Professional Documents
Culture Documents
22 - People vs. Cabrera
22 - People vs. Cabrera
Sedition
Article 139. Sedition - How committed. - The crime of sedition is committed by persons who rise publicly
and tumultuously in order to attain by force, intimidation, or by other means outside of legal methods,
any of the following objects:
1. To prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or the holding of any popular election;
2. To prevent the National Government, or any provincial or municipal government, or any public
officer thereof from freely exercising its or his functions, or prevent the execution of any
administrative order;
3. To inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any public officer or
employee;
4. To commit, for any political or social end, any act of hate or revenge against private persons or
any social class; and
5. To despoil, for any political or social end, any person, municipality or province, or the National
Government (or the Government of the United States), of all its property or any part thereof.
ISSUE/S:
This case involves friction between Manila police officers and Philippine Constabulary.
The police arrested a woman who is a member of the household of a Constabulary soldier.
One day, a policeman (Mojica) was patrolling when he encountered several soldiers. Commotion
took place, and a soldier (Macasinag) was shot and mortally wounded.
This engendered resentment among the soldiers in Sta. Lucia Barracks. Word had gotten out: (1)
Macasinag died, and (2) Mojica allowed to continue his duty in Intramuros.
A corporal persuaded a private in charge of a quarter to be let out of the window. They sawed out
the window bars and brought rifles and ammunition. They divided to attack police officers.
On “Calle Real”: 10-12 soldiers attacked 2 policemen. They also fired shot against a civilian car,
killing the driver and 3 passengers. They also killed the assistant chief of police who was with a
policeman driving a motorcycle (also killed). A police patrol went to the place and was also gunned
down by the soldiers (2 were killed).
On “Calle General Luna”: another platoon of soldiers fired upon a police motorcycle on its way to
Calle Real, wounding 1. They also fired indiscriminately in one police station, where no one was
harmed.
Chief of the Constabulary rounded up the soldiers, who then came back one by one to the barracks.
No list of the soldiers was released. But an investigation was made: there were around 74 soldiers
who participated.
According to one soldier: the wife of a soldier was arrested and abused by the policemen, after
which they gave her to an American, then the unjustified arrest of 2 soldiers, and then the killing of
the soldier Macasinag.
2 separate charges were filed: (1) crime of sedition, and (2) murder and serious physical injuries.
RULING
Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State.
Defendants argue that in a crime of sedition, (1) there should be a private citizen as offender and a
public functionary as offended party, and (2) what transpired was a fight between two government
bodies.
The Court said that the law on sedition (1) makes no distinction on who can be held liable, and (2)
what transpired was an unequal fight.
77 members of the PH constabulary were held guilty of sedition. The object of the public and tumultuous
uprising is to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person of police officers.
Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. The
Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and
tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of vie objects, including that
of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular
Government or of Provincial or Municipal Government. The trial court found that the crime of sedition,
as defined and punished by the law, had been committed, and we believe that such finding is correct.
Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292 it
is and necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a public functionary,
and that what really happened in this instance was a fight between two armed bodies of the Philippine
Government, is absolutely without foundation. Subdivison 3 of section 5 of the Treason and Sedition Law
makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies. In one scene there was a fights between
two armed bodies of the Philippine Government, but it was an unequal fight brought on by the actions of
the accused.
Article 140. Penalty for sedition. - The leader of a sedition shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 10,000 pesos.
Other persons participating therein shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine not exceeding 5,000 pesos. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).
Article 141. Conspiracy to commit sedition. - Persons conspiring to commit the crime of sedition
shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000
pesos. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).
Article 142. Inciting to sedition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a
fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking any direct
part in the crime of sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment of any of the acts
which constitute sedition, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems,
cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same end, or upon any person or
persons who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous
libels against the (Government of the United States or the Government of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines) or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or
obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions of his office, or which tend to instigate
others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite
rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people against the
lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).
ARTICLE 142. Inciting to sedition. — The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period and a fine
not exceeding Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000) shall be imposed upon any person who, without
taking any direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment of any of the acts
which constitute sedition, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or
other representations tending to the same end, or upon any person or persons who shall utter seditious
words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government, or any of the duly
constituted authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the
functions of his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes,
or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices.
DOCTRINE: The essence of seditious libel is its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to
the pitch of illegal courses or to induce people to resort to illegal methods in order to redress the
evils which press upon their mind.
A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with
Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling
incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government, is a scurrilous libel against the
Government.
