Article 5.

 Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or that it covers only adoptions for the purpose establishing a The following cannot adopt
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself relationship of paternity and filiation, where none existed, but
authorizes their validity. (4a) not where the adopting parents are not total strangers to said
xxx     xxx     xxx
child; that there is already a relation between the child and
Brehm, created by affinity that Art. 338 of the New Civil code,
expressly authorizes the adoption of a step-child by a step- (4) Non-resident aliens;
G.R. No. L-18566             September 30, 1963
father, in which category petitioner Brehm falls. Petitioners
contend that the records show their residence is Manila, for
xxx     xxx     xxx
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF ELIZABETH MIRA, while Brehm works at Subic, he always goes home to Manila,
GILBERT R. BREHM and ESTER MIRA BREHM, petitioners- during week-ends and manifested that he intends to reside in
appellees, the Philippines permanently, after his tour of duty with the U.S. This legal provision is too clear to require interpretation. No
vs. Naval Forces. matter how much we may sympathize with the plight of Baby
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant. Rose and with the good intentions of petitioners herein, the law
leaves us no choice but to apply its explicit terms, which
The Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court rendered judgment,
unqualifiedly deny to petitioners the power to adopt anybody in
Pitt Vasquez for petitioners-appellees. the Pertinent portions of which read —
the Philippines (Ellis & Ellis v. Republic, L-16922, Apr. 30,
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant.
1963).
... Since residence is principally a matter of intention, the Court
PAREDES, J.: is of the opinion that notwithstanding the nature of Petitioner
Prior to the above decision, We have also denied petitions to
Gilbert R. Brehm's coming to the Philippines, his subsequent
adopt by persons similarly situated as petitioner Brehm. Thus,
acts, coupled with his declared intention of permanently
Finding that only legal issues are involved in the instant case, in the case of Caraballo v. Republic, G.R. No. L-15080, April
residing herein, have cured the legal defect on the point of
the Court of Appeals certified the same to this Court for 25, 1962, giving some reason why non-resident aliens are
residence.
disposition. disqualified to adopt, We said —

Finally, we must consider the status of the minor Elizabeth Mira

Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen, serving the U.S. Navy ... Looking after the welfare of a minor to be adopted the law
whose welfare deserves paramount consideration. Being a
with temporary assignment at Subic Bay. On October 9, 1958, has surrounded him with safeguards to achieve and insure
natural child of the petitioning wife, it cannot be in conscience
he married Ester Mira, a Filipino citizen, who had a daughter such welfare. It cannot be gain said that an adopted minor may
be expected that when petitioners married, the mother would
Elizabeth, by another man, also of the American Navy, who left be removed from the country by the adopter, who is not a
reduce her responsibility and her affection toward her child....
the country in 1952, and never heard from since then. After the resident of the Philippines, and placed beyond the reach and
marriage, the couple established residence at Intramuros, protection of the country of his birth. (See also S/Sgt. Katancik,
Manila, and the minor Elizabeth had always been under their WHEREFORE, finding that the principal allegations of the v. Republic, G.R. No. L-15472, June 20, 1962).
care and support of Brehm. petitioners are true, it is hereby adjudged that henceforth the
minor Elizabeth is freed from all obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural father, and is, to all This notwithstanding, petitioners press the argument that
On January 28, 1959, the spouses filed a Joint Petition with the Brehm being now the step-father of the minor, he is qualified to
legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioners Gilbert R.
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the adoption of the adopt, in view of the provisions of par. 3, Art. 338, Civil Code,
Brehm and Ester Mira Brehm, said minor's surname being
minor Elizabeth, claiming that they have mutually given their which states —
change from "Mira" to "Mira Brehm".1awphîl.nèt
consent to the adoption, not only to promote her best interest
and well-being, but also to give her a legitimate status. They
The following may be adopted:
prayed that after the proper proceedings, judgment be entered, The Solicitor General took exception from the judgment,
freeing the child Elizabeth Mira from all legal obligations of claiming that it was error for the Court in adjudging the minor
obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural father, Elizabeth Mira the adopted child of petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm. (1) The natural child by the natural father
and be, for all legal intents and purposes, the child of the The appeal, however, did not assail the right of petitioner Ester
petitioners, with all the rights pertinent thereto. Mira Brehm, the natural mother of the minor, to adopt her.
(2) Other legitimate children, by the father or mother

An opposition to the petition with respect to Gilbert Brehm was There is no question that petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm is a non-
resident alien. By his own testimony, he supplied the (3) A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother.
registered by the Republic of the Philippines, it appearing that
Brehm testified that his residence in Philippines was merely conclusive proof of his status here, and no amount of reasoning
temporary, same being effective only for purposes of his tour of will overcome the same. For this reason, he is not qualified to We should construe, however, Article 338 in connection with
duty with the Navy, thus disqualifying him from making an adopt. On this very point, We have recently declared: article 335. Art. 335 clearly states that "The
adoption (Art. 335 [4], New Civil Code; Sec. 2, Rule 100, Rules following cannot adopt: ... (4). Non-resident aliens". It is
of Court), and that being a non-resident alien, the Court has no therefore, mandatory, because it contains words of positive
The only issue in this appeal is whether, not being permanent
jurisdiction over him. prohibition and is couched in the negative terms importing that
residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt
Baby Rose. Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated
Provides that — (50 Am. Jur. 51). On the other hand, Art. 338, Provides "the
A reply to the opposition was presented by petitioners. They
following may be adopted: (3) a
claim that Art. 335 does not apply in the case, reasoning out
step-child, by the step-father or step-mother", which is merely
directory, and which can only be given operation if the same The following antecedents are culled from the assailed decision d. The bidder and manufacturer are capable of supplying the
does not conflict with the mandatory provisions of Art. 335. of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 22, woodpoles and specified in the bid documents and as based on
Moreover, as heretofore been shown, it is article 335 that 2004,2 viz: the pre-award inspection conducted.
confers jurisdiction to the court over the case, and before
Article; 338 may or can be availed of, such jurisdiction must
In 1999, the National Electrification Administration ("NEA") However, on December 19, 2000, NEA’s Board of Directors
first be established. We ruled out the adoption of a step-child
published an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, passed Resolution No. 32 reducing by 50% the material
by a step-father, when the latter has a legitimate child of his
otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of requirements for IBP No. 80 "given the time limitations for the
own (Ball v. Rep., 50 O.G. 145; and McGee v. Rep., L-5387,
about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles and twenty delivery of the materials, xxx, and with the loan closing date of
April 29, 1959).
thousand (20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in the country’s October 2001 fast approaching". In turn, it resolved to award
Rural Electrification Project. The said contract consisted of four the four (4) schedules of IBP No. 80 at a reduced number to
IN VIEW HEREOF, the decision appealed from, in so far as it (4) components, namely: PIA, PIB and PIC or woodpoles and private respondent [Nerwin]. Private respondent [Nerwin]
affects the petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm, is hereby reversed, and P3 or crossarms, necessary for NEA’s projected allocation for protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the same was a
his Petition to adopt the child EIizabeth Mira, denied. Without Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. In response to the said ploy to accommodate a losing bidder.
costs. invitation, bidders, such as private respondent [Nerwin], were
required to submit their application for eligibility together with
On the other hand, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific
their technical proposals. At the same time, they were informed
Synnergy appeared to have filed a complaint, citing alleged
that only those who would pass the standard pre-qualification
false or falsified documents submitted during the pre-
would be invited to submit their financial bids.
qualification stage which led to the award of the IBP-80 project
G.R. No. 167057               April 11, 2012
to private respondent [Nerwin].
Following a thorough review of the bidders’ qualifications and
NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, Petitioner, eligibility, only four (4) bidders, including private respondent
Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding,
vs. [Nerwin], qualified to participate in the bidding for the IPB-80
NEA officials sought the opinion of the Government Corporate
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and contract. Thereafter, the qualified bidders submitted their
Counsel who, among others, upheld the eligibility and
ESTER R. GUERZON, Chairman, Bids and Awards financial bids where private respondent [Nerwin] emerged as
qualification of private respondent [Nerwin]. Dissatisfied, the
Committee, Respondents. the lowest bidder for all schedules/components of the contract.
said officials attempted to seek a revision of the earlier opinion
NEA then conducted a pre-award inspection of private
but the Government Corporate Counsel declared anew that
respondent’s [Nerwin’s] manufacturing plants and facilities,
DECISION there was no legal impediment to prevent the award of IPB-80
including its identified supplier in Malaysia, to determine its
contract to private respondent [Nerwin]. Notwithstanding, NEA
capability to supply and deliver NEA’s requirements.
allegedly held negotiations with other bidders relative to the
BERSAMIN, J.: IPB-80 contract, prompting private respondent [Nerwin] to file a
In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC complaint for specific performance with prayer for the issuance
Republic Act No. 89751 expressly prohibits any court, except and P3 - IBP No. 80 [for the] Supply and Delivery of Woodpoles of an injunction, which injunctive application was granted by
the Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining and Crossarms dated October 4, 2000, NEA administrator Branch 36 of RTC-Manila in Civil Case No. 01102000.
order (TRO), preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory Conrado M. Estrella III recommended to NEA’s Board of
injunction to restrain, prohibit or compel the Government, or Directors the approval of award to private respondent [Nerwin]
In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation
any of its subdivisions or officials, or any person or entity, of all schedules for IBP No. 80 on account of the following:
purporting to be under the Department of Energy, issued
whether public or private, acting under the Government’s Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 or an invitation to pre-qualify and
direction, from: (a) acquiring, clearing, and developing the right- a. Nerwin is the lowest complying and responsive bidder; to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural
of-way, site or location of any National Government project; (b) Electrification Project ("O-ILAW project").
bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the National
Government; (c) commencing, prosecuting, executing, b. The price difference for the four (4) schedules between the
implementing, or operating any such contract or project; (d) bid of Nerwin Industries (lowest responsive and complying Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1
terminating or rescinding any such contract or project; and (e) bidder) and the second lowest bidder in the amount of $1.47 for the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in
undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity necessary million for the poles and $0.475 million for the crossarms, is Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 03106921 entitled Nerwin
for such contract or project. deemed substantial and extremely advantageous to the Industries Corporation v. PNOC-Energy Development
government. The price difference is equivalent to 7,948 pcs. of Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as Chairman, Bids and
poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms; Awards Committee, alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1
Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the was an attempt to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB
statutory prohibition and issues a TRO or a writ of preliminary No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against a c. The price difference for the three (3) schedules between the
enjoin respondents’ proposed bidding for the wooden poles.
government contract or project acts contrary to law. bids of Nerwin and the Tri-State Pole and Piling, Inc.
approximately in the amount of $2.36 million for the poles and
$0.475 million for the crossarms are equivalent to additional Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921,
Antecedents 12.872 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms; and stating that the complaint averred no cause of action, violated
the rule that government infrastructure projects were not to be
subjected to TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition
against non-forum shopping, and the corporate president had Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the
no authority to sign and file the complaint.3 a special civil action for certiorari (CA-GR SP No. 83144), propriety of respondent Judge’s issuance of a preliminary
alleging that the RTC had thereby committed grave abuse of injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter.
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding
On June 27, 2003, after Nerwin had filed its rejoinder to
that Nerwin had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of
respondents’ reply, the RTC granted a TRO in Civil Case No. Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining
preliminary injunction despite the express prohibition from the
03106921.4 an application for TRO/preliminary injunction, and worse, in
law and from the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant
issuing a preliminary injunction through the assailed order
violation of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence; in
enjoining petitioners’ sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project. The
On July 30, 2003, the RTC issued an order,5 as follows: declaring respondents in default; and in disqualifying
same is a palpable violation of RA 8975 which was approved
respondents’ counsel from representing them.7
on November 7, 2000, thus, already existing at the time
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing considerations, an order is respondent Judge issued the assailed Orders dated July 20
hereby issued by this Court: On October 22, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision,8 to wit: and December 29, 2003.

1. DENYING the motion to consolidate; WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:
dated July 30 and December 29, 2003 are hereby ANNULED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 03106921, private
2. DENYING the urgent motion for reconsideration; Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order,
respondent’s complaint for issuance of temporary restraining
Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions.
order/writ of preliminary injunction before Branch 37 of the
– No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any
3. DISQUALIFYING Attys. Michael A. Medado, Datu Omar S. Regional Trial Court of Manila, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
Sinsuat and Mariano H. Paps from appearing as counsel for preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or
the defendants; SO ORDERED. any of its subdivisions, officials, or any person or entity,
whether public or private, acting under the government’s
4. DECLARING defendants in default; direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
Nerwin filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the
motion on February 9, 2005.9
5. GRANTING the motion for issuance of writ of preliminary xxx
injunction. Issues
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national
Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
Hence, Nerwin appeals, raising the following issues:
the defendant PNOC-EDC and its Chairman of Bids and
Awards Committee Esther R. Guerzon from continuing the xxx
holding of the subject bidding upon the plaintiffs filing of a bond I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the
in the amount of ₱200,000.00 to answer for any damage or basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary
damages which the defendants may suffer should it be finally restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, except if issued This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or
adjudged that petitioner is not entitled thereto, until final by the Supreme Court, on government projects. controversies instituted by a private party, including but not
determination of the issue in this case by this Court. limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights
through such bidders involving such contract/project. This
II. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the
prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme
This order shall become effective only upon the posting of a entire case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 which prohibits the
urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a
bond by the plaintiffs in the amount of ₱200,000.00. issuance only of a preliminary injunction but not injunction as a
temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
final remedy.
irreparable injury will arise. xxx
Let a copy of this order be immediately served on the
defendants and strict compliance herein is enjoined. Furnish III. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case
The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel copy of this considering that it is also one for damages.
supersedes PD 1818 which earlier underscored the prohibition
order. to courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary
Ruling injunctions in cases involving infrastructure or National
SO ORDERED. Resources Development projects of, and public utilities
operated by, the government. This law was, in fact, earlier
The petition fails. upheld to have such a mandatory nature by the Supreme Court
Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order of July in an administrative case against a Judge.
30, 2003, and also to set aside the order of default and to admit
In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it
their answer to the complaint.
annulled and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC issued Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition, the
on July 20, 2003 and December 29, 2003, and why it altogether Supreme Court had the same embodied in its Administrative
On January 13, 2004, the RTC denied respondents’ motions for dismissed Civil Case No. 03106921, as follows: Circular No. 11-2000 which reiterates the ban on issuance of
reconsideration, to set aside order of default, and to admit TRO or writs of Preliminary Prohibitory or Mandatory Injunction
answer.6
in cases involving Government Infrastructure Projects. (a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way of his issuance of the assailed TRO and writ of preliminary
Pertinent is the ruling in National Housing Authority vs. Allarde and/or site or location of any national government project; prohibitory injunction. The Court could only fine him in the
"As regards the definition of infrastructure projects, the Court amount of ₱40,000.00 last August 6, 2008 in view of his
stressed in Republic of the Phil. vs. Salvador Silverio and Big intervening retirement from the service. That sanction was
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national
Bertha Construction: The term ‘infrastructure projects’ means meted on him in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133 entitled Sinsuat v.
government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
‘construction, improvement and rehabilitation of roads, and Hidalgo,11 where this Court stated:
bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication facilities,
irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and (c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation,
The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross
sewerage systems, shore protection, power facilities, national operation of any such contract or project;
misconduct. As the CA explained in its above-stated Decision
buildings, school buildings, hospital buildings and other related
in the petition for certiorari, respondent failed to heed the
construction projects that form part of the government capital
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and mandatory ban imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975
investment."
against a government infrastructure project, which the rural
electrification project certainly was. He thereby likewise
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity
Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even obstinately disregarded this Court’s various circulars enjoining
necessary for such contract/project.
from the facts of the case, that would justify respondent courts from issuing TROs and injunctions against government
Judge’s blatant disregard of a "simple, comprehensible and infrastructure projects in line with the proscription under R.A.
unequivocal mandate (of PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance of This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or No. 8975. Apropos are Gov. Garcia v. Hon.
injunctive writs relative to government infrastructure projects." controversies instituted by a private party, including but not Burgos and National Housing Authority v. Hon. Allarde wherein
Respondent Judge did not even endeavor, although limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights this Court stressed that P.D. No. 1818 expressly deprives
expectedly, to show that the instant case falls under the single through such bidders involving such contract/project. This courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against the
exception where the said proscription may not apply, i.e., when prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme implementation or execution of a government infrastructure
the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a project.
issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an Reiterating the prohibitory mandate of P.D. No. 1818, the Court
amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in in Atty. Caguioa v. Judge Laviña faulted a judge for grave
favor of the government if the court should finally decide that
Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner in misconduct for issuing a TRO against a government
the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
default because, in the first place, he should not have given infrastructure project thus:
due course to private respondent’s complaint for injunction.
Indubitably, the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the xxx It appears that respondent is either feigning a
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. contract is null and void, the court may, if appropriate under the misunderstanding of the law or openly manifesting a
circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning contumacious indifference thereto. In any case, his disregard of
bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to
Perforce, this Court no longer sees the need to resolve the the clear mandate of PD 1818, as well as of the Supreme Court
any liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws.
other grounds proffered by petitioners.10 Circulars enjoining strict compliance therewith, constitutes
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary administration of justice. His claim that the said statute is
The CA’s decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary inapplicable to his January 21, 1997 Order extending the
abused its discretion, firstly, when it entertained the complaint
mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is dubious TRO is but a contrived subterfuge to evade
of Nerwin against respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was
void and of no force and effect. administrative liability.
thereby contravening the express provisions of Section 3 and
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the
bidding out by respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and, The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and In resolving matters in litigation, judges should endeavor
secondly, when it issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary unambiguous, nothing was left for the RTC to do except to assiduously to ascertain the facts and the applicable laws.
prohibitory injunction. enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin obedience to them. Moreover, they should exhibit more than just a cursory
The RTC could not have been unaware of the prohibition under acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Also,
Republic Act No. 8975 considering that the Court had itself they are expected to keep abreast of and be conversant
Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 provide:
instructed all judges and justices of the lower courts, through with the rules and the circulars which the Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to comply with and has adopted and which affect the disposition of cases
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary respect the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of before them.
Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving
Mandatory Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme Court, contracts and projects of the Government. Although judges have in their favor the presumption of
shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary
regularity and good faith in the performance of their judicial
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the
It is of great relevance to mention at this juncture that Judge functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable
government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person
Vicente A. Hidalgo, the Presiding Judge of Branch 37 of the terms of the law obviates this presumption and renders
or entity, whether public or private, acting under the
RTC, the branch to which Civil Case No. 03106921 had been them susceptible to administrative sanctions. (Emphasis
government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the
raffled, was in fact already found administratively liable for and underscoring supplied)
following acts:
gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law as the result
The pronouncements in Caguioa apply as well to respondent. As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive
at the instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or relief ought to be wary of improvidently or unwarrantedly
title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is issuing TROs or writs of injunction that tend to dispose of the
The questioned acts of respondent also constitute gross
proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the merits without or before trial. Granting an application for the
ignorance of the law for being patently in disregard of simple,
relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver the relief in disregard of that tendency is judicially impermissible, 22 
elementary and well-known rules which judges are expected to
existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose for it is never the function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to
know and apply properly.
averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie determine the merits of a case,23 or to decide controverted
showing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the facts.24 It is but a preventive remedy whose only mission is to
IN FINE, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and gross conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the prevent threatened wrong,25 further injury,26 and irreparable
ignorance of the law, which are serious charges under right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought harm27 or injustice28 until the rights of the parties can be settled.
Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. He having retired to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an Judges should thus look at such relief only as a means to
from the service, a fine in the amount of ₱40,000 is imposed urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious protect the ability of their courts to render a meaningful
upon him, the maximum amount fixed under Section 11 of Rule damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in decision.29 Foremost in their minds should be to guard against
140 as an alternative sanction to dismissal or suspension.12 esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never a change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the
arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause granting of proper reliefs after a trial on the merits.30 It is well
of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by worth remembering that the writ of preliminary injunction should
Even as the foregoing outcome has rendered any further statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a issue only to prevent the threatened continuous and
treatment and discussion of Nerwin’s other submissions right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as irremediable injury to the applicant before the claim can be
superfluous and unnecessary, the Court notes that the RTC did a matter of law.16 justly and thoroughly studied and adjudicated.31
not properly appreciate the real nature and true purpose of the
injunctive remedy. This failing of the RTC presses the Court to
use this decision to reiterate the norms and parameters long Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to be protected is WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
standing jurisprudence has set to control the issuance of TROs not demanded, however, for, as the Court has held in Saulog v. Appeals; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
and writs of injunction, and to now insist on conformity to them Court of Appeals,17 it is enough that:
by all litigants and lower courts. Only thereby may the grave
The Court Administrator shall disseminate this decision to the
misconduct committed in Civil Case No. 03106921 be
xxx for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of lower courts for their guidance.
avoided.1âwphi1
facts affording a present right which is directly threatened
by an act sought to be enjoined. And while a clear showing
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an of the right claimed is necessary, its existence need not be
to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. (4a)
requiring a party or a court, agency or person, to refrain from a submitted to justify preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon
particular act or acts.13 It is an ancillary or preventive remedy need not be conclusive or complete but need only be a
resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or "sampling" intended merely to give the court an idea of the
interests during the pendency of the case. As such, it is issued justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision G.R. No. L-17915           January 31, 1967
only when it is established that: of the case on the merits. This should really be so since our
concern here involves only the propriety of the preliminary
TEODORO M. CASTRO, petitioner and appellant,
injunction and not the merits of the case still pending with
(a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the vs.
the trial court.
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the AMADO DEL ROSARIO as Commissioner of Civil Service,
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or DOMINADOR AYTONA as Secretary of Finance,
in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the MELECIO R. DOMINGO, as Commissioner of Internal
limited period or perpetually; or private respondent needs only to show that it has Revenue, and TOMAS C. TOLEDO, respondents and
the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its appellants.
complaint xxx.18
(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the
act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably Ramon C. Aquino, Teodoro M. Castro, Leandro C. Sevilla and
work injustice to the applicant; or In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the Antonio M. Castro for petitioner and appellant.
trial courts considering that conflicting claims in an application Emma Quisumbing-Fernando and E. M. Fernando for
for a provisional writ more often than not involve and require a respondent and appellant Toledo.
(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or factual determination that is not the function of the appellate Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor
is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, courts.19 Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion must be Ceferino S. Gaddi for respondents and appellants Secretary of
some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the sound, that is, the issuance of the writ, though discretionary, Finance, et al.
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding,
should be upon the grounds and in the manner provided by
and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.14 law.20 When that is done, the exercise of sound discretion by
MAKALINTAL, J.:
the issuing court in injunctive matters must not be interfered
The existence of a right to be protected by the injunctive relief with except when there is manifest abuse.21
is indispensable. In City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated This is a proceeding in quo
Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc.,15 the Court elaborated on this warranto, certiorari and mandamus originally filed in the Court
requirement, viz: of First Instance of Manila. The controverted position is that of
Assistant Regional Revenue Director II, Manila, which became ground that his previous appointment as Chief Revenue Whenever a vacancy occurs in any competitive or classified
vacant on August 24, 1959, upon the promotion of its occupant, Examiner was illegal. position in the government or in any government-owned or
Alfredo Jimenez. Respondent Tomas C. Toledo was appointed controlled corporation or entity, the officer or employee next in
in his place, and it is this appointment that is being questioned rank who is competent and qualified to hold the position and
Both sides appealed from the decision. Respondents claim that
by petitioner Teodoro M. Castro in this proceeding. The court a who possesses an appropriate civil service eligibility shall be
the lower court should not have nullified Toledo's appointment.
quo annulled Toledo's appointment, but did not grant Castro's promoted thereto: Provided, That should there be two or more
They contend (1) that the question as to the legality of his
prayer that respondent officials be ordered to appoint him. persons under equal circumstances, seniority shall be given
previous appointment as Chief Revenue Examiner was neither
preference: And provided, however, That should there be any
raised in the pleadings nor proven at the trial with the consent
special reason or reasons why such officer or employee should
Toledo's appointment by the Secretary of Finance, upon of the parties; (2) that petitioner was precluded by laches from
not be promoted, such special reason or reasons shall be
recommendation of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, questioning said appointment; and (3) that the same was not
stated in writing by the appointing official and the officer or
was made on November 24, 1959, effective as of October 1, contrary to the Revised Administrative Code.
employee concerned shall be informed thereof and be given
1959. When he was appointed Toledo's position was that of
opportunity to be heard by the Commissioner of Civil Service,
Chief Revenue Inspector, or Chief Revenue Examiner,
On the other hand, petitioner argues that the lower court should whose decision in such case shall be final. If the vacancy is not
stationed in Manila. The appointment was protested by Castro
have ordered respondents Commissioner of Internal Revenue filled by promotion as provided herein, then the same shall be
in a letter he wrote the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on
and Secretary of Finance to appoint him to the controverted filled by transfer of present employees in the government
January 19, 1960, wherein he alleged that in accordance with
position because (1) he was senior in rank to Toledo and was service, by reinstatement, by reemployment of persons
the provisions of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 2260,
the competent and qualified employee next in line for the separated through reduction in force, or by certification from
otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, he was the
position; and (2) the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional appropriate registers of eligibles in accordance with rules
one who should have been considered for the position. Copy of
Directors I had waived their rights to the position. promulgated in pursuance of this Act.
the letter-protest was furnished the Secretary of Finance. On
February 8, 1960 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in a
first indorsement, informed Castro that "the position of Castro entered the government service in 1931 as a It appears that for internal revenue tax purposes the Philippines
Assistant Revenue Regional Director II, R-53, at P6,000.00 messenger in the Bureau of Forestry. He became a clerk in the is divided into ten regional districts, with Manila as District No.
adjusted to P6,597.60 per annum, is for Regional District No. 3, Bureau of Internal Revenue on February 1, 1937. Then he 3. Each district has a Revenue Regional Director and an
Manila, and the appointment thereto had to be issued to the became successively law clerk, income tax examiner, Chief of Assistant Revenue Regional Director. The Revenue Regional
person actually performing the functions of the position," Tax Audit Branch and eventually, on July 1, 1957, Assistant Director for the Manila District outranks the nine other Revenue
namely, respondent Toledo, who was then acting as Assistant Revenue Regional Director I. Regional Directors, while the Assistant Revenue Regional
Revenue Regional Officer II, Manila. Director for Manila outranks the nine other Assistant Revenue
Regional Directors. These nine Assistant Revenue Regional
On the other hand , Toledo first worked in the Metropolitan Directors therefore usually aspire to be promoted either to the
On March 8, 1960 Castro appealed to the Commissioner of Water District on July 16, 1948. He became employed in the position of Revenue Regional Director or to that of Assistant
Civil Service, who indorsed the matter to the Commissioner of Bureau of Internal Revenue on December 4, 1952, when he Revenue Regional Director for Manila.
Internal Revenue with a request for a statement of the was appointed distillery agent. At the time he left the Bureau on
comparative qualifications of Toledo and Castro. After setting January 15, 1958 his position was that of income tax examiner
forth the qualifications as requested, the Commissioner with a salary of P3,300 per annum. On said date he became a At the time the controverted petition became vacant Toledo
explained that the next two Assistant Revenue Regional Technical Assistant to the Executive Secretary of the President was occupying the position of Chief Revenue Inspector, (or
Directors in line for the protested position, as reported for of the Philippines at P7,200 per annum. On July 1, 1958, when Examiner) while the positions of Assistant Revenue Regional
purposes of Administrative Order No. 171, were Teodoro he returned to the Bureau he was appointed Chief Revenue Director outside the Manila District were occupied by the
Lucero, Assistant Revenue Regional Director I (Regional Inspector (a new position created under the Appropriation Act following:
District No. 4), with a salary of P6,900 per annum; and Lauro of 1958-1959, which look effect on July 1, 1958) at P6,787 per
Abraham, Assistant Revenue Regional Director I (Regional annum.
District No. 6), with a salary of P6,000 per annum, but that Name Salary
since the protested position was for Regional District No. 3,
This case is principally a special civil action in quo warranto. 1. Teodoro Lucero . . . . . . . . . . . . . P6900      
Manila, where Toledo was next in rank, and since he was
A quo warranto proceeding is one to determine the right to the
actually performing the functions of the controverted office,
use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder 2. Lauro D. Abraham . . . . . . . . . . . 6000      
there was no need to make a comparison between his
from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well founded, or if he has
qualifications and those of Castro. 3. Ricardo A. Rivera . . . . . . . . . . . . 6000      
forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. 1 The action may be
commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General or by
On July 1, 1960 the Commissioner of Civil Service rendered his a fiscal;2 or a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or 4. Gaspar L. Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . 5100      
decision dismissing Castro's protest on the ground that the position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another
5. Jaime Araneta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6000      
contested position belonged properly to Regional District No. 3, may bring an action in his own name. 3 Where a private person
where Toledo was the next ranking employee, while Castro files the action, he must prove that he is entitled to the 6. Policronio Blanco . . . . . . . . . . . . 6000      
was in Regional District No. 5, San Pablo City. Hence, Castro controverted position, otherwise respondent has a right to the
filed the present petition asking that Toledo's appointment be undisturbed possession of his office.4 7. Francisco Tantuico . . . . . . . . . . 6266.40
annulled and that he be declared entitled to the position. As
already stated, the trial court rejected Castro's claim, but at the 8. Pedro D. Uy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6000      
Castro claims the position by virtue of Section 23, paragraph 3,
same time annulled Toledo's appointment — this last on the
Republic Act 2260, which provides:
9. Teodoro M. Castro . . . . . . . . . . . 6000       to said position on July 1, 1958. Castro had one year from that tons of Burmese rice. As her bid of $203.00 per metric ton was
date to assail the legality of the appointment. The petition here the lowest, she was awarded the contract for the same.
was filed only on August 6, 1960, or beyond the one-year Accordingly, on July 1, 1952, plaintiff-appellee Paz P. Arrieta
According to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the next period. and the appellant corporation entered into a Contract of Sale of
two in line for the position in question were Lucero and Rice, under the terms of which the former obligated herself to
Abraham. Obviously the position of Chief Revenue Inspector deliver to the latter 20,000 metric tons of Burmess Rice at
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified by
(Examiner) was considered to be of the same rank as the $203.00 per metric ton, CIF Manila. In turn, the defendant
eliminating therefrom that portion annulling respondent
position of Assistant Revenue Regional Director for regions corporation committed itself to pay for the imported rice "by
Toledo's appointment to the position in dispute, and is affirmed
other than Manila. And Toledo, who was then Chief Revenue means of an irrevocable, confirmed and assignable letter of
in other respects. Costs against petitioner.
Inspector (Examiner), was chosen because in the opinion of credit in U.S. currency in favor of the plaintiff-appellee and/or
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue he was already in the supplier in Burma, immediately." Despite the commitment to
region where the vacancy occurred and therefore was more pay immediately "by means of an irrevocable, confirmed and
familiar with the work there, and both his salary range and assignable Letter of Credit," however, it was only on July 30,
efficiency rating5 were higher than Castro's aside from the fact 1952, or a full month from the execution of the contract, that the
that he was already performing the functions of the office. defendant corporation, thru its general manager, took the first
to open a letter of credit by forwarding to the Philippine National
Bank its Application for Commercial Letter Credit. The
Even on the assumption that Castro possessed, as he claims, application was accompanied by a transmittal letter, the
better qualifications and a higher efficiency rating than Toledo, relevant paragraphs of which read:
it would avail him nothing because he has failed to prove that
his position was the one next in rank to the vacant office. He G.R. No. L-15645             January 31, 1964
was not even the most senior among the different Assistant In view of the fact that we do not have sufficient deposit with
Revenue Regional Directors outside the Manila District. your institution with which to cover the amount required to be
PAZ P. ARRIETA and VITALIADO ARRIETA, plaintiffs-
However, he insists that the eight other Assistant Revenue deposited as a condition for the opening of letters of credit, we
appellees,
Regional Directors waived their rights to the position by their will appreciate it if this application could be considered special
vs.
failure to complain against Toledo's appointment. case.
NATIONAL RICE AND CORN CORPORATION, defendant-
appellant,
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. The MANILA UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE CO., We understand that our supplier, Mrs. Paz P. Arrieta, has a
silence of the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors INC., defendant-appellee. deadline to meet which is August 4, 1952, and in order to
does not amount to a waiver on their part. Waiver must be comply therewith, it is imperative that the L/C be opened prior
predicated on more concrete grounds. The evidence must be to that date. We would therefore request your full cooperation
Teehankee and Carreon for plaintiffs-appellees.
sufficient and clear to warrant a finding that the intent to waive on this matter.
The Government Corporate Counsel for defendant-appellant.
is unmistakable. Isidro A. Vera for defendant-appellee.
On the same day, July 30, 1952, Mrs. Paz P. Arrieta thru
Castro himself, when he testified, could not categorically state counsel, advised the appellant corporation of the extreme
REGALA, J.:
that the eight others were not interested in the position. 6 Not necessity for the immediate opening of the letter credit since
having shown either seniority in rank among the nine Assistant she had by then made a tender to her supplier in Rangoon,
Revenue Regional Directors outside the Manila District or This is an appeal of the defendant-appellant NARIC from the Burma, "equivalent to 5% of the F.O.B. price of 20,000 tons at
waiver on the part of those who were senior to him Castro has decision of the trial court dated February 20, 1958, awarding to $180.70 and in compliance with the regulations in Rangoon this
failed to establish a clear right to the office which would entitle the plaintiffs-appellees the amount of $286,000.00 as damages 5% will be confiscated if the required letter of credit is not
him to oust respondent Toledo. for breach of contract and dismissing the counterclaim and third received by them before August 4, 1952."
party complaint of the defendant-appellant NARIC.

