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Republic of the Philippines

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
National Prosecution Service
CITY PROSECUTION OFFICE
Province of Pangasinan
City of Udaneta

(1) REALYN NATNAT TARAPE


Complainant,
-versus- NPS DOCKET No. I-II-INV-18G-00381
For: SYNDICATED ESTAFA

SHARMAINE JUNIO CASTILLO,


HANNAH CRISTINA E. MARQUEZ,
And MHAY ANN VALDEZ LANUZA,
Respondents.

(2) JESSICA GALAPATE BAYBAYAN


Complainant,
-versus- NPS DOCKET No. I-II-INV-18G-00355
For: SYNDICATED ESTAFA

SHARMAINE JUNIO CASTILLO,


HANNAH CRISTINA E. MARQUEZ,
And MHAY ANN VALDEZ LANUZA,
Respondents.

(3) CHARIZ ANTONETTE PADUA


CHAREM V. NAGUILA
RENALYN JOY D. JARAMILLO
And MARY ANN E. BIAZON
Complainant,
-versus- NPS DOCKET No. I-II-INV-18H-00768
For: SYNDICATED ESTAFA

SHARMAINE JUNIO CASTILLO,


ROCHELLE BASING-AT PANGILINAN
HANNAH CRISTINA E. MARQUEZ,
And MHAY ANN VALDEZ LANUZA,
KRISTINE COLEEN A. MARTIN.
Respondents.

(4) MARJORIE R. DONAYTRE,


MELANIE L. PALAD,
MARIA CRISTINA LAPENA.
Complainant,
-versus- NPS DOCKET No. I-II-INV-18H-00768
For: SYNDICATED ESTAFA

SHARMAINE JUNIO CASTILLO,


ROCHELLE BASING-AT PANGILINAN
HANNAH CRISTINA E. MARQUEZ,
And MHAY ANN VALDEZ LANUZA,
KRISTINE COLEEN A. MARTIN,

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CAMILLE CYRE DELA CRUZ,
AURELLA MARQUEZ,
HAYDEE MARIA EDRADA RAMOS,
JANICE EDURA DALUSONG.
Respondents.

(5) CHRISTINE JHOY DONAYRE


MAY ANN REASONDA
ALEXANDER FLORES,
Complainant,
-versus- NPS DOCKET No. I-II-INV-18H-00373
For: SYNDICATED ESTAFA

SHARMAINE JUNIO CASTILLO,


ROCHELLE BASING-AT PANGILINAN
HANNAH CRISTINA E. MARQUEZ,
And MHAY ANN VALDEZ LANUZA,
KRISTINE COLEEN A. MARTIN,
CAMILLE CYRE DELA CRUZ,
AURELLA MARQUEZ,
HAYDEE MARIA EDRADA RAMOS,
JANICE EDURA DALUSONG.
Respondents.

(6) DESIREE D. LANDAGORA


Complainant,
-versus- NPS DOCKET No. I-II-INV-18H-00374
For: SYNDICATED ESTAFA

SHARMAINE JUNIO CASTILLO,


ROCHELLE BASING-AT PANGILINAN
HANNAH CRISTINA E. MARQUEZ,
MHAY ANN VALDEZ LANUZA,
KRISTINE COLEEN A. MARTIN,
CAMILLE CYRE DELA CRUZ,
AURELLA MARQUEZ,
HAYDEE MARIA EDRADA RAMOS,
JANICE EDURA DALUSONG.
Respondents.

(7) AURELIA NICOLAS MARQUEZ


Complainant,
-versus- NPS DOCKET No. I-II-INV-18H-00382
For: SYNDICATED ESTAFA

SHARMAINE JUNIO CASTILLO,


Respondents.

(8) HANNAH CRISTINA


EVANGILISTA MARQUEZ
Complaint,
-versus- NPS DOCKET No. I-II-INV-18H-00384
For: SYNDICATED ESTAFA

SHARMAINE JUNIO CASTILLO,

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Respondents.

Motion For Reconsideration


With Motion for Inhibition

WITH ALL DUE DEFERENCE TO THIS HONORABLE OFFICE.

