REPUBLIC V.

NERI
G. R. No. 139588             March 4, 2004

FACTS:
Lot 2821, Plan (LRC) SWO-150, approved by the Land Registration Commission, is a parcel of
land with an area of 105.568 hectares located along the Cagayan de Oro River in Sitio
Taguanao, Indahag, Cagayan de Oro City. On September 3, 1973, the Bureau of Forest
Development certified that the property was alienable and disposable. On July 24, 1974, the
heirs of Graciano Neri, Sr. filed an application with the then Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. The court
rendered judgment granting the application.

The petitioner prayed that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered nullifying the
proceedings in LRC No. N-531, as well as the court’s decision therein, for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner as well as the property subject matter of the case.
According to the petitioner, this is in view of the court’s failure to comply with Section 51 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, which mandates that a copy of an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title should be duly served on the Director of the Bureau of Lands;
and the private respondents’ failure to comply with Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 239, which
requires the plan to be re-verified and approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, in
this case, Plan (LRC) SWO-150. The petitioner prayed OCT No. 0662 issued in favor of the
private respondents be declared null and void.

ISSUE:  whether the RTC erred in rendering the decision without a full-blown trial, based
solely on the pleadings of the parties and the documents appended to their memorandum.

RULING:
The Court agrees with the petitioner that the trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor
of the private respondents and that the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the
same.

As applicants in LRC Case No. N-531, the private respondents had the burden of complying
with the statutory requirement of serving the Director of the Bureau of Lands with a copy of
their application and amended application, and to show proof of their compliance thereon.
However, the Court also agrees with the CA that it was the burden of the petitioner in the
trial court to prove the material allegations of its complaint. 

In ordinary civil cases, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint which are denied by the defendant, and the defendant has the burden of proving
the material allegations in his case where he sets up a new matter. All facts in issue and
relevant facts must, as a general rule, be proven by evidence except the following:
(1) Allegations contained in the complaint or answer immaterial to the issues.
(2) Facts which are admitted or which are not denied in the answer, provided they have
been sufficiently alleged.
(3) Those which are the subject of an agreed statement of facts between the parties; as well
as those admitted by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case.
(4) Facts which are the subject of judicial notice.
(5) Facts which are legally presumed.
(6) Facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposite party.
G.R. No. 158621             December 10, 2008
ROYAL CARGO CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
DFS SPORTS UNLIMITED, INC., respondent.

FACTS:
The plaintiff [herein petitioner] and the defendant [herein respondent] are domestic
corporations organized under the laws of the Philippines. [Petitioner] is an international
freight forwarder, which offers trucking, brokerage, storage and other services to the public,
and serves as conduit between shippers, consignees, and carriers for the transportation of
cargos from one point of the globe to another. [Respondent], on the other hand, is one of
the concessionaires of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). It is principally engaged
in the importation and local sale of duty-free sporting goods and other similar products.
Sometime in October 1993, the [respondent] engaged the services of the [petitioner] to
attend and undertake the former's brokerage and trucking requirements.

Between the period from April to July, 1994 [petitioner] rendered trucking, brokerage,
storage and other services to the [respondent] in connection with the latter's importation
business, and as a consequence it incurred expenses for brokerage forms, stamps, notarial
fees, arrastre charges, wharfage fees, storage charges, guarding fees, telegrams, LCL
charges, photostat copies, trucking charges, processing fees, ocean freight charges,
collection fees, brokerage fees, insurance premiums, and 10% VAT, which amounted to the
total of P248,449.63, which the [respondent] fails and refuses to pay despite [petitioner's]
demands.

ISSUE:
whether the issues raised by petitioner are factual.

RULING:
An issue is factual when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
alleged facts, or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering
mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the
situation. On the other hand, an issue is one of law when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts.

In the present case, the main issues raised by petitioner are: (1) whether respondent, who is
the debtor, has the burden of proving payment; and (2) whether the subject invoices prove
such payment or at least raise a disputable presumption that payment has been made.
Clearly, the first issue is not factual as it does not require calibration of evidence. However,
the second issue is factual because it requires an examination of the probative value of the
evidence of the parties.
G.R. No. 170049               March 14, 2008
GENEROSO A. JUABAN and FRANCIS M. ZOSA, Petitioners,
vs.
RENE ESPINA and CEBU DISCOVERY BAY PROPERTIES, INC., Respondents.

