mausss Essai sur le don, published in 1925, before it is extinguished. In the emission of
which is ancient as social science goes.2 It many kinds of behavior the pigeon incurs
may be that the tradition of neglect is now aversive stimulation, or what I shall call
changing and that, for instance, the psy¬ "cost” for short, and this, too, will lead in time
chologists who interpret behavior in terms of to a decrease in the emission rate. Fatigue is
transactions may be coming back to some¬ an example of a "cost.” Extinction, satiation,
thing of the sort I have in mind.3 and cost, by decreasing the rate of emission
An incidental advantage of an exchange of a particular kind of behavior, render more
theory is that it might bring sociology closer probable the emission of some other kind of
to economics—that science of man most ad¬ behavior, including doing nothing. I shall
vanced, most capable of application, and, in¬ only add that even a hard-boiled psychologist
tellectually, most isolated. Economics stud¬ puts "emotional” behavior, as well as such
ies exchange carried out under special cir¬ things as pecking, among the unconditioned
Social Behavior as Exchange 289
between the value to others of the behavior a have built-in antidotes to change: there is no
man gives them and the value to him of the homeostasis here. I do not mean that we as¬
behavior they give him.8 sume equilibrium. I mean only that we some¬
Schachter also studied the behavior of times observe it, that for the time we are with
members of a group toward two kinds of a group—and it is often short—there is no
other members, “conformers" and “devi¬ great change in the values of the variables we
ates."9 I assume that conformers are people choose to measure. If, for instance, person A
whose activity the other members find valu¬ is interacting with B more than with C both
able. For conformity is behavior that coin¬ at the beginning and at the end of the study,
cides to a degree with some group standard then at least by this crude measure the group
or norm, and the only meaning I can assign is in equilibrium.
to norm is “a verbal description of behavior Many of the Festinger-Schachter studies
that many members find it valuable for the are experimental, and their propositions
actual behavior of themselves and others to about the process of influence seem to me to
conform to." By the same token, a deviate is
imply the kind of proposition that empiri¬
a member whose behavior is not particularly
cally holds good of real-life groups in practi¬
valuable. Now Schachter shows that, as the
cal equilibrium. For instance, Festinger et al.
members of a group come to see another
find that, the more cohesive a group is, the
member as a deviate, their interaction with
greater the change that members can pro¬
him—communication addressed to getting
duce in the behavior of other members. If the
him to change his behavior—goes up, the
influence is exerted in the direction of con¬
faster the more cohesive the group. The
members need not talk to the other conform¬ formity to group norms, then, when the pro¬
ers so much; they are relatively satiated by cess of influence has accomplished all the
the conformers’ behavior: they have gotten change of which it is capable, the proposition
what they want out of them. But if the devi¬ should hold good that, the more cohesive a
ate, by failing to chance his behavior, fails to group is, the larger the number of members
reinforce the members, they start to withhold that conform to its norms. And it does hold
social approval from him: the deviate gets good.10
low sociometric choice at the end of the ex¬ Again, Schachter found, in the experiment
periment. And in the most cohesive groups— I summarized above, that in the most cohe¬
those Schachter calls “high cohesive-rele¬ sive groups and at the end, when the effort to
vant"—interaction with the deviate also falls influence the deviate had failed, members
off in the end and is lowest among those interacted little with the deviate and gave him
members that rejected him most strongly, as little in the way of sociometric choice. Now
if they had given him up as a bad job. But how two of the propositions that hold good most
plonking can we get? These findings are ut¬ often of real-life groups in practical equilib¬
terly in line with everyday experience. rium are precisely that the more closely a
members activity conforms to the norms the
Practical Equilibrium more interaction he receives from other
members and the more liking choices he sets
At the beginning of this paper I suggested from them too. From these main proposi¬
that one of the tasks of small-group research tions a number of others may be derived that
was to show the relation between the results also hold good.11
of experimental work done under laboratory Yet we must ever remember that the truth
conditions and the results of field research on of the proposition linking conformity to lik¬
real-life small groups. Now the latter often ing may on occasion be masked by the truth
appear to be in practical equilibrium, and by of other propositions. If, for instance, the
this I mean nothing fancy. I do not mean that man that conforms to the norms most closely
all real-life groups are in equilibrium. I cer¬ also exerts some authority over the group,
tainly do not mean that all groups must tend this may render liking for him somewhat less
to equilibrium. I do not mean that groups than it might otherwise have been.12
Social Behavior as Exchange 291
Be that as it may, I suggest that the labora¬ all easy to specify, except that he is not apt to
tory experiments on influence imply propo¬ think like one of the theoretical antagonists
sitions about the behavior of members of in the Theory of Games. Before a sociologist
small groups, when the process of influence rejects this answer out of hand for its horrid
has worked itself out, that are identical with profit-seeking implications, he will do well to
propositions that hold good of real-life ask himself if he can offer any other answer
groups in equilibrium. This is hardly surpris¬ to the question posed. I think he will find that
ing if all we mean by equilibrium is that all he cannot. Yet experiments designed to test
the change of which the system is, under pre¬ the truth of the answer are extraordinarily
sent conditions, capable has been effected, so rare.
that no further change occurs. Nor would this I shall review one that seems to me to pro¬
be the first time that statics has turned out to vide a little support for the theory, though it
be a special case of dynamics. was not meant to do so. The experiment is
reported by H. B. Gerard, a member of the
Profit and Social Control Festinger-Schachter team, under the title
“The Anchorage of Opinions in Face-to-Face
Though I have treated equilibrium as an Groups.”14 The experimenter formed artifi¬
observed fact, it is a fact that cries for expla¬ cial groups whose members met to discuss a
nation. I shall not, as structural-functional case in industrial relations and to express
sociologists do, use an assumed equilibrium their opinions about its probable outcome.
as a means of explaining or trying to explain, The groups were of two kinds: high-attrac¬
why the other features of a social system tion groups, whose members were told that
should be what they are. Rather, I shall take they would like one another very much, and
practical equilibrium as something that is it¬ low-attraction groups, whose members were
self to be explained by the other features of told that they would not find one another
the system. particularly likable.
If every member of a group emits at the At a later time the experimenter called the
end of, and during, a period of time much the members in separately, asked them again to
same kinds of behavior and in much the same express their opinions on the outcome of the
frequencies as he did at the beginning, the case, and counted the number that had
group is for that period in equilibrium. Let us changed their opinions to bring them into
then ask why any one members behavior accord with those of other members of their
should persist. Suppose he is emitting behav¬ groups. At the same time, a paid participant
ior of value Aj. Why does he not let his behav¬ entered into a further discussion of the case
ior get worse (less valuable or reinforcing to with each member, always taking, on the
the others) until it stands at Aj — AA? True, probable outcome of the case, a position op¬
the sentiments expressed by others toward posed to that taken by the bulk of the other
him are apt to decline in value (become less members of the group to which the person
reinforcing to him), so that what he gets from belonged. The experimenter counted the
them may be Sj — AS. But it is conceivable number of persons shifting toward the opin¬
that, since most activity carries cost, a de¬ ion of the paid participant.
cline in the value of what he emits will mean The experiment had many interesting re¬
a reduction in cost to him that more than sults, from which I choose only those
offsets his losses in sentiment. Where, then, summed up in Tables 45-1 and 45-2. The
does he stabilize his behavior? This is the three different agreement classes are made
problem of social control.13 up of people who, at the original sessions,
Mankind has always assumed that a per¬ expressed different degrees of agreement
son stabilizes his behavior, at least in the with the opinions of other members of their
short run, at the point where he is doing the groups. And the figure 44, for instance,
best he can for himself under the circum¬ means that, of all members of high-attraction
stances, though his best may not be a “ratio¬ groups whose initial opinions were strongly
nal” best, and what he can do may not be at in disagreement with those of other mem-
292 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XI. Exchange Theory and Rational Choice Theory
bers, 44 per cent shifted their opinion later those who change most are the high-attrac¬
toward that of others. tion, strong-disagreement people and the
low-attraction, mild-disagreement ones.
Table 45-1 How am I to interpret these particular re¬
sults? Since the experimenter did not discuss
Percentage of Subjects Changing Toward them, I am free to offer my own explanation.
Someone in the Group The behavior emitted by the subjects is opin¬
Mild Strong ion and changes in opinion. For this behavior
Agree¬ Disagree¬ Disagree¬ they have learned to expect two possible
ment ment ment
kinds of reinforcement. Agreement with the
High Attraction_ 0 12 44
group gets the subject favorable sentiment
Low Attraction_ 0 15 9
(acceptance) from it, and the experiment was
designed to give this reinforcement a higher
Table 45 2 value in the high-attraction condition than in
the low-attraction one. The second kind of
Percentage of Subjects Changing Toward possible reinforcement is what I shall call the
the Paid Participant “maintenance of ones personal integrity,"
Mild Strong which a subject gets by sticking to his own
Agree¬ Disagree- Disagree opinion in the face of disagreement with the
ment ment ment group. The experimenter does not mention
High Attraction_ 7 13 25
this reward, but I cannot make sense of the
Low Attraction_ 20 38 8
results without something much like it. In
In these results the experimenter seems to different degrees for different subjects, de¬
have been interested only in the differences pending on their initial positions, these re¬
in the sums of the rows, which show that wards are in competition with one another:
there is more shifting toward the group, and they are alternatives. They are not absolutely
less shifting toward the paid participant, in scarce goods, but some persons cannot get
the high-attraction than in the low-attraction both at once.
condition. This is in line with a proposition Since the rewards are alternatives, let me
suggested earlier. If you think that the mem¬ introduce a familiar assumption from eco¬
bers of a group can give you much—in this nomics—that the cost of a particular course
case, liking—you are apt to give them of action is the equivalent of the foregone
much—in this case, a change to an opinion value of an alternative15—and then add the
in accordance with their views—or you will definition: Profit = Reward - Cost.
not get the liking. And, by the same token, if Now consider the persons in the corre¬
the group can give you little of value, you will sponding cells of the two tables. The behavior
not be ready to give it much of value. Indeed, of the high-attraction, agreement people gets
you may change your opinion so as to depart them much in the way of acceptance by the
from agreement even further, to move, that group, and for it they must give up little in
is, toward the view held by the paid partici¬ the way of personal integrity, for their views
pant. are from the start in accord with those of the
So far so good, but, when I first scanned group. Their profit is high, and they are not
these tables, I was less struck by the differ¬ prone to change their behavior. The low-at¬
ence between them than by their similarity. traction, strong-disagreement people are get¬
The same classes of people in both tables ting much in integrity and they are not giving
showed much the same relative propensities up for it much in valuable acceptance, for
to change their opinions, no matter whether they are members of low-attraction groups.
the change was toward the group or toward Reward less cost is high for them, too, and
the paid participant. We see, for instance, they change little. The high-attraction,
that those who change least are the high-at- strong-disagreement people are getting
traction, agreement people and the low-at¬ much in the way of integrity, but their costs
traction, strong-disagreement ones. And in doing so are high, too, for they are in high-
Social Behavior as Exchange 293
attraction groups and thus foregoing much they might never arrive at any equilibrium at
valuable acceptance by the group. Their all.
profit is low, and they are very apt to change,
either toward the group or toward the paid
Distributive Justice
participant, from whom they think, perhaps,
they will get some acceptance while main¬ Yet practical equilibrium is often ob¬
taining some integrity. The low-attraction, served, and thus some further condition may
mild-disagreement people do not get much in make its attainment, under some circum¬
the way of integrity, for they are only in mild stance, more probable than would the indi¬
disagreement with the group, but neither are vidual pursuit of profit left to itself. I can offer
they giving up much in acceptance, for they evidence for this further condition only in the
are members of low-attraction groups. Their behavior of subgroups and not in that of in¬
rewards are low; their costs are low too, and dividuals. Suppose that there are two sub¬
their profit—the difference between the groups, working close together in a factory,
two—is also low. In their low profit they re¬ the job of one being somewhat different from
semble the high-attraction, strong-disagree¬ that of the other. And suppose that the mem¬
ment people, and, like them, they are prone bers of the first complain and say: "We are
to change their opinions, in this case, more getting the same pay as they are. We ought to
toward the paid participant. The subjects in get just a couple of dollars a week more to
the other two cells, who have medium profits, show that our work is more responsible."
display medium propensities to change. When you ask them what they mean by
If we define profit as reward less cost, and "more responsible," they say that, if they do
if cost is value foregone, I suggest that we their work wrong, more damage can result,
have here some evidence for the proposition and so they are under more pressure to take
that change in behavior is greatest when per¬ care.16 Something like this is a common fea¬
ceived profit is least. This constitutes no di¬ ture of industrial behavior. It is at the heart
rect demonstration that change in behavior of disputes not over absolute wages but over
is least when profit is greatest, but if, when¬ wage differentials—indeed, at the heart of
disputes over rewards other than wages.
ever a mans behavior brought him a balance
In what kind of proposition may we ex¬
of reward and cost, he changed his behavior
press observations like these? We may say
away from what got him, under the circum¬
that wages and responsibility give status in
stances, the less profit, there might well come
the group, in the sense that a man who takes
a time when his behavior would not change
high responsibility and gets high wages is ad¬
further. That is, his behavior would be stabi¬
mired, other things equal. Then, if the mem¬
lized, at least for the time being. And, so far
bers of one group score higher on responsi¬
as this were true for every member of a group,
bility than do the members of another, there
the group would have a social organization is a felt need on the part of the first to score
in equilibrium. higher on pay too. There is a pressure, which
I do not say that a member would stabilize shows itself in complaints, to bring the status
his behavior at the point of greatest conceiv¬ factors, as I have called them, into line with
able profit to himself, because his profit is one another. If they are in line, a condition of
partly at the mercy of the behavior of others. status congruence is said to exist. In this con¬
It is a commonplace that the short-run pur¬ dition the workers may find their jobs dull or
suit of profit by several persons often lands irksome, but they will not complain about the
them in positions where all are worse off than relative position of groups.
they might conceivably be. I do not say that But there may be a more illuminating way
the paths of behavioral change in which a of looking at the matter. In my example I have
member pursues his profit under the condi¬ considered only responsibility and pay, but
tion that others are pursuing theirs too are these may be enough, for they represent the
easy to describe or predict; and we can read¬ two kinds of thing that come into the prob¬
ily conceive that in jockeying for position lem. Pay is clearly a reward: responsibility
294 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XI. Exchange Theory and Rational Choice Theory
may be looked on, less clearly, as a cost. It that thus confessing to him their inability to
means constraint and worry—or peace of solve a problem would reflect on their com¬
mind foregone. Then the proposition about petence, affect the official ratings he made of
status congruence becomes this: If the costs their work, and so hurt their chances for pro¬
of the members of one group are higher than motion. So agents often asked other agents
those of another, distributive justice requires for help and advice, and, though this was
that their rewards should be higher too. But nominally forbidden, the supervisor usually
the thing works both ways: If the rewards are let it pass.
higher, the costs should be higher too. This Blau ascertained the ratings the super¬
last is the theory of noblesse oblige, which we visor made of the agents, and he also asked
all subscribe to, though we all laugh at it, the agents to rate one another. The two opin¬
perhaps because the noblesse often fails to ions agreed closely. Fewer agents were re¬
oblige. To put the matter in terms of profit: garded as highly competent than were re¬
though the rewards and costs of two persons garded as of middle or low competence; com¬
or the members of two groups may be differ¬ petence, or the ability to solve technical prob¬
ent, yet the profits of the two—the excess of lems, was a fairly scarce good. One or two of
reward over cost—should tend to equality. the more competent agents would not give
And more than “should.” The less-advan¬ help and advice when asked, and so received
taged group will at least try to attain greater few interactions and little liking. A man that
equality, as, in the example I have used, the will not exchange, that will not give you what
first group tried to increase its profit by in¬ he has when you need it, will not get from you
creasing its pay. the only thing you are, in this case, able to
I have talked of distributive justice. give him in return, your regard.
Clearly, this is not the only condition deter¬ But most of the more competent agents
mining the actual distribution of rewards and were willing to give help, and of them Blau
costs. At the same time, never tell me that says:
notions of justice are not a strong influence
on behavior, though we sociologists often ne¬ A consultation can be considered an ex¬
glect them. Distributive justice may be one of change of values: both participants gain
the conditions of group equilibrium. something, and both have to pay a price.
The questioning agent is enabled to per¬
form better than he could otherwise have
Exchange and Social Structure done, without exposing his difficulties to
his supervisor. By asking for advice, he im¬
I shall end by reviewing almost the only plicitly pays his respect to the superior
study I am aware of that begins to show in proficiency of his colleague. This ac¬
detail how a stable and differentiated social knowledgment of inferiority is the cost of
structure in a real-life group might arise out receiving assistance. The consultant gains
of a process of exchange between members. prestige, in return for which he is willing
to devote some time to the consultation
This is Peter Blau's description of the behav¬
and permit it to disrupt his own work. The
ior of sixteen agents in a federal law-enforce¬ following remark of an agent illustrates
ment agency.17 this: T like giving advice. It's flattering, I
The agents had the duty of investigating suppose, if you feel that others come to
firms and preparing reports on the firms' you for advice.'18
compliance with the law. Since the reports
might lead to legal action against the firms, Blau goes on to say: “All agents liked being
the agents had to prepare them carefully, in consulted, but the value of any one of very
the proper form, and take strict account of many consultations became deflated for ex¬
the many regulations that might apply. The perts, and the price they paid in frequent in¬
agents were often in doubt what they should terruptions became inflated.''19 This implies
do, and then they were supposed to take the that, the more prestige an agent received, the
question to their supervisor. This they were less was the increment of value of that pres¬
reluctant to do, for they naturally believed tige; the more advice an agent gave, the
Social Behavior as Exchange 295
greater was the increment of cost of that ad¬ Blau shows, then, that a social structure in
vice, the cost lying precisely in the forgone equilibrium might be the result of a process
value of time to do his own work. Blau sug¬ of exchanging behavior rewarding and costly
gests that something of the same sort was in different degrees, in which the increment
true of an agent who went to a more compe¬ of reward and cost varied with the frequency
tent colleague for advice: the more often he of the behavior, that is, with the frequency of
went, the more costly to him, in feelings of interaction. Note that the behavior of the
inferiority, became any further request. "The agents seems also to have satisfied my second
repeated admission of his inability to solve condition of equilibrium: the more compe¬
his own problems . . . undermined the self- tent agents took more responsibility for the
confidence of the worker and his standing in work, either their own or others', than did the
the group/'20 less competent ones, but they also got more
The result was that the less competent for it in the way of prestige. I suspect that the
agents went to the more competent ones for same kind of explanation could be given for
help less often than they might have done if the structure of many "informal" groups.
the costs of repeated admissions of inferior¬
ity had been less high and that, while many Summary
agents sought out the few highly competent
ones, no single agent sought out the latter The current job of theory in small-group
much. Had they done so (to look at the ex¬ research is to make the connection between
change from the other side), the costs to the experimental and real-life studies, to consoli¬
highly competent in interruptions to their date the propositions that empirically hold
own work would have become exorbitant. Yet good in the two fields, and to show how these
the need of the less competent for help was propositions might be derived from a still
still not fully satisfied. Under these circum¬ more general set. One way of doing this job
stances they tended to turn for help to agents would be to revive and make more rigorous
more nearly like themselves in competence. the oldest of theories of social behavior—so¬
Though the help they got was not the most cial behavior as exchange.
valuable, it was of a kind they could them¬ Some of the statements of such a theory
selves return on occasion. With such agents might be the following. Social behavior is an
they could exchange help and liking, without exchange of goods, material goods but also
the exchange becoming on either side too non-material ones, such as the symbols of
approval or prestige. Persons that give much
great a confession of inferiority.
to others try to get much from them, and
The highly competent agents tended to en¬
persons that get much from others are under
ter into exchanges, that is, to interact with
pressure to give much to them. This process
many others. But, in the more equal ex¬
of influence tends to work out at equilibrium
changes I have just spoken of, less competent
to a balance in the exchanges. For a person
agents tended to pair off as partners. That is,
engaged in exchange, what he gives may be a
they interacted with a smaller number of peo¬
cost to him, just as what he gets may be a
ple, but interacted often with these few. I reward, and his behavior changes less as
think I could show why pair relations in these profit, that is, reward less cost, tends to a
more equal exchanges would be more eco¬ maximum. Not only does he seek a maximum
nomical for an agent than a wider distribu¬ for himself, but he tries to see to it that no
tion of favors. But perhaps I have gone far one in his group makes more profit than he
enough. The final pattern of this social struc¬ does. The cost and the value of what he gives
ture was one in which a small number of and of what he gets vary with the quantity of
highly competent agents exchanged advice what he gives and gets. It is surprising how
for prestige with a large number of others less familiar these propositions are; it is surpris¬
competent and in which the less competent ing, too, how propositions about the dynam¬
agents exchanged, in pairs and in trios, both ics of exchange can begin to generate the
help and liking on more nearly equal terms. static thing we call "group structure" and, in
296 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XI. Exchange Theory and Rational Choice Theory
so doing, generate also some of the proposi¬ 7. S. Schachter, N. Ellertson, D. McBride, and D.
tions about group structure that students of Gregory, “An Experimental Study of Cohe¬
real-life groups have stated. siveness and Productivity,” Human Relations,
IV (1951), 229-38.
In our unguarded moments we socio¬
logists find words like “reward” and “cost” 8. Skinner, op. cit., p. 100.
slipping into what we say. Human nature will 9. S. Schachter, “Deviation, Rejection, and Com¬
break in upon even our most elaborate theo¬ munication,” Journal of Abnormal and Social
ries. But we seldom let it have its way with us Psychology, XLVI (1951), 190-207.
and follow up systematically what these 10. L. Festinger, S. Schachter, and K. Back, Social
words imply.21 Of all our many “approaches” Pressures in Informal Groups (New York: Har¬
to social behavior, the one that sees it as an per & Bros., 1950), pp. 72-100.
economy is the most neglected, and yet it is 11. For propositions holding good of groups in
the one we use every moment of our lives— practical equilibrium see G. C. Homans, The
except when we write sociology. Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace &
Co., (1950), and H. W. Riecken and G. C.
Endnotes Homans, “Psychological Aspects of Social
Structure,” in G. Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of
1. See R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation Social Psychology (Cambridge, Mass.: Ad¬
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, dison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1954), II, 786-
1953). 832.
2. Translated by I. Cunnison as The Gift (Glen¬ 12. See Homans, op. cit., pp. 244-48, and R. F.
coe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954). Bales “The Equilibrium Problem in Small
3. In social anthropology D. L. Oliver is working Groups,” in A. P. Hare, E. F. Borgatta, and R.
along these lines, and I owe much to him. See F. Bales (eds.) Small Groups (New York: A. A.
also T. M. Newcomb, “The Prediction of Inter¬ Knopf, 1953), pp. 450-56.
personal Attraction,” American Psychologist, 13. Homans, op. cit., pp. 281-301.
XI (1956), 575-86.
14. Human Relations, VII (1954), 313-25.
4. B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1953). 15. G. J. Stigler, The Theory of Price (rev. ed.; New
York: Macmillan Co., 1952), p. 99.
5. Ibid., pp. 297-329. The discussion of “double
contingency” by T. Parsons and E. A. Shils 16. G. C. Homans, “Status among Clerical Work¬
could easily lead to a similar paradigm (see ers,” Human Organization, XII (1953), 5-10.
Toward a General Theory of Action [Cam¬ 17. Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955),
1951], pp. 14-16). 99-116.
6. K. W. Back, “The Exertion of Influence 18. Ibid., p. 108.
through Social Communication,” in L. Fest-
19. Ibid., p. 108.
inger, K. Back, Schachter, H. H. Kelley, and J.
Thibaut (eds.), Theory and Experiment in So¬ 20. Ibid., p. 109.
cial Communication (Ann Arbor: Research 21. The White-Collar Job (Ann Arbor: Survey Re¬
Center for Dynamics, University of Michigan, search Center, University of Michigan, 1953),
1950), pp. 21-36. pp. 115-27. ♦
Human Capital and Social Capital 297
processes together and blurs distinctions be¬ seen; its current value lies primarily in its
tween types of social relations, distinctions usefulness for qualitative analyses of social
that are important for other purposes. The systems and for those quantitative analyses
value of the concept lies primarily in the fact that employ qualitative indicators.
that it identifies certain aspects of social . . . [T]he concept of social capital will be
structure by their function, just as the con¬ left unanalyzed (as it was in the brief descrip¬
cept “chair" identifies certain physical ob¬ tions given above as examples). In this chap¬
jects by their function, disregarding differ¬ ter, however, I will examine just what it is
ences in form, appearance, and construction. about social relations that can constitute use¬
The function identified by the concept “social ful capital resources for individuals.
capital" is the value of those aspects of social
structure to actors, as resources that can be
Obligations and Expectations
used by the actors to realize their interests.
By identifying this function of certain as¬ . . . [I]f A does something for B and trusts
pects of social structure, the concept of social B to reciprocate in the future, this establishes
capital aids in both accounting for different an expectation in A and an obligation on the
outcomes at the level of individual actors and part of B to keep the trust. This obligation can
making the micro-to-macro transition with¬ be conceived of as a “credit slip" held by A to
out elaborating the social-structural details be redeemed by some performance by B. If A
through which this occurs. For example, holds a large number of these credit slips
characterizing the clandestine study circles from a number of persons with whom he has
of South Korean radical students as consti¬ relations, then the analogy to financial capi¬
tuting social capital that these students can tal is direct: The credit slips constitute a large
use in their revolutionary activities is an as¬ body of credit on which A can draw if neces¬
sertion that the groups constitute a resource sary—unless, of course, the placement of
which aids in moving the students from indi¬ trust has been unwise, and the slips represent
vidual protest to organized revolt. If a re¬ bad debts that will not be repaid. In some
source that accomplishes this task is held to social structures (such as, for example, the
be necessary in a theory of revolt... then the neighborhoods discussed by Willmott and
study circles can be grouped with other orga¬ Young, 1967) it is said that people are “always
nizational structures, of different origins, doing things for each other." There are a large
which have fulfilled the same function for number of these credit slips outstanding,
individuals with revolutionary goals in other often on both sides of a relation (for these
contexts, such as the comites d’action lyceen credit slips often appear to be not fungible
of the French student revolt of 1968 or the across different areas of activity, so credit
workers’ cells in czarist Russia described and slips from B held by A and those from A held
advocated by Lenin (1973 [1902]). by B are not fully used to cancel each other
It is true, of course, that for other purposes out). The market in Cairo described earlier in
one wants to investigate the details of such this chapter constitutes an extreme case of
organizational resources, to understand the such a social structure. In other social struc¬
elements that are critical to their usefulness tures where individuals are more self-suffi¬
as resources for a given purpose, and to ex¬ cient, depending on each other less, there are
amine how they came into being in a particu¬ fewer of these credit slips outstanding at any
lar case. But the concept of social capital can time.
allow showing how such resources can be Two elements are critical to this form of
combined with other resources to produce social capital: the level of trustworthiness of
different system-level behavior or, in other the social environment, which means that
cases, different outcomes for individuals. obligations will be repaid, and the actual ex¬
Whether social capital will come to be as use¬ tent of obligations held. Social structures dif¬
ful a quantitative concept in social science as fer in both of these dimensions, and actors
are the concepts of financial capital, physical within a particular structure differ in the sec¬
capital, and human capital remains to be ond.
Human Capital and Social Capital 299
A case which illustrates the value of trust¬ Still another case that illustrates the im¬
worthiness is the rotating credit association portance of trustworthiness as a form of so¬
found in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. cial capital is a system of mutual trust. The
These associations are groups of friends and extreme example of such a system is a couple,
neighbors who typically meet monthly; each each of whom places extensive trust in the
person contributes the same amount of other, whether they are deeply in love or not.
money to a central fund, which is then given For both members of such a couple, the rela¬
to one of the members (through bidding or tion has extraordinary psychological value.
by lot). After n months each of the n persons Each can confide in the other, can expose
has made n contributions and received one inner doubts, can be completely forthright
payout. As Geertz (1962) points out, these with the other, can raise sensitive issues—all
associations serve as efficient institutions for without fear of the others misuse of the trust.
amassing savings for small capital expendi¬ Differences in social structures with re¬
tures, an important aid to economic develop¬ spect to the extent of outstanding obligations
ment. Without a high degree of trustworthi¬ arise for a variety of reasons. These include,
ness among the members of the group, such besides the general level of trustworthiness
a credit association could not exist—for a that leads obligations to be repaid, the actual
person who received a payout early in the needs that persons have for help, the exis¬
sequence of meetings could abscond, leaving tence of other sources of aid (such as govern¬
the others with a loss. One could not imagine ment welfare services), the degree of afflu¬
such a rotating credit association operating
ence (which reduces the amount of aid
successfully in urban areas marked by a high
needed from others), cultural differences in
degree of social disorganization—or, in other
the tendency to lend aid and ask for aid (see
words, by a lack of social capital.
Banfield, 1967), the degree of closure of so¬
Another situation in which extreme trust¬
cial networks, the logistics of social contacts
worthiness facilitates actions that would not
(see Festinger, Schachter, and Back, 1963),
otherwise be possible is that of heads of state.
and other factors. Individuals in social struc¬
Various accounts of the experiences of heads
tures with high levels of obligations outstand¬
of state suggest that for persons in this posi¬
ing at any time, whatever the source of those
tion it is extremely valuable to have an exten¬
obligations, have greater social capital on
sion of ones self, an agent one can trust ab¬
which they can draw. The density of out¬
solutely to act as one would in a given situ¬
standing obligations means, in effect, that
ation. Many heads of state have such a per¬
son, who may not occupy a formal position the overall usefulness of the tangible re¬
of power but may be a member of a personal sources possessed by actors in that social
staff. The fact that these persons are often old structure is amplified by their availability to
friends, or cronies, rather than persons who other actors when needed.
have distinguished themselves in some politi¬ In a farming community such as ... where
cal activity, is derivative from this: The most one farmer got his hay baled by another and
important attribute of such a person is that where farm tools are extensively borrowed
trust can be placed in him, and this require¬ and lent, the social capital allows each farmer
ment often dictates choosing a long-term per¬ to get his work done with less physical capital
sonal friend. Such persons often come to in the form of tools and equipment. Such a
have enormous power due to their proximity social structure is analogous to an industrial
to a head of state and the trust placed in them; community in which bills of exchange (that
and there are many recorded accounts of the is, debts) are passed around, serving as
use of that power. What is of interest here is money and effectively reducing the financial
the social capital this relation provides for capital necessary to carry out a given level of
the head of state, assuming that the trust is manufacturing activity. (See Ashton, 1945,
well placed. The trusted other is virtually an for a description of this in Lancashire in the
extension of self, allowing the head of state 1790s, before a centralized monetary system
to expand his capacity for action. was well established in England.)
300 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XI. Exchange Theory and Rational Choice Theory
Individual actors in a social system also deference, and high occupational prestige.
differ with respect to the extent of credit slips These constituted a felt obligation to the phy¬
on which they can draw at any time. For ex¬ sician, a form of social capital which inhib¬
ample, in hierarchically structured extended ited patients dissatisfied with the outcome of
family settings, a patriarch often holds an their medical treatments from taking action
extraordinarily large set of such credit slips, against the physician.
which he can call in at any time to get done But several factors have changed. One is
what he wants done. Another clear example that physicians’ monopoly on medical knowl¬
occurs in villages in traditional settings that edge has been lessened by an expansion of
are highly stratified, where certain wealthy education. A second is a reduction in the like¬
families, because of their wealth, have built lihood that there is a personal relation be¬
up extensive credits on which they can call at tween physician and patient, since a patient
any time. (It is the existence of such asymme¬ is less likely to use a family doctor or even a
tries that can make some families immune to general practitioner and more likely to see
sanctions that can be used to regulate the specialists for particular medical problems.
actions of others in the community. . . .) A third is the high income of many physi¬
Similarly, in a political setting such as a cians, which reduces the perceived asymme¬
legislature, a legislator in a position that try between service and compensation. A
brings extra resources (such as the Speaker
fourth is the increased use of liability insur¬
of the House of Representatives or the Major¬
ance, which transfers the financial cost of a
ity Leader of the Senate in the U.S. Congress)
lawsuit from physician to insurer. The com¬
can, by effective use of those resources, build
bination of these and other factors has re¬
up a set of credits from other legislators so
duced the social capital that protected the
that it becomes possible for him to get legis¬
physician from becoming a target when pa¬
lation passed that would otherwise be de¬
tients experienced undesirable medical out¬
feated. This concentration of obligations
comes.
constitutes social capital that is useful not
only for the powerful legislator, but also in ***
increasing the level of action of the legisla¬
ture. Thus those members of legislatures who
Why do rational actors create obligations?
have extensive credit slips should be more
Although some of the variation in the extent
powerful than those who do not because they
of outstanding obligations arises from social
can use the credits to produce bloc voting on
changes of the sort described above, some
many issues. It is well recognized, for exam¬
ple, that in the U.S. Senate, some senators are appears to arise from the intentional creation
members of what is called the Senate Club, of obligation by a person who does some¬
and others are not. This in effect means that thing for another. For example, Turnbull
some senators are embedded in a system of (1972), who studied the Ik, a poverty-ridden
credits and debts, and others (outside the tribe in Africa, describes an occasion when a
Club) are not. It is also well recognized that man arrived home to find his neighbors, un¬
those in the Club are more powerful than asked, on the roof of his house fixing it. De¬
those outside it. spite his not wanting this aid, he was unable
Another example showing asymmetry in to induce them to stop. In this case and others
the sets of obligations and expectations is the there appears to be, not the creation of obli¬
one . .. about the crisis in medical care in the gations through necessity, but a purposive
United States due to liability suits. Tradition¬ creation of obligations. The giving of gifts has
ally physicians have been in control of events been interpreted in this light (see Mauss,
having literally life-and-death importance to 1954), as have the potlatches of the Kwakiutl
patients, who in turn often felt unable to ade¬ tribe in the Pacific Northwest. In rural areas
quately compensate them for the extreme persons who do favors for others often seem
benefits they brought about. Part of a physi¬ to prefer that these favors not be repaid im¬
cians payment was in the form of gratitude, mediately, and those for whom a favor is done
Human Capital and Social Capital 301
sometimes seem anxious to relieve them¬ favor costs him little), rather than when the
selves of the obligation. donor is in need, because the call for his serv¬
Although the motives for freeing oneself ices may come at an inconvenient time (when
from obligations may be readily understood repaying the obligation would be costly).
(especially if the existence of obligations con¬ Thus in principle there can be a struggle be¬
sumes ones attention), the motives for creat¬ tween a person wanting to do a favor for an¬
ing obligations toward oneself are less trans¬ other and the other not wanting to have the
parent. If there is a nonzero chance that the favor done for him or a struggle between a
obligation will not be repaid, it would appear person attempting to repay a favor and his
that rational persons would extend such creditor attempting to prevent repayment.
credit only if they expect to receive some¬
thing greater in return—just as a bank makes Information Potential
a loan only at sufficient interest to realize a
profit after allowing for risk. The question An important form of social capital is the
then becomes whether there is anything potential for information that inheres in so¬
about social obligations to make a rational cial relations. Information is important in
person interested in establishing and main¬ providing a basis for action. But acquisition
taining such obligations on the part of others of information is costly. The minimum it re¬
toward himself. quires is attention, which is always in short
A possible answer is this: When I do a favor supply. One means by which information can
for you, this ordinarily occurs at a time when be acquired is to use social relations that are
you have a need and involves no great cost to maintained for other purposes. Katz and
me. If I am rational and purely self-inter¬ Lazarsfeld (1955) show how this operates for
ested, I see that the importance to you of this women in several areas of life; for example, a
favor is sufficiently great that you will be woman who has an interest in being in style
ready to repay me with a favor in my time of but not at the leading edge of fashion can use
need that will benefit me more than this favor certain friends, who do stay on the leading
costs me—unless, of course, you are also in edge, as sources of information. As another
need at that time. This does not apply when example, a person who is not deeply inter¬
the favor is merely the lending of money, ested in current events but who is interested
since a unit of money holds about the same in being informed about important develop¬
interest to a person over time.1 When the fa¬ ments can save the time required to read a
vor involves services, expenditure of time, or newspaper if he can get the information he
some other nonfungible resource, however, wants from a friend who pays attention to
or when it is of intrinsically more value to the such matters. A social scientist who is inter¬
recipient than to the donor (such as help with ested in being up to date on research in related
a task that can be done by two persons but fields can make use of his everyday interactions
not by one), this kind of mutually profitable with colleagues to do so, if he can depend on
exchange is quite possible. The profitability them to be up to date in their fields.
for the donor depends on the recipient s not All these are examples of social relations
repaying the favor until the donor is in need. that constitute a form of social capital in pro¬
Thus creating obligations by doing favors viding information that facilitates action.
can constitute a kind of insurance policy for The relations in this case are valuable for the
which the premiums are paid in inexpensive information they provide, not for the credit
currency and the benefit arrives as valuable slips they provide in the form of obligations
currency. There may easily be a positive ex¬ that one holds for others' performance.
pected profit.
There is one more point: A rational, self- Norms and Effective Sanctions
interested person may attempt to prevent
others from doing favors for him or may at¬ . . . When an effective norm does exist, it
tempt to relieve himself of an obligation at a constitutes a powerful, but sometimes frag¬
time he chooses (that is, when repaying the ile, form of social capital. Effective norms
302 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XI. Exchange Theory and Rational Choice Theory
ployers looked for monotype operators and cial capital for the purpose of earning income
as monotype operators looked for jobs, both for them. These organizations ordinarily take
found this organization to be an effective em¬ the form of authority structures composed of
ployment referral service and utilized it for positions connected by obligations and ex¬
this purpose. Still later, when the Progressive pectations and occupied by persons. ... In
Party came into power in the New York Typo¬ creating such an organization, an entrepre¬
graphical Union, the Monotype Club served neur or capitalist transforms financial capi¬
as an organizational resource for the ousted tal into physical capital in the form of build¬
Independent Party The Monotype Club sub¬ ings and tools, social capital in the form of
sequently served as an important source of the organization of positions, and human
social capital for the Independents, sustain¬ capital in the form of persons occupying po¬
ing their party as an organized opposition sitions. Like the other forms of capital, social
while they were out of office. capital requires investment in the designing
In an example used earlier in this chapter, of the structure of obligations and expecta¬
the study circles of South Korean student tions, responsibility and authority, and
radicals were described as being groups of norms (or rules) and sanctions which will
students who came from the same high bring about an effectively functioning orga¬
school or hometown or church. In this case nization.
also, organization that was initiated for one Another form of intentional organization
purpose is appropriable for other purposes, is a voluntary association which produces a
constituting important social capital for the public good. For example, a group of parents
individuals who have available to them the whose children attend a school forms a PTA
organizational resources. chapter where one did not exist before. This
These examples illustrate the general organization constitutes social capital not
point that organization brought into exis¬ only for the organizers but for the school, the
tence for one set of purposes can also aid students, and other parents. Even if the orga¬
others, thus constituting social capital that is nization serves only the original purpose for
available for use.2 It may be that this form of which it is organized and is not appropriated
social capital can be dissolved, with nothing for other purposes, as is the case for organi¬
left over, into elements that are discussed un¬ zations described in an earlier section, it
der other headings in this section, that is, serves this purpose, by its very nature, for a
obligations and expectations, information wider range of actors than those who initi¬
potential, norms, and authority relations. If ated it. Such an organization is, concretely,
so, listing this form of social capital is redun¬ of the same sort as those described earlier.
dant. But the phenomenon of social organi¬ The PTA is the same kind of organization as
zation being appropriated as existing social the Monotype Club, the residents' associa¬
capital for new purposes is such a pervasive tion formed to deal with faulty plumbing, and
one that separate mention appears war¬ the church groups of South Korean Youth. All
ranted. are voluntary associations. As it functions,
however, the organization creates two kinds
Intentional Organization of by-products as social capital. One is the
by-product described in the preceding sec¬
A major use of the concept of social capital tion, the appropriability of the organization
depends on its being a by-product of activi¬ for other purposes. A second is the by-prod¬
ties engaged in for other purposes. . . . uct described here: Because the organization
[Tjhere is often little or no direct investment produces a public good, its creation by one
in social capital. There are, however, forms of subset of persons makes its benefits available
social capital which are the direct result of to others as well, whether or not they partici¬
investment by actors who have the aim of pate. For example, the disciplinary standards
receiving a return on their investment. promulgated by an active PTA change a
The most prominent example is a business school in ways that benefit nonparticipants
organization created by the owners of finan¬ as well as participants. . . .
304 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XI. Exchange Theory and Rational Choice Theory
place, unique cooperative solutions to the su¬ termed joint goods) that cannot be obtained
pergame rest on a most unrealistic assump¬ by following individual strategies. Coopera¬
tion—that players are endowed with perfect tive institutions are generally formed to take
monitoring capacity (Bendor and Mookher- advantage of positive externalities, such as
jee, 1987). This assumption limits the appli¬ increasing returns to scale, risk-sharing, and
cation of game-theoretic solutions to the evo¬ cost-sharing. The demand for joint goods is
lution of cooperative institutions to the heightened by contextual events like wars,
smallest of groups.5 invasions, epidemics, and natural disasters,
In the wake of these current difficulties as well as by endogenous processes like rapid
with the invisible-hand approach, it is best to demographic growth. These events and pro¬
consider the merits of solidaristic explana¬ cesses are commonly experienced by a num¬
tions, even though they require much ber of people, and on this account stimulate
stronger initial conditions. From a solidaris¬ demand for goods that spread risk—such as
tic point of view, the emergence of coopera¬ the protection afforded by walls around a set¬
tive institutions requires individual agree¬ tlement, and the insurance provided the es¬
ment on some common end, acceptance of tablishment of a mutual benefit society.
corporate obligations, and the establishment But the mere existence of demand for a
of formal controls to preclude free riding. joint good is insufficient to guarantee its pro¬
Can these admittedly strong initial condi¬ duction. One of the firmest conclusions of
tions be explained on the basis of the typical rational choice is that whereas the produc¬
self-interested behavioral assumptions of tion of private goods is hardly problematic,
rational choice theory?6 I believe that the an¬ in general public goods will not be produced
swer to this question is a qualified yes. Using at optimal levels, if they are produced at all.
the relatively weak assumptions that are tra¬ Whether a joint good is public or private is
ditional in rational choice, it is indeed possi¬ largely a function of its excludability from
ble to explain the emergence of cooperative potential consumers. With respect to produc¬
institutions on the basis of solidaristic logic. ers, both the protection afforded by town
The remainder of this chapter sketches out walls and the insurance offered by mutual
the basic argument, and then suggests that benefit associations are collective goods, but
the argument can be applied to several types with respect to consumers they are private
of empirical situations. goods in that these consumers (under certain
conditions) can be readily excluded from
them.
A Solidaristic Approach to the Whether or not a joint good is excludable
Emergence of Cooperative is, at least in part, due to the control capacity
of the potential producers of the good. This
Institutions
control capacity depends upon formal con¬
trols that must emerge endogenously. The es¬
Briefly, the genesis of cooperative institu¬
tablishment of these formal controls may be
tions depends on the conjunction of (1) indi¬
seen as a series of solutions to a three-tier
viduals' demands to provide themselves with
free-rider problem. All three of these free¬
jointly-produced private (that is, excludable)
rider problems must be solved before a coop¬
goods, as well as on (2) these individuals' po¬
erative institution can emerge. Since the first
tential control capacity—that is, their oppor¬
two of these problems are already well-appre¬
tunities either to dissuade each other from
ciated in the literature, this chapter focuses
free riding, or to assure each other of their
on the third of these.
intent to cooperate. Both demand and con¬
trol capacity are necessary for the emergence
The First Tier Free-Rider
of cooperative institutions; without either,
Problem—Design-Making
this kind of institutional genesis is doomed.
The demand for cooperative institutions In the first place, at least one design or
arises from individuals' desires to consume plan must be devised that promises to yield
jointly-produced private goods (hereafter the joint good. Each plan must comprise a set
308 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XI. Exchange Theory and Rational Choice Theory
of production rules that specify what must get were assured that others would do likewise
done by whom in order to provide an ade¬ (this is often known as the assurance prob¬
quate supply of the good.7 Yet since these lem). If there is no means of deterring free
designs are themselves a collective good, who riders, then there will be suboptimal produc¬
will devise them? Although X is eager to con¬ tion of the joint good—either because every¬
sume the joint good, X can spend her time one prefers to free ride, or because the assur¬
more profitably by attempting to add to her ance problem cannot be resolved to the sat¬
resource endowment than by thinking up de¬ isfaction of contingent cooperators.8
signs for newfangled institutions. Whatever its specific causes, suboptimal
The solution to this first-order free-rider production of the joint good leads the group
problem is the entrepreneurial one; it lies in to unravel. In order to attain optimal produc¬
the individuals' incentive to think up designs tion, formal controls that assure high levels
that—were their design implemented— of compliance with production (and distribu¬
would provide them with private benefits tion) rules by monitoring and sanctioning
greatly exceeding the cost of design-making. group members must be adopted.
For example, ambitious individuals would Yet since these controls are themselves a
gamble by formulating plans whose adoption collective good, their establishment has been
requires either expertise or resources that difficult to explain from choice-theoretic
they alone can claim to have. premises. One solution (the solution I have
been working on) flows from the visibility of
The Second Tier Free-Rider Problem: the production and distribution of the joint
Establishment of an Initial Constitution good.
