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[NUMBER] [CASE TITLE] 
Docket No.| Date | Topic | Ponente | Digest Maker 
 
Petitioner:  
Respondents: 
 
Case Doctrine : 
 
FACTS: 
 
 
 
ISSUE/S: 
Whether or not (YES/NO) 
 
 
HELD: 
 
 1. Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 179987 | April 29, 2009 | Registration under PD 1529 | Tinga | Borja

Petitioner: Heirs of Mario Malabanan

Respondent: Republic of the Philippines

Doctrine:

FACTS:

Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land. Malabanan claimed
that he had purchased the property from Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30)
years.

Velazco testified at the hearing that the property originally belonged to his great-grandfather, Lino
Velazco. Upon Lino's death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by
1966, Esteban's wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the
Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio
succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his
uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification issued by the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land....”

the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of
time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of
Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree any
period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential
and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court
noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and
disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos' possession prior to that date could not be factored in
the computation of the period of possession.

Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals; hence, it was his heirs who
appealed the decision of the appellate court.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the petitioners are entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both.
HELD:

The Court synthesized the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of
their possession.
a. Since Section 48 (b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require
that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as
soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section
47 of the Public Land Act.
b. The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed
by Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.

In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public
domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article
422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for
the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
a. Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration
thereof under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.
b. There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good
faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person's uninterrupted
adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good
faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

Applying these doctrines, It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The
earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence — the Tax
Declarations they presented in particular — is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of
registration under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14 (2) as basis for registration. While the subject property
was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article
422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420 (2) of the
Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
 2. Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic (RESOLUTION)
G.R. No. 179987 | September 3, 2013 | Registration under 1529 | J. Bersamin |

Facts: Same as Previous. The Resolution merely focuses on the subsequent arguments in the MR
● Petitioners: Mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient
to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. They argue that the reclassification of the land
as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code.
● Respondent: applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application had
been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Issue: W/N an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application had been
declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier? NO.

Held: Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period. In fact, by virtue of this
doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already
converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. It is for this reason that the property subject of the
application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public
domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption
that the land is inalienable.

Doctrine:

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the
public domain, namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong
to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of
the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land
subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of
the application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to
June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant arises, and the applicant becomes the owner of
the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased
to be part of the public domain and has become private property.

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for
public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that
may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the
land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive
prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code)
that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
 [3] [REPUBLIC V. ESTATE OF SANTOS] 
G.R. No. 218345| Dec. 7, 2016 | Proof of Alienability and disposability| Mendoza J.| DELA CRUZ, SEAN 
MICHAEL 
 
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines 
Respondents: The Estate of Virginia Santos 
 
Case  Doctrine  :  The  present  rule  is  that to prove the alienability and disposability of the land sought to be 
registered,  an  application  for  original  registration  must  be  accompanied  by  (1)  a  City  Environment  and 
Natural  Resources  Office  (CENRO)  or  Provincial  Environment  and  Natural  Resources  Officer  (PENRO) 
Certification;  and  (2)  a  copy  of  the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as 
a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records 
 
 
FACTS: 
 
Application  for  Land  Registration  of  a  parcel  of  land...  was  filed  by  respondent  Estate  of  Virginia  Santos 
(respondent estate), through its administrator, Pacifico Santos (Pacifico) 
 
Together  with  its  application  for  registration,  respondent  estate  submitted  the  following  documents:  (1) 
Letters  of  Administrationshowing  that  Pacifico  was  appointed  as  the  administrator  of  the  estate  of 
Virginia  Santos  (Virginia);  (2)  Oath  of  Office  of  Pacifico  (3)  Subdivision  Plan (4) Technical Description (5) 
Certification  in  Lieu  of  Surveyor's/Geodetic  Engineer's  Certificate  issued  by  the  Land  Survey  Records 
Section,  Department  of  Environment  and  Natural  Resources  (DENR),  National  Capital  Region;  (6)  Tax 
Declaration (T.D.) (7) Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate by Sole Heir of the Late Alejandro Santos 
 
Respondent  estate  alleged  that  the  late  Virginia  was  the  only  child  and  heir  of  Alejandro  Santos 
(Alejandro), who was the owner of the subject land during his lifetime. 
 
after  Alejandro's  death,  Virginia  executed  an  Extrajudicial  Settlement  of  Estate  by  Sole  Heir  of  the  Late 
Alejandro  Santos  (Extrajudicial  Settlement)  and  appropriated  the  subject  land  for  herself.  Respondent 
estate  further  alleged  that  Virginia,  by  her  and  through  her  predecessor-in-interest,  had  been  in  open, 
continuous,  exclusive,  and  adverse  possession  of  the  property  in  the  concept  of  owner  for  more  than 
thirty (30) years. 
 
petitioner  Republic  of  the  Philippines  (Republic),  through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its 
Opposition[13]  to  the  Application,  raising  the  following  grounds:  that  neither  the  applicant  nor  the 
predecessors-in-interest  of  Virginia  had  been  in  open,  continuous,  exclusive,  and  notorious  possession 
and  occupation  of  the  subject  land  for  a period of not less than thirty (30) years; that the tax declarations 
and/or  tax  payment  receipts  attached  to  the  application  did  not  constitute  competent  and  sufficient 
evidence  of  a  bona  fide  acquisition  of  the  land  applied  for;  that  the  claim  of  ownership  in  fee  simple  on 
the  basis  of  a  Spanish  title  or  grant  could  no  longer  be  availed  of  by  the  applicant;  and  that  the  subject 
land  was  a  portion  of  the  public  domain  belonging  to  the  Republic  and  not  subject  to  private 
appropriation. 
 
the  Land  Registration  Authority  (LRA)  submitted  its  Report[14]  stating  that  the  subject  property,  as 
plotted,  did  not  appear  to  overlap  with  any  previously  plotted  decreed  properties  and  that  it  was  not in a 
position  to  verify  whether  or  not  the  aforesaid  land  was  already  covered  by  a  land  patent  and previously 
approved isolated surveys. 
 
respondent  estate  presented  Romualdo  B.  Flores  (Romualdo)  who  testified  that  Virginia  owned  the 
subject  land;  that  he  had  been  tilling  the  land  since  1970...  the  MeTC  denied  respondent  estate's 
application  for  registration of the subject land. It opined that respondent estate failed to present sufficient 
evidence  to  establish  its  claim  of  possession  and  ownership  over  the  subject  land.  The  MeTC  reasoned 
that  mere  casual  cultivation  of  portions  of  the  subject  land  did  not  constitute  sufficient basis for a claim 
of ownership. 
 
respondent estate failed to prove the alienable and disposable character of the subject land. It opined that 
the  certification  at  the  dorsal  portion  of  the  survey  plan  was  not the kind of evidence contemplated in an 
application for original registration of title to land... respondent estate filed its Motion for Reconsideration 
 
MeTC  issued  the  Order[22]  granting  the  subject  application.  In  completely  reversing  itself,  the  trial  court 
stated  that  the  tax  declarations  submitted  by  respondent  estate  and  the  certification  appearing  at  the 
dorsal  portion  of  the  survey  plan  of  Lot  No.  10839,  showing  that  the  land  was  disposable  and  alienable, 
were  already  sufficient  to  establish  respondent  estate's  claim  over  the  property  as  well  as  the  alienable 
and disposable character of the subject land. 
 
the Republic, through the OSG, elevated an appeal to the CA. 
 
he  CA  dismissed  the  Republic's  appeal  and  affirmed  the  Amended  Order,  dated  August  5,  2013  of  the 
MeTC. 
 
