Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs

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The Salafis in America: The Rise, Decline and

Prospects for a Sunni Muslim Movement among
African-Americans

Shadee Elmasry

To cite this article: Shadee Elmasry (2010) The Salafis in America: The Rise, Decline and
Prospects for a Sunni Muslim Movement among African-Americans, Journal of Muslim Minority
Affairs, 30:2, 217-236, DOI: 10.1080/13602004.2010.494072

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Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 2010

The Salafis in America: The Rise, Decline and

Prospects for a Sunni Muslim Movement among
African-Americans

SHADEE ELMASRY

Abstract
This paper examines the rise of the first African-American Sunni Muslim group,
the Salafis, who identify with the Wahhabi interpretive tradition. The Salafi move-
ment arrived in America in the early 1990s when the resurgence of Black Con-
sciousness coincided with the recruitment mission undertaken by the University of
Madina in Saudi Arabia. The main element of their program is the revival of
the sunnah of the Prophet by promoting hadith study and the suppression of inno-
vations or bida’. In America, the movement operated through two key communities
in East Orange, New Jersey and in Northern Virginia. By the mid 1990s the
Salafis could claim to be arguably the largest, most vibrant Islamic da‘wah
group in the U.S. However, the ensuing competition and rivalry among the new
leadership and the negative energy borne out of condemning others turned inward
and the movements’ members began excommunicating each other. The backlash
of 9/11 administered a severe blow on “a movement that at one time was the
source of much hope”. However, a decade has since passed and the Salafiyya
has displayed a surprising degree of resiliency. It continues to grow, and lately
has garnered significant attention through the conversion of popular rappers who
converted to Islam and Salafism. The future will tell whether or not the leadership
has learned from the errors of the past.

Introduction
Given that Muslims often believe their particular orientations to be simply “Islam”, dis-
cussing specific theological groups can be rather sensitive and complicated. However, the
complexities surrounding this are removed when a group of Muslims name themselves or
accept an appellation. One such group is the Salafis. While the term Salafi is used to refer
to a range of ideas, individuals, and movements, the one constant throughout all is the
idea of “following the Salaf al-Saalih (the Pious Predecessors)”.1 Those whose focal
point of piety is the preservation of the ways of the Salaf and the avoidance of innovations
would come under the category of “Salafi”. The ascription is a quasi-religious term (just
as Sunni) in that it has its basis in the terminology of the Prophet’s hadith, “I am the best
predecessor (salaf) for you”, (Sahih Muslim, 2450) while not necessarily being an expli-
citly decreed name in the Qur’an or hadith, as “Muslim”, for example, in “He named you
the Muslims” (Qur’an, 22:78).
There are Muslims across the globe who follow the Salaf al-Salih, purify their mono-
theism, avoid innovations, and look towards Saudi Arabia for religious guidance, but
may not accept being “labeled” Salafi. However, the group which we will be discussing
here expressly identify themselves as Salafis. They are a large group, spread across

ISSN 1360-2004 print/ISSN 1469-9591 online/10/020217-20 # 2010 Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs
DOI: 10.1080/13602004.2010.494072
218 Shadee Elmasry

America, Canada, and England, interconnected through conferences, websites, and

blogs. In saying “Salafi” from here on, we intend solely this group.

Literature Review
Until recently, the study and examination of African-Americans and Islam surrounded
Malcolm X, the Nation of Islam, and its offshoot groups, in particular the organization
of W. D. Muhammad, which became a Sunni movement. As such, a look at works related
to the history of African-American Muslims and Islam cover Amina B. Mcloud’s chapter
“The Nation of Islam: Wallace D. Muhammad and the World Community of Islam in
the West”, in her African American Islam;2 Richard Turner’s chapter “Malcolm X and
His Successors: Contemporary Significations of African-American Islam”3; Ernest
Allen Jr.’s “Identity and Destiny: The Formative Views of the Moorish Science
Temple and the Nation of Islam”,4 and Asma Hasan’s chapter “Shahada: Conversion
and Renewal in Prison from Malcolm X to Mike Tyson”.5
When studies on African-American Muslim movements diversify, they cover the
Ahmadiyya (Turner),6 the Ansarullah (Nuruddin),7 and the Sufis (McCloud).8 Cur-
iously, such surveys as African American Islam (McCloud), Islam in the African American
Experience (Turner), and Black Pilgrimage to Islam (Dannin)9 contain no chapters—or
references—to Salafis and their movement. In sum, the influence and visibility of
Salafis is not reflected in academic documentation. Sherman Jackson concludes likewise:
“Everyone in the Muslim community knows, for example, of the influence of Salafism
over the past two decades. Yet, this is hardly reflected in the scholarly literature on
Islam in America”.10
Where Salafis and their ideas are mentioned, it is almost always very brief and some-
times not flattering. Paul Barret of the Wall Street Journal says:
Wahhabi ideas, including hostility to non-Muslims and more moderate
Muslims, have persisted and fused with other strains of fundamentalism.
One such strain, Salafism. . . seeks to reestablish a dominant Islamic empire
based on the pure religion of the Prophet’s era. In a misguided attempt to
promote their Islamic legitimacy, the Saudi petroleum princes and their char-
ities have financed the propagation of Wahhabi and Saudi radicalism through-
out the world. In the United States, a Saudi-underwritten construction boom
has produced scores of mosques and Islamic centers. . . One Saudi charity offi-
cial based in the United States estimated in October 2001 that fully half the
mosques and Islamic schools in the country had received Saudi money.
Saudi religious organizations have funded the training of hundreds maybe
thousands of Muslim clerics and teachers sent to America. And Saudi publish-
ers inundate American mosques with books and pamphlets. Inevitable,
Wahhabi and Salafi influenced fundamentalism has colored the thinking of
some American Muslims. The breadth and degree of this influence are hotly
disputed.11
Dannin mentions “Muslims who speak only of tawhid (the oneness of Allah), ummah,
and other strictly Islamic concepts. These are Arabophiles who identify with the
Wahhabi sect”.12 Sherman Jackson has perhaps the longest section on them, listing
them as the first major “Blackamerican Sunni group”. After describing the group’s
origins and main beliefs, he goes on to state that “Salafism is largely an East Coast
phenomenon. Its influence goes far beyond its numbers however as it’s staunchly
 The Salafis in America 219

‘protestant’ approach resonates with the generality of Blackamerican Muslims”.13 In

terms of jurisprudence, Khaled Abou El Fadl’s Speaking in God’s Name is devoted to dis-
crediting the interpretive method of Wahhabi scholars. He accuses their methodology of
“rely[ing] on an arrogant premise. . .” and “proved to be entirely incoherent”.14
Outside the realm of scholarly research, there is an autobiographical essay about the
Salafi movement written by former insider, Umar Lee. He was part of the movement
in the early 1990s, residing between St. Louis, Missouri and Northern Virginia. The his-
torical leads provided in “The Rise and Fall of the Salafi Da’wah”15 have proved integral
to this research.

