People V Jose 37 SCRA 450

2/17/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 037
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Jose
46
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME
JOSE Y GOMEZ,BASILIO PINEDA,JR., alias “BOY,”
EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and ROGELIO CAÑAL
Y SEVILLA, defendants-appellants.
Remedial law; Evidence; Forcible abduction; When evidence is

clear and overwhelming.—The evidence is clear and
overwhelming that all the appellants participated in the forcible
abduction. Miss De la Riva declared on the witness stand, as well
as in her sworn statements, that they helped one another in
dragging her into the car against her will; that she did not know
them personally; that while inside the car, Jose and Aquino,
between whom she was seated, toyed with her body, the former
forcing his lips on hers, and the latter touching her thighs and
raising her skirt; that meaningful and knowing glances were in
the meanwhile being exchanged among the four; and that all of
them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This
testimony, whose evidenciary weight has not in the least been
overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to establish the
crimes charged in the amended complaint. In the light thereof,
appellants’ protestation that they were not motivated by lewd
designs must be rejected as absolutely without factual basis.
Same; Same; Rape; Absence of spermatozoa.—The absence of
spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape, the
important consideration being, not the emission of semen, but
penetration.
Same; Same; When self injuries are disproved by evidences.—
It is difficult to imagine that any sane woman, who is single and
earning as much as Miss De la Riva did, would inflict injuries on
her genital organ by puncturing the same with a sharply-pointed
instrument in order to strike back at four strangers who allegedly
would not pay her the sum of P900.00 due her for a striptease act.
Besides, Dr. Brion testified that the insertion of such an
instrument in the genital organ would not result in the kind of
injuries he found in the mucosa of the cervix.
Same; Same; Res gestae; When victim confided to her mother
immediately the incident upon arrival.—Other evidence and
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000177ae9bca7d3a0581ed003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/38
considerations exist which indubitably establish the commission

of successive rapes by the four appellants. Upon Miss De la Riva’s
arrival at her house in the morning of June 26, 1967, she
immediately told her mother, “Mommy, Mommy, I have been
raped. All four of them raped me.” This utterance,
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VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 6, 1971 451
People vs. Jose
which is part of the res gestae, commands strong probative value,

considering that it was made by the complainant to her mother
who, in cases of this nature, was the most logical person in whom
a daughter would confide the truth. x x x Equally important is
complainant’s public disclosure of her tragedy, which led to the
examination of her private parts and lay her open to risks of
future public ridicule and diminution of popularity and earnings
as a movie actress.
Same; Same; Extrajudicial statements; When extrajudicial
statements were taken in the presence of several people and
subscribed and sworn to before the City Fiscal of Quezon City.—
We are not convinced that the statements were involuntarily
given, or that the details recited therein were concocted by the
authorities. The statements were given in the presence of several
people and subscribed and sworn to before the City Fiscal of
Quezon City, to whom neither of the aforesaid appellants
intimated the use of inordinate methods by the police. They are
replete with details which could hardly be known to the police;
and although it is suggested that the authorities could have
secured such details from their various informers, no evidence at
all was presented to establish the truth of such allegation.
Same; Criminal procedure; Constitutional law; Article III,
Section 1, paragraph 17 of the Constitution, Rule 112, Section 11,
Rule 113, Section 18 and Rule 115, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
construed.—The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in
point is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, par. 17 of which
provides: “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall x x x
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel x x x.” While
the said provision is identical to that in the Constitution of the
United States, in this jurisdiction the term criminal prosecutions
was interpreted by this Court, in U.S. vs. Beecham, 23 Phil. 258
(1912), in connection with a similar provision in the Philippine
Bill of Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) to
mean proceedings before the trial court from arraignment to
rendition of the judgment. Implementing the said constitutional
provisions, We have provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules
of Court that “In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be
entitled x x x (b) to be present and defend in person and by
attorney at every stage of the proceedings, that is, from the

arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment.” The only
instances where an accused is entitled to counsel before
arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second stage of the
preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the
arrest (Rule 113, Section 18). The rule in the United States need
not be unquestionably adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only
because it has no binding
452
People vs. Jose
effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the

Constitution the meaning attached thereto at the time of the
adoption thereof should be considered. And even there the said
rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the absence of
unanimity in the voting by the members of the United States
Supreme Court in all the three above-cited cases.
Criminal law; Plea of guilty; Plea of guilty is mitigating and
constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the
information; When the presence of the accused in court is not
necessary.—Pineda contends that because the charge against him
and his co-appellants is a capital offense and the amended
complaint cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved,
would raise the penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to
insist on his presence during all stages of the trial. The contention
is untenable. While a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time
it constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the
information, including the aggravating circumstances, and it
matters not that the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of
guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant circumstances
qualifying and/or aggravating the crime. Because of the aforesaid
legal effect of Pineda’s plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon
the trial court to receive his evidence, much less to require his
presence in court.
Same; Penalty; Imposition of four death penalty.—The
Supreme Court is of the opinion that in view of the existence of
conspiracy among the accused arid of its finding as regards the
nature and number of crimes committed, as well as of the
presence of aggravating circumstances, four death penalties
should be imposed in the premises.
Same; When statements during the trial do not constitute a
claim of ownership over the car used in the commission of the
crime; Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code construed.—
Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of
Mrs. Dolores Gomez, who, in the absence of strong evidence to the
contrary, must be considered as the lawful owner thereof; that the

only basis of the court a quo in concluding that the said car
belongs to appellant Jose were the latter’s statements during the
trial of the criminal case to that effect; that the said statements
were not, however, intended to be, nor could constitute, a claim of
ownership over the car adverse to his mother, but were made
simply in answer to questions propounded in court for the sole
purpose of establishing the identity of the defendant who
furnished the car used by the appellants in the commission of the
crime; that the chattel mortgage on the car and its assignment in
favor of the intervenor were made several months before the date
of the com-
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VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 6, 1971 453
People vs. Jose
mission of the crimes charged, which circumstance forecloses the

possibility of collusion to prevent the State from confiscating the
car; that the final judgment in the replevin case can only be
executed by delivering the possession of the car to the intervenor
for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and that Article 45 of the
Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an
instrument or tool used in the commission of the crime if such “be
the property of a third person not liable for the offense,” it is the
sense of this Court that the order of the court below for the
confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and that the
said car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for
foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in the replevin case.
APPEAL from and automatic review of a decision of the

Court of First Instance of Rizal. San Diego, J .
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor
Augusto M. Amores for plaintiff-appellee.
Baizas, Alberto & Associates, Andreciano F.
Caballero and Lota, Paraiso, Garcia & Dueñas for
defendant-appellant Jaime G. Jose.
Mabanag, Eliger & Associates for defendant-
appellant Basilio Pineda, Jr.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano for
defendant-appellant Edgardo P. Aquino.
Antonio Coronel Law Office and Roberto J. Ignacio
for defendant-appellant Rogelio S. Canial.
PER CURIAM:
The amended complaint filed in this case in the court

below, reads as follows:
“The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ,

BASILIO PINEDA, JR. alias “BOY,” EDUARDO AQUINO Y
PAYUMO alias “EDDIE” and ROGELIO CAÑAL Y SEVILLA
alias “ROGER,” as principals, WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO
GUANZON Y ROMERO and JESSIE GUION Y ENVOLTARIO as
accomplices, of the crime of Forcible Abduction with rape,
committed as follows:
“That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon
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People vs. Jose
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

Court, the above-named principal accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design,
forcibly abduct the undersigned complainant against her will, and
did, then and there take her, pursuant to their common criminal
design, to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, where each of the four
(4) accused, by means of force and intimidation, and with the use
of a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
complainant against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such
amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the civil
code.
“That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y
ROMERO, and JESSIE GUION y ENVOLTARIO, without taking
a direct part in the execution of the offense either by forcing,
inducing the principal accused to execute, or cooperating in its
execution by an indispensable act, did, then and there cooperate
in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts,
that is, by cooperating, aiding, abetting and permitting the
principal accused in sequestering the undersigned complainant in
one of the rooms of the Swanky Hotel then under the control of
the accused Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero and
Jessie Guion y Envoltario, thus supplying material and moral aid
in the consummation of the offense.
“That the aforestated offense has been attended by the
following aggravating circumstances:
1. Use of a motor vehicle.