It  also  found  that  respondent  estate  was  able  to  prove  its  open,  continuous,  exclusive,  and  notorious 
possession in the concept of owner. 
 
 
ISSUE/S: 
 
Republic  asserts  that  respondent  estate  failed  to  establish  its  open,  exclusive,  continuous and notorious 
possession  and  occupation  under  a  bona  fide  claim  of  ownership  over  the  subject  land  since  June  12, 
1945, or earlier 
 
It  contends  that  the  tax  declarations  submitted  by  respondent  estate  were  considered  not  proofs  of 
ownership 
 
HELD: 
 
Examination  of  respondent  estate's  application,  it  would  seem  that  the  basis  for  their  application  was 
Section  14(2)  of  P.D.  No.  1529  considering  its  allegation  of  possession  and occupation in the concept of 
owner  for  more  than  thirty  (30)  years.  The  MeTC,  and  later  the  appellate  court,  however,  granted  the 
application  under  Section  14(1)  of  the  same  law  making  reference  to  June  12,  1945,  or  prior  thereto,  as 
the  earliest  date  of  possession  and  occupation.  Thus,  the  Court  deems  it  proper  to  discuss  respondent 
estate's  application  for  registration  of  title to the subject property vis-a-vis the provisions of Section 14(1) 
and (2) of P.D. No. 1529. 
 
In  Republic  of  the  Philippines  vs.  Cortez,  the  Court  explained  that  applicants  for  original  registration  of 
title  to  land  must  first  establish compliance with the provisions of either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of 
P.D. No. 1529. 
 
Under  Section  14(1),  applicants  for  registration  of  title  must  sufficiently  establish the following: first, that 
the  land  or  property  forms  part  of  the  disposable  and  alienable  lands  of  the  public  domain;  second, that 
the  applicant  and  his  predecessors-in-interest  have  been  in  open,  continuous,  exclusive,  and  notorious 
possession  and  occupation  of  the  same;  and  third,  that  it  is  under  a  bona  fide  claim  of  ownership  since 
June 12, 1945, or earlier. 
 
The  present  rule  is  that  to  prove  the  alienability  and  disposability  of  the  land  sought  to  be  registered,  an 
application  for  original  registration  must  be  accompanied  by  (1)  a  City  Environment  and  Natural 
Resources  Office  (CENRO)  or  Provincial  Environment  and  Natural  Resources  Officer  (PENRO) 
Certification;  and  (2)  a  copy  of  the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as 
a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records 
 
Proof of Possession 
 
Possession  is  open  when  it  is  patent,  visible,  apparent,  notorious,  and  not  clandestine.  It  is  continuous 
when  uninterrupted,  unbroken  and  not  intermittent  or  occasional.  It  is  exclusive  when  the  adverse 
possessor  can  show  exclusive  dominion  over  the  land  and  an  appropriation  of  it  to  his  own  use  and 
benefit.  And  it  is  notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public 
or the people in the neighborhood. 
 
n  Republic  vs.  Remman  Enterprises,  Inc.[40]  (Remman),  the  Court  held  that  for  purposes  of  land 
registration  under  Section  14(1)  of  P.D.  No.  1529,  proof  of  specific  acts  of  ownership  must be presented 
to  substantiate  the  claim  of  open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the 
land  subject  of  the  application.  "Applicants  for  land  registration  cannot  just  offer  general  statements 
which  are  mere  conclusions  of  law  rather  than  factual  evidence  of  possession.  Actual  possession 
consists  in  the  manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such nature as a party would actually exercise 
over  his  own  property."[...  unsubstantiated  claims  of  cultivation  of  land  do  not  suffice  to  prove  open, 
continuous,  exclusive,  and  notorious  possession  and  occupation  of  the  public  land  applied  for  in  the 
concept of an owner. 
 
In  Aranda  vs.  Republic  of  the Philippines,[43] the Court held that mere statements regarding cultivation of 
land would not establish possession in the concept of an owner 
 
Section  14(2)  explicitly  refers to the principles on prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code. In this regard, 
the  Civil  Code  makes  it  clear  that  patrimonial  property  of  the  State  may  be  acquired  by  private  persons 
through prescription. 
 
This  does  not  necessarily  mean,  however,  that  when a piece of land is declared alienable and disposable, 
it can already be acquired by prescription. 
 
In  Malabanan,  this  Court  ruled  that  declaration  of  alienability  and  disposability  was  not  enough  —  there 
must  be  an  express  declaration  that  the  public  dominion  property  was  no  longer  intended  for  public 
service  or  the  development  of  the  national  wealth  or  that  the  property  had  been  converted  into 
patrimonial 
 
WHEREFORE,  the  petition  is  GRANTED.  The  May  22,  2015  Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 
No.  100999  is  hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of the Estate of Virginia 
Santos in LRC Case No. 326 is DENIED, without prejudice. 
4. Peregrina Mistica v. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 165141| September 11, 2009| Registration under PD 1529 | Nachura J. | Gonzales

Petitioner: Peregrina Mistica

Respondents: Republic of the Philippines

Case Doctrine :

Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law
requires possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction "and," the clear
intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks
to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant
to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property.

FACTS:

On July 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an
Application for Registration of Title over a parcel of land known as Lot 7766-D located in the same. The
petitioner alleged that she is the owner in fee simple of the land sought to be registered, that she and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject lot since time immemorial. She further
averred that she did not know of any lien, mortgage or encumbrance affecting said lot or that any person
has any claim or interest therein. Attached are the following documents; (N.B. – Please note
documents, the decision discussed the brevity of each)
1) the technical description of the subject lot;
2) Certification in Lieu of Lost Surveyor’s Certificate;
3) tax declaration of Real Property No. 06075, covering the subject lot effective 1998;
4) official receipts of realty tax payments; and
5) blueprint/machine copies of Subdivision Plan Csd-03-010587-D.

In addition, the petitioner testified that the previous owner and possessor of the land was her father, who
acquired the same by virtue of a contract of sale which was supported by a document dated May 1921,
written in Spanish without any translation. She further opined that the heirs executed an extrajudicial
settlement of his estate. Eventually, she acquired sole ownership over the subject property.

Respondent Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the application on the following grounds:
a) neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto;
b) the muniments of title did not appear to be genuine and did not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for, or of petitioner’s open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of an
owner since June 12, 1945;
 c) the claim of ownership in fee simple of the subject lot on the basis of a Spanish title or grant
could no longer be availed of by petitioner who failed to file an appropriate application for
registration within a period of six (6) months from January 16, 1976 as required by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 892; and;
d) the subject lot applied for was a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

MTC Ruled in favor of the petitioner in finding that the subject property was alienable and disposable,
and that petitioner sufficiently established her right over the lot in question, granted petitioner’s application
for registration.

CA Subsequent to a denied MR filed in the MTC, the respondents filed an appeal. The appellate
court set aside the MTC decision stating that the most important requirement for granting petitioner’s
application for registration – that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 – had not been adequately established.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the SC.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Petitioner failed to prove the requisites laid down in Sec 14 (1) of PD 1529
(NO)

HELD:

The SC quoted both Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141 and Sec 14 (1) of PD 1529.

In accordance with the aforesaid laws, any person, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, who
has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, may file in the proper trial court an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through his duly authorized representative.

Being the applicant for confirmation of imperfect title, petitioner bears the burden of proving that: 1) the
land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and 2) she has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide
claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier. These the petitioner must prove by no less than
clear, positive and convincing evidence.