Upon the other hand, the supposed illegality of Toledo's On August 4, 1952, the Philippine National Bank informed the
appointment as Chief Revenue Officer of the Manila District In accordance with Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3452, "the appellant corporation that its application, "for a letter of credit
cannot be a ground for the annulment of his appointment to the National Rice and Corn Administration (NARIC) is hereby for $3,614,000.00 in favor of Thiri Setkya has been approved
controverted position.7 The legality of that earlier appointment abolished and all its assets, liabilities, functions, powers which by the Board of Directors with the condition that marginal cash
may not be questioned except in a quo warranto proceeding are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and all deposit be paid and that drafts are to be paid upon
brought by the proper person at the proper time. To be sure, as personnel are transferred "to the Rice and Corn Administration presentment." (Exh. J-pl.; Exh. 10-def., p. 19, Folder of
heretofore stated this is principally such a proceeding, but only (RCA). Exhibits). Furthermore, the Bank represented that it "will hold
insofar as the position of Assistant Revenue Regional District II your application in abeyance pending compliance with the
is concerned. It is true there is an allegation in Castro's petition above stated requirement."
All references, therefore, to the NARIC in this decision must
that the earlier appointment of Toledo as Chief Revenue officer accordingly be adjusted and read as RCA pursuant to the
was illegal.8 But Castro does not claim to be entitled to that aforementioned law. As it turned out, however, the appellant corporation not in any
other position and consequently the legality of Toledo's financial position to meet the condition. As matter of fact, in a
appointment thereto is not properly in issue. Besides, even if letter dated August 2, 1952, the NARIC bluntly confessed to the
Castro were the proper party to raise that issue, he did so On May 19, 1952, plaintiff-appellee participated in the public appellee its dilemma: "In this connection, please be advised
beyond the time limit prescribed by law.9 Toledo was appointed bidding called by the NARIC for the supply of 20,000 metric
that our application for opening of the letter of credit has been damage which resulted. As it is then, the disposition of this demanded by the bank, then the letter of credit would have
presented to the bank since July 30th but the latter requires case depends on a determination of who was responsible for been approved, opened and released as early as August 4,
that we first deposit 50% of the value of the letter amounting to such failure. Stated differently, the issue is whether appellant's 1952. The letter of the Philippine National Bank to the NARIC
aproximately $3,614,000.00 which we are not in a position to failure to open immediately the letter of credit in dispute was plain and explicit that as of the said date, appellant's
meet." (Emphasis supplied. Exh. 9-Def.; Exh. 1-Pe., p. 18, amounted to a breach of the contract of July 1, 1952 for which "application for a letter of credit ... has been approved by the
Folder of Exhibits) it may be held liable in damages. Board of Directors with the condition that 50% marginal cash
deposit be paid and that drafts are to be paid upon
presentment." (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, the credit instrument applied for was opened Appellant corporation disclaims responsibility for the delay in
only on September 8, 1952 "in favor of Thiri Setkya, Rangoon, the opening of the letter of credit. On the contrary, it insists that
Burma, and/or assignee for $3,614,000.00," (which is more the fault lies with the appellee. Appellant contends that the The liability of the appellant, however, stems not alone from this
than two months from the execution of the contract) the party disputed negotiable instrument was not promptly secured failure or inability to satisfy the requirements of the bank. Its
named by the appellee as beneficiary of the letter of because the appellee , failed to seasonably furnish data culpability arises from its willful and deliberate assumption of
credit.1äwphï1.ñët necessary and required for opening the same, namely, "(1) the contractual obligations even as it was well aware of its financial
amount of the letter of credit, (2) the person, company or incapacity to undertake the prestation. We base this judgment
corporation in whose favor it is to be opened, and (3) the place upon the letter which accompanied the application filed by the
As a result of the delay, the allocation of appellee's supplier in
and bank where it may be negotiated." Appellant would have appellant with the bank, a part of which letter was quoted
Rangoon was cancelled and the 5% deposit, amounting to
this Court believe, therefore, that had these informations been earlier in this decision. In the said accompanying
524,000 kyats or approximately P200,000.00 was forfeited. In
forthwith furnished it, there would have been no delay in correspondence, appellant admitted and owned that it did "not
this connection, it must be made of record that although the
securing the instrument. have sufficient deposit with your institution (the PNB) with
Burmese authorities had set August 4, 1952, as the deadline
which to cover the amount required to be deposited as a
for the remittance of the required letter of credit, the
condition for the opening of letters of credit. ... .
cancellation of the allocation and the confiscation of the 5% Appellant's explanation has neither force nor merit. In the first
deposit were not effected until August 20, 1952, or, a full half place, the explanation reaches into an area of the proceedings
month after the expiration of the deadline. And yet, even with into which We are not at liberty to encroach. The explanation A number of logical inferences may be drawn from the
the 15-day grace, appellant corporation was unable to make refers to a question of fact. Nothing in the record suggests any aforementioned admission. First, that the appellant knew the
good its commitment to open the disputed letter of credit. arbitrary or abusive conduct on the part of the trial judge in the bank requirements for opening letters of credit; second, that
formulation of the ruling. His conclusion on the matter is appellant also knew it could not meet those requirement. When,
sufficiently borne out by the evidence presented. We are therefore, despite this awareness that was financially
The appellee endeavored, but failed, to restore the cancelled
denied, therefore, the prerogative to disturb that finding, incompetent to open a letter of credit immediately, appellant
Burmese rice allocation. When the futility of reinstating the
consonant to the time-honored tradition of this Tribunal to hold agreed in paragraph 8 of the contract to pay immediately "by
same became apparent, she offered to substitute Thailand rice
trial judges better situated to make conclusions on questions of means of an irrevocable, confirm and assignable letter of
instead to the defendant NARIC, communicating at the same
fact. For the record, We quote hereunder the lower court's credit," it must be similarly held to have bound itself to answer
time that the offer was "a solution which should be beneficial to
ruling on the point: for all and every consequences that would result from the
the NARIC and to us at the same time." (Exh. X-Pe., Exh. 25—
representation. aptly observed by the trial court:
Def., p. 38, Folder of Exhibits). This offer for substitution,
however, was rejected by the appellant in a resolution dated The defense that the delay, if any in opening the letter of credit
November 15, 1952. was due to the failure of plaintiff to name the supplier, the ... Having called for bids for the importation of rice involving
amount and the bank is not tenable. Plaintiff stated in Court millions, $4,260,000.00 to be exact, it should have a certained
that these facts were known to defendant even before the its ability and capacity to comply with the inevitably
On the foregoing, the appellee sent a letter to the appellant,
contract was executed because these facts were necessarily requirements in cash to pay for such importation. Having
demanding compensation for the damages caused her in the
revealed to the defendant before she could qualify as a bidder. announced the bid, it must be deemed to have impliedly
sum of $286,000.00, U.S. currency, representing unrealized
She stated too that she had given the necessary data assured suppliers of its capacity and facility to finance the
profit. The demand having been rejected she instituted this
immediately after the execution of Exh. "A" (the contract of July importation within the required period, especially since it had
case now on appeal.
1, 1952) to Mr. GABRIEL BELMONTE, General Manager of the imposed the supplier the 90-day period within which the
NARIC, both orally and in writing and that she also pressed for shipment of the rice must be brought into the Philippines.
At the instance of the NARIC, a counterclaim was filed and the the opening of the letter of credit on these occasions. These Having entered in the contract, it should have taken steps
Manila Underwriters Insurance Company was brought to the statements have not been controverted and defendant NARIC, immediately to arrange for the letter of credit for the large
suit as a third party defendant to hold it liable on the notwithstanding its previous intention to do so, failed to present amount involved and inquired into the possibility of its issuance.
performance bond it executed in favor of the plaintiff-appellee. Mr. Belmonte to testify or refute this. ...
In relation to the aforequoted observation of the trial court, We
We find for the appellee. Secondly, from the correspondence and communications which would like to make reference also to Article 11 of the Civil Code
form part of the record of this case, it is clear that what which provides:
singularly delayed the opening of the stipulated letter of credit
It is clear upon the records that the sole and principal reason and which, in turn, caused the cancellation of the allocation in
for the cancellation of the allocation contracted by the appellee Those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty of
Burma, was the inability of the appellant corporation to meet
herein in Rangoon, Burma, was the failure of the letter of credit fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner
the condition importation by the Bank for granting the same.
to be opened with the contemplated period. This failure must, contravene the tenor thereof, are liable in damages.
We do not think the appellant corporation can refute the fact
therefore, be taken as the immediate cause for the consequent that had it been able to put up the 50% marginal cash deposit
Under this provision, not only debtors guilty of fraud, award herein is provided by Exhibit HH of the plaintiff and currency at the rate of exchange at the time of the judgment
negligence or default in the performance of obligations a Exhibit 34 of the defendant, hereunder quoted so far as rather than at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of
decreed liable; in general, every debtor who fails in germane. defendant's breach. This ruling, however, can neither be
performance of his obligations is bound to indemnify for the applied nor extended to the case at bar for the same was laid
losses and damages caused thereby (De la Cruz Seminary of down when there was no law against stipulating foreign
It is equally of record now that as shown in her request dated
Manila, 18 Phil. 330; Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan, 21 currencies in Philippine contracts. But now we have Republic
July 29, 1959, and other communications subsequent thereto
Phil. 184; De la Cavada v. Diaz, 37 Phil. 982; Maluenda & Co. Act No. 529 which expressly declares such stipulations as
for the opening by your corporation of the required letter of
v. Enriquez, 46 Phil. 916; Pasumil v. Chong, 49 Phil. 1003; contrary to public policy, void and of no effect. And, as We
credit, Mrs. Arrieta was supposed to pay her supplier in Burma
Pando v. Gimenez, 54 Phil. 459; Acme Films v. Theaters already pronounced in the case of Eastboard Navigation, Ltd.
at the rate of One Hundred Eighty Dollars and Seventy Cents
Supply, 63 Phil. 657). The phrase "any manner contravene the v. Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-9090, September 10,
($180.70) in U.S. Currency, per ton plus Eight Dollars ($8.00) in
tenor" of the obligation includes any illicit act which impairs the 1957, if there is any agreement to pay an obligation in a
the same currency per ton for shipping and other handling
strict and faithful fulfillment of the obligation or every kind or currency other than Philippine legal tender, the same is null and
expenses, so that she is already assured of a net profit of
defective performance. (IV Tolentino, Civil Code of the void as contrary to public policy (Republic Act 529), and the
Fourteen Dollars and Thirty Cents ($14.30), U.S., Currency, per
Philippines, citing authorities, p. 103.) most that could be demanded is to pay said obligation in
ton or a total of Two Hundred and Eighty Six Thousand Dollars
Philippine currency "to be measured in the prevailing rate of
($286,000.00), U.S. Currency, in the aforesaid transaction. ...
exchange at the time the obligation was incurred (Sec.
The NARIC would also have this Court hold that the
1, idem)."
subsequent offer to substitute Thailand rice for the originally
Lastly, herein appellant filed a counterclaim asserting that it has
contracted Burmese rice amounted to a waiver by the appellee
suffered, likewise by way of unrealized profit damages in the
of whatever rights she might have derived from the breach of UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is
total sum of $406,000.00 from the failure of the projected
the contract. We disagree. Waivers are not presumed, but must hereby affirmed, with the sole modification that the award
contract to materialize. This counterclaim was supported by a
be clearly and convincingly shown, either by express stipulation should be converted into the Philippine peso at the rate of
cost study made and submitted by the appellant itself and
or acts admitting no other reasonable explanation. (Ramirez v. exchange prevailing at the time the obligation was incurred or
wherein it was illustrated how indeed had the importation
Court of Appeals, 52 O.G. 779.) In the case at bar, no such on July 1, 1952 when the contract was executed. The appellee
pushed thru, NARIC would have realized in profit the amount
intent to waive has been established. insurance company, in the light of this judgment, is relieved of
asserted in the counterclaim. And yet, the said amount of
any liability under this suit. No pronouncement as to costs.
P406,000.00 was realizable by appellant despite a number of
We have carefully examined and studied the oral and expenses which the appellee under the contract, did not have
documentary evidence presented in this case and upon which to incur. Thus, under the cost study submitted by the appellant,
the lower court based its award. Under the contract, the NARIC banking and unloading charges were to be shouldered by it,
bound itself to buy 20,000 metric tons of Burmese rice at including an Import License Fee of 2% and superintendence
G.R. No. L-29746 November 26, 1973
"$203.00 U.S. Dollars per metric ton, all net shipped weight, fee of $0.25 per metric ton. If the NARIC stood to profit over
and all in U.S. currency, C.I.F. Manila ..." On the other hand, P400 000.00 from the disputed transaction inspite of the extra
documentary and other evidence establish with equal certainty expenditures from which the herein appellee was exempt, we INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMILIO CAMON.
that the plaintiff-appellee was able to secure the contracted are convicted of the fairness of the judgment presently under CONCEPCION EREÑETA, administratrix-appellee,
commodity at the cost price of $180.70 per metric ton from her appeal. vs.
supplier in Burma. Considering freights, insurance and charges IGNATIUS HENRY BEZORE, ELWOOD KNICKERBOCKER,
incident to its shipment here and the forfeiture of the 5% and MARY IRENE FALLON MCCORMICK, claimants-
In the premises, however, a minor modification must be
deposit, the award granted by the lower court is fair and appellants; MARTINIANO O. DE LA CRUZ, administrator.
effected in the dispositive portion of the decision appeal from
equitable. For a clearer view of the equity of the damages
insofar as it expresses the amount of damages in U.S. currency
awarded, We reproduce below the testimony of the appellee,
and not in Philippine Peso. Republic Act 529 specifically Manuel T. Tonogbanua, Manuel S. Tonogbanua, Jr. and Hilado
adequately supported by the evidence and record:
requires the discharge of obligations only "in any coin or and Hilado for administratrix-appellee.
currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public
Q. Will you please tell the court, how much is the damage you and private debts." In view of that law, therefore, the award
Martiniano O. de la Cruz for Claimants-appellants.
suffered? should be converted into and expressed in Philippine Peso.

A. Because the selling price of my rice is $203.00 per metric This brings us to a consideration of what rate of exchange
ton, and the cost price of my rice is $180.00 We had to pay should apply in the conversion here decreed. Should it be at
also $6.25 for shipping and about $164 for insurance. So the time of the breach, at the time the obligation was incurred CASTRO, J.:
adding the cost of the rice, the freight, the insurance, the total or at the rate of exchange prevailing on the promulgation of this
would be about $187.99 that would be $15.01 gross profit per decision.
metric ton, multiply by 20,000 equals $300,200, that is my This is a direct appeal from the order of the Court of First
supposed profit if I went through the contract. Instance of Negros Occidental, dated July 20, 1968, which
In the case of Engel v. Velasco & Co., 47 Phil. 115, We ruled denied a claim of the appellants Ignatius Henry Bezore, Elwood
that in an action for recovery of damages for breach of contract, Knickerbocker and Mary Irene Fallon McCormick filed against
The above testimony of the plaintiff was a general even if the obligation assumed by the defendant was to pay the the estate of the late Emilio Camon in Special Proceeding 8366
approximation of the actual figures involved in the transaction. plaintiff a sum of money expressed in American currency, the of the said court.
A precise and more exact demonstration of the equity of the indemnity to be allowed should be expressed in Philippine
Emilio Camon was the lessee of the hacienda Rosario, located instrument, sold, transferred and conveyed "all their rights, title, must be in existence at the time of the waiver.1 Nonetheless,
in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, for the period from crop year interest and participation, whether accrued or accruing in their whatever defect there was in the waiver was subsequently
1940-41 to crop year 1960-61. One-half (1/2) pro-indiviso of the two-fourth (2/4) pro-indiviso share" in the hacienda Rosario, cured by the deed of sale of August 4, 1961 by virtue of which
said sugar plantation belonged to the above-named claimants- "together with all the improvements now existing thereon, the appellants sold not only their pro-indiviso half-share in
appellants (as their inheritance from the late Thomas Fallon), including its sugar quota," in favor of Amparo Sta. Romana and the hacienda but also their accrued rights therein. It is
while the other half belonged to Petronila Alunan vda. de Sta. Alberta vda. de Hopon. immaterial that Emilio Camon was not the vendee since what
Romana, * Amparo Sta. Romana and Alberta vda. de Hopon mattered is that the appellants parted with their accrued rights
(as their inheritance from their mother Rosario Sta. Romana). for a valuable consideration. That the vendees represented to
The lower court rejected the appellants' contention that the
Martiniano O. de la Cruz that the sugar quedans and palay
sugar allotments and allowances, subject of their claim against
were not included in the sale and that such was the intention of
Upon the death of Emilio Camon in 1967, his widow, the estate of Emilio Camon, were not included in the sale, and
the parties, involves a question of fact which is not reviewable
Concepcion Ereñeta, filed a petition in the court a held that by the positive and categorical terms of the deed of
in a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. 2 The words "accrued
quo (docketed as Special Proceeding 8366) praying for the sale, all benefits accrued and accruing to the appellants before
or accruing" the deed of sale are not obscure and, as the lower
grant to her of letters of administration of the estate of the of August 4, 1961 were included in the sale. The court then
court declared, are in fact positive and categorical enough to
deceased Camon. The petition was granted. Thereafter, the dismissed the claim per its order dated July 20, 1968.
include accrued allotments and allowances. Since the said
court issued an order requiring all persons with money claims
words are not ambiguous, there is no need to interpret them.
against the estate to file their claims within the period
Two issues are here tendered for resolution, to wit: (1) whether
prescribed in the order. The claimants-appellants Bezore, et al.,
the phrase "accrued or accruing" (in the deed of sale) having
thru their judicial administrator and counsel, Martiniano O. de la Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
reference to the claimants' rights, title, interest and participation
Cruz, filed a claim against the estate in the amounts of P62,065 doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
in the plantation, should be interpreted to exclude the sugar
as the money value of sugar allotments and allowances and meaning of its stipulations shall control. ... (Civil Code)
allotments and allowances adherent to the hacienda; and (2)
P2,100 as the money value of palay and rentals, or a total of
whether, notwithstanding the absence of a written contract of
P64,165, appertaining to the claimants' half-share in
lease for the crop years 1952-53 to 1960-61, Emilio Camon's That the consideration in the sale was "cheap" is not a ground
the hacienda.
continued cultivation of the hacienda created an express trust for the infirmity of the sale. Inadequacy of cause in a contract
in favor of the claimants. does not of itself invalidate the contract.3 The appellants' stand
The appellants and the administratrix-appellee are agreed that that the silence of Camon with respect to the several demand
the late Emilio Camon appropriated for himself the amounts letters sent to him was an admission of his debt, is without
The premises upon which the appellants would conclude that
claimed. The appellants had demanded payment of their claim support or sanction in our law of evidence.
the allotments and allowances were not included in the sale
from Emilio Camon when he was still alive, but the latter
are: that on January 12, 1961 there was then no sale and,
ignored the demands.
therefore, by the "Release and Waiver of Claims" Amparo Sta. Nor was there a change in the juridical relationship between
Romana and Alberta vda. de Hopon released and waived the hacienda owners and Emilio Camon when, after the
At the trial, three documents, the authenticity of each of which nothing in favor of Emilio Camon; that the waiver was made in expiration of their written contract of lease, he continued
is not controverted by the appellants, were submitted in advance, which is contrary to public policy; that Emilio Camon cultivating the hacienda during the crop years 1952-53 to 1960-
evidence by the administratrix-appellee. These are: was not the vendee in the sale; that the vendees represented 61. The continuance in the cultivation, with the acquiescence of
to Martiniano O. de la Cruz that the sugar quedans and palay the owners, did not convert the original relationship into an
claimed were not included in the sale and that such was the express trust, as contended by appellants, but merely implied a
(1) An "Agreement to Sell" (exhibit "1"), executed on January
intention of the parties; that the words "accrued and accruing" new lease over the property, with the same terms and
11, 1961, whereby the claimants Bezore, et al., agreed to sell
in the deeds are obscure, and since the deeds were prepared conditions provided in the original contract, except as to the
their one-half (1/2) share in the hacienda Rosario to Amparo
by Ramon S. Ereñeta who is a brother of the administratix period of the lease.
Sta. Romana and Alberta vda. de Hopon;
Concepcion Ereñeta who, in turn, is the widow of Emilio
Camon, the obscure words should not favor the party which
Art. 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should
(2) A "Release and Waiver of Claims" (exhibit "3"), executed on caused the obscurity; that the consideration in the sale, which
continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the
January 12, 1961, whereby Amparo Sta. Romana and Alberta is equivalent to P1,300 per hectare, is "cheap;" and that
acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary
vda. de Hopon, for and in consideration of "their gratitude for Camon's silence regarding the demands made upon him to pay
by either party has previously been given, it is understood that
the various services, financial and personal" extended to them the claim was an admission of his debt.
there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original
by Emilio Camon, released him from "any and all claims that
contract, but for the time established in articles 1682 and 1687.
may have accrued pertaining to the two-fourth (2/4) pro-
The claimants-appellants' view that at the time of the execution, The other terms of the original contract shall be revived. (Civil
indiviso share in Hacienda Rosario" owned by the appellants
on January 12, 1961, of the deed of "Release and Waiver of Code)
who had bound themselves "to sell their share in the said
Claims," Amparo Sta. Romana and Alberta vda. de Hopon
Hacienda Rosario" to Amparo and Alberta, "including rights
could not release or waive accrued claims belonging the
accrued or accruing," and whereby Amparo and Alberta bound There is nothing in the record that evidence the creation of a
claimants, is correct because the right that Amparo and Alberta
themselves "to waive in favor of Mr. Emilio Camon for his own fiduciary relationship between the lessors and the lessee after
then had was a mere promise by the claimants to sell their
use and benefit said rights accrued or accruing." the expiration of their written contract of lease, which fiduciary
share in the hacienda, not the right to the accrued claims. What
relationship is an essential characteristic of trust,4 and no
was agreed to be sold in the future was different from what was
written instrument has been pointed to as establishing an
(3) A "Deed of Sale" (exhibit "2"), executed on August 4, 1961, purportedly waived; and even if the object in both contracts
express trust, which writing is required in express trusts over
whereby the claimants Bezore, et al., for and in consideration were the same, the waiver would still be invalid for it is
immovables.5 There is therefore no basis for the appellants'
of the sum of P78,000, to be paid in the manner stated in the essential that a right, in order that it may be validly waived,
claim that an express trust was created when Camon continued rentals due at the rate of P6.00 a month from 1949 until such common cause with herein appellant Matias Gongon, stating (in
to cultivate the land after the expiration of the written contract of possession is restored to her and to pay attorney’s fees in the part) as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
lease. amount of P1,000.00.
"That at the time it issued the said Order, the LTA Board of
Lot 18-B, Block 23, with an area of 274 square meters, is a Administrators was newly constituted and therefore it has not
ACCORDINGLY, the order a quo of July 20, 1966 is affirmed,
portion of the Tambobong Estate in Malabon, Rizal, which used had sufficient time to study thoroughly the legality or wisdom of
at claimants-appellants' cost.
to belong in its entirety to the Roman Catholic Church. The lot the Bureau of Lands policy giving preference right to tenants to
was originally leased to Amada Aquino. who in turn sublet it in purchase the lots leased by them over and above the actual
[G.R. No. L-24421. April 30, 1970.] 1934 to Matias Gongon for a term of 15 years at a nominal occupants or sublessees thereof; hence, it just affirmed the
monthly rental of P6.00. The sublessee constructed his said decision of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
MATIAS GONGON, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, residential house on the property and since then has been Resources as a matter of sound administrative policy.
THE SPOUSES AMADA AQUINO and RUFINO RIVERA, THE living there, together with his family.
OFFICE OF THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, and That after a serious study of the issues of facts and of law in
THE OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE Meanwhile, the Tambobong Estate was purchased by the cases identical to the case at bar, the LTA Board of
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Government from the Roman Catholic Church on December Administrators found out that it would be more in keeping with
31, 1947 under the provisions of Section 1 of Commonwealth the spirit and intention of the laws (Commonwealth Acts Nos.
Enrique M. Fernando for Petitioner. Act No. 539, which authorized the President of the Philippines." 20 and 539 and Republic Act No 1400) governing acquisition
. . to acquire private lands or any interest, through purchase or and disposition of the landed estates (including the Tambobong
Bengzon & Bengzon for respondents spouses Amada expropriation, and to subdivide the same into home lots or Estate) if it followed the doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Aquino, Et. Al. small farms for resale at reasonable prices and under such Court in the case of Marukot, Et. Al. v. Jacinto, Et Al., (GR.
conditions as he may fix to their bona fide tenants or occupants Nos. L-8036-38) promulgated on December 20, 1955, giving
Solicitor General for other respondents. or to private individuals who will work the lands themselves and the actual occupants or sublessees the preference to purchase
who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines." the lots occupied by them as against tenants or lessees who do
SYLLABUS In due time Matias Gongon filed an application with the defunct not occupy the same; hence answering defendant
Rural Progress Administration for the purchase of Lot 18-B, subsequently reversed the policy followed by the Bureau of
1. LAND REFORM; LANDED ESTATES; POLICY Block 23, claiming preferential right as bona fide occupant. The Lands and adopted by the doctrines laid down in the Marukot
GOVERNING DISPOSITION OF LANDED ESTATES; CASE application was opposed by Amada Aquino, who also filed her case."cralaw virtua1aw library
AT BAR.— The intendment of Commonwealth Act No. 539, own application, alleging that as bona fide tenant or lessee she
governing the acquisition and disposition of landed estates is to had the preferential right to purchase the lot. After investigation, As heretofore stated, the lower court dismissed the complaint.
award lots to those who may apply, the first choice to the bona the Director of Lands — the Bureau of Lands having then taken In due time the plaintiff elevated the case to the Court of
fide "tenants," the second to the "occupants," and the last, to over the functions of the Rural Progress Administration — Appeals. In affirming the decision appealed from the appellate
"private individuals," if the parties affected thereby stand on rendered a decision on May 31, 1965 approving Gongon’s court pointed out (1) that the finding of the Secretary of
equal footing or under equal circumstances. Where the parties application, he being the actual occupant. On appeal to the Agriculture and Natural Resources, as affirmed by the Office of
cannot be said to be in equal footing — respondent spouses Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, this official set the President, to the effect that appellant Matias Gongon had
have their house on another lot they already own which is aside the order of the Director of Lands and gave due course to waived whatever right he might have had over the lot in
bigger than that where petitioner constructed his house — Amada Aquino’s application. question was factual in nature and could not be reviewed by the
justice and equity command that petitioner be given the courts; and (2) that appellant could be not considered as a
preferential right to purchase the lot in question to carry out the Matias Gongon moved for reconsideration, but his motion was bona fide occupant of the lot because his possession as
avowed policy of the law to give land to the landless. denied by the Land Tenure Administration, which had sublessee was in effect possession by the lessee, citing Article
meanwhile taken over the functions, powers and duties of the 524 of the Civil Code.
2. ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF PREFERENTIAL RIGHT, CONTRARY Landed Estate Division of the Bureau of Lands upon the
TO PUBLIC POLICY.— Petitioner’s waiver of his preferential enactment of Republic Act No. 1400. Matias Gongon then His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court
right over the lot being contrary to the avowed policy laid down appealed to the Office of the President, which thereafter of Appeals, Matias Gongon filed the present petition for review,
in Commonwealth Act No. 539, such waiver is null and void. affirmed the decision of the Land Tenure Administration. contending that the appellate court erred in failing to recognize
Accordingly, on February 24, 1961 the Land Tenure his right as sublessee-tenant to the lot in question and in not
DECISION Administration executed a deed of sale of Lot 18-B in favor of cancelling the sale thereof to respondent Amada Aquino as well
Amada Aquino, as a result of which she obtained, on March 10, as its registration in her name; in holding that he had waived his
MAKALINTAL, J.: 19761, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84738 in her name. right to the lot in question in favor of respondents-spouses
Amada Aquino and Rufino Rivera; and in ordering him to pay
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of On April 24, 1961 Matias Gongon filed the instant case in the rentals at the rate of P6.00 a month from 1949, plus attorney’s
Appeals which affirmed the dismissal by the Court of First Court of First Instance of Manila to annul the decisions of the fees and costs.
Instance of Manila of Matias Gongon’s complaint to set aside Land Tenure Administration and of not in question to him; to
the decision of the Land Tenure Administration — as affirmed cancel its registration in the name of Amada Aquino and to The two issues posed in this appeal are (1) whether or not
by the Office of the President — awarding Lot 18-B, Block 23 of have it registered in his name instead. The complaint likewise petitioner has the preferential right to purchase the lot in
the Tambobong Estate, to herein private respondent Amada contained a prayer for attorney’s fees and costs. question; and (2) if he has, whether or not the alleged waiver of
Aquino, wife of her co-respondent Rufino Rivera. The decision whatever right he might have had over said lot is valid.
appealed from likewise ordered Gongon to turn over the It is noteworthy that the Land Tenure Administration, in a
possession of the litigated lot to Amada Aquino, to pay the manifestation it filed in the lower court on May 27, 1961, made The first issue involves a conflict of claims between a lessee
and a sublesee insofar as the right to purchase the property is provision of the law be implemented with equity, justice and
concerned. Several decisions of this Court have been cited and fairness to all and in keeping with the spirit of giving land to the
discussed by the parties. Parenthetically, it may be noted that landless so that he may have a land of his own. But the order
in those cases the concept of possession by a sublessee under need not be rigidly followed when a party, say a bona fide
G.R. No. L-27828 February 27, 1970
the Civil Code, which according to the Court of Appeals in its tenant, has already in his name other lots more than what he
decision under review was in effect possession by the lessee needs for his family, for certainly to give him the preference
sublessor, was not considered by this Court applicable at all in would work injustice to the occupants."cralaw virtua1aw library THE SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (Formerly San Miguel
construing the term "occupant" under Commonwealth Act No. Brewery, Inc.), petitioner,
539. In the case at bar it is not disputed that respondent spouses vs.
have their house on another lot (lot No. 34, block No. 7) in the MACARIO CRUZ and the COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
In Grande v. Santos (98 Phil. 62), the registered lessee sublet Tambobong Estate. Furthermore, respondent Rufino Rivera is RELATIONS, respondents.
two portions of the lot to two different persons. In giving the the registered bona fide tenant of still another lot, also in
right of preference to the registered lessee this Court took into Tambobong, with an area of 2,761 square meters, which is
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo Belo and Ongsiako for petitioner.
consideration a number of circumstances: that the lot was a considerably bigger than the lot in question, where petitioner
small one of only 144 square meters; that the lessee was and his family constructed their residence and where they have
himself an actual occupant of part thereof; and that to subdivide been living since 1934. It cannot be said, therefore, that the Gonzalo A. Tejada for respondent Macario Cruz.
said lot into three portions would, owing to the extremely limited parties herein stand on an equal footing or under equal
size of each, lead to frictions, conflicts, misunderstandings and circumstances. Justice and equity command that petitioner be
perhaps disturbances of the peace — consequences which given the preferential right to purchase in order to carry out the
Commonwealth Act No. 539 precisely sought to avert. avowed policy of the law to give land to the landless.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
On the other hand, Marukot, Et. Al. v. Jacinto and Director of On the second issue petitioner’s position is that his preferential
Lands (supra, 98 Phil. 128) this Court awarded to the right could not be validly waived, such waiver being against
sublessees the portions of the lot they were occupying, as public policy. Under Article 6 of the new Civil Code "rights may Petition filed by the San Miguel Corporation (formerly San
against the claim of the lessee. This case differed from the be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, Miguel Brewery, Inc.) for review of the decision of the Court of
Grande case not only in that the lot involved had a bigger area public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third Industrial Relations (in Case No. 2870-ULP), finding it guilty of
— some 500 square meters — but principally in the fact that person with a right recognized by law." The old Civil Code (Art. unfair labor practices and ordering the reinstatement with back
the lessee was not actually occupying the lot but had his 4) carried a similar provision, although it mentioned only public wages of complainant Macario Cruz.
residence on another property altogether. This Court did not interest or public order.
rule on whether a "tenant" that is, a lessee, should enjoy The records of the case show that sometime in October, 1957
priority over an "occupant" who is a sublessee, because after That Commonwealth Act No. 539 lays down a public policy the "Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa sa S.M.B. (Paflu)", a
awarding the portions covered by the sublease to the actual there can be no doubt. In the case of Juat v. Land Tenure labor organization in the San Miguel Corporation, staged a
occupants, the registered lessee still got about 300 square Administration, G.R. No. L-17080, January 28, 1961, this Court, strike against the latter. After said strike ended and the strikers
meters, or 100 square meters more than the total area awarded thru Mr. Justice Felix Angelo Bautista. ruled in this resumed their work, Macario Cruz, a driver-employee and
to the sublessees. wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library member of the Union, was called by one Mr. Camahort, a
company official, and was shown a newspaper clipping carrying
In Santiago, Et. Al. v. Cruz, Et Al., (98 Phil. 168), the right of . . . It may also be stated that the avowed policy behind the a picture depicting him (Cruz) as one of the strikers. According
preference was given to the registered tenant. In interpreting adoption of such measure, is, as aptly observed by the Court of to Cruz, he was told by Camahort that he would be dismissed if
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 539, this Court said that Appeals, ‘to provide the landless elements of our population he would not desist from union activities. A few months
"the intendment of the law is to award the lots to those who with lots upon which to build their homes and small farms which thereafter, or on 17 March 1958, Cruz was advised of the
may apply in the order mentioned", that is, "the first choice is they can cultivate and from which they can derive their company's decision to retire him from the service for physical
given to the bona fide ‘tenants’, the second to the ‘occupants’ livelihood without being beholden to any man’ (Pascual v. disability, effective 31 March 1958. 1 Cruz must have already
and the last to ‘private individuals.’" The Court also took into Lucas, 51 O.G., No. 4, p. 2429), such measure having been received information thereof before it could be sent by the
consideration the fact that the sublessees executed a adopted in line with the policy of social justice enshrined in our company because under date of 15 March 1958 said employee
document expressly agreeing to vacate the lots anytime the Constitution to remedy and cure the social unrest caused by wrote the company requesting that the benefits due him on
tenant so required, together with the affidavit of one of the the concentration of landed estates in the hands of a few by account of his retirement be given in only one
sublessees acknowledging the right of the tenant to purchase giving to the landless elements a piece of land they can call installment.2 Accordingly, on 10 April 1958, Cruz, received from
the lot and renouncing whatever rights he might have to their own."cralaw virtua1aw library the company HSBC Cheeks Nos. K905357 and K905358 in the
purchase it. total sum of P3,019.46 as "full and complete payment of all my
Being contrary to public policy, the alleged waiver of his right (his) retirement benefits."3
However, in the subsequent case of Gutierrez v. Santos, Et. Al. made by herein petitioner should be considered null and void.
(107 Phil. 419), the ruling in the Santiago decision was clarified
and given a restrictive application, as WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. The On 12 June 1958, Cruz also filed with the Social Security
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph award of the lot in question to respondent Amada Aquino is set System an application for disability benefit,4 wherein he
aside; transfer certificate of title No. 84738 of the Registry of affirmed having retired from employment on 31 March 1958.
"Now, we say that the above order of preference should be Deeds of Rizal is ordered cancelled; and petitioner is declared This claim, however, was denied for the reason that the case
observed if the parties affected stand on an equal footing or to have the preferential right to purchase the said lot. Costs properly falls under sickness benefits, to which claimant was
under equal circumstances, for only in that way can the against respondents.
not yet entitled, he having been a member of the System for was ground to declare his separation from the service invalid, The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon
less than one year.5 complainant's receipt of all the benefits arising therefrom, with grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
full knowledge of all the facts surrounding the same, amounts society, the discouragement of stale claims, and unlike the
to waiver of the right to contest the validity of the company's statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
Three years after he was retired, on 27 May 1961, Macario
act.7 principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting
Cruz charged the San Miguel Company before the Court of
a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. (Tijam vs.
Industrial Relations with unfair labor practices for his dismissal
Sibonghanoy, L-21456, 15 April 1968). 10
in 1958, allegedly for union activities. The formal complaint Secondly, the petitioner company's cause is not only premised
against the company was filed by the Acting Prosecutor of the on estoppel, but also on complainant's right having lapsed into
Court on 12 October 1961 (Case No. 2870-ULP). After hearing, a stale demand. For, truly, all the elements for the operation of WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations
the trial Judge rendered decision sustaining the charges and the principle of laches are here present: (a) conduct on the part under review is hereby reversed, and the complaint for unfair
ordering therein respondent Company to reinstate the of the employer that gave rise to the situation on which the labor practices against herein petitioner, dismissed. No
complainant with back, wages, but deducting there from the complaint is made, which is the retirement of the complainant pronouncement as to costs.
amounts already received by him as retirement benefits. The for physical disability; (b) delay in the assertion of complainant's
company sought reconsideration thereof before the court en right — the lapsing of a period of 3 years which is neither
banc, and when the same was denied on 5 June 1967 (with explained nor justified; (c) lack of knowledge or notice on the
two judges dissenting) the present petition for review was filed. part of the respondent employer that the complainant would
assert the right on which the present suit is based; and (d)
injury or prejudice to the employer in the event relief is awarded [G.R. NO. 126780 : February 17, 2005]
The primary question posed in this proceeding is whether or
to the complainant.8
not a former employee who has accepted retirement benefits
may still contest the regularity and validity of his retirement 3 YHT REALTY CORPORATION, ERLINDA LAINEZ
years thereafter. Herein private respondent tries to remove this case from the and ANICIA PAYAM, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF
operation of the laches principle by alleging that the matter of APPEALS and MAURICE
unfair labor practice involves public interest, and that the McLOUGHLIN, Respondents.
In disposing of the company's defense of estoppel and ruling
Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875)did not prescribe any
that the acceptance by complainant of retirement benefits did
period within which a right provided thereunder may be
not preclude the latter from assailing the validity of the DECISION
enforced. There can be no quarrel on this point; but it must be
termination of his employment, the respondent Court cited the
realized that, unlike prescription, the defense of laches is not
case of Cariño vs. Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
dependent on the existence of a statutory period of limitation. It
Financing Administration,6 wherein we said: TINGA, J.:
can be invoked without reckoning any specific or fixed period; it
is sufficient that there be an unreasonable and unexplained
Acceptance of those benefits (separation pay and terminal delay in bringing the action that its maintenance would already The primary question of interest before this Court is
leave benefits) would not amount to estoppel. The reason is constitute inequity or injustice to the party claiming it. As this the only legal issue in the case: It is whether a hotel
plain. Employer and employee, obviously, do not stand on the Court succinctly declared in previous cases: may evade liability for the loss of items left with it for
same footing. The employer drove the employee to the wall. safekeeping by its guests, by having these guests
The latter must have to get hold of money. Because, out of job, execute written waivers holding the establishment or
... Laches is different from the statute of limitations. Prescription
he had to face the harsh necessities of life. He thus found its employees free from blame for such loss in light of
is concerned with the fact of delay, whereas laches is
himself in no position to resist money proferred. His, then, is a Article 2003 of the Civil Code which voids such waivers.
concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of
case of adherence, not of choice. One thing sure, however, is
time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a
that petitioners did not relent on their claim. They pressed it.
claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some
They are deemed not to have waived any of their rights. Before this Court is a Rule 45 Petition for Review of
change in the condition of the property or the relation of the
the Decision1 dated 19 October 1995 of the Court of
parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies
The above pronouncement relied upon by the Industrial Court in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is Appeals which affirmed the Decision2 dated 16
is not controlling in the present case. In the first place, as based on fixed time; laches is not. (Nielson & Co., Inc. vs. December 1991 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
distinctly stated in the Cariño case, therein petitioners were Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., L-21601, 17 December Branch 13, of Manila, finding YHT Realty Corporation,
improperly dismissed and never relented in their efforts to 1966).9 Brunhilda Mata-Tan (Tan), Erlinda Lainez (Lainez) and
assert the illegality of their separation 'from employment and to Anicia Payam (Payam) jointly and solidarily liable for
demand reinstatement. By contrast, the herein complainant not damages in an action filed by Maurice McLoughlin
Laches in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an
only specified, and obtained, payment of retirement gratuities (McLoughlin) for the loss of his American and
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
due him in a lump sum but even applied for disability benefits Australian dollars deposited in the safety deposit box of
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
with the Social Security System. Moreover, he never protested
earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a Tropicana Copacabana Apartment Hotel, owned and
his alleged illegal dismissal nor demanded reinstatement. It operated by YHT Realty Corporation.
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
took him more than 3 years to question the validity of his said
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
retirement. The original posture taken by the complainant,
it. The factual backdrop of the case follow.
indeed, can be nothing but an agreement, or at least
acquiescence, to the decision of the company to have him
retired for physical disability. Thus, even assuming that there
Private respondent McLoughlin, an Australian other items in the box as he did not check out of his McLoughlin requested the management for an
businessman-philanthropist, used to stay at Sheraton room at the Tropicana during his short visit to investigation of the incident. Lopez got in touch with
Hotel during his trips to the Philippines prior to 1984 Hongkong. When he arrived in Hongkong, he opened Tan and arranged for a meeting with the police and
when he met Tan. Tan befriended McLoughlin by the envelope which contained Five Thousand US Dollars McLoughlin. When the police did not arrive, Lopez and
showing him around, introducing him to important (US$5,000.00) and discovered upon counting that only Tan went to the room of McLoughlin at Tropicana and
people, accompanying him in visiting impoverished Three Thousand US Dollars (US$3,000.00) were thereat, Lopez wrote on a piece of paper a promissory
street children and assisting him in buying gifts for the enclosed therein.7 Since he had no idea whether note dated 21 April 1988. The promissory note reads
children and in distributing the same to charitable somebody else had tampered with his safety deposit as follows:
institutions for poor children. Tan convinced McLoughlin box, he thought that it was just a result of bad
to transfer from Sheraton Hotel to Tropicana where accounting since he did not spend anything from that
I promise to pay Mr. Maurice McLoughlin the amount of
Lainez, Payam and Danilo Lopez were employed. Lopez envelope.8
AUS$4,000.00 and US$2,000.00 or its equivalent in
served as manager of the hotel while Lainez and
Philippine currency on or before May 5, 1988.14
Payam had custody of the keys for the safety deposit
After returning to Manila, he checked out of Tropicana
boxes of Tropicana. Tan took care of McLoughlin's
on 18 December 1987 and left for Australia. When he
booking at the Tropicana where he started staying Lopez requested Tan to sign the promissory note which
arrived in Australia, he discovered that the envelope
during his trips to the Philippines from December 1984 the latter did and Lopez also signed as a witness.
with Ten Thousand US Dollars (US$10,000.00) was
to September 1987.3 Despite the execution of promissory note by Tan,
short of Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000). He also
McLoughlin insisted that it must be the hotel who must
noticed that the jewelry which he bought in Hongkong
assume responsibility for the loss he suffered.
On 30 October 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and stored in the safety deposit box upon his return to
However, Lopez refused to accept the responsibility
and registered with Tropicana. He rented a safety Tropicana was likewise missing, except for a diamond
relying on the conditions for renting the safety deposit
deposit box as it was his practice to rent a safety bracelet.9
box entitled "Undertaking For the Use Of Safety
deposit box every time he registered at Tropicana in
Deposit Box,"15 specifically paragraphs (2) and (4)
previous trips. As a tourist, McLoughlin was aware of
When McLoughlin came back to the Philippines on 4 thereof, to wit:
the procedure observed by Tropicana relative to its
April 1988, he asked Lainez if some money and/or
safety deposit boxes. The safety deposit box could only
jewelry which he had lost were found and returned to
be opened through the use of two keys, one of which is 2. To release and hold free and blameless TROPICANA
her or to the management. However, Lainez told him
given to the registered guest, and the other remaining APARTMENT HOTEL from any liability arising from any
that no one in the hotel found such things and none
in the possession of the management of the hotel. loss in the contents and/or use of the said deposit box
were turned over to the management. He again
When a registered guest wished to open his safety for any cause whatsoever, including but not limited to
registered at Tropicana and rented a safety deposit
deposit box, he alone could personally request the the presentation or use thereof by any other person
box. He placed therein one (1) envelope containing
management who then would assign one of its should the key be lost;
Fifteen Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00), another
employees to accompany the guest and assist him in
envelope containing Ten Thousand Australian Dollars
opening the safety deposit box with the two keys.4 ...
(AUS$10,000.00) and other envelopes containing his
traveling papers/documents. On 16 April 1988,
McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety McLoughlin requested Lainez and Payam to open his 4. To return the key and execute the RELEASE in favor
deposit box: Fifteen Thousand US Dollars safety deposit box. He noticed that in the envelope of TROPICANA APARTMENT HOTEL upon giving up the
(US$15,000.00) which he placed in two envelopes, one containing Fifteen Thousand US Dollars use of the box.16
envelope containing Ten Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00), Two Thousand US Dollars
(US$10,000.00) and the other envelope Five Thousand (US$2,000.00) were missing and in the envelope
US Dollars (US$5,000.00); Ten Thousand Australian previously containing Ten Thousand Australian Dollars On 17 May 1988, McLoughlin went back to Australia
Dollars (AUS$10,000.00) which he also placed in (AUS$10,000.00), Four Thousand Five Hundred and he consulted his lawyers as to the validity of the
another envelope; two (2) other envelopes containing Australian Dollars (AUS$4,500.00) were missing.10 abovementioned stipulations. They opined that the
letters and credit cards; two (2) bankbooks; and a stipulations are void for being violative of universal
checkbook, arranged side by side inside the safety hotel practices and customs. His lawyers prepared a
When McLoughlin discovered the loss, he immediately letter dated 30 May 1988 which was signed by
deposit box.5
confronted Lainez and Payam who admitted that Tan McLoughlin and sent to President Corazon
opened the safety deposit box with the key assigned to Aquino.17 The Office of the President referred the letter
On 12 December 1987, before leaving for a brief trip to him.11 McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was to the Department of Justice (DOJ) which forwarded
Hongkong, McLoughlin opened his safety deposit box staying and confronted her. Tan admitted that she had the same to the Western Police District (WPD).18
with his key and with the key of the management and stolen McLoughlin's key and was able to open the
took therefrom the envelope containing Five Thousand safety deposit box with the assistance of Lopez, Payam
US Dollars (US$5,000.00), the envelope containing Ten and Lainez.12 Lopez also told McLoughlin that Tan stole After receiving a copy of the indorsement in Australia,
Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), his the key assigned to McLoughlin while the latter was McLoughlin came to the Philippines and registered
passports and his credit cards.6 McLoughlin left the asleep.13 again as a hotel guest of Tropicana. McLoughlin went to
Malacaňang to follow up on his letter but he was
instructed to go to the DOJ. The DOJ directed him to and other transportation expenses, long distance calls 6. Ordering defendants, jointly and
proceed to the WPD for documentation. But McLoughlin to Australia, Meralco power expenses, and expenses for severally, to pay plaintiff the sum
went back to Australia as he had an urgent business food and maintenance, among others.22 of P200,000.00 as attorney's fees,
matter to attend to. and a fee of P3,000.00 for every
appearance; andcralawlibrary
After trial, the RTC of Manila rendered judgment in
For several times, McLoughlin left for Australia to favor of McLoughlin, the dispositive portion of which
attend to his business and came back to the Philippines reads: 7. Plus costs of suit.
to follow up on his letter to the President but he failed
to obtain any concrete assistance.19
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, judgment is SO ORDERED.23
hereby rendered by this Court in favor of plaintiff and
McLoughlin left again for Australia and upon his return against the defendants, to wit:
The trial court found that McLoughlin's allegations as to
to the Philippines on 25 August 1989 to pursue his
the fact of loss and as to the amount of money he lost
claims against petitioners, the WPD conducted an
1. Ordering defendants, jointly and were sufficiently shown by his direct and
investigation which resulted in the preparation of an
severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of straightforward manner of testifying in court and found
affidavit which was forwarded to the Manila City Fiscal's
US$11,400.00 or its equivalent in him to be credible and worthy of belief as it was
Office. Said affidavit became the basis of preliminary
Philippine Currency of P342,000.00, established that McLoughlin's money, kept in
investigation. However, McLoughlin left again for
more or less, and the sum of Tropicana's safety deposit box, was taken by Tan
Australia without receiving the notice of the hearing on
AUS$4,500.00 or its equivalent in without McLoughlin's consent. The taking was effected
24 November 1989. Thus, the case at the Fiscal's
Philippine Currency of P99,000.00, or through the use of the master key which was in the
Office was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
a total of P441,000.00, more or less, possession of the management. Payam and Lainez
Mcloughlin requested the reinstatement of the criminal
with 12% interest from April 16 1988 allowed Tan to use the master key without authority
charge for theft. In the meantime, McLoughlin and his
until said amount has been paid to from McLoughlin. The trial court added that if
lawyers wrote letters of demand to those having
plaintiff (Item 1, Exhibit CC); McLoughlin had not lost his dollars, he would not have
responsibility to pay the damage. Then he left again for
gone through the trouble and personal inconvenience
Australia.
of seeking aid and assistance from the Office of the
2. Ordering defendants, jointly and
President, DOJ, police authorities and the City Fiscal's
severally to pay plaintiff the sum
Upon his return on 22 October 1990, he registered at Office in his desire to recover his losses from the hotel
of P3,674,238.00 as actual and
the Echelon Towers at Malate, Manila. Meetings were management and Tan.24
consequential damages arising from
held between McLoughlin and his lawyer which resulted
the loss of his Australian and
to the filing of a complaint for damages on 3 December
American dollars and jewelries As regards the loss of Seven Thousand US Dollars
1990 against YHT Realty Corporation, Lopez, Lainez,
complained against and in (US$7,000.00) and jewelry worth approximately One
Payam and Tan (defendants) for the loss of
prosecuting his claim and rights Thousand Two Hundred US Dollars (US$1,200.00)
McLoughlin's money which was discovered on 16 April
administratively and judicially (Items which allegedly occurred during his stay at Tropicana
1988. After filing the complaint, McLoughlin left again
II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX, previous to 4 April 1988, no claim was made by
for Australia to attend to an urgent business matter.
Exh. "CC"); McLoughlin for such losses in his complaint dated 21
Tan and Lopez, however, were not served with
November 1990 because he was not sure how they
summons, and trial proceeded with only Lainez, Payam
were lost and who the responsible persons were. But
and YHT Realty Corporation as defendants. 3. Ordering defendants, jointly and
considering the admission of the defendants in their
severally, to pay plaintiff the sum
pre-trial brief that on three previous occasions they
of P500,000.00 as moral damages
After defendants had filed their Pre-Trial Brief allowed Tan to open the box, the trial court opined that
(Item X, Exh. "CC");
admitting that they had previously allowed and it was logical and reasonable to presume that his
assisted Tan to open the safety deposit box, personal assets consisting of Seven Thousand US
McLoughlin filed an Amended/Supplemental 4. Ordering defendants, jointly and Dollars (US$7,000.00) and jewelry were taken by Tan
Complaint20 dated 10 June 1991 which included severally, to pay plaintiff the sum from the safety deposit box without McLoughlin's
another incident of loss of money and jewelry in the of P350,000.00 as exemplary consent through the cooperation of Payam and
safety deposit box rented by McLoughlin in the same damages (Item XI, Exh. "CC"); Lainez.25
hotel which took place prior to 16 April 1988. 21 The trial
court admitted the Amended/Supplemental Complaint. 5. And ordering defendants, jointly The trial court also found that defendants acted with
and severally, to pay litigation gross negligence in the performance and exercise of
During the trial of the case, McLoughlin had been in expenses in the sum of P200,000.00 their duties and obligations as innkeepers and were
and out of the country to attend to urgent business in (Item XII, Exh. "CC"); therefore liable to answer for the losses incurred by
Australia, and while staying in the Philippines to attend McLoughlin.26
the hearing, he incurred expenses for hotel bills, airfare
Moreover, the trial court ruled that paragraphs (2) and 7) One-half of P356,400.00 We are not persuaded.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl
(4) of the "Undertaking For The Use Of Safety Deposit or P178,000.00 representing lαω  lιbrαrÿ
Box" are not valid for being contrary to the express expenses for food and maintenance;
mandate of Article 2003 of the New Civil Code and
We adhere to the findings of the trial court as affirmed
against public policy.27 Thus, there being fraud or
8) P50,000.00 for moral damages; by the appellate court that the fact of loss was
wanton conduct on the part of defendants, they should
established by the credible testimony in open court by
be responsible for all damages which may be attributed
McLoughlin. Such findings are factual and therefore
to the non-performance of their contractual 9) P10,000.00 as exemplary
beyond the ambit of the present
obligations.28 damages; andcralawlibrary
petition.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
lιbrαrÿ
The Court of Appeals affirmed the disquisitions made 10) P200,000 representing attorney's
by the lower court except as to the amount of damages fees.
The trial court had the occasion to observe the
awarded. The decretal text of the appellate court's
demeanor of McLoughlin while testifying which
decision reads: With costs. reflected the veracity of the facts testified to by him.
On this score, we give full credence to the appreciation
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision SO ORDERED.29 of testimonial evidence by the trial court especially if
is hereby AFFIRMED but modified as follows: what is at issue is the credibility of the witness. The
oft-repeated principle is that where the credibility of a
Unperturbed, YHT Realty Corporation, Lainez and witness is an issue, the established rule is that great
The appellants are directed jointly and severally to pay Payam went to this Court in this appeal by certiorari. respect is accorded to the evaluation of the credibility
the plaintiff/appellee the following amounts:
of witnesses by the trial court.31 The trial court is in the
Petitioners submit for resolution by this Court the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and
1) P153,200.00 representing the following issues: (a) whether the appellate court's their testimonies because of its unique opportunity to
peso equivalent of US$2,000.00 and conclusion on the alleged prior existence and observe the witnesses firsthand and note their
AUS$4,500.00; subsequent loss of the subject money and jewelry is demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
supported by the evidence on record; (b) whether the examination.32
2) P308,880.80, representing the finding of gross negligence on the part of petitioners in
peso value for the air fares from the performance of their duties as innkeepers is We are also not impressed by petitioners' argument
Sidney [sic] to Manila and back for a supported by the evidence on record; (c) whether the that the finding of gross negligence by the lower court
total of eleven (11) trips; "Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit Box" as affirmed by the appellate court is not supported by
admittedly executed by private respondent is null and evidence. The evidence reveals that two keys are
void; and (d) whether the damages awarded to private required to open the safety deposit boxes of Tropicana.
3) One-half of P336,207.05
respondent, as well as the amounts thereof, are proper One key is assigned to the guest while the other
or P168,103.52 representing
under the circumstances.30 remains in the possession of the management. If the
payment to Tropicana Apartment
Hotel; guest desires to open his safety deposit box, he must
The petition is devoid of merit. request the management for the other key to open the
same. In other words, the guest alone cannot open the
4) One-half of P152,683.57 safety deposit box without the assistance of the
or P76,341.785 representing It is worthy of note that the thrust of Rule 45 is the management or its employees. With more reason that
payment to Echelon Tower; resolution only of questions of law and any peripheral access to the safety deposit box should be denied if the
factual question addressed to this Court is beyond the one requesting for the opening of the safety deposit
bounds of this mode of review. box is a stranger. Thus, in case of loss of any item
5) One-half of P179,863.20
or P89,931.60 for the taxi xxx deposited in the safety deposit box, it is inevitable to
transportation from the residence to Petitioners point out that the evidence on record is conclude that the management had at least a hand in
Sidney [sic] Airport and from MIA to insufficient to prove the fact of prior existence of the the consummation of the taking, unless the reason for
the hotel here in Manila, for the dollars and the jewelry which had been lost while the loss is force majeure.
eleven (11) trips; deposited in the safety deposit boxes of Tropicana, the
basis of the trial court and the appellate court being Noteworthy is the fact that Payam and Lainez, who
the sole testimony of McLoughlin as to the contents were employees of Tropicana, had custody of the
6) One-half of P7,801.94
thereof. Likewise, petitioners dispute the finding of master key of the management when the loss took
or P3,900.97 representing Meralco
gross negligence on their part as not supported by the place. In fact, they even admitted that they assisted
power expenses;
evidence on record. Tan on three separate occasions in opening
McLoughlin's safety deposit box.33 This only proves that
Tropicana had prior knowledge that a person aside the owners and managers of an establishment or effects are within the hotel or inn.39 With greater
from the registered guest had access to the safety enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused reason should the liability of the hotelkeeper be
deposit box. Yet the management failed to notify by their employees in the service of the branches in enforced when the missing items are taken without the
McLoughlin of the incident and waited for him to which the latter are employed or on the occasion of guest's knowledge and consent from a safety deposit
discover the taking before it disclosed the matter to their functions. Also, this Court has ruled that if an box provided by the hotel itself, as in this case.
him. Therefore, Tropicana should be held responsible employee is found negligent, it is presumed that the
for the damage suffered by McLoughlin by reason of employer was negligent in selecting and/or supervising
Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the "undertaking" manifestly
the negligence of its employees. him for it is hard for the victim to prove the negligence
contravene Article 2003 of the New Civil Code for they
of such employer.35 Thus, given the fact that the loss of
allow Tropicana to be released from liability arising
McLoughlin's money was consummated through the
The management should have guarded against the from any loss in the contents and/or use of the safety
negligence of Tropicana's employees in allowing Tan to
occurrence of this incident considering that Payam deposit box for any cause whatsoever.40 Evidently, the
open the safety deposit box without the guest's
admitted in open court that she assisted Tan three undertaking was intended to bar any claim against
consent, both the assisting employees and YHT Realty
times in opening the safety deposit box of McLoughlin Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the safety
Corporation itself, as owner and operator of Tropicana,
at around 6:30 A.M. to 7:30 A.M. while the latter was deposit box whether or not negligence was incurred by
should be held solidarily liable pursuant to Article
still asleep.34 In light of the circumstances surrounding Tropicana or its employees. The New Civil Code is
2193.36
this case, it is undeniable that without the explicit that the responsibility of the hotel-keeper shall
acquiescence of the employees of Tropicana to the extend to loss of, or injury to, the personal property of
opening of the safety deposit box, the loss of The issue of whether the "Undertaking For The Use of the guests even if caused by servants or employees of
McLoughlin's money could and should have been Safety Deposit Box" executed by McLoughlin is tainted the keepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers,
avoided. with nullity presents a legal question appropriate for except as it may proceed from any force majeure.41 It
resolution in this petition. Notably, both the trial court is the loss through force majeure that may spare the
and the appellate court found the same to be null and hotel-keeper from liability. In the case at bar, there is
The management contends, however, that McLoughlin,
void. We find no reason to reverse their common no showing that the act of the thief or robber was done
by his act, made its employees believe that Tan was
conclusion. Article 2003 is controlling, thus: with the use of arms or through an irresistible force to
his spouse for she was always with him most of the
qualify the same as force majeure.42
time. The evidence on record, however, is bereft of any
showing that McLoughlin introduced Tan to the Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from
management as his wife. Such an inference from the responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is Petitioners likewise anchor their defense on Article
act of McLoughlin will not exculpate the petitioners not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any 200243 which exempts the hotel-keeper from liability if
from liability in the absence of any showing that he stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest the loss is due to the acts of his guest, his family, or
made the management believe that Tan was his wife or whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in visitors. Even a cursory reading of the provision would
was duly authorized to have access to the safety Articles 1998 to 200137 is suppressed or diminished lead us to reject petitioners' contention. The
deposit box. Mere close companionship and intimacy shall be void. justification they raise would render nugatory the
are not enough to warrant such conclusion considering public interest sought to be protected by the provision.
that what is involved in the instant case is the very What if the negligence of the employer or its
Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as
safety of McLoughlin's deposit. If only petitioners employees facilitated the consummation of a crime
an expression of public policy precisely to apply to
exercised due diligence in taking care of McLoughlin's committed by the registered guest's relatives or
situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel
safety deposit box, they should have confronted him as visitor? Should the law exculpate the hotel from liability
business like the common carrier's business is imbued
to his relationship with Tan considering that the latter since the loss was due to the act of the visitor of the
with public interest. Catering to the public,
had been observed opening McLoughlin's safety deposit registered guest of the hotel? Hence, this provision
hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for
box a number of times at the early hours of the presupposes that the hotel-keeper is not guilty of
hotel guests and security to their persons and
morning. Tan's acts should have prompted the concurrent negligence or has not contributed in any
belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of
management to investigate her relationship with degree to the occurrence of the loss. A depositary is
the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty
McLoughlin. Then, petitioners would have exercised not responsible for the loss of goods by theft, unless
to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary
due diligence required of them. Failure to do so his actionable negligence contributes to the loss.44
stipulation in so-called "undertakings" that ordinarily
warrants the conclusion that the management had
appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers on
been remiss in complying with the obligations imposed
guests for their signature. In the case at bar, the responsibility of securing the
upon hotel-keepers under the law.
safety deposit box was shared not only by the guest
himself but also by the management since two keys are
In an early case,38 the Court of Appeals through its
Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who, in necessary to open the safety deposit box. Without the
then Presiding Justice (later Associate Justice of the
the performance of their obligations, are guilty of assistance of hotel employees, the loss would not have
Court) Jose P. Bengzon, ruled that to hold hotelkeepers
negligence, are liable for damages. As to who shall occurred. Thus, Tropicana was guilty of concurrent
or innkeeper liable for the effects of their guests, it is
bear the burden of paying damages, Article 2180, negligence in allowing Tan, who was not the registered
not necessary that they be actually delivered to the
paragraph (4) of the same Code provides that guest, to open the safety deposit box of McLoughlin,
innkeepers or their employees. It is enough that such
even assuming that the latter was also guilty of The amount of P50,000.00 for moral damages is here in Manila, for the eleven (11)
negligence in allowing another person to use his key. reasonable. Although trial courts are given discretion to trips;
To rule otherwise would result in undermining the determine the amount of moral damages, the appellate
safety of the safety deposit boxes in hotels for the court may modify or change the amount awarded when
(6) One-half of P7,801.94
management will be given imprimatur to allow any it is palpably and scandalously
or P3,900.97 representing Meralco
person, under the pretense of being a family member excessive.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
power expenses;
or a visitor of the guest, to have access to the safety lιbrαrÿ
deposit box without fear of any liability that will attach
thereafter in case such person turns out to be a (7) One-half of P356,400.00
Moral damages are not intended to enrich a
complete stranger. This will allow the hotel to evade or P178,200.00 representing
complainant at the expense of a
responsibility for any liability incurred by its employees expenses for food and maintenance;
defendant.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
in conspiracy with the guest's relatives and visitors.
lιbrαrÿ
(8) P50,000.00 for moral damages;
Petitioners contend that McLoughlin's case was
They are awarded only to enable the injured party to
mounted on the theory of contract, but the trial court (9) P10,000.00 as exemplary
obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve
and the appellate court upheld the grant of the claims damages; and
to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by
of the latter on the basis of tort.45 There is nothing
reason of defendants' culpable action.55
anomalous in how the lower courts decided the
controversy for this Court has pronounced a (10) P200,000 representing
jurisprudential rule that tort liability can exist even if The awards of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages attorney's fees.
there are already contractual relations. The act that and P200,000.00 representing attorney's fees are
breaks the contract may also be tort.46 likewise sustained.