Theology and the Intellectual Ethos

The center piece of the Salafi program is their ‘aqida (beliefs), which despite its detrac-
tors, rests on solid theological grounds. It is the theology of the early Muslims as codified
by Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1351) then revived
by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792). Its claim is that traditional Ash‘ari theology had
parted in two major ways. Firstly, the Ash‘aris’ syllogism based system was extra-
Qur’anic, it was not based on the Qur’an or Sunnah. It was inherited from the Greek
Hellenistic tradition, and as such, depended heavily on “arguments for the existence
of God” that were purely rational; they did not rest on any revelation. Secondly, the
Ash‘ari interpretation of the Divine Names and Attributes (al-asma’ wal-sifat) invaded
territory that belonged to God alone by assuming them to be metaphoric. Salafi ‘aqida
on the other hand only interprets such verses through other verses (such as laysa
kamithlihi shay, “there is none other like unto Him”), not through their own intellect.
This paper will not delve into this debate, but suffice it to say that the Salafi movement
is one of knowledge. Its leaders are the scholars, and it shuns political activity. The theol-
ogy was outlined quite clearly for English readers in Al-Hijra magazine in 1983. Syrian
businessman Abdullah Makkawi began circulating this publication on the East Coast
with the title: “Tawhid, Ittiba’, & Tazkiyya” (as explained below). This was a summation
of its principles. Given Makkawi’s ties with al-Albani, the magazine may have been
inspired by al-Albani (d. 1999) and the phrase may have been developed by the Alba-
nian/Syrian hadith scholar himself, known to be amongst the chief Salafı thinkers and
scholars world-wide.
The three Salafi principles:
a. Tawhid, in the motto, represented the aforementioned belief system that
sought to purify the monotheism of the Muslims that had been corrupted
by extra-Qur’anic interpretations, external philosophical structures, talis-
mans, and grave prayers. The primer for this was Muhammad ibn ‘Abd
al-Wahhab’s Kitab al-Tawhid. The work also delves into the various beliefs
and practices that entailed shirk.
b. As for Ittiba‘, this referred to a return to the pure way of the Prophet.
According to the Salafi view, the Muslims allowed cultural practices exces-
sively, which has drowned out that which is purely religious. Further, the
Sufi orders have introduced practices beyond what is called for in the reli-
gion, distracting the Muslims from their obligations. Salafi thought seeks
to re-orient fiqh back to the Prophet and his Companions and away from
taqlid (fidelity to an interpretaive tradition or school of thought). In
both matters of tawhid and ittiba‘, Salafis rely upon Ibn Taymiyya from
220 Shadee Elmasry

the classical era, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab from the latter scholars, and Shaykhs
‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Baz and Nasir al-Din al-Albani from the contemporary
era.
c. Lastly, there is Tazkiyya, and this is the spiritual/ethical component within
Salafi thought. It rests upon al-Bukhari’s Kitab al-Adab, al-Nawawi’s Riyad
al-Salihin, and Ibn Qayyim’s Madarij al-Salikın. Overall, the Salafi curricu-
lum is strong in the realms of ‘aqida, fiqh, and hadith. It’s weakest link is its
tazkiyya segment: because they categorically rejected the Sufis, they denied
themselves the rich literature the latter produced.
In almost every fundamental facet, the Salafi movement departed from Traditionalism,
which was Athari/Ash‘ari/Maturidi in doctrine, taqlidi in fiqh, and Sufi in spirituality and
ethics. But this can be debated. One can easily site numerous examples of traditional
scholars, and especially Sufis, that rejected Ash‘ari and Maturidi thought (Ibn
Qudama’s al-Luma‘ fil I‘tiqad is accepted as a “pure” Salafi creed, for example; Ibn
‘Arabi too was beyond Ash‘arism, having debated them in Fez, commenting about
one theologian, “I do not question his faith, but only his intellect”).16 Some scholars
exercised their own ijtihad independent from the madhhabs in fiqh and announced
their legal independence (al-Suyuti for example),17 and likewise there were many classi-
cal and latter scholars who censured the unorthodox developments within Sufism
(Ahmad Zarruq).18 Even Ibn Taymiyya was willing to credit his disputant al-Ghazali,
where he felt credit was due: “As for the sections of the Ihya that discuss the major vice-
s. . .some of it is acceptable, some is rejected, and some is debatable”.19 But while such
scholars were still within the fold of “the tradition”, the Salafis part drastically from it.
The main reason for this is likely not because of their interpretations, but rather
because of their sweeping personalization of Salafi condemnation, which is displayed
below.
Upon studying the Salafi manner of condemnation, one notes three points: (a) they are
personal, (b) they are categorical, and (c) they translate into the social realms. To give an
example of the personalization of the condemnation, a text on al-Albani’s position of
takfir sites one Abu Zubayr al-‘Azzami as one who disputed with al-Albani on some
points. Al-‘Azzami is mocked as “the young child, Abu Zubair al-Azzaami who sitting
behind his glass screen –day and night – feigns the gown of knowledge but is in reality
a muqallid of his Qutubi cohorts and teachers from the US”.20 Statements such as
these, and there are numerous examples of them, shift the discussion from the issue
towards the person.
Just as critiques spill over from issue of the person, they likewise extend from the
specific point to all other points by that same author. There is no separation of points,
nor is there the determination that all scholars will be correct on some matters and
faulty on others. Furthermore, pigeonholes are established for such individuals and
their followers. Salafi works are filled with categories of deviants. Thus, one who
adopts an idea from Sayyid Qutb becomes a “Qutubi or Qutubist”: “one who subscribes
to the thought and ideology of Qutubism”. All words and ideas that derive from such a
person are deviant. “Qutubism” in turn is “the thought and ideology of Sayyid Qutb as
found in his most popular works such as Milestones, . . . In the Shade of the Quran, Social
Justice, and others”.21 What is to be noted here is how an identity has been given to a
person and his followers, in this case, Sayyid Qutb and those who read him. While
there is some obvious justification for this, such broad and sweeping categorizations
cannot always be accurate. In our example of “Qutubis”, individuals may read and
 The Salafis in America 221

agree with parts of Qutb and disagree with other parts. Still they may read or expose
themselves to Qutb’s thought and neither confirm nor deny it. A vast majority will
simply sympathize with his martyrdom without ever investigating his ideas. Moreover,
the attribution of an idea to a person is hard to support in that one’s identity is
formed through a myriad of factors, not just one position, belief, or ritual. Lastly,
Salafis are inconsistent with this, for Imams al-Nawawi and Ibn Hajar are renowned
in Salafi circles but they were known Ash‘aris. Ibn Taymiyya was an initiate of the
Qadiri Sufi Order.22 In these three cases Salafis do not abandon the whole because of
one part.
The third and last point is that Salafis are encouraged to follow a harsh and severe
approach towards deviants. Evidence of this is taken from classical scholars and how
they rejected any interaction with innovators. Ibn Sirin (d. 110/728), Sufyan al-
Thawri (d. 161/778), and al-Alika’i (d. 418/1027) for example, warned against sitting
with innovators. A good Muslim today, according to Salafi thought, must also
embrace this same sternness with deviants.23 The application of this however, does
not take into consideration the time/space factor, namely that perhaps the methods of
the Fifth Century were applicable then, but do not apply in the Twentieth Century.
Further, the early scholars would not engage in theological discussions with deviants,
but how did they interact with them on other levels, for example, if they were family
members, neighbors, or co-workers? Later in this paper we show how the manifestation
of this approach has resulted in the break up of families and communities.
In sum, the personal demonization of their opponents, the grouping together of all
associated with them, and the harsh interaction that manifests in the practical and
social settings creates an intellectual culture that is very rough. But it is important to
note that these elements are part and parcel of Salafi thought, not mere accidentals
that have accrued over time. This and not the theological positions per se, are likely
the reason why Salafis are so separated from the larger mainstream tradition. The
strict divide between Salafis and non-Salafis is critical in creating a group-culture. On
the other hand, it leads to a very caustic and bitter experience of ostrasization for non-
Salafıs. In many instances, the coarse presentation drowns out the content, and it is
crucial to note that many Salafi opinions on theology and law are very strongly evidenced
and accurate in their conclusions.

