Republic of the Philippines

Court of Appeals
Manila

SIXTH DIVISION

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, CA-G.R. SP No. 159811

Petitioner,
Members:

- versus - Bruselas, Jr., Chairman

Azcarraga-Jacob, and
Quimpo-Sale, JJ.
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 150, OFFICE OF
THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF
MAKATI CITY, and/or Promulgated:
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 01 March 2021
_______________
Respondents.
x==============================================x

DECISION

Bruselas, Jr., J.

“May amnesty be revoked? Who may revoke it?

When may it be revoked, if at all?”

These are the incidental questions raised against the Orders

of the respondent court that summarily granted an Omnibus
Motion predicated on a revoked amnesty and thus challenged to
have been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

The Antecedents

The undisputed facts show that petitioner Antonio F.

Trillanes IV stood charged in 2007 with the crime of rebellion
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 150. 1 He
also stood charged in 2003 with coup d'etat before the RTC of

1 Docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-3126.

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Makati - Branch 148.2

On 24 November 2010, then President B.S. Aquino III issued

Presidential Proclamation No. 75, Series of 2010 (Proclamation
No. 75), which granted amnesty to all active and former personnel
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) who have or may have committed crimes
in connection with, in relation to, or as an incident of the
Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines Stand-Off, and the
29 November 2007 Manila Peninsula Hotel Take-over. On 13
December 2010, both Houses of Congress concurred with said
proclamation. The Department of National Defense (DND) was
tasked to process applications and to determine whether or not an
applicant was entitled to the benefit of amnesty.

An Ad Hoc Amnesty Committee promulgated Circular No. 1

dated 21 December 2010 or the Rules and Procedures in the
processing of Amnesty Applications pursuant to Proclamation
No. 75. The relevant provisions of the said circular are as follows:

“Section 5. Application Forms. Applicant for amnesty

under Presidential Proclamation No. 75, shall fill up the official
application form as attached herein. xxx xxx xxx

“Section 6. Where to apply; Period of availment. - Sworn

applications for the grant of amnesty shall be personally filed
by the applicant with the DND Ad Hoc Amnesty Committee
thru its Secretariat xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Section 11. Deliberations by the Committee; Admission

of Participation and Guilt.- xxx xxx xxx

No application shall be approved without an express

admission by the applicant of actual involvement/participation
in connection with, in relation or incident to the July 27, 2003
Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and/or
the November 29, 2007 Peninsula Manila Hotel incident and
that such involvement/participation constituted a violation of
the 1987 Constitution, criminal laws and the Articles of War, as
2 Docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
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indicated in the application form. No application shall likewise
be approved without a recantation of all previous statements, if
any, that are inconsistent with such express admission of actual
involvement/participation and guilt.”

Pursuant to the provisions of Proclamation No. 75, the

petitioner was issued a Certificate of Amnesty which stated that
he was granted amnesty on 21 January 2011 for his participation
and involvement in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood Mutiny and the 29
November 2007 Peninsula Manila Hotel Siege.3

On 18 August 2011, the petitioner filed a Manifestation with Ex

Parte Motion to Dismiss, which prayed for the dismissal of the
rebellion case. He attached the Certificate of Amnesty and argued
that any possible criminal liability on his part had been fully
extinguished by the said grant of amnesty.4

On 07 September 2011, respondent Presiding Judge Elmo M.

Alameda issued an Order that dismissed the rebellion case. He
explained that, taking into consideration the Certificate of
Amnesty and Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the
petitioner’s criminal liability had been extinguished. 5 No appeal
or motion for reconsideration was taken against the said Order.

A similar motion to dismiss was filed in the coup d'etat case

which was also granted by the RTC Makati – Branch 148.

On 31 August 2018, President R.R. Duterte issued

Proclamation No. 572, Series of 2018 (Proclamation No. 572), the
relevant provisions of which state:

“WHEREAS, former LTSG Antonio Trillanes IV, O-11797

PN, a grantee under Proclamation No. 75, did not file an Official
Amnesty Application Form as per the Certification dated
August 30, 2018 issued by Lt. Col. Thea Joan N. Andrade, Chief,
Discipline, Law and Order Division of the Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel J1, stating that “there is no available
copy of his application for amnesty in the records”;
3 Rollo, p. 99.
4 Id., at 96-98.
5 Id., at 100-101.
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WHEREAS, former LTSG Antonio Trillanes, O-11797 PN,

never expressed his guilt for the crimes that were committed on
occasion of the Oakwood Mutiny and Peninsula Manila Hotel
Siege, xxx;

WHEREAS, despite former LTSG Trillanes IV's failure to

apply for amnesty and refusal to admit his guilt, his name was
nonetheless included among those granted amnesty pursuant to
DND Ad Hoc Committee Resolution No. 2 approved by the
Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin;

NOW, THEREFORE, I RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE,

President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in
me by Section 19, Article VII of the Philippine Constitution, do
hereby DECLARE and PROCLAIM:

Section 1. The grant of amnesty to former LTSG

Antonio Trillanes IV under Proclamation No. 75 is
declared void ab initio because he did not comply with
the minimum requirements to qualify under the Amnesty
Proclamation.

Section 2. Effects.

1. As a consequence, the Department of Justice and

Court Martial of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are
ordered to pursue all criminal and administrative cases
filed against former LTSG Antonio Trillanes in relation to
the Oakwood Mutiny and the Manila Peninsula incident.

2. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the

Philippine National Police are ordered to employ all
lawful means to apprehend former LTSG Antonio
Trillanes so that he can be recommitted to the detention
facility where he had been incarcerated for him to stand
trial for the crimes he is charged with.”

On 07 September 2018, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed

a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion for the Issuance of a Hold
Departure Order (HDO) and Warrant of Arrest (Omnibus Motion) against
the petitioner. It alleged that because of Proclamation No. 572, the
rebellion case remained to be a pending action and the
prosecution/DOJ still has to present its evidence-in-chief;
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considering the petitioner's means and resources to flee to another
country, a hold departure order was necessary to prevent him
from leaving the Philippines.6 An identical motion was filed
before the RTC of Makati - Branch 148, with regard to the criminal
action for coup d'etat.7

In its Order dated 10 September 2018, the respondent court

scheduled the Omnibus Motion for summary hearing on 14
September 2018.8

On 11 September 2018, the Supreme Court, acting on the

petitioner's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, issued a Resolution,9 which, among others, held:

“The Court resolves to deny petitioner Senator Trillanes'

prayer for the issuance of a WPI and/or TRO on the grounds
as follows:

(1) Preliminarily, the issues of whether or not Senator

Trillanes filed an application for amnesty and whether
or not he admitted his guilt for the crimes subject thereof
appears to be factual in nature. Only a trial court, and in
certain cases, the Court of Appeals, are trier of facts.
Hence, it is appropriate that the Makati RTCs should be
given leeway in exercising their concurrent jurisdiction
to hear and resolve the pleadings/motions filed by the
parties as regards the legality of Proclamation No. 572,
Series of 2018. xxx”

At the summary hearing of 14 September 2018, the

petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition. He argued that the rebellion
case can no longer be reopened or revived because the Order of 07
September 2011, which dismissed the said action, had long
become final and executory; that the amnesty granted by
Proclamation No. 75 completely extinguished his criminal liability
such that he stood as if no offense had been committed. He
likewise took issue with the statements set forth in Proclamation
No. 572 that he did not file an application and that he did not
6 Id., at 106-109.
7 Id., at 102-105.
8 Id., at 110-112.
9 Id., at 113-114.
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admit his guilt to the crimes charged.10

In its reply, the DOJ countered that the grant of amnesty to

the petitioner was void ab initio because the petitioner never filed a
duly accomplished application form, as evidenced by a
Certification issued by Lt. Col. Thea Joan Andrada, and did not
admit his guilt, as evidenced by an article from GMA News.11

In his rejoinder, the petitioner asserted that the DOJ had the
burden of overcoming the validity of the Certificate of Amnesty.
The certification that his amnesty application could not be found
and the news article that he did not admit his guilt were not
sufficient to rebut the presumption of regularity that attended the
issuance of the Certificate of Amnesty. He also attached the
affidavits executed by the concerned personnel who received and
processed his amnesty application and those of other military
officials who accompanied him and witnessed him file his
application.12

Meanwhile, on 05 October 2018, RTC Makati Branch - 148

conducted an evidentiary hearing of the identical omnibus motion
filed by the DOJ in the coup d'etat case.

On 25 September 2018, the respondent court issued the first

assailed Order which granted the DOJ's Omnibus Motion.13 It ruled
that there were factual and legal bases for the issuance of
Proclamation No. 572; the petitioner failed to offer substantial
evidence to prove that he actually applied to be granted amnesty
under Proclamation No. 75 and that he expressly admitted his
guilt to those crimes committed pertaining to the Oakwood
mutiny. Since the amnesty granted to the petitioner was revoked,
the Order of 07 September 2011 which dismissed the case against
him, in effect, was a void order and therefore cannot attain
finality. Thus:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the above disquisition, the

10 Id., at 115-143.
11 Id., at 144-153.
12 Id., at 154-205.
13 Id., at 68-89.
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prosecution's Omnibus Motion dated September 7, 2018 for
issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Hold Departure Order
against Sen. Antonio F. Trillanes IV is granted. Bail for
temporary liberty of the accused is fixed at Php200,000.00 per
Order dated February 16, 2010.”

The petitioner consequently filed an Omnibus Motion for

Reconsideration and Motion to Set the Case for Hearing and Reception of
Evidence of the Parties which prayed that the first assailed Order be
reversed and that the respondent court schedule a hearing so that
the parties may adduce their evidence on the factual issues
referred to by the Supreme Court.14

At the hearing of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration

on 12 October 2018, the DOJ submitted its comment cum
opposition. It cited pieces of evidence and testimonies of
witnesses that were presented during the 05 October 2018 hearing
before the RTC of Makati - Branch 148.15 Subsequently, the DOJ
submitted to the respondent court a copy of the entire transcript of
stenographic notes of the 05 October 2018 hearing in the coup
d'etat case, conducted by the RTC of Makati - Branch 148.16

In a subsequent manifestation, the petitioner informed the

respondent court that the RTC of Makati - Branch 148, has denied
the DOJ's identical omnibus motion in the coup d'etat case via an
Order dated 22 October 2018.17

The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in

the second assailed Order of 18 December 2018.18 The respondent
court reiterated that the petitioner failed to prove through
testimonial and documentary evidence that he filed his
application for amnesty and expressly admitted his guilt for the
crimes that he committed during the Oakwood mutiny, which
were the minimum requirements set forth by Proclamation No.
75.

14 Id., at 246-265.
15 Id., at 266-277.
16 Id., at 320-671.
17 Id., at 672-676.
18 Id., at 90-95.
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Allegations of Grave Abuse

The petitioner, believing that he has been aggrieved, filed

the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, with
very urgent application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order.19 He contended that:

“I.

THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS

DISCRETION IN A MANNER AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO ADMIT THE CERTIFICATE OF
AMNESTY ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DND) AS
PROOF THAT HE APPLIED FOR AND/OR WAS GRANTED AMNESTY
UNDER PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 75, SERIES OF 2010;

II.

THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS

DISCRETION IN A MANNER AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO ADMIT DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE AND/OR TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO PRESENT
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS FACTUAL CLAIM THAT
HE APPLIED AND WAS GRANTED AMNESTY UNDER
PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 75, SERIES OF 2010;

III.

THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS

DISCRETION IN A MANNER AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN HE RE-OPENED CRIM. CASE NO. 03-3126
DESPITE THE WEIGHT OF PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE TO THE
EFFECT THAT FINAL AND EXECUTORY CASES ARE IMMUTABLE
AND MAY NO LONGER BE RE-OPENED;

-AND-

IV.

THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS

DISCRETION IN A MANNER AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN HE UPHELD PRESIDENTIAL
PROCLAMATION NO. 572, SERIES OF 2018, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE SAME IS CLEARLY ILLEGAL AND/OR
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND/OR IN FACT CONSTITUTES A CLEAR
TRANSGRESSION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE EXCLUSIVE POWER
OF THE JUDICIARY TO RULE ON THE LEGALITY AND/OR
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS,
AMONG OTHERS, AS CLEARLY SET FORTH UNDER SECTION 4(2)
AND 5(2)(A) OF ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION;”20

19 Id., at 3-64.
20 Id., at 8-9.
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On 18 March 2019, the Court denied the petitioner's

application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order.21

The Court's Opinion

In essence, the petitioner attributes grave abuse of discretion

to the respondent court when it: 1) upheld the validity of
Proclamation No. 572; 2) re-opened the rebellion case with the
issuance of a warrant of arrest/hold departure order; and 3) did
not allow him reasonable opportunity to present his evidence. He
seeks relief through the writ of certiorari, prohibition, and
injunction.