As to damages awarded to McLoughlin, we see no WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,

reason to modify the amounts awarded by the the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 October
appellate court for the same were based on facts and 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioners are directed,
law. It is within the province of lower courts to settle jointly and severally, to pay private respondent the
factual issues such as the proper amount of damages following amounts:
awarded and such finding is binding upon this Court G.R. No. 137873       April 20, 2001
especially if sufficiently proven by evidence and not (1) US$2,000.00 and AUS$4,500.00
unconscionable or excessive. Thus, the appellate court or their peso equivalent at the time D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,
correctly awarded McLoughlin Two Thousand US Dollars of payment; vs.
(US$2,000.00) and Four Thousand Five Hundred COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
Australian dollars (AUS$4,500.00) or their peso
equivalent at the time of payment,47 being the amounts (2) P308,880.80, representing the
peso value for the air fares from KAPUNAN, J.:
duly proven by evidence.48 The alleged loss that took
place prior to 16 April 1988 was not considered since Sydney to Manila and back for a total
the amounts alleged to have been taken were not of eleven (11) trips; At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a
sufficiently established by evidence. The appellate construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from
court also correctly awarded the sum of P308,880.80, the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
(3) One-half of P336,207.05
representing the peso value for the air fares from or P168,103.52 representing
Sydney to Manila and back for a total of eleven (11) payment to Tropicana Copacabana PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District
trips;49 one-half of P336,207.05 or P168,103.52 Apartment Hotel; investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated November 25,
representing payment to Tropicana;50 one-half 1990, stating that:
of P152,683.57 or P76,341.785 representing payment
to Echelon Tower;51 one-half of P179,863.20 (4) One-half of P152,683.57
or P76,341.785 representing x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in
or P89,931.60 for the taxi or transportation expenses Pasig, Metro Manila where he was pronounced dead on arrival
from McLoughlin's residence to Sydney Airport and payment to Echelon Tower;
(DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around
from MIA to the hotel here in Manila, for the eleven 2:15 p.m. of the same date.
(11) trips;52 one-half of P7,801.94 or P3,900.97 (5) One-half of P179,863.20
representing Meralco power expenses;53 one-half or P89,931.60 for the taxi or
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place,
of P356,400.00 or P178,000.00 representing expenses transportation expense from
while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and
for food and maintenance.54 McLoughlin's residence to Sydney Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at
Airport and from MIA to the hotel
the elevator core of the 14 th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance  THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts
Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE therein stated.
(steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF
plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners PETITIONER.
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing
and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or
the work of Chief Justice Moran, enumerated the requisites for
pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING admissibility under the above rule:
the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform
assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction LOQUITOR [sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another
thereby crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER. person specially enjoined by law to do so;
companions who luckily jumped out for safety.
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
when the [p]latform he was then on board and performing work, UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND specially enjoined by law; and
fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or
getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the  THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been
a safety lock.1 RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL acquired by him personally or through official information.
CODE.3
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is Petitioner contends that the last requisite is not present.
against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. The CA ruled otherwise.
employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior It held that said report, being an entry in official records, is an
availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. exception to the hearsay rule. The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in
question, also testified before the trial court. In Rodriguez vs.
Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire Investigation Report,
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to the officer who signed the fire report also testified before the
Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, trial court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for
reads: which are derived from his perception. 4 A witness, therefore, the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained in
may not testify as what he merely learned from others either the report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony of the officer who executed the report.
defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows: testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as
proof of the truth of what he has learned. 5 This is known as the
hearsay rule. x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego. was available for cross-examination, the portions of the report
which were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of his
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the perceptions and conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages. general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to report, such as the summary of the statements of the parties
written, as well as oral statements.6 based on their sworn statements (which were annexed to the
3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego’s earning Report) as well as the latter, having been included in the first
capacity. The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible purpose of the offer [as part of the testimony of Major
deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and Enriquez], may then be considered as independently relevant
untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested statements which were gathered in the course of the
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not
exposed by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:
5. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit. therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be tested by cross-
examination.8 "Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact
SO ORDERED.2 that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the
rule,9 among which are entries in official records. Section 44, making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA)
Rule 130 provides: statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be
affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."

D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for
the following grounds:
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty petitioners on his Report and made himself available for cross-
examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it
proved that certain utterances were made (but not their truth), of the building the day after the incident13 and saw the platform causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has
was effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned for himself.14 He observed that the platform was crushed15 and the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has
Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does that it was totally damaged. 16 PO3 Villanueva also required no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege
away with the testimony in open court of the officer who made Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the police negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the
the official record, considers the matter as an exception to the headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. The
hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record detached from the lifting machine, without any pin or bolt.17 inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact
admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or
therein stated. The underlying reasons for this exceptionary innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3
rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon inaccessible to the injured person.
Villanueva’s testimony that the cause of the fall of the platform
v. Barcelon.
was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed
that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily certain exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause,
needed; the occasions in which the officials would be admissible.19 reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the
summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant
numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily work in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res
Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of
something is not done in which testimony is not needed from ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of
the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the
official sources. Were there no exception for official statements, necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that under the
doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere
hosts of officials would be found devoting the greater part of peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is
fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of
their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering within the power of the defendant to show that there was no
the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the
deposition before an officer. The work of administration of negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendant’s
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence
government and the interest of the public having business with negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power. Accordingly, some court
which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
officials would alike suffer in consequence. For these reasons, add to the three prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
and for many others, a certain verity is accorded such loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa
specific proof of negligence.20
documents, which is not extended to private documents. (3 loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party
Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631). had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence
wise: has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it
accident.23
presumes they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy
and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and
of their duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are
true under such a degree of caution as to the nature and generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was present in the case at bar:
circumstances of each case may appear to require. due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction
There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the
speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez 14th floor of a building to the basement while he was working
instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances
was not presented to testify on his report. In that case the with appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death. The
accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been ripe for construction site is within the exclusive control and
presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on
determination, and this Court would have agreed with the Court management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project
the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged
of Appeals that said report was inadmissible since the superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in
with negligence.
aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied. The complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances of
statements given by the sources of information of Major any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly within the
Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information," there being x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other
no showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to caused the injury complained of was under the control or hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the
give the statements for record. management of the defendant, and that the occurrence accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies
resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the
things would not happen if those who had its control or following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the
management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained therein
as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony
explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
of PO3 Villanueva.
caused by the defendant’s want of care.21 negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due
to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s injured. x x x.
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity,
testimony which were of his personal knowledge suffice to
i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not available.22
prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the
crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juego’s remains at the
basement while performing work in a construction site unless
morgue,12 making the latter’s death beyond dispute. PO3 The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the
Villanueva also conducted an ocular inspection of the premises that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As
explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia the cause of her husband’s death. Regrettably, petitioner does Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of
and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or remedies, majority of the Court En Banc,31 following the rule
exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,] the presumption of negligence arising from the application of res in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.
second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the
was attributed to the appellee’s deceased husband[;] thus[,] the incident.
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured
last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the
employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s
reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence
availed of the death benefits provided under the Labor Code right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the
arises. x x x.24
and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual,
employer damages under the Civil Code. moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail
the application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and
since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
which befell respondent’s husband." Article 173. Extent of liability. – Unless otherwise provided, the
liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaña vs. Cebu
exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker
the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to
the doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendant’s negligence is has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed
receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents.
presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the amounts set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to
The payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the
requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for
recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the
plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action
Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven
burden then shifts to defendant to explain. 26 The presumption simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]
hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six
or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence
hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight
and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption,
hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws whose benefits Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said
such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the
are administered by the System or by other agencies of the case to proceed with their suit under the Civil Code despite
inference.27 It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its
government. having availed of the benefits provided under the Workmen’s
defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising.
Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:
Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play
only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the
has been established.1âwphi1.nêt Workmen’s Compensation Act, provided that: With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in
its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a
quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. – The rights and
Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and
Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police investigator as remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a
Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensation to the
evidence of its due care. According to Fabro’s sworn personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all
Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all
statement, the company enacted rules and regulations for the other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his
of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except
safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against
Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in
the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its use. the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of
installments x x x. Such allegation was admitted by herein
said injury x x x.
petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabro’s sworn statement as may 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but they set up the
proof of its due care but, in arguing that private respondent Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen’s
failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioner’s employees, allowed recovery under said Act as well as under the Civil Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of
also assails the same statement for being hearsay. Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court the committee created to investigate the accident which
finally settled the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining established the criminal negligence and violation of law by
Corporation,30 which involved a cave-in resulting in the death of Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of
Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and
the employees of the Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging that Mines to then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter
inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence under the
the mining corporation, in violation of government rules and dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.
hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand
regulations, failed to take the required precautions for the
to testify thereon.28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is
protection of the employees, the heirs of the deceased
based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the
employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court
adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such my not
of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI
commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs
prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has
sought relief from this Court.
own language in writing the affiant’s statements which may been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased
either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.29  miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had
Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules
due care any more than private respondent can use it to prove and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not
have sought redress under the Workmen’s Compensation supervisor referred the same to the prosecutor’s office. This is 1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also knew
Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. a standard operating procedure for police investigators which of the two choices of remedies available to her and yet she
The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a appellee may not have even known. This may explain why no chose to claim and receive the benefits from the ECC.
mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an complainant is mentioned in the preliminary statement of the
intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to public prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6, 1991,
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election
the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged
between inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars
petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the by complainant of "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide."
any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected
payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act It is also possible that the appellee did not have a chance to
remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act
should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in appear before the public prosecutor as can be inferred from the
of election acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the doctrine of
their favor. [Underscoring supplied.] following statement in said memorandum: "Respondents who
election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness
were notified pursuant to Law waived their rights to present
to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to
controverting evidence," thus there was no reason for the
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the
public prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence, notice of
remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to
appellant’s negligence cannot be imputed on appellee before
Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper prevent a double redress for a single wrong.38
she applied for death benefits under ECC or before she
Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case, the Court again
received the first payment therefrom. Her using the police
recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act
investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9, The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in
could still sue under the Civil Code. The Court said:
1991 may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the a waiver by election. Hence, the rule in Floresca that a
February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the Prosecutor’s Office claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence, Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under
sustained by workers in the course of their employment could stating therein that: "The death of the victim is not attributable the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is
be filed only under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, to the to any negligence on the part of the respondents. If at all and deemed to have waived the other.
exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In Floresca, this as shown by the records this case is civil in nature."
doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule that the (Underscoring supplied.) Considering the foregoing, We are
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act more inclined to believe appellee’s allegation that she learned
or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence about appellant’s negligence only after she applied for and
that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that [It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has
the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will will make this case fall under the exception held in knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must
preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other the Floresca ruling.35 be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the
remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time
been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the
The CA further held that not only was private respondent
sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they depended.
ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well:
supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon
the first remedy. (Underscoring supplied.) which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given
only elementary school for her educational attainment; that she under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under
did not know what damages could be recovered from the death
the exception because private respondent was unaware of
of her husband; and that she did not know that she may also
petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that
recover more from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent person knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge
filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy upon which to make an intelligent decision.
of the police investigation report and the Prosecutor’s Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that
Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against private respondent "failed to allege in her complaint that her
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise
petitioner’s personnel. While stating that there was no application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended
of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences.
negligence attributable to the respondents in the complaint, the by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an issue submitted
That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be
prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at during the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear or
illustrated on the record or by the evidence.40
all," the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the adjudicate that issue."
exception in Floresca:
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have
remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca.
x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the been ignorant of the facts because as early as November 28,
alleged negligence of appellant as early as November 25, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in a criminal
1990, the date of the police investigator’s report. The appellee complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address
merely executed her sworn statement before the police against petitioner’s employees. On February 6, 1991, two petitioner’s contentions.
investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her months before the filing of the action in the lower court,
relation to the victim, and her knowledge of the accident. She Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that, although
did not file the complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to there was insufficient evidence against petitioner’s employees, Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private
Homicide" against appellant’s employees. It was the the case was "civil in nature." These purportedly show that prior respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that she had
investigator who recommended the filing of said case and his to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC on January 2, availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for
petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of x-----------------------x
an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to damages. The records do not indicate the total amount private
plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer; 41  respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears
G.R. No. 155101
otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for from Exhibit "K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial
petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction payment representing the accrued pension from November
over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension, according to FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,
proceedings before the trial court. the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total monthly vs.
pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the
P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial court is
facts that led to her husband’s death and the rights pertaining x-----------------------x
subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial
to a choice of remedies?
court for such determination. Should the trial court find that its
award is greater than that of the ECC, payments already G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be
knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the "fact" that deducted from the trial court'’ award of damages. Consistent
with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of
double compensation. vs.
petitioner’s employees, of which private respondent purportedly
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL
learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating
CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and
that there may be civil liability. In Floresca, it was
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation of
Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in
government rules and regulations. Negligence, or violation of
its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award
government rules and regulations, for that matter, however, is RESOLUTION
decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the
not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over which only the courts
ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant
have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the
to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other SERENO, CJ:
courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the principle
respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been
misapplied in Floresca and in the case at bar. We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the
SO ORDERED. death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa due to fraternity hazing. While
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew there is nothing new in the arguments raised by the parties in
that her husband died in the elevator crash when on November their respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, we
15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the find a few remaining matters needing to be clarified and
ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, resobed. Sorne oJ' these matters include the effect of our
1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner Decision on the finality of the Court of Appeals judgments
G.R. No. 151258               December 1, 2014 insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda (Almeda),
filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.
June] Anthony D. Arna (Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug),
and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are concerned; the question of
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the who are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the validity
vs.
remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was of the probation proceedings and the concomitant orders of a
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was court that allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.
not aware of her rights.
x-----------------------x
Before the Court are the respective Motions for
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, Reconsideration or Clarification filed by petitioners People of
ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance G.R. No. 154954 the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by respondents
or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
(Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1 February
vs.
ignorance of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of 2012.1 The Court modified the assailed judgments 2 of the Court
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO
remedies. of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found
MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL
respondents Fidelito Dizon (Dizon), Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and
ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT
Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III,
imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification had the
limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws.42 This may be NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
effect of lowering the criminal liability of Dizon from the crime of
deduced from the language of the provision, which, MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO,
homicide, while aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al.
notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE
from slight physical injuries. The CA Decision itself had
her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA,
modified the Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court
private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ,
(RTC) Branch 121 finding all of the accused therein guilty of the
nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and
crime of homicide.3
held against her. RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to
case docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153 and ruled Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several
that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling
dismissed the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II Villa (neophytes). to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense
(Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr. pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of
(Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) on the ground that physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by
their right to speedy trial was violated. Reproduced below is the carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for
some members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby
dispositive portion of our Decision:5 the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating
of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s
dinner. They then slept at the carport.
Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes
finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they Lenny’s shivering and incoherent mumblings.1avvphi1 Initially,
in G.R. No. 154954 – finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought
Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of last for three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny
the crime of slight physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping
SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano commencement of their initiation. him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a
Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened,
Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and dead on arrival.
received threats and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the
penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the
neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota
Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an
court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of
physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to the following 35 Aquilans:
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included
months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition,
the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a
accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering
Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000,
blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the
and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000, plus legal
neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall 1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the
and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped,
date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction. Costs de
or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes
oficio. 2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the
Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit 3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed with fist blows on their arms or withknee blows on their thighs
Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which
criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain 4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also
89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their 5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against first day of initiation.
Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President neophytes were made to present comic plays and to play rough
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the 7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a
include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in 8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper
circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties. and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically.
The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing 9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours,
SO ORDERED.
the initiation for the day officially ended. 10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)

To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity 11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
surrounding the present case:6
members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the 12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the
join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and 13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos) Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C- From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated
38340(91) were jointly tried. On the other hand, the trial against Petitions were individually brought before this Court. (Citations
the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was omitted)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved
first.
Motion for Partial Reconsideration
16. Antonio General (General)
filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores) Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized
Reconsideration7 in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 &
with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim) 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed
Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment,
grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case
or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against
against Escalona, Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively,
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo) the remaining nine accused commenced anew.
Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and Resolution. 8 Villa
reiterates her previous arguments that the right to speedy trial
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada) On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside of the accused was not violated, since they had failed to assert
the finding of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. that right within a reasonable period of time. She stresses that,
C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the unlike their co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion, respondents
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza) accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon Escalona et al.did not timely invoke their right to speedy trial
had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied during the time that the original records and pieces of evidence
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero) only to the remaining 25 accused, viz: were unavailable. She again emphasizes that the prosecution
cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse of 12 years from the
arraignment until the initial trial, as there were a number of
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima) 1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban,
incidents attributable to the accused themselves that caused
Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General,
the delay of the proceedings. She then insists that we apply the
Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero,
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez) balancing test in determining whether the right to speedy trial of
Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) –
the accused was violated.
were acquitted,as their individual guilt was not established by
25. Adel Abas (Abas) proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola) 2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel
Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration 9 of G.R. Nos.
Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the crime of slight 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of
In Criminal Case No. C-38340 physical injuriesand sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that accused
They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither the felonious intent to kill
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona) sum of ₱30,000 as indemnity. (animus interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure (animus
iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it concedes that the mode in
which the accused committed the crime was through fault
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca) 3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio
(culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed should
Villareal– were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
have been equivalent to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article
crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. It argues that the
Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable
CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years
to the accused was so gross that it shattered the fine distinction
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos) of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were
between dolo and culpaby considering the act as one
also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of
committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the accused
Lenny Villa in the sum of ₱50,000 and to pay the additional
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion) conducted the initiation rites in such a malevolent and
amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
merciless manner that it clearly endangered the lives of the
initiates and was thus equivalent to malice aforethought.
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil) On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340
dismissed the charge against accused Concepcion on the
With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera) ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on
OSG asserts that their acquittal may also be reversed despite
different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court
the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also committed grave
denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona,
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez) abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R.
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in
No. 15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al. should have
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial court’s
been similarly convicted like their other co-accused Dizon,
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon) Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona,
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the former also
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their
right to speedy trial.
participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
contributed to his death. circumstances and legal assertions raised by petitioner Villa in the penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period toprisión
her Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning G.R. Nos. correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a
178057 & 178080 have already been thoroughly considered less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.
and passed uponin our deliberations, which led to our Decision and medium periods shall be imposed.
dated 1 February 2012. We emphasize that in light of the
Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions finding of violation of the right of Escalona et al. to speedy trial,
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall
pertaining to G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted
commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony,
They essentially seek a clarification as to the effect of our to an acquittal,15 and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its medium and
Decision insofar as their criminal liability and service of would result in a violation of their right against double
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious
sentence are concerned. According to respondents, they jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that the acquittal of the
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall
immediately applied for probation after the CA rendered its accused may be challenged where there has been a grave
be imposed.
Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal liability abuse of discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly
from the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable established that the CA’s Decision dismissing the case was
sentence, to slight physical injuries, which carries a attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment xxxx
probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that, as a result, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the
they have already been discharged from their criminal liability assailed judgment constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice,
and the cases against them closed and terminated. This discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
doing or falling to do an act from which material damage results
outcome was supposedly by virtue of their Applications for virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or toact in
by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
Probation on various dates in January 2002 11 pursuant to contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and
person performing or failing to perform suchact, taking into
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
the Probation Law. They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances
City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice." 18 Thus,
regarding persons, time and place.
respective Applications for Probation on 11 October grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply
200212 and, upon their completion of the terms and conditions because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the
thereof, discharged them from probation and declared the evidence.19 Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed
criminal case against them terminated on various dates in April in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is
2003.13 not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. (Emphases
We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA
supplied)
Decision, and petitioner’s arguments and found no basis to rule
To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true that the CA gravely abused its discretion in concluding that the
copies of their respective Applications for Probation and the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated. Its findings On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in
RTC Orders granting these applications, discharging them from were sufficiently supported by the records of the case and which a deliberate malicious intent to do an unlawful act is
probation, and declaring the criminal case against them grounded in law. Thus, we deny the motion of petitioner Villa present. Below is our exhaustive discussion on the
terminated. Thus, they maintain that the Decision in CA-G.R. with finality. matter:20 Our Revised Penal Code belongs tothe classical
No. 15520 had already lapsed into finality, insofar as they were school of thought. x x x The identity of mens rea– defined as a
concerned, whenthey waived their right to appeal and applied guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent – is
Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
for probation. the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do
what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist,
We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration it is necessary that the act be committed by means of doloor
ISSUES
filed by the OSG with respect to G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. "malice."
People) and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). Many of the
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion arguments raised therein are essentially a mere rehash of the
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for Certiorari.
elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent. x x x x The
the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
element of intent – on which this Court shall focus – is
violation of their right to speedy trial
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially
even if the act complained of was born of imprudence or a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the
II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on account resolve with which a person proceeds.It does not refer to mere
corresponded to that for intentional felonies of the gravity of the actions of the accused. We emphasize that will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intentconcerns the
the finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is legally result of the act. While motive is the "moving power" that impels
inconsistent with that committed by means of dolo. Culpable one to action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of
III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and
felonies involve those wrongs done as a result of an act using a particular means to produce the result. On the other
conditions of their probation discharged them from their performed without malice or criminal design. The Revised hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious,
criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against Penal Code expresses thusly: villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.With
them DISCUSSION
these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in
intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person
Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden
who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had
Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence
of dolus malus– that the act or omission be done "willfully," punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). Negligence) are mandatorily applied if the death of a person
"maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of another.
aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246 to 261
rea– a crime is not committed if the mind of the person lack of skill. (Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the death was
performing the act complained of is innocent. As is required of a result of the commission of a forbidden act accompanied by a
the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent malicious intent. These imposable penalties are statutory,
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. mandatory, and not subjectto the discretion of the court. We
done without malice, from which an immediate personal harm,
have already resolved – and the OSG agrees – that the
injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable
accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither animus
xxxx lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person
interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on
committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and consciously
Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is what
appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is is applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from
thus a vital ingredient in establishing the commission of the homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the
which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a
intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of Revised Penal Code.
mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not
homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately
immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.
before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration
kill – or animus interficendi– cannot and should not be inferred,
unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in
Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been the product doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position filed by Tecson et al.
of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to
act executed without malice or criminal intent – but with lack of the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the
foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must be about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the
motions of respondents Tecson et al. vis-à-vis G.R. No. 154954
qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence duty to take precaution against the mischievous resultsof the
(People v. Court of Appeals).
resulting in homicide. act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.