COMES NOW, the Respondent SHARMAINE JUNIO CASTILLO, unto


the Honourable City Prosecutor, respectfully submits this Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion for Inhibition, and for that purpose alleges that:

1. The undersigned Respondent only received a copy of the Resolution


of the Honourable Investigating Prosecutor on October 22, 2018 - thus having ten
days within which to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Resolution,
this Motion for Reconsideration is timely filed today, this 5 th day of November
2018;

2. The dispositive portions of the assailed Resolutions of the Honourable


Investigating Prosecutors, in the respective cases, reads:

(1) NPS DOCKET No. I-II-INV-18G-00381 -

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, undersigned finds


probable cause that the crime of Estafa under Article 315 (2)(A) of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 10175 has been committed and that
respondent Sharmaine Junio Castillo is probably guilty thereof. Accordingly,
let the corresponding INFORMATION for Estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 10175 against
respondent Sharmaine Junio Castillo be FILED. x x x

(2) NPS DOCKET No. I-II-INV-18G-00355 –

WHEREFORE, finding probable cause that the crime of Swidling may


have been committed and the respondent Sharmaine Junio Castillo may be
guilty thereof, the undersigned recommends the FILING of one count of
Swindling punishable under Article 315 Paragraph 2(a), in relation to Section
6 of RA 10175.

(3) NPS DOCKET No. I-II-INV-18H-00768 -

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing the undersigned finds


probable cause that the crime of Estafa under Artcile 315(2) (a) of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to R.A. 10175 has been committed and that respondent
Sharmaine Junio Castillo is probably guilty thereof. Accordingly, let the
corresponding INFORMATION for Estafa for each of the complainant under
Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No.
10175 against respondent Sharmaine Junio Castillo be FILED. On the other

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Hand, for Lack of probable cause the complaint agianst the other respondents
is hereby respectfully recommended to be DISMISSED.

(4) NPS DOCKET No. I-II-INV-18H-00768

WHEREFORE, finding the probable cause that the crime of swindling


may have been committed and the respondent Sharmaine Junio Castillo May
be guilty thereof, the undersigned recommends the filing of Swindling
punishable under paragraph 2, Section 1, P.D. 1689 in relation to Article 315,
par. 2 (a) and Section 6 of RA 10175.

(5) NPS DOCKET No. I-II-INV-18H-00373

Therefore, let three(3) separate information be filed against respondent


Sharmaine Junio Castillo for Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 6 of RA
10175. The Charges against the other respondents are recommended
dismissed for lack of probable cause.

(6) NPS DOCKET No. I-II-INV-18H-00374

WHEREFORE, finding probable cause that the crime of Swindling may


have been committed and the respondent Sharmaine J. Castillo may be guilty
thereof, the undersigned recommends the Filing of one count of Swindling
punishable under Article 315 par. 2 (a) in relation of Section 6 of RA 10175.

(7) NPS DOCKET No. I-II-INV-18H-00382

Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing let an Information for Estafa in


relation to Section 6 of RA. 10175 be filed against Respondent.

(8) NPS DOCKET No. I-II-INV-18H-00384

Wherefore, finding probable cause that the crime of Swindling may


have been committed and the respondent Sharmaine J. Castillo may be guilty
thereof the undersigned recommends the filing of one count of Swindling
punishable under Article 315 par 2(a) in relation to Section 6 of 10175.

3. It is the humble submission of the Respondent that the assailed


Resolutions were not in accordance with the facts, law, and jurisprudence,
obtaining in the present case, as discussed hereunder;

4. Thus, the Respondent likewise prays for the inhibition of the Honorable
Investigating Prosecutors, and the entire Office of the City Prosecutor of Urdaneta
City, in the interest of justice, fairness, and equality. With all due respect, while the
Respondent strongly believes in the probity and integrity of the Honorable
Investigating Prosecutors, it would be in the best interest of all parties, for a new

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Prosecutor to take an objective and “second hard look”, so to speak, and conduct a
reinvestigation of the present matter.

Moreover, the subject case has been the subject of widespread media
attention, and unfair and unfounded publicity, by several media outlets and the
public, which may have cast undue influence on the investigation of this Honorable
Office;

5. With all due respect and deference to this Honorable Office, the
Respondents respectfully moves for the reconsideration of the above cited
Resolutions, for being contrary to the facts, law, jurisprudence, obtaining in the
present case, on the following grounds:

ISSUES
I.
THERE WAS NO DECEIT NOR FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS
AND PRETENSES FROM THE RESPONDENT, TO JUSTIFY THE
PRESENT CHARGE.

II.
THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES CHARGED ARE ABSENT IN THE
PRESENT CASE.

III.
THE LIABILITY IN THE PRESENT CASE, IF ANY, IS CIVIL IN
NATURE, AND NOT CRIMINAL.

IV.
THE “AGGRAVATING” CIRCUMSTANCE, IN RELATION TO
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10175, WAS NOT DULY AUTHENTICATED OR
PROVEN, PURSUANT TO THE ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE RULE.