History of the Movement in America

The Salafi movement in America was born and fueled out of the meeting between two
distinct social phenomena. The first was the resurgence of Black Consciousness,
triggered in part by Spike Lee’s film X, taken from the The Autobiography of Malcolm
X. The three-hour motion picture, along with increased sales of the Autobiography,
revived the memory of Islam and the Black community. Simultaneously, the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia was giving out full scholarships for young students to study at the Uni-
versity of Madina. Abu Muslima, Imam of the East Orange Islamic Center of America
since 1996, is a classic example of how these two phenomena came together to set in
motion the Salafi da‘wa movement in America:
I grew up in an area that was heavily influence by the late Elijah Muhammad. . .
[The feeling was] ‘if you’re African American, then your true religion is Islam’
. . .My first year in college I read the Autobiography of Malcolm X. . . and that’s
when I actually believed in Islam. . . Upon graduation, there was a delegation
222 Shadee Elmasry

from Saudi Arabia that was recruiting young students to go to Al-Madina to

study Islam. I signed up and was actually accepted and actually went to
Madina to study Islam.24
Dawud Adib relates that, “Every year recruiters were coming and going to every
country”.25 One had to be under the age of twenty-two; the school was likely looking
for influential young minds that could stimulate a youth movement in America for Sal-
afiyya and last a long time. Applicants needed to have some experience with the Arabic
language and have a leaning towards Salafiyya, if not already an appreciation for the per-
spective and a willingness to undergo its curriculum of study. The scholarship meant
accommodations, a food stipend, and an education, in which around two years of inten-
sive Arabic preceded four years at one of the University’s colleges.
The founders of the Salafi movement in America, leaders such as Bilal Philips (the first
Westerner to enroll at the University of Madina), Abdullah Hakim Quick (the first Amer-
ican graduate, 1979),26 Ali al-Tamimi, Dawud Adib, Abu Muslima, and Abu Usama all
share the commonality of having studied in Madina on full scholarships. Abu Muslima
spent three years in the Arabic program, then four in the Kulliyyat al-Da‘wa wa Usul
al-Din.27 However, not all students stayed the full term. Idris Palmer, who now runs
the Al-Huda School in Maryland, stayed two years. Some stayed longer: Khidr Lawrence
for example stayed fifteen years studying at the College of Hadith. He went on to teach
in Madina, and eventually returned to lead the Germantown Masjid in Philadelphia,
one of the largest Salafi communities, consisting of over 300 families.28
By the late 1990s, the floodgates had opened; Madina had a substantial number of
young Americans on scholarship to study. One way the University handled the applicants
and their obtaining the necessary prerequisites was the Institute of Islamic and Arabic
Studies in America (IIASA), also known as the ma‘had. Established in 1988 in
Fairfax, Virginia, the institute was a University of Madina satellite school, where teachers
were supplied from Saudi Arabia to teach and award certificates that were recognized in
Madina. As such, dozens if not hundreds of students arrived at Madina having already
graduated from the rudimentary courses of study. Those who could not travel, could
attain a BA or an MA from the Institute. The degrees, however, were only recognized
by other Saudi universities; the Institute was not an accredited American college.
Of all the Islamic schools of thought and perspectives that were operating in the
United States throughout the 1990s, it was the Salafiyya—by way of the Saudis and
the University of Madina—that had the most funding, and hence established a strong
presence, if not a domination, over the religious discourse. The concepts of tawhid
and the sunnah were reinforced by relentless attacks on shirk and bid‘a, as interpreted
by Imam Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Further, there was no shortage of personnel,
as the Salafi da‘wa thrived on converts derived mainly from East Coast cities, and some
even came through the prison system.

Satellite Communities
The movement operated through two key communities and several “satellite” commu-
nities. The largest Salafi masjid29 during the prime of the da‘wa was the Islamic
Center of America (ICOA) in East Orange, NJ. In 1995, Dawud Adib was the imam
of the masjid, and it was primarily his energy, according to several sources, that
sparked what would become the most active Salafi community in America by many esti-
mations. One individual, who was in New Jersey at the time, says:
 The Salafis in America 223

Dawud Adib was one of the first great American born speakers, at least on the
East Coast. He was tall and handsome and had charisma; people wanted to be
around him, whether it was for a class, or visiting someone ill, taking a road trip
to a conference, or just eating together. It was he who drew the people to East
Orange in the beginning. Most of all, he made people feel like they belonged.
He was definitely the spark.30

For Dawud Adib, his term there ended abruptly and bitterly. The ICOA was placing its
future on the shoulders of a younger Salafi Imam with a degree in Business Adminis-
tration known simply as Abu Muslima. Although Dawud Adib and Abu Muslima
were classmates at the University of Madina, the two did not part cordially. Dawud
Adib resented that he was named during a Friday khutba as being misguided which ulti-
mately led to his "being boycotted" and “cut off ”.31 This very well may have been the
beginning of a future schism involving Adib and Abu Muslima that would eventually
engulf the entire movement. In 1996, Adib began afresh in Kansas City, Missouri.
Neither he nor Abu Muslima were interested in discussing the details of their split.
If Dawud Adib was the spark that ignited religious enthusiasm in East Orange, we can
say that Abu Muslima was the manager who handled that enthusiasm and helped build
the ICOA into a full community center. In addition to its massive prayer hall, the ICOA
established a K-12 school (Madrasatu Ahlis Sunnah), a library, kitchen, eating area,
bookstore, gym, and even guest housing all within one large building, a former armory
that can be seen clearly between Exits 145 and 147 of the Garden State Parkway. One
of the main reasons the ICOA was successful was the economic awareness of community
leaders. Approximately forty community members were employed between the mosque
and the school. Dozens of Muslim families resided in the apartment complexes sur-
rounding the center, and some members were able to open stores selling Salafi related
tapes, clothes, oils (perfumes), and food.
East Orange was populated through a great deal of conversion resulting from the
aggressive da‘wa carried out by Dawud Adib, Abu Muslima, and a third speaker who
became popular through the East Orange platform, Abu Usama al-Dhahabi. At an
April 2008 conference in Somerset, NJ, Imam Zaid Shakir, a traditionalist who was
once loosely associated with the Salafi movement, recalled how he and Abu Muslima
used to “stand on platforms on street corners and speak to the people”. Others recall
how simply walking down the busy streets of Newark or East Orange in thawbs and
caps would inevitably attract someone and a conversation would begin. This sometimes
led to large circles of people gathering to listen. Conversions occurred through inter-
actions such as these. Each convert actually represented two, three, or more converts,
since the new convert would shortly bring in friends and family members. In some
cases, entire families became Muslim. Even when people were turned off from the
message (which also happened in abundance) the awareness that Muslims were in the
area expanded. The same patterns developed outside East Orange in satellite commu-
nities, such as Asbury Park (Masjidul Bayaan), Newark (Masjid Rahmah), Germantown
in Philadelphia (Masjid al-Sunnah An-Nabawiyya), and other predominantly East Coast
cities where Salafı masjids were established.
The second major “hub” of Salafiyya at this time was the Northern Virginia/DC area.
While East Orange was exclusively Salafi and predominantly African-American, North-
ern Virginia consisted of a blend of various Muslim populations (Arab, Somali, Afghani).
Muslim organizations (Discover Islam; World Association of Muslim Youth; Muslim
World League) were attracted to Virginia due to its lower taxes. Furthermore, the
224 Shadee Elmasry

Muslim Brotherhood/Muslim American Society (MAS) and the Saudi Embassy’s Reli-
gious Affairs Office established two major institutions in the area that provided the phys-
ical settings for a great deal of activity, including Salafi da‘wa. The Institute of Islamic
and Arabic Sciences in America (IIASA) was situated only six miles away from the
Dar Al Hijra Islamic Center.