The finality of a CA decision will not

xxxx As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being
bar the state from seeking the
charged with recklessness, the degree of precaution and
annulment of the judgment via a
diligence required varies with the degree of the danger
In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Rule 65 petition.
involved. If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger
Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the employment
of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who
of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an
chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to In their separate motions, 21 respondents insist that the previous
act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is
be very careful, inorder to prevent or avoid damage or injury. In verdict of the CA finding them guilty of slight physical injuries
fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the
contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is has already lapsed into finality as a result of their respective
wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no
thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or availments of the probation program and their ultimate
criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an
diligence that may be required of an individual, "from a discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no longer
intentional felony. Thus, incase of physical injuries under the
transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The duty of be convicted of the heavier offense of reckless imprudence
Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi
the person to employ more or less degree of care will depend resulting in homicide.22 Respondents allude to our Decision in
or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity
upon the circumstances of each particular case. (Emphases Tan v. People23 to support their contention that the CA
or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the
supplied, citations omitted) judgment can no longer be reversed or annulled even by this
victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond
Court.
reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt
act of inflicting physical injuries per semerely satisfies the We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond
elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent or dolus The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have
The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for committing attained finality, as the former had timely filed with this Court a
unless his intentions are. an intentional felony. petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65 petition is
analogous to an appeal, or a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, in that a petition for certiorarialso prevents the
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by
case from becoming final and executory until after the matter is
infliction of physical injuries, absentmalicious intent, does not means of culpa, we cannot agree with the argument of the
ultimately resolved.
make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony.x x OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for intentional
x. felony can also be applied to the present case on the ground
that the nature of the imprudence or negligence of the accused Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of
was so gross that the felony already amounted to malice. The a criminal judgment once the accused applies for probation, viz:
xxxx
Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the imposable
penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpaon
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, the one hand and felonies committed by means of doloon the
convictionmay, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set
however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn between
aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected.
devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also them. The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and
Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
becomes finalafter the lapse of the period for perfecting an In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the the authority or jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide
appeal, or whenthe sentence has been partially or totally merits, in the manner done in an appeal, actually takes place; the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity
satisfied or served, or when the accusedhas waived in writing the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a particular case or
his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) sevoid on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was matter before it.31 That power and capacity includes the
(Emphases supplied) rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court competence to pronounce a judgment, impose a
has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the execution of a
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other sentencein accordance with law.
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule
words, the review is on the question of whether there has been
122,26 it can be culled from the foregoing provisions that only
a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the
the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the
decision’s error or correctness. Under the exceptional nature of
especially if the relief being sought is the correction or review of probation applications of Tecson et al. before Caloocan City
a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a very heavy one — is on the
the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order to give RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not have
shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the
life to the constitutional edict27 against putting a person twice in competence to take cognizance of the applications, considering
presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It is beyond that it was not the court of origin of the criminal case. The OSG
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse
contention that the accused would be exposed to double points out that the trial court that originally rendered the
of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a
jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order to Decision in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch 121 of
virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in
reverse an acquittal or even to increase criminal liability. Thus, the Caloocan City RTC.
contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary
the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when applying
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
for probation – makes the criminal judgment immediately final
(Emphases supplied, citations omitted) While this Court’s The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted
and executory. Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth
Decision in Tan may have created an impression of the for reference:
reiterating:28
unassailability of a criminal judgment as soon as the accused
applies for probation, we point out that what the state filed
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal therein was a mere motion for the modification of the penalty,
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
is likewise barred because the government has already been and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari is a special
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant
afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal civil action that is distinct and separate from the main case.
within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the
defendant’s culpability; after failing to persuade the court to While in the main case, the core issue is whether the accused
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons is innocent or guilty of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule 65
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions
supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and petition is whether the court acted (a) without or in excess of its
as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendant’s jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
already established innocence at the first trial where he had lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking, there is
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. x x x x
been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward nomodification of judgment in a petition for certiorari, whose
(Emphases supplied)
and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a resolution does not call for a re-evaluation of the merits of the
government who has at its disposal all the powers and case in order to determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of
resources of the State. the accused. In a Rule 65 petition, any resulting annulment of a It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires
criminal judgment is but a consequence of the finding of lack of that an application for probation be filed withthe trial court that
jurisdiction. convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of
Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the
origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and
government would then be allowed another opportunity to
sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of homicide was Branch
persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section
121 – not Branch 130 – of the Caloocan City RTC.35 Neither the
strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, 7 of Rule 120 must be that it is inapplicable and irrelevant
judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson et al.in their
all in a process where the government’s power and resources where the court’s jurisdiction is being assailed through a Rule
pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any
are once again employed against the defendant’s individual 65 petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a
special authority that would clarify why the Applications for
means. That the second opportunity comesvia an appeal does criminal judgment only if the appeal brought before the court is
Probation had not been filed with or taken cognizance of by
not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of in the nature of a regular appeal under Rule 41, or an appeal
Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in a
reason, justice and conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations by certiorari under Rule 45, and if that appeal would put the
previous case, the CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition
omitted) accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in
of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from hearing and
the partial annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520
deciding Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), the ruling was made
in spite of its finality, as the judgment therein was issued with
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners therein, i.e.
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer blanket accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez.36
jurisdiction.
invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained
in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute,
Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their
and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state The orders of Caloocan City RTC
probation applications with Caloocan City RTC Branch 130,
assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
and not with Branch 121. We stress that applicants are not at
judgment.29 The reasoning behind the exception is articulated in they were issued without jurisdiction.
liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek probation,
Nazareno, from which we quote:30
as the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation law is
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the substantive and not merely procedural. Considering, therefore,
wrong court. Part and parcel of our criminal justice system is that the probation proceedings were premised on an
unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City the probation applications,51 the OSG had filed Manifestations We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law
RTC Branch 130 never acquired jurisdiction over the case. of Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA 52 and this as follows:
Court.53 Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA judgments by
filing before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25 November
Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this
2002.54 We noted the petition and then required respondents to
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 granted the probation Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
file a comment thereon.55 After their submission of further
applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant
pleadings and motions, we eventually required all parties to file
which the criminal action has been properly instituted. 37 If a within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the
their consolidated memoranda.56 The records of the case
party appeals the trial court’s judgment or final execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
remained with the CA until they were elevated to this Court in
order,38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions
2008.57
execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
appealing party is concerned.39 The court of origin then loses probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
jurisdiction over the entire case the moment the other party’s For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
time to appeal has expired.40 Any residual jurisdiction of the no jurisdiction to act on the probation applications of Tecson et
court of origin shall cease – including the authority to order al. It had neither the power nor the authority to suspend their
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a
execution pending appeal – the moment the complete records sentence, place them on probation, order their final discharge,
term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation
of the case are transmitted to the appellate and eventually declare the case against them terminated. This
shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application
court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have glaring jurisdictional faux pasis a clear evidence of either gross
shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
the authority to wield the power to hear, try, and decide the ignorance of the law oran underhanded one-upmanship on the
case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both – to which this
resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and authority shall Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur. An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
remain with the appellate court until it finally disposes of the (Emphases supplied)
case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any subsequent event,
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at
even if the nature of the incident would have prevented
the time they applied for it. Probation 58 is a special privilege Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the
jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.
granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who offender must not have appealed the conviction. 61 In the 2003
immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this Court was faced with
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate and willingness the issue of whether a convict may still apply for probation even
penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment." to be reformed, the state affords them a chance to avoid the after the trial court has imposed a non probationable verdict,
A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the accused of stigma of an incarceration recordby making them undergo provided that the CA later on lowers the original penalty to a
the offense charged becomes final under any of the following rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major purposes of sentence within the probationable limit. In that case, the trial
conditions among others:42 after the lapse of the period for the law are to help offenders to eventually develop themselves court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of eight years
perfecting an appeal; when the accused waives the right to into law-abiding and self respecting individuals, as well as to of prisión mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the
appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal ofan appeal; when the assist them in their reintegration with the community. Probation Law. They only became eligible for probation after
sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1
served; or when the accused applies for probation. When the year, 8 months and 21 days of prisión correccional.
It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the
decision attains finality, the judgment or final order is entered in
accused. Rather, it is an act of grace orclemency conferred by
the book of entries of judgments.43 If the case was previously
the state. In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 59 this Court In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in
appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or
explained thus: Francisco and ruled that the accused was ineligiblefor
final order must be attached to the original record, which shall
probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In
then be remanded to the clerk of the court from which the
Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation Law
appeal was taken.44 The court of origin then reacquires It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group
offers no ambiguity and does not provide for any distinction,
jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is during this of persons not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the
qualification, or exception. What is clearis that all offenders who
time that the court of origin may settle the matter of the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court
previously appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for
execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation.
thereof,45 including the convicts’ applications for probation.46 society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The
Accordingly, this Court enunciated in Lagrosathat the accused
Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the
are disallowed from availing themselves of the benefits of
state or its government of any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for
or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is
relinquished its jurisdiction over the case when Caloocan City probation only on appeal as a result of the downgrading of their
clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms
RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for sentence from non-probationable to probationable.
of the law who is not clearly within them. (Emphases supplied)
Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their
respective applications47 while a motion for reconsideration was
While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan
still pending before the CA48 and the records were still with that The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation
City RTC Branch 130 issued its various Orders discharging
court.49 The CA settled the motion only upon issuing the applications of Tecson et al.60 It points out that when they
Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in Lagrosa, however,
Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the RTC, they
was a mere reiteration of the reasoning of this Court since the
months after Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the thereby made themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant
1989 case Llamado v. Court of Appeals63 and Francisco. The
trial court.50 In September 2002, or almost a month before the to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation
Applications for Probation of Tecson et al., therefore, should
promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002 granting Law).
not have been granted by RTC Branch 130, as they had
appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents 3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and trial court,now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted
were originally found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer all its effects. homicide by the Supreme Court.
14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their
4. By absolute pardon. If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard
conviction to slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20
position, it will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the
days of arresto menor, which made the sentence fall within
trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will not be
probationable limits for the first time, the RTC should have 5. By prescription of the crime.
entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such
nonetheless found them ineligible for probation at the time.
judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s
6. By prescription of the penalty. judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an will also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment — even
arbitrary and despotic use of authority, so gross that it divested if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in
the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a be made to pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the
article 344 of this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
consequence, the RTC Orders granting the Applications for forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang
Probation of Tecson et al. and thereafter discharging them from nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the
their criminal liability must be deemed to have been issued with As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of of legal rights; legally speaking, it is as if no judgment had been
jurisdiction. rendered at all. Considering our annulment of the Orders of The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation allowing Arnel to apply for probation would dilute the ruling of
proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits that technically
Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat the probation
do not exist.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, we declare all law requires that an accused must not have appealed his
orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City RTC conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is
Branch 130 in relation to the probation applications of Tecson In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the a huge difference between Franciscoand this case.
et al. null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction. Revised Penal Code, as we find it inapplicable to this case.
We find our pronouncement in Galman v. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to xxxx
Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz: "suspend the execution of the sentence," 66 and not to replace
the original sentence with another, as we pointed out in our
discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia:67 Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that
A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no
would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have
rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being
a choice between appeal and probation. Hewas not in a
worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for
worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed but is rather in effect a suspension of the imposition of probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him
under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to
supplied) "interlocutory judgment"in the nature of a conditional order now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished
placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains
court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of
The ultimate discharge of Tecson et that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when
discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with,
al. from probation did not totally they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to
or by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated.
extinguish their criminal liability. apply for that privilege.
(Emphases supplied)

Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal xxxx

Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.
liability has already been extinguished as a result of their
In light of our recent Decision in
discharge from probation and the eventual termination of the
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al. In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of
criminal case against them by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130.
may now reapply for probation. frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an
To support his argument, he cites the following provision of the
original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a
Revised Penal Code:
probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the
Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our ruling in start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and
Franciscoand modified our pronouncements insofar as the
ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months
eligibility for probation of those who appeal their conviction is
Criminal liability is totally extinguished: maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for
concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En Bancin probation.
effect abandoned Lagrosaand settled the following once and
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and for all:69
as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. to probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such
who appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is disqualified philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation
2. By service of the sentence. from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it of the statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said
happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be
Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional
regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only Decision dated 1 February 2012, the fourth sentence reads as accessory penalties: ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional— Its
where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so follows: accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión correccional shall
would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right
Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not tofollow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison
because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said
term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
purpose. imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión
suffer the disqualification provided in this article although
correccional, as maximum.
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
xxxx
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was term of the "penalty next lower" than that prescribed by the
The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of
right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless imprudence
their principal penalty sans the ISL; that is, for four years and
four months maximum, he would havehad the right to apply for resulting in homicide, in accordance with the Indeterminate
two months81 or until they have served their sentence in
probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have Sentence Law (ISL),70 the phrase "and one (1) day," which had
accordance with law. Their suspension takes effect
availed himself of the right had the RTC doneright by him. The been inadvertently added, must be removed. Consequently, in
immediately, once the judgment of conviction becomes final.82
idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the the first paragraph of the dispositive portion, the fourth
penalty he got was not probationable. sentence should now read as follows:
We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment
exceeds 18 months, they shall furthermore suffer a perpetual
The question in this case is ultimately one of They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison
special disqualification from the right of suffrage. Under Article
fairness.1âwphi1 Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
32 of the RevisedPenal Code, if this accessory penalty
probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as
attaches, it shall forever deprive them of the exercise of their
is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, maximum. In this instance, we further find it important to clarify
right (a) to vote in any popular election for any public office; (b)
subject to probation? (Emphases supplied) the accessory penalties inherent to the principal penalty
to be elected to that office; and (c) to hold any public
imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.
office.83 Any public office that they may be holding becomes
In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments vacant upon finality of the judgment. 84 The aforementioned
and found Tecson et al.ultimately liable for the crime of By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal accessory penalties can only be wiped out if expressly remitted
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant to Article Code, a corresponding accessory penalty automatically in a pardon.85
365 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense is punishable by attaches every time a court lays down a principal penalty
arresto mayor in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1 day outlined in Articles 25 and 27 thereof.71 The applicable
Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without
to 6 months) to prisión correccional in its medium period (from accessory penalty is determined by using as reference the
prejudice to a grant of probation, shouldthe trial court find them
2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). principal penaltyimposed by the court before the prison
eligible therefor. As we explained in Baclayon,86 the grant of
Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable sentence is computed in accordance with the ISL. 72 This
probation suspends the execution of the principal penalty of
to Tecson et al., we rule that they are now eligible to apply for determination is made in spite of the two classes ofpenalties
imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory penalties. We
probation. Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was convicted of the mentioned in an indeterminate sentence. It must be
have reiterated this point in Moreno v. Commission on
same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible for emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory
Elections:87
probation. penalties specifically allude to the actual "penalty"73 imposed,
not to the "prison sentence"74 set by a court. We believe that
the ISL did not intend to have the effect of imposing on the In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing
While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC
convict two distinct sets of accessory penalties for the same defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect,
Branch 130, which granted the Applications for Probation, we
offense.75 The two penalties are only relevant insofar as setting a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the
cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have fulfilled the
the minimum imprisonment period is concerned, after which the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the
terms and conditions of their previous probation program and
convict may apply for parole and eventually seek the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory
have eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they
shortening of the prison term.76 penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to
reapply for probation, the trial court may, at its discretion,
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
consider their antecedent probation service in resolving
disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from
whether to place them under probation at this time and in Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed
the order granting probation the paragraph which required that
determining the terms, conditions, and period thereof. penalty for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching profession.
homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión
correccionalin its medium period. As this provision grants
Final clarificatory matters
courts the discretion tolay down a penalty without regard to the Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory
presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to
We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional imposable penaltymust also be within the aforementioned follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
typographical error in the minimum term of the penalty imposed range.77 Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the
on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While this issue was on Dizon and Tecson et al. the actual (straight) penalty 78 of four penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
not raised by any of the parties before us, this Court deems it years and two months of prisión correccional. 79 Pursuant to correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were
proper to discuss the matter ex proprio motuin the interest of Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
justice. In the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of our correccional automatically carries with it80 the following
It appears then that during the period of probation, the Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan,
probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Basilan Province.
office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public Constitution. (5a)
office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated
During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve
Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably
the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely
because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan.
required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the
Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of
probation order. G.R. No. 154598             August 16, 2004
respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them
there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE issued a certification3 that respondent was no longer residing
Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H. Villa in connection OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS there.
with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby DENIED. The RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s
General concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is also THORNTON, petitioner,
cellular phone bills showing calls from different places such as
DENIED. vs.
Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces.
ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.
Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this
The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas
Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato corpus enforceable in the entire country.
Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise DENIED. In light
of the finding that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch
DECISION However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on
130 acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled
cognizance of the aforementioned Applications for Probation,
that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave
we hereby ANNUL the entire probation proceedings and SET
family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for
ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments issued in
habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act
connection thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio
CORONA, J.: Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas
Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr.,
Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or
reapply for probation in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v. This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
People of the Philippines,88 without prejudice to their remaining the July 5, 2002 resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate
civil liability, if any. Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition for Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of
habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
substance. The dispositive portion2 read: This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902
Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive
(1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This
portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012 and hereby
jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102
delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the fourth WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas of the Rules of Court.
sentence of the first paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now corpus on the grounds that: a) this Court has no jurisdiction
read as follows: "They are hereby sentenced to suffer an over the subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, sufficient in substance. In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was
as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisi6n enacted. It provides:
correccional, as maximum."
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were
married on August 28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. – The Family Courts shall
SO ORDERED. at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer following cases:
Delle Francisco Thornton.
xxx       xxx       xxx
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus
their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the freedom to in relation to the latter.
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. go out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of
the country, respondent was also often out with her friends,
leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp. The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and
RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? The
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but simple answer is, yes, it did, because there is no other meaning
govern. she continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, of the word "exclusive" than to constitute the Family Court as
respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera the sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other than the
without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she
Family Court also possesses the same competence, then the for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the
jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but concurrent – and family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the
such an interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of
wording of RA 8369. transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the habeas corpus enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction.
case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left On the other hand, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for
without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with certainty,
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction
been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable
over a petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a
Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of
respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas
General: the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
corpus on him or her by just moving out of the region over
which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial
jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme
law. In the absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction in this State is to "protect the rights and promote the welfare of Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or
Court, it cannot exercise it even if it is demanded by children." The creation of the Family Court is geared towards by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances
expediency or necessity. addressing three major issues regarding children’s welfare authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable
cases, as expressed by the legislators during the deliberations anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable
for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on
authority of this Court – or any court for that matter – to
further clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance,
determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the
sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of the case or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable
exclusive domain of the legislature. When there is a perceived
and the parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of the before himself, enforceable only within his judicial
defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought form the
children party to the case remains protected. district. (Emphasis supplied)
courts but only from the legislature.