One particular design then must be se¬ For a joint good to be maximally exclud¬
lected by the relevant population. The desire able, both individual production and distri¬
to consume the joint good motivates indi¬ bution must be highly visible. In the absence
viduals to make such a selection, for if they of visibility, neither free riding (a production
fail to do so, too little of the good will be problem), nor overconsumption (a distribu¬
produced. It is probable that each rational tion problem) can be precluded. Production
individual will prefer a realistic design that visibility is at a maximum when individual
seems to offer the greatest amount of the effort can be well-measured by output assess¬
good at the least (private) cost. These individ¬ ment. Distribution visibility, however, is at a
ual preferences must then be aggregated into maximum when individuals must draw mea¬
a collective design. Under the conditions of surable shares of the joint good publicly from
the state of nature—that is, in the absence of some central store or repository.
any prior institutional framework, and in the Most (if not all) of the positive externalities
absence of any significant resource imbal¬ of cooperative institutions rest on the advan¬
ance among participants—agreement on a u- tages of pooling individual assets so that a
nanimity rule is likeliest among a relatively common central store, or bank, is thereby
small group of rational egoists, because this established. The individual depositor expects
kind of rule is most consistent with each to draw some net private benefit from this
member's private interest (Buchanan and central store (either interest, or—most likely
Tullock, 1962). in the state of nature—access to a wholly dif¬
ferent kind of good than that deposited, such
The Third Tier Free-Rider Problem: as a share of the meat of a large game animal,
Implementation of the Design
or insurance against some loss).
Even though all institution-builders want Two examples should suffice to illustrate
to consume the joint good, each rational ac¬ how control is attained in cooperative insti¬
tor will prefer to free ride on the others’ con¬ tutions. In hunting and gathering societies
tributions. This preference may not, however, hunters pool individual inputs of time and
characterize those contingent cooperators labor in drives to kill large game that yield
who would willingly contribute to the estab¬ meat. Both the production and distribution
lishment of a cooperative institution if they of killed meat is highly visible to the other
The Emergence of Cooperative Social Institutions 309
hunters. The effort that each hunter contrib¬ lem here. Whereas I can assume that other
utes to the drive is difficult to conceal: indi¬ members also have an interest in getting their
vidual roles in the drive are agreed upon be¬ own investment back, I have no assurance
fore it takes place, and whether a given per¬ that they won’t take my share, split it among
son is performing his assigned role is rela¬ themselves, and claim that my share was
tively visible (although this is a less accurate never found. There is no guarantee that any¬
way to judge his contribution than output one else will look after my interests.
assessment would provide). As for distribu¬ Likewise, all members will sanction the
tion, the meat that is produced by the drive noncompliant depositor; no depositor has
is usually spatially concentrated—and anything to gain by associating with a rule-
thereby constitutes a central fund—for, given breaker whose assets have already been
the technology of hunter-gatherers, the most stripped—and presumably much to lose (if it
efficient way to kill large animals is to stam¬ is discovered that the deviant has been
pede them into shallow arroyos or pits helped, the helper herself is then subject to
(Wheat, 1967; Lee, 1979). sanctioning).9 Finally, the ultimate sanction¬
In rotating credit associations (Hechter, ing resource is easily produced, for it lies en¬
1987: Chap. 6), individuals pool a given tirely within the control of the members
amount of money (which is maximally visible themselves—ostracism from the group.10
because it is an archetypical output) for the
right to draw upon the common store of By-Products of Extant Cooperative
money to increase their purchasing power. In Institutions: A Fourth Tier in
this way the monetary contributions of indi¬ Institutional Genesis
vidual participants generate what is in effect It is likely that the institutionalized group
a credit line, access to which is highly visible may come to produce different goods than
to all other participants. those providing its initial rationale. This is
Once individual assets are pooled in a cen¬ because the group now has the immense
tral place, however, another free-rider prob¬ comparative advantage that it is already orga¬
lem occurs: how is it possible to stop a de¬ nized11 and therefore can produce new joint
positor from taking more than her fair share, goods much more efficiently than can unor¬
or from consuming the entire central fund? ganized individuals.12
This is a question that faces all rational inves¬ In certain situations, the group may even
tors—would you be likely to deposit your come to produce public (nonexcludable)
paycheck in a bank that you believe will soon goods. This can occur if members gain so
be robbed? Presumably, only if you had some much from the production of a public good
assurance that your deposit is secure. Hence that they are willing to provide it even to non¬
it is rational for individuals to establish formal contributors.13 In larger groups, this can also
controls in cooperative institutions so as to occur due to agency considerations. This will
preserve the integrity of their investment happen if the agent is not fully constrained
(which, after all, is a private good). By estab¬ by her principals, and if she can increase her
lishing these controls, individuals inadver¬ own reputation by transforming some of the
tently provide themselves with a collective assets of the central fund into public goods.14
good—namely, security of the common fund. All told, this analysis suggests that coop¬
But who will monitor the depositors; who erative institutions indeed can arise from the
will sanction them; and how will the requisite interaction of rational egoists in a state of
sanctioning resources be produced? nature. In such an environment, however, co¬
All members will take on the burden of operative institutions will emerge only in a
monitoring in the initial cooperative institu¬ contractarian fashion. Without prior coop¬
tion. Since anyone who consumes more than erative institutions, there can be no en¬
their fair share of the common fund appro¬ trepreneurial route to new ones. This is why
priates some of my own assets, I am moti¬ the earliest institutions tend to be of the
vated to try to get my own (augmented) in¬ “primitive communist” variety.15 In institu¬
vestment back. There is no free-rider prob¬ tionally rich environments where, for exam-
310 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XI. Exchange Theory and Rational Choice Theory
pie, individual private property rights have and Hill, 1985). Irrigation systems provide a
been established, it is far simpler for these graphic example of a cooperative institution
institutions to emerge via an entrepreneurial that develops to provide access to a bulky
rather than a contractarian route on account joint good. Wittfogel (1957:18), for example,
of decision-making costs, and of the costs of notes that water is a distinctive resource in
specifying fully adequate contracts (William¬ that it has a tendency to gather in bulk.16
son, 1975; North, 1981). Further research into the visibility of the pro¬
This discussion of the emergence of coop¬ duction of different kinds of joint goods, and
erative institutions has two principal impli¬ of the potential centricity of these goods,
cations. If institutions emerge as a result of doubtless will provide a richer body of em¬
the demand for joint private goods, then pirical implications for the genesis of coop¬
shifts in a variety of environmental and demo¬ erative institutions.
graphic conditions will heighten demand for It should be emphasized that the analysis
certain kinds of joint goods and favor the emer¬ in this chapter is quite different from Mancur
gence of institutions supplying these goods. Olsons (1965) well-known explanation of the
Thus, the members of foraging societies development of collective goods-seeking or¬
tend to form local groups in the dry season— ganizations like trade unions and farm orga¬
when the scarcity of water increases the nizations. Insofar as these groups sought to
benefits of cooperation among different nu¬ raise the wages of whole classes of workers,
clear families—but these groups disband they aimed to produce a collective good.
when there is sufficient water to meet the
Given this, the optimal strategy for any given
subsistence needs of individual families
worker is to free ride and cash in on the (pre¬
(Johnson and Earle, 1987). Likewise, as mar¬
sumably successful) efforts of union orga¬
kets penetrate into economically isolated ter¬
nizers and their credulous followers. How,
ritories this leads to the establishment of in¬
then, did these groups emerge? Olson s expla¬
surance institutions (Hechter, 1987). Finally,
nation is that the early trade unions (in the
the rise of insecurity (due to the threat of
days before the passage of closed-shop legis¬
invasion, piracy, and so forth) promotes the
lation) could lure members only if they pro¬
establishment of protective associations.
vided them with desirable selective incen¬
Other kinds of shifts will diminish the de¬
tives, including insurance. In Olsons ac¬
mand for such institutions. Hence the growth
count, therefore, insurance is considered to
of insurance markets in the late nineteenth
century is associated with the decline of fra¬ be the by-product of trade unions.
ternal insurance institutions. If some public The problem with Olsons explanation is
good-providing organization in a territory that, like formal controls, selective incentives
did not go through the first stage (that is, if it are themselves a collective good. This means
did not grow from the roots of some private that they, too, have to be produced by rational
good-producing institution), such evidence egoists. How is it that a group aiming to pro¬
would contradict the thrust of this analysis. vide a public good can attract any rational
Yet demand alone is insufficient to pro¬ members at all, let alone manage to produce
duce cooperative institutions: both in their selective incentives? As the previous analysis
roles as producers and consumers, individuals shows, the rise of groups providing imma¬
must be highly visible to one another in order nent joint goods entails no such liability.
to reduce the severity of the free-rider and as¬ Since they are formed for the provision of
surance problems. private goods, there is no initial free-rider
In the state of nature, bulky goods that problem. To obtain their goods, members are
must be cooperatively acquired are likely to led to adopt formal controls that make possi¬
promote both kinds of visibility. This is con¬ ble production of the goods. Once the goods
sistent with the finding that meat (at least have been produced, they can be used in a
some of which is often cooperatively ac¬ variety of ways. For example, there is no in¬
quired) is more widely shared among hunter- herent reason why the members of an insur¬
gatherers than other types of food (Kaplan ance group cannot convert their common as-
The Emergence of Cooperative Social Institutions 311
sets into a strike fund and reconstitute them¬ experiments. Hence these solutions to the
selves as a trade union. . . . free-rider and assurance problems are incon¬
sistent with the premises of this analysis.
Endnotes 9. In more complex situations where there are
alternative benefit-providing institutions, de¬
1. Consider an elevator having male and female viant actors often gain a negative reputation
passengers. If male passengers are observed that makes them unsuitable for admission to
to allow the females to exit first, this is a col¬ any such institution. After other participants
lective behavioral regularity. Whether this be¬ get their investment back, what is their incen¬
havioral regularity is due to the presence of a tive to ruin the deviant's reputation? Why
norm or to explicit rules is beside the point. should rational egoists be concerned about
2. For the purposes of this chapter, language it¬ the fortunes of the participants in other insti¬
self may be considered to be a convention. tutions? This kind of problem is endemic in
3. This restriction is due to the fact that the rise academic hiring situations, where the mem¬
of institutions among close relations can be bers of sending departments often provide
explained easily by evolutionary arguments misleading information to receiving depart¬
based on genetic relatedness. Such reasoning ments in hopes of getting rid of a troublesome
is, however, generally insufficient to account colleague or a sub-par student. The only force
for institutions whose scope surpasses the that can counter this free-rider problem is the
members of a nuclear family. damage that such deceit might bring to the
information provider in further repeat deal¬
4. The problem of multiple equilibria is double-
ings. Hence, the less frequent the contact be¬
barrelled. On the one hand, cooperation may
tween the members of two academic depart¬
not emerge because some of these equilibria
ments, the less reliable the information sup¬
are inefficient. On the other hand, coopera¬
plied about potential colleagues and stu¬
tion may not emerge even if the various
dents, ceteris paribus. The multiplexity of ties
equilibria are all efficient, since they are un¬
between groups increases the probability of
likely to be equally preferred by all the players
this intergroup sanctioning.
or the game. This situation then leads to a
noncooperative bargaining problem. 10. It should be noted that this solution to the
emergence of cooperative institutions is prac¬
5. In the absence of perfect monitoring capacity,
ticable only in relatively small groups. In es¬
a player can never be certain of the moves that
sence, the creation of a central store of re¬
other players have taken in past plays of the
sources commits participants to involvement
game. Thus, she cannot infer that coopera¬
in a repeated game. As such, many of the
tion is ever rational.
mechanisms that produce cooperation in the
6. This question is critical, for if we suspend self- literature on repeated games (Taylor, 1976;
interested behavioral assumptions— and al¬ Axelrod, 1984) are employed here to the same
low individuals to have internalized values or effect. The reader may wonder wherein this
some small but positive amount of altruism— approach differs from the invisible-hand ap¬
then there is an all too easy way to overcome proach. Whereas repeated game theorists
the assurance problem, and thereby to ac¬ take the existence of the supergame (and
count for the emergence of cooperative insti¬ sometimes the existence of a specific dis¬
tutions. This strategy is akin to invoking a count rate) as a given, this analysis explains
deus ex machina, but there can be no theoreti¬ how it is that rational egoists voluntarily com¬
cal justification for so doing. mit themselves to social situations involving
7. I ignore the obvious complication that the ini¬ repeated exchange.
tial production functions for the joint good 11. The connection between pre-existing organi¬
will be estimates, and that disagreements zations founded to produce joint private
may well result about the accuracy of these goods and public good-providing organiza¬
estimates. tions often has been stressed in the literature
8. There is a growing experimental literature on on social movements (Oberschall, 1973;
the use of provision points and money-back McAdam et al., 1988). Thus in her analysis of
guarantees as means of resolving the assur¬ the emergence of the contemporary womens
ance problem. Whereas there is evidence that movement, Evans (1980) locates its roots in
some of these arrangements do, in fact, result informal networks of women who had come
in the production of greater public goods, to know one another in the context of prior
each of them is imposed exogenously in the civil rights and New Left political organiza-
312 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XI. Exchange Theory and Rational Choice Theory
Hobbes, Thomas. (1968). Leviathan, edited by C. Nozick, Robert. (1974). Anarchy, State and Uto¬
B. Macpherson. Harmondsworth, England: pia. New York: Basic Books.
Penguin. [Originally published 1651.] Oberschall, Anthony. (1973). Social Conflict and
Johnson, Allen W. and Timothy Earle. (1987). The Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Evolution of Human Societies. Stanford: Stan¬ Prentice-Hall.
ford University Press.
Olson, Mancur. (1965). The Logic of Collective Ac¬
Kaplan, Hillard and Kim Hill. (1985). "Food shar¬ tion. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
ing among Ache foragers: Tests of explanatory
hypotheses.” Current Anthropology, 26(2):223- Snow, David A. and Susan Marshall. (1984). "Cul¬
239. tural imperialism, social movements, and the
Islamic revival.” Pp. 131-152 in Louis Kries-
Lee, Richard B. (1979). The IKung San. Cam¬
berg, ed., Social Movements, Conflicts and
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Change, Vol. 7. Greenwich CT: JAI Press.
Lewis, David. (1969). Convention: A Philosophical
Study. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Stolarik, M. Mark. (1980). “Slovak fraternal bene¬
fit societies.” Pp. 130-145 in Scott Cummings,
McAdam, Doug. (1982). Political Process and the
ed., Urban Self-Help in America. Port Washing¬
Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970.
ton, NY: Kennikat Press.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Taylor, Michael. (1976). Anarchy and Cooperation.
Zald. (1988). "Social movements and collective London: John Wiley.
behavior: Building micro-macro bridges.” In Ullman-Margalit, Edna. (1978). "Invisible hand
Neil J. Smelser, ed., Handbook of Sociology. explanations.” Synthese, 39:263-91.
Newbury Park, CA: Sage. pp. 695-738.
Wheat, J. B. (1967). "A Paleo-Indian bison kill.”
Menger, Carl. (1963). Investigations into the Scientific American, January.
Method of the Social Sciences with Special Ref¬
erence to Economics, edited by Louis White, Harrison C. (1981). "Where do markets
Schneider. Translated by Francis J. Nock. come from?” American loumal of Sociology,
Campaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 87(3):517-547.
[Originally published 1883.] Williamson, Oliver. (1975). Markets and Hierar¬
Morris, Aldon. (1984). The Origins of the Civil chies. New York: Free Press.
Rights Movement. New York: Free Press. Wittfogel, Karl A. (1957). Oriental Despotism: A
North, Douglass C. (1981). Structure and Change Comparative Study of Total Power. New Haven:
in Economic History. New York: Norton. Yale University Press. ♦
314 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XI. Exchange Theory and Rational Choice Theory
relations more likely than the latter, but nei¬ best foot forward, associating with him turns
ther would determine which specific social out to be an enjoyable experience. In due
relations occur. course, people start doing favors for one an¬
Many, if not most, human gratifications other. In a work situation, the more experi¬
are obtained in relations with other human enced may give their colleagues advice or
beings. Intellectual stimulation and relaxing help with a difficult job. Neighbors may lend
conversation, sexual pleasures and the en¬ one another tools. People who met socially
chantment of love, academic recognition and may issue invitations to dinner or a party.
a happy family life, satisfying the lust for Most people enjoy doing favors for others,
power and the need for acceptance—all of usually without any thought of return, at
these are contingent on eliciting responses least initially. Nevertheless, a person who
from others. Exchange theory analyzes the benefits from an association is under an ob¬
mutual gratifications persons provide one ligation to reciprocate. If the benefits are re¬
another that sustain social relations. current—whether involving merely the en¬
joyment of the others company or getting
*** frequently needed advice about ones work
from a colleague—the self-imposed obliga¬
The basic assumption of the theory of so¬ tion to reciprocate is sustained by the interest
cial exchange is that persons establish social in continuing to obtain the benefits. It is fur¬
associations because they expect them to be ther reinforced by the fear of not seeming
rewarding and that they continue social ungrateful. Even when there is no initial
interaction and expand it because they expe¬ thought of return, failure to reciprocate when
rience it to be rewarding. This assumption the occasion arises invites such an accusa¬
that two parties associate with one another tion, which will be experienced though it re¬
not owing to normative requirements but be¬ mains unspoken.
cause they both expect rewards from doing Imagine a neighbor lends you her lawn
so implies that the exchange of rewards is a mower in the summer, but when she asks you
starting mechanism of social relations that is next winter to borrow your snow blower you
not contingent on norms prescribing obliga¬ refuse. The neighbor and others who learn of
tions. If a person is attracted to others be¬ your refusal undoubtedly will consider you
cause she expects associating with them to be ungrateful, and whether they do or not, you
rewarding, she will want to associate with yourself will feel ungrateful and surely will be
them to obtain the expected rewards. For hesitant to ask to borrow her lawn mower
them to associate with her, they must be in¬ again. The feelings and possible accusations
terested in doing so, which depends, accord¬ of ingratitude indicate that favors freely
ing to the initial assumption, on their expect¬ given are not entirely free but create obliga¬
ing such association to be rewarding to them. tions in ones own mind to reciprocate as well
Consequently, for the first person to realize as possible social pressures to discharge the
the rewards expected from the association obligations.
with others, she must impress them as a de¬ A fundamental distinction between social
sirable associate with whom interaction will and economic exchange is that social ex¬
be rewarding. change engenders diffuse obligations, whereas
Individuals are often hesitant to take the those in economic exchange are specified in
first step for fear of rejection. A widely used an implicit or explicit contract. For economic
early strategy is for people to impress others transactions that are not immediately com¬
in whom they are interested with their out¬ pleted, like purchases in stores, the terms of
standing qualities—their wit, charm, intelli¬ the exchange are agreed upon in advance by
gence, knowledge of the arts—which implic¬ both parties, and major agreements are for¬
itly promises that associating with them malized in a contract that specifies the pre¬
would be a rewarding experience. If the early cise nature of the obligations of both parties
steps are successful, they tend to become self- and when any outstanding debts are due. The
fulfilling prophecies. As each person puts his favors in social exchange, by contrast, create
316 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XI. Exchange Theory and Rational Choice Theory
periments performed by Cook and her col¬ cial intercourse, intergroup relations also
leagues indicate that networks that provide regularly occur.
alternative exchange partners to one person The common occurrence of intergroup re¬
but not to others increase the bargaining lations is revealed in a study by Marsden
power of this person in dyadic exchanges (1990) that applies my theoretical scheme to
(see, for example, Cook, Gillmore, and Tam- the egocentric face-to-face networks of a
agishi 1983). sample of the American population. He ini¬
A second influence of the immediate social tially distinguishes a demand-side view of
context is that it discourages failure to recip¬ networks in terms of preferences for various
rocate for benefits received by social disap¬ kinds of associates from a supply-side view,
proval of such ingratitude. I realize that my like my theory's, in terms of opportunities for
reference to social disapproval, which im¬ associating with diverse others. On the basis
plies social pressure, sounds as if I attributed of previous research on the composition of
exchange to group norms, for which I criti¬ families and work places, we know that fami¬
cized the principle of generalized exchange. lies are more diverse in age and sex but less
diverse in ethnic and religious affiliation than
There is a major difference, however. If the
associates at work. Accordingly, Marsden hy¬
practice of making a contribution freely to
pothesizes more intergroup relations in re¬
any group member without expecting a re¬
spect to age and sex and fewer intergroup
turn from that member is explained by the
relations in respect to ethnic and religious
cultural norm to do so, the explicans cannot
affiliation between relatives than between
explain the explicandum, because the two are
fellow workers. The results support these hy¬
redundant. But exchange is explained not by
potheses, which stipulate intergroup as well
social pressures but by the returns it brings, as ingroup relations even between close asso¬
including pleasant company or friendship as ciates. Marsden concludes that my macro-
well as possibly tangible benefits. Social ex¬ structural opportunity theory is applicable to
change, however, cannot prevail if trust, once the study of the relations in microstructures,
established, is violated, and social disap¬ contrary to what I myself had stated.
proval discourages its violation. Social pres¬ I am pleased that the theory can be used
sures do not explain—account for—recipro¬ in the investigation of face-to-face networks,
cal exchange, but they help to sustain it. which I had questioned. One should note,
The influence of the wider social circles— however, that confining network analysis to
the population structure of a neighborhood, the supply-side approach would fail to take
community, or entire society—depends on full advantage of the possibilities for analysis
the extent to which the population distribu¬ the small scope of these networks provides.
tions of the encompassing social structure In the study of large populations, analysis
penetrate into the substructures of face-to- and research cannot proceed without ignor¬
face groups. Many of the differences in soci¬ ing the complexities of social life by having
ety's population structure are the result of to aggregate specific observations into gross
differences among rather than within sub¬ concepts and measures, like heterogeneity, in¬
structures on successive levels. As a result, tersection, or intergroup relations. The subtle
face-to-face groups are less differentiated processes that govern face-to-face relations are
than their encompassing social structures. admittedly (but inevitably) obscured by such
Multilevel structural analysis discloses how aggregations. The study of interpersonal rela¬
much differentiation in various dimensions tions and small networks can directly analyze
penetrates into the substructures of inter¬ these processes and thereby contribute to our
personal relations. Greater homophily in seg¬ understanding of them.
regated substructures promotes ingroup re¬
lations, but despite much segregation, some Imbalance in Exchange
differentiation penetrates to the lowest level
of interpersonal relations. Consequently, al¬ A paradox of social exchange is that it gives
though ingroup relations prevail in daily so¬ rise to both social bonds between peers and
318 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XI. Exchange Theory and Rational Choice Theory
differentiation of status. This was the case for form better than he could otherwise have
the ceremonial exchange of gifts in nonliter¬ done, without exposing his difficulties to
ate societies, and it is the case for exchange the supervisor. By asking for advice, he
implicitly pays his respect to the superior
processes in advanced industrial societies. To
proficiency of his colleague. This ac¬
start by exemplifying the former, the Kula
knowledgment of inferiority is the cost of
ceremonial gift exchange of the Trobriand Is¬ receiving assistance. The consultant gains
landers, as discussed by Malinowski (1961: prestige, in return for which he is willing
92), "provides every man within its ring with to devote some time to the consultation
a few friends near at hand, and with some and permit it to disrupt his own work. The
friendly allies in far away, dangerous, foreign following remark illustrates this: "I like
districts." A few pages later he states that giving advice. Its flattering, I suppose, if
"among the natives of the Kula . . . wealth is you feel that the others come to you for
the indispensable appanage of social rank" advice."
(p. 97). Probably the extreme case of the sig¬
The principle of marginal utility applies to
nificance of social exchange for differentia¬
these exchanges. Although most agents liked
tion of status is the famous potlatch of the
being consulted, for those frequently asked
Kwakiutl, a feast of reckless spending in
for advice the gain in informal status of an
which "status in associations and clans, and
additional consultation diminished and the
rank of every kind, are determined by the war
cost in repeated interruptions of ones own
of property" (Mauss 1954: 35).
work increased. As the most popular consul¬
A contemporary case of status differentia¬
tant said to me when asked about being con¬
tion resulting from social exchange was ob¬
sulted, "I never object, although sometimes
served in the office of a federal government
it's annoying." The principle also applies to
agency responsible for the enforcement of
agents who frequently need advice, but in re¬
certain laws. The duties of the agents in¬
verse, of course.
volved investigating private firms by auditing
Repeated admissions of needing advice
their books and conducting interviews, deter¬
undermine ones self-confidence and stand¬
mining any legal violations and the action to
ing in the group, particularly if an oft-inter¬
be taken, and negotiating a settlement with
rupted consultant expresses some impa¬
the employer or a top manager. The work was
tience or annoyance. To forestall such expe¬
quite complex, and agents often encountered
riences, most agents establish partnerships
problems. When they did, they were expected
of mutual consultation, reserving consulting
to consult their supervisor, but they tended to
the most expert colleagues for their most dif¬
be reluctant to do so for fear of adversely
ficult problems. Since agents often have ten¬
affecting their annual rating by their super¬
tative solutions for their problems and need
visor. Instead, they usually consulted col¬
not so much an answer as assurance that
leagues. Whereas officially prohibited, this
theirs is correct, a colleague whose expertise
practice was widespread and evidently toler¬
is not superior to ones own can provide such
ated. Although agents worked on different
support.
cases, one could observe all day long pairs or
The most expert agents face a different di¬
small clusters of persons in deep discussions,
lemma: asking for advice or even for confir¬
most of which dealt with problems of their
mation of their tentative solutions may well
cases. Lunch periods were filled with such
endanger their superior standing as experts.
discussions.
Making official decisions in a difficult case
The observation of these consultations
on ones own can easily raise doubts and
originally gave me the idea of social ex¬
questions in a person's mind, even an expert’s.
change. To cite the central passage (Blau
One way to cope with this situation is to stop
1955: 108):2
going over it again and again in one’s head
A consultation can be considered an ex¬ and instead telling some colleagues about the
change of values; both participants gain interesting problems that have arisen in a
something and both have to pay a price. given case and discussing how they might be
The questioning agent is enabled to per¬ solved, possibly over lunch if not in the office.
Formulation of Exchange Theory 319
Such “thinking out loud"' may well stimu¬ sult in reciprocal exchange relations between
late new associations and ideas one would peers. Third, they can coerce him to give
not have come up with on ones own, particu¬ them what they want. This involves domina¬
larly as the listeners are also experienced tion by force and is outside the purview of
agents, who might raise objections if one is exchange. Fourth, they can resign themselves
on the wrong track, and whose assent im¬ to do without what they thought they needed,
plicit in attentive listening and interested which is Diogenes' solution for remaining in¬
questions conveys approval. In contrast to dependent.
asking for advice, telling colleagues about in¬ If none of these four alternatives is avail¬
teresting problems in a case and how they able, the others become dependent on the
might be solved enhances the respect of ones supplier of the needed services and must de¬
colleagues, though it is, in effect, a subtle fer to her to reciprocate for the benefits re¬
form of asking colleagues to corroborate ceived lest she lose interest in continuing to
ones own provisional decisions. provide them. Deference implies not only
paying respect to another's superior ability,
*** implicit in asking her help, but also deferring
to her wishes in everyday intercourse. Thus,
To put the underlying principles of imbal¬ the social interaction among colleagues or in
anced and balanced exchange into general other groups that involves imbalances in so¬
terms, rendering important services or pro¬ cial exchange gives rise to differentiation in
viding valued benefactions is a claim to supe¬ the power to influence as well as in prestige,
rior status. Reciprocation denies this claim, which is reflected in a stratified structure of
and excessive returns make a counterclaim, informal status.
which can lead to a potlatch-like war of seek¬ The illustration of instrumental assistance
ing to outdo one another to stay ahead. Fail¬ in a work group may have left the misleading
ure to reciprocate by discharging ones obli¬ impression that most social exchange in¬
gations validates the claim and acknowl¬ volves instrumental benefits. Much of the so¬
edges the others superiority in return for the cial interaction, even among co-workers and
benefits received and in the hope of continu¬ still more outside a work situation, is social
ing to receive them. Thus, the contingency intercourse engaged in for its own sake.
that determines whether social exchanges Hechter (1987: 33) states that people often
lead to friendships between peers or superor¬ join groups to pursue joint goods or common
dination and subordination is whether bene¬ objectives, and he stresses that their joint
fits received are reciprocated or not. This, in achievement and, particularly, the intrinsic
turn, depends on whether one of the two par¬ gratifications obtained from social associa¬
ties has superior resources of the kind that tions among fellow members are the sources
are in contention (which was professional of group solidarity.4
competence in the case of agents).3 Workers who organize in order to bargain
In a seminal article, Emerson (1962) speci¬ collectively with their employer for higher
fied conditions in which balance in social ex¬ wages exemplify joint efforts to achieve a
change can be restored. I have slightly modi¬ common objective. It is in the interest of the
fied his scheme to conceptualize it as four group as a whole if workers who devote more
alternatives to becoming dependent on a per¬ energy to and prove more adept in this en¬
son s influence who has some services to offer deavor are allowed to take the leading role in
that others need or want. First, they can give their organizing effort. Thus, superior status
him something he needs or wants enough to based on past services prompts other work¬
reciprocate by satisfying their wishes, pro¬ ers to acknowledge and submit to the leader¬
vided that they have resources that meet his ship of the one who seems to be most effec¬
needs. Second, they can obtain the needed tive in making contributions to organizing
benefits elsewhere, assuming that they have the nascent union. Informal leadership is le¬
access to alternative sources of these bene¬ gitimated by the social approval of the rest of
fits. These two possibilities, if recurring, re¬ the group, and this approval is the return for
320 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XI. Exchange Theory and Rational Choice Theory
past services and for the future contributions partly excludable goods from public goods.
the leader is expected to make to the welfare The former are not available to the entire
of the group by helping to organize them.5 public but only to group members. His major
illustration is that one cannot enjoy the socia¬
This fictitious description may well be ide¬
bility in a group without having become a
alized, but it is not completely inaccurate for member and thus a contributor to that socia¬
the initial stage of workers getting together bility. But this solution does not work for in¬
on their own to organize themselves for joint strumental objectives, as indicated by the
bargaining. To be sure, it is not applicable to case next discussed in the text.
formal positions of leadership, particularly 5. Workers who fail to contribute to the organ¬
not to the impersonal power their incum¬ izing efforts of the new union would also
bents exercise. Thus, the description is not benefit from its success, which illustrates the
intended to depict the leadership of large na¬ criticism I made in the last sentence of the
tional unions; indeed, it is designed as a con¬ preceding footnote that Hechter's (1987) con¬
trast to them. Once a union has become a cept of partial excludability does not solve the
large, formal organization and its leaders freeloader problem for joint instrumental ob¬
jectives.
have become persons of great power, a hand¬
ful of workers with a grievance cannot on 6. I am particularly critical of the inference
their own decide upon a course of action if made by conservative social scientists that
the elite's domination of society's economy
the powerful leader is opposed. All they can
and government is earned as a return for the
do is organize a wildcat strike informally, as
great contributions they have made to society.
workers originally did, but now against both It is the counterpart of the assumption that
the union leadership and management. The oligopolistic corporations achieved their po¬
point of this illustration is that the inter¬ sition in free competition. ♦
personal power that develops in face-to-face
relations is fundamentally different from the References
impersonal power to dominate large num¬
bers, even in the rare cases when the latter Blau, Peter M. 1955. The Dynamics of Bureau¬
emerged from the former.6 cracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Cook, Karen S., Mary R. Gillmore, and Toshio
Endnotes Tamagishi. 1983. 'The Distribution of Power
in Exchange Networks.'' American Journal of
1. Cultural theories that explain social patterns Sociology 89:275-305.
in terms of norms and values are prone to Ekeh, Peter P. 1974. Social Exchange Theory.
commit this tautology. It is the same fallacy Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University.
as that of psychological explanations of be¬
Emerson, Richard M. 1962. "Power-Dependence
havior in terms of instincts to engage in such
Relations." American Sociological Review
behavior.
27:31-41.
2. As indicated by the publication date, this was
Hechter, Michael. 1987. Principles of Group Soli¬
written long before the womens movement
darity. Berkeley: University of California Press.
called attention to the implicit bias involved
in referring to some unspecified person al¬ Homans, George C. 1961. Social Behavior. New
ways by the masculine pronoun instead of us¬ York: Harcourt, Brace, & World.
ing either he/she or even s/he (which I find Levi-Strauss, Claude. 1949. Les structures elemen-
deplorable) or alternating between feminine taires de la parente. Paris: Press Universitaires
and masculine pronouns, as I have done in de France.
this book. Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1961 (1922). Argonauts of
3. This analysis applies to processes of differen¬ the Western Pacific. New York: Dutton.
tiation in informal status among persons Marsden, Peter V. 1990. "Network Diversity, Sub¬
whose formal status is essentially the same. structures, and Opportunities for Contact." Pp.
4. The achievement of joint goods raises the 396-410 in C. Calhoun, M. W. Meyer, and W. R.
well-known free-rider problem (that persons Scott (eds.), Structures of Power and Con¬
may benefit from public goods without con¬ straint. Cambridge: University Press.
tributing to their production), which Hechter Mauss, Marcel. 1954 (1925). The Gift. Glencoe,
considers to have solved by distinguishing Ill.: Free Press. ♦
Subversive Bodily Acts 321
tury, understand “the body" as so much inert creation of values and meanings by a signify¬
matter, signifying nothing or, more specifi¬ ing practice that requires the subjection of
cally, signifying a profane void, the fallen the body. This corporeal destruction is neces¬
state: deception, sin, the premonitional sary to produce the speaking subject and its
metaphorics of hell and the eternal feminine. significations. This is a body, described
There are many occasions in both Sartres through the language of surface and force,
and Beauvoirs work where “the body" is fig¬ weakened through a “single drama" of domi¬
ured as a mute facticity, anticipating some nation, inscription, and creation (ISO). This
meaning that can be attributed only by a tran¬ is not the modus vivendi of one kind of history
scendent consciousness, understood in rather than another, but is, for Foucault, “his¬
Cartesian terms as radically immaterial. But tory" (148) in its essential and repressive ges¬
what establishes this dualism for us? What ture.
separates off “the body" as indifferent to sig¬ Although Foucault writes, “Nothing in
nification, and signification itself as the act man [sic]—not even his body—is sufficiently
of a radically disembodied consciousness or, stable to serve as the basis for self-recogni¬
rather, the act that radically disembodies that tion or for understanding other men [sic]”
consciousness? To what extent is that (153), he nevertheless points to the constancy
Cartesian dualism presupposed in phenome¬ of cultural inscription as a “single drama"
nology adapted to the structuralist frame in that acts on the body. If the creation of values,
which mind/body is redescribed as cul¬ that historical mode of signification, requires
ture/nature? With respect to gender dis¬ the destruction of the body, much as the in¬
course, to what extent do these problematic strument of torture in Kafka’s In the Penal
dualisms still operate within the very descrip¬ Colony destroys the body on which it writes,
tions that are supposed to lead us out of that then there must be a body prior to that in¬
binarism and its implicit hierarchy? How are scription, stable and self-identical, subject to
the contours of the body clearly marked as that sacrificial destruction. In a sense, for
the taken-for-granted ground or surface upon Foucault, as for Nietzsche, cultural values
which gender significations are inscribed, a emerge as the result of an inscription on the
mere facticity devoid of value, prior to signifi¬ body, understood as a medium, indeed, a
cance? blank page; in order for this inscription to
Wittig suggests that a culturally specific signify, however, that medium must itself be
epistemic a priori establishes the naturalness destroyed—that is, fully transvaluated into a
of “sex." But by what enigmatic means has sublimated domain of values. Within the
“the body" been accepted as a prima facie metaphorics of this notion of cultural values
given that admits of no genealogy? Even is the figure of history as a relentless writing
within Foucaults essay on the very theme of instrument, and the body as the medium
genealogy, the body is figured as a surface which must be destroyed and transfigured in
and the scene of a cultural inscription: “the order for “culture" to emerge.
body is the inscribed surface of events."1 The By maintaining a body prior to its cultural
task of genealogy, he claims, is “to expose a inscription, Foucault appears to assume a
body totally imprinted by history." His sen¬ materiality prior to signification and form.
tence continues, however, by referring to the Because this distinction operates as essential
goal of “history"—here clearly understood on to the task of genealogy as he defines it, the
the model of Freud’s “civilization"—as the distinction itself is precluded as an object of
“destruction of the body" (148). Forces and genealogical investigation. Occasionally in
impulses with multiple directionalities are his analysis of Herculine, Foucault sub¬
precisely that which history both destroys scribes to a prediscursive multiplicity of bod¬
and preserves through the entstehung (his¬ ily forces that break through the surface of
torical event) of inscription. As “a volume in the body to disrupt the regulating practices
perpetual disintegration" (148), the body is of cultural coherence imposed upon that
always under siege, suffering destruction by body by a power regime, understood as a vi¬
the very terms of history. And history is the cissitude of “history." If the presumption of
Subversive Bodily Acts 323
some kind of precategorial source of disrup¬ boundaries of the body as the limits of the
tion is refused, is it still possible to give a socially hegemonic. In a variety of cultures,
genealogical account of the demarcation of she maintains, there are
the body as such as a signifying practice?
This demarcation is not initiated by a reified pollution powers which inhere in the
history or by a subject. This marking is the structure of ideas itself and which punish
result of a diffuse and active structuring of a symbolic breaking of that which should
be joined or joining of that which should
the social field. This signifying practice ef¬
be separate. It follows from this that pol¬
fects a social space for and of the body within
lution is a type of danger which is not
certain regulatory grids of intelligibility. likely to occur except where the lines of
Mary Douglas’ Purity and Danger suggests structure, cosmic or social, are clearly de¬
that the very contours of "the body” are es¬ fined.
tablished through markings that seek to es¬ A polluting person is always in the
tablish specific codes of cultural coherence. wrong. He [sic] has developed some
Any discourse that establishes the bounda¬ wrong condition or simply crossed over
ries of the body serves the purpose of instat¬ some line which should not have been
ing and naturalizing certain taboos regarding crossed and this displacement unleashes
danger for someone.3
the appropriate limits, postures, and modes
of exchange that define what it is that consti¬ In a sense, Simon Watney has identified
tutes bodies: the contemporary construction of "the Pol¬
luting person” as the person with AIDS in his
ideas about separating, purifying, demar¬ Policing Desire: AIDS, Pornography, and the
cating and punishing transgressions have
Media.4 Not only is the illness figured as the
as their main function to impose system
on an inherently untidy experience. It is "gay disease,” but throughout the media’s
only by exaggerating the difference be¬ hysterical and homophobic response to the
tween within and without, above and be¬ illness there is a tactical construction of a
low, male and female, with and against, continuity between the polluted status of the
that a semblance of order is created.2 homosexual by virtue of the boundary-tres¬
pass that is homosexuality and the disease as
Although Douglas clearly subscribes to a a specific modality of homosexual pollution.
structuralist distinction between an inher¬ That the disease is transmitted through the
ently unruly nature and an order imposed by exchange of bodily fluids suggests within the
cultural means, the "untidiness” to which she sensationalist graphics of homophobic signi¬
refers can be redescribed as a region of cul¬ fying systems the dangers that permeable
tural unruliness and disorder. Assuming the bodily boundaries present to the social order
inevitably binary structure of the nature/cul- as such. Douglas remarks that "the body is a
ture distinction, Douglas cannot point to¬ model that can stand for any bounded sys¬
ward an alternative configuration of culture tem. Its boundaries can represent any
in which such distinctions become malleable boundaries which are threatened or precari¬
or proliferate beyond the binary frame. Her ous.”5 And she asks a question which one
analysis, however, provides a possible point might have expected to read in Foucault:
of departure for understanding the relation¬ "Why should bodily margins be thought to be
ship by which social taboos institute and specifically invested with power and dan¬
maintain the boundaries of the body as such. ger?”6
Her analysis suggests that what constitutes Douglas suggests that all social systems
the limit of the body is never merely material, are vulnerable at their margins, and that all
but that the surface, the skin, is systemically margins are accordingly considered danger¬
signified by taboos and anticipated trans¬ ous. If the body is synecdochal for the social
gressions; indeed, the boundaries of the body system per se or a site in which open systems
become, within her analysis, the limits of the converge, then any kind of unregulated per¬
social per se. A poststructuralist appropria¬ meability constitutes a site of pollution and
tion of her view might well understand the endangerment. Since anal and oral sex
324 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XII. Feminist Theory
among men clearly establishes certain kinds “Other.” This appears as an expulsion of alien
of bodily permeabilities unsanctioned by the elements, but the alien is effectively estab¬
hegemonic order, male homosexuality would, lished through this expulsion. The construc¬
within such a hegemonic point of view, con¬ tion of the “not-me” as the abject establishes
stitute a site of danger and pollution, prior to the boundaries of the body which are also the
and regardless of the cultural presence of first contours of the subject. Kristeva writes:
AIDS. Similarly, the “polluted” status of les¬
nausea makes me balk at that milk cream,
bians, regardless of their low-risk status with
separates me from the mother and father
respect to AIDS, brings into relief the dangers who proffer it. “I” want none of that ele¬
of their bodily exchanges. Significantly, being ment, sign of their desire; “I” do not want
“outside” the hegemonic order does not sig¬ to listen, “I” do not assimilate it, “I” expel
nify being “in” a state of filthy and untidy it. But since the food is not an “other” for
nature. Paradoxically homosexuality is al¬ “me,” who am only in their desire, I expel
most always conceived within the homopho¬ myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself
bic signifying economy as both uncivilized within the same motion through which “I”
and unnatural. claim to establish myself.10
The construction of stable bodily contours The boundary of the body as well as the
relies upon fixed sites of corporeal perme¬ distinction between internal and external is
ability and impermeability. Those sexual established through the ejection and trans¬
practices in both homosexual and heterosex¬ valuation of something originally part of
ual contexts that open surfaces and orifices identity into a defiling otherness. As Iris
to erotic signification or close down others Young has suggested in her use of Kristeva
effectively reinscribe the boundaries of the to understand sexism, homophobia, and
body along new cultural lines. Anal sex racism, the repudiation of bodies for their
among men is an example as is the radical sex, sexuality, and/or color is an “expulsion”
re-membering of the body in Wittig s The Les¬ followed by a “repulsion” that founds and
bian Body. Douglas alludes to “a kind of sex consolidates culturally hegemonic identities
pollution which expresses a desire to keep the along sex/race/sexuality axes of differentia¬
body (physical and social) intact,”7 suggest¬ tion. 11 Youngs appropriation of Kristeva
ing that the naturalized notion of “the” body shows how the operation of repulsion can
is itself a consequence of taboos that render consolidate “identities” founded on the insti¬
that body discrete by virtue of its stable tuting of the “Other” or a set of Others
boundaries. Further, the rites of passage that through exclusion and domination. What
govern various bodily orifices presuppose a constitutes through division the “inner” and
heterosexual construction of gendered ex¬ “outer” worlds of the subject is a border and
change, positions, and erotic possibilities. boundary tenuously maintained for the pur¬
The deregulation of such exchanges accord¬ poses of social regulation and control. The
ingly disrupts the very boundaries that deter¬ boundary between the inner and outer is con¬
mine what it is to be a body at all. Indeed, the founded by those excremental passages in
critical inquiry that traces the regulatory which the inner effectively becomes outer,
practices within which bodily contours are and this excreting function becomes, as it
constructed constitutes precisely the geneal¬ were, the model by which other forms of
ogy of “the body” in its discreteness that identity-differentiation are accomplished. In
might further radicalize Foucaults theory.8 effect, this is the mode by which Others be¬
Significantly, Kristeva’s discussion of ab¬ come shit. For inner and outer worlds to re¬
jection in The Powers of Horror begins to sug¬ main utterly distinct, the entire surface of the
gest the uses of this structuralist notion of a body would have to achieve an impossible
boundary-constituting taboo for the pur¬ impermeability. This sealing of its surfaces
poses of constructing a discrete subject would constitute the seamless boundary of
through exclusion.9 The “abject” designates the subject; but this enclosure would invari¬
that which has been expelled from the body, ably be exploded by precisely that excremen¬
discharged as excrement, literally rendered tal filth that it fears.
Subversive Bodily Acts 325
Regardless of the compelling metaphorrs compel their bodies to signify the prohibitive
of the spatial distinction of inner and outer, law as their very essence, style, and necessity.
they remain linguistic terms that facilitate That law is not literally internalized, but in¬
and articulate a set of fantasies, feared and corporated, with the consequence that bod¬
desired. “Inner” and “outer” make sense only ies are produced which signify that law on
with reference to a mediating boundary that and through the body; there the law is mani¬
strives for stability And this stability, this co¬ fest as the essence of their selves, the mean¬
herence, is determined in large part by cul¬ ing of their soul, their conscience, the law of
tural orders that sanction the subject and their desire. In effect, the law is at once fully
compel its differentiation from the abject. manifest and fully latent, for it never appears
Hence, “inner” and “outer” constitute a bi¬ as external to the bodies it subjects and sub-
nary distinction that stabilizes and consoli¬ jectivates. Foucault writes:
dates the coherent subject. When that subject
is challenged, the meaning and necessity of It would be wrong to say that the soul is
the terms are subject to displacement. If the an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the
“inner world” no longer designates a topos, contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is pro¬
then the internal fixity of the self and, indeed, duced permanently around, on, within,
the body by the functioning of a power
the internal locale of gender identity, become
that is exercised on those that are pun¬
similarly suspect. The critical question is not
ished (my emphasis).13
how did that identity become internalized? as
if internalization were a process or a mecha¬
The figure of the interior soul understood
nism that might be descriptively recon¬
as “within” the body is signified through its
structed. Rather, the question is: From what
inscription on the body, even though its pri¬
strategic position in public discourse and for
mary mode of signification is through its very
what reasons has the trope of interiority and
absence, its potent invisibility. The effect of a
the disjunctive binary of inner/outer taken
structuring inner space is produced through
hold? In what language is “inner space” fig¬
the signification of a body as a vital and sa¬
ured? What kind of figuration is it, and
cred enclosure. The soul is precisely what the
through what figure of the body is it signi¬
body lacks; hence, the body presents itself as
fied? How does a body figure on its surface
a signifying lack. That lack which is the body
the very invisibility of its hidden depth?
signifies the soul as that which cannot show.