Mode 1. Inciting others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition by means of
speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, etc.
Mode 2. Uttering seditious words or speeches which tend to disturb the public peace;
Mode 3. Writing, publishing, or circulating scurrilous libels against the government or any of the duly
constituted authorities thereof, which tend to disturb the public peace.
ISSUE/S:
Is the acts of Espuelas making a fake suicide note by a certain Alberto Reveniera because the latter
was not pleased with the administration of Roxas, further accusing the government that it is
infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis and instructs children to burn pictures of Roxas
considered as acts inciting to sedition? [YES].
After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers and
weeklies of general circulation not only in the province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and
abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a
fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter
or note is hereunder reproduced:
" My dear wife, if someone asks you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not pleased
with the administration of Roxas.” “And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point
out to them the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps.” “Tell them about Julio Guillen and the
banditry of Leyte.” “Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. “Tell them that here in the
Philippines our government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.” “Teach our children to burn
pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one" "I committed suicide because I am ashamed, of
our government under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to the world with this dirty government.” "I
committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people now in
power. So, I sacrificed my own self."
The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter above quoted and caused its publication in
the Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisaya, Lamdag and other local periodicals and that he had
impersonated one Alberto Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in said note or letter and posed
himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken wherein, he was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied
to a limb of a tree.
RULING
Yes, the acts of Espuelas making a fake suicide note by a certain Alberto Reveniera because the latter
was not pleased with the administration of Roxas, further accusing the government that it is infested with
many Hitlers and Mussolinis and instructs children to burn pictures of Roxas are considered as acts
inciting to sedition.
The Supreme Court ruled on the basis of U.S. vs. Strong, 263 Fed.., 789; U.S. vs. Ault, 263 Fed., 800
which defines “scurrilous" as low, vulgar, mean, foul. In U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332, the communication
reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal
to the government. In 19 Am, Law Rep. 1511, writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security
of the government or to weaken the confidence of the people in the government are against the public
peace, and are criminal not only because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace but because they are
conducive to the destruction of the very government itself.
In Peterson, Liberty of the Press, Speech and Public Workshop, the essence of seditious libel may be said
to be its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses ; that is to say to
induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress
the evils which press upon their minds.
In this case, the publication suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up the
people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition groups who may seek to
silence the writer. Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.
The idea of violence pervades the whole letter. The mere fact that a person was so disgusted with his
"dirty government" to the point of taking his own life, is not merely assign of disillusionment; it is a clear act
to arouse its readers a sense of dissatisfaction against its duly constituted authorities . The mention made
in said letter of the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps, Julio Guillen and the banditry in Leyte,
which are instances of flagrant and armed attacks against the law and the duly constituted authorities,
cannot but be interpreted by the reading public as an indirect justification of the open defiance by the
Hukbalahaps against the constituted government, the attempt against the life of President Roxas and the
ruthless depredations committed by the bandits of Leyte, thus insinuating that a state of lawlessness,
rebellion and anarchy would be very much better than the maladministration of said President and his
men.
To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he committed suicide because he had "no power
to put under juez de cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power" Knowing, that the expression Juez de
Cuchillo means to the ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary and arbitrary execution by the
knife", the idea intended by the appellant to be conveyed was no other than bloody, violent and unpeaceful
methods to free the government from the administration of Roxas and his men.
The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a question of fact, making the findings of the
court of appeals conclusive upon us. Further, it is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or
assassination of all Roxas officials (at least members of the Cabinet and a majority of Legislators including
the Chief Executive himself). And such suggestion clinches the case against appellant.
Hence, Oscar Espuelas is found guilty of inciting to sedition because the acts publication he made had a
seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a
state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.
Chapter Two
CRIMES AGAINST POPULAR REPRESENTATION
Article 143. Act tending to prevent the meeting of the Assembly and similar bodies. - The penalty
of prision correccional or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon
any person who, by force or fraud, prevents the meeting of the National Assembly
(Congress of the Philippines) or of any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional
commissions or committees or divisions thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal
council or board. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).
Article 144. Disturbance of proceedings. - The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to
1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who disturbs the meetings of the National
Assembly (Congress of the Philippines) or of any of its committees or subcommittees,
constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, or of any provincial board or city
or municipal council or board, or in the presence of any such bodies should behave in such
manner as to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due it. (Reinstated by E.O.
No. 187).