To prove that she has been in possession of the subject lot, petitioner presented documentary evidence
(mentioned in the facts of the case). Moreover, to prove that her predecessors-in-interest had
also been in possession thereof, petitioner presented a document written in Spanish which she
claimed to be a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 16, 1921. Lastly, she testified that she
acquired the subject lot from her parents who had been the owners and possessors thereof
since she was still very young.

As aptly held by the appellate court, these pieces of evidence, taken together, do not suffice to prove that
petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
 a. The technical description, Certification in Lieu of Lost Surveyor’s Certificate, and
blueprint copies of the subdivision plan only prove the identity of the lot sought to be
registered.

b. The joint affidavits of her co-heirs, as well as the Deed of Partition, merely show that the
petitioner acquired the property through succession.

c. Tax declarations – effective only in 1998, she failed to adduce in evidence any tax
declaration over the property under the name of her parents and that the realty taxes for
the property had been paid prior to 1998.

d. Spanish deed of sale dated May 16, 1921 - the document was written in Spanish and
petitioner did not bother to have the contents thereof translated to English or to any other
language that the court could understand. We cannot, therefore, determine if, indeed, the
document was a Deed of Sale, and if the subject matter thereof was the property sought
to be registered.

e. Possession of the subject land relative to petitioner’s age - her testimony failed to meet
the standard required by law. Petitioner failed to state the facts and circumstances
evidencing the alleged ownership of the land applied for. To be sure, general statements
that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and
cannot suffice.

More importantly, we would like to stress that possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable
lands of the public domain because the law requires possession and occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction "and," the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere
fiction. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature
as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.

In the case at bar, actual possession of the subject lot was not convincingly established.

Petition dismissed.
 [5] [REPUBLIC VS. RAYOS DEL SOL] 
G.R. No.| May 30, 2016 | Registration under PD 1529 | Mendoza, J. | Maxwell 
 
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines 
Respondents:  Cesar  P.  Rayos  Del  Sol,  Lydia  P.  Rayos  Del  Sol,  Gloria  P.  Rayos  Del  Sol  And  Elvira  P.  Rayos 
Del Sol 
 
Case  Doctrine  :  A  person  who  seeks  the  registration  of title to a piece of land on the basis of possession 
by  himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence, that is, 
he must prove his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of evidence of the oppositors. 
 
FACTS:  An  application  for  land  registration  involving  a  Lot  8173-A  was  filed  by  the  respondent  siblings. 
They  alleged  that  they  inherited  the  lot  from  their  father  (Jose),  who,  in  turn,  inherited  it  from  his  father 
(Felipe).  They  executed  the  Extra-judicial  Settlement  of  the  Estate  of  Felipe,  wherein  the  lot  was 
adjudicated  to  them  pro  indiviso;  and  that,  through  their  predecessor-in-interest,  they  had  been  in  open, 
continuous,  exclusive,  and  notorious  possession  and  occupation  of  alienable  and  disposable  land  of 
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since the 1930s, when Felipe was still alive. 
 

Thereafter,  respondent siblings declared the lot to be subdivided into 4 parcels of land. One of the parcels, 
Lot  8173-A-2  was  purchased  by the Republic through the DPWH which was embodied in an undated deed 
of absolute sale. 
 

Respondent  siblings  presented  Lydia  and  Gloria  as  witnesses.  Lydia  testified  that  she,  together  with  the 
other  respondents,  inherited  the  lot  from their father, Jose; that Felipe cultivated the lot during his lifetime 
and  planted  it  with  rice;  that  they  possessed  the lot for more than 70 years since their grandfather’s time; 
they  paid  the  taxes  on  the  lot. Gloria testified that they had farmed for respondents, who were the owners 
of  the  lot;  that  nobody  else  claimed  the  lot;  and  that  she was born in 1942 and she grew up knowing that 
her father farmed the lot for Jose.

Both  RT  and  CA  found  the  respondent  siblings  were  able to present sufficient evidence to prove that they 
had  an  open,  exclusive,  continuous,  and  notorious  possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of 
ownership over the subject land.  

The OSG argued that respondents failed to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had been occupying
the subject land since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.
 
ISSUE/S:  W/N  respondent  siblings  were  able  to  establish  the  requirements  set  in section 14 of PD 1529. 
-YES 
 
HELD:  YES,  the  respondent  siblings  were  able  to  establish  the  requirements  set  in  section  14  of  PD 
1529. 
 
Section  14(1)  of  P.D.  No.  1529  refers  to  the  original  registration  of  “imperfect”  titles  to  public  land 
acquired  under  Section  11(4)  in  relation  to  Section  48(b)  of  Commonwealth  Act  No.  141,  or  the  Public 
Land  Act,  as  amended.  The  requisites  under  the  said  provision  are  enumerated  as  follows:  1.  That  the 
subject  land  forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; 2. That the applicants, 
by  themselves  or  through  their  predecessors-in-interest,  have  been  in  open,  continuous,  exclusive  and 
notorious  possession  and  occupation  of  the  subject  land  under  a  bona  fide  claim  of  ownership;  and  3. 
That such possession and occupation must be since June 12, 1945 or earlier.19 
 

A  person  who  seeks  the  registration  of  title  to  a  piece  of  land  on  the basis of possession by himself and 
his  predecessors-in-interest  must  prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence, that is, he must prove 
his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of evidence of the oppositors. 
 
In  the  present  case,  It  is  undisputed  that  the  subject  lot  was  inside  an  alienable  and  disposable  land  as 
per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forest Development on January 3, 1968. 
 
Tax  declarations  have  probative  value  in  land  registration  proceedings  - The  records  reveal  that 
respondents  and  their  predecessors-in-interest  religiously  paid  the  realty  taxes  of the subject lot over the 
decades.  The  voluntary  declaration  of  a  piece  of  real  property  for  taxation  purposes  not  only  manifests 
one’s  sincere  and  honest  desire  to  obtain  title  to  the  property,  but  also  announces  an  adverse  claim 
against  the  state  and  all  other  interested  parties  with  an  intention  to  contribute  needed  revenues  to  the 
government. 
 
Testimonial  evidence  establish  respondents’  claim  of  possession  and  occupation  since  June  12,  1945 
or  earlier  - Lydia  explained  the  origin  of  their  property.  Noticeably,  the  possession  and  occupancy  of 
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest happened prior to June 12, 1945. 
 
Documentary  evidence  substantiate  respondents’  nature  and  character  of  possession  -  respondents 
presented  documentary  evidence  to  establish  that  they  had  an  open  and  continuous  possession  of  the 
subject  property. The Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Felipe would show that the subject property 
had  been  part  of  Felipe’s  estate and it had been adjudicated to respondents. This would also confirm that 
the  ownership  and  possession  of  the  subject  land  by  respondents  from  the  time  of  Felipe’s  death  had 
continued  up  to  the  present.  Also,  respondents  offered  the  Deed  of  Absolute  Sale between them and the 
Republic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

   
 [6] REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS 
G.R. No. L-40912| September 30, 1976 | Registration Under P.D. 1529 | Martin, J. | Noel 
 
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines, represented by Mindanao Medical Center 
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Alejandro De Jesus 
 
Case  Doctrine  :  Section  122  of  the  Act,  which  governs  the  registration  of  grants  or  patents  involving 
public  lands,  provides  that  "Whenever  public  lands  in  the  Philippine  Islands  belonging to the Government 
of  the  United  States  or  to  the  Government  of  the  Philippines  are  alienated,  granted,  or  conveyed  to 
persons  or  to  public  or  private  corporations,  the  same  shall  be  brought  forthwith  under  the  operation  of 
this Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become registered lands. 
 