Credible Leadership
As East Orange was led by Abu Muslima and Abu Usama, the Salafis of Northern Vir-
ginia were led by the duo of senior scholar Dr Jaafar Sheikh Idris and the young, Amer-
ican reared intellectual, Dr Ali al-Tamimi.32 These two scholars were of Arabic speaking
backgrounds (Sudan and Iraq respectively) and hence complemented the fresh zeal of
the newly converted Muslims in the movement with their experience, having derived
from Muslim families and societies.33
Both of these scholars had advanced degrees. Dr Idris obtained a PhD in Islamic
Studies from the University of London (1970). He taught ‘aqıda at the Imam Muham-
mad ibn Saud University as well as at Riyadh University and is published in nearly a
dozen academic journals.34 In terms of the Salafi movement, it was he who headed
the IIASA and brought in many of its teachers and lecturers.
Dr Ali al-Tamimi was born in Virginia and attended Georgetown Day School through
the eighth grade. His father was a lawyer at the Iraqi Embassy, and his mother was a PhD
in psychology. Al-Tamimi took two tours of study in Saudi Arabia. One from 1978 to
1981, when he completed High School in Riyadh and learned the rudiments of Islam
from official Saudi authored texts. Then again in 1987, he returned to Saudi Arabia,
where he developed a fond student –teacher relationship with Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azız
bin Baz.
He returned to the United States and re-enrolled in computer science and software
programming at the University of Maryland and The George Washington University.
At George Mason University, he completed a PhD in computational biology, a new
field at the time that applied the procedures of computer science and mathematics
to seek medical solutions. Ali is a published author in this field, specializing in
cancer research. He was employed at a Fortune 100 company and was once awarded
a letter of recognition from the White House following an assignment completed for
them.35
As a result of this leadership, the Salafi da‘wa of the Northern Virginia/DC area
extended into many suburban neighborhoods and mosques, where suburbanite pro-
fessionals of Arabic and South Asian origin could relate to speakers such as Dr’s. Idris
and Tamimi. Teaching took place between the IIASA, the shaykhs’ homes, and two
additional organizations: The Society for the Adherence to the Sunnah (founded by
Dr Idris) and Dar al-Arqam (founded by Dr al-Tamimi). Umar Lee, a convert who
was deeply involved in the Salafi movement, tells of his experience:
In the DC area, they began in the 1990s very small with a small office in DC for
an organization called the Society for the Adherence to the Sunnah. . . Friday
night lectures were given at the home of Jafar Sheikh Idris. The classes at the
home of Sheikh Jaffar created a brotherhood amongst the students that grew
and attracted an extremely diverse group of students from all racial and
economic backgrounds. Eventually these classes would be given by Sheikh
Ali al-Tamimi and at other times by Sheikh Jaffar’s son Yusuf.
 The Salafis in America 225

Under the tenure of Sheikh Ali, the classes would expand tremendously and the
tapes and CD’s of the lectures would be mass produced, sold and spread all
over the US, Canada and the UK. Sheikh Ali became such a popular local
figure that his classes became “the place to be” for the youth of the masjids
throughout the DC-area. People would come who were raised in Muslim
homes. Some were even secular or sufi and generally very far from the Salafi
Dawah.
The attraction of Sheikh Ali was the fact that this was a man who was born and
raised in America, spoke in clear English, and not only had a great knowledge of
the deen but was college educated, an IT professional, a cancer researcher and a
very serious intellectual. This was a man who could take the knowledge of the
Salaf and make it applicable to your everyday life and could speak in a language
we all understood. . . He was not a firebrand and seldom raised his voice, and
sounded like an NPR host most of the time. How he differed from the other
Salafi leaders in the community is that he would—from time to time—
address political issues and acknowledged the world that we live in. The aura
around him and the strength of the brotherhood around Sheikh Ali was unbe-
lievable.36
The communities of East Orange, New Jersey and the Virginia/DC area were the
“Mecca and Medina” of Salafiyya in America. Having two centers alleviated pressure
and spread the responsibility of advancing the Salafi da‘wa.

The Rewards of Scholarship

Despite the diversity of the Northern Virginia wing of the movement, African-American
converts represented the majority of the Salafi populace. The African-American
Muslims, as Christine Kolars puts it “are members of an undeniably marginalized
portion of American society”.37 In the Salafi movement, college educated members
and professionals existed but they were the exception not the rule. The majority of
Salafis came from backgrounds that did not provide consistency or stability in the
realms of education, employment, family/society, and race relations. The Salafi move-
ment was a source of reform for many of its members.
Salafiyya was the first exposure to the world of reading and the practice of studying and
learning for many of its members. As a result, “Salafiyya” became a symbol of intellectual
enlightenment. The Salafi da‘wa comes with a curriculum of books to study; novices are
thus guided in a very detailed way through their first experience as serious students and
for some, future intellectuals. The University of Madina and its scholarships represent a
very handsome reward: those who study well can live abroad for up to seven years, all
expenses paid.
Salafiyya engenders a strong sense of brotherhood, sisterhood, and loyalty. Members
are brought together by a combination of fear and hope. By demonizing their opposition,
and casting non-Salafis as threats to their eternal salvation, members are kept away from
non-Salafis. Moreover, the Salafiyya are the only “saved sect”, and it is upon this belief
that their hope is based. The Salafiyya retains this loyalty by emphasizing the importance
of avoiding non-Salafi material. By barring exposure to non-Salafi material, new
members cannot possibly be tempted to leave the group, since one experience is all
they know. One such example was a pamphlet listing “Scholars You Can Trust”. It
plays on the emotion of fear, namely that these scholars would lead one to perdition.
226 Shadee Elmasry

The researcher asked one young Salafi if he ever read non-Salafi books. “No, and why
should I”, he responded “when I know that they are misguided”.
For many young Salafis (and this can be applied to students of other groups as well),
studying abroad provided an escape from the mundane, sometimes grim realities of life.
Considering that the bulk of Salafis derived from the disenfranchised, sometimes anti-
American sectors of society, the idea of leaving the “land of disbelief” was legitimate.
The idea of traveling to foreign lands with a mission (to study) was enshrouded with a
great deal of excitement. Further, traveling for knowledge was rewarded by the group:
those who actually met the shaykhs and studied with them returned with celebrity
status. Around them, circles would be made and their opinion consulted. Regarding
this, Salafiyya may have been psychologically soothing for the short-term, but in the
long term, it crippled any path to financial independence, let alone wealth, as we shall
cover below.38
The companionship the movement offered was always tied to religious study. The
Salafi da‘wa is purely religious. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s agreement with ibn
Saud stated that the former would tend to religion, while the latter managed the
affairs of state. The Salafis follow this, and thus, their program is politics-free. Salafis
do not engage in the social debates of the day, and since that is the case, they also do
not follow the news. The Salafi culture was also a “Salafi bubble”. While this can
easily limit the movement in many ways, this closing off of the media leads to the devel-
opment of peace of mind as one would not hear of any news or events that would be
particularly disturbing.
Besides simply cutting themselves off, everything worldly is supplanted by an ambi-
tious curriculum of theological study, namely that of tawhid. The idea of emphasizing
tawhid serves the larger function of eliminating distractions and focusing upon the one
single source of power that deserves a believer’s undivided attention. Tawhid offers an
explanation for a very complex world. A strong consciousness of Allah, as the Cause
of all things Who created the world as a test of faith, relieves and explains the strains
of poverty and racism that confront African-Americans daily. The oft-mention of a
higher authority through the reading and study of Allah’s Lordship, Divinity, Names
and Attributes diminishes the worth and importance of any worldly superiors who
may be oppressive or antagonistic. The study of tawhid, in sum, has a spiritually thera-
peutic function for a crushed psyche.