2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission
of the crime and to make its discovery difficult;
3. Abuse of superior strength;
4. That means were employed or circumstances brought
about which added ignominy to the natural effects of the
act; and
That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be

5. deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not
necessary for the commission.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty to the

charge imputed in the above-quoted amended complaint;
however, in an order dated July 11, 1967, the court
reserved judgment “until such time as the prosecution shall
have concluded presenting all of its evidence to prove the
aggravating circumstances listed in the complaint.” Upon
the other hand, the rest of the defendants
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People vs. Jose
went to trial on their respective pleas of not guilty. After

hearing on the merits, the court below rendered its decision
on October 2, 1967, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio

Cañal, Eduardo Aquino and Basilio Pineda, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape as
described under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and hereby sentences each of them to the death penalty to be
executed at a date to be set and in the manner provided for by
law; and each to indemnify the complainant in the amount of ten
thousand pesos. On the ground that the prosecution has failed to
establish a prima facie case against the accomplices Wong Lay
Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero, and Jessie Guion y
Envoltario, the Motion to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf is
hereby granted, and the case dismissed against the
aforementioned accused.
“Insofar as the car used in the abduction of the victim which
Jaime Jose identified by pointing to it from the window of the
courtroom and pictures of which were submitted and marked as
Exhibits “M” and “M-1,” and which Jaime Jose in his testimony
admitted belonged to him, pursuant to Art. 45 of the Revised
Penal Code, which requires the confiscation and forfeiture of the
proceeds or instruments of the crime, the Court hereby orders its
confiscation.”
This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal

interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr., Edgardo Aquino, and
Jaime Jose, and for automatic review as regards Rogelio
Cañal. However, for practical purposes all of them shall
hereafter be referred to as appellants.
The complainant, Magdalena “Maggie” de la Riva, was,

at the time of the incident, 25 years old and single; she
graduated from high school in 1958 at Maryknoll College
and finished the secretarial course in 1960 at St. Theresa’s
College. Movie actress by profession, she was receiving
P8,000.00 per picture. It was part of her work to perform in
radio broadcasts and television shows, where she was paid
P800.00 per month in permanent shows, P300.00 per
month in live promotional shows, and from P100.00 to
P200.00 per appearance as guest in other shows.
So it was that at about 4:30 o’clock in the morning of
June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva, homeward bound from
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People vs. Jose
the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, was driving

her bantam car accompanied by her maid Helen Calderon,
who was also at the front seat. Her house was at No. 48,
12th Street, New Manila, Quezon City. She was already
near her destination when a Pontiac two-door convertible
car with four men aboard (later identified as the four
appellants) came abreast of her car and tried to bump it.
She stepped on her brakes to avoid a collision, and then
pressed on the gas and swerved her car to the left, at which
moment she was already in front of her house gate; but
because the driver of the other car (Basilio Pineda, Jr.) also
accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided for the
second time. This prompted Miss De la Riva, who was
justifiably annoyed, to ask: “Ano ba?” Forthwith, Pineda
stopped the car which he was driving, jumped out of it and
rushed towards her.
The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that
she tooted the horn of her car continuously. Undaunted,
Pineda opened the door of Miss De la Riva’s car and
grabbed the lady’s left arm. The girl held on tenaciously to
her car’s steering wheel and, together with her maid,
started to scream. Her strength, however, proved no match
to that of Pineda, who succeeded in pulling her out of her
car. Seeing her mistress’ predicament, the maid jumped out
of the car and took hold of Miss De la Riva’s right arm in
an effort to free her from Pineda’s grip. The latter,
however, was able to drag Miss De la Riva toward the
Pontiac convertible car, whose motor was all the while
running.
When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda,
was very near the Pontiac car, the three men inside started
to assist their friend: one of them held her by the neck,
while the two others held her arms and legs. All three were
now pulling Miss De la Riva inside the car. Before she was
completely in, appellant Pineda jumped unto the driver’s
seat and sped away in the direction of Broadway Street.
The maid was left behind.
The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose
and Edgardo Aquino at the back seat; Basilio Pineda,
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People vs. Jose
Jr. was at the wheel, while Rogelio Cañal was seated

beside him. Miss De la Riva entreated the appellants to
release her; but all she got in response were jeers, abusive
and impolite language, and threats that the appellants
would finish her with their Thompson and throw acid at
her face if she did not keep quiet. In the meantime, the two
men seated on each side of Miss De la Riva started to get
busy with her body: Jose put one arm around the
complainant and forced his lips upon hers, while Aquino
placed his arms on her thighs and lifted her skirt. The girl
tried to resist them. She continuously implored her captors
to release her, telling them that she was the only
breadwinner in the family and that her mother was alone
at home and needed her company because her father was
already dead. Upon learning of the demise of Miss De la
Riva’s father, Aquino remarked that the situation was
much better than he thought since no one could take
revenge against them. By now Miss De la Riva was
beginning to realize the futility of her pleas. She made the
sign of the cross and started to pray. The appellants
became angry and cursed her. Every now and then Aquino
would stand up and talk in whispers with Pineda, after
which the two would exchange knowing glances with Cañal
and Jose.
The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the
car around and headed towards Victoria Street. Then the
car proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Street, Shaw
Boulevard, thence to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. When
the car reached Makati, Aquino took a handkerchief from
his pocket and, with the help of Jose, blindfolded Miss De
la Riva. The latter was told not to shout or else she would
be stabbed or shot with a Thompson. Not long after, the car
came to a stop at the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City. The
blindfolded lady was led out of the car to one of the rooms
on the second floor of the hotel.
Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on a
bed. Her blindfold was removed. She saw Pineda and
Aquino standing in front of her, and Jose and Cañal sitting
beside her, all of them smiling meaningfully. Pine-
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People vs. Jose
da told the complainant: “Magburlesque ka para sa amin.”

The other three expressed their approval and ordered Miss
De la Riva to disrobe. The complainant ignored the
command. One of the appellants suggested putting off the
light so that the complainant would not be ashamed. The
idea, however, was rejected by the others, who said that it
would be more pleasurable for them if the light was on.
Miss De la Riva was told to remove her stockings, in order,
according to them, to make the proceedings more exciting.
Reluctantly, she did as directed, but so slowly did she
proceed with the assigned task that the appellants cursed
her and threatened her again with the Thompson and the
acid. They started pushing Miss De la Riva around. One of
them pulled down the zipper of her dress; another
unhooked her brassiere. She held on tightly to her dress to
prevent it from being pulled down, but her efforts were in
vain: her dress, together with her brassiere, fell on the
floor.
The complainant was now completely naked before the
four men, who were kneeling in front of her and feasting
their eyes on her private parts. This ordeal lasted for about
ten minutes, during which the complainant, in all her
nakedness, was asked twice or thrice to turn around. Then
Pineda picked up her clothes and left the room with his
other companions. The complainant tried to look for a
blanket with which to cover herself, but she could not find
one.
Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began
undressing himself. Miss De la Riva, who was sitting on
the bed trying to cover her bareness with her hands,
implored him to ask his friends to release her. Instead of
answering her, he pushed her backward and pinned her
down on the bed. Miss De la Riva and Jose struggled
against each other; and because the complainant was
putting up stiff resistance, Jose cursed her and hit her
several times on the stomach and other parts of the body.
The complainant crossed her legs tightly, but her attacker
was able to force them open. Jose succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of the complainant. He then left the
room.
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People vs. Jose
The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room
next. A struggle ensued between him and Miss De la Riva,
during which he hit her on different parts of the body. Like
Jose, Aquino succeeded in abusing the complainant. The
girl was now in a state of shock. Aquino called the others
into the room. They poured water on her face and slapped
her to revive her. Afterwards, three of the accused left the
room, leaving Pineda and the complainant. After some
struggle during which Pineda hit her, the former succeeded
in forcing his carnal desire on the latter. When the
complainant went into a state of shock for the second time,
the three other men went into the room, again poured
water on the complainant’s face and slapped her several
times. The complainant heard them say that they had to
revive her so she would know what was happening. Jose,
Aquino and Pineda then left the room. It was now
appellant Cañal’s turn. There was a struggle between him
and Miss De la Riva. Like the other three appellants before
him, he hit the complainant on different parts of the body
and succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her.
Mention must be made of the fact that while each of the
four appellants was struggling with the complainant, the
other three were outside the room, just behind the door,
threatening the complainant with acid and telling her to
give in because she could not, after all, escape, what with
their presence.
After the appellants had been through with the sexual
carnage, they gave Miss De la Riva her clothes, told her to
get dressed and put on her stockings, and to wash her face
and comb her hair, to give the impression that nothing had
happened to her. They told her to tell her mother that she
was mistaken by a group of men for a hostess, and that
when the group found out that she was a movie actress, she
was released without being harmed. She was wanted not to
inform the police; for if she did and they were apprehended,
they would simply post bail and later hunt her up and
disfigure her face with acid. The appellants then
blindfolded Miss De la Riva again and led
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People vs. Jose
her down from the hotel room. Because she was stumbling,
she had to be carried into the car. Inside the car, appellant
Jose held her head down on his lap, and kept it in that
position during the trip, to prevent her from being seen by
others.
Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the
question of where to drop Miss De la Riva. They finally
decided on a spot in front of the Free Press Building not far

from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue near Channel 5 to
make it appear, according to them, that the complainant
had just come from the studio. Pineda asked Jose to alight
and call a taxicab, but to choose one which did not come
from a well-known company. Jose did as requested, letting
several taxicabs pass by before flagging a UBL taxicab.
After they warned again Miss De la Riva not to inform
anyone of what had happened to her, appellant Cañal
accompanied her to the taxicab. The time was a little past
6:00 o’clock. When Miss De la Riva was already inside the
cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke
down and cried. She kept asking the driver if a car was
following them; and each time the driver answered her in
the negative.
It was 6:30 o’clock—or some two hours after the
abduction—when Miss De la Riva reached home. Her
mother, her brother-in-law Ben Suba, as well as several PC
officers, policemen and reporters, were at the house. Upon
seeing her mother, the complainant ran toward her and
said, “Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them
raped me.” The mother brought her daughter upstairs.
Upon her mother’s instruction, the complainant
immediately took a bath and a douche. The older woman
also instructed her daughter to douche herself two or three
times daily with a strong solution to prevent infection and
pregnancy. The family doctor, who was afterwards
summoned, treated the complainant for external physical
injuries. The doctor was not, however, told about the sexual
assaults. Neither was Pat. Pablo Pascual, the police officer
who had been sent by the desk officer, Sgt. Dimla, to the De
la Riva residence when the latter re-
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People vs. Jose
ceived from a mobile patrol a report of the snatching. When