In this sense, then, the soul is a surface signi¬
From Interiority to fication that contests and displaces the in¬
Gender Performatives ner/outer distinction itself, a figure of interior
psychic space inscribed on the body as a so¬
In Discipline and Punish Foucault chal¬ cial signification that perpetually renounces
lenges the language of internalization as it itself as such. In Foucaults terms, the soul is
operates in the service of the disciplinary re¬ not imprisoned by or within the body, as
gime of the subjection and subjectivation of some Christian imagery would suggest, but
criminals.12 Although Foucault objected to “the soul is the prison of the body.”14
what he understood to be the psychoanalytic The redescription of intrapsychic pro¬
belief in the “inner” truth of sex in The History cesses in terms of the surface politics of the
of Sexuality, he turns to a criticism of the body implies a corollary redescription of gen¬
doctrine of internalization for separate pur¬ der as the disciplinary production of the fig¬
poses in the context of his history of crimi¬ ures of fantasy through the play of presence
nology. In a sense, Discipline and Punish can and absence on the body's surface, the con¬
be read as Foucaults effort to rewrite struction of the gendered body through a se¬
Nietzsche s doctrine of internalization in On ries of exclusions and denials, signifying ab¬
the Genealogy of Morals on the model of in¬ sences. But what determines the manifest
scription. In the context of prisoners, Fou¬ and latent text of the body politic? What is
cault writes, the strategy has been not to en¬ the prohibitive law that generates the corpo¬
force a repression of their desires, but to real stylization of gender, the fantasied and
326 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XII. Feminist Theory-
fantastic figuration of the body? We have al¬ tasy through the surface politics of the body,
ready considered the incest taboo and the the gender border control that differentiates
prior taboo against homosexuality as the inner from outer, and so institutes the "integ¬
generative moments of gender identity the rity” of the subject. In other words, acts and
prohibitions that produce identity along the gestures, articulated and enacted desires cre¬
culturally intelligible grids of an idealized ate the illusion of an interior and organizing
and compulsory heterosexuality That disci¬ gender core, an illusion discursively main¬
plinary production of gender effects a false tained for the purposes of the regulation of
stabilization of gender in the interests of the sexuality within the obligatory frame of re¬
heterosexual construction and regulation of productive heterosexuality. If the “cause” of
sexuality within the reproductive domain. desire, gesture, and act can be localized
The construction of coherence conceals the within the “self” of the actor, then the political
gender discontinuities that run rampant regulations and disciplinary practices which
within heterosexual, bisexual, and gay and produce that ostensibly coherent gender are
lesbian contexts in which gender does not effectively displaced from view. The displace¬
necessarily follow from sex, and desire, or ment of a political and discursive origin of
sexuality generally, does not seem to follow gender identity onto a psychological “core”
from gender—indeed, where none of these precludes an analysis of the political consti¬
dimensions of significant corporeality ex¬ tution of the gendered subject and its fabri¬
press or reflect one another. When the disor¬ cated notions about the ineffable interiority
ganization and disaggregation of the field of of its sex or of its true identity.
bodies disrupt the regulatory fiction of het¬ If the inner truth of gender is a fabrication
erosexual coherence, it seems that the ex¬ and if a true gender is a fantasy instituted and
pressive model loses its descriptive force. inscribed on the surface of bodies, then it
That regulatory ideal is then exposed as a seems that genders can be neither true nor
norm and a fiction that disguises itself as a false, but are only produced as the truth ef¬
developmental law regulating the sexual field fects of a discourse of primary and stable
that it purports to describe. identity. In Mother Camp: Female Impersona¬
According to the understanding of identi¬ tors in America, anthropologist Esther New¬
fication as an enacted fantasy or incorpora¬ ton suggests that the structure of impersona¬
tion, however, it is clear that coherence is tion reveals one of the key fabricating mecha¬
desired, wished for, idealized, and that this nisms through which the social construction
idealization is an effect of a corporeal signi¬ of gender takes place.15 I would suggest as
fication. In other words, acts, gestures, and well that drag fully subverts the distinction
desire produce the effect of an internal core between inner and outer psychic space and
or substance, but produce this on the surface effectively mocks both the expressive model
of the body, through the play of signifying of gender and the notion of a true gender
absences that suggest, but never reveal, the identity. Newton writes:
organizing principle of identity as a cause. At its most complex, [drag] is a double in¬
Such acts, gestures, enactments, generally version that says, “appearance is an illu¬
construed, are performative in the sense that sion.” Drag says [Newtons curious per¬
the essence or identity that they otherwise sonification] “my 'outside' appearance is
purport to express are fabrications manufac¬ feminine, but my essence 'inside' [the
tured and sustained through corporeal signs body] is masculine.'' At the same time it
and other discursive means. That the gen¬ symbolizes the opposite inversion; “my
dered body is performative suggests that it appearance 'outside' [my body, my gen¬
der] is masculine but my essence 'inside'
has no ontological status apart from the vari¬
[myself] is feminine.”16
ous acts which constitute its reality. This also
suggests that if that reality is fabricated as an Both claims to truth contradict one another
interior essence, that very interiority is an and so displace the entire enactment of gen¬
effect and function of a decidedly public and der significations from the discourse of truth
social discourse, the public regulation of fan¬ and falsity.
Subversive Bodily Acts 327
The notion of an original or primary gen¬ The notion of gender parody defended
der identity is often parodied within the cul¬ here does not assume that there is an original
tural practices of drag, cross-dressing, and which such parodic identities imitate. In¬
the sexual stylization of butch/femme identi¬ deed, the parody is of the very notion of an
ties. Within feminist theory, such parodic original; just as the psychoanalytic notion of
identities have been understood to be either gender identification is constituted by a fan¬
degrading to women, in the case of drag and tasy of a fantasy, the transfiguration of an
cross-dressing, or an uncritical appropria¬ Other who is always already a “figure” in that
tion of sex-role stereotyping from within the double sense, so gender parody reveals that
practice of heterosexuality, especially in the the original identity after which gender fash¬
case of butch/femme lesbian identities. But ions itself is an imitation without an origin.
the relation between the “imitation” and the To be more precise, it is a production which,
“original” is, I think, more complicated than in effect—that is, in its effect—postures as an
that critique generally allows. Moreover, it imitation. This perpetual displacement con¬
gives us a clue to the way in which the rela¬ stitutes a fluidity of identities that suggests
tionship between primary identification— an openness to resignification and recontex-
that is, the original meanings accorded to tualization; parodic proliferation deprives
gender—and subsequent gender experience hegemonic culture and its critics of the claim
might be reframed. The performance of drag to naturalized or essentialist gender identi¬
plays upon the distinction between the anat¬ ties. Although the gender meanings taken up
omy of the performer and the gender that is in these parodic styles are clearly part of
being performed. But we are actually in the hegemonic, misogynist culture, they are
presence of three contingent dimensions of nevertheless denaturalized and mobilized
significant corporeality: anatomical sex, gen¬ through their parodic recontextualization. As
der identity, and gender performance. If the imitations which effectively displace the
anatomy of the performer is already distinct meaning of the original, they imitate the
from the gender of the performer, and both myth of originality itself. In the place of an
of those are distinct from the gender of the original identification which serves as a de¬
performance, then the performance suggests termining cause, gender identity might be re¬
a dissonance not only between sex and per¬ conceived as a personal/cultural history of
formance, but sex and gender, and gender received meanings subject to a set of imita¬
and performance. As much as drag creates a tive practices which refer laterally to other
unified picture of “woman” (what its critics imitations and which, jointly, construct the
often oppose), it also reveals the distinctness illusion of a primary and interior gendered
of those aspects of gendered experience self or parody the mechanism of that con¬
which are falsely naturalized as a unity struction.
through the regulatory fiction of heterosex¬ According to Fredric Jameson s “Postmod¬
ual coherence. In imitating gender, drag im¬ ernism and Consumer Society,” the imitation
plicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender that mocks the notion of an original is char¬
itself—as well as its contingency. Indeed, part
acteristic of pastiche rather than parody:
of the pleasure, the giddiness of the perfor¬
mance is in the recognition of a radical con¬ Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a
tingency in the relation between sex and gen¬ peculiar or unique style, the wearing of a
der in the face of cultural configurations of stylistic mask, speech in a dead language:
causal unities that are regularly assumed to but it is a neutral practice of mimicry,
without parody's ulterior motive, without
be natural and necessary. In the place of the
the satirical impulse, without laughter,
law of heterosexual coherence, we see sex without that still latent feeling that there
and gender denaturalized by means of a per¬ exists something normal compared to
formance which avows their distinctness and which what is being imitated is rather
dramatizes the cultural mechanism of their comic. Pastiche is blank parody, parody
fabricated unity. that has lost it humor.17
328 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XII. Feminist Theory
The loss of the sense of “the normal/' how¬ tuted by incest taboos. Originally written in
ever, can be its own occasion for laughter, honor of Georges Bataille, this essay explores
especially when “the normal,” “the original” in part the metaphorical “dirt” of transgres¬
sive pleasures and the association of the for¬
is revealed to be a copy, and an inevitably
bidden orifice with the dirt-covered tomb.
failed one, an ideal that no one can embody.
See pp. 46-48.
In this sense, laughter emerges in the reali¬
9. Kristeva discusses Mary Douglas' work in a
zation that all along the original was de¬
short section of The Powers of Horror: An Es¬
rived.
say on Abjection, trans. Leon Roudiez (New
Parody by itself is not subversive, and York: Columbia University Press, 1982), origi¬
there must be a way to understand what nally published as Pouvoirs de Vhorreur
makes certain kinds of parodic repetitions (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1980). Assimilating
effectively disruptive, truly troubling, and Douglas’ insights to her own reformulation of
which repetitions become domesticated and Lacan, Kristeva writes, “Defilement is what is
recirculated as instruments of cultural he¬ jettisoned from the symbolic system. It is what
gemony. A typology of actions would clearly escapes that social rationality, that logical or¬
not suffice, for parodic displacement, indeed, der on which a social aggregate is based,
which then becomes differentiated from a
parodic laughter, depends on a context and
temporary agglomeration of individuals and,
reception in which subversive confusions can
in short, constitutes a classification system or
be fostered. What performance where will in¬ a structure” (p. 65).
vert the inner/outer distinction and compel a
10. Ibid., p. 3.
radical rethinking of the psychological pre¬
suppositions of gender identity and sexual¬ 11. Iris Marion Young, “Abjection and Oppres¬
ity? What performance where will compel a sion: Unconscious Dynamics of Racism, Sex¬
reconsideration of the place and stability of ism, and Homophobia,” paper presented at
the Society of Phenomenology and Existen¬
the masculine and the feminine? And what
tial Philosophy Meetings, Northwestern Uni¬
kind of gender performance will enact and versity, 1988. The paper will be published in
reveal the performativity of gender itself in a the proceedings of the 1988 meetings by the
way that destabilizes the naturalized catego¬ State University of New York Press. It will also
ries of identity and desire. . . . be included as part of a larger chapter in her
forthcoming The Politics of Difference.
Endnotes
12. Parts of the following discussion were pub¬
1. Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, His¬ lished in two different contexts, in my “Gen¬
tory/’ in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: der Trouble, Feminist Theory, and Psycho¬
Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Fou¬ analytic Discourse,” in Feminism/Postmod-
cault, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry emism, ed. Linda J. Nicholson (New York:
Simon, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cor¬ Routledge, 1989) and “Performative Acts and
nell University Press, 1977), p. 148. Refer¬ Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenome¬
ences in the text are to this essay. nology and Feminist Theory," Theatre Jour¬
nal, Vol. 20, No. 3, Winter 1988.
2. Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (London,
Boston, and Henley: Routledge and Kegan 13. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the
Paul, 1969), p. 4. Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New
3. Ibid., p. 113. York: Vintage, 1979), p. 29.
sic literacy, quality educational experiences, that something is true but be unwilling or
and faculty and administrative positions has unable to legitimate our claims using Euro¬
limited Black womens access to influential centric, masculinist criteria for consistency
academic positions (Zinn et al. 1986). While with substantiated knowledge and criteria
Black women can produce knowledge claims for methodological adequacy. For any body
that contest those advanced by the white of knowledge, new knowledge claims must
male community, this community does not be consistent with an existing body of knowl¬
grant that Black women scholars have com¬ edge that the group controlling the interpre¬
peting knowledge claims based in another tive context accepts as true. The methods
knowledge validation process. As a conse¬ used to validate knowledge claims must also
quence, any credentials controlled by white be acceptable to the group controlling the
male academicians can be denied to Black knowledge validation process.
women producing Black feminist thought on The criteria for the methodological ade¬
the grounds that it is not credible research. quacy of positivism illustrate the epistemo¬
Black women with academic credentials logical standards that Black women scholars
who seek to exert the authority that our status would have to satisfy in legitimating Black
grants us to propose new knowledge claims feminist thought using a Eurocentric mascu¬
about African-American women face pres¬ linist epistemology. While I describe Euro¬
sures to use our authority to help legitimate centric masculinist approaches as a single
a system that devalues and excludes the ma¬ process, many schools of thought or para¬
jority of Black women. When an outsider digms are subsumed under this one process.
group—in this case, African-American wom¬ Moreover, my focus on positivism should be
en—recognizes that the insider group— interpreted neither to mean that all dimen¬
namely, white men—requires special privi¬ sions of positivism are inherently problem¬
leges from the larger society, a special prob¬ atic for Black women nor that nonpositivist
lem arises of keeping the outsiders out and at frameworks are better. For example, most
the same time having them acknowledge the traditional frameworks that women of color
legitimacy of this procedure. Accepting a few internationally regard as oppressive to
“safe” outsiders addresses this legitimation women are not positivist, and Eurocentric
problem (Berger and Luckmann 1966). One feminist critiques of positivism may have less
way of excluding the majority of Black political importance for women of color, es¬
women from the knowledge validation pro¬ pecially those in traditional societies than
cess is to permit a few Black women to ac¬ they have for white feminists (Narayan
quire positions of authority in institutions 1989).
that legitimate knowledge, and to encourage Positivist approaches aim to create scien¬
us to work within the taken-for-granted as¬ tific descriptions of reality by producing ob¬
sumptions of Black female inferiority shared jective generalizations. Because researchers
by the scholarly community and by the cul¬ have widely differing values, experiences,
ture at large. Those Black women who accept and emotions, genuine science is thought to
these assumptions are likely to be rewarded be unattainable unless all human charac¬
by their institutions, often at significant per¬ teristics except rationality are eliminated
sonal cost. Those challenging the assump¬ from the research process. By following strict
tions run the risk of being ostracized. methodological rules, scientists aim to dis¬
African-American women academicians tance themselves from the values, vested in¬
who persist in trying to rearticulate a Black terests, and emotions generated by their
womens standpoint also face potential rejec¬ class, race, sex, or unique situation. By de-
tion of our knowledge claims on epistemo¬ contextualizing themselves, they allegedly
logical grounds. Just as the material realities become detached observers and manipula¬
of the powerful and the dominated produce tors of nature (Jaggar 1983; Harding 1986).
separate standpoints, each group may also Moreover, this researcher decontextualiza-
have distinctive epistemologies or theories of tion is paralleled by comparable efforts to
knowledge. Black women scholars may know remove the objects of study from their con-
332 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XII. Feminist Theory
texts. The result of this entire process is often pendently of racial oppression (Jahn 1961;
the separation of information from meaning Mbiti 1969; Diop 1974; Zahan 1979; Sobel
(Fausto-Sterling 1989). 1979; Richards 1980, 1990; Asante 1987; My¬
Several requirements typify positivist ers 1988). Moreover, as a result of colonial¬
methodological approaches. First, research ism, imperialism, slavery, apartheid, and
methods generally require a distancing of the other systems of racial domination, Black
researcher from her or his “object” of study people share a common experience of op¬
by defining the researcher as a “subject” with pression. These two factors foster shared
full human subjectivity and by objectifying Afrocentric values that permeate the family
the “object” of study (Keller 1985; Asante structure, religious institutions, culture, and
1987; Hooks 1989). A second requirement is community life of Blacks in varying parts of
the absence of emotions from the research Africa, the Caribbean, South America, and
process (Hochschild 1975; Jaggar 1983). North America (Walton 1971; Gayle 1971;
Third, ethics and values are deemed inappro¬ Smitherman 1977; Shimkin et al. 1978;
priate in the research process, either as the Walker 1980; Sudarkasa 1981; Thompson
reason for scientific inquiry or as part of the 1983; Mitchell and Lewter 1986; Asante 1987;
research process itself (Richards 1980; Haan Brown 1989). This Afrocentric consciousness
et al. 1983). Finally, adversarial debates, permeates the shared history of people of Af¬
whether written or oral, become the pre¬ rican descent through the framework of a dis¬
ferred method of ascertaining truth: the ar¬ tinctive Afrocentric epistemology (Turner
guments that can withstand the greatest as¬ 1984).
sault and survive intact become the strongest Feminist scholars advance a similar argu¬
truths (Moulton 1983). ment by asserting that women share a history
Such criteria ask African-American of gender oppression, primarily through
women to objectify ourselves, devalue our sex/gender hierarchies (Eisenstein 1983;
emotional life, displace our motivations for Hartsock 1983b; Andersen 1988). These ex¬
furthering knowledge about Black women, periences transcend divisions among women
and confront in an adversarial relationship created by race, social class, religion, sexual
those with more social, economic and profes¬ orientation, and ethnicity and form the basis
sional power. It therefore seems unlikely that of a womens standpoint with a correspond¬
Black women would use a positivist episte¬ ing feminist consciousness and epistemology
mological stance in rearticulating a Black (Rosaldo 1974; D. Smith 1987; Hartsock
womens standpoint. Black women are more 1983a; Jaggar 1983).
likely to choose an alternative epistemology Because Black women have access to both
for assessing knowledge claims, one using the Afrocentric and the feminist standpoints,
different standards that are consistent with an alternative epistemology used to rearticu¬
Black womens criteria for substantiated late a Black womens standpoint should re¬
knowledge and with our criteria for meth¬ flect elements of both traditions. The search
odological adequacy. If such an epistemology for the distinguishing features of an alterna¬
exists, what are its contours? Moreover, what tive epistemology used by African-American
is its role in the production of Black feminist women reveals that values and ideas African¬
thought? ist scholars identify as characteristically
“Black” often bear remarkable resemblance
The Contours of an Afrocentric to similar ideas claimed by feminist scholars
Feminist Epistemology as characteristically “female.” This similarity
suggests that the material conditions of race,
Africanist analyses of the Black experience class, and gender oppression can vary dra¬
generally agree on the fundamental elements matically and yet generate some uniformity
of an Afrocentric standpoint (Okanlawon in the epistemologies of subordinate groups.
1972). Despite varying histories, Black socie¬ Thus the significance of an Afrocentric femi¬
ties reflect elements of a core African value nist epistemology may lie in how such an
system that existed prior to and inde¬ epistemology enriches our understanding of
Toward an Afrocentric Feminist Epistemology 333
how subordinate groups create knowledge therefore have the best standpoint from
that fosters resistance. which to understand the mechanisms, pro¬
The parallels between the two conceptual cesses, and effects of oppression, this simply
schemes raise a question: Is the worldview of may not be the case.
women of African descent more intensely in¬ Like a Black womens standpoint, an Afro¬
fused with the overlapping feminine/Afro¬ centric feminist epistemology is rooted in the
centric standpoints than is the case for either everyday experiences of African-American
African-American men or white women? women. In spite of diversity that exists
While an Afrocentric feminist epistemology among women, what are the dimensions of
reflects elements of epistemologies used by an Afrocentric feminist epistemology?
African-Americans and women as groups, it
also paradoxically demonstrates features Concrete Experience as a Criterion
that may be unique to Black women. On cer¬
tain dimensions Black women may more
of Meaning
closely resemble Black men; on others, white “My aunt used to say, 'A heap see, but a few
women; and on still others Black women may know,'" remembers Carolyn Chase, a 31-
stand apart from both groups. Black womens year-old inner-city Black woman (Gwaltney
both/and conceptual orientation, the act of 1980, 83). This saying depicts two types of
being simultaneously a member of a group knowing—knowledge and wisdom—and
and yet standing apart from it, forms an in¬ taps the first dimension of an Afrocentric
tegral part of Black womens consciousness. feminist epistemology. Living life as Black
Black women negotiate these contradictions, women requires wisdom because knowledge
a situation Bonnie Thornton Dill (1979) la¬ about the dynamics of race, gender, and class
bels the “dialectics of Black womanhood," by oppression has been essential to Black
using this both/and conceptual orientation. womens survival. African-American women
Rather than emphasizing how a Black give such wisdom high credence in assessing
womens standpoint and its accompanying knowledge.
epistemology are different from those in Allusions to these two types of knowing
Afrocentric and feminist analyses, I use pervade the words of a range of African-
Black womens experiences to examine American women. Zilpha Elaw, a preacher of
points of contact between the two. Viewing the mid-1800s, explains the tenacity of
an Afrocentric feminist epistemology in this racism:
way challenges additive analyses of oppres¬
sion claiming that Black women have a more The pride of a white skin is a bauble of
accurate view of oppression than do other great value with many in some parts of the
United States, who readily sacrifice their
groups. Such approaches suggest that op¬
intelligence to their prejudices, and pos¬
pression can be quantified and compared sess more knowledge than wisdom (An¬
and that adding layers of oppression pro¬ drews 1986, 85).
duces a potentially clearer standpoint (Spel-
man 1982). One implication of standpoint In describing differences separating African-
approaches is that the more subordinated the American and white women, Nancy White
group, the purer the vision of the oppressed invokes a similar rule: “When you come
group. This is an outcome of the origins of right down to it, white women just think
standpoint approaches in Marxist social the¬ they are free. Black women know they ain't
ory, itself an analysis of social structure free" (Gwaltney 1980, 147). Geneva Smither-
rooted in Western either/or dichotomous man, a college professor specializing in Afri¬
thinking. Ironically, by quantifying and rank¬ can-American linguistics, suggests that
ing human oppressions, standpoint theorists
from a black perspective, written docu¬
invoke criteria for methodological adequacy ments are limited in what they can teach
characteristic of positivism. Although it is about life and survival in the world. Blacks
tempting to claim that Black women are are quick to ridicule ‘educated fools,'. . .
more oppressed than everyone else and they have ‘book learning' but no ‘mother
334 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XII. Feminist Theory
wit,' knowledge, but not wisdom and my father had good common sense.
(Smitherman 1977, 76). Now, I think that's all you need. I might
not know how to use thirty-four words
Mabel Lincoln eloquently summarizes the where three would do, but that does not
distinction between knowledge and wisdom: mean that I don't know what I'm talking
about. ... I know what I'm talking about
To black people like me, a fool is funny— because I'm talking about myself. I'm talk¬
you know, people who love to break bad, ing about what I have lived (Gwaltney
people you can't tell anything to, folks that 1980, 27, 33).
would take a shotgun to a roach (Gwalt-
ney 1980, 68). Implicit in Ms. Shays’s self-assessment is a
critique of the type of knowledge that ob¬
African-American women need wisdom to scures the truth, the "thirty-four words" that
know how to deal with the "educated fools" cover up a truth that can be expressed in
who would "take a shotgun to a roach." As
three.
members of a subordinate group, Black
Even after substantial mastery of white
women cannot afford to be fools of any type,
masculinist epistemologies, many Black
for our objectification as the Other denies us
women scholars invoke our own concrete ex¬
the protections that white skin, maleness,
periences and those of other African-Ameri¬
and wealth confer. This distinction between
can women in selecting topics for investiga¬
knowledge and wisdom, and the use of expe¬
tion and methodologies used. For example,
rience as the cutting edge dividing them, has
Elsa Barkley Brown (1986) subtitles her es¬
been key to Black women's survival. In the
say on Black women’s history, "how my
context of race, gender, and class oppression,
mother taught me to be an historian in spite
the distinction is essential. Knowledge with¬
of my academic training." Similarly Joyce
out wisdom is adequate for the powerful, but
Ladner (1972) maintains that growing up as
wisdom is essential to the survival of the sub¬
a Black woman in the South gave her special
ordinate.
insights in conducting her study of Black
For most African-American women those
adolescent women. Lorraine Hansberry al¬
individuals who have lived through the expe¬
ludes to the potential epistemological signifi¬
riences about which they claim to be experts
cance of valuing the concrete:
are more believable and credible than those
who have merely read or thought about such In certain peculiar ways, we have been
experiences. Thus concrete experience as a conditioned to think not small—but tiny.
criterion for credibility frequently is invoked And the thing, I think, which has strangled
by Black women when making knowledge us most is the tendency to turn away from
claims. For instance, Hannah Nelson de¬ the world in search of the universe. That
is chaos in science—can it be anything
scribes the importance personal experience
else in art? (1969, 134).
has for her:
Experience as a criterion of meaning with
Our speech is most directly personal, and
practical images as its symbolic vehicles is a
every black person assumes that every
other black person has a right to a per¬ fundamental epistemological tenet in Afri¬
sonal opinion. In speaking of grave mat¬ can-American thought systems (Mitchell and
ters, your personal experience is consid¬ Lewter 1986). "Look at my arm!" Sojourner
ered very good evidence. With us, distant Truth proclaimed: "I have ploughed, and
statistics are certainly not as important as planted, and gathered into bams, and no man
the actual experience of a sober person could head me! And ain’t I a woman?"
(Gwaltney 1980, 7). (Loewenberg and Bogin 1976, 235). By in¬
voking concrete practical images from her
Similarly, Ruth Shays uses her concrete ex¬
own life to symbolize new meanings, Truth
periences to challenge the idea that formal
deconstructed the prevailing notions of
education is the only route to knowledge:
woman. Stories, narratives, and Bible princi¬
I am the kind of person who doesn't have ples are selected for their applicability to the
a lot of education, but both my mother lived experiences of African-Americans and
Toward an Afrocentric Feminist Epistemology 335
become symbolic representations of a whole tion but a women's tradition as well. Some
wealth of experience. Bible tales are often feminist theorists suggest that women are so¬
told for the wisdom they express about every¬ cialized in complex relational nexuses where
day life, so their interpretation involves no contextual rules versus abstract principles
need for scientific historical verification. The govern behavior (Chodorow 1978; Gilligan
narrative method requires that the story be 1982). This socialization process is thought
told, not tom apart in analysis, and tmsted to stimulate characteristic ways of knowing
as core belief, not "admired as science" (Hartsock 1983a; Belenky et al. 1986). These
(Mitchell and Lewter 1986, 8). theorists suggest that women are more likely
June Jordan's essay about her mothers sui¬ to experience two modes of knowing: one lo¬
cide illustrates the multiple levels of meaning cated in the body and the space it occupies
that can occur when concrete experiences are and the other passing beyond it. Through
used as a criterion of meaning. Jordan de¬ their child-rearing and nurturing activities,
scribes her mother, a women who literally women mediate these two modes and use the
died trying to stand up, and the effect her concrete experiences of their daily lives to
mothers death had on her own work: assess more abstract knowledge claims (D.
Smith 1987).
I think all of this is really about women Although valuing the concrete may be
and work. Certainly this is all about me as more representative of women than men, so¬
a woman and my life work. I mean I am cial class differences among women may
not sure my mother's suicide was some¬
generate differential expression of this
thing extraordinary. Perhaps most women
must deal with a similar inheritance, the women's value. One study of working-class
legacy of a woman whose death you can¬ women's ways of knowing found that both
not possibly pinpoint because she died so white and African-American women rely on
many, many times and because, even be¬ common sense and intuition (Luttrell 1989).
fore she became your mother, the life of These forms of knowledge allow for subjec¬
that woman was taken. ... I came too late tivity between the knower and the known,
to help my mother to her feet. By way of rest in the women themselves (not in higher
everlasting thanks to all of the women authorities), and are experienced directly in
who have helped me to stay alive I am the world (not through abstractions).
working never to be late again (Jordan
Amanda King, a young African-American
1985, 26).
mother, describes how she used the concrete
While Jordan has knowledge about the con¬ to assess the abstract and points out how dif¬
crete act of her mother's death, she also ficult mediating these two modes of knowing
strives for wisdom concerning the meaning can be:
of that death.
The leaders of the ROC [a labor union] lost
Some feminist scholars offer a similar
their jobs too, but it just seemed like they
claim that women as a group are more likely
were used to losing their jobs. . . . This
than men to use concrete knowledge in as¬ was like a lifelong thing for them, to get
sessing knowledge claims. For example, a out there and protest. They were like,
substantial number of the 135 women in a what do you call them—intellectuals. . . .
study of women's cognitive development You got the ones that go to the university
were "connected knowers" and were drawn that are supposed to make all the
to the sort of knowledge that emerges from speeches, they're the ones that are sup¬
first-hand observation (Belenky et al. 1986). posed to lead, you know, put this little
Such women felt that because knowledge revolution together, and then you got the
little ones . . . that go to the factory every¬
comes from experience, the best way of
day, they be the ones that have to fight. I
understanding another person's ideas was to
had a child and I thought I don't have the
develop empathy and share the experiences time to be running around with these peo¬
that led the person to form those ideas. ple. ... I mean I understand some of that
In valuing the concrete, African-American stuff they were talking about, like the
women invoke not only an Afrocentric tradi¬ bourgeoisie, the rich and the poor and all
336 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XII. Feminist Theory
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Sociology From Women s Experience: A Reaffirmation 339
My project is a sociology that begins in the In those early days, taking the standpoint
actualities of women’s experience. It builds of women transformed how we thought and
on that earlier extraordinary moment, unlike worked, how we taught, the social relation¬
anything I've experienced before or since, a ships of the classroom, almost every aspect
giving birth to ourselves—slow, remorseless, of our lives. Remaking sociology was a mat¬
painful, and powerful. It attempts to create a ter that arose out of practical demands. Es¬
method of inquiry beginning from the site of tablished sociology distorted, turned things
being that we discovered as we learned to upside down, turned us into objects, wasn't
center ourselves as speaking, knowing sub¬ much use. I thought we could have a sociol¬
jects in our experience as women. When I ogy responding to people's lack of knowledge
first began this sociological project, I and of how our everyday worlds are hooked into
others used notions such as “womens per¬ and shaped by social relations, organization,
spective,” “womens experience,” “womens and powers beyond the scope of direct expe¬
standpoint” to express this singular move— rience. The theorizing of “standpoint” within
the foundation of this phase of the womens feminist discourse displaces the practical
movement. Particularly since Sandra Hard¬ politics that the notion of “standpoint” origi¬
ings (1986) study of The Science Question in nally captured. The concept is moved up¬
Feminism, the concept of “standpoint” has stairs, so to speak, and is reduced to a purely
been used to formalize such notions and sub¬ discursive function.
In exploring our experiences we talked
ject them to a critique. Formalization is in¬
with, wrote to and for, women, beginning
evitable, but it also breaks connection with
with what we shared as women, our sexed
the original experience that sought expres¬
bodies. Here was and is the site of women's
sion in a variety of terms. My own attempts
oppression, whether of violence, of rape, of
to express the project probably contribute to
lack of control over our choices to have chil¬
this process, though I wish they would not.
dren, through our connectedness to our chil¬
Only when I encounter critiques, for example
dren, or through childbirth and suckling. To
those of Lemert and of Harding herself, or
declare this is not to formulate essentialism
Connell's version, which seems both to be
or biological determinism. Women's experi¬
correct and to miss the point altogether, do I
ence of oppression, whatever its form and
become aware that in my own thinking I still
focus, was grounded in male control, use,
rely on the original and extraordinary discov¬
domination of our bodies. No transcendence
ery. Can I explicate it better than I have, in
for us. We were irremediably (as it seemed)
this new context, where feminist theorizing
defined by our bodies' relevance for and uses
has developed to such a sophisticated level to men.
and where even the notion of subject that we I emphasize this embodied ground of our
used to rely on (see Schutz 1962, for example) experiencing as women. Much feminist theo¬
is called into question? rizing since this original moment has taken
The experience, of course, was complex, up the standpoint in text-mediated discourse
individualized, various. It’s hard to recall now for which Descartes wrote the constitution.
that at that time we did not even have a lan¬ The Cartesian subject escapes the body,
guage for our experiences of oppression as hence escaping the limitations of the local
women. But we shared a method. We learned historical particularities of time, place, and
in consciousness-raising groups, through the relationship. When we began with our expe¬
writings of other women (I relied a great deal riences as women, however, we were always
on the rich and marvelous poetry that femi¬ returning to ourselves and to each other as
nists were writing at that time), in talk, and subjects in our bodies.
through an inner work that transformed our I'm not talking about reflecting on our bod¬
external and internal relationships. We ex¬ ily existence or describing our bodily experi¬
plored our experience as women with other ence. The consciousness raising of this phase
women—not that we necessarily agreed or of the women’s movement did not reflect on
shared our experiences. the body from a discursive standpoint. But
Sociology From Women s Experience: A Reaffirmation 341
the sexed body was always the common ing. I’m concerned with examining and expli¬
ground in relation to which we could find cating how “abstractions” are put together,
ourselves with each other as women, even if with concepts, knowledge, facticity, as so¬
only to discover the depth of our differences. cially organized practices. Making these pro¬
Of course our experiences in this mode were cesses visible also makes visible how we par¬
multiple and various, and as we sought in ticipate in and incorporate them into our
them a common ground, we also disagreed, own practices (see “The Politics and the
sometimes bitterly—fierce fights and divi¬ Product” below). In explicating the social re¬
sions were endemic. It was a lot of work to lations of knowledge, I am concerned also
arrive at shared political projects. But what with redesigning them. My notion of an
we could have in common was explored everyday world as problematic is just such an
through experiences grounded in our sexed attempt—to redesign the social organization
bodies, our womens bodies. Exploring the of our systematically developed knowledge of
varieties of our experience returned us to the society.
site of our bodily being to rediscover, remake Theorizing the standpoint of women con¬
ourselves, stripping away the inner and outer tradicts the project I am addressing. Inter¬
restraints and constraints. We sought our preting that project in those terms misinter¬
grounding in what was there for us when we prets it. All three critics argue that my project
took up the particularized, localized, felt ex¬ necessarily privileges a particular experi¬
periencing of a subject who is not divorced ence. Lemert, for example, asks whether I do
from her bodily site of being. not do “sociology with exceptional, if not ex¬
I certainly think that other sociological clusive, attention to one specific and gen¬
transformations may be created from other dered subjective experience of the actual
sites of oppression, although I don't think (as world[.]” It's true that I begin with what I
Connell seems to do) that it is the opposi¬ learned from my own experience of two
tional which defines the standpoint. I am so worlds of consciousness and their relations
bold as to believe that there's something dis¬ (so, incidentally, did Descartes), but the for¬
tinctive about the standpoint of women as mulation of a method of inquiry that I devel¬
I've expressed and experienced it, and have oped in fact works to make a space into which
tried to build it into a method of sociological anyone's experience, however various, could
inquiry. Its distinction is this: that the stand¬ become a beginning-place inquiry. “Anyone”
point of women situates inquiry in the actu¬ could be an Afro- or Chinese or Caucasian
alities of people's living, beginning with their Canadian, an individual from one of the First
experience of living, and understands that in¬ Nations, an old woman or man, a lesbian or
quiry and its product are in and of the same a gay man, a member of the ruling class, or
actuality. any other man.
For me, then, the standpoint of women I draw a contrast between beginning with
locates a place to begin inquiry before things the standpoint of women and standpoints
have shifted upwards into the transcendent constituted in text-mediated discourse. The
subject. Once you’ve gone up there, settled categories that identify diversity (race, gen¬
into text-mediated discourse, irremediably der, class, age, and so forth) for Collins, op¬
stuck on the reading side of the textual sur¬ positional sites for Connell, and fragmented
face, you can't peek round it to find the other identities for Lemert are categories of such
side where you're actually doing your read¬ discourse and of discursively embedded po¬
ing. You can reflect back, but you're already litical organization and activism. To begin
committed to a standpoint other than that of with the categories is to begin in discourse.
actual people's experience. Experiencing as a woman of color, as Himani
I'm not arguing against abstractions, as Bannerji (1987) has pointed out, does not
Connell seems to think (this would indeed be break down into experience as a woman and
a contradiction). And I'm not concerned experience as a person of color. Roxana Ng
merely with “discrediting” (Connell) or “de¬ (1990) has explored how the category “immi¬
constructing” (Collins) the relations of rul¬ grant women” is constituted in the social re-
342 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XII. Feminist Theory
lations of the Canadian state and labor mar¬ people and in ways beyond her knowing.
ket. The latter study in particular calls into Whereas a standpoint beginning in text-me¬
question Haraway’s (1985) derivation of diated discourse begins with the concepts or
identities from the discursive fragmentation schema of that discourse and turns towards
of social categories (cited by Lemert). Are we the actual to find its object, the standpoint of
really to be stuck with Althusser’s (1971) con¬ women never leaves the actual. The knowing
demnation of the subject to lasting depen¬ subject is always located in a particular spa¬
dency on being interpellated by "ideological tial and temporal site, a particular configura¬
state apparatuses"? Of course no ones citing tion of the everyday/everynight world. In¬
Althusser these days, but Haraway follows quiry is directed towards exploring and expli¬
the same path from discourse to subjectivity, cating what she does not know—the social
from discursive category to identity. I want to relations and organization pervading her
go another way. world but invisible in it.
If I could think of a term other than "stand¬
point," I'd gladly shift, especially now that
A Method of Inquiry
I've been caged in Hardings (1986) creation
of the category of "standpoint theorists" and Central to this particular sociology for
subjected to the violence of misinterpreta¬ women (I take for granted there's more than
tion, replicated many times in journals and one) is a method of inquiry. The notion of a
reviews, by those who speak of Hartsock and standpoint of women doesn't stand by itself
Smith but have read only Hardings version as a theoretical construct; it is a place to be¬
of us (or have read us through her version). gin inquiry. I argue that proceeding (and I
My notion of standpoint doesn’t privilege a emphasize the activity here) according to es¬
knower. It does something rather different. It tablished methods of inquiry in sociology, be¬
shifts the ground of knowing, the place where ginning in discourse with its concepts, and
inquiry begins. Since knowledge is essen¬ relying on standard good social scientific
tially socially organized, it can never be an methodologies produces people as objects.
act or an attribute of individual conscious¬ This is an effect of its methods of thinking
ness. and inquiry; it is not an effect of the socio¬
As I see it, the notion of standpoint works logist’s intentions. Sociologists’ intentions
like this: Social scientific inquiry ordinarily may be as oppositional and as progressive as
begins from a standpoint in a text-mediated any of us could wish, but if they work with
discourse or organization; it operates to standard methods of thinking and inquiry,
claim a piece of the actual for the relations of they import the relations of ruling into the
ruling of which that discourse or organiza¬ texts they produce. (Note, as an aside, that
tion is part; it proceeds from a concept or this is not an issue of quantitative versus
theory expressing those relations and it oper¬ qualitative method.)
ates selectively in assembling observations of Hence the importance of the method of
the world that are ordered discursively. The inquiry, as a method both of thinking about
standpoint of women proposes a different society and social relations, and of doing re¬
point d’appui: It begins one step back before search—or, as I sometimes prefer to put it, of
the Cartesian shift that forgets the body. The writing the social into discursive texts. Unlike
body isn't forgotten; hence the actual site of sociologies that seek to generate a totalizing
the body isn’t forgotten. Inquiry starts with system, this sociology is always in the mak¬
the knower who is actually located; she is ing. From different sites of women’s experi¬
active; she is at work; she is connected with ence, different social relations or different as¬
particular other people in various ways; she pects of the same complex are brought into
thinks, laughs, desires, sorrows, sings, view and their organization is explicated. Far
curses, loves just here; she reads here; she from being a dead end, as Connell suggests,
watches television. Activities, feelings, expe¬ it is a lively, unfolding, fascinating, and very
riences, hook her into extended social rela¬ productive method. I am not talking now
tions linking her activities to those of other about my own work, but am referring to the
Sociology From Women s Experience: A Reaffirmation 343
growing body of work, mostly in Canada, that theory/practice split and opt for practice, but
is exploring contemporary social relations by to locate the knower in a lived world in which
using this approach, an enterprise that is on¬ both theory and practice go on, in which the¬
going and not exclusively mine. Those who ory is itself a practice, and in which the divide
have taken up such methods of inquiry have between the two can itself be brought under
taken them in their own direction; there's no examination. The entry into text-mediated
orthodoxy From innovations made in differ¬ discourse and the relations of text-mediated
ent courses of inquiry, we learn how to do discourse are themselves actual. They are the
things that we didn't know how to do before, activity of people together, happening, al¬
or we see flaws and problems in how we were ways now. Concepts, beliefs, ideas, knowl¬
working. I am struck by the extraordinary edge, and so on (what Marxists know as con¬
expansion of our grasp of how the relations sciousness) are included in this ontology.
of ruling are put together, and by the effec¬ They are practices, they happen, they are on¬
tiveness with which this knowledge can be going, and they are integral to the concerting
put to practical use in a variety of contexts. and coordinating of people's activities.
So let me try to characterize this method 4. Inquiry and its product are forms of so¬
of inquiry briefly: cial organization. They enter into and may
1. The subject/knower of inquiry is not a become constituents of social relations.
transcendent subject but is situated in the Knowledge itself is not distinct from yet de¬
actualities of her own living, in relations with pendent on social practices and contexts, as
others. Lemert is quite right when he says Flax (quoted by Lemert) holds; rather, it is
that “key to the position is the somewhat understood as socially organized. Hence the
open term 'actual.' " Yes, it is a key, and it is importance, for this sociology, of investigat¬
not defined. I don't give it content because I ing social relations as a critique of its own
use it like the arrow you see on maps of malls, practices as well as those of others. Designing
which tells you, “You are here!" I want the a new organization for sociological knowl¬
term actual to be always directing us back to edge is the project of a sociology for women,
the “outside the text" in which living goes on and of making the everyday/everynight world
and in which the text is being read. Of course a problematic of inquiry.
the text is always in the actual, though we 5. Texts, text mediation, textuality, are cen¬
seem to feel that we can escape through the tral. The text is the bridge between the actual
text, riding it like the magic carpet of legend. and the discursive. It is a material object that
The “open” term actual reminds us of the ac¬ brings into actual contexts of reading a fixed
tuality of the flying carpet, of us who are rid¬ form of meaning that can be and may be read
ing it, and of the ground below. in many other settings by many other people
2. In this method, we're talking about the at the same time or at other times. It creates
actual ongoing practices of actual individu¬ something like an escape hatch out of the
als. This ontology is based on Marx and actual and is foundational to any possibility
Engels's formulation in The German Ideology. of abstraction of whatever kind including this
Yet we're not concerned just with what indi¬ one written here. The preceding clauses can
viduals do. The sociology I'm proposing is be read as a set of procedures for writing the
interested in the social as people's ongoing social into texts, and hence for exploiting the
concerting and coordinating of activities. power of the textual to analyze and isolate
Here I mark a shift away from the social as dimensions of organization that are fully em¬
order or as rules or as meaning, to the social bedded in the actualities of living. Of course
as actually happening and hence as investi- that writing, that text, its reading, are always
gatable. This notion owes much to eth- ongoing and in the actual. The act of reading
nomediodology, except that I want to extend is very deceitful in this respect; it conceals its
it to macro relations. particularity, its being in time and place.
3. What I've called the standpoint of 6. Text-mediated relations are the forms in
women locates us in bodily sites—local, ac¬ which power is generated and held in con¬
tual, particular. The idea is not to reenact the temporary societies. Marx argued that eco-
344 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XII. Feminist Theory
nomic relations are a specialization of inter¬ reliability and accuracy of the products of
dependencies which were previously embed¬ inquiry, beginning from the standpoint of
ded in direct personal relationships, as in feu¬ women. The product I imagine is an explica¬
dalism. With the emergence of money, mar¬ tion, an unfolding, of how things actually are
kets, and capital, these relations become dis¬ being put together, of actual ongoing social
tinct, specialized, and autonomic. Similarly, organization. I am also increasingly formu¬
in contemporary societies, the functions of lating the enterprise of inquiry as a kind of
organization and control are increasingly ongoing dialogue with society, with people,
vested in distinct, specialized, and (to some in which the inquirer is always exposed to the
extent) autonomic forms of organization and discipline of the other—sometimes the
relations mediated by texts. I’ve called these other's direct response, but more often how
“the relations of ruling." The materiality of people's activities are actually coordinated.
the text and its indefinite replicability create The language of dominant discourse, to use
a peculiar ground in which it can seem that Collins's term, is continually displaced and
language, thought, culture, formal organiza¬ reworked in the process of trying to “get it
tion have their own being outside lived time right." It is necessarily destabilized because
and the actualities of people's living—other it is always open to being rewritten as it is
than as the latter become objects of action or disciplined by its engagement with the ac¬
investigation from within the textual. But tual.
from the viewpoint of this method of inquiry, All three critics treat what I'm doing as
the textual mediation of these relations and derived from or as a synthesis of previous
forms of organization has the miraculous ef¬ sociological theories. Collins is critical of my
fect of creating a join between the local and “grounding . . . work in sociological theories,
particular (on one hand) and the generalizing yet refusing to embrace fully any one theo¬
and generalized organization of the relations retical perspective," and describes it as eclec¬
of ruling (on the other), hence making the ticism. Connell views it as “synthesis.” But if
latter investigatable in a new way. we're talking about actual people and the ac¬
From this very summary formulation of tual ongoing concerting of activities, there's
the method of inquiry, we return to issues a common ground—a real world, if you like—
raised by the critics. Lemert thematizes sub¬ to which we can refer. If you're seeking to
jective and objective, representing what I'm learn how things actually are put together,
doing as a sociology of womens, perhaps of that dialogue with the world constrains you.
anyone's, subjective experience. But the You or I draw on what is available in sociol¬
standpoint of women locates the knowing ogy that we can use in developing inquiry and
subject in the actual, before the differentia¬ methods of inquiry. This is neither synthesis
tion between subjective and objective—a nor eclecticism. Obviously I think of what I'm
conceptualization of objectifying institu¬ doing as sociology, and use what I've learned
tions. To respond to another issue Lemert from sociology. But to situate the standpoint
raises, I do hold that texts or textual technolo¬ governing inquiry in the theoretical organi¬
gies are essential to the objectification both zation of sociological discourse contradicts
of organization and of knowledge, but not, as the project of beginning from the standpoint
he seems to suggest, that texts necessarily of women “in real life" (to use Marx and
result in objectification. Engels's phrase in The German Ideology).
