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SECOND DIVISION

AMRODING LINDONGAN y UDK-16615

AMPATUA,
Petitioner, Present:

PERLAS-BERNABE, S.A.J,
- versus -
Chairperson,
GESMUNDO,
LAZARO-JAVIER,
PEOPLE OF THE
LOPEZ, and
PHILIPPINES,
ROSARIO,JJ
Respondent.
Promulgated:

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision2

dated February 28, 2018 and the Resolution3 dated July 25, 2018 rendered
by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 08782, which
affirmed in toto the Judgment4 dated May 17, 2016 of the Regional Trial
Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 45 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. U-
16620 finding petitioner Amroding Lindongan y Ampatua (Lindongan)
gui lty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs under Secti.on 5 Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,5 otherwise
1

1
See Lindongan ' s letter treaied as a petition for review on certiorari; rollo, pp. 4-5.
2
CA ro/lo, pp. 129- 138. Penned by Presiding Justice Romeo F. Barza with Associate Justices Stephen
C. Cruz and Carmelita Salandanan Manahan, concurring.
3
Id. at 166-168.
4
Id. at 45-53. P::nned by Presiding Judge Tita S. Obinario.
Entitled '"AN Ac ;- l1'STl":'UTING rHE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEA LING
REPUBLIC ACT No . 6425. OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS Acr OF 1972, AS AMENDED,
PROVIDING F UNDS THCIF,FOf{, AND FOR OTHER PL!RPOSES," approved on June 7, 2002.
Decision 2 UDK-16615

known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002." Likewise

assailed is the Resolution 6 dated January 27, 2020 of the CA denying
petitioner' s Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment and Notice of Appeal.

The Facts

The present case stemmed from an Infonnation 7 filed before the RTC
charging Lindongan with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, as defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory portion of
which reads:

That on or about 2:00 o ' clock dawn of December 21 , 2009 at Dofia

Loleng Village, Brgy. Nancayasan, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell one (1) heat
sealed plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
(SHABU) , weighing 0.054 gram, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY to Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165. 8

The prosecution alleged that in the wee hours of the morning of

December 21 , 2009, acting upon a tip from a confidential informant about
the illegal drug peddling activities of a certain "Amron" - later identified as
Lindongan - at Dofia Loleng Village, Barangay Nancayasan, Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan, several operatives of the Intel Division of the Drug Enforcement
Unit of the Urdaneta City Police, led by Police Officer 2 Mannan E. Dela
Cruz (PO2 Dela Cruz) as poseur buyer, successfully implemented a buy-bust
operation against Lindongan. The buy-bust team was immediately
dispatched at the target area; PO2 Dela Cruz, accompanied by the
confidential informant, positioned themselves at a pathway near a mosque to
wait for Lindongan. Upon Lindongan' s arrival, he asked PO2 Dela Cruz,
"A1agkano ang bibilhin mo?" to which the latter replied, "P300.00."
Lindongan then produced a brown leather purse containing a plastic sachet
of suspected shabu, which he handed to PO2 Dela Cruz, who in turn, gave
the fonner the marked money. After PO2 Dela Cruz performed the pre-
arranged signal, the rest of the buy-bust team rushed to the scene and
apprehended Lindongan. The arresting officers apprised him of his
constitutional rights and violation. PO2 Dela Cruz was able to recover the
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance as well as the buy-bust
money from Lindongan. 9

Thereafter, Lindor.gan and the confiscated items were brought to the

police station where PO2 Dela Cruz and Police Officer 3 Danny A. Ventura

6
CA rollo. pp. 200-20:">.. Penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz with Associate Justices Celia C.
Librea-Leagogo and Ra fael A ntonio M. Santos. concurring.
7
Records, p. I .
Id.
9
See CA ro/lo, pp. 48 and l 30-13 1.
Decision 3 UDK-166 15

(PO3 Ventura) marked the plastic sachet with their respective initials,
"MEC" and ''DAV" in the presence of Lindongan. Likewise, after preparing
°
the Joint Affidavit of Arrest, 1 Confiscation Receipt, 11 Coordination Form, 12
and Request for Laboratory Examination, 13 they conducted the inventory 14
and photography 15 in the presence of Lindongan. 16 PO3 Ventura then
brought the seized items and the Confiscation Receipt to the barangay hall
for the signature of Barangay Captain Gerola, but the latter refused to sign. 17
Subsequently, PO2 Dela Cruz brought the seized items to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination, which was
received by Police Officer 3 Marie June Milo, who then turned over the
confiscated item to Police Chief Inspector Emelda B. Roderos (PCI
Roderos), the forensic chemist. 18 After qualitative examination, 19 the
contents tested positive for 0.054 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu, a dangerous drug. PCI Roderos placed her markings on the
specimen before turning it over to NUP Merceditas C. Velasco, who had
custody thereof before PCI Roderos retrieved the same for presentation in
court. 20

In defense, Lindongan claimed that at around 6:30 in the evening of

December 20, 2009, he was in front of his house at Dofi.a Loleng Village
talking with his fellow Muslims when a black car suddenly stopped nearby
where three (3) persons disembarked and approached him. One of them,
whom he recognized as a police officer, frisked him and confiscated a
cellphone and some cash. When he asked why he was being frisked, there
was no answer. Thereafter, he was brought to t he police station where he
was asked to settle his case. 2 1

In a Judgment 22 dated May 17, 2016, the RTC found Lindongan

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and accordingly,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in
the amount of PS00,000.00. 23 The RTC found that the prosecution was able
to prove all the elements of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs and
that the chain of custody of the seized items had been observed. Conversely,
the RTC rejected Lindongan' s uncorroborated defense and asserted that
there was no reason for the police to single him out if, as he claimed, he was
speaking with a group of people when he was arrested.24

10
Dated December 2 i, 2009. Records, pp. 5-6.
11
Dated December 2 1, 2009. ld. at 9.
12
Dated December 2 1, 2009. IJ. at 2 1.
13
Dated December 2 1, 20 09. ld. at 7.
1
~ See Confiscation Receipt dated December 2 1, 2009; id. at 9 .
15
Id. at 10-19.
16
See CA rol/o, pp. 48-49 and 13 I .
7
i See id . at 50.
18
See id. at 49 a nd 13 i.
19
See C hem istry Report No. D-1 03-2009-U dated December 2 1, 2000; reco rds. p. 8.
20
See CA rollo, pp. 50 and 13 1- 132.
21
See id. at 50-51 ar.d 112.
2
~ Id. at 45-53 .
23
Id. a t 53.
24
See id. at:> !-'.::3.
Decision 4 UDK-16615

On appeal to the CA, Lindongan's conviction was affirmed in toto in

a Decision 25 dated February 28, 2018 upon a finding that all the elements of
the crime charged had been successfully proven, the chain of custody rule
had been complied with, and the presumption that official duty had been
performed by the arresting officers was not overcome. 26

Lindongan ' s motion for reconsideration 27 was denied in a

Resolution28 dated July 25, 2018. In the absence of any appeal filed before
the Court, the CA's February 28, 2018 Decision attained finality on August
30, 2018 per Entry of Judgment29 dated January 17, 2019. This prompted
Lindongan to file, assisted by the Humanitarian Paralegal Assistance of the
New Bilibid Prison, a Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment and Notice of
Appeal 30 on March 13, 2019 before the CA, explaining that he has been
exerting efforts to contact his counsel of record, Atty. Ernesto T. Buquing
(Atty. Buquing), even from the time the CA rendered its Decision, but to no
avail. Asserting that Atty. Buquing abandoned his appeal to the Court,
Lindongan pleaded reconsideration from the CA. 31

However, in a Resolution32 dated January 27, 2020, the CA denied his

motion. While admitting the fact that Lindongan had already lost
communication with his counsel on record, the CA nonetheless ascribed
fault upon Lindongan for his fai lure to secure the services of a new counsel
before its February 28, 2018 Decision became final. As such, the CA held
that Lindongan is now barred from availing of post-conviction remedies.33

Hence, the present petition fi led by Lindongan sans the assistance of

counsel.

The Issue Before the Court

The essemial issue for the Cou11' s resolution is whether the CA

correctly: (a) denied Lindongan's Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment and
Notice of Appeal; and (b) affirmed Lindongan ' s conviction for Illegal Sale
of Dangerous Drugs.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

25
Id.at 129-138.
M See id. at 134-137.
27 Dated March 27, 2018. ld . at 145-152.
2
~ Id. at 166- 168 .
29 Id at 18 1.
,o Dated February 16, 20 19 . Id. at 182-183 .
31
See id.
32
Id. at 200-202.
" See id. at 201-202.
Decision 5 UDK-16615

At the outset, 1t bears stressing that, as a rule, "a final and executory
judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified,
directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land." 34 However,
"[the] Court has · relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice
considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence
of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, [and] (e) a lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory."35

In relation thereto, the general rule is that the negligence of counsel

binds the client, even on mistakes in the application of procedural
rules. However, this rule should not apply "when the reckless or gross
negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due process of law" 36 or of
his libe1iy or prope1iy, and where the interest of justice so requires. 37

Finding the existence of all the above-enumerated considerations

justifying the relaxation of the rule on immutability of judgments in this
case, as well as the acknowledged fact that Lindongan exerted efforts not
just to contact Atty. Buquing for the purpose of pursuing his appeal, but also
to file such appeal even without the assistance of counsel at the soonest time
possible, 38 the Court finds it proper to: (a) recall the CA's Entry of Judgment
dated January 17, 2019; (b) consider Lindongan' s notice of appeal filed; and
(c) resolve the case on the merits, in the interest of justice.

A meticulous review of the records reveals glaring lapses committed

by the a1Testing officers in complying with the chain of custody rule,
particularly with respect to the witness requirement.

In cases for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165,39 it is

essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral
ce1tainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of
°
the corpus delicti of the crime. 4 Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus

,J Barnes v. Judge Padilla, 482 Phil. 903, 9 15 (2004).

35 Id.; e mphases supplied.
36
Ong Lay Hin v. CA, 752 Phil. 15, 23-24(201 5).
37 See Curammeng v. People, 799 Phil. 575, 582-583 (20 16), citing City of Dagupan v. Maramba, 738
Phil. 7 1, 87 (20 14).
38 T he Entry of Judgment was issued o n January 17, 20 I9 and Li ndongan 's Motion to Recall Entry of
.Judgme nt and Notice of Appeal was filed on March 13, 2019 (see CA rollo, pp. 181 - 182).
N The e lements of lllegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under Section 5, Article 11 of RA 9 16 5 are: (a) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment. (See People v. Crispo, 828 Phil. 416. 429 (20 18); People v. Sanche::., 827 Phil.
457, 465 (20 18): People v. Magsano, 826 Ph il. 947, 958 [2018]; People v. Manansala, 826 Phil. 578,
586[2018] ; Peuple v. Miranda, 824 Phil. I042, I 050 [20 I 8]: and People v. Mamangon, 824 Phi l. 728,
735-736 [2018] ; a ll cases c iting People v. Sumili, 753 Phil. 342, 348 [20 15]; and People 1·. Bio, 753
Ph il. 730 , 736(20 15).)
0
~ See People v. Crispo , id. ; People v. Sanchez, id.; People v. Magsano , id. at 959; People v. Manansala,
id.: Peopie v. Miranda. id.; and People v. Mamangon, id. at 736. See a lso People v. Viterbo, 739 Phi l.
593,60 1 (2014).
Decision 6 UDK-166 15

delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence, warrants an acquittal. 41

To establish the identity of the dangerous drugs with moral certainty,

the prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody
from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as
evidence of the crime. 42 As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law
requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of
the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of
the same.