Certiorari, as a special civil action, is available if: 1) it is

directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; 2) the tribunal, board, or officer acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and 3) there
is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.22 Prohibition, on the other hand, may be
availed of if: 1) it is directed against a tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions; 2) the tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and 3) and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 23 A petition for
certiorari and prohibition, therefore, lies when an officer gravely
abuses his or her discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so
patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
21 Id., Vol. II, at 705-707.
22 Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 1.
23 Id., Section 2.
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all in contemplation of law.24
On the other hand, injunction, as a principal action, is a
judicial writ, process, or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to
do or refrain from doing a certain act. The writ of injunction
would issue upon the satisfaction of two requisites, namely: 1) the
existence of a right to be protected; and 2) acts which are violative
of said right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of
the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights.
Where the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, injunction
is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof
of actual, existing right is not a ground for an injunction.25

Amnesty vis-a-vis Pardon

Amnesty, according to Black's Law Dictionary, 26 is a

sovereign act of oblivion for past acts, granted by a government to
all persons (or to certain persons) who have been guilty of crimes
or delicts, generally political offenses – such as, treason, sedition,
rebellion - and often conditioned upon their return to obedience
and duty within a prescribed time. It comes from the Greek word
“amnéstia,” meaning forgetfulness or oblivion. In an amnesty,
crimes committed are removed from legal scrutiny and, from the
point of view of law, forgotten. It is distinguished from other
forms of immunity because of the political context of its grant.

In the 1903 case of Villa v. Allen,27 the Supreme Court

defined amnesty as “the general pardon to rebels for their treason
and other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one
sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended by
some breach of the law of nations” and is “applied to rebellions
which by their magnitude are properly within international law,
but has no technical meaning in common law. It is a synonym of
oblivion, which in English law is the synonym of pardon.” When
Villa was decided, the Philippines was still a colony of the United
States, whose Constitution does not specifically mention amnesty;
24 Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017.
25 BP Philippines, Inc. v. Clark Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 175284, September 19, 2012.
26 4th Ed. (1968), p. 108.
27 G.R. No. 1448, August 22, 1903; Allen was the first Chief of Constabulary; thus, Camp Allen, etc.
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thus, the synonymous treatment. The United States' constitutional
provision empowering the President to grant reprieves and
pardons has been interpreted as the legal basis for declarations of
amnesty.28 Amnesty, per the 1877 case of Knote v. United States,29
is included in pardon and the distinction between them is treated
as one of “philological interest rather than of legal importance.”
This is also consistent, as will be discussed, with the traditional
notion that amnesty fundamentally emanates from the power to
pardon.

More than a decade after Villa was promulgated, the United

States Supreme Court, in Burdick v. Unites States,30 clarified that
while the distinction between pardon and amnesty may not be of
legal importance as to their ultimate effect, there are nonetheless
incidental differences of importance. In the 1949 case of
Barrioquinto v. Fernandez,31 the distinction was acknowledged by
our Supreme Court in this wise:

“Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it

is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the
person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof;
while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one
after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons
or communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks
forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an
offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or
forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "not work
the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms
of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence" while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and
puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though
28 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871).
29 95 U.S. 149 (1877).
30 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
31 G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949.
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he had committed no offense.”

Thus, although amnesty took its roots from the State's

power to pardon, it has since acquired a legal identity distinct
from pardon. Amnesty refuses knowledge while pardon refuses
action. In amnesty, the State does not deny the criminal nature of
an action but it refuses to discover who committed a crime and
from bringing him to trial. Pardon, on the hand, recognizes both
the criminal nature of an action and the guilt of the perpetrator,
but refuses to punish and impose the sanctions for such act.32

From the perspective of history, the use of amnesty as a tool

for forgetfulness or oblivion has not changed. As a legal concept,
however, it has developed over time and our present-day
understanding of amnesty is widely influenced by how it was
utilized in the past.33 In the Philippines, the idea of amnesty, as a
32 Ross Poole, Enacting Oblivion, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 22,
2009, at 152.
33 A brief history of amnesty:
It is claimed that amnesty, as a form of political forgiveness, had been used since the
ancient times and “for as long as there have been written laws there has been institutionalised
power of mercy.”
In ancient Greece, amnesty was used during times of national peril or after civil strife to
reconcile opposing factions. Perhaps the most famous of these Hellenic amnesties is the Amnesty
of 403 BC. During the regime of the Thirty Tyrants, political unrest engulfed the state. A
revolution was orchestrated by Thrasybulus, an Athenian general, who successfully overthrew the
Thirty in 403 BC. The reconciliation that occurred thereafter resulted in an amnesty law which
forbade punishment of Athenians for wrongs committed before the fall of the Thirty for the
purpose of re-establishing civil concord and preventing renewed civil conflagration. The warring
parties were made to swear a “pledge of forgiveness” or “pledge not to recall wrong” called “me
mnêsikakein,” which promised “to refrain from vengeful action provoked by the memory of the
past wrongdoing.” It “binds the wronged side from taking retributive action” and “[i]n return for
laying down arms, it grants the vanquished reprieve.”
In early modern times, amnesties were adopted in peace agreements after armed conflicts
which gave birth to modern-day nations. The European war of religions, which ultimately led to
the Thirty Years' War, saw the European powers and empires in conflict and turmoil in what is
considered to be the bloodiest war in modern-day Europe. When the war ended in 1648, the
belligerent states convened in the Westphalian cities of Osnabrück and Münster for peace
negotiations, which came to be known as the Peace Treaty of Westphalia. Article II of the treaty
states: “That there shall be on the one side and the other a perpetual Oblivion, Amnesty, or Pardon
of all that has been committed since the beginning of these Troubles, in what place, or what
manner soever the Hostilitys have been practis'd, xxx; That they shall not act, or permit to be
acted, any wrong or injury to any whatsoever; but that all that has pass'd on the one side, and the
other, xxx shall be entirely abolish'd in such a manner that all that might be demanded of, or
pretended to, by each other on that behalf, shall be bury'd in eternal Oblivion.”
Several peace treaties containing amnesty provisions were entered into after the end of
the Seven Year's War. Article I of the 1763 Treaty of Paris, provided that “[t]here shall be a
Christian, universal, and perpetual peace” and that “there shall be a general oblivion of every thing
that may have been done or committed before or since the commencement of the war which is just
ended.” In the early 19 th century, the 1814 Treaty of Paris granted amnesty in order to “bury in
entire oblivion the dissensions which agitated Europe.”
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form of general pardon, surfaced as early as the period of the
Spanish colonization, particularly those acts of generosity granted
to Filipino and Chinese insurgents. Written records of these
grants are elusive, if not totally absent. Amnesties during the
American occupation until the present time, however, are duly
recorded.34 The resort to amnesty in the Philippines, at least those
that are recorded, has been consistent with how it was used and
understood in history. They were issued after wars, insurgencies,
or certain political events to encourage reconciliation, such as
those issued after the Second World War, to “accelerate the
rehabilitation of this war-devastated country, restore peace and
order, and secure the welfare and happiness of their
communities.”35 They also served as a peace-making tool in the
resolution of on-going conflicts to encourage combatants to
surrender and cooperate with the State. To avoid further
In the early 20th century, the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy was
prohibited under international law. Amnesty clauses were then mostly excluded from and did not
constitute a major component in most peace treaties entered into in relation to the Second World
War. Amnesty clauses that found their way into these peace treaties were mostly crafted in favor of
those who fought alongside or sympathized with the Allied Powers. The emergence of human
rights as an international concern, rising from the ashes of atrocities horrendously committed
during the great war, and developments in humanitarian law contributed to the push for more
accountability in the case of political crimes that constitute violations of international norms. The
global effort to combat impunity also put great emphasis on the trial and punishment of war
criminals, rather than oblivion or amnesty.
Years after the Second World War, the use of amnesty regained popularity and resort to it
has since then increased in frequency. The increase in the number of states due to the decline of
colonization is just one of the possible factors that may have influenced the resurgence. Amnesty
laws were consequently enacted in relation to conflicts, whether on-going or a result of peace
negotiations, or by dictatorial regimes in situations of conflicted democracy. Amnesty had also
been resorted to “in the wake of failed military coups to pacify the military, encourage their
cooperation with the government, and stabilise the regime” and in cases of “violence emanating
from small-scale or short-lived terrorist campaigns.”
The foregoing discussion is based on the historical analysis found on the following works: Louis
Joinet, Study on Amnesty Laws and their role in the safeguard and promotion of human rights,
United Nations Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/16/Rev.1, 1987
(hereinafter, UN Study); Louise Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions:
Bridging the Peace and Justice Divide, Hart Publishing, 2008; H.S. Smith, A Note on Amnesty,
The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology, Vol. 54, 1968; Christopher J. Joyce, The Athenian Amnesty
and Scrutiny of 403, The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 58, No. 2, 2008; Faustin Z.
Ntoubandi, Amnesty for Crimes Against Humanity Under International Law, Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2007; Louise Mallinder, Global Comparison of Amnesty Laws,
The Pursuit of International Criminal Justice: A World Study on Conflicts, Victimization,
and Post-Conflict Justice, M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., Intersentia, Antwerp, 2010; Mark Freeman,
Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice, Cambridge University Press, 2009; Garth
Meintjes and Juan Mendez, Reconciling Amnesties and Universal Jurisdiction, International Law
Forum du droit international, Vol. II, 2000; Alberto T. Muyot, Amnesty in the Philippines: The
Legal Concept as a Political Tool, 69 Phil. L.J. 51, 1994.
34 Muyot, Amnesty in the Philippines: The Legal Concept as a Political Tool, note 33, at 68, citing,
Blair and Robertson, III The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, 1973.
35 Proclamation No. 76, Series of 1948.
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bloodshed and waste of time and efforts, it is “deemed necessary,
just and wise for the Government to forgive and forego the
prosecution of the said [amnestied] persons.”36

The circumscribed nature of amnesty

The State's power to grant amnesty, although long

recognized, is not infinite or boundless. The exercise of such
authority is sourced from the State's legal system, whether it be
through its Constitution, statutory law, or its customs. Regardless
of the source of such authority, courts recognize certain limits and
formalities of the amnesty power and characterize them into two
groups: substantive and procedural.

Substantive limits and formalities

Substantive formalities pertain to the scope and coverage of

the amnesty. The term includes the crime or offenses subject of
the amnesty power, its purpose, the persons or classes of persons
covered, the time frame, territory or geographical areas where
applicable, and the extent of liability extinguished by such grant.

Amnesty may be utilized for any offense or, traditionally, be

restricted to political and conflict-related offenses. In some
countries, amnesty had been used, non-traditionally, even for
ordinary offenses as “an expression of the relatively broad power
of civil society to grant every citizen the right of oblivion, if only
to facilitate his reintegration into society.”37 For instance, in the
United Kingdom, the power of amnesty had been used to reduce
prison overcrowding; in Syria, to release incurable or chronically
ill prisoners.38 In the Philippines, as discussed above, we follow
and adopt the view that amnesty applies only to political offenses,
consistent with the traditional practice of using amnesty to
positively affect or assure social and political peace. For instance,
Proclamation No. 8, Series of 1946, granted amnesty to guerrillas
and armed fighters who pursued activities in opposition to the
Japanese forces and described them as “patriots and heroes who
36 Presidential Decree No. 95, Series of 1973.
37 Joinet, UN Study, note 33, at 8, para. 23.
38 Id., para. 25-26.
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have rendered invaluable services to the nation.” 39 The matter of
what constitutes political offenses and how they are distinguished
from ordinary offenses will depend on the domestic legal and
political systems. The Supreme Court had, in the past, classified
political offenses into different categories.40 Further, the 1987
Constitution allows amnesty in relation to election offenses. 41 In
international law, however, the exact definition of political
offenses evades unanimity.