Article 145. Violation of parliamentary immunity. - The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall use force, intimidation, threats, or fraud to prevent any member
of the National Assembly (Congress of the Philippines) from attending the meetings of the
Assembly (Congress) or of any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional
commissions or committees or divisions thereof, from expressing his opinions or casting
his vote; and the penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or
employee who shall, while the Assembly (Congress) is in regular or special session, arrest or
search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable
under this Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor.
Purpose and coverage of parliamentary immunity – The parliamentary non-accountability thus granted
to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable
them, as the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made
responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall. It is intended to protect
members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-
making prerogatives of Congress and its members.
ARTICLE 145. Violation of Parliamentary Immunity. — The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall use force, intimidation, threats, or fraud to prevent any member of either
House of the Legislature from attending the meetings thereof, from expressing his opinions or
casting his vote; and the penalty of prisión correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or
employee who shall, while the Legislature is in session, knowingly arrest or search any member
thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under this Code by a penalty
higher than prisión mayor.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity,
being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its
committee? [NO]
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the
Court’s attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on
the Senate floor:
RULING
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of
personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense,
therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even
parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the
reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are
agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the
Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and
the institution that represents them.
To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good
professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and
highly improper in substance. Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like
any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due
its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree
of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice. Senator Santiago should
have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the people’s faith in
the integrity of the courts.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful
language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-
instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind
her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect
them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to
perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other
forums outside the congressional hall. It is intended to protect members of Congress against government
pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its
members.
Chapter Three
ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES AND ASSOCIATIONS
Article 146. Illegal assemblies. - The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon the organizers or leaders of any
meeting attended by armed persons for the purpose of committing any of the crimes
punishable under this Code, or of any meeting in which the audience is incited to the
commission of the crime of treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition or assault upon a
person in authority or his agents. Persons merely present at such meeting shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor, unless they are armed, in which case the penalty shall be prision
correccional.
Article 147. Illegal associations. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon the founders, directors,
and presidents of associations totally or partially organized for the purpose of committing
any of the crimes punishable under this Code or for some purpose contrary to public
morals. Mere members of said associations shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
(Reinstated by E.O. No. 187)
Chapter Four
ASSAULT UPON, AND RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE TO, PERSONS IN AUTHORITY
AND THEIR AGENTS
Article 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purpose enumerated in
defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously
intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000 pesos,
when the assault is committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or
employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of these
circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not
exceeding P500 pesos shall be imposed.
Article 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority; Who shall be deemed as
such. - In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person
directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or
governmental corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority.
A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors and
persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and
universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion
of such performance, shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by PD No. 299, Sept.
19, 1973 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12, 1985).
Article 203. Who are public officers. - For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the
preceding titles of this book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election or
appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in
the Government of the Philippine Islands, of shall perform in said Government or in any of its
branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class, shall
be deemed to be a public officer.
PEOPLE V. ABALOS
First Mode
Without public uprising,by employing force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition.
ELEMENTS:
1. Offender employs force or intimidation;
2. The aim of the offender is to attain any of the purposes of the crime of rebellion or any
of the objects of the crime of sedition;
3. There is no public uprising.
Art. 148. Direct Assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or
intimidation for the attainment of any of the purpose enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall
suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding
P1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or
employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of these circumstances be
present, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P500 pesos
shall be imposed.
The crime is not based on the material consequence of the unlawful act. The crime of direct assault
punishes the spirit of lawlessness and the contempt or hatred for the authority or the rule of law.
ISSUE/S:
Is the appellant Tiburcio Abalos guilty for the crime of direct assault with murder? (YES)
As recounted by witness Felipe Basal, the incident happened during a drinking session near the house of
appellant Tiburcio Abalos. On that night, he saw Major Cecilio Abalos, father of the appellant, scolding and
berating his employees. The appellant arrived and asked his father to stop scolding them and just let them
take part in the barangay festivities. This infuriated the elder Abalos and set off a heated argument
between father and son.
While the appellant and his father were having a heated argument, a woman shouted for help. The victim,
Police Officer Sofronio Labine, then appeared at the scene and asks Major Abalos about what happened.
The victim saluted Major Abalos when the latter turned around to face him.
As Major Abalos leveled his carbine at Labine, the appellant hurriedly left and got a piece of wood, about
two inches thick, three inches wide, and three feet long from a nearby ford Fiera Vehicle.
