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Republic of the Philippines

COURT OF APPEALS
Manila

TWELFTH DIVISION
CAMILO S. CASTILLON, CA-G.R. SP No. 164451
CONCEPCION GABAN, and all
persons claiming rights and Members:
interests under them,
Petitioners, BUESER, D. Q.,
Chairperson
FIEL-MACARAIG, G. C., and
*
- versus - LAUIGAN, R.R. R., JJ.

Promulgated:
CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, INC., March 3, 2021
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BUESER, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 dated 4 March 2020


filed by the petitioners Camilo S. Castillon, Concepcion Gaban, and
all persons claiming rights and interest under them, assailing the
Order2 dated 24 January 2020 rendered by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-25201, which
affirmed the 9 January 2018 Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 51, Caloocan City. The MeTC Decision granted the
complaint for unlawful detainer filed by respondent Carmel
Development, Inc. (CDI).

The Facts

On 19 January 2012, respondent CDI, filed a verified complaint 3

*
Acting Third Member per Office Order No. 33-21-RSF dated 29 January 2021.
1
Rollo, p. 3.
2
Rollo, p. 15.
3
Rollo, p. 18.
CA-G.R. SP No. 164451
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_________________________________________________________________________

for ejectment, particularly for unlawful detainer, against the


petitioners. Respondent alleged that it is the registered owner of three
(3) parcels of land, with a total area of 156 hectares, located in
Caloocan, City. CDI claimed to have acquired the said parcels of land
sometime in 1958 and was then registered under Carmel Farms, Inc.,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (62603) 15631,
TCT No. (62605) 15632, and TCT No. (64007) 15807. CDI averred
that the said titles were derived from TCT No. 62604, previously
owned by Spouses Roman C. Tuason and Remedios Tuason who
sold the subdivided land covered by that title to CDI, the property sold
to the latter is now covered by TCT No. (64007) 15807.

Sometime in 1973, CDI was starting to develop the said land


under the name of Consuelo Heights Subdivision, when then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed into law Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 2934, which invalidated and declared as null and void the
titles of CDI, and declared the land as “open for disposition and sale
to the members of Malacañang Homeowner's Association, Inc.” The
same law likewise invalidated the titles of the lot owners who bought
their land from CDI.

After PD No. 293 took effect, CDI's efforts to continuously


assert its ownership and proprietary rights over the parcels of land
became futile, and the members of the Malacañang Homeowner's
Association, Inc. (MHAI) started to occupy the subject property, which
was later known as Pangarap Village. Informal settlers also took
advantage of the legal restraint and started to proliferate the area.
CDI was left with no option but to tolerate the influx of both MHAI
members and informal settlers within the property.

Meanwhile, on 29 January 1988, the Supreme Court En Banc


promulgated the case of Roman Tuason, et. al. vs. Register of
Deeds, Caloocan City, et. al. 5 (Tuason Case), declaring PD No. 293
4
CANCELLING THE SALE CERTIFICATES AND/OR TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
NUMBERS 62603, 62604, AND 62605, COVERING LOTS 1, 2, AND 3, RESPECTIVELY,
PCS-4383, ALL IN THE NAME OF CARMEL FARMS, INC., WHICH IS A CONSOLIDATION
AND SUBDIVISION OF LOTS 979, 981, 982, 985, 988, 989, 990, 991-NEW, 1226, 1230, AND
980-C-2 (LRC PSD-1730), ALL OF TALA ESTATE, CALOOCAN CITY, AND DECLARING
THE SAME OPEN FOR DISPOSITION TO THE MALACAÑANG HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., THE PRESENT OCCUPANTS, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF
COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBER 32, AS AMENDED, 14 September 1973.
5
G.R. Np. 70484, 29 January 1988.
CA-G.R. SP No. 164451
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as unconstitutional and void ab initio, and in effect, restored CDI's


titles over the subject properties. CDI then alleged that its ownership
over the parcels of land were strengthened by the pronouncements
made by the Supreme Court in the cases of Republic of the
Philippines, et. al. vs. Carmel Development, Inc. (G.R. No. 187876)
and Malacañang Homeowner's Association, Inc., et. al. vs. Carmel
Development, Inc. et. al. (G.R. No. 187618).