The Price of Scholarship

While the “study bubble” may have been a source of emotional and spiritual healing, it
was not tempered with any worldly concerns and this eventually reinforced the culture of
unemployment and poverty. This phenomenon is exacerbated by the leadership. At an
April 2008 Salafi conference in New Jersey, none of the five main speakers had pro-
fessional careers. They were itinerant imams. One such imam, for example, never com-
pleted college, and has moved three or more times since 1995, making it nearly
impossible for him to establish himself in any one specific location. The indirect
message reflected from such a leadership is that one need not pursue a professional
career to succeed in Salafi culture.
The leadership routinely and consistently promotes studying abroad. Naturally, trips
of one or two years in Tanta, Egypt or Damaj, Yemen, or five and six year tours in
Madina, would disrupt any systematic advancement of a secular education or a career.
Nonetheless, traveling to study and going to college are not mutually exclusive. As
 The Salafis in America 227

Umar Lee put it, “We would just find an odd job here or there to support ourselves and
our families and return to our Salafi world”. (Granted, attaining degrees and having
careers are not directly religious matters, but any movement that wishes to be influential
in the West, will need a strong middle class of professionals.)
While a search for a fatwa on attending secular colleges yielded no results (no formal
prohibition from the scholars), it goes without saying that Salafis shun such non-Islamic
institutions. Because Western universities support Darwinism and atheism, and further
promote a culture of gender-mingling and alcohol, the researcher found that Salafis
highly discourage their attendance. One exception however was for the study of the
sciences. From conversations with Salafis, there was little objection towards computer
science, engineering, or even medicine, most likely because these matters do not infringe
upon ‘aqida. Still, the general trend is to go without college. This by itself closes the door
on a Salafi becoming a professional in any field. Salafis that are professionals are likely to
have attended school and climbed the ranks before discovering Salafiyya and joining it.
“Brothers like me”, Umar Lee says, “made it their full-time jobs ‘being Muslim’”.
Further in the realm of social establishment, or the lack thereof, the Salafiyya pro-
motes the hijra, i.e., the emigration away from the non-Islamic West to more pure
places such as Yemen, Egypt, or if extremely fortunate, Makka or Madina. On
SMatch.net, a Salafi matrimonial site, one of the mandatory questions on the personal
profile page reads “When do you plan on making the hijra?”39 Logically then, if “depart-
ing” is a recurrent theme throughout the movement, then the idea of establishing oneself
financially has little to no relevance. In fact it would bar one from advancing through the
movement’s ranks.

Providing a Refuge
As much as it offered religion, the Salafi movement provided its members with a refuge of
like-minded companions from a society in which they were disadvantaged outsiders.
Even among the Muslims, African-Americans did not integrate into immigrant commu-
nities due to a hardening of habits that occurred on both sides. One cannot discount a
lingering racism against blacks imported from the East. Thus, Salafis founded their
own social centers, based on the store-front “Salafi masjids”. A “Salafi masjid”, accord-
ing to Dawud Adib, is “one in which Salafis control the mimbar”. Anyone may attend,
but the board must be comprised of Salafis who supply the masjid with Salafi books
and a Salafi imam who gives the Friday khutba and other classes. In most cases, a
halal restaurant is located walking distance from the masjid, as in Masjid al-Da‘wah
ila al-Tawheed in Baltimore City, which neighbors the Lahore Kabob House, an Asian
halal restaurant. In Indianapolis, Casablanca Gyros, a Middle Eastern halal restaurant,
is only two miles south of the Al-Haqq Foundation, a registered Salafi masjid. In the case
of East Orange, there is a kitchen and eating area within the same building as the prayer
hall.
Salafi masjids can be found in urban areas, and are hence accessible by foot or public
transport. Inside the masjid, the main activities are the five daily prayers and the circles of
knowledge or study circles, in which brothers and sisters read scripture and relevant lit-
erature or listen to a lecture (there are plenty of junior teachers due to the free scholar-
ships given by the University of Madina). All these conveniences amount to creating a
culture of assembly: Salafis are always getting together for something, be it at the
masjid for obligatory prayers, at the halal restaurant for lunch or dinner, or at the
masjid again for classes. Add to this the various conferences to which Salafis often
228 Shadee Elmasry

carpool. The constant assembly with like minded individuals is a sure way to establish
friendships and bonds. Marriages often took place through these networks. They are
also ways of reinforcing the curriculum of study.
Zabihah.com is a popular web site that lists mosques along with their theological
orientation (Traditional, Salafi, or Shi‘a). This site has 69 mosques40 registered as
“Salafi”, including one in Alaska—the Ar-Rashid Masjid, located on Arctic Boulevard
in Anchorage. Sites like these, which supply addresses and telephone numbers, allow
Salafis to search for the masjid of their choice wherever they are traveling. When they
arrive, they are sure to be greeted by like-minded brothers or sisters who have had
similar experiences in their past.

Making the Grade

In addition to the shared experience, the Salafis have developed their own fashion and
dressing style and appearance. Some of these observances are based on hadiths, while
others are not. The untrimmed beard is the most characteristic feature. Some
Muslims hold the beard to be an additional non-obligatory deed that symbolizes a
man’s masculinity and religion. Salafis (among other schools of thought) hold the
beard to be an obligation. Shaving it, or even shaving the cheeks, says Shaykh Bin
Baz, is not permissible given the hadith, “Trim your mustache and grow your beards”
(Muslim, 5892). The beard (lihya), he continues, is that hair which grows on the
cheek and the chin, according to Lisan al-‘Arab and al-Qamus al-Muhit.41 Salafis
shorten their pants and thawbs, wear a cap known as a kufi, and carry the miswak, the
tooth stick used during the time of the Prophet. While these items are common
enough among all Muslims, Salafis distinguish themselves with extra short pants (high
waters), and logo-free shirts and jackets. Interestingly, Salafis eschew the turban, for
which there are many hadıths, and opt for the ghutra, a white or red/white checkered
cloth that is draped over the head, for which there are no hadiths. During the late
1990s, a unique trend developed of Salafis in extra short thawbs with pricey Nike Air
or Adidas running sneakers, a unique blend of Salafiyya and American culture.
There are other ways in which Salafis distinguished themselves. The kunya, or nick-
name that specified someone by referring to their son or daughter, as in “Abu” (father
of), gained acceptance among Salafis, since this was used during the time of early
Muslims. Again, the kunya is universal, but it is far more pronounced amongst Salafis
than other communities. Thus, Dawud Adib becomes Aboo Tasneem Dawud Adib.
As the movement grew, the naming became more detailed, making use of the origin,
as in Aboo Hafsah Kashif Khan al-Baakistanee (of Pakistan), current Imam of Masjidul
Bayaan in Asbury Park. Again the names got longer and even more detailed when the
addition of the father was introduced using “ibn” (son of) as in Abu’l-Abbaas Moosaa
ibn John Richardson. We now know that John begot Moosaa, and Moosaa begot Abbaas.
Salafis utilize a unique system of transliteration too, preferring double letters in places
of the Arabic alif and the ya and waw in their vowel forms, as in “Aboo” rather than
“Abu”, “Saalih” rather than “Salih”, and “hadeeth” not “hadith”. All of these seemingly
inconsequential details become ways by which Salafis can express their loyalties, identify
one another, and feel part of a larger, exclusive group.
The combination of religious study and consistent companionship are probably the
factors that alleviated many of the personal, social, and emotional tensions Salafis
faced before they were involved with the movement. “Before I got involved”, said one
former Salafi, “I was confused and my heart was an abode of anger and hatred
 The Salafis in America 229

towards society. . . with the brothers (the Salafis) I had a new family. The fire inside me
was extinguished”.42 Umar Lee, further tells of the great sense of hope that permeated
the brotherhood and sisterhood that the Salafi movement provided:
One of the things that I want to keep emphasizing is the great hope and excite-
ment amongst the brothers. . . Another thing everyone needs to understand is
that we believed with our very beings that this was going to be the answer to
the world’s problems. This way was the right way for everyone. We had discov-
ered the roadmap to utopia. If only we could get everyone to realize it. This was
behind the zeal (and in many cases over zeal) of many of the brothers. They had
found gold and desperately wanted this good thing for everyone. . . we were
largely. . . idealistic.
The intense study of religion, combined with the companionship supplied through the
classes and the masjid allowed for many Salafis to escape their personal or social chal-
lenges. For others, it was something meaningful to fill a void. Sociologically, the move-
ment was a subculture that supplanted a closed-door dominant culture that offered only
a miniscule chance of upward mobility.
As positive as this may sound, however, any tightly knit, clearly delineated subculture
that closes itself off from the larger society is dangerously vulnerable to a quick and
speedy collapse. That is to say that such an arrangement can easily mutate into a
cult or a groupthink. It deprives itself from external criticisms that may be beneficial,
and it settles upon a limited set of themes (study circles on ‘aqida in this case),
lacking the diversity needed for long-term viability. This collapse did indeed take
place towards the late 1990s when the energy directed towards the takfir (excommuni-
cation) and tabdi‘ (declaration of heresy) of other Muslims turned inward, and the
Salafis began excommunicating one another. What exists now in the way of the Salafi
da‘wa are the remains and remnants of the drama that unfolded between roughly
1996 and 2001.