The amnesty's scope may also be limited to exclude certain

categories of crimes. It is not uncommon for an amnesty
enactment to explicitly list offenses that are excluded from its
scope. The amnesty power under the 1987 Constitution, for
instance, cannot be used in cases of impeachment or as otherwise
provided therein.42 In Proclamation No. 8, Series of 1946, crimes
against chastity or for purely personal motives committed by
guerrillas were excluded from its scope. In international law, the
United Nations Organization (UN) views the grant of amnesty as
impermissible and should be outside of its scope if such grant will
prevent prosecution of individuals who may be criminally
responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, or
gross violations of human rights.43 The Trial Chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is of
similar position that granting amnesty in relation to violations of
jus cogens norm should not be accorded legal recognition. 44
Proclamation No. 1377, Series of 2007, specifically excepts
violations of international law or conventions and protocols, even
if alleged to have been committed in pursuit of political beliefs,
from the amnesty's coverage. In contrast, some amnesty laws and
39 Proclamation No. 8, Series of 1946.
40 See, U.S. v. Vergara, G.R. No. 1016, January 16, 1903 (“The amnesty covers, then, three classes of
offenses, namely, (1) purely political crimes, compendiously described in the proclamation as
"treason and sedition," (2) common crimes "political in their character," that is, committed in
furtherance of the interest of the insurrection, if committed pursuant to orders from superior
authority, and (3) crimes which are shown to have had their origin in the two classes of "internal
political feuds or dissensions" named, without reference to whether they are in their nature
political or common crimes, or common crimes of a political character, and without reference to
whether they were committed under orders of a superior authority or not.”)
41 1987 Constitution, Article IX (C), Section 5.
42 Id., Article VII, Section 19.
43 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-
Conflict States: Amnesties, 2009. Retrieved from: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/rule%20of
%20law%20Amnesties_en.pdf
44 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, ICTY Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998.
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peace treaties grant amnesty even to these kinds of crimes.45

From the standpoint of who may be covered, an amnesty

may be granted in favor of a broad classification of offenders or
may be limited to specific persons or groups. For instance,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 497, Series of 1974, granted
amnesty specifically in favor of Muslim Filipinos who have joined
rebel groups or secessionist movements engaged in subversion.
Proclamation No. 76, Series of 1948, was limited to those
associated with the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon
(HUKBALAHAP) and Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga
Magbubukid (PKM). The amnesty may also exclude certain
individuals from its coverage. P.D. No. 95, Series of 1973,
excluded the leaders of groups engaged in rebellion, subversion,
and sedition from the coverage of the amnesty decree; P.D. No.
125, Series of 1973, excepted not just the leaders but also the
officers and ranking leaders of subversive groups and their co-
conspirators. This practice of excluding heads and leaders is
consistent with other States' practices and the developing view
that an amnesty, to be more acceptable, must only provide
protection to low-ranking perpetrators, child soldiers, and those
responsible for less serious crimes and not to leaders of insurgent
movements or high-ranking government and military officials.46

The grant of amnesty may also be limited by time. It could

cover all subject offenses before the grant of the amnesty or could
be narrowed down to cover only offenses within a specific time
frame or in relation to particular events or circumstances.
Proclamation No. 80, Series of 1987, for instance, covered offenses
in furtherance of political beliefs committed before its issuance. In
contrast, Proclamation No. 164, Series of 1950, only covered
offenses committed during the Batangas uprising in 1949.

The amnesty may also broadly cover the territorial

jurisdiction of the amnesty-giving body or be limited to certain
parts of its jurisdiction. In the Philippines, most of the amnesties
45 See, e.g., the Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999 and the Spanish Amnesty Act of 1977.
46 See, e.g., Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict Justice, International Human Rights Law Institute,
2007, Principle 1.8. Retrieved from: https://law.depaul.edu/about/centers-and-
institutes/international-human-rights-law-institute/projects/Documents/chicago_principles.pdf
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that have been decreed were broad enough to cover the entire
country.47 Some amnesties, however, were limited to specific
provinces and cities, such as P.D. No. 497, Series of 1974, and P.D.
No. 1082, Series of 1977.48

The substantive scope of an amnesty power also pertains to

its effects. Usually, the grant of amnesty involves the immediate
release of the grantee, if imprisoned, and the cessation of all
criminal proceedings against him. The amnesty’s legal effects may
also extend to avoidance of civil liability that is attached to the
crime.49 For example, under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code,
an amnesty completely extinguishes the criminal liability and all
its effects. The grant may include the restoration of the grantee's
civil and political rights.50 In some states or jurisdictions,
however, the effect of an amnesty grant with respect to civil and
political rights may be restricted or limited. 51 The amnesty may
also confer reinstatement to their jobs of persons who were
dismissed because of political reasons. The amnesty subject of the
herein certiorari, Proclamation No. 75, includes the reintegration or
reinstatement of all enlisted personnel of the AFP, up to the rank
of Technical Sergeant, and of the PNP, up to the rank of Senior
Police Officer III. In contrast, Proclamation No. 347, Series of 1994,
does not ipso facto result in the reintegration or reinstatement into
the service of former AFP and PNP personnel. For political exiles,
the grant of amnesty may also restore their right to freely return

47 See, e.g., P.D. Nos. 206 and 872, Series of 1973; P.D. Nos. 1182 and 1429, Series of 1977;
Proclamations Nos. 10 and 10-A, Series of 1992; Proclamation Nos. 347 and 248, Series of 1994.
48 Specifically, in P.D. No. 497 - the provinces of North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat,
Maguindanao, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur,
Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Palawan and the cities of Cotabato, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi,
Zamboanga, Pagadian, Basilan, Dipolog and Dapitan; in P.D. No. 1082 – the provinces of Tawi-
Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato,
North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Palawan; and
in the cities of Basilan, Zamboanga, Dapitan, Dipolog, Pagadian, Davao, General Santos,
Cotabato, Iligan, Marawi and Puerto Princesa.
49 See, e.g., United Nations Regulation No. 2001/10 on the establishment of a Commission for
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor, Section 32. Retrieved from:
https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/etimor/untaetR/Reg10e.pdf
50 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 1377, Series of 2007 (“The grant of amnesty shall restore the grantee’s
civil and political rights lost or suspended by virtue of conviction for crime/s covered thereby.”).
51 See, e.g., Proclamation 208 of 01 June 1872 issued by then United States President Ulysses S.
Grant, for instance, did not remove all political disabilities imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment
to officers in the judicial, military, and naval service, heads of Departments, and foreign ministers,
among others. Retrieved from https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-208-
suspension-prosecution-for-violations-the-office-holding-prohibition.
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and enter their own country.52

When an amnesty is granted to a whole class of persons

within a territorial domain, the amnesty is considered a general
amnesty. On the other hand, if the amnesty qualifies the grant
with respect to persons to be favored, the place where the
amnesty is to be effective, or the time frames to which the decree
may be applied, the amnesty is a limited amnesty.53

Procedural Limits and Formalities

Procedural formalities pertain to the mechanisms and

technicalities that operationalize the grant of amnesty. It may
encompass the steps to be undertaken by an individual seeking
the grant, the process to be implemented by the amnesty-granting
authority, the period within which one can avail of an amnesty,
and the conditions attached to the amnesty.

The grant of amnesty may be applied across the board

without requiring any application on the part of the beneficiary or
even an initial inquiry into the facts to determine if they fit within
the scope of the amnesty grant. Eligibility is presumed and
individuals need not affirmatively apply.54 Such blanket or
collective amnesty, broad in its application and not subject to any
condition, was popular in Latin America in the 1980s and early
1990s due to the transitions from military dictatorship to
democracy. In the sense that the amnesty does not lay down
specific requirements and procedures for such grant, the amnesty
is deemed unconditional. When an amnesty is unconditional, the
mere enactment of a statute or executive decree, depending on
whom the power to grant amnesty is reposed by the domestic
legal system, is sufficient to grant the benefits of the amnesty law
to anybody who would qualify and fit within its substantive
coverage.
52 See, e.g., P.D. No. 571-A, Series of 1974 (“[P]olitical expatriates and persons who upon the
proclamation of Martial Law on September 21, 1972 were abroad and who for political reasons
and fear of prosecution therefor have chosen or elected to stay/remain abroad, should be
encouraged to return to their homeland and thereby become our co-workers in the New Society.”).
53 Muyot, Amnesty in the Philippines: The Legal Concept as a Political Tool, note 33, at 60-61.
54 Freeman, Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice, note 33, at 164. See, e.g., the
Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999.
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On the other hand, the amnesty is deemed conditional when

its grant is subject to the fulfillment of certain requisites or when
there are conditions which the covered persons must satisfy
before it becomes effective. Conditional amnesties are designed
to “shape the ability of an amnesty to contribute to reducing
security threats and consolidating sustainable peace” and are
meant to complement other post-conflict justice processes, e.g.,
encouraging combatants to participate in traditional justice
process, reducing the strain on the judiciary.55 In conditional
amnesties, the amnesty may be granted and will remain valid
only with respect to those who have successfully complied with
the specific requirements and conditions set by the amnesty
decree.56 Prompt compliance is necessary, otherwise, the amnesty
becomes valueless.57 The conditions may be contained in the
amnesty law itself or may be imposed or provided by the
authorized body or agency that will implement the amnesty law.
A process is commonly established by which applications may be
administered and evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In this sense,
the grant of amnesty is individualized. Unlike the collective effect
of an unconditional amnesty, a conditional amnesty has been
referred to also as individualized amnesty.

Conditions may require the performance of a certain task at

the time of application, e.g., pre-conditions for obtaining amnesty.
There may also be reference to conditions to which the grantee
must adhere after the amnesty has been granted, e.g., conditions
for retaining amnesty. In the former, compliance with the
conditions gives rise to the grant of amnesty and non-compliance
precludes its grant; in the latter, compliance gives the amnesty
granted continuing effect and non-compliance terminates or
nullifies it.

An example of a condition of the first kind is the

55 Louise Mallinder, Amnesties and Inclusive Political Settlements, 2018. Retrieved from:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3341311.
56 Muyot, Amnesty in the Philippines: The Legal Concept as a Political Tool, note 33, at 61.
57 See separate opinion of J. Geoffrey Robertson in Prosecutor v. Allieu Kondewa, Decision on Lack
of Jurisdiction/ Abuse of Process: Amnesty Provided by Lome Accord, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-
AR72(E), Special Court for Sierra Leone, May 25, 2004. para. 23-24. Retrieved from:
http://www.worldcourts.com/scsl/eng/decisions/2004.05.25_Prosecutor_v_Kondewa.pdf.
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requirement to submit an individual application form within a
specific period of time or deadline. Requiring an application
inserts into the amnesty process a level of both “voluntariness and
accountability.”58 The time limit is used to “quicken [the] peace
process by increasing pressure on the targeted group to
participate“ and avail of the amnesty.59 For example, the
following Philippine amnesty decrees required as a condition for
the grant of amnesty the submission of an application not later
than a specified date: P.D. No. 1182, Series of 1977; Proclamation
No. 1377, Series of 2007; Proclamation Nos. 390 and 405, Series of
2000.60 Some form of repentance on the part of the applicant may
also be required as a condition to show the applicant's recognition
of and regret for his actions and to show that he is willing to make
amends. Thus, the amnesty process may require the applicant to
admit his guilt or to take an oath of allegiance to the State and its
laws, or to do both, during the application and evaluation stage. 61
P.D. No. 1182, Series of 1977, for instance, mandated applicants to
take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to
support and defend its Constitution. Other examples of pre-
conditions include the requirement of surrendering or laying
down of arms62 and payment of amnesty fee.63 In some countries,
applicants have been required to issue public apologies or to
renounce their political beliefs.64 In extreme cases, applicants may
be required to provide information on their former comrades and
58 Freeman, Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice, note 33, at 164-165.
59 Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: Bridging the Peace and Justice
Divide, note 33, at 159.
60 P.D. No. 1182, Series of 1977, in relation to those who committed subversive acts to overthrow the
Marcos regime; Proclamation No. 1377, Series of 2007, in relation to members of the CPP-NPA-
NDF and other communist rebel groups; Proclamation Nos. 390 and 405, Series of 2000, in
relation to the unrest in Mindanao brought about mainly by the armed conflict with the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front.
61 See, e.g., dissenting opinion of J. Tuason in People v. Abendan, G.R. No. L-1481, January 28,
1949.
62 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 164, Series of 1950 (“xxx do hereby declare and proclaim an amnesty
xxx subject to the condition that the rebels shall surrender xxx, together with their arms and
ammunitions, and other military equipment and supplies, xxx. Xxx”;); Contra, Proclamation No.
347, Series of 1994: (“Section 3. Firearms. – The surrender of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives shall not be a condition for amnesty. xxx”).
63 See, e.g., Executive Order No. 171, Series 2003 (“Section 3. An amnesty fee of Three Thousand
Pesos (P3,000.00) for High Powered Firearms and Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) for Low
Powered Firearms, shall be collected for each firearm registered.”).
64 See, e.g., United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor, Regulation 2001/10, at note
49 (“27.7 Following the CRP Hearing, the CRP Panel shall deliberate upon the act of
reconciliation which it considers most appropriate for the Deponent and inform the Deponent of
the outcome of their deliberations. The act of reconciliation may include: (a) community service,
(b) reparation; (c) public apology; and/or (d) other act of contrition.”).
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their whereabouts.