FACTS:
The Heirs of Bancale later entered into a 31 January 1997 Agreement to Sell and to Buy with
respondent Rene Espina (Espina), paragraph 5 of which states:

That after the title is transferred to their names, the First Party [Heirs of Bancale] will
execute an absolute deed of sale in favor of the second party [herein respondent Rene
Espina] or whoever will be designated by him as the vendee for the consideration
mentioned in paragraph 2 hereof. The amount of ₱2,000,000.00 advanced by the Second
Party shall form part of said consideration.

In accordance with said Agreement, respondent Espina paid petitioners ₱2,000,000.00 as an

advance on the purchase price for the subject properties for the benefit of the Heirs of
Bancale. Respondent Espina then designated the other respondent in this case, Cebu Bay
Discovery Properties, Inc. (CDPI), as the vendee of the said properties.

Later, on 1 September 1997, respondents learned that petitioners, counsels Juaban and
Zosa, had filed on 26 August 1997, at around 1:10 p.m., a Motion to fix their attorney’s fees
in Civil Case No. 2309-L. They also learned that the Lapu-Lapu City RTC, Branch 27, had
issued an Order on the very same date of 26 August 1997, at around 2:20 p.m., granting the
motion and fixing petitioners’ attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱9,000,000.00. The Heirs of
Bancale filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied in an Order dated 22
September 1997. The Heirs of Bancale received a copy of the Order denying their Motion for
Reconsideration on 9 October 1997, after which they filed a Notice of Appeal dated 15
October 1997.

ISSUE: Whether the contention of petitioners that since no evidence was presented by the
parties in the lower court, the appeal of the dismissal of the complaint required no
determination by the appellate court of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the parties.

RULING:

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.

The nature of the issues to be raised on appeal can be gleaned from the appellant’s notice of
appeal filed in the trial court and in his or her brief as appellant in the appellate court.

This rule, however, does not relate to the nature of the issues that may be raised on appeal
by the aggrieved party, whether issues of fact or issues of law, or the mode of appeal of the
aggrieved party from a final order or resolution of the trial court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; it merely provides the nature of the issues appellant may include in his
assignment of error incorporated in his Brief as appellant. It may happen that the appellant
may have raised in the trial court errors of fact or law or both, and need not include all said
issues in his appeal in the appellate court. The appellant has the right to choose which issues
of law he or she may raise in the CA in addition to factual issues already raised.

A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged
facts. If the query requires a reevaluation of the credibility of witnesses or the existence or
relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that
query is factual. On the other hand, there is a question of law when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. In a case involving a
question of law, the resolution of the issue rests solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances. Ordinarily, the determination of whether an appeal involves only
questions of law or both questions of law and fact is best left to the appellate court. All
doubts as to the correctness of the conclusions of the appellate court will be resolved in
favor of the CA unless it commits an error or commits a grave abuse of discretion.

G.R. No. 91646 August 21, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMIL MARCOS Y ISIDRO, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Appellant Romil Marcos y Isidro was charged with the crime of Violation of Section 4, Article
II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
in an information filed by the Office of the City Fiscal of Zamboanga City with the Regional
Trial Court of Zamboanga City. When arraigned the appellant pleaded not guilty.

After trial on the merits, the appellant was found by the court guilty as charged and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua at the San Ramon Penal Colony and
to pay the costs.

The trial court gave credence to the buy-bust operation conducted by the prosecution
witnesses, all of them Narcom agents, wherein the appellant sold six (6) sticks of marijuana
to Sgt. Amado Ani, a member of the operation, who acted as the poseur-buyer. The other
target of the operation, a certain Ballena eluded arrest and escaped.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused based on testimonies of prosecution
witnesses which were not properly offered in evidence and on real evidence consisting of six
(6) sticks of marijuana which were not also offered in evidence.

RULING:

Contrary to the assertion of the appellant, Sgt. Amado Ani's testimony was formally offered
by the prosecution. Hence, when Sgt. Ani was called to testify for the prosecution,
Prosecuting Fiscal Deogracias Avecilla said that Sgt. Amado Ani's testimony was being
offered "to the effect that he was the poseur-buyer of this case."