Having been merely tolerating the continued stay of the illegal


occupants, CDI gave formal notice to all those occupying the subject
property illegally, including petitioners herein. Moreover, it was
discovered after conducting a survey, that petitioners have been
illegally occupying a portion of TCT No. (64007) 15807, particularly,
Block 1, Lot 6 located along Acacia St., Pangarap Village.

CDI repeatedly served demand letters to the petitioners asking


them to vacate and turnover the possession of the specific lot, but the
latter refused to acknowledge the demand. CDI was then constrained
to post a copy of the demand letter at the premises occupied by the
petitioners, and send the same through registered mail. Despite the
said demands, petitioners continuously refused to vacate the
property, prompting CDI to institute a complaint for unlawful detainer
against petitioners.

The MeTC in its Order6 dated 29 February 2012, dismissed the


complaint for lack of jurisdiction stating that the allegations therein
failed to constitute a case of either forcible entry or unlawful detainer,
and ruled that CDI should have pursued the remedy of either an
accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria.

On appeal, the RTC rendered its Order dated 28 December


2012, affirming the MeTC's order of dismissal. Yet, acting on CDI's
motion for reconsideration, the RTC, in its Resolution dated 14
September 2015, reconsidered its order of dismissal and remanded
the case to the MeTC for further proceedings 7.

After the remand to the MeTC, petitioners failed to timely file


their Answer despite their receipt of the summons on 27 March 2017.
6
Rollo, p. 27.
7
Rollo, p. 33, MeTC Decision dated 9 January 2018, page 1.
CA-G.R. SP No. 164451
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_________________________________________________________________________

Instead, petitioners filed a Motion to Admit Attached Answer on 9 May


2017. The MeTC denied such belated filing in its Order dated 3
August 20178.

Eventually, the MeTC in its Decision9 dated 9 January 2018,


granted the complaint for unlawful detainer in favor of CDI, hence:

“WHEREFORE judgment is hereby rendered in favor of


plaintiff Carmel Development, Inc. ordering defendant Camilo S.
Castillon and Concepcion Gaban and all persons claiming rights
and interests under them as follows:

1. To VACATE the premises located at Block 1, Lot 6


Located along Acacia St. Pangarap Village, Caloocan City and
restore Carmel of its lawful possession.

2. To REMOVE all structures locate at Block 1, Lot 6


located along Acacia St. Pangarap Village, Caloocan City.

3. To PAY Carmel a monthly rental of FIVE


THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) from July 1, 2011 until
defendant fully vacates Block 1, Lot 6, located along Acacia St.
Pangarap Village, Caloocan City.

4. To PAY Attorney's fees of TWENTY THOUSAND


PESOS (P20,000.00) and

5. To pay the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.”10

Petitioners elevated the case on appeal upon which the RTC,


Branch 121 issued an Order11 dated 25 October 2018, directing both
parties to submit their respective memoranda. However, despite the
time given to them, the petitioners still failed to timely file their
memorandum. Thus, in its Order 12 dated 22 March 2019, the trial
court dismissed the appeal for failure of the petitioners to timely file
their memorandum. Still, on 27 August 2019 petitioners' counsel filed
a Formal Entry of Appearance with Motion to Admit Accompanying
8
Rollo, pp. 40-41, MeTC Resolution dated 3 August 2017.
9
Rollo, pp. 33-39.
10
Rollo, pp. 42 and 105.
11
Rollo, p. 133.
12
Rollo, p. 193.
CA-G.R. SP No. 164451
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_________________________________________________________________________

Memorandum13 but was subsequently denied by the trial court in its


Order14 dated 25 September 2019.