ARGUMENTS / DISCUSSION
I.
THERE WAS NO DECEIT NOR FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS
AND PRETENSES FROM THE RESPONDENT.

The Respondent in the assailed Resolutions and corresponding Information,


was charged with alleged violation of Article 315 (2a), which provides xxx

2.     by means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts


executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud:

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(a)          by using fictitious name, or actions, falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualification, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

The elements of the crime of estafa under the foregoing  provision are: (1)
there must be a false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means; (2) such false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have
relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means and was thus
induced to part with his money or property; and (4) as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage.”

In the present case, there was no such false pretenses nor assurances that
were employed by the Respondent against the Complainants. The transactions
mentioned therein, as detailed hereunder, all pertained to truthful and legitimate
businesses and transactions, thus negating the allegations of the Complainants, the
truth of the matter being:

It is undisputed from the record that the Respondent is the sole proprietor of
C&G Dry Goods, engaged in the business of wholesale and retail trading of “ukay-
ukay.” Apart from the aforementioned business, the Respondent is also engaged in
other businesses, namely: C&G Party Needs and Merchandise, Kios Arts and
Crafts Merchandise, C&G Snack Pacl, C&G Trendy Clothing Botique Shop, and a
franchise of M.Lhuiller, all of which are legitimate and registered businesses.

The aforementioned businesses, are duly registered with the concnered


government agencies, namely: the Office of the City Mayor and the Department of
Trade and Industry, and other concerned government agencies.

Such fact and circumstances, namely that the money of herein


Complainants, were being LOANED, to finance and support the said legitimate
businesses, were duly and thoroughly explained to the Complainant, thus negating
any false pretense or assurances.

Hence, herein Complainants, in their understandable desire to recover the


money they loaned to the Respondent, appears to be using this Esteemed and
Honorable Office as a means to collect the said amounts, by filing this baseless and
unwarranted suit.

Since the aforementioned businesses are legitimate, duly-accredited, and


registered entity, contrary to the allegations of the Complainant that it was a
fictitious and non-existent enterprise, the Respondent cannot be held liable under
the aforementioned provision of Article 315, since there is no misrepresentation,
nor fraudulent pretenses and assurances, in the first place.

It is fundamental and elementary that a bare or mere, accusation or


allegation is not equivalent to proof or evidence. In the present case, there was
even no evidence introduced by the Complainants, to show that the aforementioned
businesses were fictitious or non-existent.

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II.
THE ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA ARE ABSENT IN THE PRESENT CASE.

In the present case, there was no showing of any deceit or estafa employed
by the Respondent. The Supreme Court enunciates in a plethora of cases, that:

It must be noted that our Revised Penal Code was enacted to penalize
unlawful acts accompanied by evil intent denominated as crimes mala in se. The
principal consideration is the existence of malicious intent. There is a concurrence
of freedom, intelligence and intent which together make up the “criminal mind”
behind the “criminal act.” Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must, generally and
in most cases, be accompanied by a criminal intent.Actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea. No crime is committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of is innocent.1

As the Supreme Court also held in Tabuena  vs. Sandiganbayan2, 

“Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a
crime.  Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.  There can be no crime when the
criminal mind is wanting.”

American jurisprudence echoes the same principle. It adheres to the view


that criminal intent in embezzlement is not based on technical mistakes as to the
legal effect of a transaction honestly entered into, and there can be no
embezzlement if the mind of the person doing the act is innocent or if there is no
wrongful purpose.

Further, the elements of the crime of estafa under the foregoing  provision
are: (1) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means; (2)
such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party
must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means and was
thus induced to part with his money or property; and (4) as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage.”

As discussed in the foregoing discussion, there were no false pretenses or


assurances were employed by the Respondent. Hence, there exists no probable
cause to indict the Respondent for the charge of Estafa.

In the present case, not a scintilla of evidence was adduced to prove the
element of deceit, as to warrant the finding of Estafa in the present case. Since
there is no factual basis, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense
and must be established by satisfactory proof to warrant conviction, or in this case,
probable cause for Estafa.  It is likewise fundamental that good faith is a defense
in malum in se, such as estafa.

1 PEOPLE VS. OJEDA, (G.R. NOS. 104238-58, JUNE 2004)


2 268 SCRA 332 [1997]
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III.
THE LIABILITY IN THE PRESENT CASE, IF ANY, IS CIVIL IN
NATURE, AND NOT CRIMINAL.