Lemert suggests that the postmodernist If we are going to do a sociology that serves
sealing off of an escape hatch out of text-me¬ women, perhaps people in general, it is cru¬
diated discourse is merely an issue of post¬ cial to get it right. This objective makes no
modernism’s “willingness to tolerate the claim to a unitary, absolute, or final truth
irony and uncertain possibilities of life in a (hence Lemert's application of the Flax para¬
world without comforting certitudes." I dis¬ dox doesn't apply). I’ve used the analogy of a
agree. The issue, as far as I'm concerned, isn't map. We have maps, we use maps, we rely on
comfort or tolerance for ambiguity or appre¬ maps in a perfectly ordinary and mundane
ciation of irony. Rather it is an issue of the way. I’m not aiming for the one truth. I'm
Sociology From Women s Experience: A Reaffirmation 345
aiming rather to produce sociological ac¬ but in an inquiry disciplined by its commit¬
counts and analyses that can have this kind ment to explore how things actually work,
of credence: Here is how you get from the including language not as terms but as actual
Bloor-Bathhurst intersection to Ossington on practice. Such inquiry explores “dominant
the subway line. The map extends my capac¬ discourses'' and discovers, among other mat¬
ity to move about effectively in the city It ters, how we may be implicated in those dis¬
does not tell me everything about the subway courses. A sociology from the standpoint of
system in Toronto (its technology opera¬ women insists that there is no place outside;
tions, organization), but it does tell me the hence it must be an insider's sociology. It may
sequence of stations and gives me some idea be Connell’s failure to grasp my insistence on
of the distance between them. I'd like to de¬ critique through inquiry which allows him to
velop a sociology that would tie people’s sites draw the odd conclusion that I make femi¬
of experience and action into accounts of so¬ nism as such “the principle of anarchy'' out¬
cial organization and relations which have side and opposed to the patriarchal power
that ordinarily reliable kind of faithfulness to structure. In the sense I mean “insider,” there
“how it works.”2 are no outsiders. We are all participants. We
The project of inquiry from the standpoint discover ourselves in exploring the relations
of women is always reflexive. Also, it is al¬ in which we participate and that shape how
ways about ourselves as inquirers—not just we participate. The project locates itself in a
our personal selves, but our selves as partici¬ dialectic between actual people located just
pants. The metaphor of insider and outsider as we are and social relations, in which we
contains an ambiguity that I should be more participate and to which we contribute, that
watchful of, for I disagree with Collins's view have come to take on an existence and a
and Connell's implication that there is an out¬ power over against us.
side in society. They are directing our atten¬
tion to issues of marginality, exclusion, sup¬ The Politics and the Product
pressed and oppositional cultures and posi¬
tions—being outside in that general sense. Connell makes a major and, in my view,
But as I've used the metaphor, I've wanted to unjustified shift from the feminist sociology
stress that those outside positions are inside. I'm putting forward to a vaguely defined “op¬
In the sense I'm trying to capture, we are positional mode of doing sociology.” It is in¬
inside necessarily, and so there are no modes deed true that my feminism is generally op¬
of investigation other than those beginning positional, but I'd have got nowhere if I’d
from within. This is as true of established stuck with the radical tradition of European
sociology as of a sociology developing in¬ sociology, as Connell suggests, which for the
quiry from women's standpoint. Established most part is embedded as deeply in the male-
sociology has powerful ways of writing the dominated standpoints of ruling as is Ameri¬
social into the text, which produce society as can sociology.
seen from an Archimedean point. A sociology Much of my earlier work as a feminist
for women says: “You can't have that wish.'' sociologist was in critical dialogue with the
There is no other way than beginning from deeply masculine values of the Marxism that
the actual social relations in which we are pervaded the activism of the 1960s, 1970s,
participants. This fact can be concealed, but and early 1980s. My critique of the ideologi¬
not avoided. cal practice of sociology (Smith 1990a) is
Therefore I'm in general agreement with equally applicable to the thinking of the
Collins, who suggests that “assuming the lan¬ Marxist theorizing of that period and earlier.
guage of dominant discourses, even using the In fact, an original and much earlier version
language of objectified knowledge to critique was directed primarily towards the Marxist
its terms, weds the thinker to the relations of thinking of that time. I came to see that the
ruling supported by objectified knowledge.'' oppositional stance of Marxism did not pre¬
Yet my proposed critique is not just in lan¬ clude adopting a standpoint in the relations
guage—one set of terms against another— of ruling. Relevant here is the poststructural-
346 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XII. Feminist Theory
ist insight that the language and concepts of built into methods of thinking, reasoning,
a discourse always speak more and other and inquiry that have been powerfully influ¬
than our intentions. Though I address this ential in Europe as well as in North America,
effect quite differently, preserving an ontol¬ and have invaded oppositional thinking,
ogy of the actual and proposing to explore rather like a computer virus, on these two
discourse as actual ongoing textually medi¬ continents.
ated relations among actual people, the point Opposition as such is not what I'm doing.
is the same. Marxists might have an opposi¬ Nor am I convinced, as Collins is, that knowl¬
tional intention, but in taking up modes of edge as such can be transformative. She sees
thinking, reasoning, inquiry, and explanation my work as failing when measured against
within the established discourses of social her own objective, and indeed against her
science, humanities, and philosophy, they achievement (in Black Feminist Thought
have imported into their oppositional work a [1990]), of a transformed knowledge. Per¬
standpoint or standpoints within the rela¬ haps relations of dominance, such as those
tions of ruling. The thoroughly masculinist of white over nonwhite or of men over
stance consolidated this approach. Whatever women, can be transformed through know¬
their intentions, the organization of the dis¬ ing them. The unyoking of black womens
course drew the Marxists into relations that subjugated knowledge that has been Pat Hill
contradicted what they sought, perhaps even Collins's own enterprise is surely empower¬
to the point of locating them in class relations ing, but when we turn to the practice of
on the side opposite that to which they change, how shall we proceed? Collins is con¬
claimed allegiance. cerned to transform the consciousness of the
I do not suggest for one moment that oppressed. My concern is with what we con¬
Marxists were dishonest—only that they did front in transforming oppressive relations.
not have methods of analysis, or perhaps a I've never seen resistance or opposition as
standpoint, from which such contradictions beginning in theory, much less in sociology.
might become visible. Characteristically, the Rather I've thought of "revolution” and orga¬
working class was other and object (analyses nization for change as needing a division of
of women were always of their place in the labor in which the production of knowledge
working class). Characteristically, drawing plays an essential, though not a leading, part.
on Lenin and Lukacs, Marxists viewed the But the social organization of such knowl¬
working class as the political constituency of edge must not reclaim the enterprise for the
revolution, to be led by an ''oppositional” in¬ established relations of ruling. I want a soci¬
telligentsia. Characteristically, Althussers ology capable of exploring and mapping ac¬
theorizing empowered a "scientific” intelli¬ tual organization and relations that are invis¬
gentsia and, in a new day, recreated an ideol¬ ible but active in the everyday/everynight
ogy enabling a revolutionary intelligentsia to sites where people take up resistance and
represent itself as the proper leaders of its struggle, capable of producing a knowledge
constituency, the working class. Charac¬ that extends and expands their and our grasp
teristically, the Marxist-Leninist organiza¬ of how things are put together and hence
tions—at least those I was familiar with in their and our ability to organize and act ef¬
Canada and the United States—were led by fectively.
university-educated and mostly middle-class Universities and colleges already are po¬
male members of the intelligentsia, while litical; teaching in the social sciences and the
middle-class women and working-class humanities is a practical politics. Teaching
women and men played various subordinate the canon is patriarchal activism. I take this
roles. When the feminist critique finally was fact seriously. Of course I want a sociology
launched internally, it precipitated the col¬ for women to provide useful research serv¬
lapse of the movement in Canada. ices to organizations working for women's
Oppositional modes of doing sociology do issues, but I want more as well.
not of themselves entail a shift of standpoint I take the view that when we employ stan¬
from the ruling relations. These relations are dard sociological methods of work, we inad-
Sociology From Women s Experience: A Reaffirmation 347
vertently realign the issues that concern us text-mediated relations of ruling are indeed
with those of the relations of ruling. I want to pervasive. Alison Griffith and I (Griffith and
build a sociology that opens up the social Smith 1987), in the course of an inquiry into
relations and forms of organization shaping the work that mothers do in relation to their
our lives from the standpoint of women. You children’s schooling, came to recognize in
cannot get there directly from the kinds of our own lives as single parents and in our talk
applied participatory research that Connell with other mothers the pervasive organizing
recommends for me, though such a sociology effect of a mothering discourse that was
would serve participatory research well. The founded in North America in the 1920s and
long exclusion of womens knowledge and 1930s. I've written too about “femininity” as
thought from universities and schools makes a text-mediated discourse in which women
me very wary of proposals that would confine participate actively (Smith 1990b).
the focus of a sociology for women to imme¬ My research concern is to build an ordi¬
diate practical issues. Yes, I presuppose an nary good knowledge of the text-mediated or¬
“agentic professional/' but I want her to be ganization of power from the standpoint of
able to work very differently than she is able women in contemporary capitalism. Not for
to with established sociological strategies of one moment do I suggest that this is all there
thinking and inquiry. I want her to know is to be done or indeed all that this method
methods of inquiry beginning from a stand¬ of inquiry makes possible, but it is powerfully
point outside the relations of ruling and to be relevant to making change in our kind of so¬
able to call on a sociological knowledge put ciety. Work produced from this approach has
together the same way. been relevant and has been used in a variety
Far from representing the limitations of of contexts of struggle for change, including
the method of inquiry I propose, as Connell collective bargaining, issues of racial in¬
seems to suggest, my micro analyses of ide¬ equality in Canada, pay and employment eq¬
ology open up the ways in which we social uity, environmental activism, social policy,
scientists participate as subjects in the orders and gay activism—very much the kind of
of ruling. The latter aren’t just literary mat¬ knowledge that Australian “femocrats”
ters or demonstrations of how the schemata would find useful in their bridging of the gap
of psychiatry generate accounts. An example between women's experience outside the bu¬
is Adele Mueller’s (1987) investigation show¬ reaucracy and their efforts to make change
ing how research on peasant women in the from within. Studies exploring specific con¬
Third World, done by feminist researchers texts build a more general knowledge of how
and theorized in the “women and develop¬ the ruling relations are put together and how
ment” discourse of the United States, is tied to investigate them. Of special importance is
into the latter’s development policies. The an increasing knowledge of how textuality
ideological organization I examined at the operates in the organization of power and of
micro level in The Conceptual Practices of how concepts and ideology enter directly into
Power is shown to operate in the organization the organization of ruling, replicating orga¬
of relations of state, researchers, and the lo¬ nizational controls across multiple sites.
cal realities of Third World woman. Gillian People working from this approach have
Walker (1990) also investigates ideological investigated the text-based organization of
organization at the institutional level. She ex¬ nursing and how it articulates the work of
plores the process through which the concept nurses on the ward with the new systems of
of “family violence” was established as the financial accounting in health care (Camp¬
conceptual organizer of state administrative bell 1984); how public service systems of job
and welfare practice, of the work of profes¬ descriptions organize gender-differentiated
sionals, of the research and theoretical dis¬ career lines (Cassin forthcoming; Reimer
courses concerned, and of the work of “tran¬ 1988); how the process of planning legisla¬
sition houses.” tion and the operations of planning depart¬
This doesn’t mean merely exploring rela¬ ments at municipal levels work to defeat local
tions in which intellectuals are active. The activists' opposition to development even
348 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XII. Feminist Theory
when the activists win (Turner 1991); how 1. My responses are based on drafts of the criti¬
government policies involving changing cal essays, not on the final versions.
funding practices transform the accounting 2. Of course sociological maps could not be as
practices of community colleges and hence representationally simple as subway system
their internal systems of control over and use maps, though indeed the latter are highly art¬
of teaching staff (McCoy 1991); how to reor¬ ful and indeed are interesting and sophisti¬
cated as translators of properties of local spa¬
ganize the availability of treatment for people
tial and social organizational relations to a
with AIDS and who are HIV-positive so as to
visual text. It is also important epistemologi¬
make “possible” clinical knowledge widely cally to recognize that quite different maps or
available (G. Smith 1990); the ideology of the diagrams could be produced to represent the
“single parent” as organizer of multiple sites same actuality. A diagram of the subways
(parent-teacher contact, classroom, adminis¬ electrical system would be quite different.
tration, newspaper features) in education 3. A fuller list is available on request.
(Griffith 1986); and the formation and prac¬
tice of social work consciousness as an agent References
of ruling (De Montigny 1989). I have men¬
tioned other issues earlier. Althusser Louis. 1971. “Ideology and Ideological
It is also possible to deploy this method of State Apparatuses.” Pp. 127-86 in Lenin and
Philosophy Other Essays. New York: Monthly
inquiry on topics other than the text-based
Review Press.
relations of ruling, as demonstrated by Hi-
Bannerji Himani 1987. "Introducing Racism:
mani Bannerjis (1988) brilliant study of late
Notes towards an Anti-Racist Feminism.” Re¬
nineteenth-century Bengali theater in the sources for Feminist Research 16:10-12.
formation of ruling-class consciousness in
-. 1988. “The Politics of Representation: A
colonial Bengal; by Ann Manicoms (1988) Study of Class and Class Struggle in the Politi¬
marvelous investigation of how teachers' cal Theatre of West Bengal.” PhD dissertation,
work is shaped by the economic status of the University of Toronto.
homes of the children they teach; and by Campbell, Marie. 1984. “Information Systems
George Smith’s (1991) investigation of the ex¬ and Management of Hospital Nursing: A Study
perience of gay students in high school, in the Social Organization of Knowledge.”
which explores through that experience the PhD dissertation, University of Toronto.
distinctive social organization of their op¬ Cassin, A. Marguerite. Forthcoming. “Pay Equity
pression.3 and the Routine Production of Inequality.” Ca¬
nadian Journal of Women and the Law.
Fragmentary as these studies may seem,
they teach us more and more about the com¬ Collins Patricia Hill. 1990. Black Feminist
Thought. London: Unwin Hyman.
plex and interwoven organization of the rela¬
tions of ruling, and more and more about De Montigny, Gerald. 1989. “Accomplishing Pro¬
fessional Reality: An Ethnography of Social
how institutional processes are coordinated
Workers' Practice.” PhD dissertation, Univer¬
and “run.” Directly or indirectly, most of this sity of Toronto.
work provides a knowledge of the processes
Griffith Alison. 1986. “Reporting the Facts: Media
and relations of ruling that at least some col¬
Accounts of Single Parent Families.” Re¬
lectivities have found invaluable. And after sources for Feminist Research 15: 32-43.
all, there is a politics of inquiry that goes be¬
Griffith, Alison and Dorothy E. Smith. 1987.
yond direct service to organized struggles. “Constructing Cultural Knowledge: Mothering
We teach, and teaching sociology, as Sally as Discourse.’ 'Pp. 87-103 in Women and Edu¬
Hacker (1990: 158) once told me, is essen¬ cation, edited by J. Gaskell and A. McLaren.
tially a political act, both in substance and in Calgary: Detselig.
classroom practice. Hacker, Sally. 1990. Doing It the Hard Way: Inves¬
tigations of Gender and Technology, edited by
Endnotes Dorothy E. Smith and Susan Turn. Boston:
Unwin Hyman.
* Barrie Thornes and Barbara Lasletts edito¬ Haraway, Donna. 1985. “A Manifesto for Cyborgs:
rial work immensely improved the original of Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism
this paper. I am very grateful. in the 1980s.” Socialist Review 15: 65-108.
Sociology From Women s Experience: A Reaffirmation 349
Harding, Sandra. 1986. The Science Question in Schutz, Alfred. 1962. “On Multiple Realities.” Pp.
Feminism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 207-59 in Collected Papers, Vol. 1. The Hague:
Manicom, Ann. 1988. "Constituting Class Rela¬ Martinus Nijhoff.
tions: The Social Organization of Teachers' Smith, Dorothy E. 1990a. The Conceptual Prac¬
Work.” PhD dissertation, University of tices of Power: A Feminist Sociology of Knowl¬
Toronto. edge. London: Routledge.
McCoy, Liza. 1991. "Accounting as Interorganiza- -. 1990b. Texts, Facts, and Femininity: Explor¬
tional Organization.” Paper presented at the ing the Relations of Ruling. London: Routledge.
annual meetings of the Society for the Study of Smith George W. 1990. “Political Activist as Eth¬
Social Problems, Cincinnati. nographer.” Social Problems 37: 401-21.
Mueller, Adele. 1987. "Peasants and Profession¬ -. 1991. "The Ideology of 'Fag': Barriers to
als: The Social Organization of Women and Education for Gay Students.” Paper presented
Development Knowledge.” PhD dissertation, at the annual meetings of the Society for the
University of Toronto. Study of Social Problems, Cincinnati.
Ng, Roxana. 1990. "Immigrant Women: The Con¬ Turner, Susan M. 1991. "Rendering the Site De¬
struction of a Labour Market Category.” Cana¬ velopable: Textual Organization in the Plan¬
dian Journal of Women and the Law 4: 96-112. ning Process.” Paper presented at the annual
Reimer, Marilee. 1988. “The Social Organization meetings of the Canadian Sociology and An¬
of the Labour Process: A Case Study of the thropology Association, Kingston, Ontario.
Documentary Management of Clerical Labour Walker, Gillian. 1990. Family Violence: The Poli¬
in the Public Service.” PhD dissertation, Uni¬ tics of Conceptualization in the Women’s Move¬
versity of Toronto. ment. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ♦
350 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XII. Feminist Theory
Freud discusses women as sex objects to which in turn stand both for castration (be¬
men in “A Special Type of Choice of Object cause the one penis has been lost) and denial
Made by Men” and “On the Universal Ten¬ of castration (because there are many pe¬
dency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love” nises). Medusa's decapitated head, the cas¬
(in which his developmental account implies trated female genitals, evokes horror and
that this “universal” tendency is found exclu¬ even paralysis—a reminder of castration—in
sively in the male).3 Men, he suggests, split the man who looks at it, but this paralysis is
women symbolically and erotically into also an erection, thereby asserting that the
mothers, or mothers and sisters, on the one penis is still there. In this two-page vignette
hand, and prostitutes on the other. The for¬ Freud captures the extreme horror at castra¬
mer cannot be sexually desired, though they tion and at the fantasied potential destruc¬
are supposed to be the kind of woman a man tiveness of women and the female genitals,
should marry; the latter, though they are which in other writings he glosses with
maritally and socially forbidden, can be sexu¬ milder words such as “contempt.”6
ally desired. As long as a woman symbolizes The phallic mother is also important in
the mother, she is a forbidden oedipal object, female development; the girl, when she first
an indication of an attachment carried on too learns about sexual difference, believes that
long. Fleeing to a woman who is or is like a her mother has a penis and that she will too
prostitute protects the defensively con¬ when she grows up. For both sexes, the
structed idea of the mothers sexual purity preoedipal mother is in Freud's view “phal¬
and denies oedipal desire. Alternatively, it
lic”: that is, active. But the recognition of the
equates the mother with a prostitute, thereby
mother's castration seems more permanently
giving her son access to her along with his
traumatic to the boy: “No male human being
father. Psychically derived impotence follows
is spared the fright of castration at the sight
the same line of reasoning: men become im¬
of the female genital.”7 The girl is, finally,
potent with women who are like, or who rep¬
much more traumatized by a castration of
resent psychically, their mothers. Freud here
her own. In Freud's view, a more drastic so¬
gives us the psychodynamics of a split long
lution than fetishism to conflict over the
present in Western culture, literature, and so¬
mother's castration (fetishism, after all, still
cial organization. Indeed, the wife must even¬
enables a heterosexual object choice with fet¬
tually reciprocate her husbands setting her
ish added on as phallus) is homosexuality, in
up as an asexual mother, for “a marriage is
which the partner himself possesses the phal¬
not made secure until the wife has succeeded
in making her husband her child as well and lus directly.8
in acting as a mother to him.”4 Like theoretical women and femininity it¬
Some men do not stop with the simple ex¬ self, clinical women are presented as objects
pedient of separating sexual from asexual as well as subjects in Freud's writings. In the
women; they must deny the female sexual “Irma” dream several doctors inject, palpate,
constitution altogether. “Fetishism,” claims minutely examine, and try to cure Irma, who
Freud, is “a substitute ... for a particular and recalcitrantly and vindictively tries to under¬
quite special penis”: that is, the penis that the mine their efforts.9 Servant women—
mother was once thought to have.5 All boys Grusha, seen from behind as she bends over
struggle with acknowledging females'— scrubbing the floor; the governesses Fraulein
originally the mother's—castration. Fetish¬ Peter and Fraulein Lina allowing their small
ists resolve the struggle by disavowal or de¬ charge to play with their genitals; and Lina,
nial, creating a fetish that externally repre¬ squeezing abscesses from her buttocks at
sents the maternal phallus and thus supports night—play important roles in the formation
such disavowal. of neurotic symptomatology in both the Wolf
Disavowal also enters the realm of mythol¬ Man and the Rat Man and specify clinically
ogy. Medusa's snakes condense signification and developmentally the class splits de¬
on the one hand of the mature female exter¬ scribed in the “Contributions to the Psychol¬
nal genitals and on the other of many penises, ogy of Love.”10 Class here intertwines with
352 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XII. Feminist Theory
gender and sexuality in the formation of male This oceanic feeling—resonant with "limit¬
erotic desire. less narcissism" and in contrast to which ma¬
Freud's perspective from within the male ture ego-feeling in later life seems a
psyche toward both abstract woman and in¬ "shrunken residue"—is very clearly, though
dividual clinical women as object, and his not stated as such, the original feeling of the
ease of identification with men in this stance, infant with its mother. It is not longing for the
produce what has seemed to many commen¬ mother, for lost narcissistic oneness, then,
tators a notable amorality in his views of that generates religious need but longing for
male behavior. I am referring not so much to the father. This longing results from "infan¬
his giving up of the seduction hypothesis (it tile helplessness" in the face of fear.12 As the
seems clear that Freud made his about-face account develops, it becomes clear that the
for theoretical and social as well as evidential fear Freud refers to is oedipal fear and fear of
reasons, but that he was certainly at the same castration: precisely, the boy's fear of his fa¬
time well aware of the prevalence and nega¬ ther, merged with his love for him. What be¬
tive impact of the sexual abuse of children gins here as an impersonal oceanic feeling,
and of incest) as I am to particular clinical held by generic human beings of both sexes,
cases. Freud barely notes that Dora's father turns out to be contrasted with a specifically
gave her mother syphilis and that his illness masculine relation to the father, which Freud
may have affected his children's health as thus sees emphatically as more important for
well. He condemns neither this father, who the boy than the relation to the mother.
handed Dora over at the age of fourteen to a Even less explicitly acknowledged than the
grown man, nor Herr K., who was willing to mother who signifies the limitless narcissism
accept the gift and who tried to seduce her. of childhood is the idealized mother, symbol¬
The case of Paul Lorenz, the Rat Man, is pre¬ ized by her breast and her sometimes perfect
sented with objectivity muted by empathy, love. In striking contrast to the devaluation
and it is a masterful rendition of the phe¬ and contempt for the mother that he displays
nomenology of obsessive neurosis. But Freud elsewhere and to his minimizing of the im¬
mentions only in passing, as interesting fact, portance of this early relation in Civilization
that Lorenz may have seduced his sister and and Its Discontents, Freud also claims that
that he certainly felt free to seduce and use a "sucking at the mother's breast is the starting-
range of other women—sometimes with point of the whole of sexual life, the un¬
drastic consequences, as he apparently drove matched prototype of every later sexual sat¬
one of them to suicide. In the case vignette of isfaction. ... I can give you no idea of the
the "dear old uncle" who had the habit of important bearing of this first object upon
taking the young daughters of friends for out¬ the choice of every later object, of the pro¬
ings, arranging for their being stranded over¬ found effects it has in its transformations and
night, and masturbating them, Freud re¬ substitutions in even the remotest regions of
marks only on the man's creation of symbolic our sexual life."13 Such sucking is ostensibly
equivalence between clean or dirty money gender-free, but Freud later implies that the
and clean or dirty hands, and he queries the satisfaction and its sequelae may be gender-
possible health consequences to the girls of differentiated. It is hard to separate male
the man's hands being dirty. But he does not wish-fulfillment from objective description
even note, let alone comment forcefully on, of the female psyche when Freud tells us that
the man's hands being used to masturbate the "a mother is only brought unlimited satisfac¬
young daughters of friends in the first tion by her relation to a son; this is altogether
place.11 the most perfect, the most free from ambiva¬
Freud's account of the male psyche repre¬ lence of all human relationships."14
sents women, and especially the mother, not In Freud's Pantheon, then, masculine im¬
only explicitly but implicitly, or latently, as ages of the mother seem to oscillate between
object. In Civilization and Its Discontents he an Aphrodite—all mature heterosexual love
contrasts the "oceanic feeling" with longing and global eroticized giving, perhaps with a
for the father as the origin of religious feeling. touch of narcissism, in love with her son and
Rethinking Freud on Women 353
his penis—and someone who, like Hera, is sion of imaginings and beliefs held by the
more vengeful, strong and insistent, resentful male psyche. He describes a variety of traits
of men and their betrayals. Not only is this that characterize a woman and that he attri¬
latter mother herself castrated, but she cas¬ butes entirely to penis envy and womens lack
trates, or threatens to castrate, both her son of a penis. These include shame about her
and her daughter. In contrast to Jungian writ¬ body, jealousy (arising directly from the envy
ing, Demeter—the mother who loves the itself), a lesser sense of justice (resulting from
daughter and mourns her loss—is nowhere the weak female superego, a superego that
to be found.15 never fully forms because the girl does not
In "The Taboo of Virginity" Freud suggests fear castration and does not therefore give up
that women other than mothers—specifi¬ oedipal longings or internalize sexual prohi¬
cally, recently deflowered ex-virgins—might bitions), and narcissism and vanity as the
castrate a man or take his penis in revenge self-love that a man centers on his penis be¬
for their painful defloration.16 In many cul¬ comes defensively diffused throughout the
tures, therefore, the custom is jusprimae noc- female body. As Freud acknowledges, femi¬
tis: the right of strong, powerful, older men nists in his time accused him of male bias in
to perform a bride s defloration. Having dis¬ these views. He also points out—in possible
cussed at length elsewhere the girls penis contradiction to his resting his case on clini¬
envy as well as her very problematic sexual cal findings—that these are "character-traits
socialization, Freud here suggests in passing which critics of every epoch have brought up
that a virgin may indeed be hurt or resent her against women."18 As cultural man, then, he
first experience of intercourse; a husband, seems to have borrowed a variety of mascu¬
who must live with his wife for some time, line cultural attitudes toward women, whose
should be spared her revenge and anger. To origins he then coincidentally attributes to
build our sense of horror, Freud invokes the the process of female development.
decapitating (castrating) Judith and Holofer-
nes, but he is much more certain of the part ***
male fantasy plays in the custom:
Whenever primitive man has set up a ta¬ We are thus led back to our place of begin¬
boo he fears some danger and it cannot be ning, the theory of femininity. At various
disputed that a generalized dread of points Freud claims that active and passive
women is expressed in all these rules of are our best approximations of masculine
avoidance. The man is afraid of being and feminine, but he in fact focuses much
weakened by the woman, infected with more on the distinction between phallicly en¬
her femininity. . . . The effect which coitus
dowed and castrated: women, basically, are
has of discharging tensions and causing
castrated men. I am not the first person to ask
flaccidity may be the prototype of what
the man fears."17 where his overwhelming preoccupation with
the penis and castration—male organs and a
Even worse, it seems, than the impotence threat to masculine body integrity, as Freud
and lack of sexual desire that Freud suggests himself, along with later psychoanalytic
in the first two "Contributions to the Psy¬ commentators, verifies—comes from. We
chology of Love," is the possibility of total have good reason, from his own account, to
weakening and "infection" with femininity. think that such a preoccupation comes from
The young, innocent husband must be pro¬ the boy; that as Freud wonders about femi¬
tected against such a psychic threat. We ninity, he is asking, as one commentator puts
must ask, in this context, if the imagined re¬ it, "What is femininity—for men?”19 I have
action of the girl is not almost entirely that tried to sort out his approach to women as
of a man imagining how he would feel if re¬ subjects, women as objects to their own sub¬
minded by intercourse of his lack of a penis. jectivity, and women as explicit and implicit
Freud presents as objective truth a final objects in the male psyche. But we are left
version of woman as subject that is, like the with this problem: what part of the Freudian
resentment of defloration, really an exten¬ construction of woman as subject is really
354 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XII. Feminist Theory
constructed after the fact from the central into fictive case accounts, of much of her the¬
conflict and trauma in Freud's theory of sexu¬ ory of femininity, and among early women
ality, based on an explicit and implicit male writers on women Deutsch is a leading de¬
norm? Is he asking, as Horney suggests, how fender and supporter of the theories of pri¬
a man or boy would feel if he were someone mary penis envy, narcissism, masochism and
without a penis?20 Hence, woman as mani¬ passivity. Elizabeth Young-Bruehl suggests
fest subject becomes, possibly, a latent pro¬ that Freud's “Dissolution of the Oedipus
jection of man. Complex" and “Some Psychical Conse¬
Freud claims, quite rightly, that his theory quences of the Anatomical Distinction be¬
comes from clinical experience, and he sup¬ tween the Sexes," as well as the earlier paper
ports it by drawing upon the writings of sev¬ “A Child Is Being Beaten," come at least par¬
eral women analysts. But the issue of clinical tially (and probably entirely in “A Child")
experience in early psychoanalysis is compli¬ from his analysis of his daughter Anna,
cated. For one thing, the women analysts he whose own writings on beating fantasies and
cites—Deutsch, Lampl-de Groot, and Bruns¬ on altruism are themselves autobiographical:
wick—were themselves analyzed by Freud, though presented fictively as cases. Both
as was Marie Bonaparte, whose later theoriz¬ Deutsch and Anna Freud, in writings now
ing on the connections of femininity, maso¬ available, affirm at some length their hatred
chism, and passivity became Freudian ortho¬ and jealousy of mothers, who are all bad, and
doxy on the psychology of women.21 Like their idealization of fathers, who are virtually
other analysands, these women analysts all good.22
seem to have remained transferentially and Freud's “clinical experience" with women
in actuality attached. Lampl-de Groot, even patients, then, from the end of World War I
as she provides the basis for a radically new through the mid-1920s—just before his writ¬
theory, does not take issue with Freud's claim ings on femininity—involved those same
for the centrality of the female castration women who wrote of themselves and of their
complex. Indeed, she reviews almost every¬ own patients as they supported and helped to
thing he has written before suggesting— create his position. Did, and how did, his
modestly, on the basis of two cases—that analysis of these young women followers—
there might possibly be something he left out. including Anna, the one nearest and dearest
Deutsch and Anna Freud in their own writ¬ to him—affect his theory? How much were
ings give evidence that they wanted to please the autobiographical and theoretical under¬
Freud by the kinds of theories they created, standings reflected in their writings on femi¬
and they have more than once been taken to ninity affected by their analysis with Freud—
task on this account. a Freud who, as we know from his classic
Moreover, as the biographical literature on case reports, was not loath to offer his pa¬
psychoanalysts expands, we are becoming tients interpretations based on previously
more aware of just how autobiographical the conceived theories? These understandings,
early writings often were. These first ana¬ translated by at least Deutsch and Anna
lysts, after all, did not have a lot of cases, and Freud into fictive patient accounts as well as
one knows—even as one doesn't know—one¬ into theory, must have emerged at least par¬
self best. Freud makes it quite explicit that tially from interpretations and reconstruc¬
his theory of the Oedipus complex evolved tions made by that very powerful and charis¬
from his own self-analysis. His Interpretation matic person who later used their writings as
of Dreams stands as a classic account of psy¬ independent corroboration of his own posi¬
choanalytic theory creation through self- tion. They may well have been reflecting their
analysis. We do not know about other occa¬ own experience—there are certainly women
sions when he may have used himself as a with the particular configuration of love and
case without acknowledging the fact. Other hate for father and mother they describe, and
writings are not so candid. A biography of women who for a variety of reasons express
Deutsch and her own autobiography make envy of or desire for a penis, or passive or
clear the autobiographical basis, translated masochistic sexual desires—but they cast
Rethinking Freud on Women 355
their writings in universal terms, as charac¬ psychology and sexuality, a rich account of
terizing femininity per se. And Freud, for masculinity as it defines itself in relation to
theoretical reasons, used them that way as women, and several potential openings to¬
well. ward more plural conceptions of gender and
The problem here is not the partially auto¬ sexuality.
biographical basis of these early psychoana¬
lytic writings. Though it is only recently that, Endnotes
under the name of countertransference, ana¬
1. See Karen Horney, “The Flight from Woman¬
lysts have been publicly willing to open them¬ hood: The Masculinity Complex in Women as
selves as extensively to scrutiny, much early Viewed by Men and by Women,” and “The
psychoanalytic theory (I do not speculate Dread of Women,” both in Feminine Psychol¬
about psychoanalytic theory today) was ogy (New York: Norton, 1967), 54-70, 133-46;
autobiographically based, and in the case of and Melanie Klein, “Early Stages of the Oedi¬
the theory of femininity, as elsewhere, the op¬ pus Conflict,” in Love, Guilt and Reparation,
position (Homey and Klein, for instance) al¬ 186-98, as well as her post-Freudian writings
such as “The Oedipus Conflict in the Light of
most certainly drew upon implicit autobio¬
Early Anxieties,” in Love, Guilt and Repara¬
graphical understandings as well.231 want to
tion, 370-419, and “Envy and Gratitude,” in
direct attention to the special complexities in Envy and Gratitude (New York: Delta, 1975),
the case of Freud s views on the psychology 176-235.
of women and the somewhat less than inde¬ 2. Freud, “Fetishism,” S.E. 21:153. I have rear¬
pendently developed clinical and theoretical ranged the structure of Freuds sentence to
support he draws upon. We can only begin to make it active and to fit into my own sen¬
untangle the convoluted interactions in the¬ tence, but I have not changed his words. The
ory creation here, but we are certainly original phrase is, “the portion of his narcis¬
thereby invited to rethink such theory. sism which Nature has, as a precaution, at¬
Although Freud claimed that his under¬ tached to that particular organ.”
standing of women was “incomplete and 3. Freud, “A Special Type of Choice of Object
fragmentary" and that the girls attachment Made by Men” and “On the Universal Ten¬
dency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love”
to her mother seemed “grey with age and
are his first two “Contributions to the Psy¬
shadowy,”24 he nevertheless developed a
chology of Love” (S.E. 11:163-90).
broad-sweeping theory about femininity and
4. Freud, “Femininity,” 133-34.
treated and discussed many women clini¬
5. Freud, “Fetishism,” 152.
cally. For the most part we admire his clinical
accounts, his forthright defense of hysterical 6. Freud, “Medusa's Head,” S.E. 18:273-74.
women, and his condemnation of the condi¬ 7. Freud, “Fetishism,” 154.
tions leading to repression and hysteria in 8. Kenneth Lewes, in The Psychoanalytic Theory
women. We admire also his toleration and of Male Homosexuality (New York: Simon and
understanding of variations in sexual object Schuster, 1988), 78, points out that all
preoedipal children are psychically male ho¬
choice and sexual subjectivity. Yet though we
mosexual, since they are imaged by Freud to
are still not able completely to evaluate his
be sexually phallic and sexually desirous of a
theory of femininity, most evaluations find it phallic mother.
extremely problematic.
9. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, S.E.
By contrast, Freuds understandings about 4:96-121.
male attitudes toward women and femininity
10. On Grusha, see Freud, From the History of an
do not seem at all fragmentary and incom¬ Infantile Neurosis [“The Wolf Man”], S.E. 17:
plete. They are specific, informative, persua¬ 90-96. On Frauleins Peter and Lina, see Notes
sive, precise; they cover, ingeniously, a variety upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis [“The Rat
of sexual, representational, and neurotic for¬ Man”], S.E. 10:160-61.
mations. They illuminate for us, with passion 11. “The Rat Man,” 197-98.
and empathy, masculine fantasies and con¬ 12. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, S.E.
flicts. Rethinking Freud on women, then, 21:72, 68. On oneness in the early infantile
leaves us with a normative theory of female relationship to the mother, see Freud, “On
356 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XII. Feminist Theory
Narcissism: An Introduction," S.E. 14:67— account here, are really asking, “What does
102. the question 'What is femininity—for men?’
13. Freud, Introductory Lectures, 16:314. mean for women?”
14. Freud, “Femininity," 133. 20. Horney, “Flight from Womanhood," esp. 57-
60 and 70.
15. See Carl J. Jung and Karoly Kerenyi, Essays
on a Science of Mythology: The Myth of the Di¬ 21. Marie Bonaparte, Female Sexuality (New
vine Child and the Mysteries ofEleusis (Prince¬ York: International Univ. Press, 1953).
ton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963); and Erich 22. ... On the autobiographical bases of Deutsch s
Neumann, The Great Mother, 2d ed. (Prince¬ and Anna Freuds writings, see Helene Deutsch,
ton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963). On Hera in Confrontations with Myself (New York: Nor¬
the masculine psyche, see Philip Slater, The ton, 1973); Paul Roazen, Helene Deutsch
Glory of Hera: Greek Mythology and the Greek (New York: Anchor, 1985); Nellie Thompson,
Family (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). “Helene Deutsch: A Life in Theory," Psycho¬
16. Freud, “The Taboo of Virginity (Contributions analytic Quarterly 56 (1987): 317—53; and
to the Psychology of Love, III)," S.E. 11: 191— Young-Bruehl, Anna Freud. On Bonaparte,
208. see Celia Bertin, Marie Bonaparte (New York:
17. Ibid., 198-99. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982).
18. Freud, “Some Psychical Consequences," 257. 23. See Quinn, A Mind of Her Own; and
19. Shoshana Felman, “Rereading Femininity," Grosskurth, Melanie Klein.
Yale French Studies 62 (1981): 21. Felman also 24. Freud, “Femininity," 135, and “Female Sexu¬
points out that accounts by women, like my ality," 226. ♦
Philosophy and Critical Theory 357
mental measures to be taken in order to ar¬ had to be overcome. Reason was established
rive at a rational organization of society are as a critical tribunal. In the philosophy of the
prescribed by analysis of economic and po¬ bourgeois era reason took on the form of
litical conditions in the given historical situ¬ rational subjectivity. Man, the individual,
ation. The subsequent construction of the was to examine and judge everything given
new society cannot be the object of theory, for by means of the power of his knowledge.
it is to occur as the free creation of the liber¬ Thus the concept of reason contains the con¬
ated individuals. When reason has been real¬ cept of freedom as well. For such examina¬
ized as the rational organization of mankind, tion and judgment would be meaningless if
philosophy is left without an object. For phi¬ man were not free to act in accordance with
losophy, to the extent that it has been, up to his insight and to bring what confronts him
the present, more than an occupation or a into accordance with reason.
discipline within the given division of labor,
has drawn its life from reason s not yet being Philosophy teaches us that all properties
reality. of mind subsist only through freedom,
Reason is the fundamental category of that all are only means for freedom, and
that all seek and produce only freedom. To
philosophical thought, the only one by means
speculative philosophy belongs the
of which it has bound itself to human destiny. knowledge that freedom is that alone
Philosophy wanted to discover the ultimate which is true of mind.1
and most general grounds of Being. Under
the name of reason it conceived the idea of Hegel was only drawing a conclusion from
an authentic Being in which all significant the entire philosophical tradition when he
antitheses (of subject and object, essence and identified reason and freedom. Freedom is
appearance, thought and being) were recon¬ the “formal element" of rationality, the only
ciled. Connected with this idea was the con¬ form in which reason can be.2
viction that what exists is not immediately With the concept of reason as freedom,
and already rational but must rather be philosophy seems to reach its limit. What re¬
brought to reason. Reason represents the mains outstanding to the realization of rea¬
highest potentiality of man and of existence; son is not a philosophical task. Hegel saw the
the two belong together. For when reason is history of philosophy as having reached its
accorded the status of substance, this means definitive conclusion at this point. However,
that at its highest level, as authentic reality, this meant for mankind not a better future
the world no longer stands opposed to the but the bad present that this condition per¬
rational thought of men as mere material ob¬ petuates. Kant had, of course, written essays
jectivity (Gegenstandlichkeit). Rather, it is on universal history with cosmopolitan in¬
now comprehended by thought and defined tent, and on perpetual peace. But his tran¬
as a concept (.Begriff). That is, the external, scendental philosophy aroused the belief that
antithetical character of material objectivity the realization of reason through factual
is overcome in a process through which the transformation was unnecessary, since indi¬
identity of subject and object is established viduals could become rational and free
as the rational, conceptual structure that is within the established order. In its basic con¬
common to both. In its structure the world is cepts this philosophy fell prey to the order of
considered accessible to reason, dependent the bourgeois epoch. In a world without rea¬
on it, and dominated by it. In this form phi¬ son, reason is only the semblance of ratio¬
losophy is idealism; it subsumes being under nality; in a state of general unfreedom, free¬
thought. But through this first thesis that dom is only a semblance of being free. This
made philosophy into rationalism and ideal¬ semblance is generated by the internalization
ism it became critical philosophy as well. As of idealism. Reason and freedom become
the given world was bound up with rational tasks that the individual is to fulfill within
thought and, indeed, ontologically depen¬ himself, and he can do so regardless of exter¬
dent on it, all that contradicted reason or was nal conditions. Freedom does not contradict
not rational was posited as something that necessity, but, to the contrary, necessarily
Philosophy and Critical Theory 359
presupposes it. Only he is free who recog¬ self-reliant, can preserve itself, and is not de¬
nizes the necessary as necessary, thereby pendent on anything else. For idealism this
overcoming its mere necessity and elevating sort of being is attained when the subject has
it to the sphere of reason. This is equivalent the world so that it cannot be deprived of it,
to asserting that a person born crippled, who that it disposes of it omnipresently, and that
cannot be cured at the given state of medical it appropriates it to the extent that in all oth¬
science, overcomes this necessity when he erness the subject is only with itself. How¬
gives reason and freedom scope within his ever, the freedom attained by Descartes' ego
crippled existence, i.e. if from the start he cogito, Leibniz's monad, Kant's transcenden¬
always posits his needs, goals, and actions tal ego, Fichte's subject of original activity,
only as the needs, goals, and actions of a crip¬ and Hegel's world-spirit is not the freedom of
ple. Idealist rationalism canceled the given pleasurable possession with which the Aris¬
antithesis of freedom and necessity so that totelian God moved in his own happiness. It
freedom can never trespass upon necessity. is rather the freedom of interminable, ardu¬
Rather, it modestly sets up house within ne¬ ous labor. In the form that it assumed as
cessity. Hegel once said that this suspension authentic Being in modern philosophy, rea¬
of necessity “transfigures necessity into free¬ son has to produce itself and its reality con¬
dom/'3 tinuously in recalcitrant material. It exists
Freedom, however, can be the truth of ne¬ only in this process. What reason is to accom¬
cessity only when necessity is already true “in plish is neither more nor less than the consti¬
itself." Idealist rationalism's attachment to tution of the world for the ego. Reason is
the status quo is distinguished by its particu¬ supposed to create the universality and com¬
lar conception of the relation of freedom and munity in which the rational subject partici¬
necessity. This attachment is the price it had pates with other rational subjects. It is the
to pay for the truth of its knowledge. It is basis of the possibility that, beyond the en¬
already given in the orientation of the subject counter of merely self-sufficient monads, a
of idealist philosophy. This subject is rational common life develops in a common world.
only insofar as it is entirely self-sufficient. All But even this achievement does not lead be¬
that is “other” is alien and external to this yond what already exists. It changes nothing.
subject and as such primarily suspect. For For the constitution of the world has always
something to be true, it must be certain. For been effected prior to the actual action of the
it to be certain, it must be posited by the individual; thus he can never take his most
subject as its own achievement. This holds authentic achievement into his own hands.
equally for the fundamentum inconcussum The same characteristic agitation, which
of Descartes and the synthetic a priori judg¬ fears really taking what is and making some¬
ments of Kant. Self-sufficiency and inde¬ thing else out of it, prevails in all aspects of
pendence of all that is other and alien is the this rationalism. Development is proclaimed,
sole guarantee of the subject's freedom. What but true development is “not a transforma¬
is not dependent on any other person or tion, or becoming something else."4 For at its
thing, what possesses itself, is free. Having conclusion it arrives at nothing that did not
excludes the other. Relating to the other in already exist “in itself" at the beginning. The
such a way that the subject really reaches and absence of concrete development appeared
is united with it (or him) counts as loss and to this philosophy as the greatest benefit. Pre¬
dependence. When Hegel ascribed to reason, cisely at its maturest stage, the inner statics
as authentic reality, movement that “remains of all its apparently so dynamic concepts be¬
within itself," he could invoke Aristotle. From come manifest. . . .
the beginning, philosophy was sure that the Critical theory's interest in the liberation
highest mode of being was being-within-it- of mankind binds it to certain ancient truths.
self (Beisichselbstsein). It is at one with philosophy in maintaining
This identity in the determination of that man can be more than a manipulable
authentic reality points to a deeper identity, subject in the production process of class so¬
property. Something is authentic when it is ciety. To the extent that philosophy has never-
360 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIII. Critical Theory
theless made its peace with man’s determina¬ as the a priori basis of all knowledge,5 this
tion by economic conditions, it has allied it¬ restriction to the a priori diverts once again
self with repression. That is the bad materi¬ from the future to what is always past. Imagi¬
alism that underlies the edifice of idealism: nation succumbs to the general degradation
the consolation that in the material world of phantasy. To free it for the construction of
everything is in order as it is. (Even when it a more beautiful and happier world remains
has not been the personal conviction of the the prerogative of children and fools. True, in
philosopher, this consolation has arisen al¬ phantasy one can imagine anything. But
most automatically as part of the mode of critical theory does not envision an endless
thought of bourgeois idealism and consti¬ horizon of possibilities.
tutes its ultimate affinity with its time.) The The freedom of imagination disappears to
other premise of this materialism is that the the extent that real freedom becomes a real
mind is not to make its demands in this possibility. The limits of phantasy are thus no
world, but is to orient itself toward another longer universal laws of essence (as the last
realm that does not conflict with the material bourgeois theory of knowledge that took se¬
world. The materialism of bourgeois practice riously the meaning of phantasy so defined
can quite easily come to terms with this atti¬ them6), but technical limits in the strictest
tude. The bad materialism of philosophy is sense. They are prescribed by the level of
overcome in the materialist theory of society. technological development. What critical
The latter opposes not only the production theory is engaged in is not the depiction of a
relations that gave rise to bad materialism, future world, although the response of phan¬
but every form of production that dominates
tasy to such a challenge would not perhaps
man instead of being dominated by him: this
be quite as absurd as we are led to believe. If
idealism underlies its materialism. Its con¬
phantasy were set free to answer, with precise
structive concepts, too, have a residue of ab¬
reference to already existing technical mate¬
stractness as long as the reality toward which
rial, the fundamental philosophical ques¬
they are directed is not yet given. Here, how¬
tions asked by Kant, all of sociology would be
ever, abstractness results not from avoiding
terrified at the utopian character of its an¬
the status quo, but from orientation toward
swers. And yet the answers that phantasy
the future status of man. It cannot be sup¬
could provide would be very close to the
planted by another, correct theory of the es¬
truth, certainly closer than those yielded by
tablished order (as idealist abstractness was
the rigorous conceptual analyses of philo¬
replaced by the critique of political econ¬
omy). It cannot be succeeded by a new theory, sophical anthropology. For it would deter¬
but only by rational reality itself. The abyss mine what man is on the basis of what he
between rational and present reality cannot really can be tomorrow. In replying to the
be bridged by conceptual thought. In order question, “What may I hope?”, it would point
to retain what is not yet present as a goal in less to eternal bliss and inner freedom than
the present, phantasy is required. The essen¬ to the already possible unfolding and fulfill¬
tial connection of phantasy with philosophy ment of needs and wants. In a situation
is evident from the function attributed to it where such a future is a real possibility, phan¬
by philosophers, especially Aristotle and tasy is an important instrument in the task of
Kant, under the title of “imagination.” Owing continually holding the goal up to view. Phan¬
to its unique capacity to “intuit” an object tasy does not relate to the other cognitive fac¬
though the latter be not present and to create ulties as illusion to truth (which in fact, when
something new out of given material of cog¬ it plumes itself on being the only truth, can
nition, imagination denotes a considerable perceive the truth of the future only as illu¬
degree of independence from the given, of sion). Without phantasy, all philosophical
freedom amid a world of unfreedom. In sur¬ knowledge remains in the grip of the present
passing what is present, it can anticipate the or the past and severed from the future,
future. It is true that when Kant characterizes which is the only link between philosophy
this “fundamental faculty of the human soul” and the real history of mankind.