 
FACTS: 
1921-  Eugenio  de  Jesus,  respondent’s  father,  applied  with  the  Bureau  of  Lands  for  Sales  Patent  of  a 
33-hectare  parcel  in  Davao  City.  The  property  applied  for  was  a  portion  of  what  was  then  known  as  Lot 
522 of the Davao Cadastre. A bidding was held and Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. 
The  Director  of  Lands  issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award. Because the area conveyed had not 
been  actually  surveyed  at  the  time  Eugenio  de  Jesus  filed  his  Sales  Application,  the  Bureau  of  Lands 
conducted  a  survey.  The  land  awarded  to  Eugenio  de  Jesus  was  designated  as  Lot  Nos.  1176-A, 
1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400 hectares. 
The  Director  of  Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a 
portion  of  the  land covered by Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for 
military  camp  site  purposes.  The  area  excluded  was  identified  as  Lot  1176-B-2,  the  very  land  in 
question,  consisting  of  12.8081  hectares.  Director  of  Lands  Jose  P.  Dans  ordered  the  issuance  of  a 
patent  to  Eugenio  de  Jesus,  pursuant  to  his  Sales  Application  for  "a  tract  of  land  having  an  area  of 
20.6400 hectares. 
President  Magsaysay  reserved  the  same  Lot  No.  1176-B-2  for  medical  center  site  purposes under the 
administration  of  the  Director  of  Hospital  (Proclamation  No. 350) . Mindanao Medical Center applied for 
the  Torrens  registration  of  the  12.8081-hectare  Lot  1176-B-2  with  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  Davao. 
The  Medical  Center  claimed  "fee  simple"  title  to  the  land  on  the  strength  of  Proclamation  No.  350 
reserving the area for medical center site purposes. 
Alejandro  de  Jesus,  the  son  and  successor-in-interest  of sale Eugenio de Jesus, opposed the registration 
on the ground that his father  had acquired a vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award 
issued to him by the Director of Lands. 

After  due  hearing,  the  CFI  rendered  judgment,  directing  "the  registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 in 
the  name  of  the  Mindanao  Medical  Center.  Alejandro  de  Jesus  \appealed  the  case  to  the  Court  of 
Appeals.  The  CA  decided  in  favor  of  Alejandro  de  Jesus.  Mindanao  Medical  Center  moved  for 
reconsideration,  maintaining  ownership  over  the  entire  area  of  12.8081  hectares,  but the Appellate Court 
in a Special Division of Five denied the motion. 

 
 
 
ISSUE/S: 
Whether Mindanao Medical Center has a registrable title over Lot 1176-B-2 - YES 
 
 
HELD: 
Mindanao  Medical  Center  has  a  registrable  title  over  the  whole  contested  area  of  12.8081  hectares, 
designated  as  Lot  No.  1176-B-2.  Proclamation  No.  350,  dated  October  9,  1956,  of  President  Magsaysay 
legally  effected  a  land  grant  to  the  Mindanao  Medical  Center,  Bureau of Medical Services, Department of 
Health,  of  the  whole  lot,  validly  sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land 
grant  is  constitutive  of  a  "fee  simple"  title  or  absolute  title  in  favor  of  Mindanao  Medical  Center.  Thus, 
Section  122  of  the  Act,  which  governs  the  registration  of  grants  or  patents  involving  public  lands, 
provides  that  "Whenever  public  lands  in  the  Philippine  Islands  belonging  to  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  or  to  the  Government  of  the  Philippines  are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or 
to  public  or  private  corporations,  the  same  shall  be  brought  forthwith  under  the  operation  of  this  Act 
[Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become registered lands. 
 
Proclamation  No.  350  is  free  of  any  legal  infirmity.  It  proceeds  from  the  recognized competence of the 
President  to  reserve by executive proclamation alienable lands of the public domain for a specific public 
use  or  service.  Section  64  (e)  of  the  Revised  Administrative  Code  empowers  the  President  "to  reserve 
from  sale  or  other  disposition  and  for  specific  public  uses  or  service,  any  land  belonging  to  the  private 
domain  of  the  Government  of  the Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law". The land 
reserved  "shall  be  used  for  the  specific  purposes  directed  by  such  executive  order  until  otherwise 
provided by law." 
 
It  is  true  that  Proclamation  No.  350  states  that  the  same  is  subject  to  "private rights, if any there be," but 
Alejandro  de  Jesus  failed  to  prove  any  private  rights  over  the  property  reserved.  Well-settled  is  the  rule 
that unless the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that a certain portion of the public 
domain  was  acquired  by  him  or  his  ancestors  either  by  composition  title from the Spanish Government 
or  by  possessory information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands, such as grants 
or patents, the property must be held to be part of the public domain. 
 
   
 [9] [City Mayor v Ebio] 
G.R. No. 178411| June 23 2010 | Registration under PD 1529 | Villarama| RUIZ 
 
Petitioner: Office of the City Mayor of Paranaque  
Respondents:MARIO  D.  EBIO  AND  HIS  CHILDREN/HEIRS  namely,  ARTURO  V.  EBIO,  EDUARDO  V.  EBIO, 
RENATO V. EBIO, LOURDES E. MAGTANGOB, MILA V. EBIO, and ARNEL V. EBIO, 
 
Case Doctrine : 
 
FACTS: 
1. Respondents  claim  to  be  the  absolute  owners  of  a  parcel  of  land (406 square meters) located in 
Barangay  Vitalez,  Parañaque  City  and  covered  by  Tax  Declaration  Nos.  01027  and  01472  in  the 
name of respondent Mario D. Ebio.  
2. Respondents’  great  grandfather,  Jose  Vitalez  (Jose)  was  alleged  to  be  the  original  owner  and 
possessor  of  the  said  parcel  of  land.  Jose  then  gave  the  land  to  his  son  Pedro.  Eventually, 
respondent  Mario  Ebio  married  Pedro’s  daughter,  Zenaida,  so  Pedro  executed  a  notarized 
Transfer of Rights ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio.  
3. Respondents  have  been  religiously  paying  real  property  taxes  for  the  said  property  since  1966. 
Respondents also built their house on the said lot. 
4. This  subject  land  was  formed  from  the  alluvial  deposits  that  have  gradually  settled  along  the 
banks of Cut-cut creek . 
5. The  Office  of  the  Sangguniang  Barangay  of  Vitalez  wanted  to  construct  an  access  road  along 
Cut-cut  Creek  located  in  the  said  barangay.  The  proposed  road  will  traverse  the  lot  occupied  by 
the respondents.  
6. The  Office  of  the  Sangguniang  Barangay  of  Vitalez  sought  assistance  from  the  City Government 
of  Parañaque  for  the  construction.  The  city government then advised all the affected residents to 
vacate the said area. 
7. Respondents  immediately  registered  their  opposition  thereto.  As  a  result,  the  road  project  was 
temporarily suspended.  
8. However,  the  officials  from  the  barangay  and  the  city  planning  office  proceeded to cut 8 coconut 
trees  planted  on  the  said  lot.  The  city administrator also sent a letter to the respondents ordering 
them to vacate the area within thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property. 

1st Level Court Proceedings 

RTC: denied the petition for lack of merit. In favor of Petitioner 

The  trial  court  held  that  respondents  were  not  able  to  prove  successfully  their  right to the property since 
they have not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales patent has not yet 
been  granted.  Additionally,  they  failed  to  implead  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines,  which  is  an 
indispensable party. 