It is apparent and glaring that the nature of the transaction of the parties in
the present case, was not an investment contract, but rather a Contract of Loan. It
was made clear to the Complainants, that the Respondent had a legitimate
business, namely: C&G Dry Goods, engaged in the business of wholesale and
retail trading of “ukay-ukay”, apart from her other businesses.

Thus, the nature of the transaction of the parties, was that the Complainants
would loan her an amount, which she would use to infuse into her business of
purchasing the bales of ukay-ukay. The profits derived therefrom would be
returned to the Complainants, by way of interest, of the loan they extended to her.
Thus, absent any written document as to the nature of their transaction, the
Contract of Loan, is more in accordance with the evidence on record.

Further, the Supreme Court has stated in a plethora of cases, that the
equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfil the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The
equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly
balanced, the constitutional, presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of
the accused. 3

In Eusebio-Calderon v. People,4 the Supreme Court has ruled in a similar


case, that the Accused "did not employ trickery or deceit in obtaining money
from the private complainants, instead, it concluded that the money obtained
was undoubtedly loans for which [Calderon] paid interest." 

The ruling was similar in People v. Cuyugan.5 In that case, the Supreme
Court acquitted Cuyugan of estafa for failure of the prosecution to prove fraud. It
held that the transaction between Cuyugan and private complainants was a loan to
be used by Cuyugan in her business. Thus, this Court ruled that Cuyugan has the
obligation, which is civil in character, to pay the amount borrowed.

The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that when the source of the
obligation is in fact, a contract, as in a contract of loan, it takes a position
completely inconsistent with the presence of estafa. In estafa, a person parts with
his money because of abuse of confidence or deceit. In a contract, a person
willingly binds himself or herself to give something or to render some
service.50 In estafa, the accused's failure to account for the property received
amounts to criminal fraud. In a contract, a party's failure to comply with his

3 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS, ALEX
BAUTISTA, AND RICKY BAUTISTA ACCUSED, G.R. No. 207662, April 13, 2016
4 G.R. No. 158495, October 21, 2004, 441 SCRA 137.
5 G.R. Nos. 146641-43, November 18, 2002, 392 SCRA 140.

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obligation is only a contractual breach. Thus, any finding that the source of
obligation is a contract negates estafa. The finding, in turn, means that there is no
civil liability ex delicto. Thus, the rulings in the foregoing cases are consistent with
the concept of fused civil and criminal actions, and the different sources of
obligations under our laws.6

IV.
THE “AGGRAVATING” CIRCUMSTANCE, IN RELATION TO
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10175, WAS NOT DULY AUTHENTICATED OR
PROVEN THROUGH THE ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE RULE.

In the assailed Resolutions, the Honorable Investigating Prosecutors,


appreciated the provisions of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10175, thus, in effect,
“aggravating” the present charge, thus:

Section 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of
information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant
provisions of this Act. Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1)
degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
special laws, as the case may be.

The aforementioned circumstance was supposedly appreciated, given the


fact that the alleged transactions transpired online or were done through the social
media platform, FACEBOOK.

However, in the present case, the mere fact was supported only by the self-
serving and bare allegations of the Complainants. Worse, the Complainants failed
to comply with the Authentication of Record Documents. Absent the
authentication, the aforementioned circumstance cannot be considered by the
Investigating Prosecutor, since said documents, may have been tampered or are
inexistent.

The Rules On Electronic Evidence7, provide:

RULE 5 - AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS 


    
SECTION 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to
introduce an electronic document IN ANY LEGAL PROCEEDING has the
burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule. 

SEC. 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic


document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be
proved by any of the following means: 

6 GLORIA S. DY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 189081, August 10, 2016

7 A.M. NO. 01-7-01-SC

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(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have
signed the same; 
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be
authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic
documents were applied to the document; or 
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the
judge. 

RULE 7 

EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS 


SECTION 1. Factors for assessing evidentiary weight. - In assessing the
evidentiary weight of an electronic document, the following factors may be
considered: 

(a) The reliability of the manner or method in which it was generated,


stored or communicated, including but not limited to input and output procedures,
controls, tests and checks for accuracy and reliability of the electronic data
message or document, in the light of all the circumstances as well as any relevant
agreement; 

(b) The reliability of the manner in which its originator was identified; 

(c) The integrity of the information and communication system in which it is


recorded or stored, including but not limited to the hardware and computer
programs or software used as well as programming errors; 

(d) The familiarity of the witness or the person who made the entry with the
communication and information system; 

(e) The nature and quality of the information which went into the
communication and information system upon which the electronic data message or
electronic document was based; or 

(f) Other factors which the court may consider as affecting the accuracy or
integrity of the electronic document or electronic data message. 