The second kind of condition, which is prospective in

application, requires the grantee, after the amnesty has been
granted, to adhere to some mode of conduct or behavior, either by
performing an act or refraining from doing an act. An example of
a positive prospective condition is that which requires an
amnesty-grantee to serve as a witness for the State. 65 This is
particularly important in post-conflict jurisdictions where
prosecutions of state officials prove difficult because real and
documentary evidence may have been hidden or destroyed. A
negative prospective condition, on the other hand, usually takes
the form of a proscription or denunciation against offenses similar
to those covered by the amnesty or a requirement of non-
recidivism.66

In conditional amnesty, the amnesty law provides for a

mechanism to process applications and assess compliance with
the conditions, either through an independent body or via an
agency incorporated in the existing structure of government,
usually in the executive branch.67 The most prominent example of
the first mode is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
South Africa. Created after the apartheid regime ended, the
commission was created to investigate the nature, causes, and
extent of gross violations of human rights committed during the
65 See Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and Others v President of the Republic of South
Africa and Others, (CCT17/96) [1996] ZACC 16; 1996 (8) BCLR 1015; 1996 (4) SA 672 (25 July
1996), where the Constitutional Court of South Africa emphasized the use of amnesty to generate
testimony from perpetrators (“That truth, which the victims of repression seek so desperately to
know is, in the circumstances, much more likely to be forthcoming if those responsible for such
monstrous misdeeds are encouraged to disclose the whole truth with the incentive that they will
not receive the punishment which they undoubtedly deserve if they do. Without that incentive
there is nothing to encourage such persons to make the disclosures and to reveal the truth which
persons in the positions of the applicants so desperately desire. With that incentive, what might
unfold are objectives fundamental to the ethos of a new constitutional order.”).
66 See, e.g., Angolan Law No. 18 of 1994 (Amnesty Law) (“Article 5. Pardon granted on condition
resulting from the beneficiary not committing any fraudulent crime punishable by a heavy prison
sentence during the 5 years following the date of publication of this law which terminates the
serving of the sentence or during its fullfilment.”) Retrieved from
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4da17.html.
67 Freeman, Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice, note 33, at 175, notes that “[i]n
terms of specific models for an amnesty body, the main choices are the following: an ad hoc
amnesty commission, a truth commission, the courts, a government office, a specially deputized
agency, or combinations of one or more of these (e.g., a deputized agency processes applications
and a court makes the final decision on whether to extend amnesty).”
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said regime. To aid in fulfilling its mandate, the Commission was
given the authority to grant amnesty to persons who make full
disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with
a political objective committed in the course of the conflicts
subject of the investigation.68 In the Philippines, a National
Amnesty Commission was specially established in 1994 to
facilitate the processing of applications for amnesty under
Proclamation No. 347, series of 1994, whose decisions were made
appealable to the Court of Appeals.69 Upon the other hand, the
process may be delegated to existing departments, agencies, or
bodies in the government. The National Committee on Social
Integration under the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process, for instance, was designated by Proclamation No.
1377, series of 2007, to implement the amnesty process. Section 2
of Proclamation No. 75, entrusted to the DND, through an ad hoc
committee, the task of receiving and processing applications,
including oppositions thereto, if any, and determining whether
the applicants be entitled to amnesty; whose decisions were
subject to the review powers of the President.

The rule, therefore, is that for a grant of amnesty to be

legitimate, it must be both substantively and procedurally sound.
In an unconditional amnesty, there is only one operative act for
an amnesty to be granted: the passage of a law that grants
amnesty to specific persons or groups. The amnesty law grants
amnesty ipso facto. A person who intends to be granted amnesty
only needs to show that he is covered or belongs to a group
covered by the substantive aspect of the amnesty law. The courts,
if a case has already been filed, can simply take judicial notice of
the amnesty law and apply it accordingly. On the other hand, in
conditional amnesty, there are two operative acts necessary for
amnesty to be effectively granted: first, the passage of an amnesty
law that grants amnesty to specific persons or groups; and second,
the individualized compliance of a person who falls within the
scope of the amnesty law with the procedure laid down therein.
The mere enactment of an amnesty law, under the second
68 The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995. Retrieved from
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1995-034.pdf.
69 The Commission was abolished by Executive Order No. 415, series of 2005, in view of the
completion of its assigned tasks.
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situation, does not ipso facto grant amnesty to a person even if he
be covered by the substantive scope of the decree. The said person
must apply, comply, adhere to the conditions, and undergo the
requisite process. Only upon compliance with the procedural
formalities can it be said that the amnesty is effectively granted to
the applicant. Thus, even if the applicant be within the
substantive coverage of the amnesty law, his failure to abide by
the procedural conditions set therein will nevertheless preclude
him from obtaining any right or benefit arising from the amnesty
proclamation.

The power to enact amnesty laws,

initiate amnesty process, and grant
amnesty

The traditional or historical view confers absolute amnesty

power, to include the determination of its bounds and limits, to
the Chief Executive or head of government, as such power
emanates from the power to pardon, which is a power vested
upon such political organs of the government. In The Federalist
Papers: No. 74, Alexander Hamilton, in arguing that, on top of his
command of the military and naval forces, the pardoning power
rightfully belongs to the Chief Executive, explained the rationale
behind the rule:

“It is not to be doubted, that a single man of prudence and

good sense is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the
motives which may plead for and against the remission of the
punishment, than any numerous body whatever. It deserves
particular attention, that treason will often be connected with
seditions which embrace a large proportion of the community; as
lately happened in Massachusetts. In every such case, we might
expect to see the representation of the people tainted with the
same spirit which had given birth to the offense.

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

But the principal argument for reposing the power of

pardoning in this case to the Chief Magistrate is this: in seasons of
insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when
a welltimed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may
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restore the tranquillity of the commonwealth; and which, if
suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards
to recall. The dilatory process of convening the legislature, or
one of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to
the measure, would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the
golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, an hour, may
sometimes be fatal.”70

A review of amnesty provisions or statutes of different

jurisdictions in modern times shows different approaches as to
which branch of government exercises the power to enact
amnesty laws. First, there are jurisdictions where, following the
traditional notion of amnesty, the amnesty power is exclusively
vested on the head of government or the chief executive and is
usually incorporated with the President's power to pardon, like
that in Myanmar.71 In those where the President is also
authorized to negotiate and enter into peace agreements, he may
likewise exercise his power to grant amnesty. Amnesty, therefore,
is an exercise of executive discretion and is a common method of
introducing amnesty laws. Second, there are also jurisdictions
where amnesty must be in the form of a statute and not a mere
executive order;72 thus, the power to enact amnesty laws is
exclusively vested in an elected legislature, such as the amnesty
provisions in the constitutions of Italy73 and Mexico.74 Third,
amnesty laws may be introduced through a referendum where
the public is directly involved, as may be allowed by the State's
constitution.75 Finally, there are jurisdictions which incorporate a
hybrid system where the amnesty power is not exclusive to one
branch of the government alone. In such a configuration, there is
no exclusive authority to enact amnesty laws and the coordinative
70 Retrieved from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed74.asp.
71 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (“204. The President has xxx (b) the power
to grant amnesty in accord with the recommendation of the National Defence and Security
Council.”). Retrieved from https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/mm/mm009en.pdf.
72 Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol II., New York, Macmillan, 1930, p. 36.
73 Constitution of the Italian Republic (“Art. 79. Amnesty and pardon may be granted by a law which
has received a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament, on each section and on the final
vote.”). Retrieved from https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/it/it037en.pdf.
74 The Constitution of Mexico, translation by Carlos Pérez Vázques (“Article 73. The Congress has
the power: xxx To grant amnesties for crimes within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”).
Retrieved from http://historico.juridicas.unam.mx/infjur/leg/constmex/pdf/consting.pdf.
75 Contra, e.g.,Venezuela's Constitution of 1999 which expressly prohibits amnesty laws by
referendum. (“Article 74. xxx It shall not be possible to submit budget laws to an abrogatory
referendum, neither xxx amnesty xxx.”) Retrieved from
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/venezuela-constitution.html.
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relationship between the executive and legislative branches of the
government come into play. For instance, in the Unites States, its
Constitution entrusted to the President autonomous power to
grant reprieves and pardons, which includes amnesty,76 although
on several occasions, the President's amnesty power has been
exercised with the support of the legislature. 77 In practice, the
United States Congress has initiated the grant of amnesties on its
own as a part of its power of legislation without any issue about
the legitimacy of such exercise of a power.78

In the Philippines, Article VII, Section 19 of the 1987

Constitution provides that the power to grant amnesty lies
exclusively with the President subject to the concurrence of a
majority of all the members of Congress:

“Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise

provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the

concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.”

This provision can be traced to Article VII, Section 10 (6) of

the 1935 Constitution, which reads:

“The President shall have the power to grant reprieves,

commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction, for all expenses except in case of impeachment, upon
such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he
may deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of the Congress.”

This was also adopted in Article VII, Section 11 of the 1973

Constitution:

“The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant

reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures
and, with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant
amnesty.“
76 United States v. Klein, note 28.
77 Leslie Sebba, The Pardoning Power--A World Survey, 68 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 83, 1977.
78 See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
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Given our discussion above about the kinds of amnesty

based on substantive and procedural specifics, we have to note
that the enactment by the State of an amnesty law does not
necessarily operate to grant the benefit bestowed by the amnesty
to an individual. As differentiated above, in the case of an
unconditional amnesty, the mere enactment by the State of an
amnesty law suffices to immediately benefit an individual; while
in a conditional amnesty, the enactment alone does not ipso facto
translate to an immediate benefit even if the individual be
substantively covered. The amnesty law, in the latter scenario,
merely initiates an amnesty process and grants the benefits of
amnesty only to those covered persons who have successfully
complied with the requirements of the amnesty enactment. While
the power to grant amnesty to persons or groups of persons may
lie with the chief executive or the legislature, depending on the
system that prevails in a specific sovereign territory, the amnesty
processes that it entails, as discussed above, are usually delegated
to other agencies of government. In such cases, the actual grant of
the benefits to covered persons under the amnesty law or
proclamation is performed by the agency or entity duly
designated, subject only to such review or oversight as may
likewise be provided. Disposed differently, it is to say, that the
benefits are granted by the amnesty law or proclamation, but
these are conveyed by the duly designated agency via an
individualized act.

Under Proclamation No. 75, the grant of conditional

amnesty is undertaken by the covered individual being made to
apply to be benefitted, with the implementation being delegated
to an agency in the executive branch – the initial evaluation
conducted by the DND ad hoc committee and, on appeal, subject
to the final determination of the President, viz:

“SECTION 2. Where to Apply. – The concerned AFP and

PNP personnel and their supporters may apply for amnesty
under this Proclamation with the ad hoc committee Department
of National Defense (DND) which is hereby tasked with receiving
and processing applications – including oppositions thereto, if
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any – for amnesty pursuant to this proclamation and determining
whether the applicants are entitled to amnesty pursuant to this
proclamation. The final decisions or determination of the DND
shall be appealable to the Office of the President by any party to
the application. The decision, however, shall be immediately
executory even if appealed.

SECTION 3. Period of Application. – Applications for the

grant of amnesty under this proclamation shall be filed under
oath with the DND within a period of ninety (90) days following
the date of the publication of this proclamation in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation as concurred in by a majority of
all members in Congress. The DND shall forthwith act on the
same with dispatch.”

In Concurrent Resolution No. 4, Congress concurred with

the amnesty proclamation and further provided certain
conditions in the processing of applications, thus:

“Resolved by both Houses of Congress, To concur with

Proclamation No. 75 issued by the President of the Philippines in
accordance with the provisions of Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitution.

Resolved, further, That both Houses of Congress adopt the

following recommendations to the President of the Philippines for
inclusion in the Implementing rules and regulations of the
Amnesty Proclamation:

(a) No application for amnesty shall be given due course

without the applicant admitting his guilt or criminal culpability of
any or all of the subject incidents in writing as expressed in the
application; xxx”

To aid the DND and the President process and evaluate

individual applicants, the Rules and Procedures in the processing
of Amnesty Applications pursuant to Proclamation No. 75, Series
of 2010, were published.