The Dénouement
It is often the case that as soon as a movement attains comfort, it’s dénouement com-
mences. Towards the mid-1990s, the Salafis’ numbers swelled incredibly, in part due
to the new technology, the Internet. In order to ensure that their new members were
not lost to other groups, there was an increase in the study of deviated sects. Soon,
this energy turned inward and a campaign was initiated that demanded each individual
declare himself Salafi. This would “purify the ranks”. Previously, Salafis had simply
accepted the appellation, whereas now, they had to actively announce it. The idea of
doing this was taken from al-Albani overseas, and translated as a pillar of one’s Islam
by Dawud Adib in the United States. In an article on the subject, al-Albani affirms
that in this day and age, with all of the sects and false doctrines that exist, it is simply
insufficient to call oneself a “Muslim”. Not even a “Muslim following the Book and
the Sunna” is sufficient, as this leaves open the door of interpretation. Thus, one must
declare himself to be a “Muslim on the Book and the Sunna with the understanding
of the Salaf al-Salih”. Al-Albani continues and concludes: “What is your view that we
shorten this phrase in the language, since the best words are those that are few but indi-
cate the desired intent, so we just say, ‘Salafi’?”43
Thus, the Salafis’ energy became devoted to this matter of obtaining a declaration of
Salafiyya from those who regularly attended Salafi events. Previously, the term Salafi was
230 Shadee Elmasry

used regularly, and some members said they were Salafi, but there was never an official
decree demanding it. Furthermore, the aggressiveness and harshness with which this was
demanded likely repelled members from the idea itself. What ensued was tantamount to
an inquisition.
It is amazing that a group which limited itself to only that which was directly in the
Qur’an and hadith would one day expend so much energy on a matter that was arbitrary
at best and nowhere to be found as a pious deed in the Qur’an or the Sunnah. While the
Sunnah called for a declaration of faith in Allah and His Prophet, Salafis now called for a
declaration of Salafiyya. As the former is called the shahada, the latter came to be called a
bayan (clarification).
“On lists” and “off lists” were made and spread through email. Those on the “on list”
had given their bayan, while those on the “off list” had not. “Boycott lists” developed
next; those who held off from declaring their Salafiyya and would be included in the
dreaded boycott:
This meant that no one would give you the salaam, nor speak to you, your wife
or even your children. That being the case, this created a lot of problems inside
homes as the wife would not appreciate being boycotted by her friends because
her husband is not ‘taking the correct position’ or vice versa.44
Ideas such as these could never acquire much traction unless their proponents worked
together through institutions and were led by a popular figure. And this occurred
through Salafi Publications, the Qur’an and Sunnah Society, and The Reign of
Islamic Da’wah, also known as TROID. These three organizations gathered and pub-
lished articles on the importance of naming oneself Salafi, and the reasons to boycott
those who refused to do so. The main personality who drove this idea through and
spoke about it in the mosques was Dawud Adib.
Scholars like Ali al-Tamimi, Jaafar Sheikh Idris, Mohammed Sayyid Adly, Abu
Muslima, and Abu Usama who were all ardent advocates of Salafiyya and always ident-
ified with the Salafiyya without such rigid delineations, were boycotted. The entire affair
climaxed when Abu Muslima, Mohammed Sayyid Adly and other Salafi leaders called
for a mass meeting in East Orange, New Jersey, to elect an amir who could lead the main-
stream Salafis through the trial of divisiveness (hizbiyya) they were facing. The meeting
occurred on the scheduled date, but it was easily derailed by Adib, who organized his
own conference a short distance from East Orange. With the populace divided, no
amir was assigned, and the splintering of the Salafis continued. Recall that Dawud
Adib was removed from East Orange rather abruptly upon the commencement of Abu
Muslima’s reign and denounced as a “deviant” on the pulpit. It is hard not to assume
that Adib was not avenging his ousting from East Orange by pulling as many
members as he could away from Abu Muslima and towards his own leadership. The
Salafi da‘wa was hijacked and broken for good. According to Umar Lee, a “new
order” had risen.
The longer the civil war continued, the less time was spent doing da‘wa and spread-
ing their original teachings. Naturally, a decline in growth came about. What were
once large conferences were divided into many small conferences. The fraternity
that bonded Salafis was replaced with suspicion and malice. The massive congrega-
tions at East Orange were slowly reduced, to the point that in July 2008, the
usually large Friday Congregational Prayer was attended by only four rows, whereas
in previous years the mosque would consist of over fifteen rows for the pre-dawn,
fajr, prayer.
 The Salafis in America 231

The “New Salafi da‘wa”, as some from the early 1990s have come to call it, is criticized
for being “empty”, “nothing but a shell of what it used to be”, and “dead”. Another
observer writes:
If there is anyone that has any doubt that the hizb known as salafi dawah in
America has fallen, go take a look inside of the masajid [at the people] that
are still hanging on by a few threads. Go speak to them. Look at the type of
people who are there and who are being recruited. Look at their women and
their conditions, look at their babies because you probably won’t even find
any born Muslims in their early 20’s still involved in great numbers as they
were in the past. Ask them to recite something from the Qur’an and see how
that goes. Ask basic aqeedah questions and see if you don’t get the same recycled
nonsense that anyone can google up from their sites instead of real adilaa. And
yet these very same people can talk to you till your ears bleed about who isn’t
salafi or why the overhead abaya is correct and the jilbab isn’t. If that doesn’t
alarm you to the truth of its failed state, it may be because you are still one
of them.45
Salafi masjids no longer attract the numbers they used to, and some have even closed. Umar
Lee’s posts such as “The Rise and Fall of the Salafi Da’waHH” on www.umarlee.com
inspired many others to do the same, creating a compilation of narratives on what took
place during those years. Most of the posts were “off list” Salafis or former Salafis that
describe the pain they went through, “having to watch something that was once so
beautiful, crash and destroy so many hopes and break so many bonds”.

The Issue of Multiple Marriages

The bayan controversy that pulled apart Salafis unfolded over a couple of years. During
these years, there was another negative element developing under the surface, this time
affecting individuals and households: it was the issue of multiple marriages. Testimonials
continuously point towards the abuse and manipulation of young Salafi sisters on the
part of popular speakers.
Lee reports that some Salafi speakers married and divorced up to twenty times, and
that it was not difficult to find a brother in the community who followed their foot-
steps, marrying and divorcing ten times. Others sought multiple wives. In Maryland,
an Egyptian mother complained of a famous Salafi speaker whom her daughter con-
tacted for help regarding her (the daughter’s) troubled marriage. In due time, the
emails led to phone calls. Several months later, the mother received news that the daugh-
ter had left her husband and married the speaker she had initially contacted for help.
The speakers on the Salafi circuit were popular figures, and many women in the move-
ment were awe-struck by them. This resulted in “hit-and-run” marriages, in which a
speaker would travel to a city for a weekend of talks and leave it having married and con-
summated the marriage with a sister from the audience. He would later send a message
that the sister was divorced. One young Muslim woman who told her story on Lee’s site
says:
It was when the whole issue of marriage started being shoved at us, left and
right, when I think I first started to worry. I was personally being hounded
by several duaat and lesser than them privately in very unIslamic ways! If I
called the masjid to seek clarification on an Islamic issue somehow the talk
232 Shadee Elmasry

turned to ‘why you playing hard to get’? I overlooked it because well every com-
munity has a few bad apples, right?
It is a simple case of abuse of power. If these speakers were the examples of the rank and
file members, then we can assume that many such marriage abuses occurred at the local
levels as well. The destruction of Salafi families was doubtless a cause of the movement’s
downfall.