Miss De la Riva arrived home from her harrowing
experience, Pat. Pascual attempted to question her, but
Ben Suba requested him to postpone the interrogation until
she could be ready for it. At that time, mother and
daughter were still undecided on what to do.
On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant’s
family gathered to discuss what steps, if any, should be
taken. After some agonizing moments, a decision was
reached: the authorities had to be informed. Thus, early on
the morning of June 29, 1967, or on the fourth day after the
incident, Miss De la Riva, accompanied by her lawyer, Atty.
Regina O. Benitez, and by some members of the family,
went to the Quezon City Police Department Headquarters,

filed a complaint and executed a statement (Exh. “B”)
wherein she narrated the incident and gave descriptions of
the four men who abused her. In the afternoon of the same
day, the complainant submitted herself to a medico-
internal examination by Dr. Ernesto Brion, NBI Chief
Medico-Legal Officer.
During the physical examination of the complainant by
Dr. Brion on June 29, 1967, Pat. Pascual was also at the
NBI office. There he received a telephone call from the
police headquarters to the effect that one of the suspects
had been apprehended. That evening, the complainant and
Pat. Pascual proceeded to the headquarters where Miss De
la Riva identified appellant Jaime Jose from among a
group of persons inside the Office of the Chief of Police of
Quezon City as one of the four men who abducted and
raped her. She executed another statement (Exh. “B-1”)
wherein she made a formal identification of Jose and
related the role played by him.
At about 9:00 o’clock of the same evening, appellant Jose
executed a statement (Exh. “I”) before Pat. Marcos G.
Viñas. In his statement, which was duly sworn, Jose
admitted that he knew about, and was involved in, the
June 26 incident. He named the other three appellants as
his companions. Jose stated, among other things, that upon
the initiative of Pineda, he and the other three
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People vs. Jose
waited for Miss De la Riva to come out of the ABS Studio;

that his group gave chase to the complainant’s car; that it
was Pineda who blindfolded her; and that only Pineda and
Aquino criminally assaulted the complainant.
After Exh. “I” was executed by Jose, an informant
furnished Pat. Viñas with a picture of appellant Edgardo
Aquino. The picture was shown to Miss De la Riva, who
declared in her sworn statement (Exh. “B-3”) that the man
in the picture was one of her abductors and rapists. The
same picture was shown to Jose, who, in another sworn
statement (Exh. “I-1”), identified the man in the picture as
appellant Aquino.
After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell
into the hands of the authorities: Pineda and Cañal on July
1, 1967, in Lipa City, and Aquino on July 5, 1967, in the
province of Batangas. On the evening of July 1, 1967, Miss
De la Riva pointed to Pineda and Cañal as among the four
persons who abducted and raped her. She picked them out
from among several persons in the Office of the Chief of
Police of Quezon City. Later in the same evening, Miss De

la Riva executed a sworn statement (Exh. “B-2”) wherein
she made the same identification of the two appellants
from among a group of persons in the Office of the Chief of
the Detective Bureau, adding that appellant Cañal had
tatoo marks on his right hip. After the identification, one of
the policemen took appellant Cañal downstairs and
undressed him, and he saw imprinted on the said
appellant’s right hip, the words “Bahala na Gang.”
Appellant Cañal and Pineda executed and swore to
separate statements on the day of their arrest. In his
statement (Exh. “G”), appellant Cañal confirmed the
information previously given by Jose that the four of them
waited for Miss De la Riva to come down from the ABS
Studio, and that they had planned to abduct and rape her.
Appellant Cañal admitted that all four of them parties
pated in the commission of the crime, but he would make it
appear that insofar as he was concerned the complainant
yielded her body to him on condition that he would re-
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People vs. Jose
lease her. Pineda executed a statement (Exh. “J”) stating

that he and his other three companions went to the ABS
Studio, and that, on learning that Miss De la Riva was
there, they made plans to wait for her and to follow her. He
admitted that his group followed her car and snatched her
and took her to the Swanky Hotel. He would make it
appear, however, that the complainant voluntarily acceded
to having sexual intercourse with him.
In his medical report (Exh. “K”), Dr. Brion noted the
presence of multiple contusions and bruises on different
parts of the complainant’s body, as well as of genital
injuries. On the witness stand the doctor was shown
several photographs of the complainant taken in his
presence and under his supervision. With the aid of the
photographs and the medical reports, the doctor explained
to the court that he found contusions or bruises on the
complainant’s chest, shoulders, arms and fore-arms, right
arm index finger, thighs, right knee and legs. He also
declared that when he was examining her, Miss De la Riva
complained of slight tenderness around the neck, on the
abdominal wall and at the sites of the extragenital physical
injuries, and that on pressing the said injuries, he elicited a
sigh of pain or tenderness on the part of the subject. The
injuries, according to Dr. Brion, could have been caused by
blows administered by a closed fist or by the palm of the
hand, and could have been inflicted on the subject while
she was being raped. It was the doctor’s opinion that they
could have been sustained on or about June 26, 1967. In
connection with the genital examination, the doctor
declared that he found injuries on the subject’s genitalia
which could have been produced by sexual intercourse
committed on June 26, 1967. He said that he failed to find
spermatozoa. He explained, however, that spermatozoa are
not usually found in the vagina after the lapse of three
days from the last intercourse, not to mention the
possibility that the subject might have douched herself.
The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose,
Aquino and Cañal) took the witness stand. We quote
hereunder the portions of the decision under review
relative to the theory of the defense:
464

People vs. Jose
“Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone to
the Ulog Cocktail Lounge somewhere in Mabini street in Manila,
and there killed time from 9:30 in the evening of June 25 until
closing time, which was about 3:30 in the early morning of the
next day. At the cocktail lounge they had listened to the music
while enjoying some drinks. Between them they had consumed a
whole bottte of whisky, so much so that at least Aquino became
drunk, according to his own testimony. They had been joined at
their table by a certain Frankie whom they met only that night.
Come time to go home, their new acquaintance asked to be
dropped at his home in Cubao. The five men piled into the red-
bodied, black topped two-door convertible Plymouth (Pontiac) car
of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the wheel repaired to Cubao.
After dislodging their new friend, Pineda steered the car to
España Extension to bring Aquino to his home in Mayon Street.
But somewhere in España Extension before the Rotonda a small
car whizzed past them almost hitting them. They saw that the
driver was a woman. Pineda gave chase and coming abreast of the
small car he shouted, ‘Putang ina mo, kamuntik na kaming
mamatay.’ The woman continued on her way. Now Pineda saying,
‘let us teach her a lesson,’ sped after her and when she swerved
ostensibly to enter a gate, Pineda stopped his car behind hers,
hurriedly got down, striding to the small car, opened the door and
started dragging the girl out. Both Jose and Aquino confirm the
presence of another woman inside the girl’s car, who helped the
girl struggle to get free from Pineda’s grip; and that the struggle
lasted about ten minutes before Pineda finally succeeded in
pushing the girl into the red convertible. All the three accused
insist they did nothing to aid Pineda; but they also admit that
they did nothing to stop him.
“Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and

around the area just to scare the girl who was in truth so scared
that she begged them to let her be and return her to her home.
She turned to Jose in appeal, but this one told her he could net do
anything as the ‘boss’ was Pineda. Aquino heard her plead with
Jose ‘do you not have a sister yourself?’ but did not hear the other
plea ‘do you not have a mother?’ Then Pineda stopped at the
corner of the street where he had forcibly snatched the girl
presumably to return her, but then suddenly changing his mind
he said, ‘why don’t you do a strip tease for us. I’ll pay you
P1,000.00’ and the girl taunted, ‘are you kidding?’; that after a
little while she consented to do the performance as long as it
would not last too long and provided the spectators were limited
to the four of them.
“Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he
and Maggie alighted first, but not before Maggie had borrowed a
handkerchief from one of them to cover her face as
465
VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 6, 1971 465