To the Court, the delegation of actual implementation

details, to include crafting of rules by which to process the
applications of covered persons under the amnesty proclamation,
to an agency in the executive branch, does not, in any way,
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infringe upon the authority of the President to grant amnesty. An
amnesty process which delegates the reception of applications
and the determination of an applicant's eligibility to be benefited
by the amnesty is not peculiar to Proclamation No. 75. Past
amnesty proclamations, especially the conditional ones, also
delegated the implementation of the amnesty process that
included the final approval of applicants who sought the benefit
of the amnesty grant, to another office or agency.79

The Court sees no usurpation of authority by a subordinate

agency that implements the actual grant of amnesty as, after all,
the amnesty benefits emanate from the amnesty proclaimed by
the President concurred in by Congress. Only the tasks of
accepting applications and evaluating compliances with the
conditions are handed over to the DND ad hoc committee and, in
case of an appeal, the Office of the President. If a person qualifies
to be within the substantive coverage of the proclamation and has
complied with the conditions of the amnesty grant, e.g., the
submission of an application with the required contents within
the prescribed period, the DND ad hoc committee and the Office of
the President have no other prerogative but to extend to the
applicant the benefits of the amnesty pursuant to Proclamation
No. 75.

From the foregoing discussions about the nature and limits

of amnesty, where the power to grant it is lodged, and how it may
be exercised, two findings emerge that are essential and relevant
to an analysis of the idea that an amnesty may be revoked, a
concept that is novel in the jurisdiction and yet to be fully
traversed by our courts.

One, there is no dispute that Proclamation No. 75 was

enacted in compliance with the above-discussed constitutional
standards; e.g., granted by the President with the concurrence of a
majority of the members of Congress. The wisdom behind the
grant of amnesty to those who participated in the Oakwood
Mutiny, the Marines Stand-Off, and the Manila Peninsula Hotel
Take-over is likewise not assailed. The instant case, therefore,
79 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 8, series of 1946, Proclamation No. 497, Series of 1974, Proclamation
No. 80, Series of 1987, Proclamation No. 1377, Series of 2007.
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does not involve the substantive aspect of the said amnesty
proclamation. The general grant of amnesty by Proclamation No.
75 was not revoked or repealed by Proclamation No. 572. Only
the individualized grant to the petitioner was revoked.

Two, Proclamation No. 75, is a conditional amnesty decree.

Under its provisions, those who intend to avail of the amnesty
must comply with the conditions imposed. The grant of amnesty,
conditional as it is, being never meant to be automatic, availing of
its benefits required an individual application that is to be
evaluated by the DND ad hoc committee, and ultimately, if
necessary, an appeal to the Office of the President.

The crux of the controversy, therefore, arises not from the

substantive aspect of the amnesty proclamation, but from its
procedural aspect. The ensuing discussion regarding the
individualized amnesty granted to the petitioner, whether or not
it may be revoked, will be analyzed based on the narrow premise
that the grant is conditional and that only the aspect of
compliance with the amnesty proclamation's procedural
formalities is in issue.

The power to revoke conditional amnesty

There is no clear constitutional basis in our jurisdiction

which is directly related to the issue of revocability of a
previously-granted amnesty. This is not particularly peculiar to
the Philippines. Of the 193 members of the UN, only two (2)
member states have constitutions that refer to the irrevocability of
the legal effects of an amnesty.80 In Peru, for instance, the grant of
amnesty “produce[s] the effects of res judicata,” thus prohibiting
the reopening of cases related thereto.81 In Angola, the rule is
much clearer. Its Constitution provides that “[t]he legal effects of
amnesties implemented under the terms of the appropriate law
shall be considered valid and irreversible.”82
80 Josepha Close, Amnesty Provisions in the Constitutions of the World: A Comparative Analysis,
2015. Retrieved from https://internationallaw.blog/2015/01/05/amnesty-provisions-in-the-
constitutions-of-the-world-a-comparative-analysis/.
81 Peru Constitution of 1993, as amended, Article 139 (13). Retrieved from:
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Peru_2009.pdf?lang=en.
82 Angolan Constitution of 2010, Article 62. Retrieved from:
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A short survey of amnesty practice of different countries,

however, reveals that the concept of revocability of an amnesty is
not entirely undemonstrated. Grants of amnesty have been
allowed to be revoked either: 1) broadly, by directly repealing or
abrogating the amnesty law itself; or 2) individually, when the
grantee fails to comply with the conditions of the amnesty law or
requisite process.

First, grants of amnesty, regardless of its nature, i.e.,

conditional or unconditional, have been revoked by the repeal of
the amnesty law itself by the State body which enacted the same.
For instance, the Argentinian Amnesty Law of National
Pacification of 22 September 1983 was repealed by the
Argentinian Amnesty Nullification Law No. 23.040 of 27
December 1983, thereby launching the criminal prosecutions
against members of the former military junta, who were the main
beneficiaries of the amnesty law.83 More recently, Peru's
Legislative Decree No. 1097 of 2010, which effectively granted
amnesty to certain military groups, was immediately repealed
after criticism from the public and international groups.84

Similarly, an amnesty law may be completely nullified, and

its grant be declared ineffective by the State courts or
international bodies when the validity thereof is challenged,
usually on substantive grounds. In El Salvador, the Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional
several articles of an amnesty law which granted amnesty to those
who participated in acts constituting crimes against humanity and
war crimes.85 Also, despite the proviso of the Peruvian
Constitution about the res judicata effect of an amnesty grant, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in Barrios Altos v. Peru,86
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Angola_2010.pdf?lang=en.
83 Full text retrieved from: Neil J. Kritz, Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon
with Former Regimes, Volume 3, US Institute of Peace Press, 1995, pp. 477-480.
84 Daniel Soltman, Applauding Uruguay’s Quest for Justice: Dictatorship, Amnesty, and Repeal of
Uruguay Law No. 15.848., 12 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 829 (2013), pp. 842-843.
85 Judgment on Unconstitutionality No. 44-2013/145-2013. Retrieved from:
http://www.jurisprudencia.gob.sv/VisorMLX/PDF/44-2013AC.PDF. Unofficial translation
retrieved from: https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/el-salvador-supreme-court-judgment-
unconstitutionality-amnesty-law.
86 Judgment of November 30, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 87.
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declared that Amnesty Laws No. 26479 and No. 26492, the
provisions of which prevented the investigation and punishment
of those responsible for torture, extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions, and forced disappearances, were
incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights
and, consequently, lacked legal effect. As a consequence, a 1995
decision of the Peruvian Supreme Court, which already affirmed
the grant of amnesty to certain military officials and personalities,
was declared null and void. The Supreme Court of Military
Justice then remanded the criminal proceedings to the procedural
stage prior to the period within which to avail of amnesty, as the
legal effects arising from the amnesty benefit have become
ineffective. Orders of convictions already entered against some
military members prior to the grant of the amnesty also regained
their effects.87

Second, the revocation may also be effected against specific

individuals without nullifying the entire amnesty law. This is
prevalent in conditional, individualized amnesties, when the
conditions are breached or not fulfilled. For instance, revocations
could apply to individuals who were required to disclose their
offenses fully, if it later becomes known that they withheld or
distorted information, like those present in Colombia's Law 975 of
2005 and Angola's Civil Harmony Law.88 Similarly, under the
Democratic Republic of Congo's 2004 Law No. 14/006, those who
were involved in insurrectional offenses from 18 February 2008 to
20 December 2013, may apply for amnesty, subject to the
undertaking in writing that they will no longer commit the acts
for which they are granted amnesty. A violation of such
commitment will automatically void the amnesty granted. Article
3 of Libya’s 2012 Law No. 35 on the Amnesty of Particular
Crimes, provided that the amnesty granted shall be revoked if the
amnestied persons commit an intentional offense within five
years from the date of entry into force of the law. In such instance,

87 La Cantuta v. Peru, Judgment of November 29, 2006, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, para.
80(63) and 80(64), citing Judgment of October 16, 2001 of the Supreme Council of Military
Justice.
88 The Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability prepared by the Ulster University's
Transitional Justice Institute, p. 54 Retrieved from:
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BelfastGuidelines_TJI2014.pdf.pdf
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criminal proceedings or service of sentence shall be resumed.89

To the Court, logic and experience point to the proposition

that a conditional amnesty may be revoked. The revocation is
intrinsic in the nature of a conditional, individually granted
amnesty. As explained, the grant of a conditional amnesty is
subject to compliance with certain conditions prior to or after the
grant of amnesty. Logically, a conditional amnesty previously
granted may be revoked if it is later found that the grantee
breached the conditions upon which the amnesty was granted or
if it becomes known that he failed to fulfill them originally. In the
herein certiorari petition, the grant of conditional amnesty to the
petitioner was subject to, among others, the pre-conditions of
application and admission of guilt or criminal culpability in
writing. If it is then found and known that he indeed failed to
fulfill these conditions originally, then the grant of amnesty
becomes susceptible to revocation.

The legal effects of non-compliance with the procedural

formalities required by a conditional amnesty law are akin to the
effects of that of a conditional pardon. When the grant of pardon
is made subject to conditions, compliance first with all the basic
requirements is a must. If the condition is violated or not fulfilled,
the State can recommit the pardonee.90 In Torres v. Director, Bureau
of Corrections,91 the Supreme Court said:

“A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract

between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the
convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the
latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the
terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the
unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. By the
pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the
pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the
Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that
the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the
pardon. xxx”
89 English translation of the legal provisions obtained from Louise Mallinder, Amnesties and
Inclusive Political Settlements, PA-X Report: Transitional Justice Series, Global Justice Academy,
University of Edinburgh, 2009, pp. 72-73.
90 United States v. Wilson. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833).
91 G.R. No. 122338, December 29, 1995.
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We are of the view that this precept applies by analogy to

conditional amnesties. In a conditional amnesty, the quid pro quo
relationship between the State and the individual is to the effect
that the former will “forget” the latter's crime subject to the
condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the
amnesty, he will then be prosecuted for the crime that was
supposedly “forgotten.” While the normal intention of amnesty is
to permanently extinguish criminal liability, in amnesties that
impose explicit conditions of acquisition and retention, a breach,
violation, or non-compliance, triggers the cancellation of the
amnesty’s benefits extended to the amnesty-grantee.

The subsequent issue pertains to the authority to effect such

revocation. To reiterate, the revocation subject of the instant case
is of the second kind and does not involve the complete
abrogation of Proclamation No. 75. Only the revocation of the
individualized grant of conditional amnesty to the petitioner is at
issue.92

Under Proclamation No. 75 and Concurrent Resolution No.

4, the implementation of the amnesty process was delegated to
the executive branch, through the DND and the Office of the
President. As explained, such delegation is not an alien concept. It
is, in fact, consistent with other countries' practices when it comes
to individualized, conditional amnesties. Ultimately, the
determination of whether or not an individual has complied with
the conditions of the amnesty decree rests with said entities.
These entities being vested with the power to confer
individualized amnesty upon satisfaction of the requisite
conditions, by force of necessary implication, it follows that upon
a finding of non-compliance or breach of the requisite conditions,
they also have the coincidental power to deny an application or,
in the case of a previously granted, individualized amnesty, to
cancel and revoke the prior grant. Since the power to ultimately
grant an individualized amnesty is lodged in the President, the
authority to revoke a conditional one can be logically ceded to
92 For now, we will leave the issue of whether or not an amnesty law may be repealed by the
President alone, without the concurrence of the Congress, for future cases where the said issue is
especially the crux of the controversy.
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that office in the absence of any provision that locates the
authority to revoke in some other office. To concede that a
conditional amnesty may be revoked, but that it cannot be
operationalized for lack of a clear mandate given by the
Constitution to any other office, is to argue the preposterous. If an
act is needed to be done, will the absence of an actor be an
impediment to carry it out? Natura abhorret vaccum. Horror vacui.
To the idea that the authority to revoke must also be concurred in
by Congress, just as when the President exercises the power to
grant amnesty, the Court can only say, why not? To be sure,
however, the Constitution requires no such concurrence. The
absence of a concurrence from Congress cannot dilute, diminish
or dissolve an exercise of executive prerogative that is sourced by
necessary implication from a clear grant of power to grant
reprieves, pardon, parole and amnesty.