As regards the other mentioned prosecution witnesses, the Court agrees with the appellant
that their testimonies were not formally offered at the time the said witnesses were called
to testify. However, the records reveal that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
were offered during the formal offer of documentary evidence by the prosecuting Fiscal. The
appellant did not object to such offer. In such a case the court ruled that the appellant is
now estopped from questioning the inclusion of the subject testimonies by the trial court in
convicting him of the crime charged.

At any rate, the appellant was not deprived of any of his constitutional rights in the inclusion
of the subject testimonies. The appellant was not deprived of his right to cross-examine all
these prosecution witnesses.

G.R. No. 155483             April 27, 2007

HEIRS OF PEDRO PASAG, represented by EUFREMIO PASAG; HEIRS OF MARIA PASAG,
represented by EPIFANIA LUMAGUI; HEIRS OF JUANITA PASAG, represented by ASUNCION
ORTIOLA; HEIRS OF ISIDRO PASAG, represented by VIRGINIA P. MENDOZA; HEIRS OF
BASILIO PASAG, represented by MILAGROSA P. NABOR; and HEIRS OF FORTUNATA PASAG,
represented by FLORENTINA S. MEMBRERE, Petitioners,
vs.
Sps. LORENZO and FLORENTINA PAROCHA, PRISCILLA P. ABELLERA, and MARIA VILORIA
PASAG, Respondents.

FACTS:

The instant case arose from a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Titles,
Recovery of Possession and Ownership, Reconveyance, Partition and Damages filed by
petitioners at the Urdaneta City RTC of Pangasinan against respondents. Petitioners alleged
a share over three (3) properties owned by respondents, which formed part of the estate of
petitioners’ deceased grandparents, Benito and Florentina Pasag. However, Severino, the
predecessor of respondents, claimed in an affidavit of self-adjudication that he is the sole,
legal, and compulsory heir of Benito and Florentina Pasag. Consequently, he was able to
appropriate to himself the properties covered by Original Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos.
2983 and 1887. Thereafter, Severino executed a deed of absolute sale over the said
properties in favor of his daughter, respondent Florentina Parocha. Moreover, petitioners
alleged that Severino used the same affidavit of self-adjudication to secure a free patent
over an agricultural land that had long been under the possession of Benito and Florentina
Pasag.

The trial of the case commenced on March 19, 1996. On March 9, 1999, petitioners rested
their case and were granted ten (10) days within which to submit their formal offer of
documentary exhibits. However, petitioners failed to submit the said pleading within the
required period.

On April 19, 1999, petitioners asked the trial court to give them until May 11, 1999 to submit
their offer of evidence; and it subsequently granted their motion. However, on May 11,
1999, they again failed to submit their offer of evidence and moved for another extension of
five (5) days.

Unfortunately, petitioners still failed to submit their formal offer of evidence within the
extended period. Consequently, in its June 17, 1999 Order, the trial court deemed waived
petitioners’ right to make their formal offer of evidence.
On July 27, 1999, petitioners moved for the admission of their offer of evidence. On
September 1, 1999, however, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners’ formal
offer of evidence for their "consistent failure" to submit it.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners waived their right to make a formal offer of evidence.

RULING:

The Court in Constantino v. Court of Appeals ruled that the formal offer of one’s evidence is
deemed waived after failing to submit it within a considerable period of time. It explained
that the court cannot admit an offer of evidence made after a lapse of three (3) months
because to do so would "condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court
order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail the speedy
administration of justice."

Applying the aforementioned principle in this case, we find that the trial court had
reasonable ground to consider that petitioners had waived their right to make a formal
offer of documentary or object evidence. Despite several extensions of time to make their
formal offer, petitioners failed to comply with their commitment and allowed almost five
months to lapse before finally submitting it. Petitioners’ failure to comply with the rule on
admissibility of evidence is anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious dispensation
of justice.

 It must be stressed that there is a significant distinction between identification of

documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is done in the course of the pre-trial,
and trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the latter is
done only when the party rests its case. The mere fact that a particular document is
identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part
of the evidence. It must be emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit
for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is
excluded and rejected.

G.R. No. 91628               August 22, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MACARIO SANTITO, JR., ALLAN CABALLERO, DIOSCORO CANDIA, BENJAMIN
CAPANGPANGAN and WILLIAM NARCISO, accused-appellants.