The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of In ruling that the Commissioner’s "exclusive" jurisdiction did not
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of
the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the foreclose resort to the regular courts for damages, this Court, in
Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction the same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and
cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in
over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in
RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over
Again, to quote the Solicitor General: the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil
such petitions.
Code. It also applied the well-established rule that what is
controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter, of the law:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20
petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child whose
of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of "Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being.
Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective
the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the The spirit of the law insures man’s survival and ennobles him.
May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the
welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its
rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in
of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the spirit giveth life."
the Supreme Court,4 Court of Appeals, or with any of its
child’s privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable
the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to
anywhere in the Philippines.5 xxx       xxx       xxx
be avoided by the legislature: the child’s welfare and well being
will be prejudiced.
The petition is granted. It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice
guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word
provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since "exclusive" as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As
power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the
there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex
mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing
writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. Mining Corporation,6 the heirs of miners killed in a work-related
legislation aforementioned.
accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if,
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Workmen’s
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of
RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive such cases. being used in more than one sense. Sometimes, what the
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended
legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the
it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus.
language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it
To the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently cannot be We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or contradiction.7 In the
construed any other way.
case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the
We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it will result in an case at bar. it supports petitioner’s submission that the word rights and promote the welfare of children"8 under the
iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without "exclusive" in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights
legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities
who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same manner
and serve as the guiding principle in construing the provisions From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals decorum, competence and propriety. Human as they
of RA 8369. and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family are, however, magistrates do have their own
courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is weaknesses, frailties, mistakes and even indiscretions.
involved. In the case before us, respondent Judge Esmeraldo G.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that
implied repeals are not favored: Cantero was charged administratively in the twilight of
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the his government service, as a result of a failed love
child all over the country is not an unreasonable availment of a affair that happened some 46 years ago. After an
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear
remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for otherwise unblemished record, he would have reached
finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied
dismissing the petition. As explained by the Solicitor General:10 the compulsory retirement age of 70 years on August
repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the
8, 1997 had death not intervened a few months ago on
maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus
interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over September 26, 1996. Notwithstanding his death, this
brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system the country" does not represent an insurmountable or Court still resolved to rule on this case, as it may affect
of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different his retirement benefits.
be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject from or difficult than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a
and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise enforceable Antecedent Facts
must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts anywhere within the Philippines.
should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all
laws on the subject."9 In a letter-complaint2 dated November 10, 1993, Maria
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition Apiag Cantero with her daughter Teresita A. Cantero
for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is
Sacurom and son Glicerio A. Cantero charged the
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of
respondent, Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero of the
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to Appeals, Sixteenth Division.
issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pinamungajan-
Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA Aloquinsan, Cebu, with gross misconduct for allegedly
7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 having committed bigamy and falsification of public
does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court documents.
Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be After receipt of the respondent's Comment, the Court
Philippines. (n)
read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts on February 5, 1996, referred this case3 to Executive
have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Judge Gualberto P. Delgado of the Regional Trial Court
Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of
of Toledo City, Cebu for investigation, report and
minors is at issue.
recommendation. The latter submitted his Report and
THIRD DIVISION
Recommendation4 dated July 26, 1996. Thereafter, the
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled Court referred this case also to the Office of the Court
with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on [A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070. February 12, 1997] Administrator5 for evaluation, report and
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to recommendation.
Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
MARIA APIAG, TERESITA CANTERO SECUROM and
GLICERIO CANTERO, complainants, vs. JUDGE According to the complainants:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified ESMERALDO G. CANTERO, Respondent.
petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors
shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be "Sometime in August 11, 1947, defendant (should be
enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court DECISION respondent) and plaintiff (should be complainant) Maria
belongs. Apiag, joined together in holy matrimony in marriage
PANGANIBAN, J.: after having lived together as husband and wife
xxx       xxx       xxx wherein they begot a daughter who was born on June
19, 1947, whom they named: Teresita A. Cantero; and
Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more then on October 29, 1953, Glicerio A. Cantero was
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, reverend than plausible, and more advised than born. Thereafter, defendant left the conjugal home
Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, confident. Above all things, integrity is their portion without any apparent cause, and leaving the plaintiff
the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The and proper virtue.1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Maria Apiag to raise the two children with her meager
writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular
income as a public school teacher at Hinundayan,
court within the region where the petitioner resides or where
the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. The eminent Francis Bacon wrote the foregoing Southern Leyte. Plaintiffs suffered a lot after defendant
(Emphasis Ours) exhortation some 400 years ago. Today, it is still abandoned them for no reason whatsoever. For several
relevant and quotable. By the nature of their functions, years, defendant was never heard of and his
judges are revered as models of integrity, wisdom, whereabout unknown.
Few years ago, defendant surfaced at Hinundayan, The letter elicited no action or response from the "x x x sometime in the year 1947, when both
Southern Leyte, whereupon, plaintiffs begged for respondent. Subsequently, complainants learned that respondent and complainant, Maria Apiag were still in
support, however, they were ignored by defendant. x x respondent Judge had another family. In their own their early age and in their second year high school
x"6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary words, days, they were engaged in a lovely affair which
resulted to the pregnancy of the said complainant, and
then and there gave birth to a child, named Teresita
On September 21, 1993, complainants, through Atty. "x x x The plaintiffs later on learned that defendant has
Apiag, having (been) born out of wedlock on June 19,
Redentor G. Guyala, wrote a letter to respondent as another wife by the name of Nieves C. Ygay, a Public
1947, now Mrs. Teresita Sacurom, one of the
follows: School teacher from Tagao, Pinamungajan, Cebu.
complainants. That in order to save name and shame,
According to some documents obtained by plaintiffs,
parents of both the respondent and the complainant
the herein defendant and Nieves C. Ygay have children
"Judge Esmeraldo Cantero came to an agreement to allow the respondent, and
of their own, named as follows with their date of births:
the complainant (to) get married in the (sic) name, but
Noralyn Y. Cantero -- May 19, 1968; Ellen Y. Cantero --
Pinamungajan, Cebu not to live together as husband, wife for being close
February 4, 1970; Erwin Y. Cantero -- April 29, 1979;
relatives, thereby forcing the respondent to appear in a
Onofre Y. Cantero -- June 10, 1977; and Desirie Vic Y.
marriage affair where all the pertinent marriage papers
Dear Judge Cantero: Cantero -- December 2, 1981.
were all ready (sic) prepared (sic), and duly signed by
somebody; that after the said affair both respondent
We are writing in behalf of your legal wife, Maria Apiag, It was shocking to the senses that in all of the public and the complainant immediately separated each other
and your two legitimate children by her, Teresita (Mrs. documents required of defendant Judge Cantero to be (sic) without living together as husband, and wife even
Sacurom) and Glicerio. filed with the Supreme Court such as his sworn for a day, nor having established a conjugal home.
statement of assets and liabilities, his personal data From that time respondent and the complainant have
sheet (SC Form P. 001), income tax returns and his never met each other nor having (sic) communicated
It appears that sometime in the 1950's for reasons insurance policy with the Government Service (with) each other for the last 40 years; that respondent
known only to you, you left your conjugal home at Insurance System, defendant misrepresented himself continued his studies at Cebu City, and eventually
Hinundayan, Southern Leyte, and abandoned without as being married to Nieves C. Ygay, with whom he became member of the Philippine Bar, having passed
any means of support your said wife and children. contracted a second marriage. The truth of the matter the bar examination in the year 1960, that is 14 years
Since then and up to now, they have not seen or heard is that defendant is married to plaintiff Maria Apiag after the affair of 1947; that in 1964, respondent was
from you. with whom they have two legitimate children, namely: first connected in the government service as Comelec
Teresita A. Cantero and Glicerio A. Registrar of the Commission on Elections, assigned at
They would wish now that you do them right by living Cantero."8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Pinamungajan, Cebu(,) that is 16 years after the affair
up to your duty as husband and father to them, of 1947; that in the year 1982, respondent was
particularly that expressly provided under Art. 68 and The respondent Judge, in his Comment, explained his appointed as CLAO lawyer, now PAO, of the
Art. 195 of the Family Code (Art. 109 and 195 of the side as follows: Department of Justice, that is 35 years after the after
Civil Code) in relation to Art. 203 of the same Code. the affair of 1947; and finally, on October 3, 1989,
respondent was appointed to the Judiciary as Municipal
"x x x I admit the existence and form of Annex 'A' of Circuit Trial Judge (MCTC) of the Municipalities of
You will please consider this letter as a formal demand the said complaint, but vehemently deny the validity of Pinamungajan and Aloguinsan, province of Cebu, that
for maintenance and support for three of them, and a its due execution, for the truth of the matter is that is 42 years from August 11, 1947; that respondent is
request that they be properly instituted and named as such alleged marriage was only dramatized at the (sic) already 32 years in the government service up to
your compulsory heirs and legal beneficiaries in all instance of our parents just to shot (sic) their wishes the present time with more than 6 years in the
legal documents now on file and to be filed with the and purposes on the matter, without my consent freely Judiciary; that respondent is already 69 years old,
Supreme Court and other agencies or offices as may be given. As a matter of fact, I was only called by my having been born on August 8, 1927, and retirable by
required under applicable laws, such as, the insurance parents to go home to our town at Hinundayan, next year if God willing; that respondent has served in
(GSIS) and retirement laws. Southern Leyte to attend party celebration of my the government service for the last 32 years, faithfully,
sister's birthday from Iligan City, without patently honestly and judiciously without any complaint
We hope this matter can be amicably settled among knowing I was made to appear (in) a certain drama whatsoever, except this instant case; that respondent
you, your wife and children, without having to resort to marriage and we were forced to acknowledge our as member of the Judiciary, has live-up (sic) to the
judicial recourse. signatures appearing in the duly prepared marriage standard required by the (sic) member (sic) of the bar
contract(.) That was 46 years ago when I was yet 20 and judiciary; that the charges against the respondent
years of age, and at my second year high school were all based or rooted from the incedent (sic) that
Very truly yours, days."9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary happened on August 11, 1947 and no other; that the
complainants are morally dishonest in filing the instant
(SGD.) REDENTOR G. Furthermore, Judge Cantero related that: (case) just now, an elapsed (sic) of almost 42 years
GUYALA"7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary and knowing that respondent (is) retirable by next
year, 1997; that this actuation is very suspicious, and City, after having duly swirn (sic) to in accordance with 5. That this agreement is executed voluntarily, in good
intriguing; law do hereby depose and say: faith, and in the interest of good will and reconciliation
and both parties is (sic) duty bound to follow faithfully
and religiously."11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx 1. That the First Party is presently a Municipal Circuit
Trial Judge of Pinamungajan-Aloguinsan, Cebu, is
charged by Second Party for Misconduct before the In line with the foregoing, the respondent wrote a
That complainant Maria Apiag has been living together
Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court letter dated 14 March, 1994 addressed to the
with another man during her public service as public
now pending action; Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
school teacher and have begotten a child, name (sic)
designating Teresita Cantero Sacurom and Glicerio
Manuel Apiag and respondent promised (sic) the
Cantero as additional beneficiaries in his life insurance
Honorable Court to furnish a complete paper regarding 2. That the parties have came (sic) to agreement to
policy.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
this case in order to enlighten the Honorable (Court) have the said case settled amicably in the interest of
that, he who seek (sic) justice must seek justice with family unity and reconciliation, and arrived at
cleab (sic) hand; compromise agreement based on law of equity, as The Issues
follows:
That respondent did not file any annullment (sic) or The respondent Judge formulated the following
judicial declaration (of nullity) of the alleged marriage (a) That both parties have agreed "issues":
because it is the contention and honest belief, all the voluntarily, the Second Party will get
way, that the said marriage was void from the ONE FOURTH (1/4) of the retirement
"1. That the first marriage with the complainant, Maria
beginning, and as such nothing is to be voided or that the First will receive from the
Apiag on August 11, 1947 is void;
nullified, and to do so will be inconsistent with the GSIS, and the rest of it will be for the
stand of the respondent; that this instant case (was) First Party;
simply filed for money consideration as reflected in 2. The absence of his first wife complainant Maria Apiag
their letter of demand; (t)hat as a matter of fact, for more than seven (7) years raise the presumption
(b) That the Second Party and his
respondent and the complainant have already signed a that she is already dead, that there was no need for
brother will be included as one of the
compromised (sic) agreement, copy of which hereto any judicial declaration;
beneficiaries of the First Party, in case
(sic) attached as Annex '1', stating among other things
of death;
that respondent will give a monthly allowance to 3. The charge of Grave Misconduct is not applicable to
Terecita (sic) Sacurom in the (amount) of P4,000.00 him because assuming that he committed the offense,
and the complainant will withdraw their complaint from (c) That the Second party and his only
he was not yet a member of the judiciary;
the Supreme Court., and that respondent had already brother will inherit the properties of the
given the said allowance for three consecutive months First party inherited from his parents;
plus the amount of P25,000.00 for their Attorney to 4. The crime of Bigamy and Falsification had already
withdraw the case, and that respondent stop (sic) the prescribed;
(d) That the Second Party,
monthly allowance until such time the complainant will representing her brother, is authorized
actually withdraw the instant case, and without to receive and collect P4,000.00, 5. The charges have no basis in fact and in
knowledge of the respondent, complainant proceeded monthly out of the second check salary law."13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(sic) their complaint after the elapsed (sic) of three (3) of the First Party (The second half
years."10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary salary only); Report and Recommendation of Investigating Judge
and Court Administrator
Relevant portions of said compromise agreement which 3. That it was further voluntarily agreed that the
was executed sometime in March 1994 by Esmeraldo Second Party will cause the withdrawal and the outright
C. Cantero and Teresita C. Sacurom and witnessed by Investigating Judge Gualberto P. Delgado
dismissal of the said pending case filed by her and her recommended in his report that:
Maria Apiag and Leovegardo Sacurom are reproduced mother;
thus:
"After a careful perusal of the evidence submitted by
4. That it was also agreed that the above agreement, the parties, this Office finds respondent Guilty of the
"That this COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is executed and shall never be effective and enforceable unless the said
entered into by ESMERALDO C. CANTERO, of legal age, crime of Grave Misconduct (Bigamy and Falsification of
case will be withdrawn and dismiss (sic) from the Public Documents) however, considering his length of
married, Filipino, and with residence and postal Supreme Court, and said dismissal be received by the
address at Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines, otherwise service in the government, it is recommended that he
First Party, otherwise the above-agreement is void be suspended for one (1) year without
called as the FIRST PARTY, and TERESITA C. from the beginning; and the Second Party must desist
SACUROM, also of legal age, married, Filipino, pay."14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
from further claining (sic) and filing civil abd (sic)
representing her mother and her brother, and a criminal liabilities.
residence (sic) of 133-A J. Ramos Street, Caloocan
The Office of the Court Administrator also submitted its constitutes gross immoral conduct' (Abadilla vs. character as a private individual. In such cases, it has
report15 recommending respondent Judge's dismissal, Tabiliran Jr., 249 SCRA 447). It is evident that been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the
as follows: respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness character of man from the character of an officer. x x x
for membership in the legal profession. While deceit It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or
employed by respondent, existed prior to his malfeasance warranting removal from office of an
"After a careful review of all the documents on file in
appointment as a x x x Judge, his immoral and illegal officer, must have direct relation to and be connected
this case, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
act of cohabiting with x x x began and continued when with the performance of official duties x x x.' More
findings of the investigating judge.
he was already in the judiciary. A judge, in order to specifically, in Buenaventura vs. Benedicto, an
promote public confidence in the integrity and administrative proceeding against a judge of the court
Extant from the records of the case and as admitted by impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with of first instance, the present Chief Justice defines
respondent, he was married to complainant Maria propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial misconduct as referring 'to a transgression of some
Apiag on August 11, 1947 and have (sic) two (2) duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial established and definite rule of action, more
children with her. Respondent's contention that such guidepost to(sic) self-evident to be overlooked. No particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by
marriage was in jest and assuming that it was valid, it position exacts a greater demand on moral the public officer.' That is to abide by the authoritative
has lost its validity on the ground that they never met righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a doctrine as set forth in the leading case of In re
again nor have communicated with each other for the seat in the judiciary (Atienza vs. Brilliantes, Jr., 243 Horilleno, a decision penned by Justice Malcolm, which
last 40 years cannot be given a (sic) scant SCRA 32-33). requires that in order for serious misconduct to be
consideration. Respondent's argument that he was not shown, there must be 'reliable evidence showing that
yet a lawyer, much more, a member of the bench when the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired
ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully recommended that
he contracted his first marriage with the complainant, by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent
respondent judge be DISMISSED from the service with
is unavailing for having studied law and had become a disregard of well-known legal rules.'"16
forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with
member of the Bar in 1960, he knows that the
prejudice to re-appointment in any branch,
marriage cannot be dissolved without a judicial
instrumentality or agency of the government, including The acts imputed against respondent Judge Cantero
declaration of death. Respondent's second marriage
government-owned and controlled corporations." clearly pertain to his personal life and have no direct
with Nieves Ygay was therefore bigamous for it was
relation to his judicial function. Neither do these
contracted during the existence of a previous marriage.
misdeeds directly relate to the discharge of his official
As earlier indicated, respondent Judge died on
responsibilities. Therefore, said acts cannot be deemed
September 27, 1996 while this case was still being
We are likewise not persuaded by the assertion of the misconduct much less gross misconduct in office. For
deliberated upon by this Court.
respondent that he cannot be held liable for any of the aforementioned acts of Judge Cantero" x x x
misconduct on the ground that he was not yet a lawyer (t)o warrant disciplinary action, the act of the judge
nor a judge when the act(s) complained of were The Court's Ruling must have a direct relation to the performance of his
committed. The infraction he committed continued official duties. It is necessary to separate the character
from the time he became a lawyer in 1960 to the time of the man from the character of the
In spite of his death, this Court decided to resolve this
he was appointed as a judge in October 23, 1989. This officer."17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
case on the merits, in view of the foregoing
is a continuing offense (an unlawful act performed
recommendation of the OCA which, if affirmed by this
continuously or over and over again, Law Dictionary,
Court, would mean forfeiture of the death and Nullity of Prior Marriage
Robert E. Rothenberg). He can therefore be held liable
retirement of the respondent.
for his misdeeds.
It is not disputed that respondent did not obtain a
Gross Misconduct Not Applicable judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Maria
On the charge of falsification, it was shown with clarity
Apiag prior to marrying Nieves C. Ygay. He argued
in his Personal Data Sheet for Judges, Sworn
The misconduct imputed by the complainants against however that the first marriage was void and that there
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth, Income
the judge comprises the following: abandonment of his was no need to have the same judicially declared void,
Tax Return (pp. 99-102, rollo), that he had committed
first wife and children, failing to give support, marrying pursuant to jurisprudence then prevailing. In the en
a misrepresentation by stating therein that his spouse
for the second time without having first obtained a banc case of Odayat vs. Amante,18 complainant
is Nieves Ygay and (had) eight (8) children (with her)
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage, and charged Amante, a clerk of court, with oppression,
which is far from (the) truth that his wife is Maria Apiag
falsification of public documents. Misconduct, as a immorality and falsification of public document. The
with whom he had two (2) children.
ground for administrative action, has a specific complainant Odayat alleged among others " x x x that
meaning in law. respondent is cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada, with
Aside from the admission, the untenable line of defense whom he begot many children, even while his spouse
by the respondent presupposes the imposition of an Filomena Abella is still alive x x x." In order to rebut
administrative sanction for the charges filed against "'Misconduct in office has definite and well understood the charge of immorality, Amante " x x x presented in
him. 'A judge's actuation of cohabiting with another legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a evidence the certification (of the) x x x Local Civil
when his marriage was still valid and subsisting - his misconduct such as affects his performance of his Registrar x x x attesting that x x x Filomena Abella was
wife having been allegedly absent for four years only duties as an officer and not such only as affects his
married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948. The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life not deny. He neglected them and refused to support
Respondent's contention is that his marriage with falls short of this standard because the record reveals them until they came up with this administrative
Filomena Abella was void ab initio, because of her he had two families. The record also shows that he did charge. For such conduct, this Court would have
previous marriage with said Eliseo Portales." This Court not attend to the needs, support and education of his imposed a penalty. But in view of his death prior to the
ruled that "Filomena Abella's marriage with the children of his first marriage. Such is conduct promulgation of this Decision, dismissal of the case is
respondent was void ab initio under Article 80 [4] of unbecoming a trial magistrate. Thus, the late Judge now in order.
the New Civil Code, and no judicial decree is necessary Cantero "violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial
to establish the invalidity of void marriages."19 Ethics which mandates that '[a] judge's official conduct
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is
should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and
hereby DISMISSED.
his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in
Now, per current jurisprudence, "a marriage though
the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
void still needs x x x a judicial declaration of such
everyday life, should be beyond reproach,' and Canon
fact"20 before any party thereto "can marry again;
2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that
otherwise, the second marriage will also be
'[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance
void."21 This was expressly provided under Article
of impropriety in all G.R. No. 136921       April 17, 2001
4022 of the Family Code. However, the marriage of
activities.'"25chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Judge Cantero to Nieves Ygay took place and all their
children were born before the promulgation of Wiegel LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner
vs. Sempio-Diy and before the effectivity of the Family A Penalty of Suspension is Warranted vs.
Code. Hence, the doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.
applies in favor of respondent.
Finally, the Court also scrutinized the whole of
respondent's record. Other than this case, we found no VITUG, J.:
On the other hand, the charge of falsification will not trace of wrongdoing in the discharge of his judicial
prosper either because it is based on a finding of guilt functions from the time of his appointment up to the Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals,
in the bigamy charge. Since, as shown in the preceding filing of this administrative case, and has to all promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374,
discussion, the bigamy charge cannot stand, so too appearances lived up to the stringent standards reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of
must the accusation of falsification fail. Furthermore, embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Considering Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage
the respondent judge's belief in good faith that his first his otherwise untarnished 32 years in government between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab
marriage was void shows his lack of malice in filling up service,26 this Court is inclined to treat him with initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
these public documents, a valid defense in a charge of leniency. respondent.
falsification of public document,23 which must be
appreciated in his favor. Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca
Man is not perfect. At one time or another, he may
commit a mistake. But we should not look only at his first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel
Personal Conduct of a Judge sin. We should also consider the man's sincerity in his bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got
repentance, his genuine effort at restitution and his married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple did not
eventual triumph in the reformation of his life. live together as petitioner was still a student in college and
However, the absence of a finding of criminal liability respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an
on his part does not preclude this Court from finding ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six
him administratively liable for his indiscretion, which This respondent should not be judged solely and finally months later, the young couple established their residence in
would have merited disciplinary action from this Court by what took place some 46 years ago. He may have Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in
had death not intervened. In deciding this case, the committed an indiscretion in the past. But having Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful
Court emphasizes that "(t)he personal behavior of a repented for it, such youthful mistake should not marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that
judge, not only upon the bench but also in his forever haunt him and should not totally destroy his they could stay together - when respondent was on vacation.
everyday life, should be above reproach and free from career and render inutile his otherwise unblemished The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old
the appearance of impropriety. He should maintain record. Indeed, it should not demolish completely what Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.
high ethical principles and sense of propriety without he built in his public life since then. Much less should it
which he cannot preserve the faith of the people in the absolutely deprive him and/or his heirs of the rewards It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that
judiciary, so indispensable in an orderly society. For and fruits of his long and dedicated service in respondent surprisingly showed signs of "psychological
the judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of government. For these reasons, dismissal from service incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of
a judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon, as recommended by the Office of the Court being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband
which he has to observe faithfully as the price he has Administrator would be too harsh. became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual
to pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the
in the administration of justice."24 It is against this afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to
However, we also cannot just gloss over the fact that stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would
standard that we must gauge the public and private life
he was remiss in attending to the needs of his children beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a
of Judge Cantero.
of his first marriage -- children whose filiation he did
loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
children. The children themselves were not spared from Appeals, contending that the trial court erred, particularly, in 'psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of the Code has not
physical violence. holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case. psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's 'Void and
the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in
City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months and declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent
Canon Law,' quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of
later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she valid and subsisting. The appellate court said:
Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association;
returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her
Edward Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases').
dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That Article 36 of the Family. Code cannot be taken and construed
became worse.
the appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the 'psychological incapacity' should refer to no less than a mental
respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature. love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most
"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the
imprisonment. serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for dissolution and nullity."1 exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
good and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they decided to
rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of
Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil
the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine
marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 2 promulgated on 14
sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs.
support pendente lite . The rule follows the settled legal maxim - "legis interpretado
Court of Appeals and Molina, 3 promulgated on 13 February legis vim obtinet" - that the interpretation placed upon the
1997, should have no retroactive application and, on the written law by a competent court has the force of law. 3 The
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes
on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by the retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as
sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of
appearance within the reglementary period, the trial court petitioner argues, the application of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a
ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a
between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be
1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no dismissal. applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the
evidence to establish that there was collusion between the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance
parties. 1âwphi1.nêt
Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did therewith5 under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
not err in its assailed decision for there is absolutely no
On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave evidence that has been shown to prove psychological The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon
of court, an answer, and the same, although filed late, was incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and,
admitted by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted the in Santos. until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the
fact of his marriage with petitioner and the birth of their concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is
children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition. in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the
complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondent term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided
vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in
psychologically incapacitated. The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on
declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not
Family Code, has been explained by the Court, in Santos and overturned, Santos.
On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the
reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded:
trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations
basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and "It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at G.R. No. 191149 PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a vs.
declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER EXCELLENCY
JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner,
irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Respondents.
vs.
psychological incapacity.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC). Respondent.
PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; DECISION
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.; NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S
social institution and the foundation of the family6 that the State LAWYERS; MARLOU B. UBANO; INTEGRATED BAR OF
BERSAMIN, J.:
cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR CHAPTER,
petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, represented by its Immediate Past President, ATTY.
totally terminating that relationship, however, may not ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and the latter in his own The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by
necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the personal capacity as a MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE BAR; May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential
law has not quite given up, neither should we. MITCHELL JOHN L. BOISER; BAGONG ALYANSANG elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually
BAYAN (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO; happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas. May the
BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR.; incumbent President appoint his successor, considering that
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
ADVANCE-MENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from
G.R. No. 191002               March 17, 2010 (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE; KALIPUNAN making appointments within two months immediately before the
NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY) SECRETARY next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
vs. SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN public safety? What is the relevance of Section 4 (1), Article VIII
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT LEONARD RAMOS; TAYO ANG PAG-ASA CONVENOR (Judicial Department) of the Constitution, which provides that
GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents. ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS) any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days
CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK TERRY LACUANAN RIDON; from the occurrence thereof, to the matter of the appointment of
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES his successor? May the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) resume
(NUSP) CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES; COLLEGE the process of screening the candidates nominated or being
EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES (CEGP) CHAIRMAN considered to succeed Chief Justice Puno, and submit the list
G.R. No. 191032 VIJAE ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT CHRISTIAN of nominees to the incumbent President even during the period
MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP) CHAIRMAN MA. of the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII? Does
JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner, CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and mandamus lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of
vs. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES; WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS nominees by the JBC?
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent. ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
YOLANDA QUISUMBING-JAVELLANA; BELLEZA
Precís of the Consolidated Cases
ALOJADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA GANDIONCO-OLEDAN;
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x MA. VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA; MARILYN STA.
ROMANA; LEONILA DE JESUS; and GUINEVERE DE Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and John G. Peralta
G.R. No. 191057 LEON. Intervenors. respectively commenced G.R. No. 1910021 and G.R. No.
1911492 as special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus,
praying that the JBC be compelled to submit to the incumbent
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
President the list of at least three nominees for the position of
(PHILCONSA), Petitioner, the next Chief Justice.
vs. G.R. No. 191342
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
In G.R. No. 191032, 3 Jaime N. Soriano, via his petition for
ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP Governor- prohibition, proposes to prevent the JBC from conducting its
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Southern Luzon), and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING search, selection and nomination proceedings for the position
(IBP Governor-Eastern Visayas), Petitioners, of Chief Justice.
A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
In G.R. No. 191057, a special civil action for mandamus,4 the
IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) wants the
THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO THE x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x JBC to submit its list of nominees for the position of Chief
JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Petitioner, Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement
on May 17, 2010, because the incumbent President is not
G.R. No. 191420
covered by the prohibition that applies only to appointments in
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x the Executive Department.
In Administrative Matter No. 10-2-5-SC,5 petitioner Estelito M. In G.R. No. 191032, Soriano offers the view that the JBC These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has
Mendoza, a former Solicitor General, seeks a ruling from the committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief
Court for the guidance of the JBC on whether Section 15, excess of its jurisdiction when it resolved unanimously on Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
Article VII applies to appointments to the Judiciary. January 18, 2010 to open the search, nomination, and presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section
selection process for the position of Chief Justice to succeed 9, Article VIII, that "vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
Chief Justice Puno, because the appointing authority for the from the occurrence thereof" from a "list of at least three
In G.R. No. 191342,6 which the Court consolidated on March 9,
position of Chief Justice is the Supreme Court itself, the nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
2010 with the petitions earlier filed, petitioners Amador Z.
President’s authority being limited to the appointment of the vacancy."
Tolentino, Jr. and Roland B. Inting, Integrated Bar of the
Members of the Supreme Court. Hence, the JBC should not
Philippines (IBP) Governors for Southern Luzon and Eastern
intervene in the process, unless a nominee is not yet a Member
Visayas, respectively, want to enjoin and restrain the JBC from On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an
of the Supreme Court.10
submitting a list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice to ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC,
the President for appointment during the period provided for in requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the
Section 15, Article VII. For its part, PHILCONSA observes in its petition in G.R. No. Chief Justice be commenced immediately.
191057 that "unorthodox and exceptional circumstances
spawned by the discordant interpretations, due perhaps to a
All the petitions now before the Court pose as the principal In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, therefore, the JBC
perfunctory understanding, of Sec. 15, Art. VII in relation to
legal question whether the incumbent President can appoint passed a resolution,15 which reads:
Secs. 4(1), 8(5) and 9, Art. VIII of the Constitution" have bred
the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. That
"a frenzied inflammatory legal debate on the constitutional
question is undoubtedly impressed with transcendental
provisions mentioned that has divided the bench and the bar The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010,
importance to the Nation, because the appointment of the Chief
and the general public as well, because of its dimensional unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
Justice is any President’s most important appointment.
impact to the nation and the people," thereby fashioning position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon
"transcendental questions or issues affecting the JBC’s proper the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice Honorable
A precedent frequently cited is In Re Appointments Dated exercise of its "principal function of recommending appointees Reynato S. Puno.
March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido to the Judiciary" by submitting only to the President (not to the
B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, next President) "a list of at least three nominees prepared by
It will publish the opening of the position for
Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy" from which the
applications or recommendations;
(Valenzuela),7 by which the Court held that Section 15, Article members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts
deliberate on the list of candidates; publish
VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to may be appointed."11 PHILCONSA further believes and submits
the names of candidates; accept
appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed. that now is the time to revisit and review Valenzuela, the
comments on or opposition to the
"strange and exotic Decision of the Court en banc."12
applications; conduct public interviews of
In G.R. No. 191002, De Castro submits that the conflicting candidates; and prepare the shortlist of
opinions on the issue expressed by legal luminaries – one side Peralta states in his petition in G.R. No. 191149 that candidates.
holds that the incumbent President is prohibited from making mandamus can compel the JBC "to immediately transmit to the
appointments within two months immediately before the coming President, within a reasonable time, its nomination list for the
As to the time to submit this shortlist to the
presidential elections and until the end of her term of office as position of chief justice upon the mandatory retirement of Chief
proper appointing authority, in the light of
President on June 30, 2010, while the other insists that the Justice Reynato S. Puno, in compliance with its mandated duty
the Constitution, existing laws and
prohibition applies only to appointments to executive positions under the Constitution" in the event that the Court resolves that
jurisprudence, the JBC welcomes and will
that may influence the election and, anyway, paramount the President can appoint a Chief Justice even during the
consider all views on the matter.
national interest justifies the appointment of a Chief Justice election ban under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.13
during the election ban – has impelled the JBC to defer the
decision to whom to send its list of at least three nominees, 18 January 2010.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 insist that there is an actual
whether to the incumbent President or to her successor.8 He
controversy, considering that the "JBC has initiated the process
opines that the JBC is thereby arrogating unto itself "the judicial
of receiving applications for the position of Chief Justice and (sgd.)
function that is not conferred upon it by the Constitution," which
has in fact begun the evaluation process for the applications to MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
has limited it to the task of recommending appointees to the
the position," and "is perilously near completing the nomination Clerk of Court &
Judiciary, but has not empowered it to "finally resolve
process and coming up with a list of nominees for submission Ex-Officio Secretary
constitutional questions, which is the power vested only in the
to the President, entering into the period of the ban on midnight Judicial and Bar Council
Supreme Court under the Constitution." As such, he contends
appointments on March 10, 2010," which "only highlights the
that the JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in deferring
pressing and compelling need for a writ of prohibition to enjoin
the submission of the list of nominees to the President; and that As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for
such alleged ministerial function of submitting the list,
a "final and definitive resolution of the constitutional questions application or recommendation, and published for that purpose
especially if it will be cone within the period of the ban on
raised above would diffuse (sic) the tension in the legal its announcement dated January 20, 2010,16 viz:
midnight appointments."14
community that would go a long way to keep and maintain
stability in the judiciary and the political system."9
Antecedents The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announces the opening for
application or recommendation, of the position of CHIEF
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, which will be vacated
on 17 May 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the a. Is the constitutional prohibition against appointment under
Justice, HON. REYNATO S. PUNO. position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution applicable only to
JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its positions in the Executive Department?
list of nominees for the position due to the controversy now
Applications or recommendations for this position must be
before us being yet unresolved. In the meanwhile, time is
submitted not later than 4 February 2010 (Thursday) to the JBC b. Assuming that the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of
marching in quick step towards May 17, 2010 when the
Secretariat xxx: the Constitution also applies to members of the Judiciary, may
vacancy occurs upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno.
such appointments be excepted because they are impressed
with public interest or are demanded by the exigencies of public
The announcement was published on January 20, 2010 in the
The actions of the JBC have sparked a service, thereby justifying these appointments during the period
Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star.17
vigorous debate not only among legal of prohibition?
luminaries, but also among non-legal
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC "automatically quarters, and brought out highly disparate
c. Does the JBC have the authority to decide whether or not to
considered" for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior opinions on whether the incumbent
include and submit the names of nominees who manifested
of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate President can appoint the next Chief
interest to be nominated for the position of Chief Justice on the
Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Justice or not. Petitioner Mendoza notes
understanding that his/her nomination will be submitted to the
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice that in Valenzuela, which involved the
next President in view of the prohibition against presidential
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio appointments of two judges of the
appointments from March 11, 2010 until June 30, 2010?
Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their Regional Trial Court, the Court addressed
nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January this issue now before us as an
25, 2010, respectively.18 administrative matter "to avoid any A. M. No. 10-2-5-SC
possible polemics concerning the matter,"
but he opines that the polemics leading to
Others either applied or were nominated. Victor Fernandez, the a. Does Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution apply to
Valenzuela "would be miniscule [sic]
retired Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, applied, but later appointments to positions in the Judiciary under Section 9,
compared to the "polemics" that have now
formally withdrew his name from consideration through his Article VIII of the Constitution?
erupted in regard to the current
letter dated February 8, 2010. Candidates who accepted their controversy," and that unless "put to a halt,
nominations without conditions were Associate Justice Renato and this may only be achieved by a ruling b. May President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo make appointments
C. Corona; Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro; from the Court, the integrity of the process to the Judiciary after March 10, 2010, including that for the
Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion; and Associate Justice and the credibility of whoever is appointed position of Chief Justice after Chief Justice Puno retires on May
Edilberto G. Sandoval (Sandiganbayan). Candidates who to the position of Chief Justice, may 17, 2010?
accepted their nominations with conditions were Associate irreparably be impaired."23
Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales.19 Declining their nominations were Atty. Henry G.R. No. 191149
Villarica (via telephone conversation with the Executive Officer Accordingly, we reframe the issues as submitted by each
of the JBC on February 5, 2010) and Atty. Gregorio M. Batiller, petitioner in the order of the chronological filing of their
petitions. a. Does the JBC have the discretion to withhold the submission
Jr. (via telephone conversation with the Executive Officer of the
of the short list to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo?
JBC on February 8, 2010).20
G.R. No. 191002
G.R. No. 191342
The JBC excluded from consideration former RTC Judge
Florentino Floro (for failure to meet the standards set by the
a. Does the JBC have the power and authority to resolve the
JBC rules); and Special Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio of the a. Does the JBC have the authority to submit the list of
constitutional question of whether the incumbent President can
Office of the Ombudsman (due to cases pending in the Office nominees to the incumbent President without committing a
appoint a Chief Justice during the election ban period?
of the Ombudsman).21 grave violation of the Constitution and jurisprudence prohibiting
the incumbent President from making midnight appointments
b. Does the incumbent President have the power and authority two months immediately preceding the next presidential
In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed
to appoint during the election ban the successor of Chief elections until the end of her term?
to the next step of announcing the names of the following
Justice Puno when he vacates the position of Chief Justice on
candidates to invite the public to file their sworn complaint,
his retirement on May 17, 2010?
written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, b. Is any act performed by the JBC, including the vetting of the
2010, to wit: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate Justice candidates for the position of Chief Justice, constitutionally
Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice G.R. No. 191032 invalid in view of the JBC's illegal composition allowing each
Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Brion, and Associate member from the Senate and the House of Representatives to
Justice Sandoval. The announcement came out in the have one vote each?
a. Is the power to appoint the Chief Justice vested in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star issues of
Supreme Court en banc?
February 13, 2010.22
On February 16, 2010, the Court directed the JBC and the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the
G.R. No. 191057
Issues consolidated petitions, except that filed in G.R. No. 191342.
On February 26, 2010, the JBC submitted its comment, part to include in or exclude from the list particular individuals, Puno;38 and (d) should the next Chief Justice come from among
reporting therein that the next stage of the process for the but, on the contrary, the JBC's determination of who it the incumbent Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
selection of the nominees for the position of Chief Justice nominates to the President is an exercise of a discretionary thereby causing a vacancy, it also becomes incumbent upon
would be the public interview of the candidates and the duty.30 the JBC to start the selection process for the filling up of the
preparation of the short list of candidates, "including the vacancy in accordance with the constitutional mandate.39
interview of the constitutional experts, as may be needed." 24 It
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint
stated:25
the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section On March 9, 2010, the Court admitted the following
15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to comments/oppositions-in-intervention, to wit:
Likewise, the JBC has yet to take a position on when to submit appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy
the shortlist to the proper appointing authority, in light of in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its
(a) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 22, 2010 of
Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Atty. Peter Irving Corvera (Corvera);40
that vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety Constitution; 31 that in their deliberations on the mandatory
(90) days from the occurrence thereof, Section 15, Article VII of period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices, the
the Constitution concerning the ban on Presidential framers neither mentioned nor referred to the ban against (b) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 22, 2010 of
appointments "two (2) months immediately before the next midnight appointments, or its effects on such period, or vice Atty. Christian Robert S. Lim (Lim);
presidential elections and up to the end of his term" and versa;32 that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to
Section 261 (g), Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code of Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly
(c) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 23, 2010 of
the Philippines. stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition
Atty. Alfonso V. Tan, Jr. (Tan);
found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in
Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also
12. Since the Honorable Supreme Court is the final interpreter
incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on (d) The comment/opposition-in-intervention dated March 1,
of the Constitution, the JBC will be guided by its decision in
the President's power to appoint members of the Supreme 2010 of the National Union of People's Lawyers (NUPL);
these consolidated Petitions and Administrative Matter.
Court to ensure its independence from "political vicissitudes"
and its "insulation from political pressures,"33 such as stringent
qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, (e) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 25, 2010 of
On February 26, 2010, the OSG also submitted its comment,
the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Atty. Marlou B. Ubano (Ubano);
essentially stating that the incumbent President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement by May Supreme Court Justice.
17, 2010. (f) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 25, 2010 of
The OSG posits that although Valenzuela involved the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Davao del Sur Chapter and its
appointment of RTC Judges, the situation now refers to the Immediate Past President, Atty. Israelito P. Torreon (IBP-
The OSG insists that: (a) a writ of prohibition cannot issue to
appointment of the next Chief Justice to which the prohibition Davao del Sur);
prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the
Constitution to recommend appointees in the Judiciary; (b) the does not apply; that, at any rate, Valenzuela even recognized
JBC's function to recommend is a "continuing process," which that there might be "the imperative need for an appointment (g) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 26, 2010 of
does not begin with each vacancy or end with each nomination, during the period of the ban," like when the membership of the Atty. Mitchell John L. Boiser (Boiser);
because the goal is "to submit the list of nominees to Supreme Court should be "so reduced that it will have no
Malacañang on the very day the vacancy arises"; 26 the JBC quorum, or should the voting on a particular important question
was thus acting within its jurisdiction when it commenced and requiring expeditious resolution be divided";34 and that (h)The consolidated comment/opposition-in-intervention dated
set in motion the process of selecting the nominees to be Valenzuela also recognized that the filling of vacancies in the February 26, 2010 of BAYAN Chairman Dr. Carolina P. Araullo;
submitted to the President for the position of Chief Justice to be Judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, most especially if BAYAN Secretary General Renato M. Reyes, Jr.;
vacated by Chief Justice Puno;27 (c) petitioner Soriano's theory there is any compelling reason to justify the making of the Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of
that it is the Supreme Court, not the President, who has the appointments during the period of the prohibition.35 Government Employees (COURAGE) Chairman Ferdinand
power to appoint the Chief Justice, is incorrect, and proceeds Gaite; Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY)
from his misinterpretation of the phrase "members of the Secretary General Gloria Arellano; Alyansa ng Nagkakaisang
Lastly, the OSG urges that there are now undeniably Kabataan ng Samayanan Para sa Kaunlaran (ANAKBAYAN)
Supreme Court" found in Section 9, Article VIII of the
compelling reasons for the incumbent President to appoint the Chairman Ken Leonard Ramos; Tayo ang Pag-asa Convenor
Constitution as referring only to the Associate Justices, to the
next Chief Justice, to wit: (a) a deluge of cases involving Alvin Peters; League of Filipino Students (LFS) Chairman
exclusion of the Chief Justice; 28 (d) a writ of mandamus can
sensitive political issues is "quite expected"; 36 (b) the Court acts James Mark Terry Lacuanan Ridon; National Union of Students
issue to compel the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the
as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), which, sitting en of the Philippines (NUSP) Chairman Einstein Recedes, College
President, considering that its duty to prepare the list of at least
banc, is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, Editors Guild of the Philippines (CEGP) Chairman Vijae
three nominees is unqualified, and the submission of the list is
returns, and qualifications of the President and Vice President Alquisola; and Student Christian Movement of the Philippines
a ministerial act that the JBC is mandated to perform under the
and, as such, has "the power to correct manifest errors on the (SCMP) Chairman Ma. Cristina Angela Guevarra (BAYAN et
Constitution; as such, the JBC, the nature of whose principal
statement of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass al.);
function is executive, is not vested with the power to resolve
(COC)";37 (c) if history has shown that during ordinary times the
who has the authority to appoint the next Chief Justice and,
Chief Justice was appointed immediately upon the occurrence
therefore, has no discretion to withhold the list from the (i) The opposition-in-intervention dated March 3, 2010 of
of the vacancy, from the time of the effectivity of the
President; 29 and (e) a writ of mandamus cannot issue to Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Bello et al.); and
Constitution, there is now even more reason to appoint the next
compel the JBC to include or exclude particular candidates as
Chief Justice immediately upon the retirement of Chief Justice
nominees, considering that there is no imperative duty on its
(j) The consolidated comment/opposition-in-intervention dated but the Commissioners decided not to write it in the not in the President, but in the Supreme Court, is utterly
March 4, 2010 of the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Constitution on account of the settled practice; that the practice baseless, because the Chief Justice is also a Member of the
Philippines (WTLOP), represented by Atty. Yolanda was followed under the 1987 Constitution, when, in 1992, at the Supreme Court as contemplated under Section 9, Article VIII;
Quisumbing-Javellana; Atty. Belleza Alojado Demaisip; Atty. end of the term of Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, Associate and that, at any rate, the term "members" was interpreted in
Teresita Gandionco-Oledan; Atty. Ma. Verena Kasilag- Justice Andres Narvasa assumed the position as Acting Chief Vargas v. Rillaroza (G.R. No. L-1612, February 26, 1948) to
Villanueva; Atty. Marilyn Sta. Romana; Atty. Leonila de Jesus; Justice prior to his official appointment as Chief Justice; that refer to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
and Atty. Guinevere de Leon (WTLOP). said filling up of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice was Supreme Court; that PHILCONSA's prayer that the Court pass
acknowledged and even used by analogy in the case of the a resolution declaring that persons who manifest their interest
vacancy of the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, as nominees, but with conditions, shall not be considered
Intervenors Tan, WTLOP, BAYAN et al., Corvera, IBP Davao
per Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358; and that the history of nominees by the JBC is diametrically opposed to the
del Sur, and NUPL take the position that De Castro's petition
the Supreme Court has shown that this rule of succession has arguments in the body of its petition; that such glaring
was bereft of any basis, because under Section 15, Article VII,
been repeatedly observed and has become a part of its inconsistency between the allegations in the body and the relief
the outgoing President is constitutionally banned from making
tradition. prayed for highlights the lack of merit of PHILCONSA's petition;
any appointments from March 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010,
that the role of the JBC cannot be separated from the
including the appointment of the successor of Chief Justice
constitutional prohibition on the President; and that the Court
Puno. Hence, mandamus does not lie to compel the JBC to Intervenors Ubano, Boiser, NUPL, Corvera, and Lim maintain
must direct the JBC to follow the rule of law, that is, to submit
submit the list of nominees to the outgoing President if the that the Omnibus Election Code penalizes as an election
the list of nominees only to the next duly elected President after
constitutional prohibition is already in effect. Tan adds that the offense the act of any government official who appoints,
the period of the constitutional ban against midnight
prohibition against midnight appointments was applied by the promotes, or gives any increase in salary or remuneration or
appointments has expired.
Court to the appointments to the Judiciary made by then privilege to any government official or employee during the
President Ramos, with the Court holding that the duty of the period of 45 days before a regular election; that the provision
President to fill the vacancies within 90 days from occurrence covers all appointing heads, officials, and officers of a Oppositor IBP Davao del Sur opines that the JBC - because it
of the vacancies (for the Supreme Court) or from the government office, agency or instrumentality, including the is neither a judicial nor a quasi-judicial body - has no duty under
submission of the list (for all other courts) was not an excuse to President; that for the incumbent President to appoint the next the Constitution to resolve the question of whether the
violate the constitutional prohibition. Chief Justice upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno, or incumbent President can appoint a Chief Justice during the
during the period of the ban under the Omnibus Election Code, period of prohibition; that even if the JBC has already come up
constitutes an election offense; that even an appointment of the with a short list, it still has to bow to the strict limitations under
Intervenors Tan, Ubano, Boiser, Corvera, NULP, BAYAN et al.,
next Chief Justice prior to the election ban is fundamentally Section 15, Article VII; that should the JBC defer submission of
and Bello et al. oppose the insistence that Valenzuela
invalid and without effect because there can be no appointment the list, it is not arrogating unto itself a judicial function, but
recognizes the possibility that the President may appoint the
until a vacancy occurs; and that the vacancy for the position simply respecting the clear mandate of the Constitution; and
next Chief Justice if exigent circumstances warrant the
can occur only by May 17, 2010. that the application of the general rule in Section 15, Article VII
appointment, because that recognition is obiter dictum; and
to the Judiciary does not violate the principle of separation of
aver that the absence of a Chief Justice or even an Associate
powers, because said provision is an exception.
Justice does not cause epic damage or absolute disruption or Intervenor Boiser adds that De Castro's prayer to compel the
paralysis in the operations of the Judiciary. They insist that submission of nominees by the JBC to the incumbent President
even without the successor of Chief Justice Puno being is off-tangent because the position of Chief Justice is still not Oppositors NUPL, Corvera, Lim and BAYAN et al. state that the
appointed by the incumbent President, the Court is allowed to vacant; that to speak of a list, much more a submission of such JBC's act of nominating appointees to the Supreme Court is
sit and adjudge en banc or in divisions of three, five or seven list, before a vacancy occurs is glaringly premature; that the purely ministerial and does not involve the exercise of
members at its discretion; that a full membership of the Court is proposed advance appointment by the incumbent President of judgment; that there can be no default on the part of the JBC in
not necessary; that petitioner De Castro's fears are unfounded the next Chief Justice will be unconstitutional; and that no list of submitting the list of nominees to the President, considering
and baseless, being based on a mere possibility, the nominees can be submitted by the JBC if there is no vacancy. that the call for applications only begins from the occurrence of
occurrence of which is entirely unsure; that it is not in the the vacancy in the Supreme Court; and that the
national interest to have a Chief Justice whose appointment is commencement of the process of screening of applicants to fill
All the intervenors-oppositors submit that Section 15, Article VII
unconstitutional and, therefore, void; and that such a situation the vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice only begins from
makes no distinction between the kinds of appointments made
will create a crisis in the judicial system and will worsen an the retirement on May 17, 2010, for, prior to this date, there is
by the President; and that the Court, in Valenzuela, ruled that
already vulnerable political situation. no definite legal basis for any party to claim that the submission
the appointments by the President of the two judges during the
or non-submission of the list of nominees to the President by
prohibition period were void.
the JBC is a matter of right under law.
ice is imperative for the stability of the judicial system and the
political situation in the country when the election-related
Intervenor WTLOP posits that Section 15, Article VII of the
questions reach the Court as false, because there is an existing The main question presented in all the filings herein - because
1987 Constitution does not apply only to the appointments in
law on filling the void brought about by a vacancy in the office it involves two seemingly conflicting provisions of the
the Executive Department, but also to judicial appointments,
of Chief Justice; that the law is Section 12 of the Judiciary Act Constitution - imperatively demands the attention and
contrary to the submission of PHILCONSA; that Section 15
of 1948, which has not been repealed by Batas Pambansa Blg. resolution of this Court, the only authority that can resolve the
does not distinguish; and that Valenzuela already interpreted
129 or any other law; that a temporary or an acting Chief question definitively and finally. The imperative demand rests
the prohibition as applicable to judicial appointments.
Justice is not anathema to judicial independence; that the on the ever-present need, first, to safeguard the independence,
designation of an acting Chief Justice is not only provided for reputation, and integrity of the entire Judiciary, particularly this
by law, but is also dictated by practical necessity; that the Intervenor WTLOP further posits that petitioner Soriano's Court, an institution that has been unnecessarily dragged into
practice was intended to be enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, contention that the power to appoint the Chief Justice is vested, the harsh polemics brought on by the controversy; second, to
settle once and for all the doubt about an outgoing President's Fuente,47 Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury
power to appoint to the Judiciary within the long period starting Felix,48 and Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works.49 cannot be denied."58
two months before the presidential elections until the end of the
presidential term; and third, to set a definite guideline for the
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus Petitioners De Castro (G.R. No. 191002), Soriano (G.R. No.
JBC to follow in the discharge of its primary office of screening
standi, being a mere procedural technicality, can be waived by 191032) and Peralta (G.R. No. 191149) all assert their right as
and nominating qualified persons for appointment to the
the Court in the exercise of its discretion. For instance, in 1949, citizens filing their petitions on behalf of the public who are
Judiciary.
in Araneta v. Dinglasan,50 the Court liberalized the approach directly affected by the issue of the appointment of the next
when the cases had "transcendental importance." Some Chief Justice. De Castro and Soriano further claim standing as
Thus, we resolve. notable controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct taxpayers, with Soriano averring that he is affected by the
injury test were allowed to be treated in the same way as continuing proceedings in the JBC, which involve
in Araneta v. Dinglasan.51 "unnecessary, if not, illegal disbursement of public funds."59
Ruling of the Court