He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooded piece at Labine from behind, hitting
the policeman at the back of the right side of his head. Labine collapsed unconsciously in a heap and he
later expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained from the blow.
The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Direct Assault
with Murder.
RULING
YES. he Court ruled that the trial court correctly concluded that he should be held accountable for the
complex crime of direct assault with murder.
Under Art. 148 of the RPC, there are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus
agentes.
The first is not a true atentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, except that there is no public
uprising.
The second is the more common way of committing assault and is aggravated when there is a weapon
employed in the attack, or the offender is a public officer, or the offender lays hands upon a person in
authority.
2. There is also no dispute that he was in the actual performance of his duties when assaulted by
appellant, that is, he was maintaining peace and order during the fiesta in Barangay Canlapwas.
Appellant himself testified that he personally knew Labine to be a policeman 17 and, in fact, Labine was
then wearing his uniform.
These facts should have sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him, and his defiant conduct clearly
demonstrates that he really had the criminal intent to assault and injure an agent of the law.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there arises
the complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide. The killing in the instant case constituted
the felony of murder qualified by alevosia through treacherous means deliberately adopted. Labine was
struck from behind while he was being confronted at the same time by appellant's father. The evidence
shows that appellant deliberately went behind the victim whom he then hit with a piece of wood which he
deliberately got for that purpose.
Direct Assault
Mallari v. People
Second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously
intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or on occasion of such performance
To be considered as direct assault, the laying on of hands or the use of physical force against the agent of
a person in authority must be serious.
Resistance / disobedience - shall resist or seriously disobey any person in authority, or the agents of
such person, while engaged in the performance of official duties
ARTICLE 148. Direct assaults. — Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force
or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion
and sedition, or shall attack, employ force or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any
of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance,
shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public
officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of these
circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.
ARTICLE 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person. —The
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who not
being included in the provisions of the preceding articles shall resist or seriously disobey any person in
authority, or the agents of such person, while engaged in the performance of official duties.
When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of a serious nature, the penalty of
arresto menor or a fine ranging from 10 to 100 pesos shall be imposed upon the offender.
1. Offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a
serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the actual
performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official
duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the
exercise of his duties.
5. That there is no public uprising
(1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful
order to the offender
(2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent.
ISSUE/S:
Is Jonah Mallari y Samar of direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority? NO, but disobedience
to a lawful order under Art. 151of the RPC
An altercation on the ground floor of GenX Billiard Hall on Gordon Avenue. At this, PO2 Navarro and
SPO3 Merza, who were both in uniform, went to the scene. There, they found two (2) groups of women
fighting and pulling each other's hair out, among them a visibly drunk Mallari. The officers rushed to stop
the fight. Once the squabble was over, the officers asked the women to go to the police station to file
proper complaints.
However, the intoxicated Mallari shouted at them, "Wala kayo pakialam sa akin, hindi aka sasama sa
inyo." She then grabbed PO2 Navarro by the collar, slapped his cheek, and kicked his legs several times.
To restrain her, PO2 Navarro held her by the shoulders and brought her to the back of the patrol car.
SPO3 Merza was about to pacify the other women, but they eventually agreed to go to the police station.
The incident was entered in the blotter and Mallari was detained for direct assault. PO2 Navarro was
treated at the James Gordon Memorial Hospital for the minor injuries he got from Mallari.
RULING
Being a police officer, PO2 Navarro is an agent of a person in authority. Mallari was aware that PO2
Navarro was a police officer. He introduced himself as one and was in his police uniform. He was
performing his official duties as a police officer when he was pacifying the melee, and right when Mallari
attacked him. Thus, the second, third, fourth, and fifth elements of direct assault are present in this case.
However, the first element of the offense is not present. To be considered as direct assault, the laying on
of hands or the use of physical force against the agent of a person in authority must be serious . Based on
the circumstances as established in the cross examination, Mallari’s resistance and use of force are not so
serious as to be deemed as direct assault. While she exerted force, it is not dangerous, grave, or severe
enough to warrant the penalties attached to the crime.Thus, instead of direct assault, this Court convicts
petitioner of resistance or disobedience.
DIRECT ASSAULT
GUELOS V. PEOPLE
● ARTICLE 148. Direct Assaults. — Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the
crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force or seriously intimidate or resist any
person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on
occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a
weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands
upon a person in authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the penalty of prisión
correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.