Philosophy and Critical Theory 361
Strong emphasis on the role of phantasy ners (a view that overlooks that "socialist"
seems to contradict the rigorously scientific planning presupposes the disappearance of
character that critical theory has always the abstract separation both of the subject
made a criterion of its concepts. This demand from his activity and of the subject as univer¬
for scientific objectivity has brought materi¬ sal from each individual subject), but the as¬
alist theory into unusual accord with idealist sociation of those men who bring about the
rationalism. While the latter could pursue its transformation. Since what is to become of
concern with man only in abstraction from science and technology depends on them, sci¬
given facts, it attempted to undo this ab¬ ence and technology cannot serve a priori as
stractness by associating itself with science. a conceptual model for critical theory.
Science never seriously called use-value into Critical theory is, last but not least, critical
question. In their anxiety about scientific ob¬ of itself and of the social forces that make up
jectivity, the Neo-Kantians are at one with its own basis. The philosophical element in
Kant, as is Husserl with Descartes. How sci¬ the theory is a form of protest against the new
ence was applied, whether its utility and pro¬ "Economism," which would isolate the eco¬
ductivity guaranteed its higher truth or were nomic struggle and separate the economic
instead signs of general inhumanity—phi¬ from the political sphere. At an early stage,
losophy did not ask itself these questions. It this view was countered with the criticism
was chiefly interested in the methodology of that the determining factors are the given
the sciences. The critical theory of society situation of the entire society, the inter¬
maintained primarily that the only task left relationships of the various social strata, and
for philosophy was elaborating the most gen¬ relations of political power. The transforma¬
eral results of the sciences. It, too, took as its tion of the economic structure must so
basis the viewpoint that science had suffi¬ reshape the organization of the entire society
ciently demonstrated its ability to serve the that, with the abolition of economic antago¬
development of the productive forces and to nisms between groups and individuals, the
open up new potentialities of a richer exis¬ political sphere becomes to a great extent in¬
tence. But while the alliance between idealist dependent and determines the development
philosophy and science was burdened from of society. With the disappearance of the
the beginning with sins engendered by the state, political relations would then become,
dependence of the sciences on established re¬ in a hitherto unknown sense, general human
lations of domination, the critical theory of relations: the organization of the adminis¬
society presupposes the disengagement of tration of social wealth in the interest of lib¬
science from this order. Thus the fateful fet¬ erated mankind. The materialist theory of so¬
ishism of science is avoided here in principle. ciety is originally a nineteenth-century the¬
But this does not dispense the theory from a ory. Representing its relation to rationalism
constant critique of scientific aims and meth¬ as one of "inheritance," it conceived this in¬
ods which takes into account every new so¬ heritance as it manifested itself in the nine¬
cial situation. Scientific objectivity as such is teenth century. Much has changed since then.
never a sufficient guarantee of truth, espe¬ At that time the theory had comprehended,
cially in a situation where the truth speaks as on the deepest level, the possibility of a com¬
strongly against the facts and is as well hid¬ ing barbarity, but the latter did not appear to
den behind them as today. Scientific predict¬ be as imminent as the "conservative" aboli¬
ability does not coincide with the futuristic tion of what the nineteenth century repre¬
mode in which the truth exists. Even the de¬ sented: conservative of what the culture of
velopment of the productive forces and the bourgeois society, for all its poverty and in¬
evolution of technology know no uninter¬ justice, had accomplished nonetheless for
rupted progression from the old to the new the development and happiness of the indi¬
society. For here, too, man himself is to de¬ vidual. What had already been achieved and
termine progress: not "socialist" man, whose what still remained to be done was clear
spiritual and moral regeneration is supposed enough. The entire impetus of the theory
to constitute the basis for planning the plan¬ came from this interest in the individual, and
362 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIII. Critical Theory
it was not necessary to discuss it philosophi¬ truth of the future in the philosophy of the
cally. The situation of inheritance has past provides indications of factors that point
changed in the meantime. It is not a part of beyond today’s anachronistic conditions.
the nineteenth century, but authoritarian Thus critical theory is still linked to these
barbarity, that now separates the previous re¬ truths. They appear in it as part of a process:
ality of reason from the form intended by the that of bringing to consciousness potentiali¬
theory. More and more, the culture that was ties that have emerged within the maturing
to have been abolished recedes into the past. historical situation. They are preserved in the
Overlaid by an actuality in which the com¬ economic and political concepts of critical
plete sacrifice of the individual has become a theory.
pervasive and almost unquestioned fact of
life, that culture has vanished to the point Endnotes
where studying and comprehending it is no
longer a matter of spiteful pride, but of sor¬ 1. Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophic der
row. Critical theory must concern itself to a Geschichte in Werke, 2d ed. (Berlin, 1840-47),
IX, p. 22.
hitherto unknown extent with the past—pre¬
cisely insofar as it is concerned with the fu¬ 2. Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der
Philosophic in Werke, XIII, p. 34.
ture.
In a different form, the situation confront¬ 3. Hegel, Enzyclopadie der philosophischen Wis-
ing the theory of society in the nineteenth senschaften, par. 158, op. cit., VI, p. 310.
century is being repeated today. Once again 4. Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der
real conditions fall beneath the general level Philosophic, op. cit., p. 41.
of history. Fettering the productive forces and 5. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vemunft, op. cit, p. 625.
keeping down the standard of life is charac¬ 6. Edmund Husserl, Formale und transzenden-
teristic of even the economically most devel¬ tale Logik in Jahrbuch fiir Philosophic, X
oped countries. The reflection cast by the (Halle, 1929), p. 219. ♦
Traditional and Critical Theory 363
Those long chains of deductive reasoning, tion has become a matter of mathematical
simple and easy as they are, of which ge¬ construction,
ometricians make use in order to arrive at The sciences of man and society have at¬
the most difficult demonstrations, had tempted to follow the lead of the natural sci¬
caused me to imagine that all those things
ences with their great successes. The differ¬
which fall under the cognizance of men
might very likely be mutually related in ence between those schools of social science
the same fashion; and that, provided only which are more oriented to the investigation
that we abstain from receiving anything of facts and those which concentrate more on
as true which is not so, and always retain principles has nothing directly to do with the
the order which is necessary in order to concept of theory as such. The assiduous col¬
deduce the one conclusion from the other, lecting of facts in all the disciplines dealing
there can be nothing so remote that we with social life, the gathering of great masses
cannot reach to it, nor so recondite that of detail in connection with problems, the
we cannot discover it.2
empirical inquiries, through careful ques¬
Depending on the logicians own general tionnaires and other means, which are a ma¬
philosophical outlook, the most universal jor part of scholarly activity, especially in the
propositions from which the deduction be¬ Anglo-Saxon universities since Spencer's
gins are themselves regarded as experiential time—all this adds up to a pattern which is,
judgments, as inductions (as with John Stu¬ outwardly, much like the rest of life in a soci¬
art Mill), as evident insights (as in rationalist ety dominated by industrial production tech¬
and phenomenological schools), or as arbi¬ niques. Such an approach seems quite differ¬
trary postulates (as in the modern axiomatic ent from the formulation of abstract princi¬
approach). In the most advanced logic of the ples and the analysis of basic concepts by an
present time, as represented by Husserls Lo- armchair scholar, which are typical, for ex¬
gische Untersuchungen, theory is defined "as ample, of one sector of German sociology. Yet
an enclosed system of propositions for a sci¬ these divergences do not signify a structural
ence as a whole.”3 Theory in the fullest sense difference in ways of thinking. In recent pe¬
is "a systematically linked set of propositions, riods of contemporary society the so-called
taking the form of a systematically unified human studies (Geisteswissenschaften) have
deduction”4 Science is "a certain totality of had but a fluctuating market value and must
propositions . . . , emerging in one or other try to imitate the more prosperous natural
manner from theoretical work, in the system¬ sciences whose practical value is beyond
atic order of which propositions a certain to¬ question. . . .
tality of objects acquires definition.”5 The ba¬ We must go on now to add that there is a
sic requirement which any theoretical system human activity which has society itself for its
must satisfy is that all the parts should inter¬ object.7 The aim of this activity is not simply
mesh thoroughly and without friction. Har¬ to eliminate one or other abuse, for it regards
mony, which includes lack of contradictions, such abuses as necessarily connected with
and the absence of superfluous, purely dog¬ the way in which the social structure is orga¬
matic elements which have no influence on nized. Although it itself emerges from the so¬
the observable phenomena, are necessary cial structure, its purpose is not, either in its
conditions, according to Weyl.6 conscious intention or in its objective signifi¬
In so far as this traditional conception of cance, the better functioning of any element
theory shows a tendency, it is towards a in the structure. On the contrary, it is suspi¬
purely mathematical system of symbols. As cious of the very categories of better, useful,
elements of the theory, as components of the appropriate, productive, and valuable, as
propositions and conclusions, there are ever these are understood in the present order,
fewer names of experiential objects and ever and refuses to take them as nonscientific pre¬
more numerous mathematical symbols. suppositions about which one can do noth¬
Even the logical operations themselves have ing. The individual as a rule must simply ac¬
already been so rationalized that, in large ar¬ cept the basic conditions of his existence as
eas of natural science at least, theory forma¬ given and strive to fulfill them; he finds his
Traditional and Critical Theory 365
satisfaction and praise in accomplishing as and they regard any other interpretation as
well as he can the tasks connected with his pure idealism. But at the same time they con¬
place in society and in courageously doing sider it rank dishonesty simply to accept the
his duty despite all the sharp criticism he may interpretation; the critical acceptance of the
choose to exercise in particular matters. But categories which rule social life contains si¬
the critical attitude of which we are speaking multaneously their condemnation. This dia¬
is wholly distrustful of the rules of conduct lectical character of the self-interpretation of
with which society as presently constituted contemporary man is what, in the last analy¬
provides each of its members. The separation sis, also causes the obscurity of the Kantian
between individual and society in virtue of critique of reason. Reason cannot become
which the individual accepts as natural the transparent to itself as long as men act as
limits prescribed for his activity is relativized members of an organism which lacks reason.
in critical theory. The latter considers the Organism as a naturally developing and de¬
overall framework which is conditioned by clining unity cannot be a sort of model for
the blind interaction of individual activities society, but only a form of deadened existence
(that is, the existent division of labor and the from which society must emancipate itself.
class distinctions) to be a function which An attitude which aims at such an emancipa¬
originates in human action and therefore is tion and at an alteration of society as a whole
a possible object of planful decision and might well be of service in theoretical work
rational determination of goals. carried on within reality as presently or¬
The two-sided character of the social total¬ dered. But it lacks the pragmatic character
ity in its present form becomes, for men who which attaches to traditional thought as a
adopt the critical attitude, a conscious oppo¬ socially useful professional activity.
sition. In recognizing the present form of In traditional theoretical thinking, the
economy and the whole culture which it gen¬ genesis of particular objective facts, the prac¬
erates to be the product of human work as tical application of the conceptual systems by
well as the organization which mankind was which it grasps the facts, and the role of such
capable of and has provided for itself in the systems in action, are all taken to be external
present era, these men identify themselves to the theoretical thinking itself. This aliena¬
with this totality and conceive it as will and tion, which finds expression in philosophical
reason. It is their own world. At the same terminology as the separation of value and
time, however, they experience the fact that research, knowledge and action, and other
society is comparable to nonhuman natural polarities, protects the savant from the ten¬
processes, to pure mechanisms, because cul¬ sions we have indicated and provides an as¬
tural forms which are supported by war and sured framework for his activity. Yet a kind
oppression are not the creations of a unified, of thinking which does not accept this frame¬
self-conscious will. That world is not their work seems to have the ground taken out
own but the world of capital. from under it. If a theoretical procedure does
Previous history thus cannot really be not take the form of determining objective
understood; only the individuals and specific facts with the help of the simplest and most
groups in it are intelligible, and even these differentiated conceptual systems available,
not totally, since their internal dependence what can it be but an aimless intellectual
on an inhuman society means that even in game, half conceptual poetry, half impotent
their conscious action such individuals and expression of states of mind? The investiga¬
groups are still in good measure mechanical tion into the social conditioning of facts and
functions. The identification, then, of men of theories may indeed be a research problem,
critical mind with their society is marked by perhaps even a whole field for theoretical
tension, and the tension characterizes all the work, but how can such studies be radically
concepts of the critical way of thinking. Thus, different from other specialized efforts? Re¬
such thinkers interpret the economic catego¬ search into ideologies, or sociology of knowl¬
ries of work, value, and productivity exactly edge, which has been taken over from the
as they are interpreted in the existing order, critical theory of society and established as a
366 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIII. Critical Theory
special discipline, is not opposed either in its which the social work process has taken
aim or in its other ambitions to the usual without any definite theory behind it, as a
activities that go on within classificatory sci¬ result of disparate forces interacting, and
ence. . . . with the despair of the masses acting as a
How is critical thought related to experi¬ decisive factor at major turning points.
ence? One might maintain that if such thought Thought does not spin such a possibility out
were not simply to classify but also to deter¬ of itself but rather becomes aware of its own
mine for itself the goals which classification proper function. In the course of history men
serves, in other words its own fundamental di¬ have come to know their own activity and
rection, it would remain locked up within itself, thus to recognize the contradiction that
as happened to idealist philosophy If it did not marks their existence. The bourgeois econ¬
take refuge in utopian fantasy, it would be re¬ omy was concerned that the individual
duced to the formalistic fighting of sham bat¬ should maintain the life of society by taking
tles. The attempt legitimately to determine care of his own personal happiness. Such an
practical goals by thinking must always fail. If economy has within it, however, a dynamism
thought were not content with the role given to which results in a fantastic degree of power
it in existent society, if it were not to engage in for some, such as reminds us of the old Asi¬
theory in the traditional sense of the word, it atic dynasties, and in material and intellec¬
would necessarily have to return to illusions tual weakness for many others. The original
long since laid bare. fruitfulness of the bourgeois organization of
The fault in such reflections as these on the the life process is thus transformed into a
role of thought is that thinking is understood paralyzing barrenness, and men by their own
in a detachedly departmentalized and there¬ toil keep in existence a reality which enslaves
fore spiritualist way, as it is today under ex¬ them in ever greater degree.
isting conditions of the division of labor. In Yet, as far as the role of experience is con¬
society as it is, the power of thought has never cerned, there is a difference between tradi¬
controlled itself but has always functioned as tional and critical theory. The viewpoints
a nonindependent moment in the work pro¬ which the latter derives from historical
cess, and the latter has its own orientation analysis as the goals of human activity, espe¬
and tendency. The work process enhances cially the idea of a reasonable organization of
and develops human life through the con¬ society that will meet the needs of the whole
flicting movement of progressive and retro¬ community, are immanent in human work
gressive periods. In the historical form in but are not correctly grasped by individuals
which society has existed, however, the full or by the common mind. A certain concern is
measure of goods produced for mans enjoy¬ also required if these tendencies are to be
ment has, at any particular stage, been given perceived and expressed. According to Marx
directly only to a small group of men. Such a and Engels such a concern is necessarily gen¬
state of affairs has found expression in erated in the proletariat. Because of its situ¬
thought, too, and left its mark on philosophy ation in modern society the proletariat expe¬
and religion. But from the beginning the de¬ riences the connection between work which
sire to bring the same enjoyment to the ma¬ puts ever more powerful instruments into
jority has stirred in the depths of mens mens hands in their struggle with nature,
hearts; despite all the material appropriate¬ and the continuous renewal of an outmoded
ness of class organization, each of its forms social organization. Unemployment, eco¬
has finally proved inadequate. Slaves, vas¬ nomic crises, militarization, terrorist re¬
sals, and citizens have cast off their yoke. gimes—in a word, the whole condition of the
Now, inasmuch as every individual in mod¬ masses—are not due, for example, to limited
em times has been required to make his own technological possibilities, as might have
the purposes of society as a whole and to been the case in earlier periods, but to the
recognize these in society, there is the possi¬ circumstances of production which are no
bility that men would become aware of and longer suitable to our time. The application
concentrate their attention upon the path of an intellectual and physical means for the
Traditional and Critical Theory 367
mastery of nature is hindered because in the However many valid analogies there may
prevailing circumstances these means are be between these different intellectual en¬
entrusted to special, mutually opposed inter¬ deavors, there is nonetheless a decisive dif¬
ests. Production is not geared to the life of ference when it comes to the relation of sub¬
the whole community while heeding also the ject and object and therefore to the necessity
claims of individuals; it is geared to the of the event being judged. The object with
power-backed claims of individuals while which the scientific specialist deals is not
being concerned hardly at all with the life of affected at all by his own theory. Subject and
the community This is the inevitable result, object are kept strictly apart. Even if it turns
in the present property system, of the prin¬ out that at a later point in time the objective
ciple that it is enough for individuals to look event is influenced by human intervention,
out for themselves. . . . to science this is just another fact. The ob¬
Even the critical theory, which stands in jective occurrence is independent of the the¬
opposition to other theories, derives its ory, and this independence is part of its ne¬
statements about real relationships from ba¬ cessity: the observer as such can effect no
sic universal concepts, as we have indicated, change in the object. A consciously critical
and therefore presents the relationships as attitude, however, is part of the development
necessary. Thus both kinds of theoretical of society: the construing of the course of
structure are alike when it comes to logical
history as the necessary product of an eco¬
necessity. But there is a difference as soon as
nomic mechanism simultaneously contains
we turn from logical to real necessity, the
both a protest against this order of things, a
necessity involved in factual sequences. The
protest generated by the order itself, and the
biologist s statement that internal processes
idea of self-determination for the human
cause a plant to wither or that certain pro¬
race, that is the idea of a state of affairs in
cesses in the human organism lead to its de¬
which mans actions no longer flow from a
struction leaves untouched the question
mechanism but from his own decision. The
whether any influences can alter the charac¬
judgment passed on the necessity inherent
ter of these processes or change them totally.
in the previous course of events implies here
Even when an illness is said to be curable,
a struggle to change it from a blind to a
the fact that the necessary curative measures
are actually taken is regarded as purely ex¬ meaningful necessity. If we think of the ob¬
trinsic to the curability, a matter of technol¬ ject of the theory in separation from the the¬
ogy and therefore nonessential as far as the ory, we falsify it and fall into quietism or
theory as such is concerned. The necessity conformism. Every part of the theory pre¬
which rules society can be regarded as bio¬ supposes the critique of the existing order
logical in the sense described, and the and the struggle against it along lines deter¬
unique character of critical theory can there¬ mined by the theory itself.
fore be called in question on the grounds that The theoreticians of knowledge who
in biology as in other natural sciences par¬ started with physics had reason, even if they
ticular sequences of events can be theoreti¬ were not wholly right, to condemn the con¬
cally constructed just as they are in the criti¬ fusion of cause and operation of forces and
cal theory of society. The development of so¬ to substitute the idea of condition or func¬
ciety, in this view, would simply be a particu¬ tion for the idea of cause. For the kind of
lar series of events, for the presentation of thinking which simply registers facts there
which conclusions from various other areas are always only series of phenomena, never
of research are used, just as a doctor in the forces and counterforces; but this, of course,
course of an illness or a geologist dealing says something about this kind of thinking,
with the earths prehistory has to apply vari¬ not about nature. If such a method is applied
ous other disciplines. Society here would be to society, the result is statistics and descrip¬
the individual reality which is evaluated on tive sociology, and these can be important
the basis of theories in the special sciences. for many purposes, even for critical theory.
368 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIII. Critical Theory
tions. . . . (c) If, finally, we consider the sys¬ 2.1. The reestablished original scene is
tem of distorted communication as a whole, typically a situation in which the child has
we are struck by the discrepancy between the once suffered and repulsed an unbearable
levels of communication; the usual congru¬ conflict. This repulse is coupled with a pro¬
ency between linguistic symbols, actions, cess of desymbolization and the formation of
and accompanying gestures has disinte¬ a symptom. The child excludes the experi¬
grated. . . . There is a communication ob¬ ence of the conflict-filled object from public
struction in the self between the ego, which communication (and at the same time makes
is capable of speech and participates in inter- it inaccessible to its own ego as well); it sepa¬
subjectively established language-games, rates the conflict-laden portion of its memory
and that “inner foreign territory" (Freud), of the object and, so to speak, desymbolizes
which is represented by a private or a pri¬ the meaning of the relevant reference person.
mary linguistic symbolism. The gap which arises in the semantic field is
2. Alfred Lorenzer has examined the ana¬ then closed by employing an unquestionable
lytical conversation between physician and symbol in place of the isolated symbolic con¬
patient from the standpoint of psychoanaly¬ tent. This symbol, of course, strikes us as be¬
sis as analysis of language.1 He considers the ing a symptom, because it has gained private
process by which the meanings of specific linguistic significance and can no longer be
incomprehensible manifestations are de¬ used according to the rules of public lan¬
coded as an understanding of scenes linked guage. The analysts scenic understanding es¬
by analogy to those in which the symptoms tablishes meaning equivalences between the
occur. The purpose of analytical interpreta¬ elements of three patterns—the everyday
tion is to explain the incomprehensible scene, the transference scene, and the origi¬
meaning of the symptomatic manifestations. nal scene—and solves the specific incompre¬
Where neuroses are involved, these manifes¬ hensibility of the symptom; thus it assists in
tations are part of a deformed language-game achieving resymbolization, that is, the reen¬
in which the patient “acts": that is, he plays try of isolated symbolic contents into public
an incomprehensible scene by violating role- communication. The latent meaning of the
expectations in a strikingly stereotyped man¬ present situation becomes accessible when it
ner. The analyst tries to make the sympto¬ is related to the unimpaired meaning of the
matic scene understandable by associating it original infantile scene. Scenic under¬
with analogous scenes in the situation of standing makes it possible to “translate" the
transference. The latter holds the key to the meaning of the pathologically frozen com¬
coded relation between the symptomatic munication pattern which had been hitherto
scene, which the adult patient plays outside unconscious and inaccessible to public com¬
the doctors office, and an original scene ex¬ munication.
perienced in early childhood. In the transfer¬ 2.2. If we consider everyday interpretation
ence situation the patient forces the doctor within the range of ordinary language or
into the role of the conflict-defined primary translation from one language into another,
reference person. The doctor, in the role of or trained linguistic analysis in general, all of
the reflective or critical participant, can in¬ them leading to hermeneutic understanding
terpret the transference situation as a repeti¬ of initially incomprehensible utterances,
tion of early childhood experiences; he can then scenic understanding differs from that
thus construct a dictionary for the hidden hermeneutic understanding because of its
idiosyncratic meanings of the symptoms. explanatory power.2 That is, the disclosure of
“Scenic understanding" is therefore based on the meaning of specific incomprehensible
the discovery that the patient behaves in the acts or utterances develops to the same extent
same way in his symptomatic scenes as he as, in the course of reconstruction of the
does in certain transference situations; such original scene, a clarification of the genesis
understanding aims at the reconstruction, of the faulty meaning is achieved. The What,
confirmed by the patient in an act of self-re- the semantic content of a systematically dis¬
flection, of the original scene. torted manifestation, cannot be “under-
On Systematically Distorted Communication 371
stood” if it is not possible at the same time to rate the private from the public world. The
“explain” the Why, the origin of the sympto¬ differentiation between being and appear¬
matic scene with reference to the initial cir¬ ance depends, moreover, on the distinction
cumstances which led to the systematic dis¬ between the language-sign, its significative
tortion itself. . . . content (significatum), and the object which
Scenic understanding—in contrast to her¬ the symbol denotes (referent, deno¬
meneutic understanding, or ordinary seman¬ tatum). ...
tic analysis—cannot be conceived as being a (d) In normal communication an intersub¬
mere application of communicative compe¬ jectivity of mutual understanding, guaran¬
tence, free from theoretical guidance. teeing ego-identity, develops and is main¬
3. The theoretical propositions on which tained in the relation between individuals
this special kind of language analysis is im¬ who acknowledge one another. On the one
plicitly based can be elicited from three hand, the analytic use of language allows the
points of view. (1) The psychoanalyst has a identification of objects (thus the categoriza¬
preconception of the structure of nondis- tion of particular items, the subordination of
torted ordinary communication; (2) he attri¬ elements under classes, and the inclusion of
butes the systematic distortion of communi¬ sets). On the other hand, the reflexive use of
cation to the confusion of two developmen- language assures a relationship between the
tally following phases of prelinguistic and speaking subject and the language commu¬
linguistic symbol-organization; and (3) to ex¬ nity which cannot be sufficiently presented
plain the origin of deformation he employs a by analytic operations.
theory of deviant socialization which in¬ ... The relation between I (ego), you (alter
cludes the connection between patterns of ego), and we (ego and alter ego) is established
interaction in early childhood and the forma¬ only by an analytically paradoxical achieve¬
tion of personality structures. I would like to ment: the speaking persons identify them¬
consider these three aspects briefly. selves at the same time with two incompat¬
3.1. The first set of theoretical proposi¬ ible dialogue roles and thereby ensure the
tions concerns the structural conditions that identity of the I (ego) as well as of the group.
must be met if normal communication is to The one being (ego) asserts his absolute non¬
obtain. identity in relation to the other being (alter
(a) In the case of a nondeformed language- ego); at the same time, however, both recog¬
game there is a congruency on all three levels nize their identity inasmuch as each ac¬
of communication. Linguistic expressions, knowledges the other as being an ego, that is,
expressions represented in actions, and those a nonreplaceable individual who can refer to
embodied in gestures do not contradict one himself as "I.” Moreover, that which links
another, but rather supplement one another them both is a mutual factor (we), a collec¬
by metacommunication. . . . tivity, which in turn asserts its individuality
(b) Normal communication conforms to in relation to other groups. This means that
intersubjectively recognized rules; it is pub¬ the same paradoxical relationship is estab¬
lic. The communicated meanings are identi¬ lished on the level of intersubjectively linked
cal for all members of the language-commu¬ collectives as holds between the individuals.
nity. Verbal utterances are constructed ac¬ The specific feature of linguistic intersub¬
cording to the valid system of grammatical jectivity exists in the fact that individuated
rules and are conventionally applied to spe¬ persons communicate on the basis of it. In
cific situations. For extraverbal expressions, the reflexive use of language we present inal¬
which are not grammatically organized, ienably individual aspects in unavoidably
there is likewise a lexicon which varies socio¬ general categories in such a way that we
culturally within certain limits. metacommunicatively comment upon and
(c) In the case of normal speech the speak¬ sometimes even revoke direct information
ers are aware of the categorical difference (and confirm it only with reservations). We
between subject and object. They differenti¬ do this for the purpose of an indirect repre¬
ate between outer and inner speech and sepa¬ sentation of the nonidentical aspects of the
372 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIII. Critical Theory
ego, aspects which are not sufficiently cov¬ cessive phases of human symbol-organiza¬
ered by the general determinations and yet tion.
cannot be manifestly represented other than (a) The archaic symbol-organization, which
by just these determinations. The analytical resists the transformation of its contents into
use of language is necessarily embedded in grammatically regulated communication,
the reflexive use, because the intersubjectiv- can only be disclosed on the basis of the data
ity of mutual understanding cannot be main¬ of speech pathology and by means of the
tained without reciprocal self-representation analysis of dream material. . . . Freud had al¬
on the part of the speaking subjects. Inas¬ ready noticed the lack of logical connections
much as the speaker masters this indirect in¬ in his dream analyses. He draws attention
formation on the metacommunicative level, particularly to the use of words with opposite
he differentiates between essence and ap¬ meaning, a remnant on the linguistic level of
pearance. The understanding we come to the genetically earlier peculiarity of combin¬
about objects can be direct, but the subjectiv¬ ing logically incompatible meanings. Prelin-
ity we encounter when we speak with one guistic symbols are emotionally loaded and
another remains, in direct information, only remain fixed to particular scenes. There is no
at the level of appearance. The categorical dissociation of linguistic symbol and bodily
meaning of this kind of indirect communica¬ gesture. The connection to a particular con¬
tion, in which the indefinable individualized text is so strong that the symbol cannot vary
independently of actions. Although the pa-
aspect of a person is expressed, and his claim
laeosymbols represent a prelinguistic basis
upon individuality is maintained, is some¬
for the intersubjectivity of mutual existence
thing we merely reify in the ontological con¬
and shared action, they do not allow public
cept of essence. In fact this essence exists
communication in the strict sense of the
only in its appearances.
word.
(e) Finally, normal speech is distinguished
. . . Prelinguistic symbol-organization
by the fact that the sense of substance and
does not allow an analytically satisfying cate¬
causality, of space and time, is differentiated
gorization of the objects experienced. Two
according to whether these categories are ap¬
types of deficiencies are found in the commu¬
plied to the objects within a world or to the
nication and thought disturbances of psy-
linguistically constituted world itself, which
chotics: namely "amorphous” and “frag¬
allows for the mutuality of speaking subjects. mented” speech disorders.3 In both cases the
The interpretational schema, "substance,” analytic operations of classification are dis¬
has a different meaning for the identity of turbed. In the first, a fragmentation of struc¬
items which can be clearly categorized ana¬ ture is apparent which does not allow disin¬
lytically from that which it has for speaking tegrated single elements to be compiled into
and interacting subjects themselves, whose classes according to general criteria. In the
ego-identity, as has been shown, just cannot second, an amorphous structure appears
be grasped by analytically clear-cut opera¬ which does not allow aggregates of superfi¬
tions. The interpretational schema of causal¬ cially similar and vaguely compiled things to
ity, when applied to observable events, leads be analyzed. . . . Animistic Weltanschauun-
to the concept of "cause”; when it is applied gen, for example, are formed in accordance
to an association of intentional actions it with such primary classes.
leads to the concept of "motive.” In the same (b) The symbol-organization described
way "space” and "time” undergo a different here, which precedes language genetically, is
schematism when viewed in regard to physi¬ a theoretical construct. We cannot observe it
cally measurable properties of observable anywhere. But the psychoanalytical decod¬
events from that which they undergo when ing of systematically distorted communica¬
viewed according to experienced inter¬ tion presupposes such a construction, be¬
actions. . . . cause that special type of semantic analysis
3.2. The second set of postulates concerns introduced here as “scenic understanding”
the connection between two genetically suc¬ resolves confusions of ordinary speech by in-
On Systematically Distorted Communication 373
terpreting them either as forced regression bols, the distortion in the case of this defense
back to an earlier level of communication, or mechanism results directly from the uncon¬
as the breakthrough of the earlier form of trolled penetration of palaeosymbolic deriva¬
communication into language. On the basis tives into language. In this case the therapeu¬
of the analyst s experience with neurotic pa¬ tic type of language analysis doesn't aim at
tients, we can, as has been shown, recognize retransforming the desymbolized content
the function of psychoanalysis as language into linguistically articulated meaning, but
analysis, insofar as it allows separated sym¬ aims rather at a consciously achieved com¬
bolic contents, which lead to a private nar¬ munication of the intermingled prelinguistic
rowing of public communication, to be rein¬ elements.
tegrated into common linguistic usage. The In both cases the systematic distortion can
performance of the analyst in putting an end be explained by the fact that palaeosymboli-
to the process of inhibition serves the pur¬ cally fixed semantic contents have encysted
pose of resymbolization; inhibition itself can themselves, like foreign bodies, into the
therefore be understood as a process linked grammatically regulated use of symbols.
to desymbolization. The defense mechanism Language analysis has the duty of dissolving
of inhibition, which is analogous to flight, is this syndrome, i.e., of isolating the two lan¬
revealed by the patient in his resistance to guage levels. There is, however, a third case:
plausible interpretations made by the ana¬ the processes of the creative extension of lan¬
lyst. This mechanism is an operation carried guage. In this case a genuine integration is
on with and by language; otherwise it would accomplished. The palaeosymbolically fixed
not be possible to reverse the process of re¬ meaning-potential is then brought into the
pulsion hermeneutically, i.e., precisely by open and is thus made available for public
means of a special type of semantic analysis. communication. This transfer of semantic
The fleeing ego, which has to submit to the contents from the prelinguistic into the com¬
demands of outer reality in a conflict situ¬ mon stock of language widens the scope of
ation, hides itself from itself by eliminating communicative action as it diminishes that
the symbolic representation of unwanted de¬ of unconsciously motivated action. The mo¬
mands of instinct from the text of its everyday ment of success in the use of creative lan¬
consciousness. By means of this censorship guage is a moment of emancipation. . . .
the representation of the prohibited object is 3.3. Psychoanalysis, which interprets the
excommunicated from public communica¬ specific incomprehensibility of systemati¬
tion and banished to the archaic level of pa- cally distorted communication, can no
laeosymbols. Moreover, the assumption that longer strictly speaking be conceived accord¬
neurotic behavior is controlled by palaeo- ing to the translation model which applies to
symbols, and only subsequently rationalized simple hermeneutic understanding or ordi¬
by a substitutive interpretation, offers an ex¬ nary semantic analysis. For the obscurities
planation for the characteristics of this be¬ which controlled "translation" from prelin¬
havior pattern: for its pseudocommunicative guistic symbolism to language does away
function, for its stereotyped and compulsive with are ones which arise not within the
form, for its emotional load and expressive scope defined by a given language-system,
content, and, finally, for its rigid fixation but rather within language itself. Here it is
upon particular situations. the very structure of communication, hence
If inhibition can be understood as desym¬ the basis of all translation, that we are con¬
bolization, then it follows that there must be cerned with. Semantic analysis of this special
a correspondingly linguistic interpretation type therefore needs a systematic pre-under-
for the complementary defense mechanism, standing which pertains to language and lin¬
which does not turn against the self but guistic communication as such, while on the
rather against outer reality, i.e., for projection other hand our ordinary semantic analysis
and denial. While in the case of inhibition the proceeds ad hoc from a traditionally deter¬
language-game is deformed by the symptoms mined pre-understanding which is tested and
formed in place of the excommunicated sym¬ revised within the process of interpretation.
374 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIII. Critical Theory
The theoretical propositions deal, as de¬ standing owes its explanatory power—as we
scribed, with the preconditions of normal have seen—to the fact that the clarification
communication, with two levels of symbol of a systematically inaccessible meaning suc¬
organization, and with the mechanism of ceeds only to the extent to which the origin
speech disorder. These theoretical assump¬ of the faulty or misleading meaning is ex¬
tions can be organized in the structural plained. The reconstruction of the original
model. scene makes both possible at the same time:
The constructions of “ego” and “id” inter¬ the reconstruction leads to an understanding
pret the analyst s experiences in his encoun¬ of the meaning of a deformed language-game
tering the resistance of his patients. “Ego” is and simultaneously explains the origin of the.
the instance which fulfils the function of re¬ deformation itself. Of course, the connection
ality-testing and of censorship. “Id” is the between semantic analysis and causal expla¬
name given to those parts of the self that are nation doesn’t become evident until one
isolated from the ego and whose repre¬ shows that the categorical framework of the
sentations become accessible in connection theory used—in our case the Freudian
with the processes of repression and projec¬ metapsychology—is based on an at least im¬
tion. The “id” is expressed indirectly by the plicitly underlying language theory. I have
symptoms which close the gap which devel¬ outlined only some of the assumptions which
ops in everyday language when desymboliza¬ extend to the structure of normal communi¬
tion takes place; direct representation of the cation and to the mechanisms of systematic
“id” is found in the illusory palaeosymbolic distortion of communication. These assump¬
elements dragged into the language by pro¬ tions have to be developed within the frame¬
jection and denial. Now, the same clinical ex¬ work of a theory of communicative compe¬
perience which leads to the construction of tence.
an ego- and id-instance, shows also that the I can sum up my thesis as follows. The
defense mechanisms usually work uncon¬ common semantic analysis of incomprehen¬
sciously. For this reason Freud introduced sible utterances, which leads to hermeneutic
the category of “superego”: an ego-foreign in¬ understanding, makes use of the non-ana-
stance which is formed out of detached iden¬ lyzed communicative competence of a native
tifications with the expectations of primary speaker. On the other hand, the special type
reference persons. All three categories—ego, of semantic analysis which deals with mani¬
id, and superego—reflect fundamental expe¬ festations of a systematically distorted com¬
riences typical of a systematically distorted munication and affords an explanatory
communication. The dimensions established understanding, presupposes a theory of com¬
by id and superego for the personality struc¬ municative competence. It is only in virtue of
ture correspond to the dimensions of defor¬ an at least implicit hypothesis concerning the
mation of the intersubjectivity of mutual nature and the acquisition of communicative
understanding in informal communication. competence that explanatory power can be ac¬
So the structural model which Freud intro¬ corded to this (particular) semantic analysis.
duced as the categorical frame of metapsy¬
chology can be reduced to a theory of deviant Endnotes
communicative competence.4
4. I have chosen psychoanalysis as my ex¬ 1. A. Lorenzer, Symbol und Verstehen im psycho-
analytischen Prozess, Vorarbeiten zu einer
ample in order to differentiate between two
Metatheorie der Psychoanalyse, forthcoming,
types of interpretation and two forms of com¬ Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt a. M. 1970.
munication.
2. Cf. S. Arieti, The Intrapsychic Self, Basic
From the viewpoint of a logic of explana¬
Books, New York 1967; also H. Werner and B.
tion, this example of the semantic analysis of
Kaplan, Symbol Formation, John Wiley, New
specific incomprehensible manifestations is York 1967; P. Watzlawick, J. H. Beavin, and
of interest because, in a unique way, it affords D. D. Jackson, Pragmatics in Human Commu¬
simultaneous hermeneutic understanding nication, W. W. Norton: New York 1967, esp.
and causal explanation. The analysts under¬ chs. 6 and 7.
On Systematically Distorted Communication 375
3. See L. C. Wynne, “Denkstorung und Familien- 4. For further elaboration see Jurgen FJabermas,
beziehung bei Schizophrenen/’ Psyche, May Erkenntnis und Interesse, Suhrkamp Verlag:
1965, pp. 82 ff. Frankfurt a. M. 1968, chs. 10 and 11. ♦
376 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIII. Critical Theory
how to re-establish an equilibrium either reality and relevance of a mixed type of wel¬
through learning processes inside the organi¬ fare-state administrative policy, which partly
zation or through enforced learning pro¬ supersedes the legal-bureaucratic type of
cesses, such as reform of the organization. In domination. This functional model is to be
such studies, it is always the organization that distinguished from legal-bureaucratic ad¬
is presented as obsolete, in need of change, ministration not on the level of empirical de¬
and deficient. One can rely on this position scription, but on the level of institutionalized
only on the understanding that adequate cri¬ normative schema that reinforce a reversal of
teria of rationality for administrative action the direction of the conversion process, that is,
are 'in principle' not only thinkable but also the process that links the inputs and outputs
practicable. Everything then depends on the of the political system.
discovery and introduction of these 'ade¬ The meaning of the concept of the 'reversal
quate' criteria. The following reflections will of the direction of the conversion process'
hypothetically abandon precisely this prem¬ should be understood in the following way.
ise of'perfectibility'. For it could easily be the In a legal-bureaucratic administration, as we
case that the incongruity between the inter¬ have seen, efficiency means the reliable sub¬
nal modes of operation and external func¬ sumption of action under premises: the in¬
tional demands on the state administration puts of administrative action determine and
have their basis in the quality of the socio¬ guide the output, and the clearer and more
economic environment, rather than in 'defi¬ exclusively these premises are carried out in
cient' bureaucracies. This environment binds decisions, the more rational is the adminis¬
the state administration to specific modes of tration. Its outputs are, in the ideal case, and
operation, yet simultaneously makes claims for all those involved, calculable reflexes of
on its performance which cannot be satisfied legal norms, organizational programmes,
by these same modes of operation. It is obvi¬ codified procedural rules, and routines.
ous that this incongruity between the norma¬ Exactly the opposite is the case in the
tive schema of the administration and these structural model of welfare-state adminis¬
external functional demands could not be trative policy. Here, administrative action is
solved by a reform of the administration, but rationalized with respect to specific premises
only through a 'reform' of the environmental of action and concrete results. Often these
structure that caused the contradiction be¬ premises are understood in terms of notions
tween the structure and performance capac¬ of some general 'adequacy' but they must,
ity of the state administration. nonetheless, be given a very concrete mean¬
ing according to the specific, situation-de¬
The Dilemma of pendent circumstances. For instance, the
Welfare-State Policies meaning, and actual requirement, in a given
situation, of providing a certain category of
I cannot summarize here the historical, people with 'adequate housing’ must be 'op¬
theoretical, and empirical evidence and argu¬ erationalized'. In such a situation, the task of
ments which refer to a historically increasing the administration often turns from imple¬
discrepancy between the two criteria of ratio¬ menting given rules in compliance with es¬
nality. It was especially the literature on con¬ tablished routines towards an active search
stitutional theory [and] administrative and for the acquisition of inputs which are ade¬
political sociology which referred at quite an quate to the fulfilment of these concrete tasks
early stage to the emerging unresolved ten¬ and quasi-autonomously interpreted goals.
sion between bureaucratic and system ratio¬ Thus, while for the first (bureaucratic)
nality in state action. The fact that today model, inputs function as the sole authorita¬
authors with the most varied political and tive ‘motor’ of conceivable outcomes, in wel¬
scientific-theoretical views find difficulties fare-state administrative policy, by contrast,
with the traditional disjunction between poli¬ the projected results of administrative action
tics and administration entitles us, without (the fulfilment of concrete tasks) serves as the
further proof, to proceed on the basis of the primary criterion forjudging actions and de-
The Divergent Rationalities of Administrative Action 379
cisions internal to the administration; the in¬ regional administrative reform. Finally, the
puts which are sought after and used depend administration cannot rely on the assump¬
upon these projected administrative out¬ tion that the prior information and profes¬
comes. Efficiency is no longer defined as 'fol¬ sional knowledge in the heads of its members
lowing the rules', but as the 'causing of ef¬ is adequate for solving existing tasks. It is,
fects'. From the standpoint of the concrete therefore, forced to introduce or create ad
tasks and the purposive action required by hoc outside experts, research staff, and infor¬
them, the administration must consider its mation systems. In short, what public admin¬
own inputs and premises as contingently de¬ istrators, who are charged with performing
pendent upon criteria of instrumental suit¬ those regulative and compensatory functions
ability It is efficient to the extent that it suc¬ on which industrial capitalist societies de¬
ceeds in doing precisely this. The premises of pend, do in fact do, can by no means be ex¬
administrative action are no longer rules to clusively by the notion of 'following rules'
be imperatively complied with, but are in¬ that are politically predetermined; rather,
stead treated as resources which are to be they extract and acquire resources that are
weighed from the standpoint of their ade¬ required for the purposive accomplishment
quacy for specific tasks. of their concrete tasks.