Petitioners sought for reconsideration15, while CDI on the


contrary, moved that the records of the case be remanded 16 to the
MeTC for execution. Its Order 17 dated 24 January 2020, the RTC,
Branch 121 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and
remanded the records of the case to the MeTC. CDI filed an Urgent
Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution 18 before the MeTC, but
the petitioners tried to prevent the execution by filing before this Court
for an Application for Preliminary Injunction19.

Petitioners aver that the trial courts, both the MeTC and RTC,
erred in not reconsidering the belated filing of their Answer and
Memorandum, respectively. Petitioners further posited that pursuant
to Section 6, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court and Article 24 of the Civil
Code, the trial courts should have afforded them liberality as they
were at a disadvantage. Finally, petitioners claim that they have a
valid defense in the unlawful detainer suit filed against them.

This Court's Ruling

At the onset, a perusal of the instant petition reveals that


petitioners ascribed procedural and substantive errors on the part of
both the MeTC and RTC. Procedurally, petitioners adverted that it
was erroneous for the courts not to admit their belatedly filed
pleadings, alleging that their counsel's negligence is not binding on
them. Substantively, petitioners averred that it was erroneous for the
MeTC to rely on the ruling in the Tuason case in resolving the
complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the respondent as the facts of
the two cases are different. Incidentally in their Memorandum 20,
petitioners claim that MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case filed by
CDI since the former were owners of the subject property covered by

13
Rollo, p. 59.
14
Rollo, p. 74.
15
Rollo, p. 77.
16
Rollo, p. 80, Motion to Remand Records dated 17 October 2019.
17
Rollo, p. 18.
18
Rollo, p. 179.
19
Rollo, p. 171.
20
Rollo, p. 197.
CA-G.R. SP No. 164451
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_________________________________________________________________________

TCT No. C-3347521. They claim that CDI's remedy should have been
an action to annul petitioner's title instead of an ejectment suit.

We are not persuaded.

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary


proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property
involved. It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is
a ‘time procedure’ designed to remedy the situation 22. Moreover, the
purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to
technical rules23.

Nevertheless, the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure itself


provides for the pleadings allowed to be filed, the period when to file
them, and the effect in case there is failure to file the necessary
pleading. One of the pleadings allowed, and necessary, to be filed in
an action for unlawful detainer is an Answer. The period of filing an
Answer is found under Section 5 of the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, viz:

Sec. 5. Answer. — Within ten (10) days from service of


summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint
and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative
defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims and
compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be
21
Rollo, p. 215.
22
Fairland Knitcraft Corporation vs. Arturo Loo Po, G.R. No. 217694, 27 January 2016, citing
Don Tino Realty and Development Corporation v. Florentino, 372 Phil. 882 (1999).
23
Republic of the Philippines and National Power Corporation, both represented by the
Privatization Management Office vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, G.R. No.
194880, 20 June 2012, citing Section 36, Chapter III, BP No. 129, which reads:

Section 36. Summary procedures in special cases. – In Metropolitan Trial Courts and
Municipal Trial Courts with at least two branches, the Supreme Court may designate one or
more branches thereof to try exclusively forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, those
involving violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations, violations of the rental law, and such
other cases requiring summary disposition as the Supreme Court may determine. The
Supreme Court shall adopt special rules or procedures applicable to such cases in order to
achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to
technical rules. Such simplified procedures may provide that affidavits and counter-affidavits
may be admitted in lieu of oral testimony and that the periods for filing pleadings shall be non-
extendible. (Emphasis and underscoring Ours).
CA-G.R. SP No. 164451
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_________________________________________________________________________

considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims


shall be filed and served within ten (10) days from service of the
answer in which they are pleaded.

Corollary thereto, the effect of failure to file an answer within the


reglementary period provided above is mentioned in Section 6 of the
same Rules, to wit:

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. — Should the


defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above
provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff,
shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged
in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein:
Provided, however, that the court may in its discretion reduce the
amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for being
excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without prejudice
to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, if
there are two or more defendants.