Comparing Cults
The cultish nature that grew on the Salafis and the way in which the movement collapsed
and negatively affected the lives of many people, are elements that can be observed in
many other Islamic and non-Islamic groups. Rigidity, isolationism, and unusual mar-
riage patterns are also the attributes of the Murabitun movement, which took off in
the late 1970s. Although this comparison may raise some eye-brows due to their theolo-
gical and demographic differences, it shall be shown that sociologically, they are quite
similar. Founded by Scottish convert Ian Dallas, the Murabitun sought to re-create
the example of Madina. Members inter-married and lived in close proximity to one
another in Norwich, England. Slowly, the doctrines (exclusively Malikı fiqh, Darqawı
Sufism, and the return of the gold dinar) became more and more specific and interaction
with non-Murabitun became a rarity for members. When the group’s leader became
involved in many marriages, the members as well began to divorce and marry with
ease, creating an odd environment that discomforted many, who left the movement,
much as many Salafis left their movement.
Yet another cult example is the Naqshabandis of London who limited themselves to
one source of authority and slowly developed their own style of dress (pointy green
hats, large turbans, Turkish jubbas, and flat shoes), manners, and religious activities
that made them incompatible with the greater society and even with the mainstream
Muslims. Author Ziauddin Sardar observes how both the Murabitun and the Naqsha-
bandis swiftly gathered large followings, only to lose them to disillusionment and finan-
cial ruin after only a decade or two.46
The crude way in which the Salafis collapsed has more to do with human nature than it
does with ideology, class, and race. The Murabitun and Salafis, for example, could not
be further apart in orientation and in membership. The Murabitun were hip. They
attracted educated, well to do, white artists, musicians, and professionals from
London and California, a very different stock than the hardened, impoverished inner-
city African-Americans that came to the Salafi movement. It would seem from this com-
parison that movements do not rise and fall due to their ideology or the elite nature of
their membership, but rather due to how these ideas are used and the membership
manipulated by the leadership.
One common thread between the Salafis, Murabitun, and Naqshabandis is that they
all based their movements on converts who dissociated themselves from their former
lives to create new lives with the new group. In doing so, they shed the protective and
balancing garb of family and became vulnerable to manipulation.
It may be thought that as the Salafis, Murabitun, and Naqshabandis enter their second
generation, their rigidity, isolationism, and group thinking will be undone by the inter-
action of their youth with other Muslim communities, especially as the Muslim popu-
lation in the West expands. However, this may not necessarily be the case, given the
example of Hassidic Jewry in America.
 The Salafis in America 233

Hassidic Jewry in America is currently in its third and fourth generation, and yet it per-
severes. The various Hassidic assemblies exist in communities based on marriage, much
like the three Islamic groups we have mentioned. Hassids shun television, newspapers,
universities, and American culture in general. They have strict dress codes and follow
a strict code of law, as interpreted by the chief Rabbi of the respective Hassidic order.
Some orders live on large rural properties where they are able to elect their own
mayor and make their own laws. In these cases, children are raised not seeing any
non-Hassids at all. This doubtlessly makes for an easier transmission of the way of
life. But others such as the Lubovitch live in Brooklyn, where they are constantly
seeing non-Hassids, and this still does not hinder their transmission of their tradition.
Thus, physical separation is not always necessary for the movements’ rigidity and isola-
tionism to be undone. There are even non-religious communities where cult-like features
manifest—the Scientologists, inner-city gangs, bikers, and the armed militias of the Mid-
West are good examples. Religion, thus, is not the only vehicle through which the human
tendency towards cultification manifests itself.

Lessons to be Learned
The early Islamic movements in America gained prominence by default, by the mere fact
that there was so little activity in the realm of Islamic scholarship and da‘wa. Given the
void in Muslim leadership, one, two, or four years of Islamic education earned one
enough legitimacy to serve as religious leaders and guides. The Salafi da‘wa, likely
more than any other movement, took advantage of this void, and with Saudi funding
enough young members were able to study and supply Salafiyya with a steady source
of leadership manpower. With no central authority or official leader, the movement
sprawled out across the country, mostly through the unorganized activism of its rank
and file members. The movement peaked in the mid-1990s, then crashed in a noticeably
ugly phase of power abuse and schism that called into question issues of group think and
the cult mentality. What is the state of Salafiyya now, and what forecasts can be made
about its future? Further, what lessons can other Muslim movements gain from highly
visible and previously ever-present Salafi movement?
When the Saudi ministers of religious affairs targeted young converts in America to
serve as the future’s indigenous Salafi leaders, they sponsored them and educated
them, and thereby succeeded in planting the seed of Salafi ideology in America. From
the short history of the movement they sponsored, it is evident that the Saudi ‘ulama’
and administrators overlooked a number of pre-requisites vital to the makeup of
imams in America that we can cite here.
Leadership training is the first of these pre-requisites. Within about a decade from the
time the Saudis first began recruiting students, severe abuses of power were being com-
mitted and power struggles ensued. Nor were these youths educated in inter-madhhab
dialogue, i.e., how to co-exist with Muslims of differing persuasions and opinions, some-
thing specifically needed in the open frontier of the West where a divergence of Islamic
tendencies and ideas were free to sprout. This is the second neglected pre-requisite.
Quite to the contrary, Salafis were encouraged to disparage and lambaste opposing
Islamic views, schools of thought, and scholars. In not learning how to differ with
others, they eventually failed to differ amongst themselves without tearing apart their
own movement. When dispute arose, no restraint was observed: husbands divorced
wives, and siblings cut off siblings. Thirdly and lastly, the Salafi leadership was a scho-
lastic one in a land of institutions. In due time, those movements that engaged the
234 Shadee Elmasry

society around them and established registered institutions based on professionalism and
transparency, surpassed the Salafis in influence and even numbers, two realms to which
the latter formerly claimed dominance. The Salafi movement was never institutionalized
in a way that could attract Muslims from diverse backgrounds (i.e., outside the inner-
cities) and demand the recognition of American civic establishments. These three
factors narrowed the opportunities of success for a movement that at one point was out-
stripping all other da‘wa efforts by a fairly large margin. They are also the three training
points which future efforts cannot afford to neglect.
Just as the Salafis’ fall and the reasons for their fall are clear, likewise the contribution
of the movement to Islam in America is clear. The number of converts this movement
brought into the fold cannot be counted. The number of marriages contracted and
the number of children born (thereby growing the Muslim population) out of this move-
ment, likewise are innumerable. While there is no doubt that many individuals and
families were severely hurt when the movement imploded, this fact cannot be the only
measure by which to judge the movement’s contribution to Islam. The appropriate ques-
tion to ask is, “how many Salafis or former Salafis left Islam?” Doubtless, there were
those who did, but as a general rule, when the movement imploded, there is no record
of any mass exodus out of the fold of Islam. Further, while the movement had its idio-
syncrasies and other extreme views, such as limiting knowledge to the imams of Saudi
Arabia; the exceedingly high pants and conspicuous style of dressing; or the various
name formulas, these are also negligible in the larger picture of Islam. Salafis seek to
practice the five pillars of worship, teach their children to believe in the six pillars of
faith, and enjoin their communities against the seven major sins. In this very broad
sense, and considering that many of its members were previously living lives of gangs,
drugs, and even violent crime, the movement can only be deemed a major success. In
short, being part of a marginalized Muslim community is a step forward, when one
was previously not Muslim at all.