Power to revoke an individualized,

conditional amnesty, not absolute

That there exists the power to revoke does not mean that
there is an unbridled authority to exercise the same. Under no
circumstance is the implied authority of the President, or of any
amnesty-granting body for that matter, to revoke an
individualized, conditional amnesty absolute. It must be
grounded only upon a failure to comply with the stated
conditions and upon no other.

Even as the prerogative lies within the discretion of the

President, its exercise is still within the purview of judicial
review. Discretion, according to the Supreme Court, is not a free-
spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it pleases but is
reined in to keep it from straying. In its classic formulation,
"discretion is not unconfined and vagrant" but "canalized within
banks that keep it from overflowing." 93 Under the 1987
Constitution, judicial power includes not only the duty of courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights that are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
93 Almario v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013, citing Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), Cardozo, J., dissenting.
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discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government:

“Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one

Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to

settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”

Prior to the 1987 Constitution, courts refrained from taking

full cognizance of cases that involved political questions or those
cases whose principal issues pertained to discretionary authority
that has been delegated to the legislative and executive branches
of government. The political question doctrine justified the courts’
refusal to process cases that essentially involved an inquiry into
the exercise of discretion by the political departments of
government.94

The above-quoted provision of the 1987 Constitution

departs from the political question approach under the 1973
Constitution in the sense that “to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, is now an expressed duty of the courts that is
included in judicial power. The added phrase requires judicial
inquiry into areas which the courts, under previous Constitutions,
would have normally left to the political departments to decide.
Borne out of the country's experience under a period of autocratic
rule, the present Constitution strengthened the power of judicial
review by making it a duty, not merely an implied power, of
courts of justice to review the exercise of political discretion that
clearly breaches fundamental values and principles congealed in
the Constitution and to resolve controversies involving acts done
by any government branch or instrumentality that are tainted

94 Tanada v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957.

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with grave abuse of discretion.95 As expounded by former Chief
Justice and Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion in
his sponsorship speech during the deliberation of the
Constitutional Commission:

“Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of

power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as
those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government
or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which

means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle
matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a
political question.”96

Thus, under our present legal regime, there can be no longer

any cloud of doubt about the courts' exercise of jurisdiction over
cases and controversies that involve executive or legislative
discretion. The argument that plenary power is granted to the two
other branches of government is no obstacle to judicial inquiry,
for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to a
justiciable controversy.97 It is true that the basic precepts of
governance calls for a judiciary that respects acts performed by
co-equal departments that are done within their spheres of
competence and authority, but the Constitution has also allowed
the courts, nay, made it a duty, to cross the line of separation on a
very limited and specific point – to determine whether or not the
acts of the executive or the legislative departments are null for
being undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.98 If grave abuse
is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for
that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its
nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.99
95 Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen in Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 208566, November 19, 2013.
96 As quoted in Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998.
97 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, citing Tañada v.
Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186.
98 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009.
99 Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989.
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Accordingly, the question of whether or not the President

gravely abused his discretion in revoking, via Proclamation No.
572, the amnesty previously granted to the petitioner, is very-well
subject to the power of judicial review. Here, the courts have been
called upon to determine whether or not the exercise by the
President of his implied power to revoke an amnesty previously
given has been performed with grave abuse of discretion. Put
another way: Is there factual basis for the President to conclude
that the petitioner did not file his application for amnesty, a
condition necessary for the grant of amnesty? Additionally, courts
have also been asked to resolve concurrent legal issues raised by
the petitioner, e.g., violation of equal protection clause, in relation
to the revocation of amnesty. If such factual and legal bases do
exist, it cannot be said that the President has acted arbitrarily or
that he has gravely abused his discretion in revoking the amnesty
that has been previously granted. These are the very issues that
the petitioner sought to thresh out in the proceedings before the
respondent court in his attempt to oppose the DOJ's Omnibus
Motion.

Constitutional issues raised

against Proclamation No. 572

In assailing Proclamation No. 572, the petitioner raises

several constitutional issues. Specifically, he argues that
Proclamation No. 572: (1) is a bill of attainder and an ex-post facto
law which are explicitly prohibited by the Constitution; (2) places
him in double jeopardy; and (3) violates the due process and
equal protection clauses in the Constitution. The respondent court
did not find any legal basis to set aside or invalidate the said
proclamation on these grounds.

Revocation under Proclamation No. 572 is not

a bill of attainder nor an ex post facto law

Section 22, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution provides:

“Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be

enacted.”
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A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts

punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional
ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of
separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and
thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial
function.100 Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of
certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a
punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. The
total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the
determination of the actual penalty to be imposed is the most
essential element.101

Proclamation No. 572 is an executive act, not an act of the

legislature. Moreover, the revocation of a conditional amnesty
does not impute guilt upon the accused and does not seek to
inflict punishment without a judicial trial. It merely allows his
prosecution or the continuation of the criminal proceedings
against him, if one has been previously filed, which was
suspended by virtue of an improperly granted amnesty. There is
no encroachment on the power of the court to determine after due
hearing whether or not the prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime of rebellion has been committed.
Thus, the petitioner's assertion that Proclamation No. 572 is a bill
of attainder lacks merit.

On the other hand, an ex-post facto law is one which, among

others, deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection
of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.102 For the constitutional prohibition against ex-post facto
law to operate, therefore, the person must actually be lawfully
protected and entitled to the benefits of an amnesty proclamation.
If a person granted conditional amnesty is proven to have failed
to comply with the conditions attached to the amnesty, then there
is no protection to speak of. The revocation of the conditional
100 People v. Ferrer, G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972.
101 Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990.
102 Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999.
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amnesty is but a necessary consequence of such finding of non-
compliance.

Moreover, the constitutional proscription against ex-post

facto laws is aimed against the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal
laws are acts of the legislature that prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes,
treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.103 This is
because penal laws and laws though not penal in nature, but
nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and prescribing
penalties for their violation, must operate prospectively. Penal
laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are
favorable to the accused.104 An act which revokes a conditional
amnesty does not define a crime nor mete out penalty, but merely
allows the prosecution or resumption of proceedings against a
former grantee for a crime already punished by existing laws. Not
being a penal law, Proclamation No. 572 cannot be challenged as
violative of the constitutional proscription against ex-post facto
laws.

Proclamation No. 572 does not and will

not place the petitioner in double jeopardy

The double jeopardy rule has a settled meaning in our

jurisdiction. It means that when a person is charged with an
offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction
or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the
latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical
offense.105 The State, with all its resources and power, should not
be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for
an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense, ordeal, compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent, he may be found guilty.106 Section 7, Rule
117 of the Rules of Court, adhering to the constitutional

103 Salvador v. Mapa, G.R. No. 135080, November 28, 2007.

104 Nasi-Villar v. People, G.R. No. 176169, November 14, 2008.
105 Carmelo v. People, G.R. No. L-3580, March 22, 1950.
106 People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000, citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S.

1842, L. Ed. 2d 199, 61 ALR 2d 1119.93

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proscription against double jeopardy, provides the requisites for
double jeopardy to attach:

“Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When

an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or
the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.”

Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are

present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second
jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy
attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or
convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.107 In herein petition, since the dismissal of the
rebellion case against the petitioner was by reason of his ex-parte
motion to dismiss, he is deemed to have expressly given his
consent to such dismissal. Considering that the first jeopardy did
not attach when Criminal Case No. 07-3126 or the rebellion case
was previously dismissed, any consequent action against the
petitioner for the same crime of rebellion will not expose him to
double jeopardy.

Proclamation No. 572 does not violate

the petitioner's right to due process

The petitioner claims that Proclamation No. 572 authorized

his arrest without a warrant, thereby violating the due process
clause of the Constitution. Particularly, he assails Section 2 (2) of
the proclamation, which states:
107 Cerezo v. People, G.R. No. 185230, June 1, 2011.
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“Section 2. Effects. xxx xxx xxx xxx

2. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine

National Police are ordered to employ all lawful means to
apprehend former LTSG Antonio Trillanes so that he can be
recommitted to the detention facility where he had been
incarcerated for him to stand trial for the crimes he is charged
with.”

Section 1, Article III, of the Constitution provides that no

person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. To assure the fullest protection of the right against
government intrusion, Section 2 thereof provides the inviolability
of one's right against unreasonable searches and seizures and
mandates that a warrant may only be issued by a judge upon
personal determination of probable cause. Thus, as a general rule,
an arrest may be made only upon a warrant issued by a court. In
very circumscribed instances, however, the Rules of Court allow
warrantless arrests under Section 5, Rule 113 thereof, e.g., en
flagrante delicto arrest.

There is nothing in Section 2 (2) of Proclamation No. 572

which authorizes the President or any person acting under his
direction to make an unwarranted arrest of the petitioner. The
revocation of the petitioner's amnesty under the proclamation
authorized the AFP and the PNP to “employ all lawful means to
apprehend” the petitioner. The proclamation never assumed the
authority to direct a warrantless arrest of the petitioner or to
disregard well-settled rules on the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Further, the filing of the Omnibus Motion to effect the petitioner's
arrest, to us, indicates that the petitioner's due process right
against unreasonable arrest was not openly violated.

Proclamation No. 572 does not

violate the equal protection clause

The petitioner also asserts that Proclamation No. 572 is

unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause
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as he was specifically named and mentioned to be the only person
adversely affected by the said proclamation.

The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or

class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
place and in like circumstances. The concept of equal protection,
therefore, does not require absolute equality among residents or a
universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. It does not prohibit discrimination as to things that
are different. It simply requires equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. 108 Classification, to
be valid, must 1) rest on substantial distinctions, 2) be germane to
the purpose of the law, 3) not be limited to existing conditions
only, and 4) apply equally to all members of the same class. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from the other.109

Proclamation No. 572 does apply only to the petitioner, but

it does not violate the equal protection clause because the
discrimination is based on a valid and substantial distinction, that
is, his purported non-compliance with the conditions set forth in
the amnesty proclamation. As discussed, in a conditional
amnesty, the non-compliance by an individual grantee triggers
the revocation of the amnesty. Only the individual amnesty is
revoked, not the entire amnesty law. Since only the petitioner was
allegedly found to have not complied with the conditions of his
individualized amnesty, then it follows that Proclamation No. 572
would only revoke the benefit of the amnesty granted to him. It
would be more dubious and questionable if the proclamation
were to include the revocation of the amnesty benefits extended
to other grantees of Proclamation No. 75 in the absence of any
finding of non-compliance with the conditions of the amnesty
proclamation.

A law does not run the risk of losing the entire remedial
scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or
108 H. Villarica Pawnshop v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No. 228087, January 24, 2018.
109 Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, January 20, 1999.
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otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been
attacked. Legislation is not unconstitutional under the equal
protection clause merely because it is under-inclusive or not all-
embracing. Where the purpose can be attained in future
legislations or regulations, a regulation challenged under the
equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate
simply because it happens to be incomplete. These cases are
referred to as a "step by step" process. 110 Thus, even if there be
other grantees who may have similarly breached the amnesty
conditions of Proclamation No. 75, their non-inclusion in
Proclamation No. 572 does not per se render the latter
proclamation unconstitutional. Proclamation No. 572 does not
preclude the revocation of other grantees' conditional amnesty at
some future time if it be found that they also breached or failed to
comply with the amnesty conditions.

Factual issues concerning

Proclamation No. 572

The petitioner challenges the reasons behind the issuance of

Proclamation No. 572, that is, his purported failure to submit an
application form and to express his guilt over the crime charged.
He insists that he has satisfied and complied with the conditions
of the amnesty grant and, thus, the President had no factual basis
to revoke the amnesty previously granted to him. Considering the
finality of the 07 September 2011 Order of the respondent court
that dismissed the rebellion case against him, said court can no
longer revive the criminal action by issuing a warrant of arrest
and a hold departure order, so he argues. He prayed a quo to be
given a fair opportunity to be duly heard on the move of the DOJ
to have him re-arrested with a hold departure order issued,
effectively reviving the dismissed criminal action for rebellion, on
the basis of a supposedly revoked amnesty. Instead of affording a
reasonable opportunity to both the petitioner and the movant
DOJ to be sufficiently heard on the novel issues set forth, the
respondent court opted to satisfy itself via a mere summary
hearing.

110 Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010.
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Whereas the RTC of Makati - Branch 148 took the time to
hear in full the evidence of both the DOJ and the petitioner
concerning the factual bases of Proclamation No. 572 before
resolving to deny DOJ's Omnibus Motion, the herein respondent
court did not duly hear and receive evidence on the Omnibus
Motion and Opposition thereto. The respondent court leaned
instead on its understanding of void judgments vis-a-vis the
doctrine of finality of judgments in resolving to grant the
Omnibus Motion, thus ordering the issuance of a warrant of arrest
and a hold departure order against the petitioner.