At this point, it bears stressing that the rationale for the creation
of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious
determination of cases without regard to technical rules. Thus,
petitioners' assertion that it was erroneous for MeTC not to admit
their belatedly filed answer on account of their counsel's negligence
may seem to be meritorious. However, settled is the rule that it is
within the discretion of the trial court to permit the filing of an answer
even beyond the reglementary period, provided that there is
justification for the belated action and there is no showing that the
defendant intended to delay the case24.

In this case, despite the petitioners' failure to attach in the


present petition their Motion to Admit Attached Answer, a reading of
the Resolution dated 3 August 2017 denying the said motion to admit
shows that the justification advanced by their previous counsel, Atty.
Alfonso P. Alfonso (Atty. Alfonso), was considered unacceptable and
inexcusable by the MeTC, viz:

“For resolution is defendants' Motion to Admit Attached

24
Hector Hernandez vs. Susan San Pedro Agoncillo, G.R. No. 194122, 11 October 2012, citing
Philippine National Bank v. Deang Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 177931, December 8,
2008, 573 SCRA 312, 319, citing Spouses Ampeloquio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
124243, June 15, 2000, 333 SCRA 465, 470.
CA-G.R. SP No. 164451
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Answer filed on May 9, 2017 (Motion).

In their Motion, counsel of defendants Atty. Alfonso P. Alfonso


states that defendants referred this case to him only on March
29, 2017. He was not able to file defendants' Answer on time
because of his heavy work load and notes that he has no
assistant or secretary to aid him with his work. Moreover,
defendants failed to furnish him the necessary evidence and
narrate to him the details of their defense.

xxx

The court DENIES defendants' Motion to Admit Attached


Answer.

The Sheriff's Returns of Summons dated March 29, 2017


show that defendant Camilo S. Castillon (Camilo) was served
with Summons personally on March 27, 2017 while defendant
Concepcion Gaban (Concepcion) was served with Summons by
substituted service on the same date through her husband and
co-defendant Camilo.

xxx

Instead of filing an answer within ten days from service of


summons or on or before April 6, 2017, defendants, through Atty.
Alfonso, filed a Motion attaching thereto their Answer on May 9,
2017 more than two months after the deadline to do so.

xxx

Atty. Alfonso has sufficient time to prepare defendants's


answer as this case was referred to him on March 29, 2016 (sic)
or shortly after defendants received their Summons. He had up to
April 6, 2016 (sic) or eight days to file defendants answer and yet
he failed to do so. Instead, he filed the same more than two
months after, on May 9, 2017.

His explanation that he failed to timely file defendants'


answer because of his heavy workload and defendants' failure to
relay to him their evidence and defenses is unacceptable and
inexcusable. Moreover, his delay in filing defendants' answer only
goes to show that he disregards the rules and directives of this
court.

It must be noted that under Section 19 of the Rule on


CA-G.R. SP No. 164451
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_________________________________________________________________________

Summary Procedure, a motion for extension of time to file


pleadings, affidavits, or any other paper is listed among the
pleadings prohibited in cases where the rule applies. Considering
that such a motion is prohibited and considering the wordings of
Sections 5 and 6 of the said Rule, there is reasonable ground to
deny a motion for the admission of an answer filed late.

xxx”

Despite the said pronouncement of the MeTC, petitioners, this


time through their present counsel, Atty. Jose Teodorico V. Molina
(Atty. Molina), filed a Formal Entry of Appearance with Motion to
Admit Accompanying Memorandum on 27 August 2019 before the
RTC, Branch 121. In the said motion, Atty. Molina explained that
petitioners engaged his services on the day before, or on 26 August
2019, and submitted the attached memorandum in the interest of
substantial justice. Again, the said motion to admit was denied by the
RTC in its Order dated 25 September 2019, viz:

“xxx

On 22 March 2019, this Court issued an Order dismissing


the instant appeal for failure to the Defendants-Appellants to file
their Memorandum. Defendants-Appellants filed on 27 August
2019 a Motion to Admit Accompanying Memorandum dated 26
August 2019. In the Motion, ATTY. TEODORICO V. MOLINA
entered his appearance as counsel for Defendants-Appellants.
xxx

In the Motion to Admit, Defendants-Appellants raised


liberal construction of the Rules and, in support thereof, alleges
that:

“The claim of defendant's counsel in filing a late


answer was due to heavy work. This claim is
understandable because trial lawyer now has
numerous Court hearings to attend morning and
afternoon sessions and many paperwork to be
accomplished. Trial lawyers have many tedious
studies to undertake.

Nowadays, there are only few trial lawyers. Most of


our lawyers are in the government, corporate,
business and academe service. x x x”
CA-G.R. SP No. 164451
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_________________________________________________________________________

xxx

The Motion to Admit is DENIED.

xxx

The reason, which is “heavy work load of counsel”, raised


by the Defendants-Appellants for late filing of their Appeal-
Memorandum does not warrant the relaxation of the rules of
procedure. Numerous workloads cannot justify the late filing of a
Memorandum.

xxx”

Once more, the RTC found the reason posed by petitioners'


counsel as unjustified. Petitioners in their motion for reconsideration
clarified that indeed, Atty. Molina never raised “heavy work load” as
an excuse in his belated filing of the memorandum before the RTC.
Petitioners posits that it was for the cause of justice for reasons,
claiming that the client should not be punished for the negligence of
their previous counsel, Atty. Alfonso. The RTC was not convinced by
these reasons raised by the petitioners, thus, in disposing of
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the assailed Order pertinently
reads in this wise, viz:

“xxx

This Court rules to DENY the Motion.

Section 7, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,


as amended, provides:

“(a) Upon receipt of the complete record or the


record on appeal, the clerk of court of the Regional
Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.

(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it


shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a
memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors
imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be
furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the appellant's
memorandum, the appellee may file his
CA-G.R. SP No. 164451
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_________________________________________________________________________

memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a


memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of
the appeal.”

[Emphasis Supplied

It is clear from the above provisions that Defendants-


Appellants failure to file their memorandum seasonably is a
ground for the dismissal of their appeal.

Defendants-Appellants' excuse that their counsel was


burdened by “heavy workload” lacks merit. The Supreme Court
cautioned lawyers to handle only as many cases as they can
efficiently handle. The zeal and fidelity demanded of a lawyer to
his client's cause require that not only he be qualified to handle a
legal matter, he must also prepare adequately and give
appropriate attention to his legal work. Since a client is, as a rule,
bound by the acts of his counsel, a lawyer, once he agrees to
take a case, should undertake the task with dedication and care.
Failure of a lawyer to file a pleading constitutes inexcusable
negligence on his part.

Also, there is no showing that they were earnestly


following up their case with their counsel. It is a dogma that
litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they
need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case.
A party to a case is mandated to inquire from time to time about
its status and progress. Defendants-Appellant were unmindful of
this mandate.

xxx”

From the foregoing Orders, it is evident that petitioners were


unmindful of the effect of the ejectment case filed against them. It is
apparent that they carelessly disregarded the rigid application of
technical rules of procedure as they have been incessantly filing
belated pleadings before trial courts. Needless to stress, it is the duty
of petitioner to monitor the status of his case and not simply rely on
his former lawyer whom he already knew to be unable to attend to his
duties as counsel. It is settled that litigants represented by counsel
should not expect that all they need to do is sit back and relax, and
await the outcome of their case. They should give the necessary
assistance to their counsel, for at stake is their interest in the case 25.
25
Editha B. Albor vs. Court of Appeals, Nery A. Macasil, joined by her husband Rudy Macasil
CA-G.R. SP No. 164451
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Having discussed the procedural aspect of this petition, We


now resolve the substantive issue raised.