CA:  Respondents  elevated  the  matter  to  the  Court  of  Appeals.  CA  ruled  in  favor  of  the  respondents  and 
held that the respondents have amply proven their right over the property. 
CA  found  that  the  subject  land  is  an  accreted  property  owned  by  Guaranteed  Homes  Inc.  (who  had  the 
land  registered  in  its  name  in  1966),  and  that  Guaranteed  Homes  Inc.  donated  the  said  land  to  the  City 
Government.  Nonetheless,  the CA also found it clear that the said accreted property has been in exclusive 
possession  of  the  respondents  and  their  predecessor-in-interest  (Pedro  Vitalez)  since  1930  and  that 
property  taxes  has been paid by them since 1966. Therefore, respondents have acquired ownership of the 
property through acquisitive prescription. 
 
ISSUE/S: 
1. Whether or not the State may build on the land in question. NO 
2. Whether  or  not  the  State  is  an  indispensable  party  to  respondents’  action  for  prohibitory 
injunction. NO 
 
 
HELD: 
1.  It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually 
settled  along  the  banks  of  Cutcut  creek.  This  being  the  case,  the  law  that  governs  ownership  over  the 
accreted  portion  is  Article  84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to 
Article  457  of  the  Civil  Code.  ART.  84.  Accretions  deposited  gradually  upon  lands  contiguous  to  creeks, 
streams,  rivers,  and  lakes,  by  accessions  or  sediments  from  the  waters  thereof,  belong  to  the  owners of 
such  lands.  Art.  457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they 
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. 
 
It  is  therefore  explicit  from  the  foregoing  provisions  that  alluvial  deposits  along  the  banks  of  a  creek  do 
not  form  part  of  the  public  domain  as  the  alluvial  property  automatically  belongs  to  the  owner  of  the 
estate  to  which  it  may  have  been  added.  The  only  restriction  provided  for  by  law  is that the owner of the 
adjoining  property  must  register  the  same  under  the  Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may 
be  subject  to  acquisition  through  prescription  by  third  persons. In contrast, properties of public dominion 
cannot  be  acquired  by  prescription.  No  matter  how  long the possession of the properties has been, there 
can  be  no  prescription  against  the  State  regarding  property  of  public  domain.  Even  a  city or municipality 
cannot  acquire  them  by  prescription  as  against  the  State. Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property 
of  public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments 
along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law. 

2.  The  State  is  NOT  an  indispensable  party  to  respondents’  action  for  prohibitory  injunction.  Alluvial 
deposits  along  the  banks  of  a  creek  do  not  form  part  of  the  public  domain  as  the  alluvial  property 
automatically  belongs  to  the  owner  of  the  estate  to  which  it  may  have  been  added.  However,  the  law 
provides  that  the  owner  of  the  adjoining  property  must  register  the  same  under  the  Torrens  system; 
otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.  

Considering  that  the  land  is  not  a  public  domain  and that the respondents’ have property right over it, the 

SC further ruled that the State is neither an indispensable nor necessary party in this case. 
 [15] [REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC]

G.R. No. 199310.| February 19, 2014 | Reg. under PD 1529 | Reyes J. | Pinto

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines

Respondents: Remman Enterprises, Inc. rep. by Ronnie P. Inocencio

Case Doctrine: Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the
Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073.Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for
registration of title must sufficiently establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable
and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

FACTS: On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an application with the RTC
for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land, Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 situated in Barangay
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.

On December 13, 2001, the RTC granted the respondent's application for registration. Thereafter,
following the required publication and posting, a scheduled hearing was set. However, on May 30, 2002,
only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an
order of general default except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the
respondent's application. The LLDA filed its Opposition to the respondent's application for registration,
asserting that the lots are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. On the
other hand, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), likewise filed its Opposition, alleging that the
respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Respondent's witnesses showed that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945.
The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares
(Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally owned and possessed by Veronica
Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted different kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker
and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and
Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same were purchased by the respondent in 1989.

The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent's application for
registration should be denied since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic Act No.
4850(R.A. No. 4850), lands surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary
elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake.The RTC granted
the respondent's application for registration of title to the subject properties. The RTC found that the
respondent was able to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain.
The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties as early as
1943. The petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA likewise
pointed out that the respondent was able to present certifications issued by the DENR, attesting that the
subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, which was not
disputed by the petitioner. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not CA err in affirming the RTC Decision which granted the application for
registration filed by the respondent?

HELD: Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to
public land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073.Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must
sufficiently establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two certifications issued
by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that
the subject properties are alienable and disposable.

Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441 (2008).The Court clarified that, in
addition to the certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable and
disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They must present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal
custodian of the records.

The Court finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership
must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer
general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual
possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
actually exercise over his own property. Valiao v. Republic, G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011

"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under
claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive
grant from the state. The possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended,
never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land
does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the
same under claim of ownership for the required number of years." Del Rosario v. Republic of the
Philippines, 432 Phil. 824
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the respondent
were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject
properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject
property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of taxation.
"While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of
ownership." Aide v. Bernal, GRANTED.
 14. REPUBLIC v. JOSON 
G.R. No. 163767 | March 10, 2014 | Registration under PD No. 1529 | Bersamin, J. | Quijano 
 
Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS 
Respondents:ROSARIO DE GUZMAN VDA. DE JOSON 
 
Case Doctrine : 
Yet,  even  assuming  that  the  DENR-CENRO  certification  alone  would  have  sufficed,  the  respondent's 
application  would  still  be  denied  considering  that  the  reclassification  of  the  land  as  alienable  or 
disposable  came  only  after  the  filing  of  the  application  in  court  in  1976.  The  certification itself indicated 
that the land was reclassified as alienable or disposable only on October 15, 1980. 

 
FACTS: 
Joson  filed  an  application  for  registration  of  a  riceland  she  allegedly  inherited  from  her  mother.  Joson 
submitted  all  the  requirements  for  the  registration.  The  Director  of  Lands  and  the  Director  of  Forest 
Development  averred  that  whatever  legal  and  possessory rights the Joson had acquired by reason of any 
Spanish  government  grants  had  been  lost,  abandoned  or  forfeited  for  failure  to  occupy  and  possess  the 
land  for  at  least  30  years  immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the land applied for, 
being  actually  a  portion  of  the  Labangan  Channel operated by the Pampanga River Control System, could 
not be subject of appropriation or land registration. 
 
CFI - granted registration 
CA - affirmed CFI decision 
 
 
ISSUE/S: 
Whether or not the land is susceptible of private acquisition (NO) 
HELD: 
Nonetheless,  what  is  left  wanting  is  the  fact  that  Joson  did  not  discharge  her  burden  to  prove  the 
classification  of  the  land  as  demanded  by  the  first  requisite.  She  did  not  present  evidence  of  the  land, 
albeit  public,  having  been  declared  alienable  and  disposable  by  the  State.  During  trial,  she  testified  that 
the  land  was  not  within  any  military  or  naval  reservation,  and  Frisco  Domingo,  her  other  witness, 
corroborated  her.  Although  the  Republic  countered  that  the  verification  made  by  the  Bureau  of  Forest 
Development showed that the land was within the unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan 

   
 16. Republic v. CA, Tancinco 
G.R. No. L61647 | Oct. 12, 1984 | Registration under PD1529 | J. Gutierrez | Sabban 
Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Director of Lands) 
Respondents:  THE  HON.  COURT  OF  APPEALS,  BENJAMIN  TANCINCO,  AZUCENA  TANCINCO  REYES, 
MARINA TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C. TANCINCO 
 
Doctrine:  Under  Art.  457,  the  riparian  owner  has  the  right  to  any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to 
compensate  him  for  the  danger  of  loss  that  he  suffers  because  of  the  location  of his land. Requisites of 
Accretion:  (1) deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current 
of  the  water;  and  (3)  that  the  land  where  accretion  takes  place  is  adjacent  to  the  banks  of  rivers.  The 
requirement  that  the  deposit  should  be  due  to  the  effect  of  the  current  of  the  river  is  indispensable. 
Hence,  the  riparian  owner does NOT acquire the additions to his land caused by special works expressly 
intended  or  designed  to  bring  about  accretion,  and  may  not  register  the  same  under  the  Land 
Registration Act.  
 