In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on PHILCONSA alleges itself to be a non-stock, non-profit
Locus Standi of Petitioners
Elections,52 this Court decided to resolve the issues raised by organization existing under the law for the purpose of
the petition due to their "far-reaching implications," even if the defending, protecting, and preserving the Constitution and
The preliminary issue to be settled is whether or not the petitioner had no personality to file the suit. The liberal promoting its growth and flowering. It also alleges that the
petitioners have locus standi. approach of Aquino v. Commission on Elections has been Court has recognized its legal standing to file cases on
adopted in several notable cases, permitting ordinary citizens, constitutional issues in several cases.60
legislators, and civic
Black defines locus standi as "a right of appearance in a court
of justice on a given question." 41 In public or constitutional In A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, Mendoza states that he is a citizen of
litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of organizations to bring their suits involving the constitutionality the Philippines, a member of the Philippine Bar engaged in the
the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present need or validity of laws, regulations, and rulings.53 active practice of law, and a former Solicitor General, former
to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to Minister of Justice, former Member of the Interim Batasang
correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing Pambansa and the Regular Batasang Pambansa, and former
However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for
the efficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in member of the Faculty of the College of Law of the University of
challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or
public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must the Philippines.
legislative action rests on the theory that the petitioner
have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, for,
represents the public in general. Although such petitioner may
as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
not be as adversely affected by the action complained against The petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 are the Governors of the
Terminals Co., Inc.:42
as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for Southern Luzon and
his petition that he is entitled to protection or relief from the Eastern Visayas. They allege that they have the legal standing
The question on legal standing is whether such parties have Court in the vindication of a public right. to enjoin the submission of the list of nominees by the JBC to
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the the President, for "[a]n adjudication of the proper interpretation
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which and application of the constitutional ban on midnight
Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so appointments with regard to respondent JBC's function in
citizen or taxpayer to gain locus standi. That is not surprising,
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional submitting the list of nominees is well within the concern of
for even if the issue may appear to concern only the public in
questions."43 Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a petitioners, who are duty bound to ensure that obedience and
general, such capacities nonetheless equip the petitioner with
person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct respect for the Constitution is upheld, most especially by
adequate interest to sue. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,54 the
and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or government offices, such as respondent JBC, who are
Court aptly explains why:
any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in specifically tasked to perform crucial functions in the whole
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of scheme of our democratic institution." They further allege that,
its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and reposed in them as members of the Bar, is a clear legal interest
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first in the process of selecting the members of the Supreme Court,
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,55 where it was held that the and in the selection of the Chief Justice, considering that the
he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to plaintiff in a taxpayer's suit is in a different category from the person appointed becomes a member of the body that has
some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act plaintiff in a citizen's suit. In the former, the plaintiff is constitutional supervision and authority over them and other
complained of.44 affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the members of the legal profession.61
latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public
concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People
It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera,45 the Court The Court rules that the petitioners have each demonstrated
ex rel Case v. Collins:56 "In matter of mere public right,
adopted the direct injury test for determining whether a adequate interest in the outcome of the controversy as to vest
however…the people are the real parties…It is at least the
petitioner in a public action had locus standi. There, the Court them with the requisite locus standi. The issues before us are
right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see
held that the person who would assail the validity of a statute of transcendental importance to the people as a whole, and to
that a public offence be properly pursued and punished,
must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such the petitioners in particular. Indeed, the issues affect everyone
and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a (including the petitioners), regardless of one's personal interest
taxpayer's suits, Terr v. Jordan57 held that "the right of a
result." Vera was followed in Custodio v. President of the in life, because they concern that great doubt about the
citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to
Senate,46 Manila Race Horse Trainers' Association v. De la authority of the incumbent President to appoint not only the
successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but also President should do, and are not invoking any issues that are short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the
others who may serve in the Judiciary, which already suffers justiciable in nature. Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
from a far too great number of vacancies in the ranks of trial occurrence of the vacancy.
judges throughout the country.
Intervenors Bello et al. submit that there exist no conflict of
legal rights and no assertion of opposite legal claims in any of The ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination may
In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the the petitions; that PHILCONSA does not allege any action not be doubted. The challenges to the authority of the JBC to
requirement of legal standing in favor of any petitioner when taken by the JBC, but simply avers that the conditional open the process of nomination and to continue the process
the matter involved has transcendental importance, or manifestations of two Members of the Court, accented by the until the submission of the list of nominees; the insistence of
otherwise requires a liberalization of the requirement.62 divided opinions and interpretations of legal experts, or some of the petitioners to compel the JBC through mandamus
associations of lawyers and law students on the issues to submit the short list to the incumbent President; the counter-
published in the daily newspapers are "matters of paramount insistence of the intervenors to prohibit the JBC from submitting
Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus standi of any
and transcendental importance to the bench, bar and general the short list to the incumbent President on the ground that said
petitioner, we dispel the doubt now in order to remove any
public"; that PHILCONSA fails not only to cite any legal duty or list should be submitted instead to the next President; the
obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of the essential issue
allege any failure to perform the duty, but also to indicate what strong position that the incumbent President is already
squarely presented herein. We are not to shirk from
specific action should be done by the JBC; that Mendoza does prohibited under Section 15, Article VII from making any
discharging our solemn duty by reason alone of an obstacle
not even attempt to portray the matter as a controversy or appointments, including those to the Judiciary, starting on May
more technical than otherwise. In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
conflict of rights, but, instead, prays that the Court should "rule 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010; and the contrary position that the
International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 63 we pointed out:
for the guidance of" the JBC; that the fact that the Court incumbent President is not so prohibited are only some of the
"Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in
supervises the JBC does not automatically imply that the Court real issues for determination. All such issues establish the
some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been
can rule on the issues presented in the Mendoza petition, ripeness of the controversy, considering that for some the short
personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
because supervision involves oversight, which means that the list must be submitted before the vacancy actually occurs by
government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters
subordinate officer or body must first act, and if such action is May 17, 2010. The outcome will not be an abstraction, or a
who actually sue in the public interest." But even if, strictly
not in accordance with prescribed rules, then, and only then, merely hypothetical exercise. The resolution of the controversy
speaking, the petitioners "are not covered by the definition, it is
may the person exercising oversight order the action to be will surely settle - with finality - the nagging questions that are
still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
redone to conform to the prescribed rules; that the Mendoza preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing
petition does not allege that the JBC has performed a specific already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to
and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised."64
act susceptible to correction for being illegal or unconstitutional; desist from the rest of the process.
and that the Mendoza petition asks the Court to issue an
Justiciability advisory ruling, not to exercise its power of supervision to
We need not await the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17,
correct a wrong act by the JBC, but to declare the state of the
2010 in order for the principal issue to ripe for judicial
law in the absence of an actual case or controversy.
Intervenor NUPL maintains that there is no actual case or determination by the Court. It is enough that one alleges
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for adjudication, conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but
considering that although the selection process commenced by We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or seemingly proscribed by the Constitution. A reasonable
the JBC is going on, there is yet no final list of nominees; controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is certainty of the occurrence of the perceived threat to a
hence, there is no imminent controversy as to whether such list that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a
must be submitted to the incumbent President, or reserved for selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be challenge, provided the Court has sufficient facts before it to
submission to the incoming President. submitted to the President for consideration of which of them enable it to intelligently adjudicate the issues.65 Herein, the
will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. facts are not in doubt, for only legal issues remain.
Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC
Intervenor Tan raises the lack of any actual justiciable began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and
controversy that is ripe for judicial determination, pointing out Substantive Merits
practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the
that petitioner De Castro has not even shown that the JBC has list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the
already completed its selection process and is now ready to next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial I
submit the list to the incumbent President; and that petitioner determination, because the next steps are the public interview
De Castro is merely presenting a hypothetical scenario that is of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of
clearly not sufficient for the Court to exercise its power of Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
candidates, and the "interview of constitutional experts, as may
judicial review. appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
be needed."
appointments to the Judiciary
Intervenors Corvera and Lim separately opine that De Castro's A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether
petition rests on an overbroad and vague allegation of political Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an
tension, which is insufficient basis for the Court to exercise its insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the
power of judicial review. JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department),
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the provides:
Intervenor BAYAN et al. contend that the petitioners are JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in
seeking a mere advisory opinion on what the JBC and the view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines agreed to suggestions to make the period three, instead of two,
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, months. As thus amended, the proposal was approved. As it
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the turned out, however, the Commission ultimately agreed on a
public safety. provisions specifically providing for the appointment of fifteen-member Court. Thus it was that the section fixing the
Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the composition of the Supreme Court came to include a command
appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department),
the President upon the submission of a list of at least three occurrence.
states:
nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the
President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence
In this connection, it may be pointed out that that instruction
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a of the vacancy.
that any "vacancy shall be filled within ninety days" (in the last
Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
sentence of Section 4 (1) of Article VIII) contrasts with the
banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, which is couched in
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the stronger negative language - that "a President or Acting
the occurrence thereof.
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could President shall not make appointments…"
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners, with the exception They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
The commission later approved a proposal of Commissioner
of Soriano, Tolentino and Inting, submit that the incumbent explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (now a Member of this Court) to add to
President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
what is now Section 9 of Article VIII, the following paragraph:
upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
"WITH RESPECT TO LOWER COURTS, THE PRESIDENT
prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
SHALL ISSUE THE APPOINTMENT WITHIN NINETY DAYS
Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. against the President or Acting President making appointments
FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST" (of nominees by the
within two months before the next presidential elections and up
Judicial and Bar Council to the President). Davide stated that
to the end of the President's or Acting President's term does
The Court agrees with the submission. his purpose was to provide a "uniform rule" for lower courts.
not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
According to him, the 90-day period should be counted from
submission of the list of nominees to the President in view of
First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Although Valenzuela67 came to hold that the prohibition covered the possibility that the President might reject the list submitted
Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the to him and the JBC thus need more time to submit a new one.
meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the
Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to
arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not On the other hand, Section 15, Article VII - which in effect
the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado
arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely deprives the President of his appointing power "two months
of this Court, a former member of the Constitutional
made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what immediately before the next presidential elections up to the end
Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply
the Constitution should contain. of his term" - was approved without discussion.68
to the appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation
Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail.
The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody However, the reference to the records of the Constitutional
the allocation of the awesome powers of government among Commission did not advance or support the result in
Relevantly, Valenzuela adverted to the intent of the framers in
the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Valenzuela. Far to the contrary, the records disclosed the
the genesis of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, viz:
Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article express intent of the framers to enshrine in the Constitution,
VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of upon the initiative of Commissioner Eulogio Lerum, "a
separation of powers that underlies the political structure, as V. Intent of the Constitutional Commission command [to the President] to fill up any vacancy therein within
Constitutional Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna (later a worthy 90 days from its occurrence," which even Valenzuela
member of the Court) explained in his sponsorship speech: conceded.69 The exchanges during deliberations of the
The journal of the Commission which drew up the present
Constitutional Commission on October 8, 1986 further show
Constitution discloses that the original proposal was to have an
that the filling of a vacancy in the Supreme Court within the 90-
We have in the political part of this Constitution opted for the eleven-member Supreme Court. Commissioner Eulogio Lerum
day period was a true mandate for the President, viz:
separation of powers in government because we believe that wanted to increase the number of Justices to fifteen. He also
the only way to protect freedom and liberty is to separate and wished to ensure that that number would not be reduced for
divide the awesome powers of government. Hence, we return any appreciable length of time (even only temporarily), and to MR. DE CASTRO. I understand that our justices now in the
to the separation of powers doctrine and the legislative, this end proposed that any vacancy "must be filled within two Supreme Court, together with the Chief Justice, are only 11.
executive and judicial departments.66 months from the date that the vacancy occurs." His proposal to
have a 15-member Court was not initially adopted. Persisting
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
however in his desire to make certain that the size of the Court
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive would not be decreased for any substantial period as a result of
Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by vacancies, Lerum proposed the insertion in the provision (anent MR. DE CASTRO. And the second sentence of this subsection
the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of the Court's membership) of the same mandate that "IN CASE reads: "Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the OF ANY VACANCY, THE SAME SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN occurrence thereof."
Article. TWO MONTHS FROM OCCURRENCE THEREOF." He later
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. has been frequently announced that where there is an The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15,
irreconcilable conflict between the different provisions of a Article VII consists of the so-called "midnight" appointments.
statute, the provision last in order of position will prevail, since it In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of
MR. DE CASTRO. Is this now a mandate to the executive to fill
is the latest expression of the legislative will. Obviously, the rule Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President, President
the vacancy?
is subject to deserved criticism. It is seldom applied, and Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection,
probably then only where an irreconcilable conflict exists became no more than a "caretaker" administrator whose duty
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. That is borne out of the fact between different sections of the same act, and after all other was to "prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the
that in the past 30 years, seldom has the Court had a complete means of ascertaining the meaning of the legislature have been incoming President." Said the Court:
complement.70 exhausted. Where the conflict is between two statutes, more
may be said in favor of the rule's application, largely because of
"The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so
the principle of implied repeal.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and
shall - an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be careful consideration of the need for the appointment and
enforced71 - should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) In this connection, PHILCONSA's urging of a revisit and a appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But
imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an review of Valenzuela is timely and appropriate. Valenzuela the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned
appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days arbitrarily ignored the express intent of the Constitutional induction of almost all of them in a few hours before the
from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the Commission to have Section 4 (1), Article VIII stand inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be
President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the independently of any other provision, least of all one found in regarded by the latter as an abuse of Presidential prerogatives,
Constitution. Article VII. It further ignored that the two provisions had no the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all
irreconcilable conflict, regardless of Section 15, Article VII vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions,
being couched in the negative. As judges, we are not to unduly and thereby to deprive the new administration of an opportunity
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the interpret, and should not accept an interpretation that defeats to make the corresponding appointments."
President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was the intent of the framers.73
undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate
for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be
defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointments to important positions which have to be made
effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was appointing a Chief Justice on the premise that Section 15, even after the proclamation of the new President. Such
"couched in stronger negative language." Such interpretation Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be appointments, so long as they are "few and so spaced as to
even turned out to be conjectural, in light of the records of the sustained. A misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful
Constitutional Commission's deliberations on Section 4 (1), allowed to last after its false premises have been exposed.74 It consideration of the need for the appointment and the
Article VIII. will not do to merely distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, appointee's qualifications," can be made by the outgoing
for the result to be reached herein is entirely incompatible with President. Accordingly, several appointments made by
what Valenzuela decreed. Consequently, Valenzuela now President Garcia, which were shown to have been well
How Valenzuela justified its pronouncement and result is hardly deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and considered, were upheld.
warranted. According to an authority on statutory construction:72 forgettable.
Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona
xxx the court should seek to avoid any conflict in the provisions We reverse Valenzuela. ruling. It may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not
of the statute by endeavoring to harmonize and reconcile every only "midnight" appointments - those made obviously for
part so that each shall be effective. It is not easy to draft a partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of
statute, or any other writing for that matter, which may not in Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all
their making - but also appointments presumed made for the
some manner contain conflicting provisions. But what appears other appointments in the Judiciary.
purpose of influencing the outcome of the Presidential election.
to the reader to be a conflict may not have seemed so to the
drafter. Undoubtedly, each provision was inserted for a definite
There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the
reason. Often by considering the enactment in its entirety, what On the other hand, the exception in the same Section 15 of
adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate
appears to be on its face a conflict may be cleared up and the Article VII - allowing appointments to be made during the period
midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief
provisions reconciled. of the ban therein provided - is much narrower than that
Executive in the mold of the appointments dealt with in the
recognized in Aytona. The exception allows only the making
leading case of Aytona v. Castillo.75 In fact, in Valenzuela, the
of temporary appointments to executive positions when
Consequently, that construction which will leave every word Court so observed, stating that:
continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger
operative will be favored over one which leaves some word or public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the
provision meaningless because of inconsistency. But a word
xxx it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two appointing power of the President during the period of the ban.
should not be given effect, if to do so gives the statute a
types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2)
meaning contrary to the intent of the legislature. On the other
those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those
hand, if full effect cannot be given to the words of a statute, Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for
appointments made within the two months preceding a
they must be made effective as far as possible. Nor should the filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the
Presidential election and are similar to those which are
provisions of a statute which are inconsistent be harmonized at President's power of appointment, it is this Court's view that, as
declared election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
a sacrifice of the legislative intention. It may be that two a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should
provisions are irreconcilable; if so, the one which expresses the yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and
intent of the law-makers should control. And the arbitrary rule xxx similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up
of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases. Temporary elections. He assured that "on the basis of the (Constitutional) of the whole enactment.84 It is absurd to assume that the
vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally Commission's records, the election ban had no application to framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14
and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six appointments to the Court of Appeals."79 This confirmation was and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect
filled temporarily by designation. But prohibited appointments consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear,
are long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as Court of Appeals.80 would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in
earlier pointed out, in fact influence the results of elections and, Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
for that reason, their making is considered an election
The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due
offense.76
consideration to the confirmation of Justice Regalado. Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15
Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on interpretation to extends to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in determine the intent of the framers rather than on the the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of
Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Much of the the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative
Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in unfounded doubt about the President's power to appoint during Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the
the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the period of prohibition in Section 15, Article VII could have Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political
the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their been dispelled since its promulgation on November 9, 1998, leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election.
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination had Valenzuela properly acknowledged and relied on the Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead
and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the confirmation of a distinguished member of the Constitutional of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief
unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that Commission like Justice Regalado. Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial
there would no longer be midnight appointments to the independence, because the appointee can also become
Judiciary. If midnight appointments in the mold of Aytona were beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the
Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14,
made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an outgoing appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same
Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing powers of
Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because
the President.
desire to subvert the policies of the incoming President or for her term will end by June 30, 2010.
partisanship,77 the appointments to the Judiciary made after the
establishment of the JBC would not be suffering from such Section 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to
Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will
defects because of the JBC's prior processing of candidates. revoke appointments made by an Acting President,81 and
be no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the
Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that the evidently refers only to appointments in the Executive
prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within
ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment is a step in the Department. It has no application to appointments in the
the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there
process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment, Judiciary, because temporary or acting appointments can only
will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section
because the reason for the enactment must necessarily shed undermine the independence of the Judiciary due to their being
4(1), Article VIII remaining.
considerable light on "the law of the statute," i.e., the intent; revocable at will.82 The letter and spirit of the Constitution
hence, the enactment should be construed with reference to its safeguard that independence. Also, there is no law in the books
intended scope and purpose, and the court should seek to that authorizes the revocation of appointments in the Judiciary. The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the
carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it.78 Prior to their mandatory retirement or resignation, judges of the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice Puno's retirement
first and second level courts and the Justices of the third level by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to
courts may only be removed for cause, but the Members of the every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court.
Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that
Supreme Court may be removed only by impeachment.
appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the purpose of
buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying The argument also rests on the fallacious assumption that there
partisan considerations. The experience from the time of the Section 16 covers only the presidential appointments that will still be time remaining in the 90-day period under Section
establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. 4(1), Article VIII. The fallacy is easily demonstrable, as the
judicial positions at any level backed by people influential with Thereby, the Constitutional Commission restored the OSG has shown in its comment.
the President could not always be assured of being requirement of confirmation by the Commission on
recommended for the consideration of the President, because Appointments after the requirement was removed from the
Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be
they first had to undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass 1973 Constitution. Yet, because of Section 9 of Article VIII, the
held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on
muster there. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely restored requirement did not include appointments to the
May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular
intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the Judiciary.83
presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the
intervention of the Commission on Appointments. This
prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14,
insulating process was absent from the Aytona midnight
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the
appointment.
same character, in that they affect the power of the President to prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill
appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there are
Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, appointments within the Executive Department renders at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest
Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day
then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing
it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to President would be in no position to comply with the
sectors about the "constitutionality of xxx appointments" to the the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It
Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not
have intended such an absurdity. In fact, in their deliberations Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 states: The appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent
on the mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court President is preferable to having the Associate Justice who is
Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers neither first in precedence take over. Under the Constitution, the heads
Section 12. Vacancy in Office of Chief Justice. - In case of a
discussed, nor mentioned, nor referred to the ban against of the Legislative and Executive Departments are popularly
vacancy in the office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or
midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII, or its elected, and whoever are elected and proclaimed at once
of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office,
effects on the 90-day period, or vice versa. They did not need become the leaders of their respective Departments. However,
they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in
to, because they never intended Section 15, Article VII to apply the lack of any appointed occupant of the office of Chief Justice
precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief
to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in any of the lower harms the independence of the Judiciary, because the Chief
Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall
courts. Justice is the head of the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice
apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of
performs functions absolutely significant to the life of the nation.
Chief Justice.
With the entire Supreme Court being the Presidential Electoral
Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even
Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the Chairman of the Tribunal.
raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the
The provision calls for an Acting Chief Justice in the event of a There being no obstacle to the appointment of the next Chief
President - any President - to appoint a Chief Justice if the
vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice, or in the event that Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the incumbent
appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the
the Chief Justice is unable to perform his duties and powers. In President to make within the 90-day period from May 17, 2010,
Supreme Court.
either of such circumstances, the duties and powers of the there is no justification to insist that the successor of Chief
office of the Chief Justice shall devolve upon the Associate Justice Puno be appointed by the next President.
Sec. 9, Article VIII says: Justice who is first in precedence until a new Chief Justice is
appointed or until the disability is removed.
Historically, under the present Constitution, there has been no
xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be wide gap between the retirement and the resignation of an
appointed by the President from a list of at least three Notwithstanding that there is no pressing need to dwell on this incumbent Chief Justice, on one hand, and the appointment to
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any peripheral matter after the Court has hereby resolved the and assumption of office of his successor, on the other hand.
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. question of consequence, we do not find it amiss to confront As summarized in the comment of the OSG, the chronology of
the matter now. succession is as follows:
xxx
We cannot agree with the posture. 1. When Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee retired on April 18,
1988, Chief Justice Pedro Yap was appointed on the same day;
The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the
Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the A review of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII shows that the
Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court is composed of a Chief Justice and 14 2. When Chief Justice Yap retired on July 1, 1988, Chief
Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or Associate Justices, who all shall be appointed by the President Justice Marcelo Fernan was appointed on the same day;
sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the JBC for
vetted by the JBC. every vacancy, which appointments require no confirmation by
3. When Chief Justice Fernan resigned on December 7, 1991,
the Commission on Appointments. With reference to the Chief
Chief Justice Andres Narvasa was appointed the following day,
Justice, he or she is appointed by the President as Chief
Can the President, therefore, appoint any of the incumbent December 8, 1991;
Justice, and the appointment is never in an acting capacity.
Justices of the Court as Chief Justice?
The express reference to a Chief Justice abhors the idea that
the framers contemplated an Acting Chief Justice to head the 4. When Chief Justice Narvasa retired on November 29, 1998,
The question is not squarely before us at the moment, but it membership of the Supreme Court. Otherwise, they would Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. was sworn into office the
should lend itself to a deeper analysis if and when have simply written so in the Constitution. Consequently, to rely following early morning of November 30, 1998;
circumstances permit. It should be a good issue for the on Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 in order to forestall
proposed Constitutional Convention to consider in the light of the imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice soonest is
5. When Chief Justice Davide retired on December 19, 2005,
Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile's statement that the to defy the plain intent of the Constitution.
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban was appointed the next day,
President can appoint the Chief Justice from among the sitting
December 20, 2005; and
justices of the Court even without a JBC list.
For sure, the framers intended the position of Chief Justice to
be permanent, not one to be occupied in an acting or
6. When Chief Justice Panganiban retired on December 6,
II temporary capacity. In relation to the scheme of things under
2006, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno took his oath as Chief
the present Constitution, Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of
Justice at midnight of December 6, 2006.85
1948 only responds to a rare situation in which the new Chief
The Judiciary Act of 1948 Justice is not yet appointed, or in which the incumbent Chief
Justice is unable to perform the duties and powers of the office. III
The posture has been taken that no urgency exists for the It ought to be remembered, however, that it was enacted
President to appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno, because the Chief Justice appointed under the 1935
Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC
considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the Constitution was subject to the confirmation of the Commission
situation of having the next President appoint the successor. on Appointments, and the confirmation process might take
longer than expected. May the JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees to the
President?
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, effectively and illegally deprive the President of the ample time On the other hand, the petition for prohibition in G.R. No.
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of 191342 is similarly devoid of merit. The challenge mounted
that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the against the composition of the JBC based on the allegedly
office, trust, or station.86 It is proper when the act against which appointment. unconstitutional allocation of a vote each to the ex officio
it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or members from the Senate and the House of Representatives,
officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a thereby prejudicing the chances of some candidates for
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the
judgment or discretion in a particular way.87 nomination by raising the minimum number of votes required in
start of the President's mandatory 90-day period to appoint is
accordance with the rules of the JBC, is not based on the
ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will
petitioners' actual interest, because they have not alleged in
For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the
their petition that they were nominated to the JBC to fill some
with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus
vacancies in the Judiciary. Thus, the petitioners lack locus
(b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President
standi on that issue.
because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because
neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an
act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) unjustified delay in performing that duty.88 For mandamus to lie WHEREFORE, the Court:
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate against the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained
remedy in the ordinary course of law. delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary,
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R.
that is, in submitting the list to the President.
No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition for
Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the JBC to mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
submit a list of at least three nominees to the President for The distinction between a ministerial act and a discretionary
every vacancy in the Judiciary: one has been delineated in the following manner:
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032
and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and
Section 8. xxx The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is
well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly,
an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of directs the Judicial and Bar Council:
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
recommending appointees to the Judiciary. xxx
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act (a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of
lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.
Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of
confirmation. same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
Chief Justice;
judgment.89
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of
appointments within ninety days from the submission of Accordingly, we find no sufficient grounds to grant the petitions
nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17,
the list. for mandamus and to issue a writ of mandamus against the
2010; and
JBC. The actions for that purpose are premature, because it is
clear that the JBC still has until May 17, 2010, at the latest,
However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the within which to submit the list of nominees to the President to (d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of
President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to
days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days Justice Puno. the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto
from the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts.
in accordance with this decision.
The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC.
Thus, the JBC should start the process of selecting the IV
candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the SO ORDERED.
occurrence of the vacancy.
Writ of prohibition does not lie against the JBC
CONCURRING OPINION
Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to
In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the conclusion is
the President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the
ineluctable that only the President can appoint the Chief ABAD, J.:
Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one
Justice. Hence, Soriano's petition for prohibition in G.R. No.
of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the
191032, which proposes to prevent the JBC from intervening in
vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno will retire on May 17, 2010.
the process of nominating the successor of Chief Justice Puno,
President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the Article VIII, Section 91 of the 1987 Constitution requires the
lacks merit.
90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to President to choose his successor from at least three nominees
make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will be of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). On January 18, 2010 the
unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby JBC passed a unanimous resolution2 to start the process of
filling up the anticipated vacancy. Indeed, it invited applications current vacancies in the courts. BAYAN, COURAGE, should have the list on or before May 17, the day the vacancy
and nominations for the position through newspapers, later KADAMAY, LFS, NUSTP, CEGP, SCMP, and BAYAN claim occurs, so she can comply with her duty under the Constitution
announced the names of candidates to it, and finally received that what the petitioners seek is a mere advisory opinion from to make the appointment within the 90-day period provided by
endorsements in favor of and oppositions against such the Court, something that it has no power to give. it. Of course, the circumstances is such that the period for
candidates. appointing the Chief Justice’s replacement will span the tenure
of the incumbent President (for 44 days) and her successor (for
The Constitution provides that judicial power is the duty of the
46 days), but it is the incumbent’s call whether to exercise the
Ordinarily, the JBC would already be holding public interviews courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
power or pass it on.
of candidates to the office to be followed by a deliberation and which are legally demandable and enforceable. 5 The court will
the eventual submission of a shortlist of nominees to the not act on an action for damages for a slap on the plaintiff’s
President. The Constitution provides that any vacancy in the face if the defendant is still to deliver that slap. The law must Again, assuming as correct petitioners’ view that the ban on
Supreme Court "shall be filled within ninety days" from its have established a right which has in fact been violated. midnight appointments does not apply to the judiciary, the
occurrence.3 Since the position of Chief Justice will be vacant JBC’s suspension of its selection process places it in default,
on May 17, 2010 when Chief Justice Puno shall have retired, given its above duty in regard to the submission of its list of
Here, the Constitution imposes on the JBC the duty to
the President has to fill up the vacancy during the period May nominees to the President within a time constraint. Under the
recommend to the President those whom he can appoint to the
17 to August 15, 2010. same assumption, moreover, the petitioner citizens and
judiciary when a vacancy occurs.6 In the case of a vacancy in
members of the bar would have a demandable right or interest
the Supreme Court, it is implicit that the JBC must submit a list
in having the JBC proceed with its selection process and
But by some unforeseen happenstance, that vacancy (May 18) of at least three nominees to the President on time to enable
submit its list of nominees in time for the incumbent President
will occur during the period of the midnight appointments ban him to fulfill his duty to fill up the vacancy within 90 days after it
or her successor to fill up the vacancy within the period
(March 10 to June 30), a ban intended to prevent an outgoing occurs.7 Those who have an interest in the fulfillment of this
required by the Constitution.
president from buying votes using such appointments or duty has the right to insist that it be done.
robbing the incoming president of the opportunity to fill up
important positions with people he will be working with. Article Alternatively, assuming that an actual controversy has not yet
But the JBC appears reluctant or unwilling to perform its above
VII, Section 15, of the Constitution prohibits the outgoing developed as to warrant action on the petitions filed in this
duty in the case of the forthcoming May 17, 2010 vacancy in
President from making appointments "two months immediately case, the Court has the authority, as an incident of its power of
the office of the Chief Justice. It expressed a desire to
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his supervision over the JBC,8 to see to it that the JBC faithfully
determine, initially, from views submitted to it by others and,
term," except temporary appointments in the interest of public executes its duties as the Constitution requires of it.
later, from what the Court might provide it by way of guidance,
service or public safety.4 The midnight appointments ban this
whether it can submit its list of nominees to the incumbent
year is in force from March 10 (two months before the
President during the ban on midnight appointments that sets in In its Resolution of January 18, 2010, the JBC confesses
elections) to June 30 (the end of the incumbent President’s
on March 10. Indeed, the JBC said in its resolution of January uncertainty regarding when and to whom to submit its list of
term), a period of 112 days.
18, 2010 that, while it would start the selection process, it was nominees for the May 17, 2010 vacancy in the office of Chief
yet to determine when and to whom to submit its shortlist of Justice in view of the apparently conflicting provisions of the
Issues to be addressed nominees. It saw an apparent conflict between the provisions of Constitution. Further, in its comment in this case, the JBC
Section 4(1) of Article VIII (the ban on midnight appointments) declared that it "will be guided by [the Court’s] decision in these
and Section 15 of Article VII (the need to fill up the vacancy consolidated Petitions and Administrative Matter."
Quite ably, the majority opinion already addressed the several
within 90 days of its occurrence) of the 1987 Constitution. Consequently, as an incident of its Constitutional duty to
issues raised by the petitions and the oppositions to them. I join
supervise the JBC, the Court can, to insure JBC’s faithful
that opinion and would add a few thoughts on what I believe to
compliance with the Constitution, resolve the issue of whether
be the key issues in this case, namely: Eventually, after taking some steps in the selection process,
or not the ban on midnight appointments applies to the
the JBC held the process in abeyance, unable to decide as yet
judiciary.
when and to whom it will submit its list of nominees for the
1. Whether or not the case presents an actual controversy that
position that Chief Justice Puno will vacate on May 17, 2010.
is ripe for this Court’s adjudication; and
Under the circumstances, the controversy is already ripe for Two. Citing "In Re: Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of
adjudication for, assuming that the ban on midnight Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as
2. Whether or not the Constitutional ban on midnight appointment does not apply to the judiciary as the petitioners Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and
appointments applies to the judiciary. would have it, then the JBC’s suspension of its selection of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,"9 the oppositors claim that the
process would constitute a violation of its duty under the ban on midnight appointments applies to the judiciary. After
Constitution to carry on with such process until it is able to examining the reasons for the two apparently conflicting
Discussion submit the desired list to the incumbent President. If my provisions, the Court said that the need to fill up vacancies in
subdivision neighbor begins constructing a shed in his yard and the judiciary within the period the Constitution provides must
One. Invoking the fundamental rule that judicial power is the tells me that he has ordered 20 pigs to raise there, I will not yield to the ban on Presidential midnight appointments. The
duty of the courts of justice to settle "actual controversies wait till the pigs arrive and defecate before I bring an action to Court explained this ruling:
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," abate a nuisance.
the National Union of People’s Lawyers (NUPL) claims that no Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for
actual controversy exists in this case as to warrant judicial As mandated by the Constitution, the incumbent President filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the
determination of the issue of whether or not the Constitutional should be able to fill up the vacancy within 90 days of its President’s power of appointment, it is this Court’s view that, as
ban on midnight appointment applies to the judiciary since the occurrence. This presupposes that the incumbent President a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should
JBC has not as yet prepared a final list of its nominees to
yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and recommended by the JBC for appointment is open or otherwise Further, the idea that the incoming President should have the
similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up unrestricted. Political connection is not a consideration that the opportunity to choose a Chief Justice who will support his
of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases. Temporary JBC entertains in short listing its nominees. policies does not also make sense. The Supreme Court that the
vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally Chief Justice heads is not a support agency under the
and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six President. One of the functions of the Supreme Court is to
Fifth. The JBC invites the public to comment on or submit
years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be provide a Constitutional check on abuses of the Executive
opposition to the nomination of candidates to a vacancy. And it
filled temporarily by designation. But prohibited appointments Department.
holds public hearings in which each candidate is queried about
are long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as
his qualifications, affiliations, and other personal
earlier pointed out, in fact influence the results of elections and,
circumstances. The proposition that a Chief Justice will always be beholden to
for that reason, their making is considered an election
the President who appoints him is a myth. Former President
offense.10
Estrada appointed Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. who
Sixth. The names in the list submitted by the JBC to the
presided over his impeachment and administered the oath to
President are not negotiable. On July 24, 2009 the Executive
But the above assumes that the outgoing incumbent President the incumbent President at the heels of EDSA II while
Secretary returned to JBC its list of six nominees for two
can make appointments in the judiciary during the period of the President Estrada still sat in Malacañang. Chief Justices
vacancies in the Court, requesting additional names that the
ban "to buy votes" and commit "similar evils" like denying the Artemio V. Panganiban and Reynato S. Puno voted against
incumbent President can choose from. Obviously, the
incoming President the opportunity to consider other positions taken by the administration of the incumbent
President was unhappy with the names on the list. But the JBC
appointees in the light of his new policies, a point former President who appointed them both to their position. These
declined the request, the pertinent portion of which reads:
President Diosdado Macapagal made in Aytona v. Castillo.11 Chief Justices like those before them were first choices of the
JBC before they were those of the Presidents concerned.
We wish to inform you that the six (6) nominees of the JBC
The fact, however, is that while the President can freely choose
were chosen after a long and thorough selection process.
to appoint any person who meets the basic qualifications for a I thus reiterate my concurrence with the main decision.
Among others, their public and private track record, experience
position in the Executive Department, he does not have such
and possession of the required qualities of competence,
freedom of choice when it comes to appointments in the
integrity, probity and independence were carefully studies and
judiciary. In the latter case, the Constitution provides in Section
considered by the JBC. They are all highly qualified for the two
9 of Article VIII that the President can choose his appointee
(2) vacancies in the Supreme Court and indeed, your letter of
only from a JBC short list of its nominees. DISSENTING OPINION
July 26, 2009 does not assail and hence, concedes the
qualification of the six (6) nominees.
Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of CARPIO MORALES, J.:
lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
With due respect, the JBC cannot acquiesce to your request to
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
expand the short list of nominees submitted to your office. The "Although the Chief Justice is primus inter pares, he cannot
for every vacancy. x x x
decision whether to include three or more than three name in legally decide a case on his own because of the Court’s nature
the short list of the nominees exclusively belongs to the JBC. It as a collegial body. Neither can the Chief Justice, by himself,
This restriction on the President’s appointing power is not a is one of the important innovations in the 1987 Constitution overturn the decision of the Court, whether of a division or
small matter. designed to depoliticize appointments in the Judiciary and the en banc."
promote its independence. This discretion given to the JBC is
the lynchpin of its autonomy and it cannot be compromised in
First. The JBC from whose list of nominees the President will — Associate Justice Renato C. Corona in
the tiniest degree without impairing the delicate check and
make his appointment is under the supervision of the Supreme Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda
balance in the appointment of members of the Judiciary
Court itself. Indeed, it is headed by the Chief Justice as its against Justice Puno, 499 Phil. 1, 14
installed in our Constitution. The JBC, voting unanimously,
presiding officer. The JBC is not a subordinate agency of the (2005)
cannot therefore accede to your request in light of the
Executive Department; the President has neither control nor
imperatives of the Constitution.1avvphi1
supervision over it.
Primus Inter pares. First among equals. The Latin maxim
indicates that a person is the most senior of a group of people
Thus, the incumbent President was forced to choose from the
Second. The JBC makes its own vetting rules and procedures. sharing the same rank or office. The phrase has been used to
few names on the list that she had.
The Constitution of course provides for the qualifications of describe the status, condition or role of the prime minister in
members of the judiciary12 but this has not prevented the JBC most parliamentary nations, the high-ranking prelate in several
from establishing grounds for disqualifying candidates, such as In reality, a President’s choice of Chief Justice is in fact first a religious orders, and the chief justice in many supreme courts
the pendency of administrative or criminal cases against them. choice of the JBC before it is that of the President. Easily there around the world.1
should at least be 20,000 lawyers who are 40 years of age and
have 15 years of law practice of some kind who could qualify
Third. The JBC announces any vacancy in the judiciary in The inclination to focus on the inter pares without due
for Chief Justice. Yet, the President can choose only from a list
newspapers of large circulations. Secret recruitment and emphasis on the primus/prima2 has spawned contemporary
of three, four, or five lawyers that the JBC draws up for him.
trading for votes in the coming elections is out. discourse that revives the original tug-of-war between
Consequently, the idea that the outgoing incumbent President
domination and parity, which impasse the conceived maxim
can take advantage of her appointment of a Chief Justice to
precisely intended to resolve.
Fourth. Anyone who has the basic qualifications can apply for a buy votes in the coming elections is utterly ridiculous. She has
vacancy or be nominated to it. Thus, the opportunity to be no control over the JBC’s actions.
In the present case, several arguments attempt to depict a from identifying and compartmentalizing the composition of the minute" appointments voided to abort the abuse of presidential
mirage of doomsday scenarios arising from the impending Cabinet. In vesting executive power in one person rather than prerogatives or partisan efforts to fill vacant positions were one
vacancy of the primus in the Court as a springboard for their in a plural executive, the evident intention was to invest the in the Supreme Court and two in the Court of Appeals.
plea to avert a supposed undermining of the independence of power holder with energy.
the judiciary. In reality, the essential question boils down to
Heeding Aytona’s admonition, the Constitutional Commission
the limitation on the appointing power of the President.
AMIN takes premium on the severed treatment of these reform (ConCom) saw it fit to provide for a comprehensive ban on
areas in marked provisions of the Constitution. It is a precept, midnight appointments, finding that the establishment of the
The ponencia of Justice Bersamin holds that the incumbent however, that inferences drawn from title, chapter or JBC is not enough to safeguard or insulate judicial
President can appoint the next Chief Justice upon the section headings are entitled to very little weight. And so appointments from politicization. The ConCom deliberations
retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno on May 17, 2010 must reliance on sub-headings, or the lack thereof, to reveal:
since the prohibition during election period3 does not extend to support a strained deduction be given the weight of
appointments in the judiciary, thereby reversing In re helium.
MR. GUINGONA: Madam President.
appointments of Hon. Valenzuela & Hon. Vallarta.4
Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not to create
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
The ponencia additionally holds that the Judicial and Bar doubt. AMIN’s thesis unsettles, more than settles the order of
Council (JBC) has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within things in construing the Constitution. Its interpretation fails to
which to submit to the President the list of nominees for the clearly establish that the so-called "ordering" or MR. GUINGONA: Would the distinguished proponent accept an
position of Chief Justice. arrangement of provisions in the Constitution was amendment to his amendment to limit this prohibition to
consciously adopted to imply a signification in terms of members of collegiate courts? The judges of the lower courts
government hierarchy from where a constitutional perhaps would not have the same category or the same
I DISSENT.
mandate can per se be derived or asserted. It fails to standing as the others mentioned here.
demonstrate that the "ordering" or layout was not simply a
Constitutional draftsmanship style is the weakest aid in arriving matter of style in constitutional drafting but one of
MR. DAVIDE: Pursuant to the post amendment, we already
at a constitutional construction intention in government structuring. With its inherent
included here government-owned or controlled corporations or
ambiguity, the proposed interpretation cannot be made a basis
their subsidiaries which are not even very sensitive positions.
for declaring a law or governmental act
The first ratiocination adverts to the "organization and So with more reason that the prohibition should apply to
unconstitutional.6 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution" that was, as appointments in these bodies.
the ponencia declares, purposely made by the framers of the
Constitution to "reflect their intention and manifest their vision" Concededly, the allocation of three Articles in the Constitution
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?
of the charter’s contents. devoted to the respective dynamics of the three Departments
was deliberately adopted by the framers to allocate the vast
powers of government among the three Departments in FR. BERNAS: What is common among these people —
It is unfortunate that the ponencia chiefly relies on the trivialities recognition of the principle of separation of powers. Ministers, Deputy Ministers, heads of bureaus or offices — is
of draftsmanship style in arriving at a constitutional
that they are under the control of the President.
construction. The petitioner in Anak Mindanao Party-List Group
v. The Executive Secretary 5 raised a similar argument, but the The equation, however, does not end there. Such kind of
Court held: formulation detaches itself from the concomitant system of MR. GUINGONA: That is correct.
checks and balances. Section sequencing alone of Sections
14, 15 and 16 of Article VII, as explained in the fourth
AMIN goes on to proffer the concept of "ordering the law" FR. BERNAS: Whereas, the other offices the Commissioner
ratiocination, does not suffice to signify functional structuring.
which, so it alleges, can be said of the Constitution’s distinct mentioned are independent offices.
treatment of these three areas, as reflected in separate
provisions in different parts of the Constitution. It argues that That the power of judicial appointment was lodged in the
President is a recognized measure of limitation on the power of MR. DAVIDE: The idea of the proposal is that about the end of
the Constitution did not intend an over-arching concept of
the judiciary, which measure, however, is counterbalanced by the term of the President, he may prolong his rule indirectly by
agrarian reform to encompass the two other areas, and
the election ban due to the need to insulate the judiciary from appointing people to these sensitive positions, like the
that how the law is ordered in a certain way should not be
the political climate of presidential elections. To abandon this commissions, the Ombudsman, the JUDICIARY, so he could
undermined by mere executive orders in the guise of
interplay of checks and balances on the mere inference that the perpetuate himself in power even beyond his term of office;
administrative efficiency.
establishment of the JBC could de-politicize the process of therefore foreclosing the right of his successor to make
judicial appointments lacks constitutional mooring. appointments to these positions. We should realize that the
The Court is not persuaded. term of the President is six years and under what we had voted
on, there is no reelection for him. Yet he can continue to rule
The establishment of the JBC is not sufficient to curtail the evils the country through appointments made about the end of his
The interplay of various areas of reform in the promotion of of midnight appointments in the judiciary term to these sensitive positions.
social justice is not something implausible or unlikely. Their
interlocking nature cuts across labels and works against a rigid
pigeonholing of executive tasks among the members of the The constitutional prohibition in Section 15 found its roots in the FR. BERNAS: At any rate, there are other checks as far as the
President’s official family. Notably, the Constitution inhibited case of Aytona v. Castillo,7 where among the "midnight" or "last appointment of those officers is concerned.
MR. DAVIDE: Only insofar as the Commission on department, it insults the collective intelligence and diligence of The line of reasoning is specious. If that is the case and for
Appointments is concerned for offices which would require the ConCom to postulate that it intended to exclude the accuracy’s sake, we might as well reconvene all ConCom
consent, and the Judicial Bar Council insofar as the judiciary is judiciary but missed out on that one. members and put the matter to a vote among them.
concerned.
To hold that the ban on midnight appointments applies only to Providentially, jurisprudence is replete with guiding principles to
FR. BERNAS: We leave the matter to the body for a executive positions, and not to vacancies in the judiciary and ascertain the true meaning of the Constitution when the
vote.8 (capitalization and emphasis supplied) independent constitutional bodies, is to make the prohibition provisions as written appear unclear and the proceedings as
practically useless. It bears noting that Section 15, Article VII of recorded provide little help:
the Constitution already allows the President, by way of
The clear intent of the framers is thus for the ban on midnight
exception, to make temporary appointments in the Executive
appointments to apply to the judiciary. The succeeding While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates
Department during the prohibited period. Under this view, there
interpellations 9 suggest no departure from this intent. and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to
is virtually no restriction on the President’s power of
arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution,
appointment during the prohibited period.
resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
For almost half a century, the seeds of Aytona, as nurtured and
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution
broadened by the Constitution, have grown into an established
The general rule is clear since the prohibition applies to ALL when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
doctrine that has weathered legal storms like Valenzuela.
kinds of midnight appointments. The Constitution made no convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual
distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they
The second ratiocination in the ponencia could thus not give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not
remove an added constitutional safeguard by pretending to talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes
The exception is likewise clear. Expressio unius et exclusio
have examined and concluded that the establishment of the at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law.
alterius. The express mention of one person, thing or
JBC had eliminated all encompassing forms of political We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears
consequence implies the exclusion of all others. 10 There is no
maneuverings during elections. Otherwise, reading into the upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends
clear circumstance that would indicate that the enumeration in
Constitution such conclusion so crucial to the scheme of more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than
the exception was not intended to be exclusive. Moreover, the
checks and balances, which is neither written nor tackled, in the framers' understanding thereof.13 (underscoring supplied)
fact that Section 15 was couched in negative language
undermines the noticeable silence or restraint exercised by the
reinforces the exclusivity of the exception.
framers themselves from making a definitive analysis.
lawph!l
Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a
To illustrate, the instance given in the fifth ratiocination that
general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they The clear import of Section 15 of Article VII is readily apparent.
having the new President appoint the next Chief Justice cannot
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all The people may not be of the same caliber as Justice
ensure judicial independence because the appointee can also
doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions Regalado, but they simply could not read into Section 15
become beholden to the appointing authority bears an
rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established something that is not there. Casus omissus pro omisso
inconsistent stance. It does not admit or recognize that the
by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former habendus est.
mechanism of removal by impeachment eliminates the evils of
nor add to the latter by implication.11 (italics in the original;
political indebtedness. In any event, that level of reasoning
underscoring supplied)
overlooks the risk of compromising judicial independence when What complicates the ponencia is its great preoccupation with
the outgoing President faces the Court in the charges that may Section 15 of Article VII, particularly its fixation with sentences
be subsequently filed against her/him, and when the appointing The proclivity to innovate legal concepts is enticing. Lest the or phrases that are neither written nor referred to
President is up for re-election in the peculiar situation basic rule be forgotten, it helps to once more recite that when therein. Verba legis non est recedendum, index animi sermo
contemplated by Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. the law is clear, it is not susceptible to interpretation and must est. There should be no departure from the words of the
be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law statute, for speech is the index of intention.
may be harsh or onerous.12
All rules of statutory construction revolt against the
interpretation arrived at by the ponencia IN FINE, all rules of statutory construction virtually revolt
In its third ratiocination, the ponencia faults Valenzuela for against the interpretation arrived at by the ponencia.
not according weight and due consideration to the opinion of
It is simplistic and unreliable for the ponencia to contend that
Justice Florenz Regalado. It accords high regard to the opinion
had the framers intended to extend the ban in Article VII to The 90-day period to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court is
expressed by Justice Regalado as a former ConCom Member,
appointments in the judiciary, they would have easily and suspended during the ban on midnight appointments
to the exception of the opinion of all others similarly situated.
surely written so in Article VIII, for it backlashes the question
that had the framers intended to exclude judicial appointments
Although practically there is no constitutional crisis or conflict
in Article VIII from the prohibition in Article VII, they would have It bears noting that the Court had spoken in one voice
involved upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice,
easily and surely written so in the excepting proviso in Article in Valenzuela. The ponencia should not hastily reverse, on the
the ponencia illustrates the inapplicability of the 90-day
VII. sole basis of Justice Regalado’s opinion, the Court’s
mandate to every situation of vacancy in the Supreme Court
unanimous en banc decision penned by Chief Justice Andres
(i.e., the 19-day vacuum articulated in the sixth ratiocination)
Narvasa, and concurred in by, inter alia, Associate Justices
Taking into account how the framers painstakingly rummaged if only to buttress its thesis that judicial appointment is an
who later became Chief Justices – Hilario Davide, Jr., Artemio
through various sections of the Constitution and came up with exception to the midnight appointments ban. The contemplated
Panganiban and Reynato Puno.
only one exception with the need to specify the executive
situation, however, supports the idea that the 90-day period is This view differs from Valenzuela in that it does not implement could never submit a list to the President before the 90-day
suspended during the effectivity of the ban. Section 15 of Article VII so as to breach Section 4(1) of Article period.
VIII. Instead of disregarding the 90-day period in the
observance of the ban on midnight appointments, the more
I submit that the more important and less complicated question Sustaining the view means20 that in case the President appoints
logical reconciliation of the two subject provisions is to consider
is whether the 90-day period in Section 4(1) of Article VIII 14 runs as Chief Justice a sitting member of the Court, from a JBC list
the ban as having the effect of suspending the duty to make the
during the period of prohibition in Section 15 of Article VII. which includes, for instance, incumbent justices and
appointment within 90 days from the occurrence of the
"outsiders," the JBC must forthwith submit a list of nominees for
vacancy. Otherwise stated, since there is a ban, then there is
the post left vacant by the sitting member-now new Chief
In response to that question, the ponencia declares that it is the no duty to appoint as the power to appoint does not even exist.
Justice. This thus calls for the JBC, in anticipation, to also
President’s "imperative duty to make an appointment of a Accordingly, the 90-day period is suspended once the ban sets
commence and conclude another nomination process to fill the
Member of the Supreme Court within 90 in and begins or continues to run only upon the expiration of
vacancy, and simultaneously submit a list of nominees for such
days from the occurrence of the vacancy [and that t]he failure the ban.
vacancy, together with the list of nominees for the position of
by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the
Chief Justice. If the President appoints an "outsider" like
Constitution."15
One situation which could result in physical impossibility is the Sandiganbayan Justice Edilberto Sandoval as Chief Justice,
inability of the JBC to constitute a quorum for some reasons however, the JBC’s toil and time in the second nomination
The ponencia quotes certain records of the ConCom beyond their control, as that depicted by Justice Arturo Brion in process are put to waste.
deliberations which, however, only support the view that the his Separate Opinion, in which case the 90-day period could
number of Justices should "not be reduced for any appreciable lapse without fulfilling the constitutional obligation.
It is ironic for the ponencia to state on the one hand that the
length of time" and it is a "mandate to the executive to fill the
President would be deprived of ample time to reflect on the
vacancy". Notably, there is no citation of any debate on how the
Another such circumstance which could frustrate the qualifications of the nominees, and to show on the other hand
framers reckoned or determined an appreciable length of time
ponencia’s depiction of the inflexibility of the period is a "no- that the President has, in recent history, filled the vacancy in
of 90 days, in which case a delay of one day could already
takers" situation where, for some reason, there are no willing the position of Chief Justice in one or two days.
bring about the evils it purports to avoid and spell a culpable
qualified nominees to become a Member of the Court. 17 Some
violation of the Constitution. On the contrary, that the addition
might find this possibility remote, but then again, the situation at
of one month to the original proposal of 60 days was approved It is ironic for the ponencia to recognize that the President may
hand or the "absurdity"18 of a 19-day overlapping vacuum may
without controversy16 ineluctably shows that the intent was not need as much as 90 days of reflection in appointing a member
have also been perceived to be rare.
to strictly impose an inflexible timeframe. of the Court, and yet abhor the idea of an acting Chief Justice
in the interregnum as provided for by law,21 confirmed by
The seventh ratiocination is admittedly a non-issue. Suffice it tradition,22 and settled by jurisprudence23 to be an internal
Respecting the rationale for suspending the 90-day period, in
to state that the Constitution is clear that the appointment must matter.
cases where there is physical or legal impossibility of
come "from a list x x x prepared by the Judicial and Bar
compliance with the duty to fill the vacancy within the said
Council."
period, the fulfillment of the obligation is released because the The express allowance of a 90-day period of vacancy rebuts
law cannot exact compliance with what is impossible. any policy argument on the necessity to avoid a vacuum of
The Supreme Court can function effectively during the midnight even a single day in the position of an appointed Chief Justice.
appointments ban without an appointed Chief Justice
In the present case, there can only arise a legal impossibility
when the JBC list is submitted or the vacancy occurred during As a member of the Court, I strongly take exception to
the appointments ban and the 90-day period would expire The ponencia also holds that the JBC has until May 17, 2010, the ponencia’s implication that the Court cannot function
before the end of the appointments ban, in which case the at the latest, within which to submit to the President the list of without a sitting Chief Justice.
fresh 90-day period should start to run at noon of June 30. This nominees for the position of Chief Justice. It declares that the
was the factual antecedent respecting the trial court judges JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill
To begin with, judicial power is vested in one Supreme
involved in Valenzuela. There also arises a legal impossibility the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the
Court24 and not in its individual members, much less in the
when the list is submitted or the vacancy occurred prior to the vacancy, explaining that the 90-day period in the proviso, "Any
Chief Justice alone. Notably, after Chief Justice Puno retires,
ban and no appointment was made before the ban starts, vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
the Court will have 14 members left, which is more than
rendering the lapse of the 90-day period within the period of the thereof," is addressed to the President, not to the JBC.
sufficient to constitute a quorum.
ban, in which case the remaining period should resume to run
at noon of June 30. The outgoing President would be released
Such interpretation is absurd as it takes the application and
from non-fulfillment of the constitutional obligation, and the duty The fundamental principle in the system of laws recognizes that
nomination stages in isolation from the whole appointment
devolves upon the new President. there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other
process. For the ponencia, the filling of the vacancy only
courts are required to take their bearings. While most of the
involves the President, and the JBC was not considered when
Court’s work is performed by its three divisions, the Court
Considering also that Section 15 of Article VII is an express the period was increased from 60 days to 90 days. The sense
remains one court — single, unitary, complete and supreme.
limitation on the President’s power of appointment, the running of the Concom is the exact opposite.19
Flowing from this is the fact that, while individual justices may
of the 90-day period is deemed suspended during the period of
dissent or only partially concur, when the Court states what the
the ban which takes effect only once every six years.
The flaw in the reasoning is made more evident when the law is, it speaks with only one voice.25
vacancy occurs by virtue of death of a member of the Court. In
that instance, the JBC could never anticipate the vacancy, and
The Court, as a collegial body, operates on a "one member, 2002.6 The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in were originally owned and possessed by Veronica
one vote" basis, whether it sits en banc or in divisions. The the Official Gazette, April 1, 2002 issue, Volume 98, Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted different
competence, probity and independence of the Court en banc, No. 13, pages 1631–16337 and in the March 21, 2002 kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker
or those of the Court’s Division to which the Chief Justice issue of People’s Balita,8 a newspaper of general and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975,
belongs, have never depended on whether the member voting circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and
as Chief Justice is merely an acting Chief Justice or a duly Hearing was likewise posted in a conspicuous place on Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the
appointed one. Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, as well as in a conspicuous same were purchased by the respondent in 1989.
place on the bulletin board of the City hall of Taguig,
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to hold, for the Metro Manila.9 The respondent likewise alleged that the subject
guidance of the Judicial and Bar Council, that the incumbent properties are within the alienable and disposable lands
President is constitutionally proscribed from appointing the On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called the case for of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications
successor of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno upon his initial hearing, only the Laguna Lake Development issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
retirement on May 17, 2010 until the ban ends at 12:00 noon of Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the Resources (DENR).
June 30, 2010. RTC issued an order of general default except LLDA,
which was given 15 days to submit its In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia,
comment/opposition to the respondent’s application for presented the following documents: (1) Deed of
registration.10 Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by
Salvador and Mijares in favor of the respondent;13 (2)
On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition11 to the survey plans of the subject properties;14 (3) technical
G.R. No. 199310, February 19, 2014
respondent’s application for registration, asserting that descriptions of the subject properties;15 (4) Geodetic
Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are not part of the alienable Engineer’s Certificate;16 (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos.
REPUBLIC OF THE and disposable lands of the public domain. On the 3068 and 3077 for 2002;17 and (6) certifications dated
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. REMMAN other hand, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno
ENTERPRISES, INC., REPRESENTED BY RONNIE P. on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its Opposition,12 alleging (Calamno), Senior Forest Management Specialist of the
INOCENCIO, Respondent. that the respondent failed to prove that it and its DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part
predecessors–in–interest have been in open, of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
DECISION continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the domain.18
subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the
REYES, J.: Trial on the merits of the respondent’s application respondent’s application for registration should be
ensued thereafter. denied since the subject parcels of land are not part of
Before this Court is a petition for review the alienable and disposable lands of the public
on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11)
seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 2 dated Villaroya, the respondent’s corporate secretary; Ronnie of Republic Act No. 485019 (R.A. No. 4850), lands,
November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in Inocencio, an employee of the respondent and the one surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below
CA–G.R. CV No. 90503. The CA affirmed the authorized by it to file the application for registration the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public
Decision3 dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena (Cerquena), the lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr.
Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land caretaker of the subject properties since 1957; and Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed
Registration Case No. N–11465. Engineer Mariano Flotildes (Engr. Flotildes), a geodetic that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject
engineer hired by the respondent to conduct a properties, based on the topographic map of Taguig,
The Facts topographic survey of the subject properties. which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted
by the then Department of National Defense–Bureau of
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Coast in April 1966, he found out that the elevations of
(respondent), filed an application4 with the RTC for Engineers Ramon Magalonga (Engr. Magalonga) and Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon
judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land Christopher A. Pedrezuela (Engr. Pedrezuela), who are actual area verification of the subject properties on
situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, both geodetic engineers employed by the LLDA. September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that
identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm–590–D, the elevations of the subject properties range from
Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square meters Essentially, the testimonies of the respondent’s 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
and 20,357 sq m, respectively. witnesses showed that the respondent and its
predecessors–in–interest have been in open, On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes,
On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the who claimed that, based on the actual topographic
Order5 finding the respondent’s application for said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the
registration sufficient in form and substance and respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from request of the respondent, the elevations of the subject
setting it for initial hearing on February 21, 2002. The Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares properties, contrary to LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50
scheduled initial hearing was later reset to May 30, (Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject properties m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No.
3068 has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m portion of the lake dike that was then under the The evidence submitted by the appellee is
while the elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 construction by FF Cruz was allegedly 12.79 sufficient to warrant registration of the subject
m to 14.80 m. meters and after finding that the elevation of lands in its name. Appellee’s witness Engr.
the subject lots are lower than the said Mariano Flotildes, who conducted an actual
[benchmark] or reference point, said witness area verification of the subject lots, ably proved
The RTC Ruling
suddenly jumped to a conclusion that the that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot
elevation was below 12.5 meters. x x x. No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and the elevation of its
On May 16, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision,20 which highest portion is 15 meters. As to the other lot,
granted the respondent’s application for registration of Moreover, the finding of LLDA’s witness was it was found [out] that the elevation of the
title to the subject based on hearsay as said witness admitted that lowest portion of Lot No. 3077 is also 12.6
properties, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary it was DPWH or the FF Cruz who determined meters and the elevation of its highest portion
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment the elevation of the portion of the lake dike is 15 meters. Said elevations are higher than the
is rendered confirming the title of the applicant which he used as the [benchmark] or reference reglementary elevation of 12.5 meters as
Remman Enterprises Incorporated over a point in determining the elevation of the provided for under paragraph 11, Section 41 of
parcels of land [sic] consisting of 29,945 square subject lots and that he has no personal R.A. No. 4850, as amended.
meters (Lot 3068) and 20,357 (Lot 3077) both knowledge as to how the DPWH and FF Cruz
situated in Brgy. Napindan, Taguig, Taguig, determined the elevation of the said In opposing the instant application for
Metro Manila more particularly described in [benchmark] or reference point and he only registration, appellant relies merely on the
the Technical Descriptions Ap–04–003103 and learn[ed] that its elevation is 12.79 meters from Topographic Map dated March 2, 1966,
Swo–00–001769 respectively and ordering the information he got from FF prepared by Commodore Pathfinder, which
their registration under the Property Cruz.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary allegedly shows that the subject parcels of land
Registration Decree in the name of Remman Even supposing that the elevations of the subject are so situated in the submerge[d] [lake water]
Enterprises Incorporated. properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined of Laguna Lake. The said data was gathered
that the same could not be considered part of the bed through aerial photography over the area of
SO ORDERED.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section Taguig conducted on March 2, 1966. However,
The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to nobody testified on the due execution and
that the subject properties form part of the alienable those areas that can be covered by the lake water authenticity of the said document. As regards
and disposable lands of the public domain. The RTC the testimony of the witness for LLDA, Engr.
when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of
opined that the elevations of the subject properties are Ramon Magalonga, that the subject parcels of
12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those parcels of
very much higher than the reglementary elevation of land are below the 12.5 meter elevation, the
land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of same can be considered inaccurate aside from
12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake. Laguna Lake form part of its bed and not those that are
The RTC pointed out that LLDA’s claim that the being hearsay considering his admission that
already far from it, which could not be reached by the his findings were based merely on the
elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50 m is lake water. The RTC pointed out that the subject evaluation conducted by DPWH and FF Cruz.
hearsay since the same was merely based on the properties are more than a kilometer away from the x x x.24 (Citations
topographic map that was prepared using an aerial shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and omitted)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
survey on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake is at The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was
to prove that an aerial survey was indeed conducted on its maximum level. The RTC likewise found that the able to present certifications issued by the DENR,
March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data for the respondent was able to prove that it and its attesting that the subject properties form part of the
preparation of the topographic map. predecessors–in–interest have been in open, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the which was not disputed by the petitioner. The CA
parcel of land does not always remain the
subject properties as early as 1943. further ruled that the respondent was able to prove,
same; that the elevations of the subject
properties may have already changed since through the testimonies of its witnesses, that it and its
1966 when the supposed aerial survey, from The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision dated May predecessors–in–interest have been in open,
which the topographic map used by LLDA was 16, 2007 to the CA. continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the
based, was conducted. The RTC likewise subject properties prior to June 12, 1945.
faulted the method used by Engr. Magalonga in The CA Ruling
measuring the elevations of the subject Hence, the instant petition.
properties, pointing out that: On November 10, 2011, the CA, by way of the assailed
Decision,23 affirmed the RTC Decision dated May 16, The Issue
Further, in finding that the elevation of the 2007. The CA found that the respondent was able to
subject lots are below 12.5 meters, oppositor’s establish that the subject properties are part of the The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether
witness merely compared their elevation to the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated May
elevation of the particular portion of the lake that the same are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, 16, 2007, which granted the application for registration
dike which he used as his [benchmark] or
as claimed by the petitioner. filed by the respondent.
reference point in determining the elevation of
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
the subject lots. Also, the elevation of the said
 The Court’s Ruling presented to establish that the land subject of the of public domain as alienable and disposable. They
application is alienable or disposable.”26 must present a copy of the original classification
The petition is meritorious. approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true
The respondent filed its application for registration of copy by the legal custodian of the records.
The petitioner maintains that the lower courts erred in title to the subject properties under Section 14(1) of Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
granting the respondent’s application for registration Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152927 , which provides Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or
since the subject properties do not form part of the that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following disposable. The applicant for land registration
The petitioner insists that the elevations of the subject persons may file in the proper Court of First must prove that the DENR Secretary had
properties are below the reglementary level of 12.50 m Instance an application for registration of title approved the land classification and released
and, pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, are to land, whether personally or through their the land of the public domain as alienable and
considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. duly authorized representatives: disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the
(1) Those who by themselves or through their approved area per verification through survey
That the elevations of the subject properties are above
predecessors–in interest have been in open, by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
the reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of fact applicant for land registration must present
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
by the lower courts, which this Court, generally may a copy of the original classification approved
and occupation of alienable and disposable
not disregard. It is a long–standing policy of this Court lands of the public domain under a bona fide by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
that the findings of facts of the RTC which were claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or true copy by the legal custodian of the
adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally deemed earlier. official records. These facts must be
conclusive and binding. This Court is not a trier of facts established to prove that the land is
and will not disturb the factual findings of the lower x x x alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to
courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial do so because the certifications presented by
so.25cralawred confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public respondent do not, by themselves, prove that
land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth the land is alienable and
That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as amended disposable.32 (Emphasis
Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily mean that by P.D. No. 1073.28 Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. ours)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
they already form part of the alienable and disposable 1529, applicants for registration of title must In Republic v. Roche,33 the Court deemed it appropriate
lands of the public domain. It is still incumbent upon sufficiently establish: first, that the subject land forms to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties,
the respondent to prove, with well–nigh part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties Respecting the third requirement, the applicant
domain; second, that the applicant and his
are indeed part of the alienable and disposable lands of bears the burden of proving the status of the
predecessors–in–interest have been in open,
land. In this connection, the Court has held that
the public domain. While deference is due to the lower continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and he must present a certificate of land
courts’ finding that the elevations of the subject occupation of the same; and third, that it is under classification status issued by the
properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or Community Environment and Natural
and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake earlier.29 Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial
pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the Court Environment and Natural Resources Office
nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove
substantiate its entitlement to registration of title to prove that the subject property forms part of the that the DENR Secretary had approved the
the subject properties. alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, land classification and released the land as
the respondent presented two certifications30 issued by alienable and disposable, and that it is
“Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form within the approved area per verification
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public through survey by the CENRO or PENRO.
the State, which is the source of any asserted right to domain “under Project No. 27–B of Taguig, Metro Further, the applicant must present a copy
any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, of the original classification approved by the
clearly within private ownership are presumed to 1968.” DENR Secretary and certified as true copy
belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not by the legal custodian of the official records.
shown to have been reclassified or released as These facts must be established by the
However, the said certifications presented by the
alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private applicant to prove that the land is alienable and
respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject
disposable.
person by the State, remain part of the inalienable properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of
public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,31 the Court Here, Roche did not present evidence that the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the clarified that, in addition to the certification issued by land she applied for has been classified as
public domain is on the person applying for the proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable or disposable land of the public
registration, who must prove that the land subject of alienable and disposable, applicants for land domain. She submitted only the survey map
the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had and technical description of the land which
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be approved the land classification and released the land bears no information regarding the land’s
 classification. She did not bother to establish Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
the status of the land by any certification from the Court in subsequent cases notwithstanding that the occupation of the land subject of the application.
the appropriate government agency. Thus, it applications for registration were filed and granted by Applicants for land registration cannot just offer
cannot be said that she complied with all the lower courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. general statements which are mere conclusions of law
requisites for registration of title under Section Properties. rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual
14(1) of P.D. 1529.34 (Citations omitted and possession consists in the manifestation of acts of
emphasis ours)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary In Republic v. Medida,37 the application for registration dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
The DENR certifications that were presented by the of the subject properties therein was filed on October actually exercise over his own property.39
respondent in support of its application for registration 22, 2004 and was granted by the trial court on June
are thus not sufficient to prove that the subject 21, 2006. Similarly, in Republic v. Jaralve,38 the Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its
properties are indeed classified by the DENR Secretary application for registration of the subject property predecessors–in–interest cultivated the subject
as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the therein was filed on October 22, 1996 and was granted properties, by planting different crops thereon, his
respondent to present a copy of the original by the trial court on November 15, 2002. In the testimony is bereft of any specificity as to the nature of
classification approved by the DENR Secretary, which foregoing cases, notwithstanding that the applications such cultivation as to warrant the conclusion that they
must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as a for registration were filed and granted by the trial have been indeed in possession and occupation of the
true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties, subject properties in the manner required by law.
granting the application for registration in spite of the this Court applied the pronouncements in T.A.N. There was no showing as to the number of crops that
failure of the respondent to prove by well–nigh Properties and denied the applications for registration are planted in the subject properties or to the volume
incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties on the ground, inter alia, that the applicants therein of the produce harvested from the crops supposedly
are alienable and disposable. failed to present a copy of the original classification planted thereon.
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by the
Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s legal custodian thereof as a true copy. Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the
ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on respondent and its predecessors–in–interest have
June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, Anent the second and third requirements, the Court indeed planted crops on the subject properties, it does
asserting that decisions of this Court form part of the finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient not necessarily follow that the subject properties have
law of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil evidence to prove that it and its predecessors–in– been possessed and occupied by them in the manner
Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in
respondent points out that its application for notorious possession and occupation of the subject the subject properties may only have amounted to
registration of title to the subject properties was filed properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier. mere casual cultivation, which is not the possession
and was granted by the RTC prior to the Court’s and occupation required by law.
promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties. To prove that it and its predecessors–in–interest have
Accordingly, that it failed to present a copy of the been in possession and occupation of the subject “A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by
original classification covering the subject properties properties since 1943, the respondent presented the the claimant does not constitute possession under
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by the testimony of Cerquena. Cerquena testified that the claim of ownership. For him, possession is not
legal custodian thereof as a true copy, the respondent subject properties were originally owned by Jaime who exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a
claims, would not warrant the denial of its application supposedly possessed and cultivated the same since presumptive grant from the state. The possession of
for registration. 1943; that sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the subject public land, however long the period thereof may have
properties to Salvador and Mijares who, in turn, sold extended, never confers title thereto upon the
The Court does not agree. the same to the respondent in 1989. possessor because the statute of limitations with
regard to public land does not operate against the
Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self–serving state, unless the occupant can prove possession and
registration was filed and granted by RTC prior to the assertions of the possession and occupation of the occupation of the same under claim of ownership for
Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements subject properties by the respondent and its the required number of years.”40
in that case may be applied to the present case; it is predecessors–in–interest; they do not constitute the
not antithetical to the rule of non–retroactivity of laws well–nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over
pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary occupation of the subject properties required by the subject properties presented by the respondent
that the interpretation of a law by this Court Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain
constitutes part of that law from the date it was testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject
originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely present any other evidence to prove the character of properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors–
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the possession and occupation by it and its in–interest have been in possession of the subject
the interpreted law carried into effect.35 “Such judicial predecessors–in–interest of the subject properties. property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started
doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, to declare the same for purposes of taxation. “While
but consists merely of a construction or interpretation For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
of a pre–existing one.”36 of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership ownership, they constitute proof of claim of
must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, ownership.”41 That the subject properties were declared
for taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the That on or about the tenth (10th day of October, 1986 in the started masturbating the young boy and also guided the boy's
presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this hand for him to be masturbated, so that they masturbated each
possession of the subject properties starting that year. Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design other, while they were both naked, and he gave Jessie Ramirez
Likewise, no improvement or plantings were declared and with intent to kill one Rosario Baluyot, a woman under an erection. When Rosario Baluyot came out of the bathroom,
or noted in the said tax declarations. This fact belies twelve (12) years of age, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully she was told to remove her clothes by accused and to join him
the claim that the respondent and its predecessors–in– and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said Rosario Baluyot in bed. The accused then placed himself between the two (2)
interest, contrary to Cerquena’s testimony, have been and inserted a foreign object into the vaginal canal of said children and accused started fingering Rosario.
Rosario Baluyot which caused her death shortly thereafter, to
in possession and occupation of the subject properties
the damage and prejudice of her relatives. (66)
in the manner required by law. At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched
him to call his attention. He looked, and he saw accused
Having failed to prove that the subject properties form When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario and that he was
part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public the case was set for trial on the merits. trying to penetrate the vagina but it would not fit. After what he
domain and that it and its predecessors–in–interest saw, Ramirez did not anymore bother to look because he was
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and sleepy and fell asleep.
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor presented the
notorious possession and occupation of the same since following witnesses, namely: (1) Jessie Ramirez, (2) Maria
June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondent’s application Burgos y Turla, (3) P/Cpl. Mariano Victoria, (4) Policarpio The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles
for registration should be denied. Baluyot, (5) Dr. Reino Rosete, (6) Sumulong Daniel, (7) Jessica described as an "American, paid Ramirez alias "Egan" P200.00
Herrera, (8) Sister Eva Palencia, (9) Conrado Salonga, (10) Dr. and Rosario P300.00. He then left them in the hotel. After the
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing Devonne Loop, (11) Dr. Leo Cruz, (12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida American left, they went downstairs, and Rosario told Egan that
disquisitions, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Sarmiento, (14) Patricia Prollamanta (15) Mel Santos, (16) the American inserted something in her vagina. But they could
Decision dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Lorna Limos, (17) Eduard Lee Bungarner, (18) Ronaldo not do anything anymore, because the American had already
Appeals in CA–G.R. CV No. 90503, which affirmed the Marquez, (19) Tom Bonte, (20) 2nd Asst. City Fiscal Nini left, and neither did they report the matter to the police.
Decision dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Alcala, (21) lst Asst. City Fiscal Dorentino Z. Floresta, (22) Sometime the following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked
Court of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Corazon Caber, (23) Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe Israel. her whether the object was already removed from her body and
Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie Ramirez claimed that on
Case No. N–11465 is hereby REVERSED and SET
the evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was
ASIDE. The Application for Registration of Remman On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence Exhibits "1"
complaining of pain in her vagina and when Egan asked her,
Enterprises, Inc. in Land Registration Case No. N– to "24" and the testimonies of (1) Heinrich S. Ritter, (2) Father
she said that the foreign object was not yet removed. Then
11465 is DENIED for lack of Roque Villanueva, (3) Angelita Amulong (4) Gaspar Alcantara,
there was another occasion wherein Jessie was summoned
merit.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary (5) Dr. Val Barcinal and (6) Dr. Pedro C. Solis.
and when he came he saw Rosario writhing in pain and when
he tried to talk to Rosario she scolded him with defamatory
The facts of the case upon which the lower court based its remarks. Thereafter, he did not see Rosario anymore because
Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt are summarized in its he already went home to his aunt's house who resided at Barrio
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (6) decision, as follows: Barretto and resumed his studies in the primary grades.