This holds true also for legal norms. Indeed, the switch from a ‘conditional' to
Authorities in the Federal Republic of Ger¬ a 'goal-oriented' programme results in a di¬
many such as the Federal Criminal Investiga¬ lemma that we can paradoxically describe as
tion Department (Bundeskriminalamt), the follows:4 the environment does not fully per¬
communal administration of large cities, and mit the administrative system to pursue the
the Federal Labour Market Agency (Bunde- very same rational schema of goal-oriented
sanstalt fiir Arbeit) clearly force upon federal action which it at the same time demands
parliamentary bodies an interpretation of from the administrative system. On the one
their own problems according to which the hand, the steering of administrative action
fulfilment of their tasks requires the expan¬ through fixed and situation-independent
sion and reform of their jurisdiction and legal rules fails wherever non-standardized mat¬
authorities to act. By implication, legal ters are involved that are not capable of sub¬
norms are transformed from 'commands' sumption under general routines. Welfare-
into 'resources'. An analogous reversal of the state steering tasks are distinctive above all
direction of action is visible in the process of in that they have to be resolved in a (tempo¬
formulating state budgets, wherein the re¬ ral, substantive, and socially) ad hoc manner
quired expenditures rather than the expected and, thereby, escape generalized jurisdic¬
income become the criterion for defined tional rules, schematized competences, and
tasks. Parallel developments are evident at instructions. These must, instead, be discov¬
the level of the personnel structure and re¬ ered with respect to consideration of the par¬
cruitment policies of the administration. The ticularities of the case and on the basis of
suitability of persons with a specific educa¬ expert knowledge. On the other hand, how¬
tion, the adequacy of specific determinations ever, the administration's latitude for concen¬
of service and maintenance rights, even the trating on 'tasks' and discovering adequate
appropriateness of specific training paths for rules with which to carry them out, is limited
the preparation for service in public admin¬ by institutional and fiscal constraints.
istration, become variables to be manipu¬ These premises are carried out in such a
lated instrumentally from within the admin¬ way that, in spite of the increasing claims
istration. In other words, the basic staffing upon it by goal-oriented programmes, the ad¬
arrangements of the administration are also ministration is not entirely free from its ‘con¬
placed at the disposal of functional consider¬ ditional' connection to legal-bureaucratic
ations. premises. This results in the interference or
The same holds for the organizational in the interaction and mutual penetration of
structure of the administration, as is indi¬ two criteria of correctness of administrative
cated by current efforts at organizational and action. The administrative system must, in a
380 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIII. Critical Theory
certain sense, be adequate both in terms of standpoint of their adequacy for specific
compliance to norms and achievement of tasks, and if, furthermore, their abstract uni¬
goals. It is consequently dependent for its versality has to be virtualized and loosened
self-legitimation upon a double strategy through reference to criteria of opportunity
which, not infrequently, leads to emergency and interpretation, they naturally become
solutions that are adequate to neither crite¬ unfit for the legitimation of administrative
rion. At the level of personnel recruitment, action that has attained this degree of reflex-
this dilemma leads to an oscillation between ivity towards legal rules. In other words, as
a 'monopoly of lawyers' and their replace¬ soon as legal norms become disposable from
ment by 'generalists’, from whom 'effective the standpoint of their suitability for con¬
administrative management’ is expected.5 In crete tasks, they lose their capacity to legiti¬
budgetary planning, the same problematic is mate the choice and fulfilment of these tasks
precipitated in the division between revenue- on the basis of any substantive validity. For
orientation and expenditure-orientation.6 example, in the well-known situation where
A further example of the same structural educational, tax, or pension laws are continu¬
conflict is the debate between 'centralists’ ously revised, it is not only the Weberian pre¬
and 'decentralizers’ in the administrative or¬ dictability and calculability of bureaucratic
ganization.7 There is a common basis for this action for all members that is lost. In addi¬
pair of alternatives in a contradictory rela¬ tion, the administration robs itself of legal
tionship which, in the mean-time, has be¬ legitimacy for the content of the revision it
come a prominent theme within the scien¬ itself initiates. The legal-constitutional prob¬
tific discussion of administrative problems. lem that emerges with respect to the consti¬
In a capitalist social formation, the state, on tutional state does not interest us so much
the one hand, leads a distinct and limited here. What is of concern is the specific con¬
existence in relation to its possibilities for straint on the administration that follows
manoeuvring and acting (and this identity is from the bracketing of the legal securing and
watched over by jurists, held together at the binding of legal norms: at the very least, the
centre and, according to given criteria of fis¬ administration is forced to complement its
cal revenues, is financially nourished); this legally established mandate and its legiti¬
aspect of the state is normatively described macy based thereupon with a criterion—suc¬
by the principle of the 'rule of law'. On the cessful and acceptable political implementa¬
other hand, the state itself must increasingly tion—which evades the legal form as such. To
organize and regulate the socio-economic the extent that the administration suspends
functional coherence of the whole order the input-orientation of legal norms and
(which requires experts, appropriate means makes them disposable from the standpoint
of investment, and decentralization adjusted of their suitability, welfare-state adminis¬
to particular contexts); this aspect presup¬ trative policy becomes dependent on extra-le¬
poses flexibility and an instrumental relation gal legitimations, that is, upon the substan¬
to rules. In respect of this structural problem, tive realization of some values (rather than
it seems that the search for new, adequate compliance to rules), and upon the resulting
problem-solving strategies inside the admin¬ processes of empirical consensus forma¬
istration can succeed only in oscillating be¬ tion. . . .
tween the two sides of this dilemma, but not
in resolving the dilemma itself.8 Endnotes
In this context, I should like to briefly ad¬
1. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Co¬
dress the significance of the partial reversal logne, 1964), p. 164.
of the direction of administrative action
2. I cannot enter here into the difficulties of the
(from input-determined decisions to a func¬
Weberian concept of 'rationality' or the mis¬
tion-determined concern with resources) for understandings that underlie an 'empirical'
the principle of rule of law and thus for the examination of the rationality of bureau¬
legal legitimation of administrative action. If cratic administration. For a treatment of
laws are contingently established from the these themes, see R. Mayntz, 'Max Webers
The Divergent Rationalities of Administrative Action 381
Idealtypus der Biirokratie und die Organisa- chen Gemeinwesen derBRD (Berlin, 1973), p.
tionssoziologie', Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziolo- 88.
gie und Sozialpsychologie, 17 (1965), 493-502; 6. F. Naschold et al., Untersuchung zur mehrjah-
M. Albrow, Bureaucracy (London, 1970); and W. rigen Finanzplanung des Bundes (Konstanz,
Schluchter, Aspekte hiirokratischer Herrschaft 1970-1).
(Munich, 1973).
7. R. Mayntz and F. W. Scharpf, Planungsorgan¬
3. H. Marcuse, 'Industrialisierung und Kapital-
isation (Munich, 1973): R. A. Levine, Public
ismus im Werke Max Webers', in Kultur und
Planning, Failure and Redistribution (New
Geselischaft (Frankfurt am Main, 1964); N.
York, 1972).
Luhmann, 'Zweck, Herrschaft, System;
Grundbegriffe und Pramissen Max Webers', 8. Cf. Preuss's interpretation, which is based on
DerStaat, 3 (1964), 129-58. a theory of capitalism, of the double mode of
functioning of state administration (U.
4. Editor’s note: This distinction between 'condi¬
Preuss, Legalitat und Pluralismus, Frankfurt
tional' and goal-oriented' or 'final' modes of
am Main, 1973). He presents evidence to
state policy draws upon a typology developed
show that:
by recent German sociologists (for example,
N. Luhmann), and is discussed further in C.
it is structually specific to the state bu¬
Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State, J. reaucracy, which in the Weimar Repub¬
Keane (ed.) (London, 1984), p., 110. A 'condi¬ lic was formulated explicitly in constitu¬
tional' programme consists of decisions that tional terms, that it operates under a dou¬
are implemented automatically if certain an¬ ble mode of functioning, being guided
tecedents (as specified by legal-bureaucratic by the rule-governed application of
rules) are present. A 'final' or 'goal-oriented' state power as well as by the reliance
programme, by contrast, is contingent upon upon concrete, goal-determined mea¬
the perceived effectiveness of the interven¬ sures . . . State power was and remains
continuously applied in accordance
tion in achieving specified outcomes.
with both general rules and the standard
5. F. W. Scharpf, Politische Durchsetzbarkeit in- of concrete and unregulated situation-de¬
nerer Reformen im pluralistisch-demokratis- termined necessity (pp. 71, 81). ♦
382 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIV: Postmodernism and Poststructuralism
advertising to tell us what it is that we con¬ So even though we may be getting better
sume through objects. and better at resisting advertising in the im¬
perative, we are at the same time becoming
Advertising in the Indicative and in ever more susceptible to advertising in the
indicative—that is, to its actual existence as a
the Imperative product to be consumed at a secondary level,
and as the clear expression of a culture. It is
Advertising sets itself the task of supplying
in this sense that we do indeed 'believe' in
information about particular products and
advertising: what we consume in this way is
promoting their sale. In principle this 'objec¬
the luxury of a society that projects itself as
tive' function is still its fundamental pur¬
an agency for dispensing goods and 'tran¬
pose.2 The supplying of information has
scends itself' in a culture. We are thus taken
nevertheless given way to persuasion—even
over at one and the same time by an estab¬
to what Vance Packard calls 'hidden persua¬
lished agency and by that agency's self-image.
sion', the aim of which is a completely man¬
aged consumption. The supposed threat this
poses of a totalitarian conditioning of man The Logic of Father Christmas
and his needs has provoked great alarm.
Studies have shown, however, that advertis¬ Those who pooh-pooh the ability of adver¬
ing's pervasive power is not as great as had tising and of the mass media in general to
been supposed. A saturation point is in fact condition people have failed to grasp the pe¬
soon reached: competing messages tend to culiar logic upon which the media's efficacy
cancel each other out, and many claims fail reposes. For this is not a logic of propositions
to convince on account of their sheer exces¬ and proofs, but a logic of fables and of the
siveness. Moreover, injunctions and exhorta¬ willingness to go along with them. We do not
tions give rise to all kinds of counter-motiva¬ believe in such fables, but we cleave to them
tions and resistances, whether rational or ir¬ nevertheless. Basically, the 'demonstration'
rational, among them the refusal of passivity, of a product convinces no one, but it does
the desire not to be 'taken over', negative re¬ serve to rationalize its purchase, which in any
actions to hyperbole, to repetition, and so on. case either precedes or overwhelms all ratio¬
In short, the discourse of advertising is just nal motives. Without 'believing' in the prod¬
as likely to dissuade as to persuade, and con¬ uct, therefore, we believe in the advertising
sumers, though not entirely immune, appear that tries to get us to believe in it. We are for
to exercise a good deal of discretion when it all the world like children in their attitude
comes to the advertising message. towards Father Christmas. Children hardly
Having said this, let us not be misled by ever wonder whether Father Christmas exists
the avowed aim of that message; while adver¬ or not, and they certainly never look upon
tising may well fail to sell the consumer on a getting presents as an effect of which that
particular brand—Omo, Simca or Frigi- existence is the cause: rather, their belief in
daire—it does sell him on something else, Father Christmas is a rationalizing confabu¬
something much more fundamental to the lation designed to extend earliest infancy's
global social order than Omo or Frigidaire— miraculously gratifying relationship with the
something, indeed for which such brand parents (and particularly with the mother)
names are merely a cover. Just as the object's into a later stage of childhood. That miracu¬
function may ultimately amount merely to lous relationship, though now in actuality
the provision of a justification for the latent past, is internalized in the form of a belief
meanings that the object imposes, so in ad¬ which is in effect an ideal extension of it.
vertising (and all the more so inasmuch as it There is nothing artificial about the romance
is the more purely connotative system) the of Father Christmas, however, for it is based
product designated—that is, its denotation or upon the shared interest that the two parties
description—tends to be merely an effective involved have in its preservation. Father
mask concealing a confused process of inte¬ Christmas himself is unimportant here, and
gration. the child only believes in him precisely be-
384 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIV: Postmodernism and Poststructuralism
cause of that basic lack of significance. What of it personally or not, we all live and breathe
children are actually consuming through this this buying power. By virtue of advertising,
figure, fiction or cover story (which in a sense too, the product exposes itself to our view and
they continue to believe in even after they invites us to handle it; it is, in fact, eroti¬
have ceased to do so) is the action of a magi¬ cized—not just because of the explicitly sex¬
cal parental solicitude and the care taken ual themes evoked5 but also because the pur¬
by the parents to continue colluding with chase itself, simple appropriation, is trans¬
their children's embrace of the fable. Christ¬ formed into a manoeuvre, a scenario, a com¬
mas presents themselves serve merely to un¬ plicated dance which endows a purely prac¬
derwrite this compromise.3 tical transaction with all the traits of amo¬
Advertising functions in much the same rous dalliance: advances, rivalry, obscenity,
way. Neither its rhetoric nor even the infor¬ flirtation, prostitution—even irony. The me¬
mational aspect of its discourse has a deci¬ chanics of buying (which is already libidi-
sive effect on the buyer. What the individual nally charged) gives way to a complete eroti-
does respond to, on the other hand, is adver¬ cization of choosing and spending.6 Our
tising's underlying leitmotiv of protection modem environment assails us relentlessly,
and gratification, the intimation that its so¬
especially in the cities, with its lights and its
licitations and attempts to persuade are the
images, its incessant inducements to status-
sign, indecipherable at the conscious level,
consciousness and narcissism, emotional in¬
that somewhere there is an agency (a social
volvement and obligatory relalionships. We
agency in the event, but one that refers di¬
live in a cold-blooded carnival atmosphere, a
rectly to the image of the mother) which has
formal yet electrifying ambience of empty sen¬
taken it upon itself to inform him of his own
desires, and to foresee and rationalize these sual gratification wherein the actual process of
desires to his own satisfaction. He thus no buying and consuming is demonstrated, il¬
more 'believes' in advertising than the child luminated, mimicked—even frustrated—
believes in Father Christmas, but this in no much as the sexual act is anticipated by
way impedes his capacity to embrace an in¬ dance. By means of advertising, as once upon
ternalized infantile situation, and to act ac¬ a time by means of feasts, society puts itself
cordingly. Herein lies the very real effective¬ on display and consumes its own image. An
ness of advertising, founded on its obedience essential regulatory function is evident here.
to a logic which, though not that of the con¬ Like the dream, advertising defines and redi¬
ditioned reflex, is nonetheless very rigorous: rects an imaginary potentiality. Like the
a logic of belief and regression.4. . . dream's, its practical character is strictly sub¬
jective and individual.7 And, like the dream,
advertising is devoid of all negativity and
The Festival of Buying Power relativity: with never a sign too many nor a
This gratificatory, infantilizing function of sign too few, it is essentially superlative and
advertising, which is the basis of our belief in totally immanent in nature.8 Our night-time
it and hence of our collusion with the social dreams are uncaptioned, whereas the one
entity, is equally well illustrated by its playful that we live in our waking hours via the city's
aspect. We are certainly susceptible to the hoardings, in our newspapers and on our
reassurance advertising offers by supplying screens, is covered with captions, with mul¬
an image that is never negative, but we are tiple subtitling. Both, however, weave the
equally affected by advertising as a fantastic most colourful of narratives from the most
manifestation of a society capable of swamp¬ impoverished of raw materials, and just as
ing the mere necessity of products in super¬ the function of nocturnal dreams is to protect
fluous images: advertising as a show (again, sleep, so likewise the prestige of advertising
the most democratic of all), a game, a mise and consumption serves to ensure the spon¬
en scene. Advertising serves as a permanent taneous absorption of ambient social values
display of the buying power, be it real or vir¬ and the regression of the individual into so¬
tual, of society overall. Whether we partake cial consensus.
Advertising 385
ognize the demagogy of a political discourse perpetually determined by the absence of re¬
whose own tactics are founded on a splitting ality, that is to say, by frustration.
into two—on the splitting of social reality The image creates a void, indicates an ab¬
into a real agency and an image, with the first sence, and it is in this respect that it is 'evoca¬
disappearing behind the second, becoming tive'. It is deceptive, however. It provokes a
indecipherable and giving way to nothing cathexis which it then immediately short-cir¬
more than a pattern of absorption into a ma¬ cuits at the level of reading. It focuses free-
terial world. When advertising tells you, in floating wishes upon an object which it
effect, that 'society adapts itself totally to you, masks as much as reveals. The image disap¬
so integrate yourself totally into society', the points: its function is at once to display and
reciprocity thus invoked is obviously fake: simultaneously to disabuse. Looking is based
what adapts to you is an imaginary agency, on a presumption of contact; the image and
whereas you are asked in exchange to adapt its reading are based on a presumption of
to an agency that is distinctly real. Via the possession. Thus advertising offers neither a
armchair that ‘weds the shape of your body', hallucinated satisfaction nor a practical me¬
it is the entire technical and political order of diation with the world. Rather, what it pro¬
society that weds you and takes you in hand. duces is dashed hopes: unfinished actions,
Society assumes a maternal role the better to continual initiatives followed by continual
preserve the rule of constraint.10 The im¬ abandonments thereof, false dawnings of ob¬
mense political role played by the diffusion jects, false dawnings of desires. A whole psy¬
of products and advertising techniques is chodrama is quickly enacted when an image
here clearly evident: these mechanisms effec¬ is read. In principle, this enables the reader
tively replace earlier moral or political ide¬ to assume his passive role and be trans¬
ologies. Indeed, they go farther, for moral and formed into a consumer. In actuality, the
political forms of integration were never un- sheer profusion of images works at the same
problematical and always had to be but¬ time to counter any shift in the direction of
tressed by overt repression, whereas the new reality, subtly to fuel feelings of guilt by
techniques manage to do without any such means of continual frustration, and to arrest
assistance: the consumer internalizes the consciousness at the level of a phantasy of
agency of social control and its norms in the satisfaction. In the end the image and the
very process of consuming. reading of the image are by no means the
This effectiveness is reinforced by the shortest way to the object, merely the short¬
status accorded the signs advertising ma¬ est way to another image. The signs of adver¬
nipulates and the process whereby these are tising thus follow upon one another like the
'read'. transient images of hypnagogic states.
Signs in advertising speak to us of objects, We must not forget that the image serves
but they never (or scarcely ever) explain those in this way to avoid reality and create frustra¬
objects from the standpoint of a praxis: they tion, for only thus can we grasp how it is that
refer to objects as to a world that is absent. the reality principle omitted from the image
These signs are literally no more than a 'leg¬ nevertheless effectively re-emerges therein as
end': they are there primarily for the purpose the continual repression of desire (as the spec-
of being read. But while they do not refer to tacularization, blocking and dashing of that
the real world, neither do they exactly replace desire and, ultimately, its regressive and vis¬
that world: their function is to impose a spe¬ ible transference onto an object). This is
cific activity, a specific kind of reading. If they where the profound collusion between the
did carry information, then a full reading, advertising sign and the overall order of soci¬
and a transition to the practical realm, would ety becomes most evident: it is not in any
occur. But their role is a different one: to draw mechanical sense that advertising conveys
attention to the absence of what they desig¬ the values of society; rather, more subtly, it is
nate. To this extent the reading of such signs in its ambiguous presumptive function—
is intransitive—organized in terms of a spe¬ somewhere between possession and dispos¬
cific system of satisfaction which is, however, session, at once a designation and an indica-
Advertising 387
tion of absence—that the advertising sign 'in¬ home remedies, and the like; they supplied
serts’ the social order into its system of simul¬ information, therefore, but information only
taneous determination by gratification on of the most tendentious kind.
the one hand and repression on the other.11 3. One is reminded of the neutral substances or
Gratification, frustration—two indivisible placebos that doctors sometimes prescribe
aspects of social integration. Every advertis¬ for psychosomatic patients. Quite often these
patients make just as good a recovery after the
ing image is a key, a legend, and as such re¬
administration of such inactive elements as
duces the anxiety-provoking polysemy of the
they do after taking real medicine. What is it
world. But in the name of intelligibility the that such patients derive or assimilate from
image becomes impoverished, cursory; inas¬ the placebo? The answer is the idea of medi¬
much as it is still susceptible of too many cine plus the presence of the physician: the
interpretations, its meaning is further nar¬ mother and the father simultaneously. Here
rowed by the addition of discourse—of a sub¬ too, then, belief facilitates the retrieval of an
title, as it were, which constitutes a second infantile situation, the result being the regres¬
legend. And, by virtue of the way it is read, sive resolution of a psychosomatic conflict.
the image always refers only to other images. 4. Such an approach might well be extended to
In the end advertising soothes people s con¬ mass communications in general, though this
sciousness by means of a controlled social is not the place to attempt it.
semantics—controlled, ultimately, to the 5. Some common leitmotivs (breasts, lips)
point of focusing on a single referent, namely should perhaps be deemed less erotic than
the whole society itself. Society thus monop¬ 'nurturing' in character.
olizes all the roles. It conjures up a host of 6. The literal meaning of the German word for
images whose meanings it immediately advertising, ‘die Werbung, is erotic explora¬
strives to limit. It generates an anxiety that it tion. ‘Der umworbene Mensch’, the person
then seeks to calm. It fulfils and disappoints, won over by advertising, can also mean a per¬
son who is sexually solicited.
mobilizes and demobilizes. Under the ban¬
ner of advertising it institutes the reign of a 7. Advertising campaigns designed to alter
freedom of desire, but desire is never truly group behaviour or modify social structures
(for example, those against alcohol abuse,
liberated thereby (which would in fact entail
dangerous driving, etc.) are notoriously inef¬
the end of the social order): desire is liberated
fective. Advertising resists the (collective) re¬
by the image only to the point where its emer¬ ality principle. The only imperative that may
gence triggers the associated reflexes of anxi¬ be effective in this context is 'Give!'—for it is
ety and guilt. Primed by the image only to be part of the reversible system of gratification.
defused by it, and made to feel guilty to boot, 8. Negative or ironic advertisements are mere
the nascent desire is co-opted by the agency antiphrasis—a well-known device, too, of the
of control. There is a profusion of freedom, dream.
but this freedom is imaginary; a continual 9. Naturally the existing political situation of the
mental orgy, but one which is stage-managed, two Germanies must be taken into account,
a controlled regression in which all perversity but there can be little doubt that the absence
is resolved in favour of order. If gratification of advertising in the Western sense is a real
is massive in consumer society, repression is contributing factor to West German preju¬
equally massive—and both reach us together dice against the East.
via the images and discourse of advertising, 10. What is more, behind this system of gratifica¬
which activate the repressive reality principle tion we may discern the reinforcement of all
at the very heart of the pleasure principle. the structures of authority (planning, cen¬
tralization, bureaucracy). Parties, States,
Endnotes power structures—all are able to strengthen
their hegemony under cover of this immense
1. See Roland Barthes's account of the system of mother-image which renders any real chal¬
fashion: Systeme de la mode (Paris: Seuil, lenge to them less and less possible.
1967). 11. This account may also be applied to the sys¬
2. We should not forget, however, that the earli¬ tem of objects, because the object too is am¬
est advertisements were for miracle cures, biguous, because it is never merely an object
388 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIV: Postmodernism and Poststructuralism
but always at the same time an indication of grative role. It is true, however, that the ob¬
the absence of a human relationship (just as ject's practical specificity means that the in¬
the sign in advertising is an indication of the dication of the absence of the real is less
absence of a real object)—for these reasons, marked in the case of the object than in that
the object may likewise play a powerful inte¬ of the advertising sign. ♦
Panopticism 389
himself the power relation in which he simul¬ periments, to alter behaviour, to train or cor¬
taneously plays both roles; he becomes the rect individuals. To experiment with medi¬
principle of his own subjection. By this very cines and monitor their effects. To try out
fact, the external power may throw off its different punishments on prisoners, accord¬
physical weight; it tends to the non-corporal; ing to their crimes and character, and to seek
and, the more it approaches this limit, the the most effective ones. To teach different
more constant, profound and permanent are techniques simultaneously to the workers, to
its effects: it is a perpetual victory that avoids decide which is the best. To try out pedagogi¬
any physical confrontation and which is al¬ cal experiments—and in particular to take up
ways decided in advance. once again the well-debated problem of se¬
Bentham does not say whether he was in¬ cluded education, by using orphans. One
spired, in his project, by Le Vaux's menagerie would see what would happen when, in their
at Versailles: the first menagerie in which the sixteenth or eighteenth year, they were pre¬
different elements are not, as they tradition¬ sented with other boys or girls; one could
ally were, distributed in a park (Loisel, 104- verify whether, as Helvetius thought, anyone
7). At the centre was an octagonal pavilion could learn anything; one would follow 'the
which, on the first floor, consisted of only a genealogy of every observable idea'; one
single room, the kings salon; on every side could bring up different children according
large windows looked out onto seven cages to different systems of thought, making cer¬
(the eighth side was reserved for the en¬ tain children believe that two and two do not
trance), containing different species of ani¬ make four or that the moon is a cheese, then
mals. By Bentham s time, this menagerie had put them together when they are twenty or
disappeared. But one finds in the programme twenty-five years old; one would then have
of the Panopticon a similar concern with in¬ discussions that would be worth a great deal
dividualizing observation, with characteriza¬ more than the sermons or lectures on which
tion and classification, with the analytical ar¬ so much money is spent; one would have at
rangement of space. The Panopticon is a least an opportunity of making discoveries in
royal menagerie; the animal is replaced by the domain of metaphysics. The Panopticon
man, individual distribution by specific is a privileged place for experiments on men,
grouping and the king by the machinery of a and for analysing with complete certainty the
furtive power. With this exception, the transformations that may be obtained from
Panopticon also does the work of a naturalist. them. The Panopticon may even provide an
It makes it possible to draw up differences: apparatus for supervising its own mecha¬
among patients, to observe the symptoms of nisms. In this central tower, the director may
each individual, without the proximity of spy on all the employees that he has under
beds, the circulation of miasmas, the effects his orders: nurses, doctors, foremen, teach¬
of contagion confusing the clinical tables; ers, warders; he will be able to judge them
among school-children, it makes it possible continuously, alter their behaviour, impose
to observe performances (without there be¬ upon them the methods he thinks best; and
ing any imitation or copying), to map apti¬ it will even be possible to observe the director
tudes, to assess characters, to draw up rigor¬ himself. An inspector arriving unexpectedly
ous classifications and, in relation to normal at the centre of the Panopticon will be able to
development, to distinguish 'laziness and judge at a glance, without anything being
stubbornness' from 'incurable imbecility'; concealed from him, how the entire estab¬
among workers, it makes it possible to note lishment is functioning. And, in any case, en¬
the aptitudes of each worker, compare the closed as he is in the middle of this architec¬
time he takes to perform a task, and if they tural mechanism, is not the director's own
are paid by the day, to calculate their wages fate entirely bound up with it? The incompe¬
(Bentham, 60-64). tent physician who has allowed contagion to
So much for the question of observation. spread, the incompetent prison governor or
But the Panopticon was also a laboratory; it workshop manager will be the first victims of
could be used as a machine to carry out ex¬ an epidemic or a revolt. " 'By every tie I could
392 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIV: Postmodernism and Poststructuralism
devise’, said the master of the Panopticon, to instruct schoolchildren, to confine the in¬
'my own fate had been bound up by me with sane, to supervise workers, to put beggars
theirs’ ” (Bentham, 177). The Panopticon and idlers to work. It is a type of location of
functions as a kind of laboratory of power. bodies in space, of distribution of individuals
Thanks to its mechanisms of observation, it in relation to one another, of hierarchical or¬
gains in efficiency and in the ability to pene¬ ganization, of disposition of centres and
trate into men’s behaviour; knowledge fol¬ channels of power, of definition of the instru¬
lows the advances of power, discovering new ments and modes of intervention of power,
objects of knowledge over all the surfaces on which can be implemented in hospitals,
which power is exercised. workshops, schools, prisons. Whenever one
The plague-stricken town, the panoptic es¬ is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals
tablishment—the differences are important. on whom a task or a particular form of be¬
They mark, at a distance of a century and a haviour must be imposed, the panoptic
half, the transformations of the disciplinary schema may be used. It is—necessary modi¬
programme. In the first case, there is an ex¬ fications apart—applicable 'to all estab¬
ceptional situation: against an extraordinary lishments whatsoever, in which, within a
evil, power is mobilized; it makes itself every¬ space not too large to be covered or com¬
where present and visible; it invents new manded by buildings, a number of persons
mechanisms; it separates, it immobilizes, it are meant to be kept under inspection’ (Ben¬
partitions; it constructs for a time what is tham, 40; although Bentham takes the peni¬
both a counter-city and the perfect society; it tentiary house as his prime example, it is be¬
imposes an ideal functioning, but one that is cause it has many different functions to ful¬
reduced, in the final analysis, like the evil that fil—safe custody, confinement, solitude,
it combats, to a simple dualism of life and forced labour and instruction).
death: that which moves brings death, and In each of its applications, it makes it pos¬
one kills that which moves. The Panopticon, sible to perfect the exercise of power. It does
on the other hand, must be understood as a this in several ways: because it can reduce the
generalizable model of functioning; a way of number of those who exercise it, while in¬
defining power relations in terms of the creasing the number of those on whom it is
everyday life of men. No doubt Bentham pre¬ exercised. Because it is possible to intervene
sents it as a particular institution, closed in at any moment and because the constant
upon itself. Utopias, perfectly closed in upon pressure acts even before the offences, mis¬
themselves, are common enough. As opposed takes or crimes have been committed. Be¬
to the ruined prisons, littered with mecha¬ cause, in these conditions, its strength is that
nisms of torture, to be seen in Piranese s en¬ it never intervenes, it is exercised spontane¬
gravings, the Panopticon presents a cruel, in¬ ously and without noise, it constitutes a
genious cage. The fact that it should have mechanism whose effects follow from one
given rise, even in our own time, to so many another. Because, without any physical in¬
variations, projected or realized, is evidence strument other than architecture and geome¬
of the imaginary intensity that it has pos¬ try, it acts directly on individuals; it gives
sessed for almost two hundred years. But the 'power of mind over mind’. The panoptic
Panopticon must not be understood as a schema makes any apparatus of power more
dream building: it is the diagram of a mecha¬ intense: it assures its economy (in material,
nism of power reduced to its ideal form; its in personnel, in time); it assures its efficacity
functioning, abstracted from any obstacle, by its preventative character, its continuous
resistance or friction, must be represented as functioning and its automatic mechanisms.
a pure architectural and optical system: it is It is a way of obtaining from power 'in hith¬
in fact a figure of political technology that erto unexampled quantity’, 'a great and new
may and must be detached from any specific instrument of government. . .; its great excel¬
use. lence consists in the great strength it is capa¬
It is polyvalent in its applications; it serves ble of giving to any institution it may be
to reform prisoners, but also to treat patients, thought proper to apply it to’ (Bentham, 66).
Panopticism 393
It's a case of 'its easy once you've thought be constantly accessible 'to the great tribunal
of it' in the political sphere. It can in fact be committee of the world'.3 This Panopticon,
integrated into any function (education, subtly arranged so that an observer may ob¬
medical treatment, production, punish¬ serve, at a glance, so many different individu¬
ment); it can increase the effect of this func¬ als, also enables everyone to come and ob¬
tion, by being linked closely with it; it can serve any of the observers. The seeing ma¬
constitute a mixed mechanism in which rela¬ chine was once a sort of dark room into
tions of power (and of knowledge) may be which individuals spied; it has become a
precisely adjusted, in the smallest detail, to transparent building in which the exercise of
the processes that are to be supervised; it can power may be supervised by society as a
establish a direct proportion between 'sur¬ whole.
plus power' and 'surplus production'. In The panoptic schema, without disappear¬
short, it arranges things in such a way that ing as such or losing any of its properties, was
the exercise of power is not added on from destined to spread throughout the social
the outside, like a rigid, heavy constraint, to body; its vocation was to become a general¬
the functions it invests, but is so subtly pre¬ ized function. The plague-stricken town pro¬
sent in them as to increase their efficiency by vided an exceptional disciplinary model: per¬
itself increasing its own points of contact. fect, but absolutely violent; to the disease that
The panoptic mechanism is not simply a brought death, power opposed its perpetual
hinge, a point of exchange between a mecha¬ threat of death; life inside it was reduced to
nism of power and a function; it is a way of its simplest expression; it was, against the
making power relations function in a func¬ power of death, the meticulous exercise of
tion, and of making a function function the right of the sword. The Panopticon, on
through these power relations. Bentham's the other hand, has a role of amplification;
Preface to Panopticon opens with a list of the although it arranges power, although it is in¬
benefits to be obtained from his 'inspection- tended to make it more economic and more
house': 'Morals reformed—health preserved— effective, it does so not for power itself, nor
industry invigorated—instruction difused— for the immediate salvation of a threatened
public burthens lightened—Economy seated, society: its aim is to strengthen the social
as it were, upon a rock—the gordian knot of forces—to increase production, to develop
the Poor-Laws not cut, but untied—all by a the economy, spread education, raise the
simple idea in architecture!' (Bentham, 39). level of public morality; to increase and mul-
Furthermore, the arrangement of this ma¬ tiply.
chine is such that its enclosed nature does not How is power to be strengthened in such
preclude a permanent presence from the out¬ a way that, far from impeding progress, far
side: we have seen that anyone may come and from weighing upon it with its rules and regu¬
exercise in the central tower the functions of lations, it actually facilitates such progress?
surveillance, and that, this being the case, he What intensificator of power will be able at
can gain a clear idea of the way in which the the same time to be a multiplicator of pro¬
surveillance is practised. In fact, any panop¬ duction? How will power, by increasing its
tic institution, even if it is as rigorously closed forces, be able to increase those of society
as a penitentiary, may without difficulty be instead of confiscating them or impeding
subjected to such irregular and constant in¬ them? The Panopticon's solution to this prob¬
spections: and not only by the appointed in¬ lem is that the productive increase of power
spectors, but also by the public; any member can be assured only if, on the one hand, it can
of society will have the right to come and see be exercised continuously in the very founda¬
with his own eyes how the schools, hospitals, tions of society, in the subtlest possible way,
factories, prisons function. There is no risk, and if, on the other hand, it functions outside
therefore, that the increase of power created these sudden, violent, discontinuous forms
by the panoptic machine may degenerate that are bound up with the exercise of sover¬
into tyranny; the disciplinary mechanism eignty. The body of the king, with its strange
will be democratically controlled, since it will material and physical presence, with the
394 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIV: Postmodernism and Poststructuralism
***
force that he himself deploys or transmits to
some few others, is at the opposite extreme
of this new physics of power represented by There are two images, then, of discipline.
panopticism; the domain of panopticism is, At one extreme, the discipline-blockade, the
on the contrary, that whole lower region, that enclosed institution, established on the edges
region of irregular bodies, with their details, of society, turned inwards towards negative
their multiple movements, their hetero¬ functions: arresting evil, breaking communi¬
cations, suspending time. At the other ex¬
geneous forces, their spatial relations; what
treme, with panopticism, is the discipline-
are required are mechanisms that analyse
mechanism: a functional mechanism that
distributions, gaps, series, combinations,
must improve the exercise of power by mak¬
and which use instruments that render vis¬ ing it lighter, more rapid, more effective, a
ible, record, differentiate and compare: a design of subtle coercion for a society to
physics of a relational and multiple power, come. The movement from one project to the
which has its maximum intensity not in the other, from a schema of exceptional disci¬
person of the king, but in the bodies that can pline to one of a generalized surveillance,
be individualized by these relations. At the rests on a historical transformation: the grad¬
theoretical level, Bentham defines another ual extension of the mechanisms of discipline
way of analysing the social body and the throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth
power relations that traverse it; in terms of centuries, their spread throughout the whole
practice, he defines a procedure of subordi¬ social body, the formation of what might be
nation of bodies and forces that must in¬ called in general the disciplinary society.
crease the utility of power while practising A whole disciplinary generalization—the
Benthamite physics of power represents an
the economy of the prince. Panopticism is the
acknowledgement of this—had operated
general principle of a new political anatomy'
throughout the classical age. The spread of
whose object and end are not the relations of
disciplinary institutions, whose network was
sovereignty but the relations of discipline. beginning to cover an ever larger surface and
The celebrated, transparent, circular cage, occupying above all a less and less marginal
with its high tower, powerful and knowing, position, testifies to this: what was an islet, a
may have been for Bentham a project of a privileged place, a circumstantial measure,
perfect disciplinary institution; but he also or a singular model, became a general for¬
set out to show how one may unlock’ the mula; the regulations characteristic of the
disciplines and get them to function in a dif¬ Protestant and pious armies of William of
fused, multiple, polyvalent way throughout Orange or of Gustavus Adolphus were trans¬
the whole social body. These disciplines, formed into regulations for all the armies of
which the classical age had elaborated in spe¬ Europe; the model colleges of the Jesuits, or
cific, relatively enclosed places—barracks, the schools of Batencour or Demia, following
the example set by Sturm, provided the out¬
schools, workshops—and whose total imple¬
lines for the general forms of educational dis¬
mentation had been imagined only at the lim¬
cipline; the ordering of the naval and military
ited and temporary scale of a plague-stricken
hospitals provided the model for the entire
town, Bentham dreamt of transforming into reorganization of hospitals in the eighteenth
a network of mechanisms that would be century. . . .
everywhere and always alert, running
through society without interruption in
space or in time. The panoptic arrangement Endnotes
provides the formula for this generalization.
1. In the Postscript to the Panopticon, 1791, Ben¬
It programmes, at the level of an elementary
tham adds dark inspection galleries painted
and easily transferable mechanism, the basic in black around the inspector’s lodge, each
functioning of a society penetrated through making it possible to observe two storeys of
and through with disciplinary mechanisms. cells.
Panopticism 395
2. In his first version of the Panopticon, Ben- scape of the Panopticon, was Bentham aware
tham had also imagined an acoustic surveil¬ of the Panoramas that Barker was construct¬
lance, operated by means of pipes leading ing at exactly the same period (the first seems
from the cells to the central tower. In the Post¬ to have dated from 1787) and in which the
script he abandoned the idea, perhaps be¬ visitors, occupying the central place, saw un¬
cause he could not introduce into it the prin¬ folding around them a landscape, a city or a
ciple of dis-symmetry and prevent the prison¬ battle? The visitors occupied exactly the place
ers from hearing the inspector as well as the of the sovereign gaze.
inspector hearing them. Julius tried to de¬
velop a system of dis-symmetrical listening
References
(Julius, 18).
3. Imagining this continuous flow of visitors en¬
Bentham, J., Works, ed. Bowring, IV, 1843.
tering the central tower by an underground
passage and then observing the circular land¬ Loisel, G., Histoire des menageries, 11, 1912. ♦
396 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIV: Postmodernism and Poststructuralism
the wondrous and the gruesome things that bound to be made triumphant was the uni¬
it did; in this, as in so many other cases, ig¬ versal (hence apodictic and obligatory) tmth.
norance, so to speak, turned out to be a privi¬ Together, political order and tme knowledge
lege. The question is: is the fading of self-de¬ blended into a design for certainty. The ratio¬
ception a final fulfilment, emancipation, or nal-universal world of order and tmth would
the end of modernity? know of no contingency and no ambivalence.
The distinctive feature of the belief in the The target of certainty and of absolute tmth
truth of ones knowledge is not the conviction was indistinguishable from the cmsading
that the knowledge in question is satisfying, spirit and the project of domination.
pleasing, useful, or otherwise worth holding While setting itself apart, making itself dis¬
to. Such a conviction does not require the tinct so that it would be possible to reserve a
belief in truth for support. More often than position of command toward the rest of the
not, this conviction can be and is held with¬ oikoumene, modernity thought of itself as of
out worry about authoritative confirmation the seed of future universality, as of an entity
that the belief in truth is sound. Where one destined to replace all other entities and thus
cannot do without the ‘well grounded con¬ to abolish the very difference between them.
cept of truth’ is when it comes to tell others It thought of the differentiation it perpetrated
that they are in error and hence (1) ought or as of universalization. This was modernity’s
must change their minds, thus (2) confirming self-deception. This was, however, a self-de¬
the superiority (read: right to command) of ception bound to disclose itself even without
the holder of truth (read: the giver of com¬ outside help (there was, anyway, no ‘outside’
mand). The bid for truth as a claimed quality left, allowed the legitimacy to disclose any¬
of knowledge arises therefore solely in the thing); a self-deception that could last only as
context of hegemony and proselytism; in the long as it worked toward that disclosure. The
context of coexistence of autonomously sus¬ self-deception supplied the courage and the
tained bodies of knowledge of which at least confidence to pursue that lonely work of uni¬
one refuses to coexist peacefully and respect versality that spawned ever more difference;
the existing borders; in the context of plural¬ to persevere in such a chase of uniformity as
ity that is treated by at least one member as was bound to result in more ambivalence.
a vexing state to be rectified; in the context of The self-deception of modernity was preg¬
a balance of forces under pressure to turn nant with its self-disclosure.
into asymmetry of power. It is perhaps the fruit of that pregnancy
Truth is, in other words, a social relation that Agnes Heller dubbed the ‘death wish’
(like povoer, ownership or freedom): an aspect that was to be found at the other end of the
of a hierarchy built of superiority-inferiority long march toward ‘wish-fulfillment’; that
units; more precisely, an aspect of the was to be, as we tried to argue here, the lat¬
hegemonic form of domination or of a bid for ter's inescapable heir and successor. Aware¬
domination-through-hegemony. Modernity ness of contingency, though a prodigal child,
was, from its inception, such a form and such was a fully legitimate offspring of blind self-
a bid. The part of the world that adopted confidence; it could not but be bom of it and
modem civilization as its structural principle it could not be bom of any other parent. The
and constitutional value was bent on domi¬ residents of the house of modernity had been
nating the rest of the world by dissolving its continuously trained to feel at home under
alterity and assimilating the product of dis¬ conditions of necessity and to feel unhappy
solution. The persevering alterity could not at the face of contingency; contingency, they
but be treated as a temporary nuisance; as an had been told, was that state of discomfort
error, sooner or later bound to be supplanted and anxiety from which one needed to escape
by tmth. The battle of order against chaos in by making oneself into a binding norm and
wordly affairs was replicated by the war of thus doing away with difference. Present un¬
tmth against error on the plane of conscious¬ happiness is the realization that this is not to
ness. The order bound to be installed and be, that the hope will not come true and
made universal was a rational order; the tmth hence one needs to learn to live without the
398 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIV: Postmodernism and Poststructuralism
cial experience. The narrators are never ab¬ ing and final proof that the human 'ought’ is
sent from their narration, though, and it is a unambiguous, and that its non-ambiguity
hopeless task to try to sift out their presence has unshakeable and totally reliable founda¬
from their stories. It may well be that at all tions.
times there was life outside philosophy, and This conviction translated into two com¬
that such life did not share the worries of the plementary beliefs: that there will be no good
narrators; that it did quite well without being in the world unless its necessity has been
regimented by rationally proved and philo¬ proven; and that proving such a necessity, if
sophically approved universal standards of and when accomplished, will have a similar
truth, goodness and beauty. It may well be effect on the world as that imputed to the
even that much of that life was liveable, or¬ legislative acts of a ruler: it will replace chaos
derly and moral because it was not tinkered with order and make the opaque transparent.
with, manipulated and corrupted by the self- Husserl was perhaps the last great philoso¬
acclaimed agents of the 'universal ought’.4 pher of the modern era spurred into action
There is hardly any doubt, however, that one by those twin beliefs. Appalled by the idea
form of life can fare but badly without the that whatever we see as truth may be founded
prop of universally binding and apodictically but in beliefs, that our knowledge has merely
valid standards: the form of life of the narra¬ a psychological grounding, that we might
tors themselves (more precisely, such form of have adopted logic as a secure guide to cor¬
life as contains the stories those narrators rect thinking simply because this is how peo¬
were telling through most of modem his¬ ple happen on the whole to think, Husserl
tory). (like Descartes, Kant and other recognized
It was that form of life first and foremost giants of modem thought before him) made
that lost its foundation once social powers a gigantic effort to cut reason free from its
abandoned their ecumenical ambitions, and worldly habitat (or was it prison?): to return
felt therefore more than anyone else threat¬ it to where it belonged—a transcendental,
ened by the fading out of universalistic expec¬ out-worldly region, towering above the daily
tations. As long as modern powers clung human bustle at a height at which it cannot
resolutely to their intention of constructing a be reached—neither glimpsed nor tar¬
better, reason-guided, and thus ultimately nished—from the lowly world of common
universal order, intellectuals had little diffi¬ daily experience. The latter could not be the
culty in articulating their own claim to the domicile of reason, as it was precisely the
crucial role in the process: universality was world of the common and the ordinary and
their domain and their field of expertise. As the spontaneous that was to be remade and
long as the modem powers insisted on the reformed and transformed by the verdicts of
elimination of ambivalence as the measure of reason. Only the few, capable of the formida¬
social improvement, intellectuals could con¬ ble effort of transcendental reduction (an ex¬
sider their own work—the promotion of uni¬ perience not unlike the shaman’s trances, or
versally valid rationality—as a major vehicle forty days of desert meditation), can travel to
and driving force of progress. As long as the those esoteric places where tmth comes into
modem powers continued to decry and ban¬ view. For the time of their journey, they must
ish and evict the Other, the different, the am¬ forget—suspend and bracket out—the 'mere
bivalent—intellectuals could rely on mighty existing’, so that they may become one with
support for their authority of passing judge¬ the transcendental subject—that thinking
ment and sorting out truth from falsity, subject that thinks the tmth because it does
knowledge from mere opinion. Like the ado¬ not think anything else, because it is free
lescent hero of Cocteau's Orphee, convinced from its worldly interests and the common
that the sun would not rise without his guitar errors of the worldly way.
and serenade, the intellectuals grew con¬ The world which Husserl left behind while
vinced that the fate of morality, civilized life embarking on his solitary expedition to the
and social order hangs on their solution of sources of certainty and tmth took little note.
the problem of universality: on their clinch¬ This was a world of evil on the loose, of con-
400 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIV: Postmodernism and Poststructuralism
centration camps and of growing stockpiles man diversity lived in hiding (a concealment
of bombs and poison gas. The most spectacu¬ enforced by the threat of exile) and it learned
lar and lasting effect of absolute truths last to be embarrassed about its stigma of iniq¬
stand was not so much its inconclusiveness, uity, the postmodern eye (that is, the modem
stemming as some would say from the errors eye liberated from modem fears and inhibi¬
of design, but its utter irrelevance to the tions) views difference with zest and glee: dif¬
worldly fate of truth and goodness. The latter ference is beautiful and no less good for that.
fate was decided far away from philosophers' The appearance of sequence is, to be sure,
desks, down in the world of daily life where itself an effect of the modem knack for neat
struggles for political freedom raged and the divisions, clean breaks and pure substances.
limits of the state ambition to legislate social The postmodern celebration of difference
order, to define, to segregate, to organize, to and contingency has not displaced the mod¬
constrain and to suppress were pushed for¬ em lust for uniformity and certainty. More¬
ward and rolled backwards. over, it is unlikely ever to do it; it has no ca¬
It seems that the more advanced is the pacity of doing so. Being what it is, postmod¬
cause of freedom at home the less demand ern mentality and practice cannot displace or
there is for the services of explorers of distant eliminate or even marginalize anything. As it
lands where absolute truth is reputed to re¬ is always the case with the notoriously am¬
side. When ones own truth seems secure and bivalent (multi-final: opening more than one
the truth of the other does not seem to be a option, pointing to more than one line of fu¬
challenge or a threat, truth can live well with¬ ture change) human condition, the gains of
out sycophants assuring it of being 'the truest postmodemity are simultaneously its losses;
of them alP and the warlords determined to what gives it its strength and attraction is also
make sure that no one disagrees. Once the the source of its weakness and vulnerability.
difference ceases to be a crime, it may be There is no clean break or unambiguous
enjoyed at peace, and enjoyed for what it is, sequence. Postmodemity is weak on exclu¬
rather than for what it represents or what it sion. Having declared limits off limits, it can¬
is destined to become. Once the politicians not but include and incorporate modernity
abandon their search for empires, there is into the very diversity that is its distinctive
little demand for the philosophers' search for mark. It cannot refuse admission lest it
universality.5 Empires of unconfined and un¬ should lose its identity. (Paradoxically, re¬
challenged sovereignty, and the truth of un¬ fusal would be equivalent to the ceding of the
limited and uncontested universality were whole real estate to the rejected applicant.) It
the two arms with which modernity wished cannot but admit the rights of a legitimate
to remould the world according to the design resident even to such a lodger as denies its
of perfect order. Once the intention is no right to admit residents and the right of other
more, both arms find themselves without residents to share its accommodation. Mod¬
use. em mentality is a bom litigant and an old
In all probability the diversity of truths, hand in lawsuits. Postmodemity cannot de¬
standards of goodness and beauty does not fend its case in court, as there is no court
grow once the intention is gone; neither does whose authority it would recognize. It might
it become more resilient and stubborn than be forced instead to follow the Christian in¬
before; it only looks less alarming. It was, junction of offering another cheek to the as¬
after all, the modem intention that made dif¬ sailant's blows. It certainly is doomed to a
ference into an offence: the offence, the most long and hard life of cohabitation with its
mortal and least forgivable sin, to be precise. sworn enemy as a room-mate.