In essence, petitioners averred that the ruling in the Tuason


case is not binding on them for the following reasons: first, the case
deals with the constitutionality of PD No. 293, and did not specify the
extent of the area of the properties covered in the said case; second,
since petitioners occupied the subject property as early as 1976, the
1988 pronouncement of the Supreme Court should not be given
retroactive application insofar as those occupying the property that
relied on a valid law; and third, CDI failed to prove that petitioners'
title is one of the properties that was subject of the Tuason case. We
are not convinced.

A perusal of the annotation in page 2 of TCT No. C-33475


shows an Entry made by the Francisco G. Romero, Register of
Deeds of Metro Manila District III, which reads, viz:

“Entry No. 218192/T-No. C-33475 DECISION: Of the Supreme


Court in its G.R. No. 70484, entitled Roman C. Tuason and
Remedios V. Tuason, Petitioners, versus Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City, et. al., respondents and Tomas Bartolome, et.al.,
Petitioners-Intervenors, declaring unconstitutional and invalid
Presidential Decree No. 293, by virtue of which this certificate of
title having been issued in pursuance of said decree, is hereby
deemed invalidated.

Date of Instrument – January 29, 1988


Date of Inscription – September 23, 1988 at 11:00 a.m.

(Sgd.)
FRANCISCO G. ROMERO
Register of Deeds”

Evident from the foregoing entry that petitioners' property


covered by TCT No. C-33475 is included in the properties affected by
the promulgation of PD No. 293 and the consequent declaration of its
unconstitutionality in the Tuason case. Albeit the subsequent Entry

and Norma Beluso, joined by her husband Noli Beluso, G.R. No. 196598, 17 January 2018,
citing Cesar Naguit v. San Miguel Corp., 761 Phil. 184 (2015).
CA-G.R. SP No. 164451
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_________________________________________________________________________

No. 2908-1026 in page 3 thereof, declaring that TCT No. C-33475 as


uncancelled, it remains undisputed that the property covered by TCT
No. C-33475 under petitioners' name are among those properties
included in the coverage of PD No. 293 and the Tuason case. The
said subsequent entry merely declared that the Register of Deeds
had no authority to motu proprio cancel titles under the Torrens
system.

In sum, there being no error committed by the RTC in denying


petitioners' motion for reconsideration, We find no reason to disturb
or modify, much less reverse the assailed Decision.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is


hereby DENIED. The Order dated 24 January 2020 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-
25201 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DANTON Q. BUESER
Associate Justice

26
Entry No. 2908-10 TCT No. C-33475
CONSULTA NO. 3127

“Decision dated January 29, 1988 in G. R. No. 70484, entitled Roman C. Tuason,
et.al., Versus Register of Deeds of Caloocan City et.al., declaring unconstitutional Presidential
Decree No. 293 pursuant to which this particular title was issued did not confer upon the
Register of Deeds sufficient authority to cancel the same. It is basic in subsequent registration
that once a certificate of title or a memorandum thereof has been entered in the registration
book and entered by the Register of Deeds, the same cannot be erased, amended, altered
and much less cancelled, UNLESS in cases provided by law or upon express Order by the
Court (Consulta No. ___, Sec. 109, P.D. No. 1529); Without such an Order therefore the same
remains UNCANCELLED. It cannot be deemed INVALIDATED by INFERENCE or by mere
declaration of P.D. No. 293.”

Date of Instrument – June 26, 2001


Date of Inscription – May 2, 2002 at 10:30 a.m.

(Sgd.)
REGULO B. COLOMA
Register of Deeds
CA-G.R. SP No. 164451
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_________________________________________________________________________

WE CONCUR:

GERALDINE C. FIEL-MACARAIG
Associate Justice

RAYMOND REYNOLD REYES LAUIGAN


Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is


hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.

DANTON Q. BUESER
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Twelfth Division

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