Final, immutable judgments and

orders, general rule and exceptions

Under the doctrine of finality or immutability of judgment

or final order, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court
that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. A judgment or
order is final and executory when the period prescribed within
which to appeal, usually within 15 days from notice, lapses
without any party appealing; thus the judgment, order or
decision “acquires finality.” Any act which violates this principle
must immediately be struck down. 111 It is grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice
that at the risk of occasional errors, the judgment of adjudicating
bodies must become final and executory at some definite date
fixed by law. It is adhered to by necessity notwithstanding
occasional errors that may result thereby, since litigations must
somehow come to an end for otherwise, it would even be more
intolerable than the wrong and injustice it is designed to
correct.112 Thus:

“xxx A definitive final judgment, however erroneous, is no

longer subject to change or revision.

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable

and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the
111 FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 161282, February 23, 2011.
112 Vios v. Pantangco, Jr., G.R. No. 163103, February 6, 2009.
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modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant
to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this
postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the
court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The
orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of
occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach
a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose is to write
finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in
our justice system, without which there would be no end to
litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must
always be maintained by those who exercise the power of
adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle, must
immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of
conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its
operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as
courts, but extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had
been conferred.”113

But like any other rule, the doctrine has exceptions, namely:
1) the correction of clerical errors; 2) the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party; 3) void judgments;
and 4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.114
Moreover, in exceptional circumstances, the Supreme Court has
allowed the alteration of final judgments or orders for legal
stability115 and to rectify serious injustice.116

There is no dispute that neither an appeal nor a motion for

reconsideration or new trial was filed within the reglementary
period to assail the Order of 07 September 2011 and that it has
already attained finality. The respondent court, however, deemed
its own Order, written by the same respondent presiding judge,
to be a void judgment and that it had no legal and binding effect;
hence, the doctrine of immutability of judgment or final order did
113 Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 178366, July 28, 2008.
114 FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court, at note 111.
115 See, e.g., Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, December 18,
2008, where the Supreme Court set aside the entry of judgment to reopen the case because "the
militating concern for the Court en banc in accepting these cases is not so much the particular fate
of the parties, but the stability of the Torrens system of registration by ensuring clarity of
jurisprudence on the field."
116 See, e.g., De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103276, April 11, 1996, where the Supreme
Court held that “[t]o cling to the general rule in this case is only to condone rather than rectify a
serious injustice to petitioner whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence to
his previous lawyers.
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not apply; that it was as if no such order was issued and that its
jurisdiction over the rebellion case which it has long-ago
dismissed, remained. This is the very same position asserted by
the DOJ that the respondent trial judge swallowed, hook, line and
sinker.

Void order, vis-a-vis revoked amnesty

A judgment is void if the court rendering it lacked

jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties, or if it
acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. 117 The Rules of
Court, for instance, require the joinder of all real parties in
interest118 and the issuance of a valid summons;119 otherwise, all
the actions of the court will be null and void for lack of
jurisdiction over the parties. Likewise, a court which has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter can only dismiss the action
and any act that it performs, including the judgment that it
renders, shall be null and void.120 A decision rendered without
giving a party his due process right to have his day in court, such
as in a judgment by cognovit actionem, has also been considered
void by the Supreme Court.121

The concept of void judgments was extended by the

Supreme Court not only to those judgments rendered without
jurisdiction, but also to those rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus,
in Imperial v. Armes,122 the Supreme Court held:

“A void judgment may also arise from the tribunal's act

constituting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. In Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio, we explained-

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a

specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only
be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when
such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise
117 Osborn v. Roche, 813 So. 2d 811 (Alabama, 2001).
118 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, Rule 3, Section 7.
119 Interlink Movie Houses Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 203298, January 17, 2018.
120 Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 116033, February 26, 1997.
121 Philippine National Bank v. Manila Oil Refining, G.R. No. L-18103, June 8, 1922.
122 G.R. No. 178842, January 30, 2017.
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of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." x x
x [T]he use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only
to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the
lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void" x x x

In Guevarra v. Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, we further

explained -

x x x However, if the Sandiganbayan acts in

excess or lack of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
dismissing a criminal case, the dismissal is null and
void. A tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it does not
have the legal power to determine the case; there is
excess of jurisdiction where a tribunal, being clothed
with the power to determine the case, oversteps its
authority as determined by law. A void judgment or
order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy
for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is
nonexistent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in
any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. x x x"

In People v. Co,123 the Supreme Court further explained:

"As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s

demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal. There are certain
exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate
the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance,
this Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a
criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence,its
judgment is considered void, as this Court ruled in People v.
Laguio, Jr. xxx”124

Given the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the view

that an order that dismisses a criminal action based on an
amnesty becomes a void judgment when the said amnesty is
revoked on the ground that the grantee failed to comply with the
conditions of such grant. As discussed above, when a conditional
amnesty is subsequently revoked on the ground of breach or non-
compliance with the conditions, the grant of amnesty is voided, as
if no amnesty was granted to begin with. By necessary
123 G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014.
124 Emphasis added.
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implication, any proceeding or action that arose from such
revoked amnesty becomes null and void as well. A previous
order that dismissed the criminal action is considered to have
been issued with grave abuse of discretion because it has no basis
in law, as the amnesty has been revoked and voided. Applied to
the case, if the revocation of the petitioner's amnesty is legally and
factually sound, the Order of 07 September 2011 can be set aside
for being a void judgment and beyond the ambit of the
immutability of final judgments and orders doctrine.

Remedies in assailing or attacking

a void judgment or final order

While a void judgment is no judgment at all in legal

contemplation, any action to challenge a judgment as void must
be commenced through the proper procedure and filed with the
appropriate tribunal. Procedural remedies and jurisdiction rules
are in place to ensure that litigants employ proper legal tools to
obtain complete relief from the tribunal fully equipped to grant
it.125 Even if the judgment be believed to be void, the party
aggrieved is not free to embark upon any voyage he may fancy.
He must resort to an appropriate proceeding to obtain relief.
Thus:

“The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides only two

remedies for aggrieved parties to annul a final and executory
judgment. The first is by filing a verified petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38 on the ground of fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence within sixty days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment to be set aside, and not more
than six months after such judgment was entered. The other
remedy is for a party to file a verified petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47, on the ground of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction, within four years from its
discovery. However, in addition to these, jurisprudence has
likewise recognized an additional relief through a direct action,
as certiorari, or by a collateral attack against a judgment that is
void on its face.”126

125 Imperial v. Armes, at note 122.

126 Escareal v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 151922, April 7, 2005. Emphasis added.
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As further elucidated in Imperial v. Armes:127

“To give flesh to these doctrines, the Rules of Court,

particularly the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, provides
for a remedy that may be used to assail a void judgment on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Rule 47 of the Rules of Court states
that an action for the annulment of judgment may be filed
before the CA to annul a void judgment of regional trial courts
even after it has become final and executory. If the ground
invoked is lack of jurisdiction, which we have explained as
pertaining to both lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and
over the person, the action for the annulment of the judgment may
be filed at any time for as long as estoppel has not yet set in. In
cases where a tribunal's action is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy of
a special civil action for certiorari to nullify the act.

Void judgments may also be collaterally attacked. A

collateral attack is done through an action which asks for a relief
other than the declaration of the nullity of the judgment but
requires such a determination if the issues raised are to be
definitively settled.”128

A void judgment, therefore, may be directly or collaterally

attacked. In Reyes v. Datu,129 the Supreme Court explained:

“Under our rules of procedure, the validity of a judgment

or order of the court, which has become final and executory,
may be attacked only by a direct action or proceeding to annul
the same, or by motion in another case if, in the latter case, the
court had no jurisdiction to enter the order or pronounce the
judgment. The first proceeding is a direct attack against the order
or judgment, because it is not incidental to, but is the main object
of, the proceeding. The other one is the collateral attack, in which
the purpose of the proceedings is to obtain some relief, other than
the vacation or setting aside of the judgment, and the attack is
only an incident. A third manner is by a petition for relief from the
judgment or order as authorized by the statutes or by the rules,
such as those expressly provided in Rule 38 of the Rules of Court,
but in this case it is to be noted that the relief is granted by express

127 At note 122.

128 Emphasis added.
129 G.R. No. L-5549, February 26, 1954.
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statutory authority in the same action or proceeding in which the
judgment or order was entered. xxx”130

A void judgment may be directly attacked either in the same

proceeding or in a separate, original action. In the former
scenario, the party aggrieved by a void judgment may seek its
nullification by filing a petition for relief from judgment, order, or
other proceeding under Rule 38 the Rules of Court before the
same court that rendered the assailed judgment or order. This
remedy is limited to the grounds of fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence. In the latter scenario, the nullity of the
judgment may be principally assailed in another court through a
Rule 47 petition for the annulment of judgments, final orders, or
resolutions; or through a Rule 65 certiorari petition before the
appropriate courts.

A collateral attack as provided by jurisprudence, on the

other hand, may be done through an original action whose
purpose is to obtain a different relief, and the validity of the
supposed void judgment is attacked as a mere incident, such as in
petitions for prohibition131 and habeas corpus.132 It may also be
made through a motion in another case where the matter of the
nullity of a judgment is an incident of the principal action. For
instance, in a criminal action, the complainant may raise the
validity of a judgment in another case as an incidental issue.
Similarly, the issue may also be raised by the accused in a motion
to dismiss or to quash an Information. In such a case, the action's
main purpose is still to determine the guilt of the accused for the
crime charged; the resolution of the validity of the challenged
judgment being merely an incident, a collateral matter, in the
determination of such guilt.

In the criminal case subject of herein petition, the

prosecution did not file an action for the annulment of or for relief
from the Order of 07 September 2011, nor did it move for the
issuance of a writ of certiorari to invalidate the said order. The
130 Emphasis and underlining added.
131 Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Misamis Oriental, Br. 40,
Cagayan de Oro City, G.R. No. 142628, February 6, 2007.
132 Abriol v. Homeres,G.R. No. L-2754, August 31, 1949; De Villa v. Director, New Bilibid Prisons,
G.R. No. 158802, November 17, 2004.
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alleged void Order, which dismissed the rebellion charge was
attacked only through the Omnibus Motion filed in the same case,
which prayed for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and hold
departure order against the petitioner. The attack, therefore, was
merely a collateral one. Tested against the outlined procedural
standards above, the remedy resorted to by the DOJ cannot be
anything else but irregular and improper. The respondent court
gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of DOJ's
Omnibus Motion, set aside its Order of 07 September 2011, and
revived the criminal action against the petitioner.

The Order of 07 September 2011,

not void on its face, therefore not
susceptible to collateral attack

A final judgment or order being collaterally attacked must

be void upon its face:

“Void judgments, because they are legally nonexistent, are

susceptible to collateral attacks. A collateral attack is an attack,
made as an incident in another action, whose purpose is to
obtain a different relief. In other words, a party need not file an
action to purposely attack a void judgment; he may attack the
void judgment as part of some other proceeding. A void
judgment or order is a lawless thing, which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head. Thus, it can never become final, and could be
assailed at any time.

Nevertheless, this Court has laid down a stiff requirement

to collaterally overthrow a judgment. In the case of Reyes, et al.
v. Datu, We ruled that it is not enough for the party seeking the
nullity to show a mistaken or erroneous decision; he must show
to the court that the judgment complained of is utterly void. In
short, the judgment must be void upon its face.”133

In People v. Pareja,134 the Supreme Court discussed:

“A judgment which has become final and executory may be

set aside in any of the three ways allowed by our present rules: (1)
by petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, Revised Rules
133 Go v. Eschavez, G.R. No.174542, August 3, 2015. Emphasis and underlining added.
134 G.R. No. 59979, August 30, 1990.
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of Court; (2) by direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement
of the judgment where the alleged defect is not apparent on its
face or from the recitals contained in the judgment; and (3) by
direct action, as certiorari, or by a collateral attack against the
challenged judgment which is void upon its face or that the
nullity of the judgment is apparent from its own recitals. In case
of a collateral attack such as in this case, the appellants must show
from the fact of the record itself that the challenged judgment is
utterly void based not on mere errors or defects of judgment but
on the ground that the court had no power or authority to grant
the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the
parties or both.”135

The Order of 07 September 2011 is not void upon its face. To

us, it is entirely regular in form, and the alleged defect is one
which is not apparent. At the time of the Order's issuance, the
respondent court had the subject matter jurisdiction to act on the
petitioner's motion to dismiss; there is also no dispute that the
respondent court had already acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of the parties. It is not sufficiently shown how the
prosecution/DOJ was deprived of its due process rights by the
issuance of said Order. The ground invoked to assail the validity
of the Order, that is, the revocation of the conditional amnesty
granted to the petitioner because of his non-compliance with the
conditions, is not readily obvious on its face. It requires the
submission of evidence outside of those originally available to the
respondent court to show such invalidity. The ground for
invalidity not being obvious upon the face of the Order, the
Omnibus Motion, therefore, is a collateral attack upon a final order
which is not allowed.