People vs. Jose
she went up the Hotel. The three followed, and when they saw the
pair enter a room, they quickly caught up. All the three accused
testify that as soon as they got into the room, Maggie de la Riva
asked the boys to close the windows before she undressed in front
of them. They themselves also removed their clothing. Two of
them removed their pants retaining their briefs, while Boy Pineda
and Cañal stripped to the skin ‘because it was hot.’ The three
accused declared that they saw Boy Pineda hand P100.00 to
Maggie and they heard him promise her that he would pay the
balance of P900.00 later. Whereupon, the show which lasted
about 10 minutes began with the naked girl walking back and
forth the room about 4 to 5 times. This accomplished. all of them
dressed up once more and the three accused (Jaime Jose, Eduardo
Aquino and Rogelio Cañal) left the room to wait in the car for Boy
Pineda and Maggie de la Riva who were apparently still
discussing the mode of payment of the balance. Three minutes
later Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda joined them. Now, the
question of how and where to drop Maggie came up and it is
testified to by the accused that it was Maggie’s idea that they
should drop her near the ABS Studio so that it would appear as if
she had just come from her work.
“Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29
along Buendia Avenue. Aquino testifies how, on June 29 Pineda
went to him with a problem. He did not have the P900.00 with
which to pay Maggie the balance of her ‘show’ and he was afraid
that if he did not pay, Maggie would have her goons after him. He
wanted Aquino to go with him to Lipa City where he had relatives
and where he could help raise the money. Aquino readily obliged,
and to make the company complete they invited Cañal to join

them. They used another car of Jaime Jose, different from the one
they had used the day before. At Lipa, Aquino detached himself
from his companions and proceeded alone to the barrio allegedly
to visit his relatives. In the meantime his two companions had
remained in the City and had, according to Cañal, gone to live in a
house very close to the municipal hall building. They later moved
to another house where the PC and Quezon City police posse
found and arrested them. Aquino was the last to be apprehended,
when having read in the newspapers that he was wanted, he
surrendered on July 5 to Mrs. Aurelia Leviste, wife of the
governor of Batangas.”
The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense

theory is anchored, defies one’s credulity and reason, and
had failed utterly to counteract the evidence for the
prosecution, particularly the complainant’s, testimony and
Dr. Brion’s medical report and testimony. We quote with
ap-
466

People vs. Jose
proval the able dissertation of the trial judge on this point:
“As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused advance
the proposition that nothing happened in Swanky Hotel except a
strip-tease exhibition which the complainant agreed to do for
them for a fee of Pl,000.00, P100.00 down and the balance to be
paid ‘later.’ The flaw in this contention lies in its utter
inverisimilitude. The Court cannot believe that any woman exists,
even one habitually engaged in this kind of entertainment (which
Maggie de la Riva has not been proven to be) who would consent
(and as easily and promptly as defense claims) to do a
performance, not even for all money in the world after the rough
handling she experienced from these wolves in men’s clothing who
now hungered for a show. There is no fury to match a woman
stirred to indignation. A woman’s pride is far stronger than her
yen for money, and her revenge much more keen. The Court
cannot believe that after the rudeness and meanness of these men
to her, Maggie would in so short an interval of time forget her
indignation and so readily consent to satisfy their immoral
curiosity about her. The woman in her would urge her to turn the
men’s hankering as a weapon of revenge by denying them their
pleasure.
“Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is
again something beyond even the wildest expectations. Assuming
that the woman whom the accused had abducted was in this kind
of trade and assuming that the price offered was to her
satisfaction, what woman would be willing to perform first and be
paid later? It is simply preposterous to believe that Maggie de la

Riva should have consented to do a striptease act for a measly
down-payment of P100.00 and the balance to be paid God knows
when. Since when are expositions of the flesh paid on instalment
basis? By the very precarious nature of their pitiful calling,
women who sell their attractions are usually very shrewd and it is
to be expected that they would demand full payment before
curtain call. How was Maggie to collect later when she did not
even know who these men were, where they lived, whether they
could be trusted with a promise to pay later (!) whether she would
ever find them again? If there is anything that has struck the
Court about the complainant, it is her courage, her intelligence
and her alertness. Only a stupid woman, and a most stupid one at
that, could have been persuaded to do what the defense wants
this Court to believe Maggie de la Riva consented to do.
“Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have
mentioned this circumstance during their interviews with anyone,
either the press, their police interrogator, the persons who
negotiated their surrender (as in the case of Aquino) or even
467
VOL. 37, JANUARY 30, 1971 467

People vs. Jose
their counsel. One cannot escape the very strong suspicion that
this story is a last ditch, desperate attempt to save the day for the
accused. It truly underscores the hopelessness of their stand and
projects all the more clearly their guilt.
“Then there is the incident of the men’s stripping themselves.
Why was there need for this? The Court realizes that in its
desperate need of an explanation for Maggie’s positive
identification of Cañal as the man with a tatoo mark on his right
buttock, the defense concocted the sickeningly indecent story that
the four men removed their underclothing in the presence of a
woman simply ‘because it was hot.’ What kind of men were these
who were so devoid of any sense of decency that they thought
nothing of adding insult to injury by not only inducing a woman to
strip before them, but of forcing her to perform before a naked
audience? And then they have the gall to argue that ‘nothing’
happened. For males of cold and phlegmatic blood and disposition
it could be credible, but not for men of the torrid regions like ours
where quick passions and hot tempers are the rule rather than
the exception!
“All of these considerations set aside, notwithstanding, it is
quite obvious that the version of the defense has not been able to
explain away a very vital piece of evidence of the prosecution
which, if unexplained, cannot but reduce any defense unavailing.
The result of the physical (external and internal) examination
conducted on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the afternoon of
June 29, the pertinent findings of which are o noted earlier in this
decision, establish beyond doubt that at the time that Maggie de

la Riva was examined she bore on her body traces of physical and
sexual assault.
“The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is
either one of the following: (1) the insinuation that when Maggie
de la Riva and Boy Pineda were left behind in the hotel room the
bruises and the sexual attack could have taken place then. But
then, the defense itself says that these two persons rejoined the
other three after three or four minutes! It is physically impossible,
in such a short time, for Boy Pineda to have attacked the girl and
inflicted on her all of these injuries; (2) it was suggested by the
defense that Maggie de la Riva could have inflicted all of those
injuries upon herself just to make out a case against the accused.
The examining physician rules out this preposterous proposition,
verily it does not take much stretch of the imagination to see how
utterly impossible this would be, and for what purpose? Was
P900.00 which she had failed to collect worth that much self-
torture? And what about all the shame, embarrassment and
publicity she would (as she eventually did) expose herself to? If
she really had not been raped would she have gone thru all of
these tribulations?
468

People vs. Jose
“A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she has
much more to lose in the notoriety the case will reap for her, her
honor and that of her family, than in the redress she demands
(Canastre, 82-480; Medina, C.A. 1943 O.G. 151; Medina y Puno,
CA O.G. 338; CA 55 O.G. 7666; Galamiton, L-6302, August 25,
1954); (3) it could also be argued that the contusions and bruises
could have been inflicted on Maggie during her struggle with
Pineda when the latter pulled and pushed her into the red
convertible car. The telltale injuries, however, discount this
possibility, for the location in which many of the bruises and
traumas were located (particularly on the inner portion of her
thighs) could not have been caused by any struggle save by those
of a woman trying to resist the brutal and bestial attack on her
honor.
“In their Memorandum the accused contend that Maggie’s sole
and uncorroborated testimony should not be rated any credence at
all as against the concerted declaration of the three accused. In
the first place, it is not correct to say that Maggie’s declaration
was uncorroborated—she has for corroboration nothing less than
the written extra-judicial statements of Jose and Cañal. But even
assuming that Maggie stood alone in her statements, the cases
cited by the accused in their Memorandum notwithstanding
which the Court does not consider in point anyway, jurisprudence
Ms confirmed the ruling that numbers is the least vital element in
gauging the weight of evidence. What is more important is which

of the declarations is the more credible, the more logical, the more
reasonable, the more prone to be biased or polluted. (Ricarte 44
OG 2234; Damian CA-GR No, 25523, April 24, 1959). Besides, it
should be borne in mind that in the most detestable crime of rape
in which a man is at his worst the testimony of the offended party
most often is the only one available to prove directly its
commission and that corroboration by other eyewitnesses would
in certain cases place a serious doubt as to the probability of its
commission, so that courts of justice are most often placed in a
position of having to accept such uncorroborated testimony if the
same is in other regards conclusive, logical and probable
(Landicho, VIII ACR 530).”
We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants

in their briefs.
1. Appellants Jose, Aquino and Cañal deny having had
anything to do with the abduction of Miss De la Riva. They
point to Pineda (who entered a plea of guilty) as the sole
author thereof, but they generously contend that even as to
him the act was purged of any taint
469
VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 6, 1971 469