● Therefore, it is necessary in a crime of direct assault that the offender has knowledge that his
victim was a person in authority performing his/her function, but in this case due to the failure of
the prosecution to state in the information, that the accused had knowledge of his victim’s
status, the accused could not be held liable for direct assault but only homicide.
Elements:
1. Offender employs force or intimidation;
2. The aim of the offender is to attain any of the purposes of the
crime of rebellion or any of the objects of the crime of sedition;
3. There is no public uprising.
Second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, "shall attack, employ
force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance.
Elements:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c)
makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious
resistance;
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his
agent;
3. That at the time of the assault, the person in authority or his
agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance of official
duties, or (b) is assaulted by reason of the past performance
of official duties;
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a
person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties;
and
5. That there is no public uprising.
ISSUE/S:
Is the knowledge that the victim was a person in authority who was performing his duty, necessary for a
crime of direct assault? (Yes)
The accused are being charged with the complex crime of Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in
Authority with Homicide, after shooting a police officer who was investigating gunshot noises heard in the
area.
On the day of the crime, the victim, Police Chief Inspector Rolando M. Camacho, with his other colleagues
set off to conduct their routine as peace officers of the area(Batangas). They heard an initial gunshot
where they proceeded to investigate but did not find anything. They took a lunch break where they heard
another set of gunshot and was able to find the source of the noise . Upon reaching the house of the
gunshot noise, they proceeded to the back of the house where they met the accused who was drinking
with 15 other people, since there was a procession during the time. The police officers introduced
themselves and had questions about the gunshot noise, since they saw bullet casing and an armalite
scattered on the floor. While the victim was instructing his fellow officers to pick up the bullet casing, the
victim was grabbed from behind and his fellow officers were hit at the nape causing them to fall down. The
victim was in a helpless and defenseless position, he was then shot by the accused causing him to fall to
the ground and later die.
The accused are now claiming not guilty and are denying the facts presented.
RULING
Yes, the knowledge that the victim was a person in authority is necessary in a crime of direct assault.
The court explained that Direct assault, may be committed in two ways:
First, by "any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or
intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the
crimes of rebellion and sedition";
Second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, "shall attack, employ
force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance.
The court stated that the case at hand falls under the second definition of Direct Assault, since the victims
had no intention to commit rebellion and sedition. The court explained that the following elements are
necessary for the second definition of a direct assault:
6. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance;
7. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent;
8. That at the time of the assault, the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged
in the actual performance of official duties, or (b) is assaulted by reason of the past
performance of official duties;
9. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority
or his agent in the exercise of his duties; and
10. That there is no public uprising.
In this case, the victim did introduce himself as a member of the PNP when he met the accused.
However, the accused could not be held liable for a crime of direct assault due to the prosecution failing
to state in the information, that the offender had knowledge of his victims status. This follows the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of his for crimes.
Therefore, it is necessary in a crime of Direct Assault that the offender has knowledge that his
victim was a person in authority performing his/her function, but in this case due to the failure of the
prosecution to state in the information, that the accused had knowledge of his victim’s status, the
accused could not be held liable for direct assault but only homicide.
Direct Assaults
PEOPLE v. HECTO
“On occasion” or “by reason of such performance: Regardless of the fact that the deceased, who was
killed, was not in actual performance of his official duties. Be that as it may, the fact is, the attack on the
deceased was occasioned by the official duties done by him. As the barangay captain, it was his duty to
enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incus the enmity
of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with assault
upon a person in authority.
Art. 148, RPC - Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation
for the attainment of any of the purpose enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or
shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000
pesos, when the assault is committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee,
or when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P500 pesos shall be
imposed.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the accused should be held liable for the complex crime of murder with assault
upon a person in authority? [YES]
The brothers Jesus Hecto and Pedro Hecto slaughtered a carabao without paying for the corresponding
“tumabada” or slaughter fee. When they were reprimanded by Barangay Capatain Catalino Pedrosa they
said that they could not pay for such fee for their customers had not paid him yet.
Pedrosa mt with Municipal Treasurer Bendicto Dela Paz, who informed him that according to the Hecto
Brothers they had paid the slaughter fee to him (Pedrosa). Pedrosa confronted the Hecto Brothers which
led to a heated discussion but was prevented due to Mrs. Pedrosa pulling her husband away.