The people's evidence show that on October 10, 1986 about On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, while
G.R. No. 88582             March 5, 1991 midnight, accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought a boy and girl garbage scavenging at Lot 21, near the gate of the U.S. Naval
namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel Base saw Rosario at Magsaysay Drive near the Happy Bake
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, room at MGM Hotel along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. Shop near Lot 21, being ogled by people because Rosario's
vs. These two (2) children were chosen from among a bunch of skirt was bloodied and she was unconscious and foul smelling.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant, street children. Once inside the hotel room accused told them Since nobody helped Rosario, he took pity on her condition and
to take a bath. Jessie Ramirez, alias "Egan", was the first to brought her to the Olongapo City General Hospital in an
take a bath and when he came out Rosario Baluyot went to the unconscious condition, via jeepney. He went to the Information
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. bathroom to do the same. While Rosario Baluyot was inside the desk and he was the one who gave the personal circumstances
Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant. bathroom, accused Ritter took out some pictures depicting of Rosario as to her name, age, her residence as Nagbakulaw,
dressed up young boys, and put them on top of the table. Other Lower Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara signed as "guardian" of
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: things which were taken out and placed on top of a table were Rosario, while Rosario was already in the emergency room.
three (3) other objects which he described as like that of a vicks Although Gaspar Alcantara denied that he did not know the
inhaler. One of these objects the accused played with his name of Rosario Baluyot when he brought her to the hospital,
The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a hands and placed it on his palms. The color of which is grayish this is belied by the testimony of the Information clerk Lorna
young girl of about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped blue which turned out later to be the foreign object which was Limos, who was then on duty. Limos testified that it was
and who later died because of a foreign object left inside her inserted inside the vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other objects Alcantara who supplied the personal circumstances of Rosario.
vaginal canal. were later established to be anti-nasal inhalers against pollution The Court gives more credence to the testimony of Miss Limos
purchased by the accused in Bangkok when he went there as a as against Gaspar Alcantara who became a defense witness,
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with tourist. While Rosario was in the bathroom, accused told for the reason that through his own testimony, Gaspar
homicide under an information which reads: Ramirez to lay down on bed, and so did the accused. He then Alcantara claimed that even prior to May 14, 1987, he had
already known Rosario Baluyot for more than one (1) year, on her was Dr. Rosete himself. He testified that Rosario had to After the case was filed against the herein accused, Atty.
because he has seen the said girl go to the house of his twin be operated even in that condition in order to save her life. Her Edmundo Legaspi with his messenger came to her house and
brother, Melchor Alcantara, who is his immediate neighbor. condition was guarded. This was corroborated by Dr. Leo Cruz, told her that the accused was willing to settle the case, but that
Rosario used to visit a girl by the name of "Nora" who was then the anesthesiologist during Rosario's operation. It was in the accused Ritter had only P15,000.00. The old woman did not
in the custody of his brother. His brother Melchor was also evening of May 19 at about 7:00 p.m. when Dr. Rosete opened accept it because she knows that the accused is liable to pay
living with their mother, brother and sister-in-law and their two her abdomen by making a 5 inch incision on her stomach. He damages anyway. After that, she received a letter from Atty.
(2) children in his house. Rosario as per Gaspar's testimony found out that the fallopian tubes were congested with pus and Legaspi telling her to get a lawyer for her case. By this time,
even stays for one week or a few days at his brother's house so with the peritonieum, and the pelvic cavity, and patches of Mrs. Turla, who wanted to have the case settled once and for
when she visits Nora. So the Court can safely assume that of pus in the liver, although the gallbladder and kidney appeared all giving the reason that she can no longer bear the situation,
all the more than one (1) year that he had regularly seen to have septicemia, poisoning of the blood. The peritonitis and sent her nephew, Conrado Marcelo to Atty. Legaspi. Her
Rosario at his brother's house, he must have already did come septicemia were traced to have been caused through infection nephew obliged and told her that she will be paid at the office of
to know the name of Rosario Baluyot including her age. In his by the foreign object which has been lodged in the intra-vaginal Atty. Legaspi. On a date not clear in the records, she went with
testimony in Court he stated that he even asked Rosario for canal of Rosario. The foreign object which was already agreed her nephew Conrado Marcelo, and Roberto Sundiam, an
movie and softdrinks money which can safely be concluded upon by both parties that it is a portion of a sexual vibrator was assistant barangay tanod of Sta. Rita, and while they were
that he knows her very well. It is against normal behavior extracted from the vagina of Rosario while under anesthesia. there, she saw Ritter arrive at the law office. Ritter and Atty.
especially to a Filipino who have a characteristic of curiosity not Said object was coated with tissues, pus and blood. Dr. Rosete Legaspi talked at the office near the bathroom, and thereafter
to have found out the real name of the girl he claims to know gave it to the assisting surgical nurse for safekeeping and gave Ritter left. After he left, Atty. Legaspi told Rosario's
only as "Tomboy". instructions to release it to the authorized person. This object grandmother that they are willing to settle for P20,000.00, but
was shown by the nurse to Dr. Leo Cruz. Dr. Rosete that Ritter left only P15,000.00, so she received the money with
considered the operation successful and the patient was alive the understanding that there was a balance of P5,000.00 yet.
While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City
when he left her under Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed with said She was made to sign a statement, and she was asked to
General Hospital, nobody was attending to her since she is a
patient in the ward for about 30 minutes and thereafter he left. change the age of her granddaughter Rosario. With the
street child, having stowed away from the custody of her
The following day, Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz document prepared, she and the lawyer's messenger went to
grandmother. Three (3) good samaritans who belong to
who pronounced her death at 2:00 to 2:15 in the afternoon of the Fiscal's office to have it subscribed, and was subscribed
religious and civic organizations, in the persons of Jessica
May 20, 1987. before an assistant city fiscal. But the balance of P5,000.00
Herrera, Fe Israel and Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of their
was not paid, because later on Atty. Legaspi became the OIC
missions in the hospital chanced upon Rosario Baluyot who
of Olongapo City and he could no longer attend to it. Atty.
was all alone with no relatives attending to her and after finding Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the direction
Legaspi, during one of the hearings before the Court even
out that she was only 12 years old decided to help her. After a of Dr. Cruz which was indicated therein that the cause of death
apologized to her.
short interview with Rosario, regarding her name and age only was cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary to septicemia caused
because she clamped up about her residence and her by the foreign object lodged in the intra uteral vaginal canal of
relatives, they decided to help her by providing her the Rosario Baluyot. As to the case, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria, as criminal investigator
medicine she needed during her confinement in readiness for of Station "A", was directed by Col. Daos, Station Commander
an operation. It was Fe Israel who was able to get the name of the Olongapo Police Department to make a follow up of the
The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then placed
and age of Rosario Baluyot from Rosario Baluyot herself when case of Rosario Baluyot. On the other hand, since the suspect
it in a transparent small jar and labelled "Rosario Baluyot".
she saw her for the first time. For Fe Israel, the age of Rosario who inserted the foreign object inside Rosario's vagina was
Jessica Herrera asked the nurse for the foreign object, and it
Baluyot was an important factor because their program said to be an American, the NISRA Subic Naval Base also
was given to her under proper receipt. Herrera then showed the
assisted only indigent patients from infants up to 13 years old. conducted its investigation headed by criminal investigator
same to the persons who helped financially Rosario's case, and
Agent Conrado Salonga. Coordinating with the local police and
afterwards she gave it to Sister Eva Palencia. Sis. Palencia
with Sister Eva Palencia, since Rosario was a street child at
Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General Hospital was in custody of the said object until Mr. Salonga came and
Magsaysay Drive, they rounded up about 43 street children and
was loose bowel movement and vomiting, which was first asked her for the object.
from some of them they learned that Rosario Baluyot was with
suspected as gastro-enteritis, but which came out later as
Jessie Ramirez with an American at the MGM Hotel when the
symptoms of peritonitis due to a massive infection in the
After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion foreign object was inserted in her vagina. After finding Jessie
abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on May 17, 1987, after she
went to Gaspar Alcantara to ask him in locating the relatives of Ramirez, they asked him about Rosario Baluyot. They found
was examined by the physicians at the hospital, it was found
Rosario. They were able to trace Rosario's grandmother, Mrs. out that indeed he was with Rosario Baluyot sometime before
out that there was a foreign object lodged in her vaginal canal
Maria Burgos Turla, and informed her that her granddaughter Christmas of 1986 with an American, who brought them to the
and she had vaginal discharge tinged with blood and foul
was already dead and lying in state at St. Martin Funeral said hotel. Jessie Ramirez was taken inside the U.S. Naval
smelling odor emanating from her body. One of the doctors
Parlor. Mrs. Turla went there with her son, who shouldered all Base, Olongapo City and took his statement. Then he was
who attended to her was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE. Dr.
the burial expenses for Rosario. brought to Mr. Edward Lee Bungarner, a cartographer, and out
Barcinal tried to extract the foreign object by means of a
of the description supplied by Ramirez, a composite drawing
forceps, but several attempts proved futile because said object
was photocopied and copies thereof were distributed to the
was deeply embedded in the vaginal canal and was covered by Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga came local police and to the sentries at the gate of the U.S. Naval
tissues. Her abdomen was enlarged, tender and distended, to her residence at Sta. Rita and asked her if she was Base. Some American servicemen who had resemblance to the
symptoms of peritonitis. The patient was feverish and interested in filing a case against the person who caused the composite drawing were photographed and these were shown
incoherent when she was scheduled for operation on May 19, death of her granddaughter. Of course she agreed. Hence, she to Jessie Ramirez, but the result was negative. Aside from the
1987, after the first attempt for an operation on May 17 was was brought to the Fiscal's (City) Office to file the same. physical description by Ramirez about the appearance of the
aborted allegedly because the consent of Dr. Reino Rosete, the
hospital director was not obtained. The surgeon who operated
suspect, he also described him as having the mannerisms of a When this case was filed, the father's whereabouts was THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
homo-sexual. unknown, and he only appeared when the trial of this case DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT ROSARIO BALUYOT WAS
before the Court was already in progress. And upon his LESS THAN TWELVE (12) YEARS OLD WHEN THE
(Policarpio Baluyot) own admission, he only learned about the ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED AND IN HOLDING
After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals
death of his daughter Rosario Baluyot from the newspaper, THAT THERE WAS RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.
frequented Ermita, Manila, and thinking that the so-called
long after Rosario was already gone.
American may be European or Australian national, the team
composed of Agent Salonga, Mr. Heinsell, P/Cpl. Marino III
Victoria and P/Cpl. Andres Montaon, Jessie Ramirez and The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that there
Michael Johnson, another juvenile, proceeded to Manila. They could be no crime of Rape with Homicide because the suspect
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
first went to the Manila NISRA Office, and thereafter checked in was described as an American while Ritter is an Austrian. Also
DISCRETION IN GIVING CREDENCE TO AND NOT
a hotel. That was on September 23, 1987. On the first night, advanced by the defense is that, it is a case of mistaken
REJECTING THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE AND IN NOT
they went to Luneta Park where foreign homo-sexuals were identity. That Rosario Baluyot was at the time of the
UPHOLDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE AND ACQUITTING
said to be frequenting, but the result was negative. Then on commission of the offense, already more than 13 years old, she
THE ACCUSED.
September 25, at about 11:00 p.m., while they were standing at having been born on December 26, 1973 as per baptismal
the corner of A. Mabini and M.H. del Pilar Street, a male certificate, wherein it appears that Rosario Baluyot was
caucasian who looked like a homo-sexual stopped by baptized on December 25, 1974 and was born on December Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a
admiringly infront of the two (2) juveniles, Ramirez and 26, 1973 as testified to by Fr. Roque Villanueva of St. James judgment of conviction only if the guilt of the accused has been
Johnson. Jessie Ramirez then reported to Mr. Salonga that this Parish Church who issued the Baptismal Certificate, having proved beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exert the
foreigner had a similarity with the American suspect, so the two custody and possession of the book of baptism for the year most painstaking effort to examine the records in the light of the
minors were instructed to follow the foreigner and to strike a 1975, but admitted that he had no personal knowledge about arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial conscience
conversation. They did, and when they returned, Jessie the matters or entries entered therein. Likewise, the defense's that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act
Ramirez told them that indeed the said foreigner was the one stand is that the accused cannot be liable for Homicide (See People v. Villapaña, 161 SCRA 73 [1988]).
who brought him and Rosario Baluyot to the MGM Hotel. because a vibrator is not a weapon of death but it is a thing for
Bobby Salonga told Ramirez that this foreigner had no beard the purpose of giving sexual pleasure, and that the death of
The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of
while the one previously described by Ramirez had a beard. Rosario Baluyot was due to the incompetence of Dr. Rosete,
rape with homicide of a young girl who died after the rape
Jessie Ramirez told them that maybe he have just shaved it off. the surgeon and Director of the Olongapo City General
because of a foreign object, believed to be a sexual vibrator,
The said caucasian then entered a bar, and after several Hospital, who operated on her. (Rollo, pp. 109-116)
left inside her vagina.
minutes he came out, and Jessie Ramirez upon his signal with
his thumbs up, as a signal to confirm that the said foreigner is
On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision. The
the suspect, arrested Ritter and brought him to the Manila As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
Western Police District. It could be mentioned at this stage that age of the victim—whether or not Rosario Baluyot was less
in this operation they were accompanied by two (2) policemen than twelve (12) years old at the time the alleged incident
from the Western Police District. The foreigner was hand cuffed WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court happened on October 10, 1986. The age is important in
and was told that he was a suspect for Rape with Homicide. holds, that the prosecution has established the GUILT of the determining whether or not there was statutory rape, Article 335
After the arrest, they first went to the pension house of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape with of the Revised Penal Code defines the third type of rape as
suspect in Ermita, Manila to get his shoulder bag which Homicide as defined and penalized in Art. 335 No. 3 of the having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age, in
contained his personal belongings, and from there they brought Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences HEINRICH which case force, intimidation, deprivation of reason or
him to the Western Police Department. At the said police STEFAN RITTER to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to unconscious state do not have to be present.
headquarters, they were allowed a permissive search by the indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of SIXTY
foreigner of his clutch bag and his small shoulder bag and THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00) Philippine Currency, and
confiscated his passport, I.D., 3 inhalers, money in the form of The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when
TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) by way of attorney's
dollars and travellers checks amounting about $1,500.00 and she was sexually abused by the accused and, therefore, rape
fees to the private prosecutors and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p.
about P100.00, all duly receipted for. From the passport they was committed inspite of the absence of force or intimidation.
126)
learned that the suspect's name was Heinrich Stefan Ritter, an
Austrian national. During the questioning of Hitter, Salonga and In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on the
The accused now comes to this Court on the following
his team already left the headquarters and went to their hotel, testimonies of the victim's grandmother and father who testified
assigned errors allegedly committed by the court:
because at this time Jessie Ramirez was already shaking with that she was born on December 22, 1975. These oral
fear after he identified the accused. declarations were admitted pursuant to then Rule 130, Section
I 33 of the Rules of Court where, in the absence of a birth
The following day, they brought the accused to Olongapo and certificate, the act or declaration about pedigree may be
was detained at the Olongapo City Jail. The case for Rape with received in evidence on any notable fact in the life of a member
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
Homicide was filed against him at the City Fiscal of Olongapo. of the family. Since birth is a matter of pedigree within the rule
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSE
At the preliminary investigation, accused was assisted by his which permits the admission of hearsay evidence, oral
WAS COMMITTED ON OCTOBER 10, 1986 AND THAT IT
own counsel. The private complainant was Maria Burgos Turla declarations are therefore admissible as proof of birth
WAS ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO COMMITTED IT.
because it was she who had custody of Rosario Baluyot after (Decision, p. 54).
her mother Anita Burgos died on January 12, 1982, and their
father Policarpio Baluyot had left them under her custody. II
The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she (5) That the relationship between the declarant and the person on the clinical records. It is even less reliable as a record of
remembered Rosario's birth date because her brother died in whose pedigree is in question must as a general rule be shown birth.
Pampanga and her daughter, Anita (Rosario's mother) was the by evidence other than such act or declaration.
only one who failed to attend the funeral because the latter has
All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that
just given birth allegedly to Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8, Jan. 13, 1988).
These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence for the Rosario Baluyot was less than 12 years old at the time of the
prosecution nor do the declarations fall within the purview of alleged incident are not adequate to establish the exact date of
The father likewise testified that as far as he could remember, the rule. birth, much less offset a documentary record showing a
Rosario was born on December 22, 1975 (T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27, different date.
1988) and he was certain that Rosario was more than one (1)
The victim's grandmother and father whose declarations
year old when she was baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988).
regarding Rosario's age were admitted by the trial court are The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's baptismal certificate
both alive, in the Philippines and able to testify as they both did which the trial court rejected as being hearsay and of no value.
The trial court further added that their testimony is supported by testify in court. Their declarations were made at the trial which As against the oral declarations made by interested witnesses
the clinical record and the death certificate indicating that she is certainly not before the controversy arose. The other establishing Rosario's age to be less than 12 years old, the
was 12 years old when she was admitted at the Olongapo City witnesses who testified on Rosario's age are not members of evidence on record is more convincing and worthy of belief.
General Hospital for treatment. The age was supplied by the victim's family. The testimonies of Rosario's relatives must (See Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664,
Rosario's alleged guardian, Gaspar Alcantara to the hospital's be weighed according to their own personal knowledge of what 673 [1990]).
clinical record clerk, Lorna Limos. Fe Israel, a social worker happened and not as hearsay evidence on matters of family
who interviewed Rosario Baluyot also testified that she was told history.
By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum,
by Rosario that she was 12 years old. The trial court accepted
issued by the lower court to the St. James Parish Church,
this as adequate evidence of the truth. Moreover, Jessie
At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosario's age of Subic, Zambales, Fr. Roque Villanueva a Roman Catholic
Ramirez, the principal witness in this case declared that he was
doubtful value. priest testified and stated that he is the head of said parish. He
born on September 5, 1973 and that he was older than Rosario
brought with him Baptismal Register No. 9 entitled "Liber
Baluyot. Therefore, since he was 13 years old in 1986, Rosario
Baptisnorum", a latin term for baptismal book or record. On
must have been less than 12 yeas old in 1986. (Decision, p. The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother's
page 151, No. 3 of the said Registry Book, there appears the
55) testimony pursuant to the ruling laid down in U.S. v.
name of Rosario Baluyot who was baptized on December 25,
Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118 [1903]) where the Court accepted the
1974, and born on December 26, 1973. Parents are Policarpio
testimony of the mother that her daughter was 14 years old and
The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the Baluyot and Anita Burgos, residents of Subic, Zambales. Edita
4 months old. The mother stated that she knew the age
grandmother and father supported by other independent R. Milan appears as the only sponsor with Olongapo City as
because the child was born about the time of the cholera
evidence such as the clinical record, death certificate and the her address.
epidemic of 1889. This was not hearsay, but came from one
testimonies of Fe Israel and Jessie Ramirez, rendered the
who had direct knowledge of the child's birth.
baptismal certificate presented by the defense without any
In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of appeals (100 SCRA
probative or evidentiary value. (Decision, p. 55)
73 [1980]), we held that:
It is however, equally true that human memory on dates or
days is frail and unless the day is an extraordinary or unusual
The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario Baluyot's
one for the witness, there is no reasonable assurance of its x x x           x x x          x x x
age cannot stand the application of evidentiary rules.
correctness. (People v. Dasig 93 Phil. 618, 632 [1953])
In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its
The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section 40
With respect to the grandmother's testimony, the date of the pronouncements on the value of baptismal certificates. It thus
of Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules of Court).
brother's death or funeral was never established, which ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be
indicates that the day was rather insignificant to be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove
For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the remembered. The father's declaration is likewise not entirely the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
requisites are: reliable. His testimony in court does not at all show that he had specified—but not the veracity of the status or declarations
direct knowledge of his daughter's birth. He was certain though made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa
that she was more than one (1) year old at the time she was v. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus
(1) That the declarant must be dead or outside of the
baptized. v. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held
Philippines or unable to testify;
that a baptismal certificate is conclusive proof only of the
baptism administered, in conformity with the rites of the
The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on the
(2) That pedigree is in issue; Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does
victim's age, nor was there any basis shown to establish their
not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements
competence for the purpose. The clinical records were based
contained in the certificate that concern the relationship of the
(3) That the person whose pedigree is in question must be on Gaspar Alcantara's incompetent information given when he
person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order
related to the declarant by birth or marriage; brought the victim to the hospital. Alcantara came to know her
that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown
only about a year before her death. He had absolutely no
by proof recognized by law. (At pp. 84-85)
knowledge about the circumstances of Rosario's birth. The
(4) That the declaration must be made before the controversy death certificate relied upon by the trial court was merely based
occurred or ante litem motam; and
In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book may be We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay may
considered as entries made in the course of business under facts. On the contrary, the evidence shows that Rosario habang dalawang pulgada. Iyong takip ay bilog na patulis at
Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay submitted herself to the sexual advances of the appellant. In may tabang mga kalahating pulgada. Hindi ko napansin ang
rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its fact, she appears to have consented to the act as she was paid hugis ng dulo ng bagay na may takip dahil natatakpan ng
transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and P300.00 the next morning while her companion, Jessie kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.
recorded in a book of the church during the course of its Ramirez was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988).
business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28 Phil. 105 [1914] Hence, the The environmental circumstances coupled with the testimonies
T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong mabuti
certificate (Exhibit "22") presented by the defense that Rosario and evidence presented in court clearly give the impression
ang larawang ito at sabihin mo nga sa akin kung makikilala mo
Baluyot was baptized on December 25, 1974 may be admitted that Rosario Baluyot, a poor street child, was a prostitute
ang mga bagay na nasa larawang ito, na may kinalaman sa
in evidence as proof of baptism. Policarpio Baluyot, the victim's inspite of her tender age. Circumstances in life may have
nakita mong kinuha ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag?
father testified that he had in his possession a baptismal forced her to submit to sex at such a young age but the
certificate different from the one presented in court. However, circumstances do not come under the purview of force or
no other baptismal record was ever presented to prove a date intimidation needed to convict for rape. S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan ay
different from that brought by the official custodian. Since the katulad na katulad noong takip ng bagay na inilabas ng
baptismal certificate states that Rosario was baptized on Amerikano sa kanyang bag. Kaya lang ay bakit naging kulay
In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to
December 25, 1974, it is therefore highly improbable that asul gayong ng makita ko ito ay kulay puti? (Exhibit "A", p. 2;
refute, no rape was committed. But was Ritter guilty of
Rosario could have been born on December 22, 1975. She Emphasis Supplied)
homicide?
could not have been baptized before she was born. Exhibit "22"
may be proof only of baptism but it puts a lie to the declaration
Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks
that Rosario was born in 1975. With the father's assertion that The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death of the
inhaler which the appellant does not deny having possessed at
Rosario was more than one (1) year old when she was victim was a consequence of the insertion of the foreign object
that time. He was certain that the object was white. (T.S.N. p.
baptized, we are then more inclined to agree that Rosario was into the victim's vagina by the appellant.
91, January 6, 1988)
born in 1973 as stated in the Baptismal Registry.
We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for the sexual
Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said that it
In the case of People v. Rebancos (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the vibrator left inside Rosario's vagina which led to her death?
was grayish in color with color blue (Medyo kulay abo na may
Court stated:
kulay na parang blue). (T.S.N. p. 92, January 6, 1988) The
The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial inconsistency of the witness' testimony casts doubt as to the
x x x           x x x          x x x evidence. Unfortunately, the circumstances are capable of veracity of the statements made especially when he answered
varying interpretations and are not enough to justify conviction. on additional cross-examination that the reason why he
concluded that Exhibit "C-2" was the same object being held by
. . . Although no birth certificate was presented because her
Ritter was because it was the only one shown to him by the
birth had allegedly not been registered, her baptismal Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see the
prosecution (T.S.N. pp. 109-110, January 6, 1988). Jessie
certificate, coupled by her mother's testimony, was sufficient to object inserted in Rosario's vagina. Neither could he identify the
Ramirez was not all certain about the sexual vibrator because
establish that Mary Rose was below twelve years old when she object (Exhibit "C-2") taken from Rosario as the same object
he did not actually see it in the possession of the appellant.
was violated by Rebancos. (At. p. 426) which the appellant was holding at that time of the alleged
incident.
What he merely remembers is the revelation made by Rosario
Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the
the next morning that the foreigner inserted something inside
date on a more reliable document as to Rosario's birth which In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on
her vagina. The trial court admitted such statement as part of
could serve as sufficient proof that she was born on December September 4, 1987, he answered that:
the res gestae. In a strained effort to accept such statement as
26, 1973. Therefore, she was more than 12 years old at the
part of res gestae, the trial court focused the test of
time of the alleged incident on October 10, 1986.
x x x           x x x          x x x admissibility on the lapse of time between the event and the
utterance. For the average 13 years old, the insertion of a
Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove mechanical device or anything for that matter into the vagina of
T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel, mayroon ka
Rosario's age. The burden of proof lies on the prosecution to a young girl is undoubtedly startling. For Rosario and Jessie,
bang napansin na inilabas ng kano sa kanyang daladalahan
prove that Rosario was less than 12 years old at the time of the however, there must be more evidence to show that the
kung mayroon man?
alleged incident in a charge of statutory rape. The prosecution statement, given after a night's sleep had intervened, was given
failed in this respect. instinctively because the event was so startling Res
S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na kulay gestae does not apply. (Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
itim, at napansin ko na may inilabas siya sa kanyang bag na
Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12
parang vicks inhaler, na kanyang inamoy-amoy habang nasa
years of age at the time of the alleged sexual violation, it was Even if it were established that the appellant did insert
otel kami at pagkatapos niya ay inilapag niya sa lamiseta.
necessary to prove that the usual elements of rape were something inside Rosario's vagina, the evidence is still not
present; i.e. that there was force of intimidation or that she was adequate to impute the death of Rosario to the appellant's
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious in accordance T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong inilabas alleged act.
with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. ng Amerikano?
Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove the Consultant of the PGH Medical Center, Makati Medical Center, A In the example given to me, considering that one of the ends
object inserted in her vagina. We quote: UERM Medical Center, MCU Medical Center. He has been with is exposed, in a way that vaginal secretion has more chance to
the NBI for 43 years. He has attended no less than 13 get in, well, liberation of this irritant chemicals would be
conferences abroad. He is the author of the textbooks entitled enhanced and therefore in a shorter period of time, there being
Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later on
"Legal Medicine" and "Medical Jurisprudence".) With his this vaginal reaction.
Rosario even categorically admitted to you that she was
impressive legal and medical background, his testimony is too
already able to remove the object allegedly inserted inside her
authoritative to ignore. We quote the pertinent portions of his
vagina, is that correct? Q How many days or weeks would you say would that follow
testimony:
after the insertion?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object marked
A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of any
as Exh. "C-2" which object was described as a part of a sexual
foreign body in the vaginal canal usually developed within, a
x x x           x x x          x x x vibrator battery operated. Now, given this kind of object, would
period of two (2) weeks . . .
you kindly tell us what would be the probable effect upon a 12
years old girl when it is inserted into her vagina?
ATTY. CARAAN:
x x x           x x x          x x x
A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body placed
Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact words into a human being and as such be considered a foreign object. Q . . . [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped, and a
used by Rosario Baluyot later on when you met her when you As a foreign object, the tendency of the body may be: No. 1— sexual vibrator was inserted in her vagina on October 10, 1986
asked her and when she told you that she was already able to expel the foreign body—No. 2.—The tendency of the body is to and she was operated on, on May 19, 1987 the following year,
remove that object from her vagina? react to that foreign body. One of the reactions that maybe so it took more than 7 months before this was extracted, would
manifested by the person wherein such foreign body is you say that it will take that long before any adverse infection
A "Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, "she told me that. I asked her, concerned is to cover the foreign body with human tissue, in a could set in inside the vagina?
"Was it already removed?" And she answered, "Yes, it was way to avoid its further injury to the body.
removed." But the same night, she again complained of pain of
A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a shorter
her stomach. She sent one of her friends to call for me. And as Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing certain time. (TSN., Oct. 19,1988, p. 18)
a matter of fact, Tomboy was uttering defamatory words manifest symptoms and changes in the area where the foreign
against me as she was groaning in pain. (TSN, Jan. 6,1988, body is located.
pp. 72-73) x x x           x x x          x x x