The law further requires that the inventory and photography be done
in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were
seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses,
namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, 43 "a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice [DOJ], and any
elected public official" ;44 or ( b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA
10640, "an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service45 or the media."46 The law requires the presence of these
witnesses primarily to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and
remove any suspicion of switching, p lanting, or contamination of evidence. 47

As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is

strictly enjoined as the same has been regarded not merely as a procedural
technicality but as a matter of substantive law_.is This is because " [t]he law
has been 'crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential

41
See People v. Gamboa, 867 Phil. 548, 570 (2018), citing People v. Umipang, 686 Phi l. 1024, 1039-
1040 (20 12).
42 See People v. APio, 828 Phil. 439, 448 (20 18); People v. Crispo, supra note 39; Peoplr! v. Sanche=,
supra note 39; People v. Magsano, supra note 39, at 959; People v. Manansala, supra note 39; People
v. Miranda, supra note 39, at I 051; and People v. Mamangon. supra note 39, at 736. See also People v.
Viterbo, supra note 40.
43
Entitled "AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTI IEN THE A NTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 2 1 OF R.El'UBI.IC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
'COMPREHENSIVE D ANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002.'" As the Cout1 noted in People v. Gutierre::. (see
G.R. No. 236304, November 5, 2018), R.A 10640 was approved on July 15, 2014. Under Section 5
thereof, it shall " take effect fifteen ( 15) days after its complete publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation." RA I 0640 was pubiished on July 23. 20 14 in The Philippine Star
(Vol. XXVIII. No. 359, Philippine Star Metro section, p. 2 1) and Manila Bulletin (Vol. 499, No. 23;
World News section, p. 6). Thus, R.A 10640 appear s to have become effective on August 7, 2014.
4
~ Section 2 I (I) and (2), Article II of R.A 9165 ; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
45
Which falls under the DOJ. (See Section I of Presidential Decree No. 1275, entitled '·REORGANIZING
THE PROSECUTION ST.A.Ff' or THE D EPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE OFFICES OF THE PROV!NCIAL AND
CITY FISCALS, REGIONALIZING Tl!E PR0SECUTION SERVICE, AND CREATING THE NATIONAL
PROSECUTION SERVICE" [April 11 , 1978] and Section 3 of RA I 0071 , entitled " A N ACT
STRENGrHENING AND RATIONALIZING TH[ NATIONAL PROSECUTION SE~VICE"' other w ise known as the
" PROSECUTION SEP.V:CE ACT OF 20 I 0'' [lapsed into law on April 8, 20 1OJ.)
46
Section 2 1 (1), Article II of RA 9 165, as amended by RA 10640; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
47
See People v. Bangulan, G.R. No. 232249. September 3, 2018. See also People v. /11/iranda. supra note
39; and People v. Mendoza, 736 Phil. 749, 761 (2014).
18
· See People v. Miranda, id. at I 059. See also People v. Macapundag, 807 Phil. 234, 244(2017). citing
People i . Umipang, supra note 4 1, at I 038.
Decision 7 UDK-166 15

police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life
imprisorunent. "'49

Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that due to varying field

conditions, strict compliance with the chain of custody procedure may not
always be possible. 50 As such, the failure of the apprehending team to
strictly comply with the same would not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is a justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. 51 The foregoing is based on the saving clause
mandated under RA l 0640. 52 It should, however, be emphasized that for the
saving clause to apply, the prosecution must duly explain the reasons behind
the procedural lapses,53 and that the justifiable ground for non-compliance
must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these
grounds are or that they even exist. 54

Anent the witness requirement, non-compliance may be permitted if

the prosecution proves that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and
sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses, albeit they
eventually failed to appear. While the earnestness of these efforts must be
examined on a case-to-case basis, the overarching objective is for the Court
to be convinced that the failure to comply was reasonable under the given
circumstances. 55 Thus, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual
serious attempts to contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as
justified grounds for non-compliance. 56 These considerations arise from the
fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from
the moment they have received the information about the activities of the
accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust operation and
consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand, knowing full y
well that they would have to strictly comply with the chain of custody rule.57