FACTS:
Appellants seek the reversal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch
XXIX, in Criminal Case No. TCS-792,1 finding them guilty of robbery with homicide and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to restitute jointly and
severally the amount of P10,000.00, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P30,000.00 and to pay compensatory damages representing funeral expenses in the amount
of P23,240.00 and moral damages of P10,000.00. They were, however, "given full credit of
their preventive imprisonment provided they complied with the rules and regulations (for)
convicted prisoners.
It is the contention of appellants that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are
belied by Entry No. 08 dated January 21, 1987 in the Police Blotter of the Balamban Police
Station. They make much of the fact that the said entry is not completely consistent with the
prosecution witnesses' testimonies in open court, although there is no indication as to who
supplied the data appearing in said entry. 

ISSUE: Whether the trial court gravely erred in giving credence to supposed eyewitnesses'
accounts despite substantial inconsistencies in their testimonies vis-a-vis the entry in the
police blotter, and the incredibility of their testimonies.

RULING:
 Identification of documentary evidence must be distinguished from its formal offer as an
exhibit. The first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the
evidence as an exhibit. The second is done only when the party rests its case and not before.
The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not
mean it will be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the party. The party may
decide to formally offer it if it believes this will advance its cause, and then again it may
decide not to do so at all.

In the case at bar, the defense did not identify or formally offer the said entry in the police
blotter as evidence for appellants. Section 35, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that
the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered; and it could not
have been offered without being identified and marked as an exhibit. Hence, contrary to the
desperate gambit of appellants, the said entry cannot be given any consideration at all.

G.R. No. L-63226 December 20, 1991

EUGENIA LLABAN y CATALAN, LUCIA BARBANERA JURBAN, MARTIN LLABAN, BEATRIZ
BARBANERA JURBAN, LUIS LLABAN NACUA, SERGIO LLABAN NACUA, MANUEL LLABAN
NACUA, EULALIA LLABAN ABELLA , EPIFANIO LLABAN NACUA, LUCRECIA LLABAN ABELLA,
JOSEFINA JABAN FORNOLLES, MARIA SOCORRO JABAN CARUBIO, LOURDES JABAN
VERGARA, BIENVENIDO P. JABAN, JOSE JABAN, CARMEN INTUD, FILOMEN JABAN, LUCIA
JABAN OLAES, ROQUE JABAN and GEN EROSO JABAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS now known as the Intermediate Appellate Court, HON. JOSE
RAMOLETE, Judge of the Court of First Instance Cebu, Branch III, JOSE G. PAULIN,
CEFERINO GABUTAN, SERAPIO ALCOSEBA, APOLONIA CAVAN, CIRIACO BACATAN
TRINIDAD LIM, GERARDO PANONGALINOG, and FILEMON SOTTO, respondents.

FACTS:
Principally involved in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the jurisdiction of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Cebu, sitting as a cadastral court, to modify or amend a 1916 decision in a cadastral case by
directing the issuance of a final decree in the names of parties who are not the original
adjudicatees of a cadastral lot.

ISSUE:
Whether there has been grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge in adjudicating
and issuing an order declaring private respondents as the new owners of the lot over the
opposition of petitioners without trial, without the presentation of evidence and without
giving the contending parties the opportunity to prove their claims, but solely on the basis of
allegations in the motion of private respondents and the annexes attached thereto.

RULING:

A careful scrutiny of the factual and procedural moorings of this case leads Us to agree with
the main thesis of petitioners that the lower court, sitting as a cadastral court, had no
jurisdiction to amend or modify the 13 September 1916 decision and that Judge Ramolete
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Order of 16
February 1981. We are, however, unable to agree with their postulation that said Judge
likewise committed grave abuse of discretion in practically setting aside the Order of 7
August 1979 by promulgating the 16 February 1981 Order.

It is true that certain documents were attached as Annexes to the petition; but Paulin et. al.,
went no further. Until identified, formally offered in evidence and admitted by the court,
the annexes were but mere scraps of paper. Section 34, rule 132 of the Rules of Court is
quite explicit: “The Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.”
The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties and the trial.