The pre-modern eye viewed difference with To the modern determination to seek or
equanimity; as if it was in the pre-ordained enforce consensus, postmodern mentality
order of things that they are and should re¬ may only respond with its habitual tolerance
main different. Being unemotional, differ¬ of dissent. This makes the antagonists'
ence was also safely out of the cognitive fo¬ chances unequal, with the odds heavily on
cus. After a few centuries during which hu¬ the side of the resolute and strong-willed. Tol-
Postmodernity, or Living With Ambivalence 401
erance is too wan a defence against willful¬ 3. Quoted after Martin Heidegger, What is Called
ness and lack of scruples. By itself, tolerance Thinking, trans. F.D. Wieck and J.G. Gray
remains a sitting target—an easy prey for the (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 53. Cf.
also Shoshana Felman, Writing and Madness,
unscrupulous. It can repulse assaults only
trans. Martha Noel Evans and author (Ithaca:
when reforged into solidarity: into the uni¬
Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 62.
versal recognition that difference is one uni¬
versality that is not open to negotiation and 4. It is a prominent feature of the postmodern
mentality that these and similar doubts are
that attack against the universal right to be
more and more widely shared by intellectual
different is the only departure from univer¬
observers. Suddenly a growing number of so¬
sality that none of the solidary agents, how¬ cial scientists discover that normative regula¬
ever different, may tolerate otherwise than at tion of daily life is often sustained through
its own, and all the other agents', peril. 'grass roots' initiative frequently of a hetero¬
And so the transformation of the fate into dox (‘deviationary' in official parlance) na¬
a destiny, of tolerance into solidarity, is not ture, and has to be protected against en¬
just a matter of moral perfection, but a con¬ croachments from above. Compare, for ex¬
dition of survival. Tolerance as 'mere toler¬ ample, Michel de Certeau's analysis of la pe-
ance' is moribund; it can survive only in the ruque [The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984), pp. 25ff]
form of solidarity. It just would not do to rest
as the tool of defence of the self-regulated
satisfied that the other's difference does not
sphere of autonomy; or Hebdidge's brilliant
confine or harm my own—as some differ¬ characterization of subculture (normally the
ences, of some others, are most evidently object of officially inspired ‘moral panics' and
bent on constraining and damaging. Survival detracted as a hiccup of barbarism, as a prod¬
in the world of contingency and diversity is uct of disintegration of order) as a phenome¬
possible only if each difference recognizes non which ‘forms up in the space between
another difference as the necessary condition surveillance and the evasion of surveillance'
of the preservation of its own. Solidarity, un¬ and ‘translates the fact of being under scru¬
like tolerance, its weaker version, means tiny into the pleasure of being watched. It is
a hiding in the light.’ Subculture, in Hebdidge’s
readiness to fight; and joining the battle for
interpretation, is a ‘declaration of indepen¬
the sake of the other's difference, not one's
dence, of otherness, of alien intent, a refusal
own. Tolerance is ego-centred and contem¬ of anonymity, of subordinate status. It is an
plative; solidarity is socially oriented and insubordination. And at the same time it is
militant. also a confirmation of the fact of powerless¬
Like all other human conditions, post¬ ness, a celebration of impotence. Subcultures
modern tolerance and diversity has its dan¬ are both a play for attention and a refusal,
gers and its fears. Its survival is not guaran¬ once attention has been granted, to be read
teed—not by God's design, universal reason, according to the book.' [.Hiding in the Light
laws of history, or any other supra-human (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 35.] Subcul¬
ture is deliberate or semi-deliberate politics;
force. In this respect, of course, the postmod¬
it has its conscious or subconscious motive,
ern condition does not differ at all from all programme and strategy. It often reaches its
other conditions; it differs only by knowing purpose: it gains attention, and then it is
about it, by its knowledge of living without closely scrutinized so that its inner nature as
guarantee, of being on its own. This makes it a defence of autonomy can be gleaned. There
exceedingly anxiety-prone. And this also are, however, much more massive though less
gives it a chance. . . . vociferous and hence less visible territories of
daily life that do not attract the obtrusive at¬
Endnotes tention of the law-enforcing authorities and
thus also the curiosity of intellectual com¬
1. Agnes Heller, 'From Hermeneutics in Social mentators.
Science toward a Hermeneutics of Social Sci¬ 5. Emperor Shih Huang Ti, the hero of Borges's
ence', in Theory and Society, vol. 18 (1989), pp. story, was credited with ordering the con¬
291-322. Other quotations from Heller that struction of the Chinese Wall and the burning
follow come from the same source. of all the books that had been written before
2. Rorty, Contigency, Irony and Solidarity, p.86. his time. He also boasted in his inscriptions
402 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIV: Postmodernism and Poststructuralism
that all things under his reign had the names ambition at its fullest and most logically co¬
that befitted them. And he decreed that his herent. The Wall guarded the perfect king¬
heirs should be called Second Emperor, Third dom against interference by other coercive
Emperor, Fourth Emperor, and so on to infin¬ pressures; the destruction of books stopped
ity [Jorge Luis Borges, 'The Walls and the infiltration of other ideas. With the kingdom
Books', in Other Inquisitions, 1937-1952, secure on both fronts, no wonder all things
trans. Ruth L.C. Simms (New York: Washing¬ finally received their right and proper names,
ton Square Press, 1966), pp. 1-2.] The four and, starting with Shih Huang Ti s reign, future
decrees of Shih Huang Ti represent modem history was to be only more of the same. ♦
Modern and Postmodern 403
In the first place the broad range of artis¬ To work towards some preliminary sense
tic, intellectual and academic fields in which of the meaning of postmodernism it is useful
the term postmodernism' has been used, is to identify the family of terms derived from
striking. We have music (Cage, Stockhausen, ‘the postmodern' and these can best be under¬
Briers, Holloway, Tredici, Laurie Anderson); stood by contrasting them to those which de¬
art (Rauschenberg, Baselitz, Mach, Schna¬ rive from 'the modem'.
bel, Kiefer; some would also include Warhol
and sixties pop art, and others Bacon); fiction modern postmodern
(Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse Five, and the
novels of Barth, Barthelme, Pynchon, Bur¬ modernity postmodernity
roughs, Ballard, Doctorow); film (Body Heat, modernite postmodernite
critics who welcome the playfulness and plu¬ gence of postmodernism and the changes
ralistic, 'democratic' spirit of postmod¬ taking place in the culture of contemporary
ernism, and would see Jameson (and by as¬ Western societies we need to move beyond
sociation, Bell) as nostalgically bemoaning the false oppositions of foundationalism and
the loss of authority of the intellectual aris¬ relativism, of single epistemology and plural
tocracy over the population (see Hutcheon, ontology, and investigate specific social and
1986-7; During, 1987). cultural processes and the dynamics of the
For those who welcome postmodernism production of particular funds of knowledge.
as a mode of critical analysis which opens up In effect we must relinquish the attractions
ironies, inter-textuality and paradoxes, at¬ of a postmodern sociology and work towards
tempts to devise a theory of postmodern so¬ a sociological account of postmodern¬
ciety or postmodemity, or delineate the role ism. . . .
of postmodernism within the social order, are To follow such an approach would entail
essentially flawed efforts to totalize or sys¬ focusing on the interrelationship between
tematize. In effect they are authoritarian three aspects or meanings of the culture of
grand narratives which are ripe for playful postmodernism. In the first place we can con¬
deconstruction. Critics are, for example, sider postmodernism in the arts and in the
quick to point out this apparent inconsis¬ academic and intellectual fields. Here we
tency in Lyotard's Postmodern Condition. could usefully employ the field approach of
Kellner (1988), for example, argues that Lyo¬ Bourdieu (1971, 1979) and focus upon the
tard's notion of postmodemity itself entails a economy of symbolic goods: the conditions
master narrative, that we can't have a theory of supply and demand for such goods, the
of the postmodern without one. It should be processes of competition and monopolization,
added that Lyotard (1988) has recently em¬ and the struggles between established and
phasized the need to move away from what outsiders. We could, for example, direct at¬
he sees as the misunderstanding of his book tention to the act of naming as an important
as an example of totalizing reason. For those strategy of groups engaged in struggles with
who take seriously the implications of post¬ other groups; the use of new terms by out¬
modernism as a mode of critical theorizing sider groups who have an interest in destabi¬
or cultural analysis, the attempt to produce a lizing existing symbolic hierarchies to pro¬
sociological understanding must necessarily duce a classification of the field more in line
fail as it cannot avoid totalizations, systema¬ with their own interests; the conditions
tizations and legitimation via the flawed which are breaking down the barriers be¬
grand narratives of modernity: science, hu¬ tween sub-fields of the arts and academic sub¬
manism, Marxism, feminism etc. Socio¬ jects; the conditions which dictate changes in
logical synthesis must be abandoned for the demand for particular types of cultural
playful deconstmction and the privileging of goods by various state agencies, consumers,
the aesthetic mode. A postmodern sociology audiences and publics.
so conceived would abandon its generalizing To adequately deal with the last areas, in¬
social science ambitions and instead parasi- deed to adequately conceptualize all the
tically play off the ironies, incoherences, in¬ above areas, would take us outside the spe¬
consistencies and inter-textuality of socio¬ cific analysis of particular artistic and intel¬
logical writings. There are, of course, lessons lectual fields and their interrelationship.
to be learned from a postmodern sociology: Here we would need to consider postmod¬
it focuses attention on the ways in which ernism in terms of a second 'level' of culture,
theories are built up, their hidden assump¬ what is often called the cultural sphere, and
tions, and questions the theorist's authority consider the means of transmission and cir¬
to speak for 'the Other', who as many re¬ culation to audiences and publics and the
searchers are finding out, is now often ac¬ feedback effect of the audience response in
tively disputing both the account and the generating further interest amongst intellec¬
authority of the academic theorist. Yet if we tuals. To focus on this second area we need
are to attempt to make sense of the emer¬ to look at artists, intellectuals and academics
410 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XIV: Postmodernism and Poststructuralism
can be related to broader shifts in the balance -. (1984) Distinction: A Social Critique of the
of power and interdependencies between Judgement of Taste, trans. R. Nice. London:
groups and class fractions on both inter- and Routledge & Kegan Paul.
intra-societal levels; (3) changes in the every¬ Bradbury, M. and McFarlane, J. (eds.) (1976)
Modernism 1890-1930. Harmondsworth: Pen¬
day practices and experiences of different
guin.
groups, who as a result of some of the pro¬
Cooke, P. (1988) 'Modernity, Postmodernity and
cesses referred to above, may be using re¬
the City', Theory, Culture & Society, 5(2-3).
gimes of signification in different ways and
Crane, D. (1987) The Transformation of the Avant-
developing new means of orientation and
Garde. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
identity structures. It is apparent that in re¬
DiMaggio, P. (1987) 'Classification in Art', Ameri¬
cent years we have witnessed a dramatic up¬ can Sociological Review, 52(4).
surge of interest in the issue of culture. Cul¬
During, S. (1987) 'Postmodernism or Post-coloni¬
ture, once on the periphery of social science alism Today', Textual Practice, 1(1).
disciplines, particularly in sociology, has now
Elias, N. (1987) 'The Retreat of Sociologists into
been thrust increasingly towards the centre the Present', Theory, Culture & Society, 4(2-3).
of the field and some of the barriers between
Featherstone, M. (1988) 'Cultural Production,
the social sciences and humanities are in the Consumption and the Development of the Cul¬
process of being dismantled (Featherstone, tural Sphere', paper presented at the Third
1988). We can understand this in terms of German-American Sociological Theory Group
two processes which must be interrelated: Conference, Bremen.
firstly, the way in which culture has shifted Foucault, M. (1986) 'What is Enlightenment?', in
in the arsenal of social science concepts from P. Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader. Har-
something which is essentially explicable in mondsworth: Penguin.
terms of other factors to broader metacultu- Frisby, D. (1985a) 'Georg Simmel, First Socio¬
ral questions concerning the cultural under¬ logist of Modernity', Theory, Culture & Society,
2(3).
pinning, or ‘deep' cultural coding, of the so¬
-. (1985b) Fragments of Modernity. Oxford:
cial (see Robertson, 1988); secondly, the way
Polity Press.
in which the culture of contemporary West¬
Gott, R. (1986) 'The Crisis of Contemporary Cul¬
ern societies seems to be undergoing a series
ture', Guardian, 1 December, p. 10.
of major transformations which must be in¬
Hassan, I. (1985) 'The Culture of Postmod¬
vestigated in terms of intrasocietal, interso-
ernism', Theory, Culture & Society, 2(3).
cietal and global processes. It should be ap¬
Hutcheon, L. (1984) Narcissistic Narrative: The
parent that this is one reason for the rise of Metafictional Paradox. London: Methuen.
interest in postmodernism, and a further rea¬
-. (1986-7) 'The Politics of Postmodernism',
son why as cultural theorists and researchers Cultural Critique, 5.
we should be interested in it. ♦
Huyssen, A. (1984) 'Mapping the Postmodern',
New German Critique, 33: 5-52.
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neutics’. Boundary 2, 22. 3). ♦
Shame and Repugnance 413
comes into contradiction with people to as it were standing in the wings—the further,
whom he is bound in one form or another, in a word, the civilization of conduct ad¬
and with himself, with the sector of his con¬ vances. Just as we can only speak of "reason"
sciousness by which he controls himself. The in conjunction with advances of ratio¬
conflict expressed in shame-fear is not nalization and the formation of functions de¬
merely a conflict of the individual with preva¬ manding foresight and restraint, we can only
lent social opinion; the individual's behav¬ speak of shame in conjunction with its socio¬
iour has brought him into conflict with the genesis, with spurts in which the shame-
part of himself that represents this social threshold advances or at least moves, and the
opinion. It is a conflict within his own per¬ structure and pattern of self-constraints are
sonality; he himself recognizes himself as in¬ changed in a particular direction, reproduc¬
ferior. He fears the loss of the love or respect ing themselves thenceforth in the same form
of others, to which he attaches or has at¬ over a greater or lesser period. Both ratio¬
tached value. Their attitude has precipitated nalization and the advance of the shame and
an attitude within him that he automatically repugnance thresholds are expressions of a
adopts towards himself. This is what makes reduction in the direct physical fear of other
him so defenceless against gestures of supe¬ beings, and of a consolidation of the auto¬
riority by others which somehow trigger off matic inner anxieties, the compulsions which
this automatism within him. the individual now exerts on himself. In both,
This also explains why the fear of trans¬ the greater, more differentiated foresight and
gression of social prohibitions takes on more long-term view which become necessary in
clearly the character of shame the more com¬ order that larger and larger groups of people
pletely alien constraints have been turned may preserve their social existence in an in¬
into self-restraints by the structure of society, creasing differentiated society, are equally ex¬
and the more comprehensive and differenti¬ pressed. It is not difficult to explain how
ated the ring of self-restraints have become these seemingly so different psychological
within which a persons conduct is enclosed. changes are connected. Both, the intensifica¬
The inner tension, the excitement that is tion of shame like the increased ratio¬
aroused whenever a person feels compelled nalization, are different aspects of the grow¬
to break out of this enclosure in any place, or ing split in the individual personality that oc¬
when he has done so, varies in strength ac¬ curs with the increasing division of func¬
cording to the gravity of the social prohibi¬ tions; they are different aspects of the grow¬
tion and the degree of self-constraint. In or¬ ing differentiation between drives and
dinary life we call this excitement shame only drive-controls, between “id” and “ego" or “su¬
in certain contexts and above all when it has per-ego" functions. The further this differen¬
a certain degree of strength; but in terms of tiation of individual self-steering advances,
its structure it is, despite its many nuances the more clearly that sector of the controlling
and degrees, always the same event. Like self¬ functions which in a broader sense is called
constraints, it is to be found in a less stable, the “ego" and in a narrower the “super-ego",
less uniform and less all-embracing form takes on a twofold function. On the one hand
even at simpler levels of social development. this sector forms the centre from which a
Like these constraints, tensions and fears of person regulates his relations to other living
this kind emerge more clearly with every and non-living beings, and on the other it
spurt of the civilizing process, and finally pre¬ forms the centre from which a person, partly
dominate over others—particularly the consciously and partly quite automatically
physical fear of others. They predominate the and unconsciously, controls his “inner life",
more, the larger the areas that are pacified, his own affects and impulses. The layer of
and the greater the importance in the mould¬ psychological functions which, in the course
ing of people of the more even constraints of the social transformation that has been
that come to the fore in society when the described, is gradually differentiated from
representatives of the monopoly of physical the drives, the ego or super-ego functions,
violence normally only exercise their control has, in other words, a twofold task within the
Shame and Repugnance 415
personality: they conduct at the same time a rank, exposure as yet arouses no feeling of
domestic policy and a foreign policy—which, inferiority or shame; it can even be taken, as
moreover, are not always in harmony and Della Casa states, as a sign of benevolence
often enough in contradiction. This explains towards the inferior. Exposure by someone of
the fact that in the same socio-historical pe¬ lower rank before a superior, on the other
riod in which rationalization makes percep¬ hand, or even before people of equal rank, is
tible advances, an advance in the shame and banished more and more from social life as
repugnance threshold is also to be observed. a sign of lack of respect; branded as an of¬
It also explains the fact that here, as always— fence, it becomes invested with fear. And only
in accordance with the sociogenetic ground when the walls between estates fall away,
rule—a corresponding process is to be ob¬ when the functional dependence of all on all
served even today in the life of each individ¬ increases and all members of society become
ual child: the rationalization of conduct is an several degrees more equal, does such expo¬
expression of the foreign policy of the same sure, except in certain narrower enclaves, be¬
super-ego formation whose domestic policy come an offence in the presence of any other
is expressed in an advance of the shame person. Only then is such behaviour so pro¬
threshold. foundly associated with fear in the individual
From here many large trains of thought from an early age, that the social character of
lead off in different directions. It remains to the prohibition vanishes entirely from his
be shown how this increased differentiation consciousness, shame appearing as a com¬
within the personality is manifested in a mand coming from within himself.
transformation of particular drives. Above And the same is true of embarrassment.
all, it remains to be shown how it leads to a This is an inseparable counterpart of shame.
transformation of sexual impulses and an ad¬ Just as the latter arises when someone in¬
vance of shame feelings in the relations of fringes the prohibitions of his own self and
men and women.1 It must be enough here to of society, the former occurs when something
indicate some of the main connections be¬ outside the individual impinges on his dan¬
tween the social processes described above ger zone, on forms of behaviour, objects, in¬
and this advance of the frontier of shame and clinations which have early on been invested
repugnance. with fear by his surroundings until this fear—
Even in the more recent history of the West in the manner of a conditioned reflex—is re¬
itself, shame feelings have not always been produced automatically in him on certain oc¬
built into the personality in the same way. To casions. Embarrassment is displeasure or
mention only one difference, the manner in anxiety which arises when another person
which they are built in is not the same in a threatens to breach, or breaches, society's
hierarchical society made up of estates as in prohibitions represented by ones own super¬
the succeeding bourgeois industrial order. ego. And these feelings too become more di¬
The examples quoted earlier, above all verse and comprehensive the more extensive
those showing differences in the develop¬ and subtly differentiated the danger zone by
ment of shame on the exposure of certain which the conduct of the individual is regu¬
bodily parts,2 give a certain impression of lated and moulded, the further the civiliza¬
such changes. In courtly society shame on tion of conduct advances.
exposing certain parts is, in keeping with the It was shown earlier by a series of exam¬
structure of this society, still largely restricted ples how, from the sixteenth century on¬
within estate or hierarchical limits. Exposure wards, the frontier of shame and embarrass¬
in the presence of social inferiors, for exam¬ ment gradually begins to advance more rap¬
ple by the king in front of a minister, is placed idly. Here, too, the chains of thought begin
under no very strict social prohibition, any slowly to join up. This advance coincides
more than the exposure of a man before the with the accelerated courtization of the up¬
socially weaker and lower-ranking woman per class. It is the time when the chains of
was in an earlier phase. Given his minimal dependence intersecting in the individual
functional dependence on those of lower grow denser and longer, when more and
416 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XV. Further Directions
more people are being bound more and more ture” is experienced is fundamentally af¬
closely together and the compulsion to self- fected, slowly at the end of the Middle Ages
control is increasing. Like mutual depen¬ and then more quickly from the sixteenth
dence, mutual observation of people in¬ century onwards, by the pacification of larger
creases; sensibilities, and correspondingly and larger populated areas. Only now do for¬
prohibitions, become more differentiated; ests, meadows and mountains gradually
and equally more subtle, equally more mani¬ cease to be danger zones of the first order,
fold become the reasons for shame and for from which anxiety and fear constantly in¬
embarrassment aroused by the conduct of trude into individual life. And now, as the
others. network of roads becomes, like social inter¬
It was pointed out above that with the ad¬ dependence in general, more dense; as rob¬
vancing division of functions and the greater ber-knights and beasts of prey slowly disap¬
integration of people, the major contrasts be¬ pear; as forest and field cease to be the scene
tween different classes and countries dimin¬ of unbridled passions, of the savage pursuit
ish, while the nuances, the varieties of their of man and beast, wild joy and wild fear; as
moulding within the framework of civiliza¬ they are moulded more and more by inter¬
tion multiply. Here one encounters a corre¬ twining peaceful activities, the production of
sponding trend in the development of indi¬ goods, trade and transport; now, to pacified
vidual conduct and sentiment. The more the men a correspondingly pacified nature be¬
strong contrasts of individual conduct are comes visible, and in a new way. It becomes—
tempered, the more the violent fluctuations in keeping with the mounting significance
of pleasure or displeasure are contained, which the eye attains as the mediator of plea¬
moderated and changed by self-control, the sure with the growing moderation of the af¬
greater becomes the sensitivity to shades or fects—to a high degree an object of visual
nuances of conduct, the more finely attuned pleasure. In addition, people—more pre¬
people grow to minute gestures and forms, cisely the town-people for whom forest and
and the more complex becomes their experi¬ field are no longer their everyday background
ence of themselves and their world at levels but a place of relaxation—grow more sensi¬
which were previously hidden from con¬ tive and begin to see the open country in a
sciousness through the veil of strong affects. more differentiated way, at a level which was
To clarify this by an obvious example, previously screened off by danger and the
“primitive” people experience human and play of unmoderated passions. They take
natural events within the relatively narrow pleasure in the harmony of colour and lines,
circle which is vitally important to them— become open to what is called the beauty of
narrow, because thier chains of dependence nature; their feelings are aroused by the
are relatively short—in a manner in which is changing shades and shapes of the clouds
in some respects far more differentiated than and the play of light on the leaves of a tree.
that of “civilized” people. The differentiation And, in the wake of this pacification, the
varies, depending on whether we are con¬ sensitivity of people to social conduct is also
cerned with farmers or hunters or herdsmen, changed. Now, inner fears grow in propor¬
for example. But however this may be, it can tion to the decrease of outer ones—the fears
be stated generally that, insofar as it is of vital of one sector of the personality for another.
importance to a group, the ability of primi¬ As a result of these inner tensions, people
tive people to distinguish things in forest and begin to experience each other in a more dif¬
field, whether it be a particular tree from an¬ ferentiated way which was precluded as long
other, or sounds, scents or movements, is as they constantly faced serious and inescap¬
more highly developed than in “civilized” able threats from outside. Now a major part
people. But among more primitive people the of the tensions which were earlier discharged
natural sphere is still far more a danger zone; directly in combat between man and man,
it is full of fears which more civilized men no must be resolved as an inner tension in the
longer know. This is decisive for what is or is struggle of the individual with himself. Social
not distinguished. The manner in which “na¬ life ceases to be a danger zone in which feast-
Shame and Repugnance 417
ing, dancing and noisy pleasure frequently the table knife, like that of the dagger, is still
and suddenly give way to rage, blows and quite extensive. Just as the hunting and kill¬
murder, and becomes a different kind of dan¬ ing of animals is still a permitted and com¬
ger zone if the individual cannot sufficiently monplace amusement for the lords of the
restrain himself, if he touches sensitive spots, earth, the carving of dead animals at table
his own shame-frontier or the embarrass¬ remains within the zone of the permitted and
ment-threshold of others. In a sense, the dan¬ is as yet not felt as repugnant. Then, with the
ger zone now passes through the self of every slow rise of bourgeois classes, in whom paci¬
individual. Thus people become, in this re¬ fication and the generation of inner con¬
spect too, sensitive to distinctions which pre¬ straints by the very nature of their social
viously scarcely entered consciousness. Just functions is far more complete and binding,
as nature now becomes, far more than earlier, the cutting up of dead animals is pushed back
a source of pleasure mediated by the eye, peo¬ further behind the scenes of social life (even
ple too become a source of visual pleasure or, if in particular countries, particularly Eng¬
conversely, of visually aroused displeasure, of land, as so often, some of the older customs
different degrees of repugnance. The direct survive incorporated in the new) and the use
fear inspired in men by men has diminished, of the knife, indeed the mere holding of it, is
and the inner fear mediated through the eye avoided wherever it is not entirely indispen¬
and through the super-ego is rising propor¬ sable. Sensitivity in this direction grows.
tionately. This is one example among many of par¬
When the use of weapons in combat is an ticular aspects of the structural transforma¬
everyday occurrence, the small gesture of of¬ tion of society that we denote by the catch¬
fering someone a knife at table (to recall one word “civilization”. Nowhere in human soci¬
of the examples mentioned earlier) has no ety is there a zero-point of fear of external
great importance. As the use of weapons is powers, and nowhere a zero-point of auto¬
restricted more and more, as external and matic inner anxieties. Although they may be
internal pressures make the expression of an¬ experienced as very different, they are finally
ger by physical attack increasingly difficult, inseparable. What takes place in the course
people gradually become more sensitive to of a civilizing process is not the disappear¬
anything reminiscent of an attack. The very ance of one and the emergence of the other.
gesture of attack touches the danger zone; it What changes is merely the proportion be¬
becomes distressing to see a person passing tween the external and the self-activating
someone else a knife with the point towards fears, and their whole structure. Peoples
him.3 And from the most highly sensitized fears of external powers diminish without
small circles of high courtly society, for ever disappearing; the never-absent, latent or
whom this sensitivity also represents a pres¬ actual anxieties arising from the tension be¬
tige value, a means of distinction cultivated tween drives and drive-control functions be¬
for that very reason, this prohibition gradu¬ come relativelly stronger, more comprehen¬
ally spreads throughout the whole of civilized sive and continuous. The documentation for
society. Thus aggressive associations, infused the advance of the shame and embarrass¬
no doubt with others from the layer of ele¬ ment frontiers . . . consists in fact of nothing
mentary urges, combine with status tensions but particularly clear and simple examples of
in arousing anxiety. the direction and structure of a change in the
How the use of a knife is then gradually human personality which could be dem¬
restricted and surrounded, as a danger zone, onstrated from many other aspects too. A
by a wall of prohibitions, has been shown very similar structure is exhibited, for exam¬
through a number of examples. It is an open ple, by the transition from the medieval-
question how far, in the courtly aristocracy, Catholic to the Protestant super-ego forma¬
the renunciation of physical violence re¬ tion. This, too, shows a pronounced shift to¬
mains an external compulsion, and how far wards the internalization of fears. And one
it has already been converted into an inner thing certainly should not be overlooked in
constraint. Despite all restrictions, the use of all this: the fact that today, as formerly, all
418 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory 4 XV.
- Further Directions
forms of adult inner anxieties are bound up sight which middle-class professional func¬
with the child's fears of others, of external tions demand. Something similar emerges if
powers. the civilizing transformation of Western reli¬
gion is investigated. The change in religious
Endnotes feeling to which sociology has paid most at¬
tention hitherto, the increased inwardness
1. This particular problem, important as it is, and rationalization expressed in the various
must be left aside for the time being. Its elu¬ Puritan and Protestant movements, is obvi¬
cidation demands a description and an exact ously closely connected to certain changes in
analysis of the changes which the structure of the situation and structure of the middle
the family and the whole relationship of the classes. The corresponding change in Ca¬
sexes have undergone in the course of West¬ tholicism, as shown, for example, in the for¬
ern history. It demands, furthermore, a gen¬ mation of the power position of the Jesuits,
eral study of changes in the upbringing of
appears to take place in closer touch with the
children and the development of adolescents.
absolutist central organs, in a manner fa¬
The material which has been collected to elu¬
voured by the hierarchical and centralist
cidate this aspect of the civilizing process,
structure of the Catholic Church. These prob¬
and the analyses it made possible have proved
too extensive; they threatened to dislocate the lems, too, will only be solved when we have a
framework of this study and will find their more exact overall picture of the intertwining
place in a further volume. of the non-courtly, middle-class and the
The same applies to the middle-class line of courtly lines of civilization, leaving aside for
the civilizing process, the change it produced the time being the civilizing movement in
in bourgeois-urban classes and the non- worker and peasant strata which emerges
courtly landed aristocracy. While this trans¬ more slowly and much later.
formation of conduct and of the structure of 2. The Civilizing Process, vol. 1, pp. 207ff. On the
psychological functions is certainly con¬ general problem of shame feelings cf. The
nected in these classes, too, with a specific Spectator (1807), vol. 5, no. 373: “If I was put
historical restructuring of the whole Western to define Modesty, I would call it, The reflec¬
social fabric, nevertheless—as already tion of an ingenuous Mind, either when a
pointed out on a number of occasions—the
Man has committed an Action for which he
non-courtly middle-class line of civilization
censures himself, or fancies that he is exposed
follows a different pattern to the courtly one.
to the Censure of others.” See also the obser¬
Above all, the treatment of sexuality in the
vation there on the difference of shame feel¬
former is not the same as in the latter—partly
because of a different family structure, and ings between men and women.
partly because of the different kind of fore¬ 3. The Civilizing Process, vol. 1, pp. 122ff. 4
Structures and the Habitus 419
class at once manifest and presuppose (inas¬ what—within the limits of the group of
much as they imply a community of disposi¬ agents possessing the schemes (of produc¬
tions). tion and interpretation) implied in their pro¬
Each agent, wittingly or unwittingly, willy duction—causes practices and works to be
nilly, is a producer and reproducer of objec¬ immediately intelligible and foreseeable, and
tive meaning. Because his actions and works hence taken for granted. This practical com¬
are the product of a modus operandi of which prehension obviates the "intention" and "in¬
he is not the producer and has no conscious tentional transfer into the Other" dear to the
mastery, they contain an "objective inten¬ phenomenologists, by dispensing, for the or¬
tion", as the Scholastics put it, which always dinary occasions of life, with close analysis
outruns his conscious intentions. The of the nuances of another’s practice and tacit
schemes of thought and expression he has or explicit inquiry ("What do you mean?”)
acquired are the basis for the intentionless into his intentions. Automatic and imper¬
invention of regulated improvisation. End¬ sonal, significant without intending to sig¬
lessly overtaken by his own words, with nify, ordinary practices lend themselves to an
which he maintains a relation of "carry and understanding no less automatic and imper¬
be carried", as Nicolai Hartmann put it, the sonal: the picking up of the objective inten¬
virtuoso finds in the opus operatum new trig¬ tion they express in no way implies "reactiva¬
gers and new supports for the modus oper¬ tion" of the "lived" intention of the agent who
andi from which they arise, so that his dis¬ performs them.4 "Communication of con¬
course continuously feeds off itself like a sciousnesses" presupposes community of
train bringing along its own rails.2 If witti¬ "unconsciouses" (i.e. of linguistic and cul¬
cisms surprise their author no less than their tural competences). The deciphering of the
audience, and impress as much by their objective intention of practices and works
retrospective necessity as by their novelty, the has nothing to do with the "reproduction"
reason is that the trouvaille appears as the (.Nachbildung, as the early Dilthey puts it) of
simple unearthing, at once accidental and ir¬ lived experiences and the reconstitution, un¬
resistible, of a buried possibility. It is because necessary and uncertain, of the personal sin¬
subjects do not, strictly speaking, know what gularities of an "intention" which is not their
they are doing that what they do has more true origin.
meaning than they know. The habitus is the The objective homogenizing of group or
universalizing mediation which causes an in¬ class habitus which results from the homo¬
dividual agents practices, without either ex¬ geneity of the conditions of existence is what
plicit reason or signifying intent, to be none enables practices to be objectively harmo¬
the less "sensible" and "reasonable". That nized without any intentional calculation or
part of practices which remains obscure in conscious reference to a norm and mutually
the eyes of their own producers is the aspect adjusted in the absence of any direct inter¬
by which they are objectively adjusted to the action or, a fortiori, explicit co-ordination.
structures of which the principle of their pro¬ ‘Imagine’, Leibniz suggests, ‘two clocks or
duction is itself the product.3 watches in perfect agreement as to the
One of the fundamental effects of the or¬ time. This may occur in one of three ways.
chestration of habitus is the production of a The first consists in mutual influence; the
commonsense world endowed with the objec¬ second is to appoint a skilful workman to
tivity secured by consensus on the meaning correct them and synchronize them at all
(sens) of practices and the world, in other times; the third is to construct these
clocks with such art and precision that
words the harmonization of agents' experi¬
one can be assured of their subsequent
ences and the continuous reinforcement that
agreement.’5
each of them receives from the expression,
individual or collective (in festivals, for ex¬ So long as, retaining only the first or at a
ample), improvised or programmed (com¬ pinch the second hypothesis, one ignores the
monplaces, sayings), of similar or identical true principle of the conductorless orchestra¬
experiences. The homogeneity of habitus is tion which gives regularity, unity, and sys-
Structures and the Habitus 421
tematicity to the practices of a group or class, linguistic competence and a cultural compe¬
and this even in the absence of any spontane¬ tence and, through these habitus, all the ob¬
ous or externally imposed organization of in¬ jective structures of which they are the prod¬
dividual projects, one is condemned to the uct, structures which are active only when
naive artificialism which recognizes no other embodied in a competence acquired in the
principle unifying a groups or class's ordi¬ course of a particular history (with the differ¬
nary or extraordinary action than the con¬ ent types of bilingualism or pronunciation,
scious co-ordination of a conspiracy.6 If the for example, stemming from different modes
practices of the members of the same group of acquisition).9
or class are more and better harmonized than Thus, when we speak of class habitus, we
the agents know or wish, it is because, as are insisting, against all forms of the occa-
Leibniz puts it, “following only [his] own sionalist illusion which consists in directly
laws", each “nontheless agrees with the relating practices to properties inscribed in
other".7 The habitus is precisely this imma¬ the situation, that “interpersonal" relations
nent law, lex insita, laid down in each agent are never, except in appearance, individual-
by his earliest upbringing, which is the pre¬ to-individual relationships and that the truth
condition not only for the co-ordination of of the interaction is never entirely contained
practices but also for practices of co-ordina¬ in the interaction. This is what social psy¬
tion, since the corrections and adjustments chology and interactionism or ethnometho-
the agents themselves consciously carry out dology forget when, reducing the objective
presuppose their mastery of a common code structure of the relationship between the as¬
and since undertakings of collective mobili¬ sembled individuals to the conjunctural
zation cannot succeed without a minimum of structure of their interaction in a particular
concordance between the habitus of the mo¬ situation and group, they seek to explain
bilizing agents (e.g. prophet, party leader, everything that occurs in an experimental or
etc.) and the dispositions of those whose as¬ observed interaction in terms of the experi¬
pirations and world-view they express. mentally controlled characteristics of the
So it is because they are the product of situation, such as the relative spatial posi¬
dispositions which, being the internalization tions of the participants or the nature of the
of the same objective structures, are objec¬ channels used. In fact it is their present and
tively concerted that the practices of the past positions in the social structure that bio¬
members of the same group or, in a differen¬ logical individuals carry with them, at all
tiated society, the same class are endowed times and in all places, in the form of dispo¬
with an objective meaning that is at once uni¬ sitions which are so many marks of social
tary and systematic, transcending subjective position and hence of the social distance be¬
intentions and conscious projects whether tween objective positions, that is, between
individual or collective.8 To describe the pro¬ social persons conjuncturally brought to¬
cess of objectification and orchestration in gether (in physical space, which is not the
the language of interaction and mutual ad¬ same thing as social space) and correlatively,
justment is to forget that the interaction itself so many reminders of this distance and of the
owes its form to the objective structures conduct required in order to “keep ones dis¬
which have produced the dispositions of the tance" or to manipulate it strategically,
interacting agents and which allot them their whether symbolically or actually, to reduce it
relative positions in the interaction and else¬ (easier for the dominant than for the domi¬
where. Every confrontation between agents nated), increase it, or simply maintain it (by
in fact brings together, in an interaction de¬ not “letting oneself go", not “becoming famil¬
fined by the objective structure of the relation iar", in short, “standing on ones dignity", or
between the groups they belong to (e.g. a boss on the other hand, refusing to “take liberties"
giving orders to a subordinate, colleagues and “put oneself forward", in short “knowing
discussing their pupils, academics taking ones place" and staying there).
part in a symposium), systems of disposi¬ Even those forms of interaction seemingly
tions (carried by “natural persons") such as a most amenable to description in terms of “in-
422 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XV. Further Directions
tentional transfer into the Other", such as tion of similarly shaped problems, and
sympathy, friendship, or love, are dominated thanks to the unceasing corrections of the
(as class homogamy attests), through the results obtained, dialectically produced by
harmony of habitus, that is to say, more pre¬ those results, and on the other hand, an ob¬
cisely, the harmony of ethos and tastes— jective event which exerts its action of condi¬
doubtless sensed in the imperceptible cues of tional stimulation calling for or demanding a
body hexis—by the objective structure of the determinate response, only on those who are
relations between social conditions. The illu¬ disposed to constitute it as such because they
sion of mutual election or predestination are endowed with a determinate type of dis¬
arises from ignorance of the social condi¬ positions (which are amenable to reduplica¬
tions for the harmony of aesthetic tastes or tion and reinforcement by the "awakening of
ethical leanings, which is thereby perceived class consciousness", that is, by the direct or
as evidence of the ineffable affinities which indirect possession of a discourse capable of
spring from it. securing symbolic mastery of the practically
In short, the habitus, the product of his¬ mastered principles of the class habitus).
tory, produces individual and collective prac¬ Without ever being totally co-ordinated,
tices, and hence history, in accordance with since they are the product of "causal series"
the schemes engendered by history. The sys¬ characterized by different structural dura¬
tem of dispositions—a past which survives in tions, the dispositions and the situations
the present and tends to perpetuate itself into which combine synchronically to constitute
the future by making itself present in prac¬ a determinate conjuncture are never wholly
tices structured according to its principles, independent, since they are engendered by
an internal law relaying the continuous exer¬ the objective structures, that is, in the last
cise of the law of external necessities (irre¬ analysis, by the economic bases of the social
ducible to immediate conjunctural con¬ formation in question. The hysteresis of habi¬
straints)—is the principle of the continuity tus, which is inherent in the social conditions
and regularity which objectivism discerns in of the reproduction of the structures in habi¬
the social world without being able to give tus, is doubtless one of the foundations of the
them a rational basis. And it is at the same structural lag between opportunities and the
time the principle of the transformations and dispositions to grasp them which is the cause
regulated revolutions which neither the ex¬ of missed opportunities and, in particular, of
trinsic and instantaneous determinisms of a the frequently observed incapacity to think
mechanistic sociologism nor the purely in¬ historical crises in categories of perception
ternal but equally punctual determination of and thought other than those of the past, al¬
voluntarist or spontaneist subjectivism are beit a revolutionary past.
capable of accounting for. If one ignores the dialectical relationship
It is just as true and just as untrue to say between the objective structures and the cog¬
that collective actions produce the event or nitive and motivating structures which they
that they are its product. The conjuncture produce and which tend to reproduce them,
capable of transforming practices objectively if one forgets that these objective structures
co-ordinated because subordinated to par¬ are themselves products of historical prac¬
tially or wholly identical objective necessi¬ tices and are constantly reproduced and
ties, into collective action (e.g. revolutionary transformed by historical practices whose
action) is constituted in the dialectical rela¬ productive principle is itself the product of
tionship between, on the one hand, a habitus, the structures which it consequently tends to
understood as a system of lasting, transpos- reproduce, then one is condemned to reduce
able dispositions which, integrating past ex¬ the relationship between the different social
periences, functions at every moment as a agencies (instances), treated as "different
matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and ac¬ translations of the same sentence"—in a Spi-
tions and makes possible the achievement of nozist metaphor which contains the truth of
infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogi¬ the objectivist language of "articulation”—to
cal transfers of schemes permitting the solu¬ the logical formula enabling any one of them
Structures and the Habitus 423
to be derived from any other. The unifying between the structure and the dispositions
principle of practices in different domains making up the habitus.
which objectivist analysis would assign to If the debate on the relationship between
separate “sub-systems”, such as matrimonial “culture” and “personality” which dominated
strategies, fertility strategies, or economic a whole era of American anthropology now
choices, is nothing other than the habitus, the seems so artificial and sterile, it is because,
locus of practical realization of the “articula¬ amidst a host of logical and epistemological
tion” of fields which objectivism (from Par¬ fallacies, it was organized around the rela¬
sons to the structuralist readers of Marx) lays tion between two complementary products
out side by side without securing the means of the same realist, substantialist repre¬
of discovering the real principle of the struc¬ sentation of the scientific object. In its most
tural homologies or relations of transforma¬ exaggerated forms, the theory of “basic per¬
tion objectively established between them sonality” tends to define personality as a
(which is not to deny that the structures are miniature replica (obtained by “moulding”)
objectivities irreducible to their manifesta¬ of the “culture”, to be found in all members
tion in the habitus which they produce and of the same society, except deviants. Cora Du
which tend to reproduce them). So long as Bois s celebrated analyses on the Alor Island
one accepts the canonic opposition which, natives provide a very typical example of the
endlessly reappearing in new forms through¬ confusions and contradictions resulting
out the history of social thought, nowadays from the theory that “culture” and personal¬
pits “humanist” against “structuralist” read¬ ity can each be deduced from the other: de¬
ings of Marx, to declare diametrical opposi¬ termined to reconcile the anthropologists
tion to subjectivism is not genuinely to break conclusions, based on the postulate that the
with it, but to fall into the fetishism of social same influences produce the same basic per¬
laws to which objectivism consigns itself sonality, with her own clinical observations
when in establishing between structure and of four subjects who seem to her to be “highly
practice the relation of the virtual to the ac¬ individual characters”, each “moulded by the
tual, of the score to the performance, of es¬ specific factors in his individual fate”, the
sence to existence, it merely substitutes for psychoanalyst who struggles to find individ¬
the creative man of subjectivism a man sub¬ ual incarnations of the basic personality is
jugated to the dead laws of a natural history. condemned to recantations and contradic¬
And how could one underestimate the tions.10 Thus, she can see Mangma as “the
strength of the ideological couple subjectiv¬ most typical” of the four (“his personality
ism/objectivism when one sees that the cri¬ corresponds to the basic personality struc¬
tique of the individual considered as ens real- ture”) after having written: “It is difficult to
issimum only leads to his being made an decide how typical Mangma is. I would ven¬
epiphenomenon of hypostatized structure, ture to say that if he were typical, the society
and that the well-founded assertion of the could not continue to exist.” Ripalda, who is
primacy of objective relations results in prod¬ passive and has a strong super-ego, is “atypi¬
ucts of human action, the structures, being cal”, So is Fantan, who has “the strongest
credited with the power to develop in accord¬ character formation, devoid of inhibitions to¬
ance with their own laws and to determine ward women” (extreme heterosexual inhibi¬
and overdetermine other structures? Just as tion being the rule), and “differs from the
the opposition of language to speech as mere other men as much as a city-slicker differs
execution or even as a preconstructed object from a farmer”. The fourth, Malekala, whose
masks the opposition between the objective biography is typical at every point, is a well-
relations of the language and the dispositions known prophet who tried to start a revivalist
making up linguistic competence, so the op¬ movement, and his personality seems to re¬
position between the structure and the indi¬ semble that of Ripalda, another sorcerer
vidual against whom the structure has to be who, as we have seen, is described as atypi¬
won and endlessly rewon stands in the way cal. All this is capped by the analysts obser¬
of construction of the dialectical relationship vation that “characters such as Mangma, Ri-
424 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XV. Further Directions
palda and Fantan can be found in any soci¬ dividuals who, being the product of the same
ety”. Anthony F. Wallace, from whom this cri¬ objective conditions, are the supports of the
tique is taken,11 is no doubt right in pointing same habitus: social class, understood as a
out that the notion of modal personality has system of objective determinations, must be
the advantage of avoiding the illogicalities re¬ brought into relation not with the individual
sulting from indifference to differences (and or with the “class” as a population, i.e. as an
thus to statistics) usually implicit in recourse aggregate of enumerable, measurable bio¬
to the notion of basic personality. But what logical individuals, but with the class habi¬
might pass for a mere refinement of the mea¬ tus, the system of dispositions (partially)
suring and checking techniques used to test common to all products of the same struc¬
the validity of a theoretical construct tures. Though it is impossible for all mem¬
amounts in fact to the substitution of one bers of the same class (or even two of them)
object for another: a system of hypotheses as to have had the same experiences, in the
to the structure of personality, conceived as a same order, it is certain that each member of
homeostatic system which changes by rein¬ the same class is more likely than any mem¬
terpreting external pressures in accordance ber of another class to have been confronted
with its own logic, is replaced by a simple with the situations most frequent for the
description of the central tendency in the dis¬ members of that class. The objective struc¬
tribution of the values of a variable or rather tures which science apprehends in the form
a combination of variables. Wallace thus of statistical regularities (e.g. employment
comes to the tautological conclusion that in rates, income curves, probabilities of access
a population of Tuscarora Indians, the modal to secondary education, frequency of holi¬
personality type defined by reference to days, etc.) inculcate, through the direct or
twenty-seven variables is to be found in only indirect but always convergent experiences
37 per cent of the subjects studied. The con¬ which give a social environment its physiog¬
struction of a class ethos may, for example, nomy, with its "closed doors”, "dead ends”,
make use of a reading of statistical regulari¬ and limited "prospects”, that "art of assessing
ties treated as indices, without the principle likelihoods”, as Leibniz put it, of anticipating
which unifies and explains these regularities the objective future, in short, the sense of
being reducible to the regularities in which it reality or realities which is perhaps the best-
manifests itself. In short, failing to see in the concealed principle of their efficacy.
notion of '"basic personality” anything other In order to define the relations between
than a way of pointing to a directly observ¬ class, habitus and the organic individuality
able "datum”, i.e. the "personality type” which can never entirely be removed from
shared by the greatest number of members sociological discourse, inasmuch as, being
of a given society, the advocates of this notion given immediately to immediate perception
cannot, in all logic, take issue with those who (intuitus personae), it is also socially desig¬
submit this theory to the test of statistical nated and recognized (name, legal identity,
critique, in the name of the same realist rep¬ etc.) and is defined by a social trajectory
resentation of the scientific object. strictly speaking irreducible to any other, the
The habitus is the product of the work of habitus could be considered as a subjective
inculcation and appropriation necessary in but not individual system of internalized
order for those products of collective history, structures, schemes of perception, concep¬
the objective structures (e.g. of language, tion, and action common to all members of
economy, etc.) to succeed in reproducing the same group or class and constituting the
themselves more or less completely, in the precondition for all objectification and ap¬
form of durable dispositions, in the organ¬ perception: and the objective coordination of
isms (which one can, if one wishes, call indi¬ practices and the sharing of a world-view
viduals) lastingly subjected to the same con¬ could be founded on the perfect impersonal¬
ditionings, and hence placed in the same ma¬ ity and interchangeability of singular prac¬
terial conditions of existence. Therefore soci¬ tices and views. But this would amount to
ology treats as identical all the biological in¬ regarding all the practices or representations
Structures and the Habitus 425
such a style of analysis is one of my main systems. But given the earlier premises I have
aims throughout this book. This bears di¬ set out, this is written in the context of the
rectly upon the sixth point below, since func¬ (bounded) knowledgeability of social actors
tionalist conceptions are by no means con¬ as always and everywhere the medium of the
fined to ‘orthodox functionalism' (Parsons, continuity of institutions.