SEC. 2. Integrity of an information and communication system. – In any


dispute involving the integrity of the information and communication system in
which an electronic document or electronic data message is recorded or stored,
the court may consider, among others, the following factors: 

(a) Whether the information and communication system or other similar


device was operated in a manner that did not affect the integrity of the electronic
document, and there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the
information and communication system; 

(b) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored by a party to


the proceedings with interest adverse to that of the party using it; or 
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(c) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored in the usual
and ordinary course of business by a person who is not a party tot he proceedings
and who did not act under the control of the party using it. 

xxx 
     
RULE 9 

METHOD OF PROOF 

SECTION 1. Affidavit of evidence. – All matters relating to the admissibility


and evidentiary weight of an electronic document may be established by an
affidavit stating facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiant or based on
authentic records. The affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of the
affiant to testify on the matters contained therein. 

SEC. 2.  Cross-examination of deponent. – The affiant shall be made to


affirm the contents of the affidavit in open court and may be cross-examined as a
matter of right by the adverse party.  

The proceeding of preliminary investigation by this Honorable Office, is


obviously a legal proceeding. Thus, considering the fact that the evidence on
record, is electronic in nature, there must have been a compliance or submission to
the provisions of the Electronic Evidence Rule. Not a scintilla of any compliance
with the foregoing provisions, were performed by herein Complainants. Thus, their
evidence must fail.

No less than the Supreme Court has stated that,

But we cannot overemphasize the admonition to agencies tasked with the


preliminary investigation and prosecution of crimes that the very purpose of a
preliminary investigation is to shield the innocent from precipitate, spiteful and
burdensome prosecution. They are duty-bound to avoid, unless absolutely
necessary, open and public accusation of crime not only to spare the innocent the
trouble, expense and torment of a public trial, but also to prevent unnecessary
expense on the part of the State for useless and expensive trials.8

A preliminary investigation .is "merely inquisitorial," 9 and is only


conducted to aid the prosecutor in preparing the information. It serves a two-fold
purpose: first, to protect the innocent against wrongful prosecutions; and second,
to spare the state from using its funds and resources in useless prosecutions.
In Salonga v. Cruz-Paño.10

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against


hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and

8 VENUS V. DESIERTO, G.R. NO. 130319, OCTOBER 21, 1998, 298 SCRA 196, 221.
9 PILAPIL V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. I 01978, APRIL 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 349, 357
10 219 PHIL. 402 (1985)
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public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial,
and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials.11

Prayer

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Office for


reasons above-stated to:

1. Inhibit from resolving the present case, and elevate/transmit the same to
the respective body of the Department of Justice;

2. Reconsider the assailed Resolution, in the above-docketed cases, of the


Honorable Investigating Prosecutor, finding probable cause for violation
of Estafa against the Respondent;

3. Upon a careful review of the facts and law obtaining in the present case,
recommend the withdrawal of the aforementioned Resolution and
corresponding Information.

Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are also prayed for.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED AT URDANETA CITY, PROVINCE


OF PANGASINAN, PHILIPPINES, THIS 5TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2018.

SHARMAINE JUNIO CASTILLO

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)


DONE IN THE CITY OF BAGUIO) S.S.

Verification

I, SHARMAINE JUNIO CASTILLO, of legal age, married, Filipino


Citizen, and with residence at ____________________, after having been duly
sworn in accordance with law, depose and state that:

1. I am the Respondent in the above-stated case;

2. That I caused the preparation of the foregoing Motion for


Reconsideration;

3. That I have read the contents thereof and the facts stated therein are
true and correct of my personal knowledge and/or on the basis of
copies of documents and records in my possession;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby affix my signature this 5th day of


November 2018, at Urdaneta City, Philippines.
11 TROCIO V. MANTA, 203 PHIL. 618 (1982) AND HASHIM V. BONCAN, 71PHIL.216 (1941)

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SHARMAINE JUNIO CASTILLO

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 5th day of


November 2018, at Urdaneta City, Philippines. I hereby certify that I have
examined the Affiant, who is personally known to me, and that I am fully satisfied
that he has voluntarily executed and understood the contents of the foregoing
Motion for Reconsideration.

ADMINISTERING OFFICER

COPY FURNISHED:

PARTIES

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