 
Facts:  
1. Benjamin  Tancinco,  Azucena  Tancinco  Reyes,  Marina  Tancinco  Imperial  and  Mario  C.  Tancinco 
are  registered  owners  of  a  parcel  of  land  in  Meycauayan,  Bulacan  bordering  on  the  Meycauayan 
and  Bocaue  rivers.  They  filed  an  application for the registration of three lots (Lots 1,2,3) adjacent 
to their fishpond property. 
2. Assistant  Provincial  Fiscal  Vicente,  in  representation  of  the  Bureau  of  Lands  filed  a  written 
opposition to the application for registration.  
3. CFI:  Granted  the  application  on  the  finding  that  the  lands  in  question  are  accretions  to  the 
Tancincos’ fishponds. 
4. CA: Affirmed in toto. 
5. The  Republic  now  claims  that  there  is  no  accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil 
Code  because  what  actually happened is that the Tancincos simply transferred their dikes further 
down  the  river  bed  of  the  Meycauayan  River,  and  thus,  if  there  is  any  accretion  to  speak  of,  it  is 
man-made  and  artificial  and  not  the  result  of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the 
waters of the river. 
6. Tancincos’  witness  however,  claims  that  they  saw  the land already dry at almost the level of their 
property, insisting that there was no human intervention. 

 
Issue: Whether the accretion can be a valid subject of registration? (NO) 
 
Ruling:  
1. Under  Art.  457,  the  riparian  owner  has  the  right  to  any  land  or  alluvion  deposited  by  a  river  is  to 
compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land.  
2. The  article  presupposes  3 requisites -- (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that 
it  be  made  through  the  effects  of  the  current  of  the  water; and (3) that the land where accretion 
takes  place  is  adjacent  to  the  banks  of rivers. The requirement that the deposit should be due to 
the  effect  of  the  current  of  the  river  is  indispensable.  This  excludes  from  Art.  457  all  deposits 
caused  by  human  intervention.  Hence,  the  riparian  owner does NOT acquire the additions to his 
land caused by special works expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion.   
 3. Alluvion  must  be  the  exclusive  work  of  nature.  In  the  instant  case,  there is no evidence to prove 
that  the  addition  to the said property was made gradually through the effects of the current of the 
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.  
4. The  alleged  alluvial  deposits  came  into  being not because of the sole effect of the current of the 
rivers  but  as  a  result  of  the  transfer  of  the  dike  towards  the  river  and  encroaching  upon  it. The 
land  sought  to  be  registered  is  not  even  dry  land  cast  imperceptibly  and  gradually  by  the  river's 
current on the fishpond adjoining it. It is under two meters of water.  
5. The  testimony  of  the  Tancincos'  lone  witness  says  that  as  early  as  1939  there  already  existed 
such alleged alluvial deposits, deserves no merit.  
● The lots in question were not included in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of 
Meycauayan conducted between the years 1958 to 1960.  
● The  alleged  accretion  was declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it 
had supposedly permanently formed.  
● The  only  valid  conclusion  therefore  is  that  the  said  areas  could  not  have  been  there  in 
1939.  They  existed  only  after  the  Tancincos  transferred  their  dikes  towards  the  bed  of 
the  Meycauayan  river  in  1951.  What  the  Tancincos  claim  as  accretion  is  really  an 
encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation. 
6. Therefore,  the  lower  court  cannot  validly  order  the  registration  of  Lots  in  the  names  of  the 
Tancincos.  These  lots  were  portions  of  the  bed  of  the  Meycauayan  river  and  are  therefore 
classified  as  property  of  the  public  domain  under Art. 420(1) and Art. 502 (1), of the Civil Code. 
They  are  not open to registration under the Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in 
question as private property in the names of the private respondents is null and void.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 [17] [GRANDE V. CA]

GR. No. L-61647 | June 30, 1962 | Registration under PD 1529 | Barrera, J. | Samaniego

Petitioner: Ignacio Grande, Et al.

Respondents: Hon. Court of Appeals, Domingo Calalung and Esteban Calalung

Case Doctrine:

Unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension,
become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the
Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land
adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code

FACTS:

Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan,
municipality of Magsaysay, province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui
(who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears
registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is
identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in
1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title). Since
then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of
the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance
of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964
hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area.

On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela
against respondents, to quiet title to said portion formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint that they
and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until
September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also
asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and
costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting
that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the
year 1933 to the present.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the
ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and
deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs.

Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the
decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:

That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which started in the
early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless
some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in
accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which
provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that
they have acquired ownership through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case. The
Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in
question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the
accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no title to
registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of
September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action was
instituted.

As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to
registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land
as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of
imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend beyond
the area given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It
would virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given therein, of their character of
conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit
in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion
of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining, so registration does not
entitle him to all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is
concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on
accession: and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person
through prescription.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is
covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible? NO.

HELD:

We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the
registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land.
Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is
quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil
Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land
Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter
protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties.
But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein
certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought
registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the
present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became
registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by
registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.
 
 
 
 
  
 
[18] International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Phils. v. University of the Philippines 
G.R. No. 52518 | August 13, 1991 | Registration under PD1529 | Reyes J. | Saquido 
 
Petitioner: International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Phils.  
Respondents: University of the Philippines 
 
Case  Doctrine:  When  it  ceded  and  transferred  the  property  to  UP,  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines 
completely  removed  it  from  the  public  domain  and,  more  specifically,  in  respect  to  the  areas  covered  by 
the  timber  license  of  petitioner,  removed  and  segregated  it  from  a  public  forest;  it  divested  itself  of  its 
rights  and  title  thereto  and  relinquished  and  conveyed  the  same  to  the  UP;  and  made  the  latter  the 
absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing concession. 
 
FACTS: 
 
International  Hardwood  was  the  grantee  of  aLicense  Agreement  effective  until  1985.  In  1961,  proc  791 
segregates  from  the  public  domain  parcels  of  land  and  reserved  them  for  use  by UP. The land subject of 
Hardwood’s  timber  concession  was  covered  by  said  proclamation.  In  1964,  RA3990  was  enacted  full, 
ceding  ownership  over  the  land  described  in  Proc  791  to  UP.  UP  sought  to  collect  forestry  charges  from 
Hardwood  and  demanded  that  the  latter  subject  itself  to  the  control  and  supervision  of  UP.  Hardwood 
resisted and held a petition for declaratory relief.  
 
Respondents  assert  that  under  RA  3990  Republic  of  Philippines  may  effect  collection  of  forest  charges 
through  university  of  the  Philippines,  and  that  having  been  vested  with  administrative  jurisdiction  and 
ownership  of  the  land,  UP  has  acquired  full  control  and  benefit  of  the  timber  and  other  resources  within 
the area. 
 
Petitioner  refutes  the  foregoing  arguments  of  respondents  by  asserting  that:  (a)  The  UP  has  not  been 
granted  by  R.A. No. 3990 the authority to collect forest charges or the authority to supervise the operation 
by the petitioner of the timber concession affected by said Act. 
 