Merton, etc.) but appear prominently in EIGHTH. According to the theory of
Marxist thought. structuration, the components of social inter¬
SIXTH. The concept of social reproduc¬ action are exhausted neither by its ‘meaning¬
tion, as the preceding points should make ful’ nor its ‘normative’ content. Power is an
clear, is not in and of itself an explanatory one: integral element of all social life as are mean¬
all reproduction is contingent and historical.
ing and norms; this is the significance of the
Understood in any other way the notion of
claim that structure can be analysed as rules
social reproduction easily tends to smuggle
and resources, resources being drawn upon
functionalist suppositions into sociology un¬
in the constitution of power relations. All so¬
der another name.1 In the theory of structu¬
cial interaction involves the use of power, as
ration there is no place for any version of
a necessary implication of the logical connec¬
‘functional explanation': the term ‘function' is
discarded altogether. The knowledge ability tion between human action and transforma¬
of actors is always bounded. by unacknow¬ tive capacity. Power within social systems can
ledged conditions and unintended conse¬ be analysed as relations of autonomy and de¬
quences of action. These can be studied in the pendence between actors in which these ac¬
social sciences without attributing any tele¬ tors draw upon and reproduce structural
ological properties whatsoever to social sys¬ properties of domination.
tems. NINTH. The integration of social systems
SEVENTH. We can identify three ‘layers' can be analysed in terms of the existence of
of temporality involved in the analysis of the ‘systemness’ as social integration and as sys¬
structuration of social systems; each is also tem integration. ‘Integration’ here has to be
an aspect of the contingent character of so¬ treated as ‘reciprocity of practices', not as
cial interaction. Temporality enters into: (a) merely synonymous with either ‘cohesion’ or
the immediate nexus of interaction as contin¬ ‘consensus’. Social integration refers to sys¬
gently ‘brought off' by social actors, the most temness expressed in face-to-face inter¬
elemental form of social reproduction, (b) action, a primary manifestation of time-
the existence of Dasein, as the living human space presence in social organisation. System
organism, the contingency of life in the face integration is concerned with systemness ex¬
of death, and of biological reproduction, and pressed as relations between collectivities,
(c) the long-term reproduction of institutions
and while it therefore presupposes social in¬
across the generations, the contingency of
tegration, the mechanisms governing the lat¬
the transformation/mediation relations im¬
ter cannot necessarily be derived from those
plicated in structural principles of system or¬
involved with the former.
ganisation. Institutions are practices which
TENTH. Contradiction, treated as a struc¬
‘stretch’ over long time-space distances in the
tural feature of social systems, has to be con¬
reproduction of social systems. The struc¬
tural practices of social systems ‘bind' the ceptually separated from conflict, in two
temporality of the duree of the day-to-day life- senses in which the second term may be
world to the longue duree of institutions, in¬ understood: as division of interest between
terpolated in the finite span of existence of actors, or as manifest struggle. Contradiction
the individual human being. Most of what I can be most usefully defined as an opposition
have to say in this book is concerned with the or disjunction between structural principles
level of institutional analysis which metho¬ of a social system, such that the system oper¬
dologically brackets the strategic conduct of ates in negation. That is to say, the operation
situated actors, treating rules and resources of one structural principle presumes another
as chronically reproduced features of social which negates it.
The Time-Space Constitution of Social Systems 429
One of the main objectives in developing . . . Social systems are composed of inter¬
the theory of structuration is to bring tempo¬ actions, regularised as social practices, the
rality into the heart of social theory, breaking most persisting of these being institutions.
with the division between the synchronic and These distinctions and relations are easy
diachronic which has played such a promi¬ enough to formulate in an abstract vein, but
nent part in both functionalist and structu¬ how do they connect with that traditional fo¬
ralist traditions of thought. In Central Prob¬ cus of sociological concern: 'society'? How
lems in Social Theory, I established a prelimi¬ are we to conceptualise ‘a society'?
nary treatment of time-space problems in so¬ We can first of all dispose of a relatively
cial theory, a treatment which I shall elabo¬ trivial issue, of a terminological sort. Some
rate further in what follows. . . . Marxist authors have held that the term 'so¬
I mean to use the concepts of presence- ciety' should not be employed in social analy¬
availability, locale, and region or regionalisa- sis, preferring to substitute for it the term
tion with very general applicability. A 'home' ‘social formation'. Nothing is gained by this
or 'household', for example, may be analysed tactic, however, unless the conceptual con¬
in terms of its time-space constitution by tent of the latter term is made clear. The no¬
means of these notions. A home is typically tion of 'society' has frequently been used in
small-scale locale, with presence-availability sociology in ways which I wish to reject; but
of short distance, and—in modern Western so also has 'social formation'. I shall continue
societies at least—strongly regionalised in¬ to speak of 'society', or more accurately) ‘so¬
ternally by modes of activity. Rooms are usu¬ cieties', in this text, but I want to make my
ally categorised in respect of their charac¬ usage unambiguously distinct from various
teristic usage in time-space, as 'living rooms', others. To put the matter specifically, there
'kitchens', 'bedrooms', etc. Larger-scale lo¬ are three general conceptions of society
cales, such as cities, may be similarly ana¬ which I propose to repudiate: that which por¬
lysed (and, of course, are composed of house¬ trays it as a system of 'functionally related
holds plus other locales). The regionalisation parts'—a view found both in academic soci¬
of cities, it can be argued, under the influence ology and in Marxist writings; that which
of relatively free housing markets is a major sees it as an 'expressive totality', the sort of
phenomenon involved in class structura¬ view taken principally by authors influenced
tion.2 The same may be argued of the differ¬ by Hegel; and that which regards it as a unity
entiation of the 'office' from the 'shop floor' of 'levels' or 'instances', the standpoint most
in industrial organisations, and of course a particularly associated with Althusser and
multiplicity of other examples of time-space his followers.
regionalisation could be offered as illustra¬ There are numerous objections which can
tive. be made against the familiar view that a so¬
The shifting nature of the relations be¬ ciety is a 'functional unity of parts', a view
tween the expansion of interaction over which has nearly always been more or less
space and its contraction over time is obvi¬ closely associated with the presumption that
ously part and parcel of the ‘time-space con¬ society can be compared with a biological
vergence' so prominent in the development organism. Some aspects, or versions, of this
of the contemporary social world. The global type of conception of society have been effec¬
nature of social interaction in the modem era tively criticised by functionalist writers
has gone along with the invention of new me¬ themselves, most notably by R. K. Merton.3
dia reducing the distances involved in pres¬ Merton's account of functionalism remains
ence-availability. The telephone, and tele¬ probably the most sophisticated general dis¬
vision video techniques, do not of course cussion of functional analysis.4 But quite
achieve the full presence of parties to inter¬ apart from the criticisms which can be made
action characteristic of ordinary 'face-to- of any standpoint which depends upon the
face' encounters, but they do permit immedi¬ notion of function, Merton's critique of the
acy of time contact across indefinite spatial 'postulate of the functional unity of society'
distances. fails to replace that postulate with any other
430 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XV. Further Directions
interpretation of how a society might be re¬ all other aspects of society, as (in Althusser's
garded as a unity. His concept of a ‘net bal¬ view) is the case in Marxist versions of the
ance of functional consequences’, to be notion of an ‘expressive totality’. Nor does the
traced out in social analysis as the outcome economic infrastructure simply determine or
of integrative versus disintegrative tenden¬ ‘cause’ the development of superstructures,
cies (‘functions’ versus ‘dysfunctions’), does as in ‘economistic’ versions of Marxism . The
not answer the question of how society is to relation between the levels of a social forma¬
be conceptualised as a totality. tion is expressed instead in terms of what
The idea that society forms an ‘expressive Althusser calls structural or ‘metonymic’ cau¬
totality’ is in some respects quite different sality, which means that ‘the structure is im¬
from the view of society as a functional unity, minent in its effects’.8
but there is one general resemblance between The Althusserian view of the composition
them. In both cases there is a fairly strong of social formations, since it is self-pro-
emphasis that societies (of all types) are uni¬ fessedly developed as a resolution of the
fied by a coherent consensus universel. Each, base/superstructure problem in Marxist
in other words, tends to look to normative thought, raises issues which are not necessar¬
consensus as the main basis of the unity of ily posed by the first two conceptions of soci¬
the totality, society. But the mode in which ety. I shall put aside discussion of whether the
this unity is understood is quite distinct in the differentiation between ‘determinant’ and
two. Those who treat society as an expressive ’dominant’ instances can be sustained, de¬
totally see the ‘whole’ as being connected in pending as it does upon the conception of the
a dialectical relation. Thus Sartre says: ‘A to¬ ‘last instance’. I shall simply assert that I do
tality is defined as a being which, while radi¬ not believe it can be sustained. Althusser’s
cally distinct from the sum of its parts, is conception of the totality is important, as
present in its entirety in one form or another, contrasted to the two former interpretations,
in each of these parts, or through its relation because it regards societies as more fractured
to the relations between all or some of them.’5 or ‘unevenly, formed’ than the others tend to
Although this sort of standpoint has been oc¬ do. But I do not think any of the main con¬
casionally caricatured by Althusser, it has stituents of Althusser’s analysis are ade¬
also been justifiably criticised by him. To quately formulated: his idea of overdetermi-
trace the unity of a society to ‘presence’ nation; his exposition of ‘metonymic causal¬
alone—the expression of the ‘whole’ in the ity'; or the thesis that the chief institutional
‘moment’—fails to generate a model of soci¬ orders of society are the economic, political
ety which adequately recognises the disjunc- and ideological. I shall make no attempt here
tures that exist in real societies, the strains or to consider each of these in an exhaustive
contradictions between different levels of the fashion, but shall consider only the following
\ over-all social system.6 questions: (1) What sense can be given to the
r "According to Althusser, the conception of ‘whole’/‘part’ relation in the structuring of so¬
/ysociety as an expressive totality cannot rec¬ cieties? (2) What gives unity to a society, or
ognise the existence of ‘structures of a real (alternatively expressed) what makes a soci¬
idea of the duality of structure as 'binding' the tives over occupied social space: especially
interplay of absence and presence in the the prerogative of the use of the material en¬
duree of social interaction. This is indeed a vironment to provide sources of food, water
notion which links the moments or instantia¬ and shelter.
tions of social activity to properties of collec¬ (c) An 'institutional clustering' of practices
tivities or social wholes (the structural prop¬ among the participants in the social system,
erties of social systems). The moment/totality sustained through mechanisms of social/sys¬
relation presumed here, however, is not an tem integration. It is very important to em¬
'expressive one': that is to say, the 'part' does phasise again that integration should not be
not in any sense 'contain' the whole, or even equated with a consensual acceptance of a
'express’ the whole. Nor is it a causal one, as 'common value system', though this is not,
Althusser argues. The recursive relation of precluded. A clustering of practices may be
moment and totality in the theory of structu¬ manifest even where there is considerable
ration in fact is best not seen as a part/whole dissensus, or divergence of attitude and be¬
relation at all: the 'parts' of society are regu¬ lief, among the members of the society (in
larised social practices, organised as social terms of both discursive and practical con¬
systems. In analysing point (2) below we have sciousness).
to consider what makes some social systems (d) An over-all awareness, discursive and
'inclusive' enough to be called 'societies'. practical, of belonging to an inclusive com¬
(2) All societies are both social systems and munity with a certain 'identity'. Two elements
also consist of social systems (structured in need stressing here. First, some accentuation
time-space). Of course, if the term 'society' is of the term 'inclusive' is needed. A 'societal
to be defined broadly enough to encompass identity' tends to be an 'outer limit’ of affili¬
both small or 'primitive' communities and ation with others: it may often go wider than,
very large-scale systems, we have to overlook although not necessarily be more strongly felt
some quite profound differences in modes of than, other more restricted group identifica¬
societal integration—differences which I tions. Second, we have once more to avoid
shall be concerned with exploring in some the necessary presumption of consensus:
part later in this book. I am offering here, consciousness that a collectivity has a certain
therefore, a 'minimum' definition of a socie¬ identity, and that one is a member of that
tal totality. Such a definition has to be under¬ collectivity, is not the same as according it
stood against the background of the general normative approval.
account of the structuration of social systems Certain qualifications have to be made
set out previously, and the argument ex¬ about these criteria. First of all, there are very
pressed in point (1) above. few, if any, societies which have ever existed in
A social system may be said to be a society isolation from others; this applies to small-
or a societal totality if it embodies an inter¬ scale 'primitive' societal communities just as
mingling of the following criteria: to modern nation-states, notwithstanding
(a) The association of the system with a the common tendency of anthropological
locale comprising 'social space' or 'territory fieldwork to concentrate attention upon sin¬
of occupation'. Such a locale does not have gle societies. Second, although the study of
to be a fixed, immobile area; still less does it varying types of societies and the relations
necessarily involve the clearly demarcated between societies comprises a prime focus of
boundaries characteristic of modem nation¬ sociological interest, it is obviously by no
states. Thus nomadic societies occupy defi¬ means the sole one. Many other types of
nite, if only diffusely bounded, social spaces structured collectivity, from dyadic associa¬
which they lay claim to, even if only in a tem¬ tions up to large organisations, as well as re¬
porary way. Most nomadic societies actually lations which cut across societal totalities
do not move in a random fashion, but along (such as, in modern times, between trans¬
regular periodic time-space 'paths'. national corporations), can of course be the
(b) As the phrase 'lay claim to' implies, the subject of sociological investigation. Third,
sustaining of a legitimated series of preroga¬ of the four features of the existence of a soci-
432 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XV. Further Directions
ety identified above, I give particular impor¬ I use the term 'ideological' in a different
tance to the 'clustering' of institutions. way to Althusser, not to refer to signification
(3) Althusser distinguishes three levels' in as such, but as a concept linked to the critique
a social formation. As critics have pointed of domination;10 consequently, it does not ap¬
out, it is by no means precisely clear how the pear in the above classificatory scheme. The
term level' (or Instance') is to be understood; dashes linking different sequences of S, D
nor is it evident why the three in question are and L above indicate four different possible
regarded as the basic constituent elements of directions of institutional focus in studying
every form of society. At any rate, I shall not societies. To analyse the institutional forms
speak in this connection of levels', but rather through which signification is organised is to
of types of institution; and the classification analyse symbolic orders and modes of dis¬
of institutions I shall propose departs sub¬ course; such an analysis must, however, also
stantially from Althusser's threefold scheme. consider how symbol orders and modes of
A classification of institutions applicable discourse interconnect with forms of domi¬
to all types of society must be derived, in my nation and legitimation. The same argument
opinion, from an analysis of the structural applies to the other types of institution.
characteristics universally implicated in hu¬ The above scheme indicates that there are
man interaction. I have tried to provide such symbolic, political, economic, and legal/re¬
an analysis in other sources,9 and draw heav¬ pressive institutional elements in all socie¬
ties. This leaves open, of course, room for
ily upon these here. All human interaction
wide variations in the articulation of collec¬
involves the communication of meaning, the
tivities in different forms of society in respect
operation of power, and modes of normative
of institutionalisation. Two aspects of such
sanctioning. These are constitutive of inter¬
articulation can be distinguished (these tend
action. In the production of interaction ac¬
to be merged by Althusser and his followers).
tors draw upon and reproduce correspond¬
One is how far a society contains distinct
ing structural properties of social systems:
spheres of 'specialism' in respect of institu¬
signification, domination and legitimation.
tional orders: differentiated forms of symbolic
The resources constituting structures of order (religion, science, etc.); a differentiated
domination are of two types, which I call au¬ 'polity', 'economy', and legal/repressive appara¬
thorisation and allocation: the former of these tus.11 The second is how modes of institutional
refers to capabilities generating command articulation are organised in terms of overall
over persons, the second command over ob¬ properties of societal reproduction: that is to
jects or material phenomena. These four say, 'structural principles'.
structural features are implicated in the re¬
production of all social systems, and simul¬
Endnotes
taneously supply the basic logic for a classi¬
fication of institutions. Such a logic ex¬
1. See R. W. Connell, 'A Critique of the Althusse-
presses the moment/totality relation, provid¬
rian Approach to Class’, Theory and Society,
ing a basic institutional categorisation which vol. 8, 1979.
at the same time recognises the interrelation
2. Cf. David Harvey, 'The Political Economy of
of structural components within concrete so¬
Urbanisation in Advanced Capitalist Socie¬
cial systems or societies. ties: the Case of the United States', in Gary
This institutional categorisation can be Grappert and Harold M. Rose (eds), The So¬
represented in the following way: cial Economy of Cities (Beverly Hills: Sage,
1975).
S-D-L Symbolic orders/modes of discourse
D(auth)-S-L Political institiutions 3. R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Struc¬
D alloc)-S-L Economic institutions ture (New York: Free Press, 1963); cf. my
L-D-S Law/modes of sanction 'Functionalism: Apres la Lutte’, in Studies in
Social and Political Theory.
where S = signification, D = domination, and 4. See, however, Piotr Sztompka, System and
L = legitimation. Function (New York: Academic Press, 1974).
The Time-Space Constitution of Social Systems 433
5. Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Rea¬ 8. Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading
son (London: New Left Books, 1976) p. 45. It ‘Capital' (London: New Left Books, 1970) p.
is important in the context of Sartre's ideas to 188.
emphasise that he complements this version 9. New Rules of Sociological Method, pp. 104-13;
of the totality with a stress upon 'totalisation'. and Central Problems in Social Theory, pp. 81-
6. Louis Althusser, For Marx (Harmondsworth: 111.
Penguin, 1969) pp. 202-6.
10. Central Problems in Social Theory, ch. 5.
7. Ibid, p. 204.
11. Cf. Georges Balandier, Political Anthropology
(London: Allen Lane, 1970) pp. 23-5 and pas¬
sim. ♦
434 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XV. Further Directions
ies, pleasures, desires, and acts as they relate between 1864 and 1879. One historian esti¬
to personal and public life, and that this en¬ mates that more than 1,000 publications on
tailed constructing sexual (and gender) iden¬ homosexuality appeared in Europe between
tities, producing discourses and cultural rep¬ 1898 and 1908 (Weeks 1985:67).
resentations, enacting state policies and What is striking is the silence in classical
laws, and conducting religious and familial sociological texts regarding these sexual con¬
interventions into personal life. In short, the flicts and knowledges. For all their aspiration
making of embodied sexual selves and codes to theorize the human as social, and to sketch
has been interlaced with the making of the the contours of modernity, the classical
cultural and institutional life of Western so¬ sociologists offered no accounts of the mak¬
cieties. ing of modern bodies and sexualities. Marx
The standard histories link the rise of the analyzed the social reproduction and organi¬
modern social sciences to social modern¬ zation of labor but not the process by which
ization (e.g., industrialism, class conflict, and laborers are physically reproduced. Weber
bureaucracy), but are silent about sexual sketched what he assumed to be the histori¬
(and gender) conflicts. At the very time when cal uniqueness of the modem West; he traced
the social sciences materialized, announcing the rise of modern capitalism, the modem
a social understanding of the human condi¬ state, formal law, modern cities, a culture of
tion, they assumed a natural order linking risk-taking individualism, but had virtually
sex, gender, and sexuality. Such silences can¬ nothing to say concerning the making of the
not be excused on the grounds that “sexual¬ modem regime of sexuality. The core prem¬
ity" had not become a site of public organi¬ ises and conceptual strategies of classical so¬
zation, conflict, and knowledges. In the eight¬ ciology defined the real and important social
eenth and nineteenth centuries, there were facts as the economy, the church, the military,
public struggles focused on the body, desire, formal organizations, social classes, and col¬
pleasure, intimate acts, and their public ex¬ lective representations.
pression—struggles in the family, the church, Perhaps the classical sociologists’ silence
the law, and the realm of knowledges and the on “sexuality" is related to their privileged
state. The womens movement flourished in gender and sexual social position. They took
Europe in the 1780s and 1790s, from the for granted the naturalness and validity of
1840s to the 1860s, and between the 1880s their own gender and sexual experience and
and 1920, the key junctures in the develop¬ status in just the way, as we sociologists be¬
ment of modern sociology. Struggles over the lieve, any individual unconsciously assumes
“women’s question" were connected to public as natural and good (i.e., normal, healthy,
conflicts around what today we would call and right) those aspects of ones life that con¬
“sexuality." Sexual conflicts escalated in in¬ fer privilege and power. Thus, just as the
tensity and gained increasing public atten¬ bourgeoisie assert the naturalness of class in¬
tion between the 1880s and World War I—the equality and of their rule, individuals whose
“breakthrough" period of classical sociology. social identity is that of male and heterosex¬
In Europe and the United States, the body ual do not question the naturalness of a male-
and sexuality were sites of moral and political dominated, normatively heterosexual social
struggle through such issues as divorce, free order. For the classics, who apparently as¬
love, abortion, masturbation, homosexuality, sumed that their gender and sexually privi¬
prostitution, obscentity, and sex education. leged status was natural and deserved, it is
This period experienced the rise of sexology, hardly surprising that they conceived of the
psychoanalysis, and psychiatry (Birken 1988; social as a realm of formal organizations,
Irvine 1990; Weeks 1985). Magnus Hirschfeld state power, economic classes, and cultural
created the Scientific Humanitarian Com¬ meanings. Thus the classics never examined
mittee and Institute for Sex Research in Ger¬ the social formation of modern regimes of
many. Homosexuality became an object of bodies and sexualities. Moreover, their own
knowledge. Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, for exam¬ science of society contributed (unwittingly,
ple, published 12 volumes on homosexuality we like to think) to the making of this regime
436 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XV. Further Directions
whose center is the hetero/homo binary and Edward Bourne, and Margaret Sanger con¬
the heterosexualization of society. nected institutional change to an agenda of
Sociology's silence on “sexuality” was bro¬ sexual and gender change (Marriner 1972;
ken when the volume of public sexual con¬ Simmons 1982; Trimberger 1983). Despite
flicts and discourses was turned so high that the vigorous efforts of vice squads and purity
even sociologists' trained deafness to such movements, pornography flourished and ob¬
sounds was pierced. In early American soci¬ scenity laws were gradually liberalized.
ology alone, isolated and still-faint voices In the first half of this century, sex was put
speaking to the issue of sexuality can be into the public culture of American society in
heard through the first half of the twentieth a manner that sociology could not ignore.
century. Indeed, sociologists could not en¬ Yet, through mid-century, sociologists man¬
tirely avoid addressing this theme in the first aged to do just that to a considerable degree.
few decades of this century. However, the ex¬ The Chicago School studied cab drivers, im¬
tent to which they did so is remarkable! migrants, factory workers, and juvenile de¬
Issues such as municipal reform, union¬ linquents, but had little to say about the do¬
ization, economic concentration, the com¬ main of sexuality. Theorists such as Park,
mercialization of everyday life, race rela¬ Cooley, Thomas, Parsons, and Ogbum had
tions, and the internationalization of politics much to say on urban patterns, the develop¬
were important topics of public debate. At ment of the self, political organization, the
the same time, Americans were gripped by structure of social action, and technological
conflicts that placed the body at the center of
development—all worthwhile topics—but lit¬
contention. The womens movement, which
tle or nothing on the making of sexualized
in the first two decades of this century was
selves and institutions. Finally, while socio¬
closely aligned to socialist and cultural radi¬
logists were surveying all other conceivable
cal politics, emerged as a national move¬
topics, and while a proliferation of sex sur¬
ment. Although the struggle for the right to
veys was stirring public debate (e.g., K.B.
vote was pivotal, no less important were
Davis 1929; Dickinson and Beam 1932; Kin¬
feminist struggles to eliminate the double
sey et al. 1948, 1953), sociologists did not
standard that permitted men sexual expres¬
deploy their empirical techniques to study
sion and pleasure while pressuring women to
conform to Victorian purity norms or suffer human sexuality.1
degradation if erotic desires were claimed. As It took the changes of the 1950s and the
women were demanding erotic equality with public turmoil of the 1960s to make socio¬
men, there were public struggles to liberalize logists begin to take sex seriously. The imme¬
divorce, abortion, and pornography; battles diate postwar years are sometimes perceived
over obscenity, prostitution, and marriage as conservative, but the war, patterns of mo¬
were in the public eye (e.g., D'Emilio and bility, prosperity, and social liberalization
Freedman 1988; Peiss 1986; Seidman 1991; loosened sexual mores. Indicative of changes
Smith-Rosenberg 1990). Sex was being dis¬ in the American culture of the body and sexu¬
cussed everywhere—in magazines, news¬ ality, the 1950s witnessed rock music, the be¬
papers, journals, books, the theater, and the ginnings of the womens movement, the ap¬
courts. In the millions of volumes of sex ad¬ pearance of homophile organizations, and
vice literature published in the early decades the figures of the beatnik and the rebel, for
of this century, there existed a process of the whom social and sexual transgression went
sexualization of love and marriage (Seidman hand in hand. The 1960s made sexual rebel¬
1991). Books such as Theodore Van de Velde's lion into a national public drama. The
Ideal Marriage ([1930] 1950), which con¬ womens movement, gay liberation, lesbian
structed an eroticized body and intimacy, feminism, the counterculture, magazines
sold in the hundreds of thousands. Ameri¬ such as Playboy and manuals such as The Joy
cans were in the first stages of a romance of Sex, and cultural radicals such as Herbert
with Freud and psychoanalysis; social radi¬ Marcuse and Norman O. Brown made sexual
cals such as Max Eastman, Emma Goldman, rebellion central to social change.
Queer-ing Sociology, Sociologizing Queer Theory 437
cieties. Michel Foucault provided the classic Social constructionist perspectives domi¬
statement: nated studies of homosexuality through the
1980s and have been institutionalized in les¬
As defined by ancient civil or canonical bian and gay studies programs in the 1990s.
codes, sodomy was a category of forbid¬
Debates about essentialism (Stein 1992) and
den acts; their perpetrator was nothing
more than the juridical subject of them. the rise, meaning, and changing social forms
The nineteenth-century homosexual be¬ of homosexual identities and communities
came a personage, a past, a case history, a are at the core of lesbian and gay social stud¬
life form. . . . Nothing that went into the ies. Since the late 1980s, however, aspects of
total composition was unaffected by his this constructionist perspective have been
sexuality. It was everywhere present in contested; its own conceptual and political
him: at the root of all his actions . . . be¬ silences and exclusions have been exposed.
cause it was a secret that always gave itself In particular, discourses that sometimes cir¬
away (1980:43). culate under the rubric of queer theory,
Foucault's thesis of the social construction though often impossible to differentiate from
of “the homosexual" found parallel articula¬ constructionist texts, have sought to shift the
tion in the concurrent work of Jonathan debate somewhat away from explaining the
Katz (1976), Carroll Smith-Rosenberg modern homosexual to questions of the op¬
(1975), Randolph Trumbach (1977), and Jef¬ eration of the hetero/homosexual binary,
frey Weeks (1977). from an exclusive preoccupation with homo¬
Foucaults genealogical studies of sexual¬ sexuality to a focus on heterosexuality as a
ity aimed at exposing a whole sexual regime social and political organizing principle, and
as a social and political event. In this regard, from a politics of minority interest to a poli¬
Foucault questioned the political strategy of tics of knowledge and difference (Seidman
1993). What is the social context of the rise
an affirmative lesbian and gay movement on
of queer theory?
the grounds that it unwittingly reproduced
By the end of the 1970s, the gay and les¬
this regime. Foucault's deconstructionist
bian movement had achieved such a level of
message, however, fell on largely deaf ears in
subcultural elaboration and general social
the context of a politics affirming identity
tolerance that a politics of cultural and social
and the prodigious efforts at lesbian and gay
mainstreaming far overshadowed both the
community building in the 1970s. A good
defensive strategies (e.g., the Mattachine So¬
deal of social constructionist studies through
ciety) and the revolutionary politics of the
the early 1980s sought to explain the origin, previous decades. Thus Dennis Altman
social meaning, and changing forms of the (1982), a keen observer of the gay movement
modern homosexual (e.g., D'Emilio 1983; in the 1970s, could speak of the homosexuali-
Faderman 1981; Plummer 1981). Although zation of America. Yet at this very historical
this literature challenged essentialist or uni- moment, events were conspiring to put les¬
versalistic understandings of homosexuality, bian and gay life into crisis.
it was often tied to a politics of the making of A backlash against homosexuality, spear¬
a homosexual minority. Instead of asserting headed by the new right but widely supported
the homosexual as a natural fact made into a by neoconservatives and mainstream Repub¬
political minority by social prejudice, con¬ licans, punctured illusions of a coming era of
structionists traced the social factors that tolerance and sexual pluralism (Adam 1987;
produced a homosexual subject or identity, Patton 1985; Seidman 1992). The AIDS epi¬
which functioned as the foundation for the demic both energized the anti-gay backlash
building of a minority, ethnic-like commu¬ and put lesbians and gay men on the defen¬
nity and politics. Social constructionist stud¬ sive as religious and medicalized models
ies often functioned as legitimations for the which discredited homosexuality were reha¬
organization of lesbian and gay subcultures bilitated in public discourses. Although the
into ethnic-like minorities (Epstein 1987; AIDS crisis also demonstrated the strength of
Seidman 1993).2 established gay institutions, for many lesbi-
440 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XV. Further Directions
ans and gay men it underscored the limits of sexual identity (Ferguson 1989; Phelan 1989;
a politics of minority rights and inclusion. Seidman 1992). The intent of people of color
Both the backlash and the AIDS crisis and of sex rebels was to encourage social dif¬
prompted a renewal of radical activism, of a ferences to surface in gay and lesbian life, but
politics of confrontation, coalition building, one consequence was to raise questions
and the need for a critical theory that would about the very foundations of gay culture and
link gay empowerment to broad institutional politics.
change. Some people in the lesbian and gay com¬
Internal developments similarly prompted munities reacted to the “crisis" by reasserting
a shift in gay theory and politics. Long-sim¬ a natural foundation for homosexuality (e.g.,
mering internal differences erupted around the gay brain) in order to unify homosexuals
the issues of race and sex. By the early 1980s, in the face of a political backlash, to defend
a public culture fashioned by lesbian and gay themselves against attacks prompted by the
people of color registered sharp criticisms of plague, and to overcome growing internal
mainstream gay culture and politics for its discord. Many activists and intellectuals,
marginalization, devaluation, and exclusion however, moved in the opposite direction, af¬
of their experiences, interests, values, and firming a stronger thesis of the social con¬
unique forms of life (e.g., their language, struction of homosexuality, which took the
writing, political perspectives, relationships, form of radical politics of difference. Al¬
and particular modes of oppression). The though people of color and sex rebels pres¬
concept of lesbian and gay identity that sured gay culture in this direction, there ap¬
served as the foundation for building a com¬ peared a new cadre of theorists, influenced
munity and organizing politically was criti¬ profoundly by French poststructuralism and
cized as reflecting a white, middle-class ex¬ Lacanian psychoanalysis, who have signifi¬
perience or standpoint (Anzaldua and Mor- cantly altered the terrain of gay theory and
aga 1983; Beam 1986; Lorde 1984; Moraga politics (e.g., Butler 1990; de Lauretis 1991;
1983; Hemphill 1991). The categories of 'les¬ Doty 1993; Fuss 1991; Sedgwick 1990;
bian" and "gay" were criticized for function¬ Warner 1993). If queer theory speaks to a se¬
ing as disciplining political forces. Simulta¬ rious epistemic shift, I think it is to this refig¬
neously, lesbian feminism was further put ured conceptual field.
into crisis by challenges to its foundational As the contributors to this symposium
concept of sexuality and sexual ethics. At the make clear, queer theory has accrued multi¬
heart of lesbian feminism, especially in the ple meanings, from a merely useful short¬
late 1970s, was an understanding of the dif¬ hand way to speak of gay, lesbian, bisexual,
ference between men and women anchored and transgendered studies to a theoretical
in a spiritualized concept of female sexuality sensibility that pivots on transgression or
and an eroticization of the male that imag¬ permanent rebellion. I take as central to
ined male desire as revealing a logic of mi¬ queer theory its challenge to what has been
sogyny and domination. Being a woman and the dominant foundational concept of both
a lesbian meant exhibiting in ones desires, homophobic and affirmative homosexual
fantasies, and behaviors a lesbian-feminist theory: the assumption of a homosexual sub¬
sexual and social identity. Many lesbians, and ject or identity. I interpret queer theory as
feminists in general, criticized lesbian femi¬ contesting this foundation and therefore the
nism for marking their own erotic and inti¬ very telos of Western homosexual politics.
mate lives as deviant or male-identified (e.g., Modern Western homophobic and gay af¬
Allison 1981; Bright 1984; Califia 1979, 1981; firmative theory has assumed a homosexual
Rubin 1983). In the course of what some de¬ subject. Dispute materialized over its origin
scribe as the feminist “sex wars," a virtual (natural or social), its changing social forms
parade of female and lesbian sexualities (e.g., and roles, its moral meaning, and its politics.
butch-fems, sadomasochists, sensualists of There has been hardly any serious disagree¬
all kinds) entered the public text of lesbian ment regarding the assumption that homo¬
culture, mocking the idea of a unified lesbian sexual theory and politics have as their object
Queer-ing Sociology, Sociologizing Queer Theory 441
“the homosexual” as a stable, unified, and interests are heard and shape gay life and
identifiable agent. Drawing from the critique politics.
of unitary identity politics by people of color Queer theory articulates a related objec¬
and by sex rebels, and from the poststructu- tion to a homosexual theory and politics or¬
ral critique of “representational” models of ganized on the ground of the homosexual
language, queer theorists argue that identi¬ subject: This project reproduces the hetero-
ties are always multiple or at best compos¬ homosexual binary, a code that perpetuates
ites, with an infinite number of ways in which the heterosexualization of society. . . . Mod¬
“identity-components” (e.g., sexual orienta¬ ern Western affirmative homosexual theory
tion, race, class, nationality, gender, age, able¬ may naturalize or normalize the gay subject
ness) can intersect or combine. Any specific or even may register it as an agent of social
identity construction, moreover, is arbitrary, liberation, but it has the effect of consolidat¬
unstable, and exclusionary. Identity con¬ ing heterosexuality and homosexuality as
structions necessarily entail the silencing or master categories of sexual and social iden¬
exclusion of some experiences or forms of tity; it reinforces the modem regime of sexu¬
life. For example, the assertion of a black, ality. Queer theory wishes to challenge the
middle-class, American lesbian identity si¬ regime of sexuality itself—that is, the knowl¬
lences differences in this social category that edges that construct the self as sexual and
relate to religion, regional location, subcultu¬ that assume heterosexuality and homosexu¬
ral identification, relation to feminism, age, ality as categories marking the truth of sexual
or education. Identity constructs are neces¬ selves. The modem system of sexuality orga¬
sarily unstable because they elicit opposition nized around the heterosexual or homosex¬
or indeed produce resistance by those whose ual self is approached as a system of knowl¬
experiences, interests, or forms of life are edge, one that stmctures the institutional and
submerged by the assertion of identity. Fi¬ cultural life of Western societies. In other
nally, rather than viewing affirmations of words, queer theorists view heterosexuality
identity as necessarily liberating, queer theo¬ and homosexuality not simply as identities or
rists figure them as disciplinary and regula¬ social statuses but as categories of knowl¬
tory structures. Identity constructions func¬ edge, a language that frames what we know
tion, if you will, as templates defining selves as bodies, desires, sexualities, identities; this
and behaviors and therefore as excluding a is a normative language that erects moral
range of possible ways to frame ones self, boundaries and political hierarchies. Queer
body, desires, actions, and social relations. theorists shift their focus from an exclusive
Approaching identities as multiple, unsta¬ preoccupation with the oppression and lib¬
ble, and regulatory may suggest to critics the eration of the homosexual subject to an
undermining of gay theory and politics, but analysis of the institutional practices and dis¬
for queer theorists it presents new and pro¬ courses producing sexual knowledges and
ductive possibilities. Although I detect a how they organize social life, with particular
strain of anti-identity politics in some queer attention to the way in which these knowl¬
theory, the aim is not to abandon identity as edges and social practices repress differ¬
a category of knowledge and politics but to ences. In this regard, queer theory is suggest¬
render it permanently open and contestable ing that the study of homosexuality should
as to its meaning and political role. In other not be a study of a minority—the making of
words, decisions about identity categories the lesbian/gay/bisexual/subject—but a study
become pragmatic, related to concerns of si¬ of those knowledges and social practices
tuational advantage, political gain, and con¬ which organize “society” as a whole by sexual-
ceptual utility. The gain of figuring identity izing—heterosexualizing or homosexualiz-
as permanently open as to its meaning and ing—bodies, desires, acts, identities, social
political use, say queer theorists, is that it relations, knowledges, culture, and social in¬
encourages the public surfacing of differ¬ stitutions. Queer theory aspires to transform
ences or a culture where multiple voices and homosexual theory into a general social the-
442 Part Two: The Branches—Contemporary Social Theory ♦ XV. Further Directions
ory or one standpoint from which to analyze has been as gentle and loving as it has been
whole societies. unyielding and provoking.
As of this writing, queer theory and sociol¬
ogy have barely acknowledged one another. Endnotes
Queer theory has largely been the creation of
academics, mostly feminists and mostly hu¬ 1. The index of the American Journal of Sociol¬
manities professors. Sociologists are almost ogy shows that between 1895 and 1965, one
article on homosexuality was printed and 13
invisible in these discussions. . . . This is
articles were listed under the heading "Sex";
somewhat ironic in light of the gesturing of most of these addressed issues of gender,
queer theory towards a general social analy¬ marriage, or lifestyle. The index of the Ameri¬
sis. Moreover, the silence of sociologists is can Sociological Review shows that between
most unfortunate because queer theory has 1936 and 1960, 14 articles were published un¬
been criticized for its textualism or “under¬ der the heading "Sexual Behavior"; most of
developed” concept of the social (e.g., Hen- these did not address issues of sexuality. One
nessy 1993; Seidman forthcoming; Warner journal article commented on the absence of
1993). Sociologists have much to learn from a sociology of sexuality: “The sociology of sex
is quite undeveloped, although sex is a social
queer theory ... as well as the opportunity to
force of the first magnitude. Sociologists have
make a serious contribution. investigated the changing roles of men and
This symposium is intended to bring to an women . . . [and] the sexual aspects of mar¬
end the mutual neglect between queer theo¬ riage. . . . Occasionally a good study on ille¬
rists and sociologists. It asks the following gitimacy or prostitution appears. However,
questions: What is queer theory? How does it when it is stated that a sociology of sex does
speak to sociologists? How does it challenge not exist, I mean that our discipline has not
sociologists to reexamine their paradigms, investigated, in any substantial manner, the
and how might sociology speak to queer the¬ social causes, conditions and consequences
of heterosexual and homosexual activities of
ory? What would a queer theory which seri¬
all types” (Bowman 1949:626). Another socio¬
ously engaged sociology look like? The queer¬
logist, Kingsley Davis (1937, 1939), who later
ing of sociology and the sociologizing of became president of the American Socio¬
queer theory are the twin themes and hopes logical Association, also studied sexuality.
of this symposium. Some 20 years after Bowman lamented the
A final word about risk and courage is in absence of a sociology of sexuality, Edward
order. Alan Sica deserves much credit for Sagarin reiterated this complaint: "Here and
supporting this symposium, the first of its there an investigation, a minor paper, a little
kind in a sociology journal. It was an act of data, particularly in the literature of criminol¬
ogy ... and what at the time was called social
risk and trust on his part; I hope he has not
disorganization . . . marked the totality of sex
been disappointed. I have enormous admira¬
literature in sociology” (1971:384).
tion for the contributors. Aside from myself
2. Placing all innovative homosexual studies in
and Ken Plummer, either they are junior fac¬
the 1970s and 1980s under the rubric of social
ulty members or anticipate entering the job
constructionism and the project of minority
market shortly. Although identifying with a theory simplifies matters. In particular, it sig-
queer standpoint has achieved a level of tol¬ ginalizes a powerful current of lesbian femi¬
erance and perhaps some cultural currency nist-inspired theorizing (e.g., Ferguson 1989;
in the humanities, queer perspectives are MacKinnon 1989; Rich [1980] 1983). Much
barely visible in sociology. These contribu¬ of this work was concerned less with issues of
tors have wagered, perhaps unconsciously essentialism and constructionism or the rise
but surely bravely, that their contesting of of homosexual identities than with analyzing
the social forces creating, maintaining, and
knowledges will be taken on its own terms as
resisting the institution of heterosexuality.
part of the ongoing sociological conversation
Departing from a tendency in constructionist
about the understanding and shape of con¬ studies to approach lesbian and gay theory as
temporary humanity. Finally, I wish to thank separate from feminism, this literature insists
Charles Lemert, whose encouragement of on tracing the link between a system of com¬
this project and whose respect for “the other” pulsive heterosexuality and patterns of male
Queer-ing Sociology, Sociologizing Queer Theory 443
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