People vs. Jose
of criminality by the complainant’s subsequent consent to

perform a striptease show for a fee, a circumstance which,
it is claimed, negated the existence of the element of lewd
design. This line of defense has evidently no leg to stand
on. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that all the
appellants participated in the forcible abduction. Miss De
la Riva declared on the witness stand, as well as in her
sworn statements, that they helped one another in
dragging her into the car against her will; that she did not
know them personally; that while inside the car, Jose and
Aquino, between whom she was seated, toyed with her
body, the former forcing his lips on hers, and the latter
touching her thighs and raising her skirt; that meaningful
and knowing glances were in the meanwhile being
exchanged among the four; and that all of them later took
turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This
testimony, whose evidentiary weight has not in the least
been overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to
establish the crimes charged in the amended complaint. In
the light thereof, appellants’ protestation that they were
not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected as
absolutely without factual basis.
2. The commission of rape by each of the appellants has,
as held by the court below, likewise been clearly
established. Jose, Aquino and Cañal contend that the

absence of semen in the complainant’s vagina disproves the
fact of rape. The contention is untenable. Dr. Brion of the
NBI, who testified as an expert, declared that semen is not
usually found in the vagina after three days from the last
intercourse, especially if the subject has douched herself
within that period. In the present case, the examination
was conducted on the fourth day after the incident, and the
complainant had douched herself to avoid infection and
pregnancy. Furthermore, the absence of spermatozoa does
not disprove the consummation of rape, the important
consideration being, not the emission of semen, but
penetration (People vs. Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980). Aquino’s
suggestion that the abrasions on the cervix were caused by
the tough tip of a noozle deliberately
470

People vs. Jose
used by the complainant to strengthen her alleged

fabricated tale of rape, is absurd, if not cruel. It is difficult
to imagine that any sane woman, who is single and earning
as much as Miss De la Riva did, would inflict injuries on
her genital organ by puncturing the same with a sharply-
pointed instrument in order to strike back at four strangers
who allegedly would not pay her the sum of P900.00 due
her for a striptease act. Besides, Dr. Brion testified that the
insertion of such an instrument in the genital organ would
not result in the kind of injuries he found in the mucosa of
the cervix.
3. Other evidence and considerations exist which
indubitably establish the commission of successive rapes by
the four appellants. Upon Miss De la Riva’s arrival at her
house in the morning of June 26, 1967, she immediately
told her mother, “Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All
four of them raped me.” This utterance, which is part of the
res gestae, commands strong probative value, considering
that it was made by the complainant to her mother who, in
cases of this nature, was the most logical person in whom a
daughter would confide the truth. Aquino and Cañal would
make capital of the fact that Miss De la Riva stated to the
reporters on the morning of June 26, that she was not
abused. Her statement to the press is understandable. At
that time the complainant, who had not yet consulted her
family on a matter which concerned her reputation as well
as that of her family, and her career, was not then in a
position to reveal publicly what had happened to her. This
is one reason why the complainant did not immediately
inform the authorities of the tragedy that befell her.
Another reason is that she was threatened with

disfiguration. And there were, of course, the traumas found
by Dr. Brion on different parts of the complainant’s body.
Could they, too, have been self-inflicted? Or, as suggested,
could they possibly have been inflicted by appellant Pineda
alone, when the story given by the other three is that
Pineda and the complainant were left in the hotel room for
only three or four minutes, and that they came out to join
them in what they would picture to be a cordial
atmosphere, the com-
471
VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 6, 1971 471

People vs. Jose
plainant even allegedly suggesting that she be dropped on

a spot where people would reasonably presume her to have
come from a studio? Equally important is the complainant’s
public disclosure of her tragedy, which led to an
examination of her private parts and lay her open to risks
of future public ridicule and diminution of popularity and
earnings as a movie actress.
4. Jose and Cañal seek the exclusion of their extra-
judicial statements from the mass of evidence on the
grounds that they were secured from them by force and
intimidation, and that the incriminating details therein
were supplied by the police investigators. We are not
convinced that the statements were involuntarily given, or
that the details recited therein were concocted by the
authorities. The statements were given in the presence of
several people and subscribed and sworn to before the City
Fiscal of Quezon City, to whom neither of the aforesaid
appellants intimated the use of inordinate methods by the
police. They are replete with details which could hardly be
known to the police; and although it is suggested that the
authorities could have secured such details from their
various informers, no evidence at all was presented to
establish the truth of such allegation. While in their
statements Jose and Cañal admitted having waited—
together with the two other appellants—for Miss De la
Riva at the ABS Studio, each of them attempted in the
same statements to exculpate himself: appellant Jose
stated that only Pineda and Aquino criminally abused the
complainant; while appellant Cañal would make it appear
that the complainant willingly allowed him to have sexual
intercourse with her. Had the statements been prepared by
the authorities, they would hardly have contained matters
which were apparently designed to exculpate the affiants.
It is significant, too, that the said two appellants did not
see it fit to inform any of their friends or relatives of the
alleged use of force and intimidation by the police. Dr.

Mariano Nario of the Quezon City Police Department, who
examined appellant Cañal after the latter made his
statement, found no trace of injury on any part of the said
appellant’s body in spite
472

People vs. Jose
of the claims that he was boxed on the stomach and that

one of his arms was burned with a cigarette lighter. In the
circumstances, and considering, further, that the police
officers who took down their statements categorically
denied on the witness stand that the two appellants were
tortured, or that any detail in the statements was supplied
by them or by anyone other than the affiants themselves,
We see no reason to depart from the trial court’s well-
considered conclusion that the statements were voluntarily
given. However, even disregarding the in-custody
statements of Jose and Cañal, We find that the mass of
evidence for the prosecu’tion on record will suffice to secure
the conviction of the two.
The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is
likewise being questioned by Jose on the other ground that
he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial
interrogations. He cites the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States in Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201),
Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478) and Miranda vs.
Arizona (384 U.S. 436).
The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in
point is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, par. 17 of
which provides: “In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall xxx enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel
x x x.” While the said provision is identical to that in the
Constitution of the United States, in this jurisdiction the
term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court,
in U.S. vs. Beecham, 23 Phil., 258 (1912), in connection
with a similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights
(Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) to mean
proceedings before the trial court from arraignment to
rendition of the judgment. Implementing the said
constitutional provision, We have provided in Section 1,
Rule 115 of the Rules of Court that “In all criminal
prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled x x x (b) to be
present and defend in person and by attorney at every
stage of the proceedings, that is, from the arraignment to
the promulgation of the judgment.” The only instances
where an accused is entitled to counsel before
473
VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 6, 1971 473

People vs. Jose
arraignment, if he so requests, axe during the second stage

of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and
after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18). The rule in the
United States need not be unquestioningly adhered to in
this jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding effect
here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the
Constitution the meaning attached thereto at the time of
the adoption thereof should be considered. And even there
the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced
from the absence of unanimity in the voting by the
members of the United States Supreme Court in all the
three above-cited cases.
5. Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is
concerned there was a mistrial resulting in gross
miscarriage of justice. He contends that because the charge
against him and his co-appellants is a capital offense and
the amended complaint cited aggravating circumstances,
which, if proved, would raise the penalty to death, it was
the duty of the court to insist on his presence during all
stages of the trial. The contention is untenable. While a
plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it constitutes
an admission of all the material facts alleged in the
information, including the aggravating circumstances, and
it matters not that the offense is capital, for the admission
(plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant
circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime
(People vs. Boyles, et al., L-15308, May 29, 1964, citing
People vs. Ama, L-14783, April 29, 1961, and People vs.
Parete, L-15515, April 29, 1961). Because of the aforesaid
legal effect of Pineda’s plea of guilty, it was not incumbent
upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much less to
require his presence in court. It would be different had
appellant Pineda requested the court to allow him to prove
mitigating* circumstances, for then it would be the better
part of discretion on the part of the trial court to grant his
request. (Cf. People vs. Arconado, L-16175, February 28,
1962.) The case of U.S. vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil., 91), cited by
Pineda, is not in point, for there this Court ordered a new
trial because it found
474