G.R. No. 117103 January 21, 1999

Spouses RENATO S. ONG and FRANCIA N. ONG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, INLAND RAILWAYS, INC. and PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISE, INC.,

FACTS:
On February 9, 1987, petitioners boarded as paying passengers Bus-No. 101 with late No.
EVB-508 ("Inland bus," for convenience), which was owned and operated by Inland Trailways
under a Lease Agreement with Philtranco. It was driven by Calvin Coronel.4 Around 3:50 in
the morning of said date, when the Inland bus slowed down to avoid a stalled cargo truck in
Tiaong, Quezon, it was bumped from the rear by another bus, owned and operated by
Philtranco and driven by Apolinar Miralles. Francia sustained wounds and fractures in both
of her legs and her right arm, while Renato suffered injuries on his left chest, right knee,
right arm and left eye.

Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioners absolving Inland Trailways, Inc., from any
liability whatsoever, and against Philtranco Service Enterprise, Inc., ordering the latter to pay
the petitioners.

The Court of Appeals (CA) resolved that Philtranco's liability for damages could not be
predicated upon the Police Report which had not been formally offered in evidence. The
report was merely annexed to the answer of Inland, and petitioner did not adopt or offer it
as evidence. Consequently, it had no probative value and, thus, Philtranco should be
absolved from liability.

ISSUE:
Whether the Police Report, which was not formally offered in evidence, could be used to
establish a claim against Philtranco based on culpa aquiliana

RULING:
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, provides that "[t]he court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered." A formal offer is necessary, since judges are
required to base their findings of fact and their judgment solely and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow parties to attach any document to their
pleadings and then expect the court to consider it as evidence, even without formal offer
and admission, may draw unwarranted consequences. Opposing parties will be deprived of
their chance to examine the document and to object to its admissibility. On the other hand,
the appellate court will have difficulty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized the
court below.

Evidence not formally offered during the trial cannot be used for or against a party litigant.
Neither may it be taken into account on appeal. Furthermore, actual and moral damages
must be proven before any award thereon can be granted.

G.R. No. 126619             December 20, 2006

UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
TITAN-IKEDA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.

FACTS:

The case originated from an action for a sum of money filed by Titan-Ikeda Construction and
Development Corporation (Titan) against Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation
(Uniwide) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City arising from Uniwide's
non-payment of certain claims billed by Titan after completion of three projects covered by
agreements they entered into with each other. Upon Uniwide's motion to dismiss/suspend
proceedings and Titan's open court manifestation agreeing to the suspension, Civil Case No.
98-0814 was suspended for it to undergo arbitration. Titan's complaint was thus re-filed with
the CIAC. Before the CIAC, Uniwide filed an answer which was later amended and re-
amended, denying the material allegations of the complaint, with counterclaims for refund
of overpayments, actual and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The agreements
between Titan and Uniwide are briefly described below.

ISSUE:
Whether by virture of the statement of Egr Tablante, Titan had admitted that it was on delay
and such be considered as judicial admission.

RULING:
The testimony of Engr. Tablante was offered only to prove that Project 1 was indeed
completed. It was not offered to prove the fact of delay. It must be remembered that the
purpose for which evidence is offered must be specified because such evidence may be
admissible for several purposes under the doctrine of multiple admissibility, or may be
admissible for one purpose and not for another, otherwise the adverse party cannot
interpose the proper objection. Evidence submitted for one purpose may not be
considered for any other purpose. Furthermore, even assuming, for the sake of argument,
that said testimony on the date of completion of Project 1 is admitted, the establishment of
the mere fact of delay is not sufficient for the imposition of liquidated damages. It must
further be shown that delay was attributable to the contractor if not otherwise justifiable.
Contrarily, Uniwide's belated claim constitutes an admission that the delay was justified and
implies a waiver of its right to such damages.
G.R. No. 164948             June 27, 2006
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:
The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3
weeks vacation. This is to enable her appear for the personal interview concerning the
adoption of her children.

The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was conceived
after the death of their paternal grandmother and guardian. The paternal relatives including
the petitioner who attended the wake of their mother were very much concerned about the
well-being of the three minors. While preparing for their adoption, they have asked a cousin
who has a family to stay with minors and act as their temporary guardian.

The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after weighing the
benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. She realized that her
children need parental love, guidance and support which she could not provide as she
already has a second family & residing in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her
children have been supporting her children up to the present and truly care for them, she
believes her children will be in good hands. She also finds petitioners in a better position to
provide a secured and bright future to her children.

However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopter’s
children sufficiently complies with the law

RULING:
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the
Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered
by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or
purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren
of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits
do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered.

Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent
purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to
prove. 

As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate children did not comply with the
afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose
authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written;
or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the
written consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.