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Alva v. Court of Appeals
Alva v. Court of Appeals
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION DOCKETED AS CA G.R. CR NO. 24077 ON
THE GROUND OF ALLEGED FAILURE TO POST A NEW BOND FOR PETITIONER’S PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
AND THAT THE PERSONAL BAIL BOND POSTED IN THE LOWER COURT HAD ALLEGEDLY ALREADY
EXPIRED;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER AS SUBSTANTIAL, THE COMPLAINCE FILED BY THE PETITIONER WHICH
SHOWED THE FACT THAT INDEED THERE WAS A BAIL BOND FILED FOR THE PROVISIONAL LIBERTY OF
THE ACCUSED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL;
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT IGNORED THE RECENT BAIL BOND EXTENSION ATTACHED TO THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE PETITIONER;
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO SUBMIT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OR TO
THE CUSTODY OF LAW DESPITE THE BAIL BOND POSTED ON MAY 21, 1999; and
VI.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO VALID BAIL BOND IN PLACE WHEN THE PETITIONER TOOK HIS
APPEAL.
The bombardment of errors notwithstanding, only two issues are raised in this petition: 1) with the exception of the fifth assignment of
error, all six can be encapsulated in one solitary question, that is, whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
dismissing the appeal in view of petitioner’s alleged failure to post a valid bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal; and 2)
whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of the law despite the posting of the
subject bail bond.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner faults the appellate court for expressing "x x x in its questioned resolutions that herein petitioner did not submit to the
jurisdiction of the court or custody of the law, or that there was no valid bail bond when the appeal was taken when the records of the case
would readily prove the contrary."29 In issuing said resolution, petitioner concludes that the Court of Appeals made "x x x no careful
examination of the records x x x." Petitioner rationalizes his deduction in the following manner:
x x x [T]he records of the case readily reveals (sic) that several pleadings were filed by the petitioner before the lower court even after the
promulgation of judgment was made. Right after the promulgation of the decision in the lower court, herein petitioner went to the court
and posted a bail bond. If the posting of the bond which was approved by the same Regional Trial Court who rendered the decision subject
of appeal is not yet a submission to the jurisdiction of the court, then the respondent Hon. Court of Appeals must have been thinking of
another matter beyond the comprehension of the petitioner and obviously outside the matters being contemplated by law and the Rules of
Court.
Equally, petitioner further posits that:
x x x Although it is respectfully submitted that an accused shall be denied bail or his bail shall be cancelled if sentenced to an
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years as provided in Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, just the same, there must be a showing by
the prosecution with notice to the accused of the fact that, the accused is a recidivist, has previously escaped from confinement, evaded
sentence, has committed an offense while under probation, there are circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail,
etc. But there was none of the said instances that may be attributable to herein petitioner.30
Respondent People, in contrast, counters that "x x x [a]lthough a personal bail bond dated May 21, 1999 was executed in favor of
petitioner by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation two days after the promulgation of the Decision, there is nothing on record which shows
that petitioner had surrendered, was arrested or otherwise deprived of his liberty after the promulgation of the judgment of his conviction
in his absence. x x x." To illustrate its point, respondent People cites the following facts: 1) the return of the Warrant of Arrest issued on
May 19, 1999 signed by P/Superintendent Ramon Flores De Jesus, Chief of Warrant and Subpoena Section, which states in full:
Respectfully returned this unexecuted Warrant of Arrest for the reason that the address of the accused is not within our area of
responsibility. Further request that the warrant of Arrest be forwarded to the Police Station which has Jurisdiction over the address of the
accused.
However, the name of the accused will be included in our list of wanted persons for our future reference.
2) the fact that six days after the decision of the RTC was promulgated, or on 25 May 1999, said court rendered judgment against the bail
bond issued by Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation executed to secure petitioner’s provisional liberty during the trial, for the
bondsman’s failure to produce petitioner before the court, to wit:
In view of the failure of Eastern Insurance & Surety Corporation, bondsman of herein accused, to produce the herein accused within the
period granted it by this Court, judgment is hereby rendered against said bond in the amount of Seventeen Thousand (P17,000.00)
Pesos.31
Respondent People explains that the first two facts make it improbable to conclude that there existed a valid bail bond securing
petitioner’s provisional liberty even after conviction. Stated in another way, petitioner’s admission to bail presumes that the latter
surrendered, was arrested or he had otherwise submitted himself under the custody of the law.
And, 3) "that petitioner belatedly attached a bond endorsement to his motion for reconsideration dated November 7, 2002 submitted
before the Court of Appeals, purportedly to extend the expired personal bond dated May 21, 1999 x x x, did not automatically confer on
petitioner the benefits of an effective bail bond,"32 as petitioner made no extension of the previous personal bond before the same expired.
We disagree in petitioner’s assertions; hence, the petition must fail.