The Order of 07 September 2011

cannot be attacked through a
motion in the same proceeding

While a collateral attack may be resorted to through a mere

motion, it must be emphasized that such a mode of collateral
attack must be made in another action or proceeding, not in the
same action or proceeding where the assailed judgment
originated. To reiterate, Reyes v. Datu holds that the validity of a
135 Emphasis added. Citations omitted.
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judgment or order of the court which has become final and
executory may be attacked only by motion in another case. This
has been the rule since the 1918 case of El Banco Espanol-Filipino
v. Palanca,136 where it was held:

“The last question of importance which we propose to

consider is whether a motion in the cause is admissible as a
proceeding to obtain relief in such a case as this. If the motion
prevails the judgment of July 2, 1908, and all subsequent
proceedings will be set aside, and the litigation will be renewed,
proceeding again from the date mentioned as if the progress of the
action had not been interrupted. The proponent of the motion
does not ask the favor of being permitted to interpose a defense.
His purpose is merely to annul the effective judgment of the court,
to the end that the litigation may again resume its regular course.

xxx xxx xxx

If the question were admittedly one relating merely to an

irregularity of procedure, we cannot suppose that this proceeding
would have taken the form of a motion in the cause, since it is
clear that, if based on such an error, the came to late for relief in
the Court of First Instance. But as we have already seen, the
motion attacks the judgment of the court as void for want of
jurisdiction over the defendant. The idea underlying the motion
therefore is that inasmuch as the judgment is a nullity it can be
attacked in any way and at any time. If the judgment were in fact
void upon its face, that is, if it were shown to be a nullity by virtue
of its own recitals, there might possibly be something in this.
Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it may be
said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and
slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
head.

But the judgment in question is not void in any such sense.

It is entirely regular in form, and the alleged defect is one which is
not apparent upon its face. It follows that even if the judgment
could be shown to be void for want of jurisdiction, or for lack of
due process of law, the party aggrieved thereby is bound to
resort to some appropriate proceeding to obtain relief. Under
accepted principles of law and practice, long recognized in
American courts, a proper remedy in such case, after the time for
appeal or review has passed, is for the aggrieved party to bring
an action to enjoin the judgment, if not already carried into
effect; or if the property has already been disposed of he may
136 G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918.
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institute suit to recover it. In every situation of this character an
appropriate remedy is at hand; and if property has been taken
without due process, the law concedes due process to recover it.
We accordingly hold that, assuming the judgment to have been
void as alleged by the proponent of this motion, the proper
remedy was by an original proceeding and not by motion in the
cause. As we have already seen our Code of Civil Procedure
defines the conditions under which relief against a judgment may
be productive of conclusion for this court to recognize such a
proceeding as proper under conditions different from those
defined by law. Upon the point of procedure here involved, we
refer to the case of People vs. Harrison wherein it was held that a
motion will not lie to vacate a judgment after the lapse of the time
limited by statute if the judgment is not void on its face; and in all
cases, after the lapse of the time limited by statute if the judgment
is not void on its face; and all cases, after the lapse of such time,
when an attempt is made to vacate the judgment by a proceeding
in court for that purpose an action regularly brought is preferable,
and should be required. xxx”137

For a final judgment or order alleged to be void to be

attacked collaterally through a mere motion, therefore, the motion
must be filed in another case where the issue of the validity of the
final judgment or order is an incident of the main action. It cannot
be made in the same proceeding where the purported void
judgment or final order was rendered or issued. The trial court,
which rendered a judgment or order that has long attained
finality but subsequently assailed to be void, should not be
allowed to review its decision's purported invalidity by mere
motion in the same case. If we are to rule otherwise, there will be
no end to litigation and the trial court will be effectively granted
with perpetual jurisdiction over a case. The doctrine of
immutability of final judgments as we know it will be rendered
meaningless, useless, inutile.

Thus, even assuming that the Order of 07 September 2011 is

void upon its face and may be collaterally attacked, the
respondent court cannot set it aside, and revive the criminal
action via a mere motion by the DOJ in the very same dismissed
case. The DOJ's failure to follow procedural rules in assailing the
validity of the Order of 07 September 2011 merits the denial of its
137 Emphasis and underlining added.
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Omnibus Motion. Consequently, the respondent court gravely
abused its discretion when it allowed the DOJ, via the expedience
of a mere motion, to question its final Order that it issued seven
years earlier. It acted without jurisdiction when it took cognizance
of the issue of the invalidity of its Order of 07 September 2011 via
the Omnibus Motion, despite the patent irregularity and serious
impropriety of the collateral attack against its very own order.

Ample opportunity required so that

parties may fully present their evidence

To recapitulate, the issue of whether or not the Order of 07

September 2011 is a void judgment, and therefore outside the
purview of the doctrine of immutability of judgments and final
orders, would require an inquiry into the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 572, that is, the compliance or non-compliance
of the petitioner with the requirements of Proclamation No. 75.
The stated ground for invalidity not being readily evident, the
controversy ought to be settled in an action whereat the issue of
the Order's invalidity will be the principal concern, providing
ample opportunity for claims and evidence to be adduced and
evaluated. Thus, the imperative that an attack against a judgment
be undertaken primarily through a direct action, and not by a
mere collateral one. It would require the reception of evidence to
fully thresh out the invalidity of a final judgment, especially since
the ground to declare it void requires evidence aliunde.

Although we have debunked the Omnibus Motion theory of

attacking the alleged void judgment or order, we emphasize that,
whether or not the Omnibus Motion be resolved in a summary
proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the petitioner must
be given an ample opportunity to present, within a reasonable
time, all the evidence that he may desire to introduce because
after all, his situation is not an ordinary one. He has been granted
amnesty about a decade earlier and by reason of which the
rebellion charge against him was dismissed in 2011, only to have
the rug pulled from under his feet because of a purported non-
compliance with the conditions of the amnesty that was
processed so many years earlier.
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In resolving the factual issues that were raised, the

respondent court satisfied itself by merely conducting a summary
hearing through the convenience of affidavits and documents, in
spite of the petitioner's repeated requests to be afforded
reasonable opportunity to present all his evidence and subpoena
his witnesses. In contrast, the RTC of Makati - Branch 148 that
previously dismissed the coup d'etat case, in the same way that the
herein respondent court previously dismissed the rebellion case,
conducted a full evidentiary hearing and gave the parties ample
opportunity to subpoena and present their witnesses, to litigate
and prove the factual issues of the case, and then to offer their
respective evidence. To the Court, the denial of the petitioner's
request to be given reasonable opportunity to adduce evidence
and present testimonies of his witnesses deprived him of
procedural due process. Further, assuming that the respondent
trial court had the jurisdiction to nullify its own Order of 07
September 2011 on the basis of the Omnibus Motion, a proposition
we have shown to be untenable, it committed grave abuse of
discretion when it tackled the Omnibus Motion cursorily, giving
the petitioner no opportunity to fully present his evidence.

We are therefore of the view that the peculiar circumstances

of the case necessitate a full, evidentiary hearing. Ordinarily,
judges would have the prosecutor's report and supporting
documents readily available to aid in the determination of
probable cause in issuing a warrant of arrest, but the ordinary
circumstance does not obtain here. The matters alleged in the
Omnibus Motion, especially those relating to the factual bases of
Proclamation No. 572, refer to documents and evidence not
readily available to the respondent court. The novelty of the
issues presented also warranted a closer and deeper inquiry.
Fundamentally, providing the parties the opportunity to present
their evidence is essential before the respondent court can
reasonably determine the novel issues and factual matters that
were raised.

We take the opportunity at this point to observe that: The

summary hearing approach taken by the respondent court stands
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in stark contrast to the hearing in-full-measure approach of the
RTC of Makati - Branch 148, that also tackled a similar Omnibus
Motion in the coup d'etat case. In both the RTC of Makati - Branch
150 (respondent court herein) and Branch 148, the same questions
of facts were asked: Did the petitioner apply for amnesty? Did he
admit his guilt? Did he comply with all requirements?
Proclamation No. 572 posited in the negative, thus the revocation
of the amnesty. Because of the factual premise that the petitioner's
rebellion and coup d'etat cases have been dismissed by the courts,
no less, more than seven years earlier, a proper judicial inquiry
became a necessity.

We further observe that one and the same document – a

Certificate of Amnesty - that attests to the grant of amnesty to the
petitioner, was read by the RTC of Makati - Branch 148 favorably
for the petitioner, but appreciated unfavorably against him by the
respondent court, RTC of Makati - Branch 150. The same
difference attended both courts' appreciation of LTC Andrade's
Certification that attested to the petitioner's having been granted
amnesty except that there was no copy of his application in the
records. RTC of Makati - Branch 148 received documentary and
testimonial evidence from several witnesses, including former
Undersecretary Honorio Azcueta, Chairman of the DND Ad Hoc
Amnesty Committee, and COL Josefa C. Berbigal, the Head of the
Committee's Secretariat. It also heard the testimonies of other
witnesses who witnessed the petitioner's personal appearance
and submission of his amnesty application to the Committee.138
The herein respondent court limited itself only to hearing oral
arguments and receiving affidavits.

The same fact patterns upon the same set of rules, when
evaluated, should generally and predictably elicit the same results
regardless of who conducts the evaluation or how many
evaluators there may be, but in the case of the petitioner, two
138 Specifically, former Marine Msgt. Dominador E. Rull, Jr. and former Cpl. Emmanuel C. Tirador.
Other witnesses for DOJ, include: LTC Thea Joan Andrade (Chief of the Discipline, Law and
Order Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel), Atty. Norman Daanoy (Chief,
DND Legal Affairs Office), Arlene De Rama Manjares (Chief of the DND Records Division),
Atty. Maria Rhodora Malabag-Peralta, and Mark Dalan Merueñas.
The TSNs and other records of the proceedings before RTC Makati Branch 148 on the Omnibus
Motion in the coup d'etat case were attached to the submissions of the parties herein.
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divergent outcomes came out. We are of the view that, had only
one approach been taken, one that allowed the reception of
evidence in full measure, common answers to common questions
of facts would have been elicited. Proper use of the rules of
evidence would have reflected the appropriate appreciation of the
admissibility, weight and sufficiency of the Certificate of Amnesty,
Certification, and Proclamation No. 572, amongst other pieces of
evidence.

To Summarize,

We hold that the benefit given by a conditional amnesty

may be revoked on the limited ground that the attached
conditions have not been met. The authority on whom the
amnesty power is lodged has the inferred power to revoke the
benefit given by a conditional amnesty. A revoked amnesty can
render void an order or judgment that dismissed a criminal action
because of the amnesty, but the process entails a proper judicial
inquiry which either party to the controversy, be it government or
grantee, may initiate via the proper legal tools and remedies with
the proper court clothed with jurisdiction. The court inquiry
cannot be merely summary and cursory, but one that shall give
the parties ample opportunity to be heard on their respective
evidence.

The respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion

when, without taking ample time to pause and ponder, whether
or not it retained jurisdiction, summarily and cursorily considered
the Omnibus Motion upon a matter involving a criminal action that
it has long-ago dismissed. It acted with grave abuse of discretion
that amounted to excess of jurisdiction, thus ousting it of
jurisdiction, when it shunned testimonial evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Orders of 25 September 2018 and 18 December 2018, having been
issued by the respondent court that no longer had jurisdiction on
a dismissed criminal action and that acted with grave abuse of
discretion, are SET ASIDE and VACATED.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Original Signed
APOLINARIO D. BRUSELAS, JR.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Original Signed
MARIE CHRISTINE AZCARRAGA-JACOB
Associate Justice

Original Signed
ANGELENE MARY W. QUIMPO-SALE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the opinion of the Court was written.

Original Signed
APOLINARIO D. BRUSELAS, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairman, Sixth Division