In this case, records reveal that the inventory and photography of the
seized items were conducted only in Lindongan's presence and absent the
presence of the required witnesses as stated above. Considering the date of
the buy-bust operation on December 21 , 2009, the applicable law58 at the
time requires the presence of the following witnesses: (a ) a representative

49 See People v. Segundo. 8 14 Phil. 697. 722(2017), citing People v. Um ipang, id.
50
See People v Sanchez, 590 Phil. 214. 234 (2008).
51
See People v. Almmfe, 63 1 Phil. 5 1, 60 (20 I0).
52 Section I of RA I 0640 pe11inently states: "Provided. finally, That noncompliance of these
requirements under j ustifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value 0f the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures and custody over said items."
53
People"· Almo,fe, supra note 5 I.
54
People v. De Guzman, 630 Phil. 637, 649 (20 I 0).
55
See People v. Manc;!1sala, supra note 39, at 591.
56
See People v. Gamboa, supra note 41 , at 569, citing People v. Umipang, supra note 4 I, at I 053.
57
See People v. Crispo. supra note 39, at 436.
58
See Section 2 I ( I) 2nd (2), A1t icle 11 of RA 9 165.
Decision 8 UDK- 16615

from the media; (b) a representative from the DOJ; and (c) an elected public
official. Here, there is dea1ih of evidence to show that any one of the said
witnesses was present at the photography and inventory, or that the arresting
officers attempted, at the very least, to secure the presence of any one of
them. PO3 Ventura's testimony that he brought the seized items, as well as
the Confiscation Receipt, for the signature of Barangay Captain Gerola
miserably fails to satisfy the chain of custody requirements, as the mere
signature of the required witnesses therein does not suffice - the law
requires the actual and physical presence of said witnesses. 59 Finally, even
assuming arguendo that Barangay Captain Gerola was present during the
photography and inventory, this still falls short of the mandate of RA 9165
which requires the presence of all the aforesaid witnesses. As it stands, there
was complete and unjustified non-compliance with the chain of custody rule,
which therefore constrains the Court to rule that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the items purportedly seized from Lindongan have been
compromised.

As a final word, the Court, in People v. Miranda, 60 issued a definitive

reminder to prosecutors when dealing with drugs cases. It declared that
"[since] the [procedural] requirements are clearly set forth in the law, then
the State retains the positive duty to account for any lapses in the chain of
custody of the drugs/items seized from the accused, regardless of whether or
not the defense raises the same in the proceedings a quo; otherwise, it risks
the possibility of having a conviction overturned on grounds that go into the
evidence's integrity and evidentiary value, albeit the same are raised only for
the first time on appeal, or even not raised, become apparent upon further
review." 61 So must it be in the case of Lindongan, whose acquittal is clearly
in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition 1s GRANTED. The Court hereby

resolves as follows:

l) The Entry of Judgment dated January 17, 2019 issued by the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 08782 is RECALLED;
and

2) The Decision dated February 28, 2018 as well as the Resolutions

dated July 25 , 2018 and January 27, 2020 rendered by the CA in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 08782 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Amroding Lindongan y Ampatua
(Lindongan) is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director
of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa C ity is ORDERED to:
(a) cause the immediate release of l indongan. unless he is being
lawfully held in custody for any other reason; and (b) inform the
59
Sec Peupie v. Acaho, G.R. No. 24108 1. February 11 , 20 19.
60
Supra note 39.
61
See id.at 1059.
Decision 9 UDK- 166 15

Court of the action taken within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA g~S-BERNABE
Senior Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

AL

RIC R. ROSARIO

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

MQ~w
ESTELA M~-PERLAS-BERNABE
Senior Associa~e Justice
Ch::iirperson, Second Division
Decision 10 UDK-16615

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was