ISSUE/S: 
1. Whether or not UP has been granted authority to collect forest charges (NO)  
2. Whether  or  not  UP  has  been  granted  authority  to  supervise  the  operation  of  the  timber 
concessions of the petitioner. (YES) 
 
HELD: 
1. Under  Section  262  of  the  Tax  Code,  as  amended,  the  duties  incident  to the measuring of forest 
products  and  the  collection of the charges thereon shall be discharged by the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue  under  the  regulations  of  the  Department  of  Finance.  The  reforestation  fee  shall  be  9 
collected  by the Bureau of Forestry. The supervision and regulation of the use of forest products 
and  of  the  cutting  and  10  removal  of  forest  products  are  vested  upon  the  Bureau  of  Forestry. 
R.A.  No.  3990  does  not  expressly,  or  even  impliedly,  grant  the  UP  any  authority  to  collect  from 
the  holders  of  timber  concessions  on  the area ceded to it forest charges due and payable to the 
Government  under  the  Tax  Code,  or  to  enforce  its  provisions  relating  to  charges  on  forest 
products or to supervise the operations of the concessions by the holders thereof. 
  
2. The  court  held  that  Under  Proclamation  No.  791,  dated  25  September  1961,  a  parcel  of  land  of 
the  public  domain  described  therein,  with  an  area  of  3,500  hectares,  which  is  the  very  parcel  of 
land  subject  of  R.A.  No.  3990,  was  withdrawn  from  sale  or  settlement  and  was  reserved  for  the 
College  of  Agriculture  of  the  UP  as  experiment  station  for  the  proposed  Dairy  Research  and 
Training  Institute  and  for  research  and  production  studies  of  said  college,  subject  however  to 
private  rights,  if  any,  and  to  the  condition  that  the disposition of timber and other forest products 
found  thereon  shall be subject to forestry laws and regulations. Pursuant, to R.A. No. 3990 which 
establishes  a  central  experiment  station  for  the  use  of  the  UP  in  connection  with  its  research 
and  extension  functions,  particularly  by  the  College  of  Agriculture,  College  of  Veterinary 
Medicine  and  College  of  Arts  and  Sciences,  the  above  “reserved”  area  was  “ceded  and 
transferred  in  full  ownership  to  the  University  of  the  Philippines  subject  to  any  existing 
concessions,  if  any.”  When  it  ceded  and  transferred  the  property  to  UP,  the  Republic  of  the 
Philippines  completely  removed  it  from  the  public  domain  and,  more  specifically,  in  respect  to 
the  areas  covered  by  the  timber  license  of  petitioner,  removed  and  segregated  it  from  a  public 
forest;  it  divested  itself  of its rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to 
the  UP;  and  made  the  latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing concession. 
That  the  law  intended  a  transfer  of  the  absolute  ownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use 
of  the  word  “full”  to  describe  it.  Full  means  entire,  complete, or possessing all particulars, or not 
wanting  in  any  essential  quality.  The  proviso  regarding  existing  concessions  refers  to  the timber 
license  of  petitioner.  All  that  it  means,  however,  is  that  the right of petitioner as a timber licensee 
must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of 
the  Philippines  is  concerned,  all  its  rights  as  grantor  of  the  license  were  effectively  assigned, 
ceded  and  conveyed  to  UP  as  a  consequence  of  the  above  transfer  of  full  ownership.  This  is 
further  borne  out  by  Section  3  of  R.A.  No.  3990  which  provides,  inter  alia,  that  “any  incidental 
receipts  or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines.” 
Having  been  effectively  segregated  and  removed  from  the  public  domain  or  from  a public forest 
and,  in  effect,  converted  into  a  registered  private  woodland,  the  authority  and  jurisdiction  of  the 
Bureau  of  Forestry  over  it  were  likewise  terminated.  This  is  obvious  from  the  fact  that  the 
condition  in  Proclamation  No.  971  to  the  effect  that  the  disposition  of  timber  shall  be subject to 
forestry  laws  and  regulations  is  not  reproduced  in  R.A.  No.  3990.  The  latter  does  not  likewise 
provide  that  it  is  subject  to  the conditions set forth in the proclamation. An owner has the right to 
enjoy  and  dispose  of  a  thing  without  other  limitations  than  those established by law. The right to 
enjoy  includes  the  jus  utendi  or  the  right  to  receive  from  the  thing  what  it  produces,  and  the  jus 
abutendi,  or  the  right  to  consume  the  thing  by  its  use.  As  provided  for  in  Article  441  of  the  Civil 
Code,  to  the  owner  belongs  the  natural  fruits,  the  industrial  fruits  and  the  civil  fruits.  There  are, 
however,  exceptions  to  this rules, as where the property is subject to a usufruct, in which case the 
usufructuary  gets  the  fruits.  In  the  instant  case,  that  exception  is  made  for  the  petitioner  as 
licensee  or  grantee  of  the  concession,  which  has  been  given  the  license  to  cut,  collect,  and 
remove  timber  from  the  area  ceded  and  transferred  to  UP  until  1  February  1985.  However, it has 
the  correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, 
at  the  same  rate  as  provided  for  in  the  Agreement.  The  charges  should  not  be  paid  anymore  to 
the  Republic  of  the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue because of the very nature 
of  the  transfer  as  aforestated.  Consequently,  even  the  Bureau  of  Internal  Revenue  automatically 
lost  its  authority  and  jurisdiction  to  measure  the  timber  cut  from  the  subject  area  and  to  collect 
forestry charges and other fees due thereon.   
 21. REPUBLIC v. CA 
G.R. No. L-40912 | September 30, 1976 | Registration under P.D. No. 1529 | Martin, J. | Sato 
 
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Mindanao Medical Center 
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alejandro Y. De Jesus 
 
Case Doctrine : 
Section  122  of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands, provides 
that  "Whenever  public  lands  in  the  Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or 
to  the  Government  of  the  Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private 
corporations,  the  same  shall  be  brought  forthwith  under  the  operation  of  this  Act  [Land Registration Act, 
Act 496] and shall become registered lands. 
 
FACTS: 
Eugenio  de Jesus, the father of Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent of a 
33-hectare  land  situated  in  Barrio  Libaron,  Municipality of Davao. A bidding was held and Sales applicant 
Eugenio  de  Jesus  was  the  lone  bidder.  The  Director  of  Lands  issued  to  Eugenio  de  Jesus  an  Order  of 
Award.  Because  the  area  conveyed  had  not  been  actually surveyed at the time Eugenio de Jesus filed his 
Sales  Application,  the  Bureau  of  Lands  conducted  a  survey.  The  land  awarded  to  Eugenio  de  Jesus  was 
designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400 hectares. 
The  Director  of  Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a 
portion  of  the  land covered by Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for 
military  camp  site  purposes.  The  area  excluded  was  identified  as  Lot  1176-B-2,  the  very  land  in 
question,  consisting  of  12.8081  hectares.  Director  of  Lands  Jose  P.  Dans  ordered  the  issuance  of  a 
patent  to  Eugenio  de  Jesus,  pursuant  to  his  Sales  Application  for  "a  tract  of  land  having  an  area  of 
20.6400 hectares. 

President  Magsaysay  reserved  the  same  Lot  No.  1176-B-2  for  medical  center  site  purposes under the 
administration  of  the  Director  of  Hospital  (Proclamation  No. 350) . Mindanao Medical Center applied for 
the  Torrens  registration  of  the  12.8081-hectare  Lot  1176-B-2  with  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  Davao. 
The  Medical  Center  claimed  "fee  simple"  title  to  the  land  on  the  strength  of  Proclamation  No.  350 
reserving the area for medical center site purposes. 

Alejandro  de  Jesus,  the  son  and  successor-in-interest  of sale Eugenio de Jesus, opposed the registration 

on the ground that his father  had acquired a vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award 
issued to him by the Director of Lands. 
After  due  hearing,  the  CFI  rendered  judgment,  directing  "the  registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 in 
the  name  of  the  Mindanao  Medical  Center.  Alejandro  de  Jesus  \appealed  the  case  to  the  Court  of 
Appeals.  The  CA  decided  in  favor  of  Alejandro  de  Jesus.  Mindanao  Medical  Center  moved  for 
reconsideration,  maintaining  ownership  over  the  entire  area  of  12.8081  hectares,  but the Appellate Court 
in a Special Division of Five denied the motion 
ISSUE/S: 
Whether or not Mindanao Medical Center has a registrable title over Lot 1176-B-2? (YES) 
 
HELD: 
Mindanao  Medical  Center  has  a  registrable  title  over  the  whole  contested  area  of  12.8081  hectares, 
designated  as  Lot  No.  1176-B-2.  Proclamation  No.  350,  dated  October  9,  1956,  of  President  Magsaysay 
legally  effected  a  land  grant  to  the  Mindanao  Medical  Center,  Bureau of Medical Services, Department of 
Health,  of  the  whole  lot,  validly  sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land 
grant  is  constitutive  of  a  "fee  simple"  title  or  absolute  title  in  favor  of  Mindanao  Medical  Center.  Thus, 
Section  122  of  the  Act,  which  governs  the  registration  of  grants  or  patents  involving  public  lands, 
provides  that  "Whenever  public  lands  in  the  Philippine  Islands  belonging  to  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  or  to  the  Government  of  the  Philippines  are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or 
to  public  or  private  corporations,  the  same  shall  be  brought  forthwith  under  the  operation  of  this  Act 
[Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become registered lands. 
 
Proclamation  No.  350  is  free  of  any  legal  infirmity.  It  proceeds  from  the  recognized competence of the 
President  to  reserve by executive proclamation alienable lands of the public domain for a specific public 
use  or  service.  Section  64  (e)  of  the  Revised  Administrative  Code  empowers  the  President  "(t)o  reserve 
from  sale  or  other  disposition  and  for  specific  public  uses  or  service,  any  land  belonging  to  the  private 
domain  of  the  Government  of  the Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law". The land 
reserved  "shall  be  used  for  the  specific  purposes  directed  by  such  executive  order  until  otherwise 
provided by law." 
 
It  is  true  that  Proclamation  No.  350  states  that  the  same  is  subject  to  "private rights, if any there be," but 
Alejandro  de  Jesus  failed  to  prove  any  private  rights  over  the  property  reserved.  Well-settled  is  the  rule 
that unless the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that a certain portion of the public 
domain  was  acquired  by  him  or  his  ancestors  either  by  composition  title from the Spanish Government 
or  by  possessory information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands, such as grants 
or patents, the property must be held to be part of the public domain 
   
 14. REPUBLIC v. CORTEZ
G.R. No. 186639 | February 5, 2014 | Registration under P.D. 1529 | Reyes, J | Segovia

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines

Respondents: Emmanuel C. Cortez

Case Doctrine :

REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 14(1) P.D. 1529

The applicant must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved
area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.

REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 14(2) P.D. 1529

Although lands of the public domain that are considered patrimonial may be acquired by prescription
under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529, before acquisitive prescription could commence, the property
sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable and disposable; it must also be declared
by the State that it is no longer intended for public use, public service or the development of the national
wealth. Thus, absent an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of public
dominion. 2

FACTS:
Emmanuel Cotez filed with the RTC an application for judicial confirmation of title over a parcel of land
located in Pateros, Manila. In support of his application, Cortez submitted documents such as tax
declarations (1966-2005), survey plan of the property with an annotation that the property is classified as
alienable and disposable, technical description of the property, with a certificate issued by a geodetic
engineer; tax clearance certificate; extrajudicial settlement of estate, and Excritura de particion
extrajudicial dated July 19, 1946 allocating the property to Felicisima Cotas - Cortez’ mother.

Cotez claimed that the parcel of land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of his mother. He
alleged that Lot 2697 was inherited by his mother from her parents in 1946 and after his parents died, the
subject property was allocated to him. He alleged that the property had been in possession of the family
since time immemorial and that the parcel of land is not part of the reservation of the DENR and is
classified as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development. Cortez presented Ernesto
Santos who testified that he had known the family of Cortez for over 60 years and that Cortez and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since he came to know them.

RTC - granted Cortez’ application for registration

Republic of the Philippines appealed to the CA alleging that RTC erred in granting the application for
registration despite Cortez’ failure to comply with the requirements for original registration of title.
RP alleged that no document was presented that would establish that Cortez and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the property for more
than thirty (30) years. Moreover, there was no certification from any government agency that the subject
property had already been declared alienable and disposable.

CA - Dismissed Republic of the Philippines’ appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.
Ruled that Cortez was able to prove that the property was alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the
declaration/notation from the BFD and that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, which under Sec. 14
(2) of P.D. 1529, sufficed to convert it to private property.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Cortez’ failed to comply with the legal requirements for registration of property
under Sec. 14(1) and (2) of P.D. 1529 - YES

HELD:
Cortez failed to comply with the legal requirements for registration of the property under Sec. 14(1) and
(2) of P.D. 1529.

REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 14(1) P.D. 1529

Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public
land acquired under Section 48 (b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by P.D. No. 1073. "Under Section 14 (1)
[of P.D. No. 1529], applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish:
1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain;
2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
3) third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the property forms part of the alienable
and disposable lands of public domain, Cortez presented a survey plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer
Fernandez and certified by the Land Management Bureau of the DENR. However, his reliance on the
annotation in the survey plan does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption
that the property remains part of the inalienable public domain.

The applicant must at the very least submit a certification from the proper government agency
stating that the parcel of land subject of the application for registration is indeed alienable and
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.

In Republic v. Roche, the Court held that the applicant must present a certificate of land
classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He
must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through
survey by the CENRO or PENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian
of the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.

The annotation in the survey plan presented by Cortez is not the kind of evidence required by law as
proof that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable land of public domain. Having
failed to present any incontrovertible evidence, his claim that the property forms part of the alienable and
disposable lands of public domain must fail.

For the second and third requirements, Cortez failed to establish the same. Cortez failed to present any
evidence to prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the property since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Cortez merely
presented oral and documentary of his and his mother’s ownership and possession of the property since
1946.

REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 14(2) P.D. 1529

Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 sanctions the original registration of lands required by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws.

In Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, the court clarified that lands of public domain that are patrimonial in
character are susceptible to acquisitive prescription and eligible for registration under Sec. 14(2) of P.D.
1529.

However, there must be an official declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public use, public service or for the development of national wealth before it
can be acquired by prescription. Mere declaration by government officials that a land of the public
domain is already alienable and disposable would not suffice for the purpose of registration under
Sec. 14 (2) of P.D. 1529. The period of acquisitive prescription would only begin to run from the
time the State officially declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public
use, public service or for the development of national wealth.

In this case, the Court found no evidence of any official declaration from the state attesting to the
patrimonial character of the property. Cortez failed to prove that acquisitive prescription has begun to run
against the State, much less that he has acquired title to the property by virtue thereof.