Conclusion
Thus far, we have been examining the Salafi movement as an object of history, looking at
its various phases throughout the 1990s, mainly. The movement, however, is not dead.
Salafis are still active, despite being in the shadows of more mainstream organizations
and da‘wa efforts such as those by Zaytuna, MAS, Al-Maghrib, ISNA, and ICNA.
From interviews and visits to Salafi masjids and recent conferences, it appears that
enough time has elapsed since the years of the fitna, to usher in a new phase of
renewal and activism. Abdul-Haqq was a young boy when his mother converted to
Islam and began studying with the Salafis in the late 1980s. That means Abdul-Haqq
was in his teen years in the drama-filled mid-1990s. In a Spring 2009 conversation, he
was “just getting back. After all the fitna, I was out of it. May Allah forgive me for
those years, but I was out of it. I am just now recovering”. There are many others like
Abdul-Haqq who are emerging from the shadows to be active again.
One of the noticeable points about the recent Salafi efforts is the relatively large
number of high profile rapper converts who are now among them and are big attractions
on the Salafi speakers’ circuit in America. Among these is Mutah Beale, popularly known
as Napoleon, who rapped alongside Tupac Shakur. There is Abdul Ali, who was well
known as Sean Cross when his tracks were owned by Ruff Ryder Records. Lastly and
most recently, the rap artist formerly known as Loon with Death Row Records is now
Amir Junaid, and according to a CNN interview with him in Winter 2009 he was residing
 The Salafis in America 235

and studying in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The combination of elapsed time and new blood
can once again spark a renewal of Salafi activity. One final point very worth mentioning is
that until today, one is hard pressed to find any organization or movement besides the
Salafis that is focused on the inner-cities. Thus, by default the Salafis will continue
their success (if not dominance) over this sector of the American Muslim community.
Regardless of the degree of success, the question that remains to be seen is whether or
not the new generation of Salafis will take heed of the movement’s past mistakes.

NOTES
1. Nasir al-Dın al-Albani, “Why the Term Salafee”, retrieved from: www.al-Ibaanah.com, no place, no
date, no year, pp. 2.
2. Amina B. McCloud, African American Islam, New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 72– 78.
3. Richard B. Turner, Islam in the African-American Experience, Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1997, pp. 174–230.
4. Ernest Allen Jr, “Identity and Destiny: The Formative Views of the Moorish Science Temple and the
Nation of Islam”, in Muslims on the Americanization Path, eds Y.Z. Haddad and J.L. Esposito,
Georgia: Scholars Press, 1998.
5. Asma G. Hasan, American Muslims: The New Generation, New York: Continuum International
Publishing Group, 2000, pp. 74– 84.
6. Turner, op. cit., 109–147.
7. Yusuf Nuruddin, “African-American Muslims and the Question of Identity: Between Traditional
Islam, African Heritage, and the American Way”, in Muslims on the Americanization Path, eds
Y. Haddad and J. Esposito, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998; pp. 215–262.
8. A. McCloud, African American Islam, op. cit., pp. 41 –95.
9. Robert Dannin, Black Pilgrimage to Islam, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
10. Sherman Jackson, Islam and the Blackamerican: Looking Towards a Third Resurrection, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005, pp. 20.
11. Paul Barret, American Islam, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007, pp. 12.
12. R. Dannin, “Understanding the Multi-Ethnic Dilemma of African-American Muslims” in American-
ization, eds Y.Z. Haddad and J.L. Esposito, op. cit., pp. 350.
13. S. Jackson, Blackmerican, op. cit., pp. 48 –49.
14. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority, and Women, Oxford: One
World, 2001, pp. 174.
15. www.UmarLee.com, December 2009. This article is part of a larger Grassroots Muslims in America
Series, a set of articles on his blog dealing with Muslims in America.
16. Claude Addas. Quest for the Red Sulphur: The Life of Ibn Arabi, trans. Peter Kingsley, Cambridge:
Islamic Texts Society, pp. 104– 107.
17. Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti, Al-Radd ala man Akhlada ila al-Ard wa Jahila anna al-Ijtihad fi Kulli Asrin Fard
(The Response to Those Who Cling to the Eart [Lowliness] and are Ignorant of the Fact that Ijtihad in Every
Age is Obligatory), Alexandria: Maktabat Shabab al-Jamia, 1985.
18. Ahmad Zarruq, Kitab Qawa’id al-Tasawwuf ala Wajh Yajmau Bayna al-Sharia wal-Haqiqa wa Yasilu al-
Usul wal-Fiqh bil-Tariqa (The Principles of Sufism That Unite Between the Law and the Reality and Connect
the Foundations and Jurisprudence with the Path), Cairo: al-Matba’a al-Ilmiyya, 1900.
19. Ibn Taymiyya, Majmu al-Fatawa, Vol. 10, ed. Abd al-Rahman bin Muhammad bin Qasim, Riyadh:
Matabi al-Riyadh, 1961, pp. 551.
20. “The Creed of Imaam al-Albaanee on Takfir and Apostasy”, authored by a panel of un-named writers
from www.SalafiPublications.com, 2000, pp. 6.
21. “Reading in Elementary Qutubism”, www.SalafiPublications.com, op. cit., pp. 3.
22. George Makdisi, “Ibn Taimiya: A Sufi of the Qadiriya Order”, American Journal of Arabic Studies 1
(1973): 118–129.
23. Abul-Qasim Habatullah al-Alika’i, “The Salaf and Their Position Towards the People of Innovations
and Desires”, unpublished translation by Abu Talha Dawud Burbank from Sharh Usul I’tiqad Ahl
al-Sunna wal-Jama’a, Riyadh: Dar Tayba, 1990.
24. Interview, Abu Muslima on Saudi TV Series “Islam in America”.
25. Interview, Dawud Adib, July 2008.
236 Shadee Elmasry

26. Interview, Abdullah Hakim Quick, December 2008.

27. Saudi TV Ch. 2, “Islam in America” Series, September 2007.
28. Interview, Adib, op. cit.
29. Dawud Adib defines a “Salafi masjid” as one in which “the mimbar is controlled by Salafis”
(Interview, Adib, op. cit.).
30. Interview, anonymous, January 2009.
31. Interview, Adib, op. cit.
32. M. Viorst, “The Education of Ali al-Tamimi”, The Atlantic Monthly, June, 2006, pp. 68– 78. This
article delves into the scientific ideas of Al-Tamimi and provides a sketch of his biography and the
case against him.
33. Although born and raised in the Washington, DC area, Ali Tamimi moved to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
when he was 15 years of age in 1978. He attended high school there, then returned to the United
States in 1981 for college. After completing a pre-med course, he returned to the Kingdom in
1987 to study at Madina University.
34. www.Jaafaridris.com, January 2009.
35. M. Viorst, The Education of Ali al-Tamimi, op. cit., pp. 71– 73.
36. Umar Lee, “The Rise and Fall of the Salafi Da’wah”, retrieved from: www.UmarLee.com, January,
2008.
37. Christine Kolars, “Masjid ul-Mutkabir: The Portrait of an African American Orthodox Muslim
Community”, in Muslim Communities in North America, eds Y. Haddad and J. Smith, New York:
State University of New York Press, 1994, p. 477.
38. This phenomenon can be seen in many students of the traditionalist movement as well. In their case,
travel was to Syria, Yemen, Morocco, or Mauritania.
39. www.SMatch.net/, December 2008.
40. Approximately twenty of these are located outside the United States.
41. ‘Abd al-‘Azız bin Baz, Fatawa Islamiyya Vol. 8; no place: Darussalam, pp. 240.
42. Interview, anonymous, January 2009.
43. www.SalafiPublications.com, “Answers to Common Misconceptions on Naming with Salafiyya”,
April, 2009.
44. Umar Lee, Rise and Fall, op. cit.
45. Anonymous in Ibid.
46. Ziauddin Sardar (ed.), “The Mysteries of Mysticism”, in Desperately Seeking Paradise: Journeys of a
Skeptical Muslim, London: Granta Press, 2005.