A definitive disposition of the issue relating to the existence and validity of petitioner’s bail bond on appeal presupposes that the latter was
allowed by law to post bail notwithstanding the RTC’s judgment of conviction and the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum of reclusion
temporal.
Section 5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court, as amended, intrinsically addresses the foregoing prefatory matter viz:
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. – Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal
subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied
bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstances of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions
of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party. [Emphasis
supplied.]
From the preceding quoted provision, the RTC is given the discretion to admit to bail an accused even after the latter has been convicted
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of more than six (6) years but less than twenty (20) years. However, the same also
provides for the cancellation of bail bonds already granted or the denial of a bail bond application upon the concurrence of two points: 1)
if the judgment of the Regional Trial Court exceeds six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years; and 2) upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the presence of any of the five circumstances therein enumerated or other similar
circumstances.
In the case at bar, petitioner was convicted by the RTC to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of nine (9) years
and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum of reclusion temporal. Quite clearly, the approval of
petitioner’s application for bail was discretionary upon the RTC.
It is incongruous, to say the least, that the posting of a bail presupposes that the accused and/ or accused-appellant is detained or in the
custody of the law.33 In the case at bar, the bench warrant issued by the RTC on 19 May 1999 still remains unserved. Nothing in the
records of the case, neither in the RTC nor the Court of Appeals, demonstrates that petitioner was ever arrested, as there has been no
related Order of Release issued by any court, or that he voluntarily surrendered or at the very least placed himself under the custody of the
law.
Basic is the principle that that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty and it would be premature, x x x, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.34
All told, no bail should have been granted petitioner. It is beyond dispute that the subject bail bond issued by Mega Pacific Insurance
Corporation was irregularly approved. Worth noting is the fact that nowhere in the records of the case is it shown that petitioner applied
for bail through a motion duly filed for such purpose nor is there showing that the RTC issued an Order of Approval or any other court
process acknowledging such document. Be that as it may, even granting for the sake of argument that it was indeed approved by Judge
Muro, such approval did not render the subject bail bond valid and binding for it has been established that petitioner was not entitled to
bail on appeal.
That the prosecution appears not to have been given the chance to object, as evidently required under the quoted rule, to the application or
approval of the subject bail bond (with notice to the accused), fortifies the declaration as to its invalidity. Nowhere in the original records
of the RTC does it even show that the prosecution was informed of petitioner’s application for bail, much less the approval of such
application.
Noting that the raison d'être for such requirement is the discretionary nature of the admission to bail of an accused after conviction,
though discretionary, such assessment must be exercised in accordance with applicable legal principles. As when there is a concurrence of
the enumerated circumstances and the range of penalty imposed, the prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to object and
present evidence, if necessary, with notice to the accused. It is on this basis that judicial discretion is balanced in determining whether or
not an accused-appellant should be admitted to bail pending appeal of his conviction vis-à-vis the increased possibility or likelihood of
flight.
Approval of an application for bail on appeal, absent the knowledge of the prosecution of such application or, at the very least, failing to
allow it to object, is not the product of sound judicial discretion but of impulse and arbitrariness, not to mention violative of respondent
People’s right of procedural due process.
This is especially true in this case as a close scrutiny of the original records of the case at bar reveals that petitioner violated the conditions
of his bail without valid justification – his failure to appear before the RTC, despite due notice, on the day of the promulgation of the
latter’s judgment, absent any justifiable reason. His absence was a clear contravention of the conditions of his bail bond to say the least.
As evidenced by the undertaking printed on the face of the bond issued by Eastern Insurance and Surety Corporation and likewise
required under Section 635 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, petitioner must present himself before the court for the reading of the
judgment of the RTC in order to render himself to the execution thereof.
While, indeed, a medical certificate was hand delivered and filed by a certain Joey Perez, allegedly a representative of petitioner, stating
therein the reason for the latter’s absence, the RTC found insubstantial the explanation proffered. Appropriately, it ordered the
promulgation of its judgment in absentia. It also issued a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner.
Upon examination, the subject medical certificate36 merely states that petitioner was diagnosed to be suffering from hypertension. It
failed to elucidate further any concomitant conditions necessitating petitioner’s physical incapability to present himself before the court
even for an hour or two; thus, it considered the absence of petitioner unjustified. What's more, though notarized, the subject document
failed to indicate evidence of affiant’s37 identity making its due execution doubtful.
Further, it should be recalled as well, that as early as 4 May 1999, petitioner and counsel had already been notified of the 19 May 1999
schedule of promulgation. The first having been postponed in view of the Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation (on 5 May 1999) filed
by petitioner’s counsel.
Another telling evidence of the violation of petitioner’s original bail bond is revealed by the Process Server’s Return,38 indicated at the
dorsal portion of the RTC’s Produce Order, indicating petitioner’s change of address without prior notice to the RTC, it states:
PROCESS SERVER’S RETURN
This certifies that on the 17th day of May, (sic) 1999, undersigned return (sic) again to Fersal Apartelle located at 130 Kalayaan Ave. (sic)
Diliman, Quezon City for confirmation and indeed the addressee, Arnold Alva, had no (sic) longer been residing nor holding office at the
aforementioned address.