On the day of the incident, Catalino Pedrosa brought his 2 yearold nephew to the house of the child’s
parents and on his way back he was shot by Jesus Hecto and Pedro Hecto. Afterwards, he was stabbed
by Marcial Hecto and Robert Silvano. Mrs. Pedrosa heard the gunshot however, she was prevented from
going down the house by Loreto Hecto and Faustino Silvano, son and nephew of Jesus Hecto. They
pointed their guns at her but it did not stop her from seeing Jesus Hecto shooting her husband.
Her husband was later on carried to a nearby ditch where Roberto and Marcial took turns stabbing the
victim with their bolos.
RULING
Yes. The accused had been positively identified by witnesses as perpetrators of the offense, the
defense of alibi is futile and unavailing. The appellant’s defense that the complex crime of murder
with assault upon a person in authority would not prosper for the barangay captain killed was ot iin
the actual performance of his official duties is NOT correct. The fact is, the attack on the deceased
was occasioned by the official duties done by him. As the barangay captain, it was his duty to
enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in the enforcement thereof he incurs the
enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with
assault upon a person in authority.
Teacher in performance of duties - On the day of the commission of the assault, Micarsos was engaged in
the performance of her official duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising and
looking after the needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the classroom to which she was
assigned. Micarsos being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority
expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The CA erred in declaring that Gelig could not be held guilty of direct assault since Micarsos was no longer
a person in authority at the time of the assault because she allegedly descended to the level of a private
person by fighting with Gelig. The fact remains that at the moment Gelig initiated her tirades, Micarsos
was busy attending to her official functions as a teacher.
Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority; Who shall be deemed as such. —
In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested
with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation,
board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman
shall also be deemed a person in authority.
The case falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault. Its elements are:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d)
makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the actual
performance of official duties, or (b) that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of his
official duties.
4. That there is no public uprising.
ISSUE/S:
Is the petitioner guilty of Direct Assault under Article 148 of the RPC or mere physical injuries?
DIRECT ASSAULT.
Gelig and private complainant Micarsos were public school teachers at Nailon Elementary School in
Cebu. Gelig’s son, Roseller, was a student of Micarsos.
One day, Gelig confronted Micarsos after learning that Micarsos had called her son a “sissy” while in class.
Gelig slapped Micarsos in the cheek and pushed her, causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result,
Micarsos suffered a contusion in her “maxillary area” (upper jaw). She continued to experience abdominal
pains and bleeding two days after the incident, and eventually suffered incomplete abortion.
Gelig claims that Micarsos was holding her hands and kicking her at the time of the incident, so she was
forced to retaliate by pushing her against the wall.
Gelig was convicted of the complex crime of Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion.
CA: Gelig cannot be held liable for direct assault since Micarsos descended from being a person in
authority to a private individual when, instead of pacifying Gelig or informing the principal of the matter, she
engaged in a fight. Likewise, Gelig’s purpose was not to defy the authorities but to confront Micarsos on
the alleged name-calling of her son.
RULING
Direct assault is an offense against public order that may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or
persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the
purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or
persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any
person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion
of such performance. The case falls under the second mode.
On the day of the commission of the assault, Micarsos was engaged in the performance of her official
duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking after the needs of pupils who
are taking their recess in the classroom to which she was assigned.
Gelig was already angry when she entered the classroom and accused Micarsos of calling her son a
"sissy". Gelig refused to be pacified despite the efforts of Micarsos and instead initiated a verbal abuse that
enraged the victim. Micarsos then proceeded towards the principal’s office but Gelig followed and
resorted to the use of force by slapping and pushing her against a wall divider. The violent act
resulted in Micarsos’ fall to the floor.
Micarsos being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority expressly
mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The appellate court must be consequently overruled in setting aside the trial court’s verdict. It erred
in declaring that Gelig could not be held guilty of direct assault since Micarsos was no longer a
person in authority at the time of the assault because she allegedly descended to the level of a
private person by fighting with Gelig. The fact remains that at the moment Gelig initiated her tirades,
Micarsos was busy attending to her official functions as a teacher.
Article 149. Indirect assaults. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine not exceeding P500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall make
use of force or intimidation upon any person coming to the aid of the authorities or their agents
on occasion of the commission of any of the crimes defined in the next preceding article.
Article 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person. -
The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who not being included in the provisions of the preceding articles shall resist or seriously
disobey any person in authority, or the agents of such person, while engaged in the performance
of official duties.
When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of a serious nature, the penalty
of arresto menor or a fine ranging from 10 to P100 pesos shall be imposed upon the offender.
Article 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority; Who shall be deemed as
such. - In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person
directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or
governmental corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio
captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.