People vs. Jose
for a fact that the accused, who had pleaded guilty, “did not
intend to admit that he committed the offense with the
aggravating circumstances” mentioned in the information.
We are not in a position to make a similar finding here.
The transcript of the proceedings during the arraignment
shows that Pineda’s counsel, Atty. Lota, prefaced his
client’s plea of guilty with the statement that
“I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in plain

simple language of the contents of aggravating circumstances and
apprised him of the penalty he would get, and we have given said
accused time to think. After a while I consulted him—for three
times—and his decision was still the same.”
Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated

in court that he had always been averse to Pineda’s idea of
pleading guilty, because “I know the circumstances called
for the imposition of the maximum penalty considering the
aggravating circumstances,” but that he acceded to his
client’s wish only after the fiscal had stated that he would
recommend to the court the imposition of life imprisonment
on his client. To be sure, any such recommendation does
not bind the Court. The situation here, therefore, is far
different from that obtaining in U.S. vs. Agcaoili, supra.
6. Two of the appellants—Jose and Cañal—bewail the
enormous publicity that attended the case from the start of
investigation to the trial. In spite of the said publicity,
however, it appears that the court a quo was able to give
the appellants a fair hearing. For one thing, three of the
seven (7) original accused were acquitted. For another
thing, Jose himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge
“had not been influenced by adverse and unfair comments
of the press, unmindful of the rights of the accused to a
presumption of innocence and to fair trial.”
We are convinced that the herein four appellants have
conspired together to commit the crimes imputed to them
in the amended information quoted at the beginning of this
decision. There is no doubt at all that the forcible
475
VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 6, 1971 475

People vs. Jose
abduction of the complainant from in front of her house in

Quezon City, was a necessary if not indispensable means
which enabled them to commit the various and successive
acts of rape upon her person. It bears noting, however, that
even while the first act of rape was being performed, the
crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated,
so that each of the three succeeding crimes off the same
nature can not legally be considered as still connected with
the abduction—in other words, they should be detached

from, and considered independently of, that of forcible
abduction and, therefore, the former can no longer be
complexed with the latter.
What kind of rape was committed? Undoubtedly, it is
that which is punishable by the penalty of reclusión,
perpetua to death, under paragraph 3, Article 335, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4111 which took effect on
June 20, 1964, and which provides as follows:
“ART. 335. When and how rape committed.—Rape is committed

by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
“1. By using force or intimidation;

“2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
“3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even
though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two
next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
“The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

“Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
“When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
become insane, the penalty shall be death.
“When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall
be likewise death.
“When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.”
As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible

abduction with rape, the first of the crimes committed, the
476

People vs. Jose
latter is definitely the more serious; hence, pursuant to the

provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period.
Consequently, the appellants should suffer the extreme
penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any
necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of
the penalty to be imposed.
Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective
and for the purpose of determining1 the proper penalty to
be imposed in each of the other three crimes of simple rape,
it behooves Us to make a definite finding in this connection

to the effect that the commission of said crimes was
attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a)
nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such
circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes;
(b) abuse of superior strength, the crime having been
committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one
another (Cf. People vs. De Guzman, et al, 51 Phil., 105,
113); (c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the
complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for
about ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a
circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime
more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With
respect to appellants Jose, Aquino and Cañal, none of these
aggravating circumstances has been offset by any
mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should,
however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least
affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for
the reason that there would still be three aggravating
circumstances remaining. As a result, appellants should
likewise be made to suffer the extreme penalty of death in
each of these three simple crimes of rape. (Art. 63, par. 2,
Revised Penal Code.)
In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there
are offenses committed, the trial court applied by analogy
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that
“the maximum duration of all the penalties therein im-
477
VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 6, 1971 477

People vs. Jose
posed upon the appellant shall not be more than threefold

the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties imposed upon the appellant, which should not
exceed forty years.” The said court is of the opinion that
since a man has only one life to pay for a wrong, the ends of
justice would be served, and society and the victim would
be vindicated just as well, if only one death penalty were
imposed on each of the appellants.
We cannot agree with the trial court. Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code can only be taken into account in
connection with the service of the sentence imposed, not in
the imposition of the penalty (People vs. Escares, 55 Off.
Gaz., 623). In holding that only one death penalty should
be imposed because man has only one life, the trial court
ignored the principle enunciated in the very case it cited,
namely, U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil., 260, where this Court, in
affirming the judgment of the trial court, found the accused
guilty of two murders and one homicide and imposed upon

him two death sentences for the murders and a prison term
for the homicide. In not applying the said principle, the
court a quo said that the case of Balaba is different from
the present case, for while in the former case the accused
was found to have committed three distinct offenses, here
only one offense is charged, even if complex. As We have
explained earlier herein, four crimes were committed,
charged and proved. There is, therefore, no substantial
difference between the two cases insofar as the basic
philosophy involved is concerned, for the fact remains that
in the case of Balaba this Court did not hesitate to affirm
the two death sentences imposed on the accused by the
trial court. In People vs. Peralta, et al., L-19060, October
29, 1968, in which this Court imposed on each of the six
accused three death penalties for three distinct and
separate crimes of murder, We said that “since it is the
settled rule that once conspiracy is established, the act of
one conspirator is attributable to all, then each conspirator
must be held liable for each of the felonious acts committed
as a result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and
severity of the ap-
478

People vs. Jose
propriate penalties prescribed by law.” In the said case

(which was promulgated after the decision of the court a
quo had been handed down) We had occasion to discuss at
length the legality and practicality of imposing multiple
death penalties, thus:
“The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as

a useless formality, an exercise in futility. It is contended,
undeniably enough, that a death convict, like all mortals, has only
one life to forfeit. And because of this physiological and biological
attribute of man, it is reasoned that the imposition of multiple
death penalties is impractical and futile because after the service
of one capital penalty, the execution of the rest of the death
penalties will naturally be rendered impossible. The foregoing
opposition to the multiple imposition of death penalties suffers
from four basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the legality of
imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish
between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it
ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be served
simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of
imposing multiple death penalties.
“The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are
two distinct, though related, concepts. The imposition of the
proper penalty or penalties is determined by the nature, gravity

and number of offenses charged and proved, whereas service of
sentence is determined by the severity and character of the
penalty or penalties imposed. In the imposition of the proper
penalty or penalties, the court does not concern itself with the
possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since
actual service is a contingency subject to varied factors like the
successful escape of the convict, grant of executive clemency or
natural death of the prisoner. All that go into the imposition of
the proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature,
gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved and the
corresponding penalties prescribed by law.
“Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because
they will have to be executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of
article 70 will show that there are only two moves of serving two
or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously or successively. The
first rule is that two or more penalties shall be served
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the
case of multiple capital penalties, the nature of said penal
sanctions does not only permit but actually necessitates
simultaneous service.
“The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a
useless formality, has practical importance. The sentencing
479
VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 6, 1971 479

People vs. Jose
of an accused to several capital penalties is an indelible badge of

his extreme criminal perversity, which may not be accurately
projected by the imposition of only one death sentence irrespective
of the number of capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing
thus the reprehensible character of the convict in its real
dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is
justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the imposition of
multiple death penalties could effectively serve as a deterrent to
an improvident grant of pardon or commutation. Faced with the
utter delinquency of such a convict, the proper penitentiary
authorities would exercise judicious restraint in recommending
clemency or leniency in his behalf.
“Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of
his constitutional power to pardon (one of the presidential
prerogatives which is almost absolute) deems it proper to
commute the multiple death penalties to multiple life
imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the convict has to
serve the maximum forty (40) years of multiple life sentences. If
only one death penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to life
imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of only
thirty years corresponding to a single life sentence.”
We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the

existence of conspiracy among them and of our finding as
regards the nature and number of the crimes committed, as
well as of the presence of aggravating circumstances, four
death penalties should be imposed in the premises.
——————
Before Us is a petition for intervention filed by Filipinas

Investment & Finance Corporation asking for reversal of
that portion of the judgment of the court below ordering the
confiscation of the car used by the appellants in abducting
the complainant. The aforesaid car is a 1965 two-door
Pontiac sedan with Motor No. WT-222410, Serial No.
2376752110777, Plate No. H-33284, File No. 11584171,
alleged by the intervenor to be in the custody of Major
Ernesto San Diego of the Quezon City Police Department.
The car is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez.
On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of
appellant Jaime G. Jose, bought the car from the Malayan
Motors Corporation and simultaneously executed a chattel
mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price
480

People vs. Jose
of P13,200, which was stipulated to be payable in 24

monthly installments of P550 beginning May 4, 1967 up to
April 4, 1969. The mortgage was duly registered with the
Land Transportation Commission and inscribed in the
Chattel Mortgage Registry. The mortgage lien was
annotated on the motor registration certificate. On April
17, 1967, for value received and with notice to Mrs. Gomez,
the Malayan Motors Corporation assigned its credit against
Mrs. Gomez, as well as the chattel mortgage, to the
intervenor. The assignment was duly registered with the
Land Transportation Commission and annotated on the
registration certificate.
Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in
view of which the intervenor filed on July 5, 1967, an action
for replevin against her (Civil Case No. 69993, Court of
First Instance of Manila) as a preliminary step to
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. On July 7, 1967, the
court issued an order for the seizure of the car. The sheriff,
however, could not enforce the writ of replevin because the
car was not in Mrs. Gomez’ possession, the same having
been used by her son, appellant Jaime G. Jose, together
with the other appellants in this case, in the abduction of
Miss De la Riva, as a result of which the car was seized by
the Quezon City police and placed in the custody of Major

San Diego, who refused to surrender it to the sheriff on the
ground that it would be used as evidence in the trial of the
criminal case.
During the pendency of that criminal case in the court
below, or on July 26, 1967, the intervenor filed with the
said court a petition for intervention. The said petition was
not, however, acted upon. On October 2, 1967, the trial
court rendered its judgment in. the present case ordering
the car’s confiscation as an instrument of the crime.
Although not notified of the said decision, the intervenor
filed, on October 17, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of
the order of confiscation; but the same was denied on
October 31, 1967, on the ground that the trial court had
lost jurisdiction over the case in view of
481
VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 6, 1971 481

People vs. Jose
the automatic elevation thereof to this Court. The

intervenor then filed a petition for relief from judgment,
but the same was also denied.
On February 5, 1968, judgment was rendered in the
replevin case ordering Mrs. Gomez to deliver the car to the
intervenor so that the chattel mortgage thereon could be
foreclosed, or, in the alternative, to pay the intervenor the
sum of P13,200 with interest thereon at 12% per annum
from July 5, 1968, the premium bond, attorney’s fees, and
the costs of suit. The judgment became final and executory.
Attempts to execute the judgment against the properties of
Mrs. Gomez were unavailing; the writ of execution was
returned by the sheriff unsatisfied. On July 26, 1968, the
present petition for intervention was filed with this Court,
which allowed the intervenor to file a brief. In his brief the
Solicitor General contends, among others, that the court a
quo having found that appellant Jose is the owner of the
car, the order of confiscation is correct.
Considering that the car in question is registered in the
name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez, who, in the absence of strong
evidence to the contrary, must be considered as the lawful
owner thereof; that the only basis of the court a quo in
concluding that the said car belongs to appellant Jose were
the latter’s statements during the trial of the criminal case
to that effect; that the said statements were not, however,
intended to be, nor could constitute, a claim of ownership
over the car adverse to his mother, but were made simply
in answer to questions propounded in court for the sole
purpose of establishing the identity of the defendant who
furnished the car used by the appellants in the commission
of the crime; that the chattel mortgage on the car and its
assignment in favor of the intervenor were made several
months before the date of the commission of the crimes
charged, which circumstance forecloses the possibility of
collusion to prevent the State from confiscating the car;
that the final judgment in the replevin case can only be
executed by delivering the possession of the car to the
intervenor for
482

People vs. Jose
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and that Article 45 of

the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture
of an instrument or tool used in the commission of the
crime if such “be the property of a third person not liable
for the offense,” it is the sense of this Court that the order
of the court below for the confiscation of the car in question
should be set aside and that the said car should be ordered
delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in the
replevin case, Civil Case No. 69993.
—————
Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court

received a formal manifestation on the part of the Solicitor
General to the effect that Rogelio Cañal, one of the herein
appellants, died in prison on December 28, 1970. As a
result of this development, this case is hereby dismissed as
to him alone, and only insofar as his criminal liability is
concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de
oficio.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby
modified as follows: appellants Jaime G. Jose, Basilio
Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty
of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, and
each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three
(3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of
them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of
them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the
complainant in the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four
crimes, or a total of P40,000; and each shall pay one-fourth
(1/4) of the costs.
Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is
concerned, the order of the court a quo for its confiscation is
hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof is
hereby ordered to deliver its possession to intervenor
Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation in accordance
with the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila

in Civil Case No. 69993 thereof.
483
VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 6, 1971 483

People vs. Jose
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,

Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
Judgment modified.
ANNOTATION
MULTIPLE FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE
The case of People vs. Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr. alias
Boy, Edgardo Aquino and Rogelio Cañal (G.R. No. L-28232,
promulgated on February 6, 1971, supra), reiterates and
clarifies the previous rulings on the complex crimes of
forcible abduction with rape committed by several persons.
This case was elevated to the Supreme Court for
automatic review in view of the death penalty imposed.
The Crime of Forcible Abduction and Rape

The abduction of any woman against her will and with
lewd designs is punished by reclusion temporal (Art. 342,
R.P.C.). In forcible abduction (Art. 342) and rape (Art. 335)
the age and character of the offended woman are not
material. The character of the offended party, whether
virgin or of good reputation, is not material (People vs.
Torres, 62 Phil. 942).
Both crimes may be committed by force or violence.
An accused cannot be legally convicted of forcible
abduction under an information charging consented
abduction (People vs. Guhil, 56 O.G. 1191).
Actual illicit relations with the woman need not be
established. The mere intent to seduce is sufficient. The
lewd designs may be inferred from the acts (People vs.
Ramirez, 39 Phil. 738; People vs. Bustos, 54 Phil. 887;
People vs. Castillo, 76 Phil. 839).
484

People vs. Jose
Penalty Imposed if Commited by Two or more Persons

When the crime of rape is commited by two or more
perosns, the penalty to be imposed, if convicted, shall be
reclusion perpetua to death (par. 3, Art. 335, Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Rep. Act 4111, approved on June 20,
1964). By analogyto Art. 294 of the Revised Penal COde on
robbery with violence, Rep. Act 2632 so provides for special
crimes of rape with homicide, frustrated or attempted rape
with homicide; rape with serious physical injuries,
rendering the victim insane, The penalty to be imposed is
reclusion perpetua and/or death (Padilla, Revised Penal
Code Anno. Vol. 11, p. 923). Republic Act 4111 like Rep. Act
2672, is also patterned after the provisions of robbery with
homicide (Art. 294, par. 1), on robbery with rape (Art. 294,
par 2.) which imposes the penalty of death on nay of the 3
individual complex crimes, namely, rape with serious
physical injuries resulting in the insanity of the victim
(Art. 263 par. 1); attempted or frustrated rape with
homicide (Art. 263, par. 1); attempted or frustrated rape
with homicide (Art. 297); and rape with homicide.
See annotations on the distinctions between forcible
abduction with rape nad kidnapping with rape (30 SCRA
179), re People vs. Ablaza, L-27352, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA
173.
Forcible Abduction with Rape Committed by Two or More

Persons on the Same Occasion
In this case under annotation (the celebrated case of movie-
actress Maggie de la Riva), the Suprem Court found that
there was committed forcible abduction with rape. With
rape as the more serious crime, the penalty to be imposed
is the maximum in accordance with Art. 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. With this finding, the extreme penalty of death
was imposed. (See People vs. Crisostomo, 46 Phil. 775;
People vs. Lindiane, 50 Phil. 64.
While the Supreme Court found no necessity of
considering the aggravating circumstances for the same, as
it did not in nay way alter the nature of the penalty, the
Court still considered the proper penalty to be imposed on
the accused. Nevertheless, to clarify the observations made
by
485
VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 6, 1971 485

People vs. Jose
the Trial Court on the imposition of multiple death penalty,

the Supreme Court made definite rulings on the matter.
In this case five (5) aggravating circumstances were

alleged in the information, namely: use of motor vehicle;
nighttime purposely sought to facilitate the commission of
the crime and to make discovery difficult; abuse of superior
strength; the means employed or circumstances brought
about which added ignominy to the natural effects of the
act; and, that the wrong done in the commission of the
crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs
not necessary for the commission.
Effects of the Commission of the Crime Attended by

Aggravating Circumstances
The general rule is that once conspiracy is established, all
persons who participated in the crime are liable as co-
principals. All those who coordinated in a rape, in an
organized band, are guilty for each and all violations
(People vs. Toledo, 83 Phil. 777). If there was conspiracy,
where each of the accused cooperated with one another in
abusing the victim, each is guilty as principal not only of
the rape committed by him but also of that committed by
his co-defendants (People vs. Villa, 81 Phil. 193; People vs.
Alfaro, 91 Phil. 404; People vs. Soriano, L-29057, Oct. 30,
1970, 35 SCRA 633).
Application of Penalties also to Other Participants of the

Crime even if They have Not Committed Rape
Where two persons are involved in the commission of a
crime, such as robbery, in the course of which one of them
rapes a woman and the other does not make any attempt to
prevent the rape, but stands guard while it is going on, the
latter may be held liable for the rape to the extent as the
one who actually committed the rape (People vs.
Galamiton, L-6302, August 25, 1954; U.S. vs. Santos, 17
Phil. 618).
In a prosecution for rape and also for robbery with rape,
it was held sufficient to sustain conviction of the appellant
for rape that he menaced the victim with a revolver, al-
486

People vs. Jose
though he did not himself have sexual intercourse with the

victim (People vs. Alfaro, L-4231, May 28, 1952). The same
rule applies with respect to abduction with rape.
It was held that where a girl was forcibly taken by a
group of several men, two of whom raped her, the offense
was abduction with rape and the defendant who did not
himself have intercourse with the girl was guilty of
abduction with rape by reason of his taking part in the
affair and his conduct in assisting the accomplishment of

the rape (People vs. Ching Suy Siong, L-6174, Feb. 28,
1955).
The rule does not apply where it is shown that he never
encouraged or took part directly or indirectly in the acts
complained of, although he was present with the others.
As Many Death Penalties as There are Offenses Committed