By failing to inform the RTC of his change of address, petitioner failed to hold himself amenable to the orders and processes of the RTC.
It was an unmistakable arrant breach of the conditions of his bail bond.
Prescinding from the above discussion, the conviction of petitioner to a period beyond six (6) years but less than twenty (20) years in
tandem with attendant circumstances effectively violating his bail without valid justification should have effectively precluded him from
being admitted to bail on appeal.
The issue of the validity of petitioner’s bail bond on appeal having been laid to rest by Section 5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court,
as amended, petitioner’s alleged failure to post a bail bond on appeal is, therefore, inconsequential as, under the circumstances, he is
disallowed by law to be admitted to bail on appeal. Thus, for all legal intents and purposes, there can be no other conclusion than that at
the time petitioner filed his notice of appeal and during the pendency of his appeal – even until now – he remains at large, placing himself
beyond the pale, and protection of the law.
Inexorably, having jumped bail and eluded arrest until the present, the issue of whether or not petitioner has lost his right to appeal his
conviction now ensues.
The manner of review of petitioner’s conviction is governed by the Rules of Court. Appropriately, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court presents
the procedural requirements regarding appeals taken to the Court of Appeals. Section 8 of said Rule finds application to the case at bar,
viz:
SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. – The appellate court may, upon motion of the appellee or its own
motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except
in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. [Emphasis supplied.]
By virtue of the second paragraph of the abovequoted provision, the act of jumping bail, among otherthings, will result in the outright
dismissal of petitioner’s appeal. As pointed out by the Court in the case of People v. Mapalao,39 the reason for said rule is that:
[O]nce an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he losses his standing in court and
unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. Within the meaning of the principles
governing the prevailing criminal procedure, petitioner impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of
the RTC final and executory.40
By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land, petitioner revealed his contempt of the law and
placed himself in a position to speculate at his pleasure his chances for a reversal. This, we cannot condone. Once more, by jumping bail,
petitioner has waived his right to appeal. In the case of People v. Ang Gioc,41 we enunciated that:
There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This
right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by
implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right
to appeal from the judgment rendered against him x x x.
Coming now to the second issue of whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of
the law, despite the posting of the subject bail bond, petitioner argues that his act of filing several pleadings after the promulgation of the
RTC’s judgment plus his filing of the application for his admission to bail should be considered a submission to the court’s jurisdiction.
He rationalizes that:
[T]he records of the case readily reveals that several pleadings were filed by the petitioner before the lower court even after the
promulgation of judgment was made. Right after the promulgation of the decision in the lower court, herein petitioner went to the court
and posted a bail bond. If the posting of the bond which was approved by the same Regional Trial Court who rendered the decision subject
of appeal is not yet a submission to the jurisdiction of the court, then the respondent Hon. Court of Appeals must have been thinking of
another matter beyond the comprehension of the petitioner and obviously outside the matters being contemplated by law and the Rules of
Court.
For the resolution of the second issue, it should have been sufficient to state that for reasons stated in the foregoing discussion, the
question posed has now become academic. However, to diminish the confusion brought about by ostensibly equating the term
"jurisdiction of the court (over the person of the accused)" with that of "custody of the law", it is fundamental to differentiate the two. The
term:
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender (citation omitted); while (the term) jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance (citation omitted). One can be under the custody of the law but not yet
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before
arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in
the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced (citation omitted).42
Moreover, jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of parties, as when an accused escapes from the custody of the law, but
continues until the case is terminated.43 Evidently, petitioner is correct in that there is no doubt that the RTC already acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused petitioner – when he appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged –
notwithstanding the fact that he jumped bail and is now considered a fugitive.
As to whether or not petitioner has placed himself under the custody of the CA, alas, we cannot say the same for "[b]eing in the custody of
the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of
the law (citation omitted). Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to,
detention."44 In the case at bar, petitioner, being a fugitive, until and unless he submits himself to the custody of the law, in the manner of
being under the jurisdiction of the courts, he cannot be granted any relief by the CA.
Parenthetically, we cannot end this ponencia without calling attention to a very disturbing fact – that petitioner admits of being the author
of a falsified public document was treated nonchalantly by authorities.
In fine, the petitioner has remained at large even as he hopes that his appeal, and consequently, this petition, will succeed and he can then
appear before the Court to claim his victory. He hopes in vain.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No.
24077, which dismissed petitioner’s appeal, are hereby AFFIRMED. In this connection, Judge Manuel Muro is DIRECTED to issue
forthwith a warrant of arrest for the apprehension of Petitioner Arnold Alva and for proper disposition of the case in line with the
foregoing discussion.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice