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I. Introduction a.6.

Moral Turpitude – Under Section 27 of


Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a
a. Definition crime involving moral turpitude is a ground
Legal profession is a branch of the administration of for disbarment or suspension. By such
justice whose main purpose is to aid in the doing of conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have
justice according to law between state and the become unfit to uphold the administration of
individual and between man and man. It is impressed justice and to be no longer possessed of good
with public interest with the end view towards the moral character. Moral turpitude has been
administration of justice. Hence, the first and foremost defined as "everything which is done contrary
duty of a lawyer is the administration of justice. to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private
A layman schooled or not is bound to know the law, as and social duties which a man owes his
ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary
therewith (Art. 3, new Civil Code). to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”

Art. 152 of the Revised Penal Code provides that b. Concept


lawyers, in the actual performance of their professional
duties or on the occasion of such performance, shall be Basic Skills required in the study of law:
deemed persons in authority. i. Dreams/Ambition – this serves as one’s
In the government, lawyers enjoy first grade civil energy and motivation in taking his day-to-day
service eligibility under R.A. No. 1080 where knowledge tasks. The dream to be a lawyer must be
of law is a pre-requisite. decided wholeheartedly.

a.1. Lawyer – sometimes called an advocate ii. Perseverance – one must have continued
or counsel, is one who aids in the effort to achieve something despite
administration of justice. It is generally difficulties, failure, or opposition.
understood as having reference to a class of iii. Patience – one must be able to accept or
persons who are by license constituted tolerate any delay, trouble, or suffering.
officers of courts of justice, and who are
empowered to appear and prosecute and/or The Basic Tools in studying law:
defend someone and on whom peculiar
duties, responsibilities and liabilities are i. Language – it is the instrument by which
devolved by law in consequence. It is a one understands, analyzes, and expresses the
person acting professionally in legal law. Faulty command of the language is a
formalities negotiations or proceedings, by huge roadblock to both comprehension and
warrant or authority of his client. expression.

a.2. Counsel de Parte – is a private counsel, ii. Logic/Critical Analysis – it involves the
secured by a person, without intervention of accurate evaluation of a certain state of facts
the government (at his own will and choice). and the reasoning behind it.

a.3. Counsel de Officio – an attorney iii. Law – to know the law, one must read and
appointed by the court to defend an indigent continue reading to keep himself abreast with
defendant in a criminal action or to represent the current laws and jurisprudence of the
a destitute party in a case pursuant to Sec. 6, country.
Rule 116, Revised Rules of Criminal c. History and Development
Procedures of the Philippines.
The sources of Philippines legal education are Spain,
a.4. Amicus Curiae – literally means a “friend which gave the Roman Civil law and the Canon Law,
of the court” and an experienced and and the United States, which is the forerunner of
impartial attorney invited by the court to English common law in the Philippines. Worthy to
appear and help in the disposition of the mention also is the Indo-Malayan influence which
issues submitted to it. shared the Islamic law in the Philippines. Not to be
a.5. Practice of Law – is a profession, a form excluded is the fact that even prior to the Spanish
of public trust, the performance of which is regime in the country, we already have our own
entrusted only to those who are qualified and codified law, and that is the Code of Kalantiao.
who possess good moral character. As defined Legal education in the country formally began with the
Black’s Law Dictionary, it is the rendition of establishment of Faculty of Civil Law at the University
services requiring the knowledge and the of Santo Tomas in 1733. From 1734 to 1800 out of 3360
application of legal principles and technique students, only 40 students graduated – 29 in Bachelors
to serve the interest of another with his of Civil Law, 8 in Licentiate in Civil Law, and 3 in Doctor
consent.
of Civil Law. In 1898, the Universidad Literia Filipinas II. Nature
was established in Malolos, Bulacan and offered
courses in law and notary public. It moved later to a. Distinction between the Legal Profession and
Tarlac. In 1899, Don Felipe Calderon, author of the Business
1899 Malolos Constitution, founded the Escuela de The term “profession” refers to a group of men
Derecho de Manila, which in 1924 was renamed Manila pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit
Law School. of public service. A profession differs from a trade or
In 1910, the College of Law of the University of the business because the primary purpose of the latter is
Philippines opened with 50 Filipino and American economic gain or profit. While in a profession, gaining
students. The first dean was Justice Sherman Moreland profits is merely incidental.
of the Philippine Supreme Court. He was later replaced The practice of law is a profession, a form of public
by George A. Malcolm, who also later on became a trust, the performance of which is entrusted only to
justice of the Philippine Supreme Court. those who are qualified and who possess good moral
In 1911, the only educational requirements for a law character. If the respect of the people in the honor and
profession were a high school degree as a pre-law and integrity of the legal profession is to be retained, both
a three-year law course. Later, the pre-law requisite lawyers and laymen must recognize and realize that the
was increased to two years of college studies in legal profession is a profession not a trade, and that the
addition to a high school degree. In 1960, Sec. 6 of Rule basic ideal of the profession is to render public service
138 of the Rules of Court was amended by the Supreme and secure justice to those who seeks its aid. Since it is
Court increasing the pre-law requisite to a four-year not a business, adequate compensation for every
bachelor’s degree in arts and science and the law service rendered should not be the primordial concern
course to four years of legal studies (bachelor of laws). of every lawyer, but rather it should be the spirit for
public service and the administration of justice.
The four-year law course put emphasis on the bar Remember that law profession is a branch of the
subjects listed under Sec. 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of administration of justice and not a mere moneymaking
Court: civil law, criminal law, remedial law, legal ethics trade.
and practical exercises, commercial law, political law,
taxation, labor laws, law on public corporation and Three Ideas involved in a Profession
public officers, public and private international law. The 1. Organization – lawyers organize as a profession thru
curriculum also contains non-bar subjects like legal the bar associations, defined as an association of
history, legal bibliography, statutory construction, legal persons practicing the profession of law formed and
research, legal medicine and court practice among maintained to promote and uphold the purposes and
others. In 1989, the Department of Education Culture spirit of that profession.
and Sports adopted a revised model curriculum for the
four-year Bachelor of Laws degree composed of 51 2. Learning – professions are learned not only from the
subjects (approximately 124 units) which took effect in nature of the art professed but historically have a
1990. It offered more subjects on the legal profession, cultural, and ideal side which furthers the exercise of
legal counseling, legal research and legal writing. that art. Problems of human relations in society, of
disease, etc. are to be dealt with by the resources of
In 1964, R.A. No. 3870 created the University of the cultivated intelligence. To carry on their tasks more
Philippines Law Center to conduct continuing legal effectively, they must be more than resourceful
education programs, legal research and publications. craftsmen. They must be learned.
R.A. No. 7662 or the Legal Education Act was enacted in
1993 to emphasize on the areas of advocacy, 3. Spirit of Public Service – every profession aims at the
counseling, problem solving, decision-making, ethics exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. The spirit of
and nobility of the legal profession, bench-bar public service in which the profession of law is a
partnership, social commitment, selection of law prerequisite of a sound administration of justice.
students, quality of law schools, the law faculty as well
as the law curriculum. The Legal Education Board was Membership in the legal profession is a privilege
likewise created. granted by the state only to those deserving
individuals. It is in the nature of a franchise conferred
The latest update on legal education is the Mandatory only for merit which must be earned by hard study,
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program for learning, and good conduct. The practice of law is a
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. This privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the
Supreme Court Resolution requires members of the bar exacting standards of mental and moral fitness. Good
to pursue further studies in law and update themselves moral character is a condition which precedes
with the current laws and jurisprudence to ensure that admission to the Bar and is not dispensed with upon
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law admission thereto. It is a continuing qualification which
and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the all lawyers must possess.
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of
law.
The law as a profession that precedes from the basic c. Nature of an Attorney
premise that membership in the Bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions and carries with it the An attorney may be defined as a person set apart by
responsibility to live up to its exacting standards and the laws of the land relating to the high interest of
honored traditions. property, liberty, and life. An attorney at law is thus
considered as a quasi-officer of the court subject to
Although the law profession is a privilege, which may regulation. He is an inherent element in our judicial
be withheld or extended in the exercise of sound system. As an advocate of justice, he should be the
judicial discretion, yet it is also a right in a limited defender of the oppressed. A lawyer, although
sense. He has the right to protest in a respectful employed by a party in a cause to manage the same for
manner anything which he thinks is prejudicial to the him, is not a part of the cause. He should dissociate
orderly and expeditious administration of justice. He himself from the facts of the case and keep himself
has the right to stand up for his right or the right of his beyond the influences of the litigants simply because
client even in the face of a hostile court. his primary purpose is to stand by the truth.

b. Standards of the Legal Profession There should be an authority. The authority of an


attorney commences with his retainer. After he has
1. Independence - a lawyer’s relation to his client entails been retained in a case, he has certain implied powers
ethical problems. A lawyer owes entire devotion and therein. The presumption is that an attorney has
loyalty to his client but it should be within the bound of authority to appear; if the person he appears for does
honor. What they should do is to get immersed in their not disclaim his authority, he is deemed bound by the
clients and then withdraw from the emotional attorney’s actions or inactions.
experience as a necessity for maintaining one’s
independence. The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is the
administration of justice, and his duty to his client is
2. Accessibility – How readily available are its services subordinate to that. Membership in the bar is an
available to our people? By this, I do not only mean the exacting responsibility. It imposes the obligation of
maintenance of legal aid clinics for indigent persons, attending with due zeal and diligent to a client’s cause.
important as this aspect of the work of the organized
bar is. Just as deserving of legal aid are those persons The Lawyer’s Oath
who are either financially capable of paying in full for
the services of lawyer or unable to pay in full but I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
nonetheless cannot be considered indigent persons. Republic of the Philippines; I will support the Constitution and
The bar should be able to aid the public in the selection obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
of a competent lawyer as part of its duty to make its authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
service available. Legal services are needed not only by doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
indigent persons, but even by those who are able to sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or give aid or consent
pay their way but do not know whom to engage as to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and I will
counsel. conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well as to the
Not only must legal services be available to all, it must courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these
be made available at the earliest possible time, and not voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose
when a case was already in court. There is a need for of evasion. So help me God.
preventive legal counseling so that parties will be saved
from the trouble, the expense and the anxiety of III. Practice of Law
litigation. Practice of Law – the rendition of services requiring the
In discussing the availability of the bar, another tuandknowledge and the application of legal principles and
challenge is the readiness of its members to engage in technique to serve the interest of another with his consent
public service. Lawyers must be able to shuttle between - It usually involves the carrying on of the calling of an attorney,
private practice and government service, enjoying not usually for compensation, acting in representative capacity and
only the financial privileges of the former but also the rendering service to another
civic rewards brought about the latter.
- It is not limited to appearing in court or advising or assisting in
3. Learning – The Code of Professional Responsibility the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
states that “a lawyer must serve his client with pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
competence and diligence.” But a bar to be able to proceedings, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
discharge its public duties and responsibilities must be and the giving of legal advice to clients
a learned organization. The proliferation of legal
materials and the emergence of new specialties in law - It is more than an isolated transaction or appearance, for it
brought about by the growing complexity of our consists of frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of
society, are a challenge to our commitment to the same kind. One is practicing law if he is customarily or
excellence – whether as members of the practicing bar habitually holding himself out to the public as a lawyer, and
of the academic branch of the profession. demanding payment for such services
- It implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the b. Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of
public, as a lawyer, for compensation as a source of livelihood or integrity, learning, professional competence, public service, and
in consideration of his service conduct;

- Under the modern concept of practice of law, it is any activity c. Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training, and experience d. Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and
brotherhood;
Criteria for the Practice of Law (Cayetano vs. Monsod, Justice
Padilla) e. Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law
reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of
1. Habituality. The term practice of law implies customarily or the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information
habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer. It is more relating thereto;
than an isolated appearance, for it consist in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. f. Encourage and foster legal education;

2. Compensation. Implies that one must have presented himself g. Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive
to be in the active practice and that his professional services are and adjective law, and make reports and recommendations
available to the public for compensation, as a source of his thereon; and
livelihood or in consideration of his services. h. Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively
3. Application of law, legal principle, practice, or procedure Persons entitled to Practice Law – under sec. 1, rule 138 of the
which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience. Rules of court, any person who has been duly licensed as a
4. Attorney-client relationship. It presupposes the existence of member of the bar and who is in good and regular standing is
lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an entitled to practice law
activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no - Before being admitted to the bar, an applicant must satisfy the
attorney-client relationship, he cannot be caid to be engaged in following requirements pursuant to sec. 2, Rule 138 of the Rules
the practice of his profession. of Court:
What is Not Considered Practice of Law 1. He/she must be a citizen of the Philippines;
- Gratuitous furnishing of legal aid to the poor and unfortunates 2. At least 21 years of age;
who are in pursuit of any civil remedy
3. Of good moral character;
- Ordinary preparation and drafting of legal instruments which
does not involve the determination by a trained legal mind of the 4. A resident of the Philippines; and
legal effects of facts and conditions, or whenever such acts
involve the use of skill and intellect by a legal mind trained and 5. Must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
schooled in a legal school but only involved in clerical labor evidence of his good moral character and no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed
IV. Admission to Practice or are pending in any court of the Philippines.
- Par. 5, Sec. 5, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that - Aside from satisfying the foregoing enumeration to prove that
the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules the applicant has the required educational, moral, and personal
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional qualification, he must also pass the bar examinations, take the
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the lawyer’s oath before the Supreme Court en banc, sign in the roll
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal of attorneys and receive a certificate from the Clerk of the
assistance to the underprivileged. This provision, however, is Supreme Court of his license to practice
subject to the following limitations:
- Although the term “good moral character” admits of broad
a. simplified and inexpensive procedures for speedy disposition dimensions and is a continuing requirement to be a lawyer, it has
of cases; been defined as including at least “common honesty”. No moral
qualification for bar membership is more important than
b. uniform for all courts of the same grade; truthfulness and candor.
c. shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights - Sec. 5, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that applicants
- The legislature, in the exercise of its police power may enact for admission to the bar must have studied law for four years
laws regulating the practice of law to protect the public and and completed all prescribed courses in university approved and
promote the public welfare. But the legislature may not pass a recognized by the Secretary of Education
law that will control the Supreme Court in the performance of its - Sec. 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that in order to
function to decide who may enjoy the privilege of practicing law be admitted, applicants must present a certificate that he has
Integration of the Bar – the purposes of this are: satisfied the Secretary of Education that before he studied law,
he completed a four-year high school and college course with
a. Assist in the administration of justice;
any of the following subjects as a major or concentration: 8. Those who by special law are prohibited from engaging in the
Political Science, Logic, English, Spanish, History, and Economics practice of their profession.

- Sec. 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that citizens of Public Officials with Restrictions in the Practice of Law:
the United States of America, who, before July 4, 1946, were
duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in 1. No Senator as member of the House of Representative may
the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular standing as personally appear as counsel before any court of justice as
such, may upon satisfactory proof of these facts before the before the Electoral Tribunals, as quasi-judicial and
Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice after taking administrative bodies (Art. VI, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution)
the oath of office. 2. Under the Local Government Code (RA 7160, Sec. 91),
Where non-lawyers may practice law – the following are Sanggunian members may practice their professions provided
allowed limited representation on behalf of another: that if they are members of the Bar, they shall not:

1. A party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of a. appear as counsel before any court in any civil ase
a friend or agent appointed by him for that purpose. In case of wherein a local government unit or any office, agency,
the latter, such is allowed only if the representation is made or instrumentality of the government is the adverse
before the inferior courts (MTCs). But the agent or friend may party;
not hold himself out as habitually engaged in representing a b. appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an
party for that will constitute unauthorized practice of law. officer or employee of the national or local government
Moreover, in criminal cases, if a party cannot afford the services is accused of an offense committed in relation to this
of a counsel de parte, he shall be provided a counsel de officio; office;
2. In localities where a duly licensed member of the bar is not c. collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
available, the municipal trial court hearing a criminal case may, proceedings involving the LGU of which he is an official;
in its discretion admit or assign a person (who is not a member
of the bar), resident of the province and of good refute for d. use property and personnel of the government
probity and ability, to aid the defendant in his defense; except when the Sanggunian member concerned is
defending the interest of the government
3. Under the Labor Code, a union representative may appear for
his organization or any of its members before the National Labor 3. Under RA 910, Sec. 1, as amended, a retired justice or judge
Relations Commission, labor arbiter or arbitrator; receiving pension from the government, cannot act as counsel in
any civil case in which the Government, or any of its subdivision
4. A person representing a land claimant in cadastral court; or agencies is the adverse party or in a criminal case wherein an
5. In case of law student practice as permitted by the rules. Rule officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense
138-A of the Rules of Court provides that a law student who has in relation to his office
successfully completed 3rd year of the regular 4-year curriculum
and is enrolled in a recognized law school’s clinical legal
education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear
without compensation in any civil, criminal, or administrative
case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to
represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law
school. The appearance of the student shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines;

6. In case of those authorized to represent the government

Public officials prohibited from engaging in private practice of


law:

1. Judges and other officials or employees of the court;

2. Officials and employees of the Office of the Solicitor General;

3. Government prosecutors;

4. President, Vice-President, members of the cabinet, their


deputies and assistants;

5. Members of the Constitutional Commissions;

6. Ombudsman and his deputies;

7. All governors, city, and municipal mayors;


ROBERTO SORIANO VS. ATTY. MANUEL DIZON fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape
punishment for his crime.
A.C. No. 6792 January 25, 2006
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not
FACTS to the exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their
Roberto Soriano is a taxi driver who overtook the brown Toyota good moral character. Where their misconduct outside of their
Corolla driven by Atty. Dizon who was then under the influence professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit
of liquor. Incensed, Atty. Dizon tailed Soriano's taxi until he for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon
stopped. The accused also stopped and alighted from his car, them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in
berated Soriano and held him by his shirt. To stop the suspending or removing them from that office.
aggression, Soriano forced open his door causing Atty. Dizon to 2. Yes. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
fall to the ground. When Soriano got out of his car to help him conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
get up, Atty. Dizon attempted to box him but Soriano disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is
outmaneuvered Atty. Dizon. Atty. Dizon went back to his car and deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of
got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character.
handkerchief. Soriano was on his way back to his vehicle when
he noticed the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon on the ground. He Atty Dizon seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of
picked them up intending to return them to Atty. Dizon, but as Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an
he was handing them, he was met by the barrel of the gun held unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil
by Atty. Dizon who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. liabilities. He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed
Soriano fell on the thigh of Atty. Dizon so the latter pushed him the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his
out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes attorney's oath and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he
who brought the complainant to the hospital. bound himself to "obey the laws of the land."

Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on DISPOSITION


the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi
driver. Wherefore, respondent Manuel Dizon is hereby disbarred, and
his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a
The trial court convicted Atty. Dizon with frustrated homicide but copy of this be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and
he filed an application for probation, which was granted by the let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
court on several conditions. One of the conditions was the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
payment of civil liabilities to Soriano, which the latter claimed circulation to all courts in the country.
Atty Dizon refuses to fulfill.

IBP Commissioner Herbosa recommended that Atty. Dizon be


disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude.

ISSUES

1. WoN Dizon’s crime frustrated homicide involves moral


turpitude.

2. WoN Atty. Dizon's guilt warrants disbarment.

HELD

1. Yes. Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is


done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” Crime of
homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude. The totality of
circumstances shows the homicide was attended with moral
turpitude. Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued
and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The act
of aggression shown by Atty. Dizon will not be mitigated by the
fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant.
Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly
intended to fend off the lawyer's assault. The trial court's finding
of treachery is a further indication of the skewed morals of Atty.
Dizon. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to
defend himself. To make matters worse, Atty. Dizon wrapped the
handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave
JAIME CURIMATMAT, ET AL., VS. ATTY. FELIPE GOJAR In a Resolution dated November 22, 1995, the Court referred the
letter-complaint to the Board of Governors of the Commission
A.C. No. 4411 June 10, 1999 on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
FACTS Hearings were set but respondent opted not to appear in any of
them. On November 5, 1998, the Board of Governors of the
On April 25, 1995, respondent Atty. Felipe G. Gojar was Integrated Bar of the Philippines passed a resolution
administratively charged by his clients, former employees of the recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice
Uniwide Sales, Inc., with lack of fidelity to his clients' cause. The of law for six (6) months for failure to demonstrate the required
alleged prejudicial acts of respondent, as alleged in the letter- fidelity to his client's cause.
complaint, are herein enumerated as follows:
ISSUE
1. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petitioner’s
petition for review without his client’s consent and authority. 1. WoN respondent is remiss in his work.

2. Respondent filed an appeal on a dismissed case beyond the HELD


10-day period in which he stated that he received the case 1. Yes. In the case at bar, respondent is alleged to have been
decision 15 days late, which is not true. remiss in his duty to appeal on time the dismissal of the union's
3. Respondent failed to prepare a petition for review despite Petition for Certification Election at the Uniwide Sales Branches;
being told by petitioners to file said petition several times for and for having moved for the dismissal of complainants' petition
which the former reasoned that he has volume of professional without their consent. He did not, however, substantiate his self-
work and failing health. serving claim that he was not remiss in his duties towards his
clients and that he consulted complainants and sought their
4. Petitioners followed up on a labor case with respondent but conformity to the withdrawal of their case before the Court,
the latter said that the case is still pending even though he which case was thereafter rendered moot and academic due to
already received the decision and failed to file the necessary the expiration of the CBA that was sought to be "discertified".
appeal. Worse, respondent chose to ignore the hearings before the IBP
where he could have shed more light on the controversy.
To which, the respondent replied that:
We do not, however, believe that respondent's shortcomings
1. Contrary to the false and malicious allegations of warrant his suspension from the practice of law. Considering that
complainants, the motion for dismissal was filed by respondent this is his first offense, a reprimand would be in order.
after due consultation and with the conformity of the petitioners
therein, as proven by the Manifestation and Motion dated July At this juncture, we would like to remind litigants that lawyers
21, 1994. Likewise, it is inconceivable how the withdrawal of the are not demi-gods or "magicians" who can always win their cases
petition "prejudiced" the complainants when the CBA sought to for their clients no matter the utter lack of merit of the same or
be "discertified" had already expired. how passionate the litigants may feel about their cause. While
lawyers are expected to serve their clients with competence and
2. It is not true that respondent filed an appeal in behalf of diligence, they are not always expected to be victorious. In every
complainants beyond the ten-day reglementary period. The litigation, there will always be a "winner" and a "loser", unless
appeal being referred to was not filed by the respondent but was the parties agree to settle the controversy between themselves
filed in behalf of complainants by Francisco Listana, a National and to work at a "win-win" solution to their problems.
Officer of ATU.
DISPOSITION
3. The complainants deliberately did not disclose to this
Honorable Court that the respondent, immediately upon receipt Wherefore, foregoing premises considered, respondent Atty.
of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on July 14, 1994, called the Felipe Gojar is hereby reprimanded with a warning that any
complainants to a meeting to inform them of the decision which repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.
was unfavorable to them. Upon being informed of such decision,
the complainants discussed among themselves and after some
time, they told the respondent of their disappointment of the
outcome of the case and that they have decided to get another
lawyer to handle their case.

4. It is not true that he "deliberately hid" to the complainants the


fact that a decision had been rendered in that case on
September 30, 1994. How can respondent hide the decision from
complainants when they are very diligent in following up the
case with the respondent and even with the labor arbiter?
Moreover, respondent cannot therefore be faulted for it was the
complainants themselves who led him into believing that their
rights were amply protected as their remedy of appeal would be
carried on by the new counsel of their choice.
MICHAEL P. BARRIOS VS. ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ brief, despite having been granted three thirty (30)-day
extensions to do so.
A.C. No. 4585 November 12, 2004
The report of IBP Investigating Commissioner Winston D.
FACTS Abuyuan stated in part that:
This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty. Several dates for the hearing of the case were scheduled but
Francisco Martinez for having been convicted by final judgment none of the parties appeared before the Commission, until finally
in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime involving moral turpitude by it was considered submitted for resolution last 27 June 2002. On
Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, the same date respondent filed a motion for the dismissal of the
wherein respondent is found guilty of violating Batas Pambansa case on the ground that the complainant died sometime in June
Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for issuing a worthless check in 1997 and that dismissal is warranted because "the case filed by
the amount of P8,000. him does not survive due to his demise; as a matter of fact, it is
On 03 July 1996, respondent was required to comment on said extinguished upon his death."
petition within ten (10) days from notice. Thereafter, three On 27 September 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
resolutions required him to show cause. Almost three years Resolution adopting and approving the report and
later, respondent was declared guilty of Contempt under Rule recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner to disbar
71, Sec. 3[b] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and ordered his respondent. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration
imprisonment until he complied with the aforesaid resolutions. and/or Reinvestigation, alleging that:
On 05 April 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation reported
that respondent was arrested in Tacloban City on 26 March 1. The Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating
1999, but was subsequently released after having shown proof Commissioner is tantamount to a deprivation of property
of compliance with the resolutions of 17 February 1997 and 27 without due process of law, although admittedly the practice of
April 1998 by remitting the amount of P2,000 and submitting his law is a privilege;
long overdue Comment.
2. If respondent is given another chance to have his day in court
In the said Comment, respondent stated that: and allowed to adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be
entirely different from that arrived at by the Investigating
1. He failed to respond to the Resolution dated 17 February 1997 Commissioner; and
as he was at that time undergoing medical treatment at Camp
Ruperto Kangleon in Palo, Leyte; 3. Respondent is now 71 years of age, and has served the
judiciary in various capacities (from acting city judge to Municipal
2. Complainant Michael Barrios passed away sometime in June Judges League Leyte Chapter President) for almost 17 years prior
1997; and to resuming his law practice.
3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case ISSUE
which was decided in respondent's favor (as plaintiff in the said
case). Respondent avers that as a result of his moving for the 1. WoN the case filed by petitioner does not survive due to his
execution of judgment in his favor and the eviction of the family demise.
of herein complainant Michael Barrios, the latter filed the
present administrative case. 2. WoN the Report and Recommendation of the IBP is a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
In the meantime, on 11 September 1997, a certain Robert Visbal
submitted a letter alleging that respondent also stood charged in 3. WoN respondent should be given another chance to adduce
another estafa case before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban evidence.
City, as well as a civil case involving the victims of the Doña Paz 4. WoN respondent’s old age and qualifications should be taken
tragedy in 1987, for which the Regional Trial Court rendered a into consideration with regard to his conviction.
decision against him, his appeal thereto having been dismissed
by the Court of Appeals. In the said Decision, it appears that Atty. 5. WoN respondent should be convicted of moral turpitude.
Martinez offered his legal services to the victims of the Doña Paz
tragedy for free. However, when the plaintiff in the said civil case HELD
was issued a check for P90,000 by Sulpicio Lines representing
1. No. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
compensation, Atty. Martinez asked plaintiff to endorse said
Court, the Honorable Supreme Court or the IBP may motu
check. When plaintiff asked for his money, he was only able to
proprio initiate the proceedings when they perceive acts of
recover a total of P30,000. Atty. Martinez claimed the remaining
lawyers which deserve sanctions or when their attention is called
P60,000 as his attorney's fees. The trial court ordered Atty.
by any one and a probable cause exists that an act has been
Martinez to pay the plaintiff therein for moral and exemplary
perpetrated by a lawyer which requires disciplinary sanctions.
damages.
2. No. The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is
Said trial court also made particular mention of Martinez's
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of
dilatory tactics during the trial, citing fourteen (14) specific
law is also untenable. As respondent himself admits, the practice
instances thereof. Martinez's appeal from the above judgment
of law is a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment
was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for his failure to file his
is "to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent, profession of a lawyer (as is the respondent’s violation of B.P.
honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may Blg. 22); however, it certainly relates to and affects the good
repose confidence." "A proceeding for suspension or disbarment moral character of a person convicted of such offense.
is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is Moreover, respondent's propensity to disregard or ignore orders
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary of the Honorable Supreme Court for which he was fined twice,
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for arrested and imprisoned reflects an utter lack of good moral
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for character.
the public welfare, and for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministrations of persons unfit to practice DISPOSITION
them." Wherefore, respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez is hereby
3. No. We note with displeasure the inordinate length of time disbarred and his name is ordered stricken from the roll of
respondent took in responding to our requirement to submit his attorneys. Let a copy of this decision be entered in the
Comment on the original petition to disbar him. These acts respondent's record as a member of the bar, and notice of the
constitute a willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on
Court, which under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in the office of the court administrator for circulation to all courts
itself a cause sufficient for suspension or disbarment. Moreover, in the country.
the IBP report cited the failure of both parties to appear before
the Commission as the main reason for the long delay, until the
same was finally submitted for Resolution on 27 June 2002.
Respondent, therefore, squandered away seven years to "have
his day in court and adduce evidence" in his behalf, which
inaction also unduly delayed the court's prompt disposition of
this petition.

4. No. We are disinclined to take respondent's old age and the


fact that he served in the judiciary in various capacities in his
favor. If at all, we hold respondent to a higher standard for it, for
a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence,[38] and his conduct should be above reproach.
[39] The fact that respondent has chosen to engage in private
practice does not mean he is now free to conduct himself in less
honorable - or indeed in a less than honorable - manner.

5. Yes. Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member
of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
to do so.

Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to


justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." It involves "an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals."

There can be no question that the term "moral turpitude"


includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or
good morals. In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a
crime involving moral turpitude because the act is
unquestionably against justice, honesty and good morals. We
should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted
also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was
bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude might not relate to the exercise of the
Practice of Law - legal education or the study of law is not the the study of law. Exempted from the PhiLSAT requirement were
practice of law, the former being merely preparatory to the honor graduates who were granted professional civil service
latter. In fact, the practice of law has a settled jurisprudential eligibility and who are enrolling within two years from their
meaning: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of college graduation.
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social Days before the scheduled conduct of the first-ever PhiLSAT on
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings April 16, 2017, Petitioners filed their Petition for Prohibition
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, principally seeking that R.A. No. 7662 be declared
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken unconstitutional and that the creation of the LEB be invalidated
for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, together with all its issuances, most especially the PhiLSAT, for
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an encroaching upon the rule-making power of the Court
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a concerning admissions to the practice of law.
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and Procedurally, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in representing the LEB, assails the propriety of the remedies of
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have certiorari and prohibition on the ground that R.A. No. 7662 is a
been held to constitute law practice as the preparation and legislative act and not a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the function. It also claims that the Congress is an indispensable
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of party to the petitions.
facts and conditions.
Substantively, the OSG contends that the Court’s power to
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part regulate admission to the practice of law does not include
of work performed outside of any court and having no regulation of legal education. The OSG urges that the PhiLSAT is
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces no different from the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of which the Court already upheld as a valid exercise of police
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments power in the seminal case of Tablarin v. Gutierrez.
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct ISSUES
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a 1. WoN the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are proper.
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs,
2. WoN petitioners have raised an actual controversy.
and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or 3. WoN petitioners have locus standi.
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration
of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns 4. WoN the Court’s power to regulate admission to the practice
the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that of law also includes regulation of legal education and, if the
part of the work of the lawyer which involved appearance in answer is affirmative, WoN the PhilSAT is unconstitutional.
court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
HELD
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by 1. Yes. The Court finds that petitioners availed of the proper
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral remedies. As constitutionally defined under Section 1, Article VIII
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power is no longer limited to
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. The the Court’s duty to settle actual controversies involving rights
definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be which are legally demandable and enforceable, or the power of
further enlarged as to cover the study of law. adjudication, but also includes the duty to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
PIMENTEL, ET AL. VS. LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD (nature)
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
G.R. No. 230642 and G.R. No. 242954 September 10, 2019 instrumentality of the Government. The Court’s expanded
jurisdiction, when invoked, permits a review of acts not only by a
FACTS tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, but also by any branch or instrumentality
R.A. No. 7662 (Legal Education Reform Act of 1993) created the
of the Government. “Any branch or instrumentality of the
Legal Education Board (LEB), an executive agency which was
Government” necessarily includes the Legislative and the
made separate from the Department of Education, Culture and
Executive, even if they are not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
Sports (DECS), but attached thereto solely for budgetary
or ministerial functions. As such, the Court may review and/or
purposes and administrative support.
prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive
Acting pursuant to its authority to prescribe the minimum officials, there being no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the
standards for law schools, the LEB issued a Memorandum Order ordinary course of law.
(LEBMO No. 7-2016) which requires all those seeking admission
2.Yes. The petitions raise an actual controversy insofar as they
to the basic Law course to take and pass a nationwide uniform
allege that R.A. No. 7662 infringe upon the Court’s power to
law school admission test, known as the PhiLSAT. It was designed
promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and upon
to measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue
institutional academic freedom and the right to quality
education. The Court has held that when an act of the legislative consistent with its functions. Regulation and
department is seriously alleged to have infringed the supervision of legal education is primarily exercised by
Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this the Legislative and implemented by the Executive, thus,
Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the it cannot be claimed by the judiciary. It is with studied
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have restraint that the Court abstains from exercising a
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt power that is not strictly judicial, or that which is not
act. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The expressly granted to it by the Constitution. This judicial
duty to adjudicate remains to assure that the supremacy of the abstention is neither avoidance nor dereliction — there
Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application is simply no basis for the Court to supervise and
or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before regulate legal education.
this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court, as guardians
of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine. Reasonable Supervision and Regulation of Legal Education as an
Exercise of Police Power
3. Yes. Petitioners have demonstrated that they were, or tend to
be directly and substantially, injured. Petitioners herein consist (a) Enactment of education laws is an exercise of police
of graduates of a four-year college course and applicants as first power. The regulation or administration of educational
year law students, as well as law students who failed to pass the institutions, especially on the tertiary level, is invested
PhiLSAT and were denied admission to law school and who were with public interest. Thus, the enactment of education
conditionally enrolled. Some petitioners anchor their standing to laws, implementing rules and regulations and issuances
challenge R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT as citizens. Standing as of government agencies is an exercise of the State’s
a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a police power. As a professional educational program,
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance legal education properly falls within the supervisory
or when paramount public interest is involved. Legal standing and regulatory competency of the State.
may be extended to petitioners for having raised a (b) State exercises supervisory and regulatory authority
“constitutional issue of critical significance.” and not control over legal education. The exercise of
4. The Court has no primary and direct jurisdiction over legal police power in relation to education must be
education. Neither the history of the Philippine legal education compliant with the normative content of Section 4(1),
nor the Rules of Court invoked by petitioners support their Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. The exercise of
argument. The supervision and regulation of legal education is police power over education must merely be
an Executive function. Regulation and supervision of legal supervisory and regulatory. This must necessarily be so
education had been historically and consistently exercised by the since the right and duty to educate, being part and
political departments. parcel of youth-rearing, do not inure to the State at the
first instance. Rather, it belongs essentially and
Legal Education has been historically exercised by the political naturally to the parents, which right and duty they
departments. The historical development of statutes on surrender by delegation to the educational institutions.
education unerringly reflects the consistent exercise by the
political departments of the power to supervise and regulate all (c) Supervision and regulation of legal education, as an
levels and areas of education, including legal education. Legal exercise of police power, must be reasonable. To be
education is but a composite of the entire Philippine education valid, the supervision and regulation of legal education
system. It is perhaps unique because it is a specialized area of as an exercise of police power must be reasonable and
study. not repugnant to the Constitution. The exercise of
police power, in order to be valid, must be compliant
The Court’s exclusive rule-making power covers the practice of with substantive due process. The State may be
law and not the study of law. considered as having properly exercised its police
power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the
(a) Definition of practice of law does not cover the study interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
of law. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct those of a particular class, require its exercise; and (2)
of cases or litigation in court; it embraces all form of the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
activities where the work done involves the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a
effect of facts and conditions. Practice of law under concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no Exercise of the power to supervise and regulate legal education
immediate relation to proceedings in court. The must respect the constitutionally guaranteed institutional
definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, academic freedom and the citizen’s right to quality and
cannot be further enlarged as to cover the study of law. accessible education.

(b) The regulation and supervision of legal education (a) State’s supervisory and regulatory power over legal
cannot be justified as an exercise of the Court’s education in relation to academic freedom of
“residual” power. A power is residual if it does not institutions of higher learning. Section 5(2), Article XIV
belong to either of the two co-equal branches and of the 1987 Constitution, provides: “Academic freedom
which the remaining branch can, thus, exercise shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.”
The rule is that institutions of higher learning enjoy for taking the bar examinations, is
ample discretion to decide for itself who may teach, UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This requirement unduly
what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who to interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to
admit, being part of their academic freedom. The State, promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and
in the exercise of its reasonable supervision and admissions thereto. The jurisdiction to determine
regulation over education, can only impose minimum whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar
regulations. At its most elementary, the power to examinations belongs to the Court. Under Section 7(g),
supervise and regulate shall not be construed as stifling the power of the LEB is no longer confined within the
academic freedom in institutions of higher learning. In parameters of legal education, but now dabbles on the
fact, this non-intrusive relation between the State and requisites for admissions to the bar examinations, and
higher educational institutions is maintained even consequently, admissions to the bar. This is a direct
when the Constitution itself prescribes certain encroachment upon the Court’s exclusive authority to
educational “thrusts” or directions. promulgate rules concerning admissions to the bar and
should, therefore, be struck down as unconstitutional.
(b) The reasonable supervision and regulation clause
viewed together with the right to education. The (c) Section 2, par. 2 of RA 7662, which gives LEB the
normative elements of the general right to education power to supervise the continuing legal education of
under Section 1, Article XIV, are (1) to protect and practicing lawyers, encroaches upon the Supreme
promote quality education; and (2) to take appropriate Court’s power to promulgate rules concerning the IBP.
steps towards making such quality education Likewise, the clause “continuing legal education” under
accessible. In order to protect and promote quality Section 2, par. 2, and Section 7(h) unduly give the LEB
education, the political departments are vested with the power to supervise the legal education of those
the ample authority to set minimum standards to be who are already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the
met by all educational institutions. While the LEB is authorized to compel mandatory attendance of
Constitution indeed mandates the State to provide practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration
quality education, the determination of what as the LEB deems necessary, the same encroaches upon
constitutes quality education is best left with the the Court’s power to promulgate rules concerning the
political departments who have the necessary Integrated Bar which includes the education of “lawyer-
knowledge, expertise, and resources to determine the professors” as teaching of law is practice of law. The
same. While there is a right to quality higher education, mandatory continuing legal education of the members
such right is principally subject to the broad academic of the bar is, in fact, covered by BM. No. 850 or the
freedom of higher educational institutions to impose Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic dated August 22, 2000.
requirements. Plainly stated, the right to receive
education is not and should not be taken to mean as a (d) Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 which gives LEB the
right to be admitted to educational institutions. power to prescribe the minimum standards for law
admission is CONSTITUTIONAL and does not conflict
LEB’s Powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the Supreme Court’s with the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. The
Jurisdiction Court finds no constitutional conflict between its rule-
making power and the power of the LEB to prescribe
(a) The objective of RA 7662 encroaches upon the the minimum standards for law admission under
Supreme Court’s power to promulgate rules on “legal Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662. Consequently, the
assistance to the underprivileged”. One of the general PhiLSAT, which intends to regulate admission to law
objectives of legal education under Section 3(a)(2) of schools, cannot be voided on this ground. LEB’s power
R.A. No. 7662 is to “increase awareness among to prescribe minimum standards for “law admission”
members of the legal profession of the needs of the pertain to admission to legal education and not to the
poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society.” This practice of law.
provision goes beyond the scope of R.A. No. 7662, i.e.,
improvement of the quality of legal education, and, The PhiLSAT is not unconstitutional in its entirety
instead delves into the training of those who are
already members of the bar. Likewise, this objective is a (a) LEB’s authority to initiate and administer an
direct encroachment on the power of the Supreme aptitude test, such as the PhiLSAT, as a minimum
Court, under Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VII of the standard for law admission, is not per se
Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning the unconstitutional. The State has an interest in improving
practice of law and “legal assistance to the the quality of legal education for the protection of the
underprivileged” and should, thus, be voided on this community at-large, and requiring entrance test is
ground. Such objective should not find a place in the reasonably related to that interest. In other words, the
law that primarily aims to upgrade the standard of State has the power and the prerogative to impose a
schools of law as they perform the task of educating standardized test prior to entering law school, in the
aspiring lawyers. same manner and extent that the State can do so in
medical school when it prescribed the NMAT.
(b) Section 7(g) of RA 7662, which grants LEB the power
to establish a law practice internship as a requirement
(b) PhiLSAT becomes UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it for law schools taking into account, among others, the
restricts admission to law school for being violative of qualifications of the members of the faculty without encroaching
academic freedom. The PhiLSAT, when administered as upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning;
an aptitude test to guide law schools in measuring the and
applicants’ aptness for legal education along with such
other admissions policy that the law school may 2. Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal
consider, is within the power of the LEB under its Education Board the power to prescribe the minimum
charter to prescribe minimum standards for law requirements of for admission to legal education and minimum
admission. However, the PhiLSAT presently operates qualifications of faculty members without encroaching upon the
not only as a measure of an applicant’s aptitude for law academic freedom of institutions of higher learning.
school. The PhiLSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of the
upon law schools who among the examinees are to be court:
admitted to any law program. When the PhiLSAT is
used to exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law 1. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly includes
schools, as its present design mandates, the PhiLSAT “continuing legal education” as an aspect of legal education
goes beyond mere ‘supervision and regulation, violates which is made subject to Executive supervision and control;
institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable
and therefore, unconstitutional. The Court partially 2. Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No.
nullifies LEBMO No. 7-2016 insofar as it absolutely 1-2011 on the objective of legal education to increase awareness
prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT and the taking among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor,
thereof within two years as a prerequisite for admission deprived and oppressed sectors of society;
to any law school which, on its face, directly counter to
3. Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(g) of LEBMO No.
institutional academic freedom. The rest of LEBMO No.
1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to
7-2016, being free from any taint of unconstitutionality,
establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking
should remain force and effect.
the Bar and
PhiLSAT and the Right to Education. Anent the argument that the
4. Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(h) of LEBMO No.
PhiLSAT transgresses petitioners’ right to education and their
1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to
right to select a profession or course of study, suffice to state
adopt a system of mandatory continuing legal education and to
that the PhiLSAT is a minimum admission standard that is
provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in
rationally related to the interest of the State to improve the
such courses and for such duration as it may deem necessary.
quality of legal education and, accordingly, to protect the
general community. The constitutionality of the PhiLSAT, As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:
therefore, cannot be voided on the ground that it violates the
right to education as stated under Section 1, Article XIV of the 1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding,
Constitution. restricting, and qualifying admissions to law schools in violation
of the institutional academic freedom on who to admit,
Law Masters Degree requirement for law faculty. Moreover, the particularly;
operation of educational institutions involves public interest. The
government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in a. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides
possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, that all college graduates or graduating students
are allowed to teach in such institutions. However, the applying for admission to the basic law course shall be
mandatory character of the master of laws degree requirement, required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement for
under pain of downgrading, phase-out and closure of the law admission to any law school in the Philippines and that
school, is in sharp contrast with the previous requirement under no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as a first
DECS Order No. 27-1989 which merely prefer faculty members year student in the basic law courses leading to a
who are holders of a graduate law degree, or its equivalent. The degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless
LEB’s authority to review the strength or weakness of the faculty he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two years
on the basis of experience or length of time devoted to teaching before the start of studies for the basic law course;
violates an institution’s right to set its own faculty standards.
b. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the passing of
DISPOSITION the PhiLSAT as a prerequisite for admission to law
schools;
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on
The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal March 12, 2019 enjoining the Legal Education Board
education is UPHELD. from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 is made
PERMANENT. The regular admission of students who
The Court further declares;
were conditionally admitted and enrolled is left to the
As CONSTITUTIONAL: discretion of the law schools in the exercise of their
academic freedom; and
1. Section 7(c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it. gives the Legal
Education Board the power to set the standards of accreditation c. Sections 15, 16, and 17 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;
2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating
the qualifications and classification of faculty members, dean,
and dean of graduate schools of law in violation of institutional
academic freedom on who may teach, particularly:

a. Sections 41.2(d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-


2011;

b. Resolution No. 2014-02;

c. Sections 31(2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2;

d. LEBMO No. 17-2018; and,

3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating


the policies on the establishment of legal apprenticeship and
legal internship programs in violation of institutional academic
freedom on what to teach, particularly:

a. Resolution No. 2015-08;

b. Section 24(c) of LEBMO No. 2; and

c. Section 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011.


Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
from business are: violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by- attorney for a party without authority to do so.
product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money. In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but
argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited
2. A relation as an 'officer of court' to the administration of acts. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges
justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability. against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary. advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not
contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, dignified.
fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods
of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
directly with their clients. which found respondent guilty. Respondent filed an Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the instant
Practice of Law – It is a profession in which duty to public petition for certiorari.
service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is
not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law ISSUE
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. 1. WoN respondent is guilty of improper advertising and
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., VS. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO solicitation.

A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003 HELD

FACTS 1. Yes. It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is
not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service,
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not
that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The
MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667." gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The
duty to public service and to the administration of justice should
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate
Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.
telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She
spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. There is no question that respondent committed the acts
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and complained of. He himself admits that he caused the publication
can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs
the case will not involve separation of property or custody of for the Court's indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering
children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he
of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no
case and the other half after a decision thereon has been intention to violate the rules. What adds to the gravity of
rendered. respondent's acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled
"Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the
Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed,
Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be
services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules case, he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise
of Court, which state that: been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their
marriage bonds, to do so.
Rule 2.03. - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business. Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether
proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be
Rule 3.01. - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
lawyer and to the bar. Thus, the use of simple signs stating the
services.
name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address
Rule 138, Section 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal
Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the the use of calling cards is now acceptable. Publication in
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason
conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and
informative data is likewise allowable.

DISPOSITION

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T.


SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is
likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
STEPHAN BRUNET AND VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET VS. FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO VS. ATTY. PABLO S.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN BERNARDO

A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014 A.C. No. 6368 June 13, 2012

FACTS FACTS

On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses filed a complaint This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainants against
against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline respondent Atty. Pablo Bernardo for estafa, deceit, malpractice,
(CBD), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and violation of his
spouses alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services duties and oath as a lawyer.
of Atty. Guaren for the titling of a residential lot they acquired in
Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Atty. Pablo Bernardo, with the help of a certain Andres Magat,
P10,000.00 including expenses relative to its proceeding, and illegally committed a fraudulent act with intent to defraud herein
asked for additional payment which they dutifully gave; that they complainants wherein he would expedite the titling of the land
always reminded Atty. Guaren about the case but to no avail; belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City who are the
that they became bothered by the slow progress of the case so acquaintance of complainants herein and they convinced
they demanded the return of the money they paid; and that complainants that if they will finance him the amount of
respondent agreed to return the same provided that the amount [₱]495,000.00 as advance money he would expedite the titling of
of P5,000.00 be deducted to answer for his professional fees. the subject land. He also misrepresented himself as lawyer of
William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the subject land
Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an and that he has contracts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and
attorney-client relationship between them, Atty. Guaren made a REGISTER OF DEEDS which representation he well knew were
special appearance against them in a case pending before the false were only made to induce the complainants to give and
Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC). deliver the said amount and converted the said amount to his
personal use and benefit and despite demand upon him to
Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an return the said amount, he failed and refused to do so. Bernardo
acceptance fee of P10,000.00, but denied that the amount was countered by claiming that it was only Magat whom they
inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot and claimed that he contacted and received the said money from them, and that
did not commit betrayal of trust and confidence when he there was no connivance between Magat and respondent.
participated in a case filed against the complainants in MCTC Furthermore, during the hearing before the RTC, respondent
explaining that his appearance was for and in behalf of Atty. failed to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice
Ervin Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed to appear in on several occasions and appear on the scheduled hearings set.
the said hearing.
ISSUES
ISSUE
1. WoN respondent should be disbarred.
1. WoN violated the code of professional responsibility.
HELD
HELD
1. Yes. As a lawyer, the respondent is considered as an officer of
1. Yes. Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional the court who is called upon to obey and respect court
Responsibility provides that: processes. Such acts of the respondent are a deliberate and
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and contemptuous affront on the court’s authority which cannot be
he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. countenanced. Most importantly, respondent failed to uphold
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and He himself admitted in his answer that his legal services were
diligence. hired by the complainants through Magat regarding the
purported titling of land supposedly purchased. While he begs
Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000.00 for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition is shallow considering
as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to the fact that he used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive
perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of the complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling
complainants’ lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren of the subject properties. He never denied that he did not
breached his duty to serve his client with competence and benefit from the money given by the complainants in the
diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. amount of ₱495,000.00.
DISPOSITION DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Pablo S.
of having violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Bernardo is found guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice
for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective from receipt of this of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.
Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction in the future
shall be dealt with more severely. Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to RETURN
the amount of P200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita
Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt of this Decision and GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS TALENTS POOL, INC., vs. ATTY.
(2) to SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof to the Court, PRIMO R. NALDOZA
through the Office of the Bar Confidant within TEN (10) DAYS
therefrom; with a STERN WARNING that failure to do so shall A.C. No. 4017 September 29, 1999
merit him the additional penalty of suspension from the practice FACTS
of law for one (1) year.
Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., filed before this Court a
Petition for disbarment against Attorney Primo R. Naldoza. The
precursor of this Petition was the action of respondent, as
counsel for complainant, appealing a Decision of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). In relation to the appeal,
complainant asserts that respondent should be disbarred for the
following acts:

1. Appealing a decision, knowing that the same was already final


and executory (in an apparent desire to collect or to "bleed" his
client of several thousand pesos of attorney's fees);

2. Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five hundred and fifty-five


US dollars (US$2,555) from complainant, allegedly for "cash
bond" in the appealed case; and

3. Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his illegal act.

In his Answer, respondent denies that he persuaded complainant


to file an appeal. On the contrary, he asserts that it was the
complainant who insisted on appealing the case in order to delay
the execution of the POEA Decision. He also controverts
complainant's allegation that he asked for a cash bond and that
he issued the fake receipt.

Subsequently the complainant corporation came to know that


the fees to be paid to the Supreme Court consist[ed] only of
nominal filing and docket fees for such kind of appeal but in
order to cover up respondent's misrepresentation, Atty. Naldoza
presented complainant a fake xerox copy of an alleged Supreme
Court receipt representing payment of U.S. $2,555.00.
Respondent was charged with estafa but was acquitted.

ISSUE

1. WoN respondent should be disbarred.

HELD

1. Yes. Respondent fails to rebut the position of the complainant


that the signature on the receipt for the amount of $2,555.00
was his. Hence, respondent anchors his position on a mere
denial that it is not his signature. Likewise, the respondent
denies the check voucher dated December 15, 1992, and the
encircled signature of the respondent, which . . . according to
him is falsified and irregular. No evidence, however, was
presented by the respondent that his signature therein was
falsified and irregular.

Moreover, respondent's contention that his acquittal in the


companion criminal case should result in the dismissal of this
administrative complaint is erroneous. The criminal case for
estafa was completely different from the proceedings before
him; acquittal in the former did not exonerate respondent in the
latter. The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a
criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an
administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly
preponderant evidence" is all that is required. Thus, a criminal
prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the
same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative QUIRINO TOMLIN II vs. ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II
proceedings.
A.C. No. 6971 February 23, 2006
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an FACTS
action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into Quirino Tomlin II filed a complaint before the Commission on Bar
the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against
punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II for allegedly reneging on his monetary
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. obligations and for having issued bouncing checks; thereby
[They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and Batas
interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22.
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its Complainant averred that respondent borrowed from him
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of P600,000.00 partially covered by seven postdated checks.
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court However, when complainant tried to encash them on their
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal respective due dates, the checks were all dishonored by the
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice drawee bank. Complainant made several demands, however,
by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct respondent still failed and refused to pay his debt without
have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with justifiable reason.
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. Consequently, complainant instituted a case before the MTC of
Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Respondent was directed to file his answer
DISPOSITION but instead he filed several motions for extension of time to file
a responsive pleading and a motion to dismiss complaint on the
WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza is hereby DISBARRED. The Office grounds that:
of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the
Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts of this Decision. 1. The case should be dismissed outright for violation of the rule
on non-forum shopping. He argued that complainant did not
inform the IBP about the cases he filed before the MTC.

2. Respondent argued that the filing of the administrative case


despite the pendency of the criminal cases is a form of
harassment which should not be allowed.

ISSUE

1. WoN respondent should be suspended.

HELD

1. Yes. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice.


As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain
not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the people’s faith
and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be
disciplined – whether in their professional or in their private
capacity – for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty,
probity and good demeanor. Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in
his profession or private capacity is a ground for the imposition
of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good
character is an essential qualification for the admission to the
practice of law and for the continuance of such privilege

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse


opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other
than by appeal or certiorari) in another or when he institutes two
or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on
the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. Forum shopping applies only to judicial
cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. Moreover,
Criminal Case Nos. 6-367-03 to 6-373-03 for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 refer to the respondent’s act of making or drawing and
issuance of worthless checks; while the present administrative
case seeks to discipline respondent as a lawyer for his dishonest
act of failing to pay his debt in violation of the Code of ADELINO H. LEDESMA vs. HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding
Professional Responsibility. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
Branch I, Silay City
DISPOSITION
G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974
WHEREFORE, Atty. Salvador N. Moya II is found GUILTY of gross
misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional FACTS
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two years, effective immediately, with a warning that any Petitioner was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality
further infraction by him shall be dealt with most severely. of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he
commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte
for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of
respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not
only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also
appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants.
Subsequently, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to
withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the
Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on
the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could
prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent
Judge denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having
proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE

1. WoN the petition for certiorari should be dismissed.

HELD

1. Yes. The defense is reminded that at its instance, this case has
been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the
government witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala.
After which, it was noted in such order that there was no
incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused
and to the court and the performance of his task as an election
registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of
justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma
to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has
already rested its case.” The law is a profession, not a trade or a
craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the
performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the
administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof,
especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be
required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are
rendered without remuneration should not occasion a
diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course,
to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his
attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. That
circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a
lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his
paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as
counsel de oficio must be fulfilled. For, indeed a lawyer who is a
vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger
dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest."

DISPOSITION

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs


against petitioner.
IN RE: BRILLANTES respondent is counsel for the petitioner, to inform it whether he
was a duly commissioned notary public, the respondent instead
A.C. No. 1245 March 02, 1977 of giving either a "yes" or "no" answer, informed the Court of
FACTS Appeals that his client is already dead. All such beating around
an otherwise simple, uncomplicated matter which the
This is a review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of respondent could confront squarely if he were honestly and
Abra, Branch II, suspending Atty. Agripino A. Brillantes of sincerely appointed notary, does not avail him any good.
Bangued, Abra from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years. DISPOSITION

Respondent Brillantes, in a civil case (Civil Case 657) in which he In view of all the foregoing, this Court does not consider it
is a counsel, notarized a deed of sale of real property without necessary to resolve the additional issues raised in the
being commissioned as a notary public in violation of Art. 171 of supplemental complaints of Atty. Bringas. ACCORDINGLY,
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and knowingly introduced said Agripino A. Brillantes of Bangued, Abra is hereby disbarred. This
deed as evidence in Civil Case in violation of the last paragraph decision shall be immediately executory.
of Art. 172 of the RPC, in an attempt to pass the document as
true and suit the defendant’s defense.

ISSUE

1. WoN Brillantes should be barred.

HELD

1. Yes. It is irrelevant and immaterial to this proceeding that the


parties a quo in Civil Case 657 expressly accepted the
genuineness of the questioned deed of sale marked therein as
Exhibit "1." That was purely a matter of personal judgment and
affected solely their private interests. The case at bar is of a
different complex and nature. Here, a lawyer's fealty to his oath
and public duties is intimately and inextricably involved, nay
affected. The primary objective of the instant action is to
determine whether the respondent notarized a deed of sale of a
parcel of land without being duly appointed as a notary public
and introduced the same as evidence in court, thereby flagrantly
violating his duties as an officer of the court.

At the hearing before this Court, Atty. Brillantes claimed that he


had in his possession evidence which would prove that he was
commissioned a notary in 1969. What he presented to this
Court, however, were carbon copies of an alleged notarial
appointment and an oath of office which did not even bear the
signature of the officials concerned, were not covered by the
seal of the issuing court and, although they had what appeared
to be initials, did not least resemble any of the first letters of the
names or surnames of the alleged officials who issued the same.
In fact, the appointment of the respondent as a notary was
denied here by the very person who supposedly gave him the
said commission.

It is quite remarkable and certainly unmitigating that instead of


simply presenting satisfactory evidence of his appointment as a
notary which is required by law to be made in official form, he
should choose to avail himself vigorously of technical defenses,
such as that the trial judge below should inhibit himself from
trying the administrative complaint and the criminal cases filed
against him; that the complaint for his suspension from the
practice of law should be tried by a grievance committee of the
Integrated Bar; that the final disposition of the appeal of Civil
Case 657 should be awaited; and that the case at bar "is a
bickering of another member of the Bar who pretends to be a
Super Citizen and guardian of Public Weal" which, it is urged,
should not be seriously entertained by this Court. When the
Court of Appeals ordered him in a case therein where the
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in
from business are: the world.

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by- ISSUES


product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money. 1. WoN the petitioners can be allowed to use the names of the
deceased.
2. A relation as an 'officer of court' to the administration of
justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability. HELD

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary. 1. No. The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from their
previous rulings which held that:
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor,
fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods The use in their partnership names of the names of deceased
of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which
directly with their clients." provides: Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm
name, which may or may not include the name of one or more of
Practice of Law – The right to practice law is not a natural or the partners.
constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise.
It is limited to persons of good moral character with special Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right does not names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a
only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and partner.
attainment, hut also the exercise of a special privilege, highly It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm
personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust. name of a partnership must either be those of living partners
IN RE: SYCIP AND OZAETA and in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who
can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code
July 30, 1979 prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm
name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs
FACTS of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they
surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip and 2) by the are nonlawyers. Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, praying that they be "prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs
allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the
of partners who had passed away. fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's
clients, both because the recipients of such division are not
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments: lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or
responsibility on the part of the recipient." There being no
1. A partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business benefits accruing, there can be no corresponding liability.
under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased
partner under Article 1840 of the Civil Code which states that the Moreover, the public relations value of the use of an old firm
use of such name shall not of itself make the individual property name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in
of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without
person or partnership. connections will have to make a name for himself starting from
scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by
engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm deceased partners.
names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name,
of the name of a deceased partner. As regards Article 1840, it treats more of a commercial
partnership with a good will to protect rather than of a
3. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states that the professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose
continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its
when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable
should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot
through this use. arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers.
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the As regards the second point raised, a partnership for the practice
deaths of their respective deceased partners were well- of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on
days. accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in
connection with the practice of accountancy.
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased
partner's name in a professional firm's name. As regards the third, fifth, and sixth point, it is true that Canon 33
does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of
6. The continued use of a deceased's name in the firm name of
a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law
partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is
partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom
permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former
partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm
names, under our custom, identify the more active and/or more
senior members or partners of the law firm. Petitioners argue
that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a
deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships.
But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom. Moreover,
Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be
proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local
custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of
justice unless such custom is properly established by competent
evidence like any other fact.

DISPOSITION

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and


petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA"
from their respective firm names. Those names may, however,
be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners
in their firms indicating the years during which they served as
such.
IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him.
Respondent denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon
FLORA QUINGWA vs. ARMANDO PUNO Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but
A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967 he did not present evidence to show where he was on that date.

FACTS DISPOSITION

On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and,
verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll
Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. Quingwa is an of Attorneys.
educated woman, having been a public-school teacher for a
number of years. She testified that respondent took her to the
Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as
"Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. The hotel
register of the Silver Moon Hotel shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A.
Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and
departed at 7:00 P.M.

When complainant learned that respondent had left for


Zamboanga City, she sent him numerous telegrams, including
one which reveals her pregnancy, but received no replies. She
went to Zamboanga City in November 1958, where she met the
respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry.

This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On
the day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared
for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral
argument. There was no appearance for the respondents.

ISSUE

1. WoN respondent should be disbarred.

HELD

1. Yes. The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and


has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his
profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient
and learned profession of law must conform themselves in
accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in
paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:

... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the
admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified
because deficient in either moral character or education. He
should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain
the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but
the administration of justice.

As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the


grounds for suspension or disbarment (Section 27, Rule 138,
Rules of Court).

Moreover, one of the requirements for all applicants for


admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before
the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now
section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent
to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is
essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise
of the privilege. When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is
not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and
show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of
Barrientos vs Daarol however, his claim of having embraced the Islam religion is not
supported by any evidence
A.C. No. 1512, January 29, 1993
Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the
FACTS Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct (Sec.
Victoria C. Barrientos seeks the disbarment of Transfiguracion 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) is in order. Good moral character is
Daarol on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. a condition which precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule
Respondent, being a friend of the petitioner’s sister, asked her to 138, Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with upon admission
be one of the usherettes in a convention in Dipolog City. One thereto. It is a continuing qualification which all lawyers must
day, Daarol invited her to stroll along the beach and proposed possess.
his love to her which she eventually accepted. Respondent DISPOSITION
invited her to a party and that when they left the party,
respondent reiterated his promise to marry her and started ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol guilty
caressing her downward. Petitioner was afraid but eventually of grossly immoral conduct unworthy of being a member of the
relented because she loved him. They had sex at the frequency Bar and is hereby ordered DISBARRED and his name stricken off
of 2 or 3 times a week while holding onto his promises. from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Resolution be
Sometime later, Barrientos became pregnant but responded furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
suggested the fetus to be aborted which she objected to. They Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the
decided to get married in Manila but upon arrival, respondent personal record of respondent Daarol.
told the petitioner and her family that she could not marry her
because he was already married. Later on, respondent reassured
complainant that he would work for the annulment of his
marriage and subsequently marry her. When she gave birth,
Barrientos tried to contact respondent by phone and thru her
brother but to no avail. She then filed an administrative case
against the respondent with the National Electrification
Administration; the case was referred to the Zamboanga del
Norte Electric Cooperative (ZANECO) and it was dismissed, hence
the present case.

ISSUE

WoN respondent should be disbarred.

HELD

Yes. From the records, it appears indubitable that complainant


was never informed by respondent attorney of his real status as
a married individual. The fact of his previous marriage was
disclosed by respondent only after the complainant became
pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as
being eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his
wife for 16 years and dangled a marriage proposal on the
assurance that he would work for the annulment of his first
marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that
respondent never bothered to annul said marriage.

He never introduced his son and went around with friends as


though he was never married much less had a child in the same
locality. This circumstance alone belies respondent's claim that
complainant and her family were aware of his previous marriage
at the very start of his courtship. The Court is therefore inclined
to believe that respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction
of his sexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant.

But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense
of respondent's moral values when he said that: "I see nothing
wrong with this relationship despite my being married." Worse,
he even suggested abortion. Finally, respondent even had the
temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and as such, could
enter into multiple marriages and has inquired into the
possibility of marrying complainant. As records indicate,
People vs. Fe Tuanda

A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990 Practice of Law - Practice of law, whether under the regular or
the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege
FACTS bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent Fe T. but who are also known to possess good moral character. The
Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued
decision of the Court of Appeals. possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.

Respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE
pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS
on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent B. M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004
would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items
to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in FACTS
February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold
pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of
P26,250.00, issued three checks. Upon presentment for payment the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling
within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose
were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of Philippine Shari’a Bar. Melendrez alleges that Meling did not
dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he
concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial
no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez. Court in Cotabato which arose after Meling allegedly uttered
defamatory words against him and his wife in front of media
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against practitioners, and hitting the face of his wife which caused
respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: 1 for estafa injuries. Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been
and 3 for violation of BP Blg. 22. The court acquitted respondent using the title "Attorney" in his communications, as Secretary to
of the charge of estafa but convicted her of violating BP Blg. 22. the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC member of the Bar.
with an additional punishment of suspension from practice of
law. Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal before the Supreme Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed
Court but was told that the CA’s decision had become final and against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson,
executory upon the expiration of the period for filing of petition their former professor, advised him to settle his
for certiorari. misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that
the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral
ISSUE ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the
College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually
WoN the respondent’s suspension should be lifted. arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as
HELD "closed and terminated." As regards the use of the title
"Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications
No. Respondent was correctly suspended from the practice of really contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to
law because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral him, typed by the office clerk.
turpitude pursuant to Sections 27 and 28 of the Revised. Rules of
Court. We should add that the crimes of which respondent was Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be
convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys
and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it
she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a recommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be
crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, suspended until further orders from the Court.
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the ISSUES
profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and
affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such 1. WoN Meling should not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath
offense. and sign the Roll of Attorneys,

DISPOSITION 2. WoN Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar should be


suspended.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift
Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from HELD
the practice of law until further orders from this Court.
1. We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the
OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations.
This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling
from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys,
moot and academic.

2. On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the
Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a Practice of Law - Practice is more than an isolated appearance,
member of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acted upon. acts of the same kind. The practice of law by attorneys employed
in the government, to fall within the prohibition of statute, has
It has been held that good moral character is what a person been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self
really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not
held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private
character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to practice of law. The word private practice of law implies that one
objective reality. The standard of personal and professional must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a practice of the legal profession and that his professional services
person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his
character includes at least common honesty. livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is People vs Villanueva
not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965
known to possess good moral character. The requirement of FACTS
good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also Simplicio Villanueva was charged with the Crime of Malicious
essential for remaining in the practice of law. Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of Laguna. The
complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as
well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the
Persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such,
of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Shari’a was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he
courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he
one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be would not receive any payment for his services.
considered "counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or
advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was
The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained questioned by the counsel for the accused as it would violate the
the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken ruling held in the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, wherein it was
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position
of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified,
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law
jurisdiction. practice." The court sustained the appearance of Atty. Fule.
Then, counsel for the accused presented a Motion to Inhibit,
DISPOSITION invoking Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the states that, “No judge or other official or employee of superior
imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the private practice as a member of the bar or give professional
membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is advice to clients.” The JP Court still affirmed the appearance of
hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the Atty. Fule. This was then appealed before the CFI of Laguna
suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition which affirmed the decision of the JP Court, to which the Court
seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath said:
and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine “Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court
Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in
academic. person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City
Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an
agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he
was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a
professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he
had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of
crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna,
because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos
are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the
City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in
the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal
case.”

Hence, this case.

ISSUE Practice of Law - Practice of law means any activity, in or out of


court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
Whether or not City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice
prosecutor in the case, was engaging in private practice. of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
HELD any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in
No. Isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute any degree of legal knowledge or skill.”
private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Cayetano vs. Monsod
Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise.
The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as FACTS
determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon Aquino
DISPOSITION to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner Renato
Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
Conformably with all the foregoing, the decision appealed from does not possess the required qualification of having been
should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years as stated in
against appellant. Sec 1 (1), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

Atty. Monsod has worked as a lawyer in the law office of his


father (1960-1963); an operations officer with the World Bank
Group (1963-1970); Chief Executive Officer of an investment
bank (1970-1986); legal or economic consultant on various
companies (1986); Secretary General of NAMFREL (1986);
member of Constitutional Commission (1986-1987); National
Chairman of NAMFREL (1987); and member of the quasi-judicial
Davide Commission (1990). The issue, therefore, is what
constitutes the practice of law – the definition of which, eludes
exactitude and consistency.

The Commission on Appointments, however, confirmed the


nomination of Monsod. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath and
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the
validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition praying
that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.

ISSUE

Whether or not the respondent possesses the required


qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.

HELD

Yes. In light of the various definitions of the term particularly the


modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services,
contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the
foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. This view
has been espoused in numerous cases as precedents operating
under the doctrine of stare decisis.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires


the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those Practice of Law - Practice of law means any activity, in or out of
acts which are characteristics of the profession. In general, a court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
whether in or out of court. law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render
In the first place, the Commission on Appointments on the basis any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The
of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured,
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
DISPOSITION
FACTS
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby dismissed.
Mauricio C. Ulep asked the Court to direct respondent to cease
DISSENTING OPINION and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same
tenor as what respondent did and to perpetually prohibit
Justice Padilla. “Practice” refers to the actual performance or persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by
of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or law. The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are
customary action. To “practice” law, or any profession for that as follows:
matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily. SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Justice Gutierrez. The Constitution uses the phrase “engaged in
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
the practice of law for at least ten years.” The deliberate choice
ANNULMENT. VISA.
of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent,
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be “engaged” in an
activity for ten years requires committed participation in And:
something which is the result of one’s decisive choice. It means
that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is GUAM DIVORCE
obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention DON PARKINSON
during the ten-year period. an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce
through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during
office hours. Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's
Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above


reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member
of the legal profession, the petitioner is ashamed and offended
by the said advertisements, hence reliefs are being sought.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of


publication of said advertisements, but claims that it is not
engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues
that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the
act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in
the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme
Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the services offered by respondent as advertised


by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the
same can properly be the subject of the advertisements
complained of.
Dacanay vs. Baker & McKenzie
HELD
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the
respondent constitute practice of law as it means any activity, in FACTS
or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr.
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in
and nine other lawyers from practicing law under the name of
the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal Respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker &
knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not limited to the McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked
conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products
and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Dacanay denied any
legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed
pending in a court. whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not,
what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law
While some of the services being offered by respondent
office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant
corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how,
complaint.
these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out ISSUE
legal information to laymen and lawyers. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, 1. WoN private respondents can practice under the name of
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all Baker & MaKenzie.
that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
HELD
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were
merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so-called paralegals, 1. No. Being an alien law firm, it cannot practice law in the
it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). It is a professional
the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members
be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside
advertisements represent and for which services it will from being members of the Philippine bar, practicing under the
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of
within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Baker & Mckenzie. Respondents' use of the firm name Baker &
McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest
advertisement of his talents as it is a violation of Canon 2 of the
quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged
Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer cannot, without
in foreign trade and investment.”
violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills
as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The DISPOSITION
canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible
for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practicing law
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
outcome of character and conduct.

DISPOSITION

Accordingly, the Court resolved to restrain and enjoin herein


respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A"
and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or
indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by
law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.
In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty re Allegations of Plagiarism 1. WoN the rights to freedom of expression and academic
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court (2011) freedom excuses the UP Law Faculty from denigrating the
Supreme Court.
FACTS
HELD
On April 28, 2010, the decision in Vinuya, et al. vs. Executive
Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated with Associate 1. No. The UP Law Faculty is guilty of violating Canon 1, 10, 11,
Justice Mariano del Castillo as ponencia. Attys. Roque and and 13.
Bagares, counsels for Vinuya et al. (Malaya Lolas), sought for
reconsideration . Subsequently, they filed a Supplemental Freedom of Expression. A lawyer, just like any citizen, has the
Motion for Reconsideration where they raised for the first time right to criticize and comment upon actuations of public officers,
their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for including judicial authority. However, such criticism of the
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. courts, whether done in court or outside of it, must conform to
standards of fairness and propriety. The accusatory and vilifying
The works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits
namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent's article "A of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;" (2) Christian J. Tams' book speech. To be clear, it was not the fact that respondents had
Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law; and (3) criticized a decision of the Court, but the manner of the criticism
Mark Ellis' article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are
International Crime." Counsels further assert that the plagiarized not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their
works were twisted as they were used as basis for the assailed opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case that
judgment when in truth the works actually support the case of gave rise to the Show Cause Resolution.
the Malaya Lolas.
Criticism of a Case Sub Judice. What the courts found
After the filing of the Supplemental MR, an article entitled "SC objectionable was not the circumstance that respondents
justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," was expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo was guilty of
posted on the Newsbreak website. The same article appeared on plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not only
the GMA News TV website. Atty. Roque also wrote an article as an established fact, but a truth” when it was "of public
entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted" in his column in the Manila knowledge that there was an ongoing investigation precisely to
Standard Today wherein he claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle determine the truth of such allegations." The publication of a
confirmed that his work had been plagiarized. criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting
the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending
The Supreme Court received a letter from Dr. Mark Ellis who to obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such
wrote to raise his concern on the use of his work to support a persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional
conclusion in opposition to the intention of his arguments. right to have their causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial
On August 9, 2010, a statement entitled "Restoring Integrity: A tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor.
Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines Academic Freedom. Academic freedom cannot be successfully
College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and invoked by respondents in this case. To our mind, the reason
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement) was that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of
posted in several online sites. The statement was also posted at lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of
the UP College of Law's bulletin board and at said college law professors. In view of the broad definition in Cayetano v.
website. Monsod, lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged
UP College of Law Dean Marvic Leonen submitted a copy of the in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and
Statement to the SC, through Chief Justice Corona. The cover more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are
letter signed by him stated that the statement was signed by 38 bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal
members of the UP College of Law faculty. The copy of the profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be
Statement (Restoring Integrity II) attached to the cover letter did measured against the same canons of professional responsibility
not contain the actual signatures but only stated the names of 37 applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their
UP Law professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that
each name. they are lawyers. No matter how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the
righteousness of his cause there is simply no excuse for
In fact, when the original signed Statement (Restoring Integrity I) denigrating the courts and engaging in public behavior that tends
was required to be presented, the Ethics Committee noted that to put the courts and the legal profession into disrepute.
only 37 of the 81 UP faculty members actually signed the same.
In particular, the signature of former SC Justice Mendoza did not Violation of Canon 10. Dean Leonen’s predicament is the fact
appear as falsely represented in the previous copies of the that he did not from the beginning submit the signed copy
Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. Also, (Restoring Integrity I) to this Court and, instead, submitted
Atty. Armovit signed the Statement although his name was not Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature
included among the signatories in the copies submitted to the pages. Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors
Court. had only authorized him to indicate them as signatories and had
not in fact signed the Statement. Thus, at around the time
ISSUE Restoring Integrity II was printed, posted and submitted to this
Court, at least one purported signatory thereto had not actually (3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
signed the same. That is precisely tantamount to making it regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 is found
appear to this Court that a person or persons participated in an UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more
act when such person or persons did not. mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the
Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor
Foreign Lawyers. As for Prof. Lynch, since he is a member of the and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that the
Bar of the State of Minnesota and, therefore, not under the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
disciplinary authority of this Court, he should be excused from severely.
these proceedings.
(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is
Administrative Liability imposed without a Need of a Hearing. excused from these proceedings. However, he is reminded that
This is not an indirect contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he
requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As explicitly should strive to be a model of responsible and professional
ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this case was docketed as conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from
an administrative matter. The rule that is relevant to this this Court.
controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary
proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court. Under (5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to
the said provision, it cannot be denied that a formal the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.
investigation, through a referral to the specified officers, is
merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither


purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an
action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges
as such. The absence of any formal charge against and/or formal
investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from
immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the
errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be
heard.

DISPOSITION

WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his


submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be satisfactory.

(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys.


Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin,
Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison,
Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O.
Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad,
Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose
Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa
Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A.
Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion
L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C.
Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen
Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D.
Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY.
These 35 respondent law professors are reminded of their
lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and
to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to
influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court
and the administration of justice and warned that the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Bernardino vs. Atty. Santos 3. He did not commit forum shopping because the various cases
filed had different issues.
A.C. No. 10583 February 18, 2015
4. The funds used were being held by his client as the special
Atty. Caringal vs. Atty. Santos administratrix of the estate of Mariano Turla. The payment of
A.C. No. 10584 February 18, 2015 attorney’s fees out of the estate’s funds could be considered as
"expenses of administration." Also, the payment of his legal
FACTS services was a matter which Atty. Caringal had no standing to
question.
Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina
de Castro Turla, was falsified by Atty. Santos. Atty. Santos made 5. Article 262 of the Civil Code is applicable because it was in
it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she died in force when Marilu Turla’s birth certificate was registered.
1990, to support the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of Mariano
Turla, husband of Rufina Turla, to present himself as the sole The IBP found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation that
legal heir entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased. Atty. Santos knew that the death certificate was falsified.
Likewise, Atty. Caringal failed to prove that Atty. Santos
Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of converted funds from Mariano Turla’s estate. Also, the evidence
Rufina and Mariano Turla, filed a Complaint for sum of money presented did not prove that Atty. Santos "knowingly cited a
with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and temporary repealed law." Further, Atty. Santos did not engage in forum
restraining order against Bernardino. The Complaint alleged that shopping. The various cases filed involved different parties and
Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla, which allegedly prayed for different reliefs. However, the IBP agreed that Atty.
contradicts the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos Santos represented clients with conflicting interests. The IBP
drafted. Hence, Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting recommended to have him suspended for 3 months.
interests.
ISSUE
Another Complaint was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty. Caringa
for the following reasons: 1. WoN defendant represented clients with conflicting interests.

1. Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests. In HELD


representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was allegedly violating 1. Yes. There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
the so-called "Dead Man’s Statute" because "he would be inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test
utilizing information or matters of fact occurring before the is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty
death of his deceased client. Similarly, he would be to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the
unscrupulously utilizing information acquired during his other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument
professional relation with his said client that would constitute a will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This
breach of trust or of privileged communication. rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications
2. Atty. Santos violated Canon 12 of the CPR by forum shopping have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has
when he filed several cases against the other claimants of been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests
Mariano Turla’s estate. if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any
3. Atty. Santos violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the CPR when he matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be
drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Atty. called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
Santos’ wife, Lynn Batac, is Mariano Turla’s niece. As part of the knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of
family, Atty. Santos knew that Rufina Turla had other heirs, the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
hence he knew that Mariano’s claim to be the sole heir is false, new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of
his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
4. Atty. Santos converted funds belonging to the heirs of suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
Mariano Turla for his own benefit. The funds involved were thereof.
rental income from Mariano Turla’s properties that were
supposed to be distributed to the heirs. However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, "by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
5. Atty. Santos cited a repealed provision of law. the facts." Respondent had the duty to inform Mariano Turla and
Marilu Turla that there is a conflict of interest and to obtain their
Atty. Santos made the following defenses:
written consent. Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009,64
1. He was not aware that there was a falsified entry in the death while respondent represented Marilu Turla in March 2009.65 It
certificate and affidavit given to him by Mariano. is understandable why respondent was unable to obtain
Mariano Turla’s consent. Still, respondent did not present
2. He did not and was not representing conflicting interests since evidence showing that he disclosed to Marilu Turla that he
Mariano was already dead. Further, he was representing Marilu previously represented Mariano Turla and assisted him in
against those who had an interest in her father’s estate. executing the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.
Mariano’s affidavit never stated that there was no other legal
heir but only that he was the sole heir. DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Victor Rey Santos guilty
of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The findings of fact and
recommendations of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bonifacio vs. Atty. Era and Atty. Bragas
Bar of the Philippines dated May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014
are ACCEPTED and ADOPTED with the MODIFICATION that the A.C. No. 11754 October 3, 2017
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is
imposed upon Atty. Victor Rey Santos. He is warned that a FACTS
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
In 2003, an illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio
severely.
and his company, Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation were
represented by Era and Associates Law Office through Atty. Era.
The Labor Arbiter found Bonifacio and the corporation liable for
illegal dismissal and, consequently, ordered them to pay Abucejo
Group their separation pay, full backwages and pro-rated 13th
month pay. Bonifacio and the corporation brought their case up
to the Supreme Court but they suffered the same fate as their
appeals and motions were decided against them.

Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against Atty.


Era for representing conflicting interests entitled Ferdinand A.
Samson v. Atty. Edgardo O. Era. The Court found Atty. Era guilty
of the charge and imposed the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for two years.

In 2013, the scheduled public auction over Bonifacio's and/or the


corporation's properties in the business establishment was
conducted. Atty. Era actively participated where he attended the
public auction and tendered a bid for his clients who were
declared the highest bidders. On the same day, a certificate of
sale was issued, which Atty. Era presented to the corporation's
officers and employees who were there at that time. Armed with
such documents, Atty. Era led the pulling out of the subject
properties but eventually stopped to negotiate with Bonifacio's
children for the payment of the judgment award instead of
pulling out the auctioned properties.

As the parties were not able to settle, on December 3, 2013,


Attys. Era and Bragas went back to Bonifacio's business
establishment together with their clients and several men, and
forced open the establishment to pull out the auctioned
properties.

Bonifacio filed a criminal complaint against Atty. Era for


malicious mischief, robbery, and trespassing. As for Atty. Bragas
– grave coercion. Bonifacio subsequently filed this administrative
complaint.

In their Answer, Attys. Era and Bragas alleged that Bonifacio has
no personal knowledge as to what transpired on November 28,
2013 and December 3, 2013 as the latter was not present
therein. Atty. Era further argued that he did not violate the
Court's order of suspension from the practice of law as he
merely acted as his clients' attorney-in-fact pursuant to a Special
Power of Attomey.

The Investigating Commissioner found nothing wrong with the


indication of a suspended lawyer's name in a pleading
considering that the same was not signed by the latter. There
was also no proof that a pleading was prepared by Atty. Era. On
the other hand, there was no impediment against Atty. Bragas to
sign the pleadings. There was also no proof that in doing so, Atty.
Bragas was assisting suspended Atty. Era in filing a pleading.
Neither the presence of Atty. Era during the public auction and
the negotiations was an implication or proof that Atty. Era was
engaging in the practice of law during his suspension. According
to the Investigating Commissioner, anybody, not exclusively
lawyers, can be present at an auction sale or negotiation. Thus,
the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the
administrative charges against Attys. Era and Bragas be Tan vs. Atty. Gumba
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
A.C. No. 9000, January 10, 2018
ISSUE
FACTS
1. WoN Atty. Era engaged in the practice of law.
This case is an offshoot of the administrative Complaint filed by
2. WoN Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his complainant against respondent, and for which respondent was
unauthorized practice of law. suspended from the practice of law for 6 months. The issues now
ripe for resolution are: a) whether respondent disobeyed a
HELD lawful order of the Court by not abiding by the order of her
1. Yes. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases suspension; and b) whether respondent deserves a stiffer
in court. It also involves the foreclosure of a mortgage, penalty for such violation.
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency Atty. Gumba acquired a loan of P350,000.00 from Mr. Tan and
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in offered a land registered in her father’s name as security. The
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute respondent also presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal that she was authorized to sell the property. However,
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by respondent failed to pay the loan. As a result, Mr. Tan went to
the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. register the Register of Deeds of the land but discovered that the
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of SPA did not allow him to sell the property but only allowed him
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of to mortgage it. Complainant argued that if not for respondent's
legal knowledge or skill. One who, in a representative capacity, misrepresentation, he would not have approved her loan. He
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights added that respondent committed dishonesty, and used her skill
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts as a lawyer and her moral ascendancy over him in securing the
either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in loan. Having done so, she is alleged to have violated the Lawyer’s
the practice of law. Oath as well as Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional
2. Yes. There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Responsibility. The IBP found her guilty, so did the Supreme
Atty. Era's suspension from the practice of law and yet, she Court, and suspended her for 6 months.
allowed herself to participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized On March 14, 2012, the Court resolved to serve anew the
practice. Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm cannot be used October 5, 2011 Resolution upon respondent because its
to circumvent the suspension order. The factual circumstances previous copy sent to her was returned unserved. In its August
of the case clearly shows that Atty. Bragas did not act to replace 13, 2012 Resolution, the Court considered the October 5, 2011
Atty. Era as counsel for his and/or the law firm's clients during Resolution to have been served upon respondent after the
the latter's suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, March 14, 2012 Resolution was also returned unserved. In the
who admittedly was the one actively performing all acts same resolution, the Court also denied with finality respondent's
pertaining to the labor case he was handling. motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution.
DISPOSITION Subsequently, Judge Margaret N. Armea inquired from the Office
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is found of the Court Administrator whether respondent could continue
GUILTY of willfully disobeying this Court's lawful order and is representing her clients and appear in courts. She also asked the
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three OCA if the decision relating to respondent's suspension, which
(3) years, while Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas is likewise found was downloaded from the internet, constitutes sufficient notice
GUILTY of violating CANON 9 of the Code of Professional to disqualify her to appear in courts for the period of her
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law suspension. Her inquiry arose because the counsel of the
for one (1) month, effective immediately from receipt of this opposing party called Judge Armea's attention regarding the
Decision. Also, both Attys. Era and Bragas are WARNED that a legal standing of respondent to appear as counsel. Judge Armea
repetition of the same or similar offense, or a commission of added that respondent denied that she was suspended to
another offense will warrant a more severe penalty. practice law since she had not yet received a copy of the Court's
resolution on the matter. Respondent insisted that service of any
pleading or judgment cannot be made through the internet and
claimed that she had not received an authentic copy of the
Court's October 5, 2011 Resolution.

ISSUE
1. WoN respondent is administratively liable for engaging in the DISPOSITION
practice of law during the period of her suspension and prior to
an order of the Court lifting such suspension. WHEREFORE, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for an additional period of six (6) months
HELD (from her original six (6) months suspension) and WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
1. Yes. The practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege severely.
subject to the inherent regulatory power of the Court. With
regard to suspension to practice law, in Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the
the Court laid down the guidelines for the lifting of an order of date of her receipt of this Decision, to determine the reckoning
suspension, to wit: point when her suspension shall take effect.

1. After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended


from the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision
imposing the penalty;

2. Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is


immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15
days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof.
The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and
executory;

3. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent


shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of
the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted
from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court
during the period of his or her suspension;

4. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local


Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts
where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her,
and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;

5. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of


respondent's compliance with the order of suspension;

6. Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the


lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more
severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.

While, indeed, service of a judgment or resolution must be done


only personally or by registered mail, and that mere showing of a
downloaded copy of the October 5, 2011 Resolution to
respondent is not a valid service, the fact however, that
respondent was duly informed of her suspension remains
unrebutted.

It is common sense that when the Court orders the suspension of


a lawyer from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from
performing all functions which require the application of legal
knowledge within the period of his or her suspension. To stress,
by practice of law, we refer to "any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training, and experience. It includes performing acts
which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any
kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.”

Moreover, the lifting of a suspension order is not automatic. It is


necessary that there is an order from the Court lifting the
suspension of a lawyer to practice law. In this case, on February
19, 2014, the Court directed respondent to comply with the
guidelines for the lifting of the suspension order against her by
filing a sworn statement on the matter. However, respondent did
not comply.
Alan Paguia vs. Office of the President Atty. Prieto vs. Atty. Corpuz and Judge Fe

G.R. No. 176278 June 25, 2010 AC No. 6517 December 6, 2006

FACTS FACTS

Petitioner, as citizen and taxpayer, filed a writ of certiorari to Invoking the principle of res ipsa loquitor, complainant objects to
invalidate President GMA’s nomination of respondent former the fact that Civil Case No. 1518-BG was raffled to the
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as Permanent Representative to respondent Judge, who was the former counsel of the plaintiff
the UN for violation of Sec. 23 of RA No. 7157 (Philippine Foreign therein in Civil Case No. 1081-BG. Another reason for his
Service Act of 1991). Respondent’s age is 70 which disqualifies objection is that, allegedly, some paragraphs in the complaint in
him from holding his post because the RA pegged the mandatory Civil Case No. 1518-BG were obviously copied from Civil Case No.
retirement age of all officers and employees of the DFA at 65. 1081-BG wherein the complaint was prepared by respondent
Judge in his capacity as then lawyer of herein complainant
Davide, Office of the Pres., and the Sec. of DFA raised three (plaintiff therein). Complainant claims that the foregoing
questions: constitute misconduct which imply malice or wrongful intent,
1. Petitioner has no standing to bring the suit due to his not just mere errors of judgment. He insists that the fact that
suspension from the practice of law. respondent Judge will try the case upon a complaint in which the
plaintiff was his former client and which complaint was copied
2. Neither petitioner’s citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests from the complaint he himself prepared does not speak well of
him with standing to question respondent Davide’s appointment his intention as to the disposition of the case.
because petitioner remains without personal and substantial
interest in the outcome of a suit. On 8 November 2001, respondent judge was appointed as the
presiding judge of RTC Branch 67. By reason of his appointment,
3. This suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto which can only he completely severed all his professional relationships with his
be filed by a contender for the office in question. clients, including Roque, the plaintiff in Civil Case 1081-BG which
involved mortgaging 6 parcels of land to the Rural Bank of Luna,
ISSUE and turned over or relinquished all case records of his office to
said clients.
1. WoN petitioner has standing to bring the suit despite being
suspended. Going over the individual case folders of the newly raffled cases
to his court, respondent judge came across Civil Case No. 1518-
HELD
BG and discovered that the plaintiff therein was Roque, his
1. No. Petitioner’s suspension from the practice of law bars him former client. Immediately, without going over the allegations of
from performing "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the complaint, the respondent judge issued an Order dated 23
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and January 2004 inhibiting himself from the case.
experience." Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully
ISSUE
crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing
highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 1. WoN petitioner’s suit is groundless.
23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.
HELD
DISPOSITION
1. Yes. A reading of the records of this case clearly shows that
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. the present administrative case is unfounded, as it is devoid of
factual and legal basis for the following reasons:

1. The mere fact that respondent lawyer had adopted relevant


and substantial portions of the complaint filed by the respondent
judge does not in any way bespeak of any illegal or unethical
practice on his part.

2. True, some allegations contained therein were substantially


retained by respondent lawyer. However, these allegations are
essential and crucial to the cause of action of Roque against the
petitioner. Aside from the fact that there is hardly a number of
ways to construct a sentence, petitioner cannot plausibly claim
that respondent lawyer is legally restrained from retaining or
rewriting sentences earlier constructed by the respondent judge.

3. Petitioner's inference that respondent judge intended to try


Civil Case No. 1518-BG is a blatant fabrication. The records of the
case refute this. Reading his petition, it is evident that petitioner
cunningly attempted to mislead this court to believe that
respondent judge is still conducting the proceedings in Civil Case
No. 1518-BG and had refused to inhibit himself therefrom.
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR vs.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in
the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this VICENTE CHING
duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
the judiciary. A lawyer is part of the machinery in the
administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument FACTS
to advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and
inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a
final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in
objectives but should likewise avoid unethical or improper Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964 under the 1935
practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, Constitution. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of
and efficient administration of justice.
Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an
The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is limited application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. He was allowed
to persons of good moral character with special qualifications to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he
duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
Ching submitted the following documents:
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly
personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust. Thus, a 1. Certification issued by the Board of Accountancy of the
lawyer should not use his knowledge of law as an instrument to Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a
harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes, as the same certified public accountant;
constitutes serious transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Canon 12. 2. Voter Certification issued by Election Officer of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing
DISPOSITION that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
ACCORDINGLY, the above-quoted report of Justice Salonga is 3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as a member of
APPROVED with modification asto the penalty imposed on the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May
complainant Atty. Marcos V. Prieto. Respondents Judge 1992 synchronized elections.
Ferdinand A. Fe and Atty. Oscar B. Corpuz are exonerated and
the administrative complaint against them is DISMISSED. Ching successfully passed the 1998 Bar Examinations but
Complainant Atty. Marcos V. Prieto is FINED P5,000.00 for filing because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was
frivolous suit with a stern warning that a repetition of the same not allowed to take his oath. The Court, in a Resolution, ordered
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Ching to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same
resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required
to file a comment on Ching's petition.

The OSG stated that a person seeking to be declared a Filipino


citizen must follow Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act
Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a
Filipino Citizen." "2 conditions must concur in order that the
election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a)
the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen
of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon
reaching the age of majority." The clause "upon reaching the age
of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after
reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the
Secretary of Justice to be 3 years. Said period may be extended
under certain circumstances, as when a person concerned has
always considered himself a Filipino. But in Cuenco, it was held
that an election done after over 7 years was not made within a
reasonable time.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally
elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would
already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present
jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances
surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of
the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable
period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and
citizenship. circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those in
the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban
After Ching elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution
question raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and
within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No.
citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to
examination. him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for
1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother.
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person
the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a
elected Philippine citizenship. This was recognized by the 1973 national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about
Constitution and was the latter was carried over to the 1987 Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21). Any
Constitution. However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
did not prescribe a time period within which the election of respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would
Philippine citizenship should be made. The age of majority then also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen
commenced upon reaching 21 years. In the decisions of the elect Philippine citizenship?
Court, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was 3
years from reaching the age of majority. However, it was held in Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, that the 3-year period is not an Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing
inflexible rule. However, the option to elect Philippine citizenship Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
is not indefinite. process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file
ISSUE the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable
1. WoN Ching’s election of Philippine citizenship falls within the and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply
“reasonable time” prescribed by law. glossed over.

HELD DISPOSITION

1. No. Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY
thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine
requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen Bar.
(14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority,"
Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick,
the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It
should be stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified
public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public
official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute


what Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship.
Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare,
the pertinent portion of which reads:

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare was legally


married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage
when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban
Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as
early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was
already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain
candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of
TELESFORO A. DIAO vs. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is
(1963) required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days.
So ordered.
FACTS
Notes:
Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar after successfully
passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953 In 1911, the only educational requirements for a law profession
were a high school degree as a pre-law and a three-year law
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with course. Later, the pre-law requisite was increased to two years
having falsely represented in his application for such Bar of college studies in addition to a high school degree. In 1960,
examination, that he had the requisite academic Sec. 6 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court was amended by the
qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Supreme Court increasing the pre-law requisite to a four-year
Solicitor-General who caused the charge to be investigated; bachelor’s degree in arts and science and the law course to four
and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's years of legal studies (bachelor of laws).
name be erased from the roll of attorneys because contrary
to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court,
he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the
required pre- legal education prescribed by the Department
of Private Education, especially in the following particulars:

(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and

(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never


obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom - which contradicts the
credentials he had submitted in support of his application for
examination, and of his allegation therein of successful
completion of the "required pre-legal education"

Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao,


practically admits the first charge; but he claims that
although he had left high school in his third year, he
entered the service of U. S. Army, passed the General
Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is
equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to
civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army
service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.

This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the


"error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. He
would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because
our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination
must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law,
he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required
pre-legal education (A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of
Private Education."

ISSUE

WON respondent should be disbarred.

HELD

Yes. Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to


take the bar examinations; but due to his false
representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it,
and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having
been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby
revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such examination is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is
equally essential.

DISPOSITION
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused
for the death of his son. However, as a loving father who had lost
B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997 a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law
FACTS: practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the
stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations
held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally
his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to
Homicide. the sound discretion of the Court.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose ISSUE


from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites WON Argosino can take the lawyer’s oath after he was charged
sometime in September 1991. with Reckless Imprudence but has thereafter repented
Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of HELD
not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later
withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded YES. After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to
guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath,
sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment the following admonition:
dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a
sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court
months :and one (1) day to four (4) years. recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber.
On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his public service.
discharge from probation.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to
Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the
C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral uncalculating.
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no ceremony or formality for practicing law.
less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among
others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) - Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions
members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the
evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly
honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be
case. faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert - The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will
Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to
render legal and other services to the more unfortunate
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states members of society.
that:
NOTES
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries
which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather than The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who
accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required
murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient
helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not
superior strength and treachery. only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the
noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out of tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has
pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991
and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and
begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that
the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon
learning of his son's involvement in the incident.
AGUIRRE vs. RANA

B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003

FACTS PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, B.


DACANAY, December 17, 2007
Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the
2000 Bar Examinations. Respondent, while not yet a lawyer, FACTS
appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections
before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers of Mandaon, Atty. Benjamin Dacanay filed a petition for leave to resume the
Masbate and filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 practice of law, he was admitted to the Philippine bar in 1960
entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of and practiced law until he migrated to Canada (in December
Votes in some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this 1998) to seek medical attention for his ailments. Petitioner
pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical
behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed aid program. His application was approved and he became a
the pleading as counsel for George Bunan. Furthermore, Canadian citizen in May 2004. (On July 14, 2006,) pursuant to
respondent also signed as counsel for Emily Estipona-Hao on 19 Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
May 2001 in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On
proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. On 21 May 2001, one day before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter,
the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as he returned to the Philippines and he intends to resume his law
members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie practice.
Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of ISSUES
Admission to the Bar. On 22 May 2001, respondent was allowed
to take the lawyer’s oath but was disallowed from signing the Whether petitioner lost his membership in the Philippine bar
Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. when he gave up his Philippine citizenship (in May 2004) and
whether he could still resume to practice law in view of RA 9225.
ISSUE
RULING
Whether or not respondent shall be denied Admission to the
Bar. PETITION – GRANTED subject to modifications and compliance
with the provided conditions.
HELD
The Office of the Bar Confidant in its report (Oct. 16, 2007) based
Yes. Respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he its recommendation in allowing the petitioner to resume practice
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various of law in the Philippines in view of Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys
pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court which provides that
charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called (SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the
himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member bar.) – Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar
of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of
had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines;
unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against
but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in
with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The any court in the Philippines. In relation to the said provision the
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, Office of the Bar Confidant declared that by virtue of petitioner’s
legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has
since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not again met all the qualifications and has none of the
acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar disqualifications for membership in the bar. OBC’s said
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be recommendation was subject to the condition on petitioner’s
withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if retaking of the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
the person seeking admission had practiced law without a responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
license. True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar The Court APPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION of the Office of
Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the the Bar Confidant WITH CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS.
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-
fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar In its resolution the Court held that the Constitution provides
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since
know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss
had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In
Attorneys. other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates
the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of
law is a privilege denied to foreigners. But the Court ratiocinated - Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
that the citizenship requirement admits an exception when
Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly
of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such
9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good
of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]." Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements
country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice
he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also law.
deemed never to have terminated his membership in the
Philippine bar, the Court also said that no automatic right to - Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules
resume law practice accrues. of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be
a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of
In modifying OBC’s recommendation the Court cited the good moral character and a resident of the Philippines. He must
provisions of RA 9225, which provides that if a person intends to also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good
practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral
his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in Philippines.
such practice." Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as
practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other
so, conditioned on: qualifications; passing the bar examinations; taking the lawyer’s
oath and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.
dues in the IBP;
- The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in
(b) the payment of professional tax; good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual
continuing legal education; this is especially significant to refresh membership dues in the IBP; payment of the annual professional
the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and tax; compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
update him of legal developments and requirement; faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the
legal profession and being continually subject to judicial
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind disciplinary control.
him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer
of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing


as a member of the Philippine bar. Petition is GRANTED, subject
to compliance with the stated conditions and submission of
proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he
may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

NOTES

- may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice
law in the Philippines? No.

- The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is


so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power
and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.

- Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of


the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules
of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
are the conditions required for membership in good standing in
the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach
by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of
the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in
him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.
IN RE: CUNANAN Chief Justice PARAS (dissenting) – RA 972 is Constitutional:

Ponente: Justice DIOKNO, 1954 (a) Constitution expressly provided the Congress the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
FACTS pleading, practice, and procedure, and admission to the practice
In 1953, the Congress passed Republic Act No. 972, known as of law. All discussions in support of proposition that the power
“Bar Flunkers Act of 1953”, which fixed the passing marks for the to regulate the admission to the practice of law is inherently
Bar Examinations held from 1946 up to and including 1955. judicial are immaterial.

The Act provides: (b) Resolution on the rejection of the petition of bar
candidates, asking for re-evaluation, does not have the finality of
Article 1. Any bar candidate who obtained a general average of decisions.
70% in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August
1951 bar examinations; 71% in the 1952 bar examinations; 72% (c) RA 972 is not an ex post facto law.
in the in the 1953 bar examinations; 73% in the 1954 bar (d) RA 972 is not a class legislation. It cannot be said that
examinations; 74% in the 1955 bar examinations without bar candidates prior to July 1, 1946, are being discriminated
obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject be allowed against, because we no longer have any record of those who
to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as might have failed before the war, apart from the circumstance
member of the Philippine Bar. that 75 percent had always been the passing mark during said
Article 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% per period.
cent in any subject in any bar examination after July 4, 1946 shall (e) Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground
be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this Court
grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the
general average that said candidate may obtain in any 1947 bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948
subsequent examinations that he may take. examinations.
According to the author of the said Act, "The reason for relaxing (f) Court should not inquire into the wisdom of the law,
the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the
handicap which students during the years immediately after the legislators.
Japanese occupation have to overcome such as the insufficiency
of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of
students who took up law soon after the liberation."
(g) To say that the admission of the bar candidates
ISSUE benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public interest, is to
assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or
W/N R.A. 972 is valid. harmful to the general public was not considered by the
DECISION Congress.

R.A. no. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without DEFINITION:
any force or effect for the following reasons: What is a Class Legislation?
(a) The act deprives the court the opportunity to determine if Class Legislation – Legislation that affects only a specific
the Bar Candidates, in those years provided for in the act, are geographic area or a particular class of persons. Such legislation
prepared to become members of the bar. It manifests is unconstitutional if it arbitrarily or capriciously distinguishes
encroachment on the Constitutional Responsibility of the between members of the same class.
Supreme Court.
For a Classification to be Valid:
(b) The Act would adversely affect the resolutions revoking the
petitions of the Bar Candidates asking for re-evaluation of their “There must be such a difference between the situation and
ratings. circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation
and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation
(c) Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just
and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. and natural reason for the difference made in their liabilities and
(d) The act is undoubtedly a class legislation. burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general
because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a
(e) Article 2 is not embraced in the title of the law, and being substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only,
inseparable to Article 1, the entire law is void. and not generally on all." – Justice DIOKNO

 The portion of Article 1 of Republic Act no. 972 with reference


to the Bar Examiners from 1953 to 1955 is valid and shall
continue in force.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
IN RE: VICTORIO LANUEVO (former Bar confidant)

RAMON GALANG (1971 Bar Examinee) flunked in 1969, 1966- Tan vs. Sabandal, B.M. No. 44, February 24, 1992
76, 1962-64 Bar exam
Facts
FACTS
Respondent passed the 1978 Bar Examination but was denied to
Administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanuevo for take his oath in view of the finding of the Court that he was
disbarment. guilty of unauthorized practice of law.

Admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Acting to his latest petition in 1989, the Court directed the
Ramon E. Galang back to the respective examiners for re- executive judge of the province where the respondent is
evalution or re-checking. domiciled to submit a comment of respondent’s moral fitness to
be a member of the bar.
The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked
the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has In compliance, the executive judge filed his comment stating that
the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned although he is not aware of any acts committed by him as would
failed only in his particular subject and was on the borderline of disqualify him from the admission to the Bar.
passing.
Said judge, however, informed the court that respondent has a
Ramon galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of pending civil case before his court for cancellation/reversion
Lanuevo’s move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5 proceedings, in which respondent, then working as a Land
subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, as per complaint filed by the
Remedial). Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have secured a free
patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land, which
Galang on the other hand, denied of having charged of Slight upon investigation, turned out to be swampland and not
Physical Injuries on Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU. susceptible of acquisition under a free patent and which he later
RULING mortgaged to the bank.

The court disbarred Lanuevo – has no authority to request the The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land sold at public
examiners to re-evaluate grades of examinees w/o prior auction and respondent has not redeemed the land since then.
authority from Supreme Court. Said case was however been settled when the parties entered
He does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of into an amicable settlement. The said amicable settlement
admission of examinees to the bar. He does not a have any cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free Patent in the
business evaluating the answers of the examinees. name of the respondent and latter’s mortgage in the bank;
provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the
Consequently, Galang was also disbarred. Sec. 2 of Rule 138 of Register of Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of
the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, candidates for admission to public domain the land covered by the aforementioned
the bar must be of good moral character. Galang has a pending certificate of title with respondent refraining from exercising acts
criminal cases of Physical Injuries, he committed perjury when he of possession or ownership over the said land. Respondent also
declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case this paid the bank a certain sum for the loan and interest.
resulted him to revoked his license.
Issue

Whether or not the respondent can now be admitted to the


practice of law considering that he already submitted three (3)
testimonials regarding his good moral character, and his pending
civil case has been terminated?

Held

His petition was denied. Time and again, it has been held that
the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law
but who are also known to possess good moral character.

It should be recalled that respondent worked as a Land


Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated
his procurement of the free patent title over the property which
he could not but have known was a public land. This was
manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral
character. It is manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the
public service, which cannot be erased by the termination of the
case and where no determination of guilt or innocence was
made because the suit has been compromised. This is a sad
reflection of his sense of honor and fair dealings.
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar v. Atty. Lauro Tapucar
Moreover, his failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the
civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period he Facts
was submitting several petitions and motions for Remedios Ramirez sought the disbarment of her husband Atty.
reconsiderations reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness. Lauro Tapucar on the ground of continuing grossly immoral
Although the term “good moral character” admits of broad conduct of cohabiting with a certain Elena Peña under
dimensions, it has been defined as “including at least common scandalous circumstances.
honesty”. It has also been held that no moral qualification for bar From Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar
membership is more important than truthfulness or candor. Discipline, it appears that shortly after being appointed as CFI
Judge, he began cohabiting and had a child with Peña. In view of
this cohabitation, an administrative complaint was previously
filed and in which he was suspended for six months without pay.

Despite this however, he continued to cohabit with Peña giving


rise to another charge of immorality and other administrative
cases such as conduct unbecoming an officer of the court and
grossly immoral conduct. The court this time ordered his
dismissal and separation from service. Still, this did not stop Atty.
Tapucar from cohabiting with the same girl, who gave birth to
their second child.

Atty. Tapucar married Elena despite the existence of his first


marriage with Ramirez. The latter on the other hand migrated to
United States. Her children kept her posted of the misery they
allegedly suffered because of their father’s acts. Thus, despite
having previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed in
1976, complainant was forced to file the present petition for
disbarment.

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines


(IBP) recommended that Atty. Tapucar be disbarred.

Issue

W/N the continued grossly immoral conduct of respondent


lawyer constitutes disbarment

Held

Yes. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar was disbarred. Well settled is the rule
that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact
in order to maintain one's good standing. There is perhaps no
profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned
morality is more imperative than that of law. 10 The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,


immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely


reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

Lawyers must live up to the standards and norms expected of


the legal profession by always upholding the ideals and tenets
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). They
must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency, as well as
morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing for they are
at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and
community approbation. Needless to state, those whose
conduct, both public and private fails this scrutiny would have to
be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized
accordingly. Zaguirre vs. Castillo

As officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and Facts
confidence of the public that justice is administered with dignity Carmelita Zaguirre and Atty. Alfredo Castillo met sometime in
and civility. A high degree of moral integrity is expected of a 1996 when the two became officemates at the National Bureau
lawyer in the community where he resides. He must maintain of Investigation (NBI). Castillo courted Zaguirre and promised to
due regard for public decency in an orderly society. marry her while representing himself to be single.
Every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain Little did she know that he was already married with three
the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the children when they had an affair. As a result of their relationship,
public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice. Zaguirre got pregnant. Castillo, who already passed the bar
Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior exams at that time, notarized an affidavit recognizing the child
one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating the and offering her support.
wife and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, By this time however, he started to refuse recognizing the child
morality and decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. and giving her any form of support. He also added that he never
In this case, records show that despite previous sanctions represented himself as single as it was known in the NBI that he
imposed upon him, he still continued with his illicit liaison with a was already a family man.
woman other than his lawfully-wedded wife. He exhibited a Zaguirre filed a petition for disbarment on the ground of Gross
cavalier attitude in the face of charges against him. Such gross Immoral Conduct. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious found him guilty of the same and recommended that he be
flaw in Atty. Tapucar’s character, his moral indifference to meted with penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of
scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of law.
established norms. All these could not but put the legal
profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the Issue
administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but
appropriate disciplinary action. The court then directed to strike W/N the penalty imposed is proper.
out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Held

Yes. The court ruled that indefinite suspension, and not


disbarment should be applied.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the


State on those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of
such privilege. We must stress that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to
practice law only during good behavior. He can be deprived of
his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment
of the cort after giving him the opportunity to be heard.

It is a privilege burdened with conditions, adherence to the rigid


standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree
of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal
profession are the conditions required for remaining a member
of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law.

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good


moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the
Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.

The illicit relationship with Zaguirre took place while respondent


was preparing to take the bar examinations. Thus, it cannot be
said that it is unknown to him that an applicant for admission to
membership in the bar must show that he is possessed of good
moral character, a requirement which is not dispensed with process “private duties” they owe their “fellowmen” or “society”
upon admission to membership of the bar. Castillo clearly in a manner “contrary to xxx accepted and customary rule of
violated the standards required of him. right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.” The duty not to
appropriate, or to return, anything acquired either by mistake or
Dela Torre v. COMELEC with malice is so basic it finds expression in some key provisions
Facts of the Civil Code on “Human Relations” and “Solutio Indebiti.

Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the 2. No. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the
COMELEC from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, execution of the sentence. Petitioner’s conviction of fencing
Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections on the ground that he was subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the
convicted by the MTC of violation the Anti-Fencing Law, citing grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal
Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for
provides as follows: probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the
application for probation.
“Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position: Clearly then, petitioner's theory has no merit. Hence, Dela Torre
is disqualified from seeking public office.
“(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby
more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving DISMISSED and the assailed resolutions of the COMELEC dated
sentence;” May 6, 1995 and August 28, 1995 are AFFIRMED in toto.

Petitioner contended that the provision is not applicable to him


because he was granted probation by the MTC.

Issue

1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.

2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)’s


applicability.

Held

1. Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness,


or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow
men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

The elements of the crime of fencing which are:

• A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

• The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the


crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value,
which have been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;

• The accused knows or should have known that the said


article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and

• There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for


himself or for another.”

Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual


knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property received is
stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s
rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft
which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And
although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking
differs in point in time and in degree, both the “fence” and the
actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s
peaceful dominion for gain - thus deliberately reneging in the
HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI, v. DIOSDADO S. FLORES Paras vs. Vailoces, A.C. No. 439, April 12, 1961

Facts Facts

Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch VI City Court of This concerns the disbarment of Quinciano Vailoces as member
Quezon City, recommended the dismissal from the service of Mr. of the Philippine bar.
Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City
Court, on grounds of moral turpitude and persistent attempts to Vailoces, on December 14, 1950, acknowledged the execution of
unduly influence the complainant amounting to undue interest a document purporting to be the last will and testament of one
in cases pending before Branch VI and gross discourtesy to Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for probate before the
superior officers as manifested by his uncalled for and unjustified Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, the will was impugned
use of strong and contemptuous language in addressing the City by her surviving spouse and daughter. Consequently, the
Judges probate court, finding that the will was a forgery, rendered
decision denying probate to the will. This decision is final.
Issue
On the basis of this decision a criminal action for falsification of
Whether or not respondent’s acts constitute grounds for public document was filed against Vailoces and the three
dismissal from the service attesting witnesses to the will before the Court of First Instance
of Negros Oriental. After trial, they were found guilty and
Held convicted on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge with regard to Vailoces but modified it with record to his co-
Oscar A. Inocentes on June 10, 1969, the respondent stated that accused.
I am a person of good moral character and integrity and have no As finally adjudged, Vailoces was found guilty beyond reasonable
administrative, criminal or police record. This claim is not true doubt of the crime of falsification of public document.
because the respondent had been convicted of libel in Criminal
Case No. Q-7171, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch This sentence having become final, Vailoces began serving it in
IV, in a sentence dated April 28, 1967. This prevarication in a the insular penitentiary. As a consequence, the offended party
sworn statement is a ground for serious disciplinary action. instituted the present disbarment proceedings.

That in his accomplished Civil Service Form No. 212 which was In his answer, respondent not only disputes the judgment of
subscribed and sworn to, the respondent admits having acted as conviction rendered against him in the criminal case but
counsel for three companies; and that the giving of legal advice contends that the same is based on insufficient and inconclusive
by notaries and others who are not admitted to the practice of evidence, the charge being merely motivated by sheer
law is dangerous to the welfare of the community, because such vindictiveness, malice and spite on the part of herein
persons have not demonstrated their capacity by submitting to complainant, and that to give course to this proceeding would be
examinations lawfully established in the practice of law. tantamount to placing him in double jeopardy. He pleads that
the complaint be dismissed.
The respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity to
speak ill of others as reflected in his letter to Judge Minerva C. Issue/s
Genovea, then Executive Judge of the City Court of Quezon City
which contains defamatory and uncalled for language. 1. Whether or not Falsification of public document be considered
ground for disbarment

Held

Under Section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of Court, a member of


the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney if it appears that he has been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude, as used in this
section, includes any act deemed contrary to justice, honesty or
good morals.1 Among the examples given of crimes of this
nature by former Chief Justice Moran are the crime of seduction
and the crime of concubinage.2 The crime of which respondent
was convicted is falsification of public document, which is indeed
of this nature, for the act is clearly contrary to justice, honesty
and good morals. Hence, such crime involves moral turpitude.
Indeed, it is well-settled that "embezzlement, forgery, robbery,
and swindling are crimes which denote moral turpitude and, as a
general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked
on as involving moral turpitude."

Dispositive
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby removed from his office as
attorney and, to this effect, our Clerk of Court is enjoined to
erase his name from the roll of attorneys.
Villaber vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 148326, The COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P. BIg. 22
November, 15, 2001 involves moral turpitude following the ruling of this Court en
banc in the administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda.
Facts
Issue/s
In this petition for certiorari, Pablo C. Villaber, seeks the
nullification of two Resolutions of the Commission on Election Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude
(COMELEC).
Held
The first one was issued by its Second Division on April 30, 2001,
In People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda we held that a conviction for
disqualifying him as a candidate for the position of Congressman
violation of B.P. BIg. 22 "imports deceit" and "certainly relates to
in the First District of the Province of Davao del Sur in the last
and affects the good moral character of a person.…" The effects
May 14, 2001 elections, and cancelling his certificate of
of the issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark
candidacy; and the second is the en banc Resolution dated May
case of Lozano vs. Martinez, through Justice Pedro L. Yap,
10, 2001 denying his motion for reconsideration.
"transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved
Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at
rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. holder, but also an injury to the public" since the circulation of
valueless commercial papers "can very well pollute the channels
Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman on of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
February 19, 2001, while Cagas filed his on February 28, 2001. eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest."
Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial
unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he
Election Supervisor, Commission On Elections (COMELEC), Davao
owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted
del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to
and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good
cancel the latter's certificate of candidacy.
morals.
Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that on March 2,
As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently
1990, Villaber was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
adopted the definition in Black's Law Dictionary as "an act of
Manila for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The check that
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
bounced was in the sum of P100,000.00.
man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
disqualified to run for any public office. good morals." In In re Vinzon,14 the term "moral turpitude" is
considered as encompassing "everything which is done contrary
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated April23, to justice, honesty, or good morals."
1992 affirmed the RTC Decision.
Disposition
Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court a petition for review on
certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision. However, in its WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
Resolution of October 26, 1992, this Court dismissed the
petition. On February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and
executory.

Cagas also asserted that Villaber made a false material


representation in his certificate of candidacy that he is "Eligible
for the office I seek to be elected " - which false statement is a
ground to deny due course or cancel the said certificate pursuant
to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

In his answers, to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered


mainly that his conviction has not become final and executory
because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial
court for promulgation in his presence. Furthermore, even if the
judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it
cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.

On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division), finding merit


in Cagas' petition, issued the challenged Resolution declaring
Villaber disqualified as "a candidate for and from holding any
elective public office" and canceling his certificate of candidacy.
Magno vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 158371, defeated by mere technical objections. In an election case, the
December 11, 2003 court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its
command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate.
Facts
As a general rule, the proper remedy after the proclamation of
Petitioner Sonia R. Lorenzo and respondent Nestor B. Magno the winning candidate for the position contested would be to file
were rival candidates for Mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the a regular election protest or a petition for quo warranto. This
local elections of May 14, 2001. rule, however, admits of exceptions, to wit: (1) where the board
A certain Carlos Montes, resident of San Isidro, filed with the of canvassers was improperly constituted; (2) where quo
Commission on Elections a petition for the disqualification of warranto was not the proper remedy; (3) where what was filed
respondent Magno as a candidate on the ground of his was not really a petition for quo warranto or an election protest
conviction by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of Direct Bribery. but a petition to annul the proclamation; (4) where the filing of a
quo warranto petition or an election protest was expressly made
On May 7, 2001, the COMELEC issued a Resolution disqualifying without prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was
respondent Magno. This was affirmed on appeal by the made ad cautelam; and (5) where the proclamation was null and
COMELEC En Banc on May 12, 2001. void.

The aforesaid Resolution was disseminated for implementation This case falls squarely within the fifth exception to the general
by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Isidro. Hence, on rule, i.e. the proclamation of Lorenzo as Mayor of San Isidro was
May 18, 2001, petitioner Lorenzo was proclaimed as the Mayor- null and void. As of May 18, 2001, the date on which Lorenzo
elect of San Isidro. was proclaimed Mayor-elect of San Isidro, the question as
regards Magno’s qualifications for said post was still pending,
Meanwhile, respondent Magno brought a petition for certiorari and was raised as an issue before this Court in certiorari
before this Court, assailing his disqualification by the COMELEC. proceedings in G.R. No. 147904. The question of Magno’s
qualifications for the office of Mayor was not resolved until
On October 4, 2002, this Court rendered a Decision reversing and
October 4, 2002, when we expressly ruled that Magno was
setting aside the two challenged Resolutions of the COMELEC
qualified for said post.
dated May 7 and 12, 2001, and declaring that Magno was under
no disqualification to run for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in Disposition
the May 14, 2001 elections.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
On October 21, 2002, respondent Magno filed an Omnibus The Resolution dated May 13, 2003, and the Orders dated May
Motion with the COMELEC, seeking: (a) that his name be 22, 2003 and June 10, 2003 of the Commission on Elections,
reinstated in the certified list of candidates for municipal mayor which (a) ordered the creation of a new Board of Election
of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2001 local election; (b) Inspectors for all precincts in the municipality of San Isidro in
the nullification of the proclamation of Lorenzo as mayor of San Nueva Ecija; and (b) ordered the immediate constitution of a
Isidro, Nueva Ecija; (c) that a special board of canvassers be new Municipal Board of Canvassers in San Isidro, Nueva Ecija,
formed to continue the canvas of votes cast in favor of are hereby AFFIRMED.
respondent Magno; and (d) after completion of the canvas, that
Magno be proclaimed the winner.

Subsequently, on May 22, 2003, the COMELEC partially modified


the above Resolution to order the immediate constitution of a
new Municipal Board of Canvassers, it appearing that the old
Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija had
already canvassed all the election returns for all precincts except
the votes for Magno. The COMELEC reiterated the directive in an
Order dated June 10, 2003, and ordered the immediate
implementation and execution thereof.

Issue/s

Whether or not COMELEC’s order for the canvass of votes defies


this Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 147904 that Magno should have
filed an election protest

Held

Well settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public


interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers should not be
allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of
their elective officials. Also settled is the rule that laws governing
election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the
will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be
Ao Lin vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-18506, January 30, 1964 revenue involved in the sealing of the meter stick, but because it
manifests an evil intent on the part of the petitioner to defraud
Facts customers purchasing from him in respect to the measurement
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of of the goods purchased.
Manila, finding the petitioner Ao Lin in the above-entitled But even assuming that the last conviction does not involve
proceedings qualified to be naturalized as a citizen of the moral turpitude, at least the above convictions, together with
Philippines. the violation civil and criminal, which he had been complained of
The court found that petitioner was born in Fookien, Amoy, before the authorities, conclusively show that he has not
China on September 1, 1921, and arrived in the Philippines in the conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during
Port of Manila in October, 1929; his entire period of residence in the Philippines in his relation
with the constituted government, as required in Sec. 2, par. 3 of
He was married to Co Piak Ngo of Fookien, Amoy, China in the Revised Naturalization Act.
November, 1935; that he has three children, one of 12 years of
age, another of 11 years and a third of 6 years, and still another Disposition
child by the name of Ay Tian Tuao, born on April 27, 1936 in WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
Amoy, China, the petition of Ao Lin for naturalization dismissed with costs
The last child, according to petitioner, is 25 years old and has not against petitioner-appellee. So ordered.
been found by him; that he sends his children to school; that he
is a merchant dealing in lumber and hardware and construction
supplies with an income of around P6,500.00 a year; that he has
paid income taxes and believes in the principles underlying the
Constitution of the Philippines, etc.

The court further found that he was found guilty of violation of


city ordinances of Manila in 1954 and that he paid as penalty a
fine of P55.00 and costs; that he was also charged and found
guilty of violation of Section 288, National Internal Revenue
Code, for using a meter stick without seal for which violation he
was sentenced to pay a fire of P30.00 with imprisonment in case
of insolvency, etc.

Against the petition, the office of the Solicitor General presented


various exhibits containing records of the complaints filed
against petitioner in the office of the city fiscal of Manila, in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, and in the National Bureau of
Investigation.

Issue/s

Whether or not violation of the ordinances of the City of Manila


and of the National Internal Revenue Code could impede his
naturalization

Held

The Court of First Instance found that the violation of the


ordinances of the City of Manila and of the National Internal
Revenue Code were not impediments to his naturalization
because the said offenses do not involve moral turpitude. The
Solicitor General contends before Us that the same do constitute
offenses involving moral turpitude. But in addition, the Solicitor
General contends that the petitioner cannot be considered as
having an irreproachable character as required by the
Naturalization Law.

We disagree with the opinion of the court below that none of


the offenses of which the petitioner was convicted involves
moral turpitude. We hold that the use of a meter stick without
the corresponding seal of the Internal Revenue Office, by one
who has been engaged in business for a long time, involves
moral turpitude because it involves a fraudulent use of a meter
stick, not necessarily because the Government is cheated of the
Teves vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 180363 is a form of gambling, the morality thereof or the wisdom in
legalizing it is not a justiciable issue.
Facts
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the
the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
2007 elections. categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that
On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal
petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own
Sandiganbayan, he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of
Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider
cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits
Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and was sentenced to pay a lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices,
fine of P10,000.00. Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no
authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that
Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running courts do no sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That
for public office because he was convicted of a crime involving is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that
moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of
disqualification from public office. statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved
only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC disqualified petitioner from function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is
running for the position of member of House of Representatives exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are
and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents
who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the
justice.
COMELEC en banc which was denied in its assailed October 9,
2007 Resolution for being moot. Disposition
It appears, however, that petitioner lost in the last 14 May 2007 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions
congressional elections for the position of member of the House of the Commission on Elections dated May 11, 2007 and October
of Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental 9, 2007 disqualifying petitioner Edgar Y. Teves from running for
thereby rendering the instant Motion for Reconsideration moot the position of Representative of the 3rd District of Negros
and academic. Oriental, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered
declaring that the crime committed by petitioner (violation of
Issue/s
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.
Whether or not petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No.
3019 involves moral turpitude.

Held

There are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct
or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019.
The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part
in his official capacity in connection with his financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The
second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an
interest by the Constitution or by law. In Teves v.
Sandiganbayan,12 petitioner was convicted under the second
mode for having pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which
is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of
1991. The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of
violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is
possession of a prohibited interest.

It may be argued that having an interest in a cockpit is


detrimental to public morality as it tends to bring forth idlers and
gamblers, hence, violation of Section 89(2) of the LGC involves
moral turpitude. Suffice it to state that cockfighting, or sabong in
the local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our culture
and was prevalent even during the Spanish occupation. While it
Uyboco vs. People, G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014 On the first element, accused Valencia was a public officer at the
time the acts in question were committed.
Facts
Thus, while petitioner was a private individual, he was found to
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by have been in conspiracy with accused Valencia. This is in accord
petitioner assailing the Sandiganbayan's Decision dated January with the rule that private persons may be charged in conspiracy
9, 2014 and Resolution dated March 14, 2014, finding petitioner with public officers.
and his co-accused Rodolfo G. Valencia guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, As to the second element, accused Valencia entered into a
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as negotiated contract with Gaikoku without authority from the
amended. Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP). In fact, Valencia had already
approved the purchase request for the dump trucks as early as
Petitioner asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the March 1993, prior to any SP resolution approving such direct
existence of a conspiracy and in convicting him in the absence of acquisition.
proof beyond reasonable doubt of such conspiracy. More
importantly, petitioner finds fault in the Sandiganbayan's denial The third element of the crime is also present since it had been
of his Motion to Reconsider the Decision of this Honorable Court proven that an overpayment was made for the dump trucks,
(Promulgated on January 9, 2014) with a Plea to Re-Open the since these were directly imported by the Provincial Government
Proceedings dated January 22, 2014. from the distributor in Japan. With this direct importation, the
Provincial Government should have only paid the tax-free
In his motion, petitioner prayed for the reopening of the amount of ₱4,594,119.85. Instead, accused Valencia had already
proceedings on the ground that his constitutional rights to due authorized and caused the disbursement of ₱6,994,286, or an
process and to competent counsel were violated when his excess of ₱2,400,166.15, in favor of petitioner’s company,
former counsel, due to blatant error, abuse of discretion, and Gaikoku. This has clearly caused undue injury to the government.
gross incompetence, did not present any evidence in his defense,
causing serious prejudice to him. Disposition

According to petitioner, he was "accorded grossly insufficient WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January
legal assistance by his former lawyer" who informed him that 9, 2014 and Resolution dated March 14, 2014 issued by the
"there was no necessity for a preliminary investigation and to Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24461 are hereby
present any evidence." His former counsel also "failed to cross AFFIRMED.
examine the main prosecution witness because said counsel was
inexplicably absent on the trial date" and even "failed to prepare
and file a memorandum" and "merely relied on the defense
presented by the lawyers of co-accused Valencia and Maramot
by adopting the defenses of the other accused and all their
pleadings and manifestations, even when these were clearly not
applicable to petitioner’s defense." Thus, petitioner avers that
his constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due
process and of law and to competent counsel were violated.

In its Comment dated September 30,2014, the Office of the


Special Prosecutor opposed petitioner’s plea to reopen the case
on the ground of denial of due process. In citing Lagua v. CA,
they claim there is no basis to set aside the assailed decision and
resolution since "a client is bound by the action of his counsel."

Issue/s

Whether or not the accused is guilty of violating Section 3(e) of


Republic Act No. 3019

Held

For accused to be found liable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the


following elements must concur: 1) The accused must be a public
officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;

2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith


or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3) That his action caused
undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his functions.

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