The trial court in the case under annotation was of the
opinion that since a man has only one life to pay for a
wrong, the ends of justice, would be served and society and
the victim would be vindicated just as well, if only one
death penalty were imposed on each of the appellants.
Disagreeing with this opinion, the Supreme Court rules
that Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code applied by the trial
court can only be taken into account in connection with the
service of sentence imposed, not in the imposition of the
penalty (People vs. Escares, 55 OG 623).
In holding that only one death penalty should be
imposed because a man has only one life, the Supreme
Court cited U.S. vs. Bolivar, 37 Phil. 260, where the
accused was found guilty on 2 murders and 1 homicide, and
was sentenced to two death penalties for the murders, and
imprisonment for the homicide. The rule is that there are
as many crimes committed as they are charged and proved
(People vs. Peralta, L-19060, Oct. 29, 1968). The Supreme
Court imposed on each of the 6 accused 3 death penalties
for the 3 distinct and separate crimes of murder. This was
the result of the act of one conspirator being attributable to
all, in which case the conspirator will be held liable for
each of the felonious acts as a result of the conspiracy,
487
VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 6, 1971 487

People vs. Jose
regardless of the nature and severity of the appropriate

penalty prescribed by the law.
When Multiple Convictions may Not be Imposed

If there is no allegation under which each accused shall be
guilty as principal of one rape, by direct participation, and
another by cooperation, multiple application of penalties
for each accused does not apply (U.S. vs. Candelaria, 2
Phil. 104; U.S. vs. Asilo, 4 Phil. 175; U.S. vs. Casañas, 5
Phil. 377; U.S. vs. Perez, 13 Phil. 287; U.S. vs. Cueva, 23
Phil. 553; U.S. vs. Javier and Caquicla, 31 Phil. 235; U.S.
vs. Valdez, 40 Phil. 876; People vs. Castillo, 76 Phil. 839;
People vs. Villa, supra; People vs. Perez @ Kid Perez, 83
Phil. 314; People vs. Toledo, supra; People vs. Margen, 85
Phil. 839; People vs. Mostoles, 85 Phil. 883; People vs.

Alfaro, supra.)
Rationale of the Imposition of Multiple Death Penalties on

One Accused
The imposition of multiple death penalties on an accused is
not a useless formality and as an exercise in futility, as
contended by some writers. Said argument, according to
the Supreme Court, fails to consider the legality of the
imposition of multiple capital penalty; that it fails to
distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of
sentence; that it ignores the fact that multiple death
sentence could be served simultaneously, and overlooked
the practical merits of the imposition of multiple death
penalty.
The imposition of penalties and the service of sentence
are two distinct concepts. The imposition of the proper
penalty or penalties is determined by the nature, gravity
and number of offenses charged and proved. Service of
sentence is determined by the severity and degree of the
penalty or penalties imposed. Moreover, granting that the
Chief Executive, in the exercise of his powers of pardon,
deems it proper to commute the multiple death penalty to
multiple life imprisonment, then the practical effect is that
the convict has to serve the maximum of 40 years of
multiple life sentence. If only one death penalty is imposed
488

People vs. Jose
and the death penalty is commuted to life imprisonment,

the convict will have to serve a maximum of only 30 years,
corresponding to 3 single life sentences.
In this case the Supreme Court ruled that in view of the
existence of conspiracy among the accused and the finding
as regards the number of crimes committed, as well as the
presence of aggravating circumstances, four death
penalties should be imposed in the premises.
Similarly, the penalty of death prescribed in the last
paragraph of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 2632 and 4111 and of rape with
homicide is imposed regardless of mitigating
circumstances, especially in a case where the crime was
committed with aggravating circumstances of nighttime
and abuse of superior strength (People vs. Amit, L-29066,
March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 95).
Escobedo and Miranda Rulings Not Followed in the

Philippines
Incidentally, the Court declined to adhere to the principle

adhered to by the United States Supreme Court in United
States vs. Messiah, 377 U.S. 201; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 and Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 936, invoked
by one of the accused for the admissibility of his extra-
judicial confession. In said cases it has been ruled that an
extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, the accused
should be represented by counsel during the custodial
interrogations.
While it is true that the provisions of the Constitution of
the Philippines (Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 17), which reads: “In
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall xxx enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel x x x,” said
provision has been interpreted by the Philippine Supreme
Court to mean proceedings before the trial court from
arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment (U.S. vs.
Beecham, 23 Phil. 258.)
At any rate, the Court observed that the rulings in the
Escobedo and Miranda cases are not yet quite settled in
489
VOL. 37, FEBRUARY 6, 1971 489

People vs. Jose
view of the absence of unanimity in the ruling by the

members of the United States Supreme Court in the three
above-entitled cases.—JUDGE JORGE COQUIA
Notes.—(a) When rape is consummated.—To prove a

charge of rape it is not necessary to prove a rupture of the
hymen; nor is it necessary to show that there was a la-
ceration of the vagina which usually results from a first
time copulation, especially with young girls (People vs.
Lomibao, 55 Phil. 616, 620, citing Kenney vs. State ,65
L.R.A. 316; 22 R.C.L. 1178). Nor is complete penetration
necessary; such penetration may indeed be impossible in
view of the tender age of the victim, but if there is
penetration of the labia, the offense is consummated
(People vs. Eriñia, 50 Phil. 998). As stated in one case,
“Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, merely,
without rapture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, is
sufficient to warrant conviction” (People vs. Oscar, 48 Phil.
527). But while rupturing of the hymen is not
indispensable to a conviction, there must be proof of some
degree of entrance of the male organ within the labia of the
pudentum (People vs. Oscar, supra; People vs. Hernan-dez,
49 Phil. 980). The fact that a sticky substance, or semen, is
found in the genital organ of the victim is not conclusive
evidence of penetration (People vs. Eriñia, supra).
(b) Plea of guilty and right of the defendant to be present

during the trial of capital offenses.—Although presence of
the defendant at the trial has been held to be indispensable
in prosecutions involving capital offenses, it has also been
ruled that even in such cases, presence of the accused may
be denied or dispensed with, for due process does not
assure the right to be present “when presence would be
useless, or the benefit but a shadow x x x . (T)he presence
of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent
that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his
absence, and to that extent only.” (Sayder vs. Massa-
chusetts, 54 S. Ct. 330, 90 A.L.R. 575, 580-581, cited in
NAVARRO, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 273n.12—274
[1960]).
The presence of the accused after he has pleaded guilty
490

Tagoranao vs. Court of Appeals
to a capital offense is no longer necessary because a plea of

guilty, amounting as it does to an admission of guilt and of
the material facts alleged in the information, removes the
necessity of presenting further evidence and for all intents
and purposes the case is deemed tried on the merits, the
court with no alternative but to impose the penalty
prescribed by law (People vs. Rapirap, L-11000, Jan. 21,
1958, 54O.G. 6072).
(c) Conspiracy.—See the annotation in 26 SCRA 761-
766.
(d) Res gestae.—See People vs. Devaras, L-25165, Feb.
27, 1971, infra, and the notes thereunder.
_______________
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2/17/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 037

450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Remedial law; Evidence; Forcible abduction; When evidence is

considerations exist which indubitably establish the commission

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People vs. Jose

which is part of the res gestae, commands strong probative value,

attorney at every stage of the proceedings, that is, from the

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People vs. Jose

effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the

contrary, must be considered as the lawful owner thereof; that the

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People vs. Jose

mission of the crimes charged, which circumstance forecloses the

APPEAL from and automatic review of a decision of the

The amended complaint filed in this case in the court

“The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ,

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City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

1. Use of a motor vehicle.

That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be

Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty to the

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went to trial on their respective pleas of not guilty. After

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio

This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal

The complainant, Magdalena “Maggie” de la Riva, was,

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the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, was driving

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Jr. was at the wheel, while Rogelio Cañal was seated

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da told the complainant: “Magburlesque ka para sa amin.”

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decided on a spot in front of the Free Press Building not far

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ceived from a mobile patrol a report of the snatching. When

went to the Quezon City Police Department Headquarters,

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waited for Miss De la Riva to come out of the ABS Studio;

Police of Quezon City. Later in the same evening, Miss De

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lease her. Pineda executed a statement (Exh. “J”) stating

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“Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and

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and to make the company complete they invited Cañal to join

The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense

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proval the able dissertation of the trial judge on this point:

paid later? It is simply preposterous to believe that Maggie de la

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decision, establish beyond doubt that at the time that Maggie de

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gauging the weight of evidence. What is more important is which

We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants

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of criminality by the complainant’s subsequent consent to

established. Jose, Aquino and Cañal contend that the

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