In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not only be

This encounter happened on the night of the day following the Q When you said shorter, how long would that be, Doctor?
localized but may be felt all over the body, we call it systemic
day after both children were invited by the foreigner to the reaction. Now, considering the fact that this foreign body as
hotel. (T.S.N. p. 73, January 6, 1988). Rosario was said to be shown to me is already not complete, this shows exposure of A As I said, in my personal experience, hair pins, cottonballs
groaning in pain so we can just imagine the distress she was its different parts for the body to react. If there is mechanism to and even this lipstick of women usually, there are only about
undergoing at this point in time. If the device inserted by the cause the foreign body to vibrate, there must be some sort of two (2) weeks time that the patient suffer some abnormal
appellant caused the pain, it is highly inconceivable how she power from within and that power must be a dry cell battery. symptoms.
was able to endure the pain and discomfort until May, 1987, [The] composition of the battery are, manganese dioxide
seven (7) months after the alleged incident. Evidence must not ammonium, salts, water and any substance that will cause
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must Q Now, considering that this is a bigger object to the object that
current flow. All of these substances are irritants including
be credible in itself such as the common experience and you mentioned, this object has a shorter time?
areas of the container and as such, the primary reaction of the
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the body is to cause irritation on the tissues, thereby inflammatory
circumstances. (People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]). changes develop and in all likelihood, aside from those A Yes, Sir shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19. 1988, p. 20)
inflammatory changes would be a supervening infection in a
At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis' testimony rather way that the whole generative organ of the woman will suffer
from diseased process causing her the systemic reaction like The trial court, however, ruled that "there is no hard and fast
significant. Dr. Pedro Solis, a witness for the defense is
fever, swelling of the area, and other systemic symptoms. . . . . rule as to the time frame wherein infection sets in upon
considered an expert witness. (A Doctor of Medicine and a
(TSN., pp. 13-15, October 19,1988) insertion of a foreign body in the vagina canal. For Dr. Solis, the
graduate of the State University in 1940, a degree of Bachelor
time frame is not more than 10 months, and this case is still
of Laws and member of the Bar 1949, and a graduate of the
within the said time frame."
Institute of Criminology University. He was awarded Post x x x           x x x          x x x
Graduate Diploma in Criminology in 1963, and also a graduate
of United Nations Asia and Far East Asia Institute on the A more generous time interval may be allowed in non-criminal
Prevention of Crimes in Tokyo Japan 1965. He was appointed Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor before cases. But where an accused is facing a penalty of reclusion
Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation in any reaction such as an infection would set in, how many days perpetua, the evidence against him cannot be based on
1940 until 1944. He became Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970 after the insertion of this object in the vagina of a 12 year old probabilities which are less likely than those probabilities which
and became the Deputy Director of the NBI up to 1984. He is at girl? favor him.
present a Professorial Lecturer on Legal Medicine at the UP,
FEU, UE, and Fatima College of Medicine; a Medico Legal
It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon the kind Q And how many times did you examine this patient Rosario Q And what did she tell you, if any?
of foreign body lodged inside the body. An examination of the Baluyot on that day?
object gave the following results:
A She said in her own words that "GINAMIT AKO NG NEGRO
A I examined her twice on that day. AT SIYA ANG NAGLAGAY NITO."
(1) Color: Blue
Size: (a) Circumference—3.031
Q The first time that you examined her, what is the result of Q Did she also tell you when, this Negro who used her and who
inches (b) Length—approximately
your findings, if any? inserted and placed the foreign object on her vagina?
2.179 inches.
Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic. A My first examination, I examined the patient inside the A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said he used me three (3)
delivery room. The patient was brought to the delivery room months ago from the time I examined her.
wheel-chaired then from the wheel chair, the patient was
(2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means of a
ambigatory (sic). She was able to walk from the door to the
battery as per certification dated 01 June 1988, signed by Mr. Q Now, you said that you referred the patient to the ward, what
examining table. On examination, the patient is conscious, she
Rodolfo D. Mercuric, Shipboard Electrical Systems Mechanics, happened next with your patient?
was fairly nourished, fairly developed, she had fever, she was
Foreman II, SRF Shop 51, Subic (see attached certification).
uncooperative at that time and examination deals more on the
abdomen which shows slightly distended abdomen with muscle A To my knowledge, the patient is already scheduled on
(3) No comparative examination was made on specimen #1 guarding with tenderness all over, with maximum tenderness operation on that date.
and vibrator depicted in the catalog because no actual physical over the hypogastric area. (T.S.N. p. 5, September 28, 1988)
dimensions and/or mechanical characteristics were shown in
Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?
the catalog. (Exhibit "LL")
x x x           x x x          x x x
A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the patient would undergo
The vibrator end was further subjected to a macro-
Q What about your second examination to the patient, what surgery after that?
photographic examination on the open end portion which
was your findings, if any?
revealed the following:
(TSN, Sept. 28,1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied)
A In my second examination, I repeated the internal
Result of Examination
examination wherein I placed my index finger and middle finger
The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals testimony considering
inside the vagina of the patient and was able to palpate a hard
Rosario's condition at that time. It ruled that it is inconceivable
Macro-photographic examination on the open end portion of object. After which, I made a speculum examination wherein I
that she would be striking a normal conversation with the
specimen #1 shows the following inscription: was able to visualize the inner portion of the vaginal canal,
doctors and would be sitting on the examination table since
there I saw purulent foul smelling, blood tints, discharge in the
Gaspar Alcantara stated that when he brought Rosario Baluyot
vaginal canal and a foreign body invaded on the posterior part
MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT (Exhibit "MM") to the hospital, she was unconscious and writhing in pain.
of the vaginal canal.

From the above results, the subject object is certainly not It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be conscious
x x x           x x x          x x x
considered as inert and based on Dr. Solis' testimony, it is and ambulant at that time because there were several
more likely that infection should set in much earlier. instances testified to by different witnesses that she was still
Considering also that the object was inserted inside the vagina A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez about my findings and he able to talk prior to her operation:
which is part of the generative organ of a woman, an organ asked me to try to remove the said foreign object by the use of
which is lined with a very thin layer of membrane with plenty of forceps which I tried to do so also but I failed to extract the
(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member of the
blood supply, this part of the body is more susceptible to same.
Olongapo Catholic Charismatic Renewal Movement testified
infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October 19, 1988)
that as a member of this group she visits indigent children in
Q All this time that you were examining the patient Rosario the hospital every Saturday and after office hours on working
The truth of Dr. Solis' testimony is more probable under the Baluyot both in the first and second instance, Rosario Baluyot days.
circumstances of the case. We see no reason why his opinions was conscious and were you able to talk to her when you were
qualified by training and experience should not be controlling examining her?
On the Saturday prior to Rosario's death which was May 17,
and binding upon the Court in the determination of guilt beyond
she was still able to talk to Rosario Baluyot. In fact, one of her
reasonable doubt. (People v. Tolentino, 166 SCRA 469 [1988]).
A Yes, sir. groupmates helped Rosario go to the comfort room to urinate.
(T.S.N., pp. 16-19, May 25, 1988)
Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified that
Q And did you ask her why there is a foreign object lodge
he examined Rosario Baluyot on May 17, 1986 as a referral
inside her vagina? (2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is another para
patient from the Department of Surgery to give an OB-GYN
social worker who worked at Pope John 23rd Community
clearance to the patient prior to operation. (T.S.N. p. 6,
Center under Sister Eva Palencia. In one of her hospital visits,
September 28, 1988) A Yes, Sir I asked her.
she encountered Rosario Baluyot in the month of May, 1987.
She actually saw a child who happened to be Rosario Baluyot "The People of the Philippines" arrayed against him. In a for its street children. It would have meant a lot to social
seated on the cement floor and when she asked why she was manner of speaking, he goes to bat with all the bases loaded. workers and prosecutors alike if one pedophile-killer could be
seated there, she was told that it was too hot in the bed. She The odds are heavily against him. It is important, therefore, to brought to justice so that his example would arouse public
saw Rosario Baluyot for about 2 or 3 days successively. equalize the positions of the prosecution and the defense by concern, sufficient for the formulation and implementation of
(T.S.N. pp. 10-13, September 7, 1988) presuming the innocence of the accused until the state is able meaningful remedies. However, we cannot convict on anything
to refute the presumption by proof of guilt beyond reasonable less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of
doubt. (At. p. 592) the Bill of Rights and our criminal justice system are as much, if
(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to the
not more so, for the perverts and outcasts of society as they
hospital actually testified that she was conscious (T.S.N. p. 36,
are for normal, decent, and law-abiding people.
September 14, 1988) but writhing in pain. He took pity on her The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as
so he brought her to the hospital (T.S.N. p. 12, September 14, against the number of witnesses and preponderance of
1988) evidence presented by the prosecution but there is no direct The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced
and convincing proof that the accused was responsible for the mind moral certainty or conviction that the accused did commit
vibrator left inside the victim's vagina which caused her death the offense has not been satisfied.
From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still
seven (7) months after its insertion. What the prosecution
conscious and could still answer questions asked of her
managed to establish were mere circumstances which were not
although she was complaining of stomach pains. Unfortunately, By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors arousing
sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of
the medical attention given to her failed to halt the aggravation reasonable doubt:
innocence. While circumstantial evidence may suffice to
of her condition. The operation on May 19 was too late.
support a conviction it is imperative, though, that the following
requisites should concur: 1. The evidence on Rosario Baluyot's baptism creates
Rosario died because of septicemia, which in layman's reasonable doubt about her being less than 12 years old when
language is blood poisoning, and peritonitis, which is massive the carnal knowledge took place. If the evidence for the
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
infection, in the abdominal cavity caused by the foreign object prosecution is to be believed, she was not yet born on the date
or the cut sexual vibrator lodged in the vagina of the victim. she was baptized.
This led to the infection from the uterus to the fallopian tubes (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and into the peritoneum and the abdominal cavity. and
2. Since the proof of Rosario's being under 12 years of age is
not satisfactory, the prosecution has to prove force,
The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale of (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to intimidation, or deprivation of reason in order to convict for
Article 4 of the RPC produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (Rule 133, rape. There is no such proof. In fact, the evidence shows a
Sec. 4 Revised Rules of Court) willingness to submit to the sexual act for monetary
considerations.
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused. For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before
conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the 3. The only witness to the fact of Ritter's placing a vibrator
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain inside the vagina of Rosario was Jessie Ramirez. This witness
But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to did not see Ritter insert the vibrator. The morning after the
rule as stated in the case of Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate
the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of insertion, he was only told by Rosario about it. Two days later,
Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:
the crime (People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942]; Emphasis he allegedly met Rosario who informed him that she was able
supplied). It must fairly exclude every reasonable hypothesis of to remove the object. And yet, Ramirez testified that on the
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420, 433 night of that second encounter, he saw Rosario groaning
natural and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon [1987]). In this case the circumstantial evidence presented by because of pain in her stomach. She was even hurling
him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal the prosecution does not conclusively point to the liability of the invectives. Ramirez' testimony is not only hearsay, it is also
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death appellant for the crime charged. (People v. Tolentino, supra) contradictory.
must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.
(Emphasis supplied)
We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of 4. It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for
Rosario Baluyot and how her death exemplified starkly the daily a foreign object with active properties to cause pain, discomfort,
In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]), we terrors that most street children encounter as they sell their and serious infection only after seven months inside a young
explained that: bodies in order to survive. At an age when innocence and girl's vaginal canal. Infection would have set in much earlier.
youthful joys should preponderate in their lives, they Jessie Ramirez recalled that the incident happened in
experience life in its most heartless and inhuman form. Instead December of 1986. (TSN., January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The
x x x           x x x          x x x of nothing more than gentle disappointments occupying their evidence, however shows that the appellant was not here in the
young minds, they daily cope with tragedies that even adults Philippines that December. As per the Commission on
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that should never be made to carry. Immigration Arrival and Departure Report, Heinrich Ritter
accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The accused is arrived in the Philippines on October 7, 1986 and left on
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the October 12, 1986. He never returned until September 23, 1987
It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly set
prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if the (Exhibits "DD" and "EE") The incident could have happened
back the efforts of Government to dramatize the death of
defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no defense at all. only in October, but then it would have been highly improbable
Rosario Baluyot as a means of galvanizing the nation to care
The defendant faces the full panoply of state authority with all
for the sexual vibrator to stay inside the vagina for seven (7) In the instant case, since there are circumstances which . . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution
months with the kind of serious complications it creates. prevent our being morally certain of the guilt of the appellant, must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a
he is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal. preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for
damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal
5. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it
hospital confinement testified that she told him "Ginamit ako ng This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of the
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability
Negro at siya ang naglagay nito." The accused is not a black. appellant on the children, Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot
might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129
in October, 1986 at the MGM Hotel. Inspite of his flat denials,
SCRA 559).
we are convinced that he comes to this country not to look at
Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about
historical sights, enrich his intellect or indulge in legitimate
Rosario's activities after the hotel incident. Considering Dr.
pleasures but in order to satisfy the urgings of a sick mind. The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code,
Barcinal's testimony indicating that she was "used" by a
which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground
"Negro" three (3) months prior to admission in the hospital and
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
Rosario's unfortunate profession, there is always the possibility With the positive Identification and testimony by Jessie
does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same
that she could have allowed herself to be violated by this Ramirez that it was the appellant who picked him and Rosario
act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission
perverse kind of sexual behavior where a vibrator or vibrators from among the children and invited them to the hotel; and that
as follows:
were inserted into her vagina between October, 1986 and May, in the hotel he was shown pictures of young boys like him and
1987. the two masturbated each other, such actuations clearly show
that the appellant is a pedophile. When apprehended in Ermita, The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
he was sizing up young children. Dr. Solis defined pedophilia in also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident
his book entitled Legal Medicine, 1987 edition, as follows: flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
in reporting the alleged crime renders the evidence for the
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
prosecution insufficient to establish appellant's guilty
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court
connection with the requisite moral certainty. (See People v. Pedophilia—A form of sexual perversion wherein a person has
as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
Mula Cruz, 129 SCRA 156 [1984]). the compulsive desire to have sexual intercourse with a child of
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal
either sex. Children of various ages participate in sexual
offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
activities, like fellatio, cunnilingus, fondling with sex organs, or
The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that demanded.
anal sexual intercourse. Usually committed by a homosexual
the appellant could have inserted a foreign object inside
between a man and a boy the latter being a passive partner.
Rosario's vagina. This object may have caused her death. It is
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to
possible that the appellant could be the guilty person. However,
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning
the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon mere Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not
fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal
possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and pedophilia, assuming this is a crime by itself. Pedophilia is
liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical
therefore should not be taken against the accused. (People v. clearly a behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the
result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and
Tolentino, supra) declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical,
distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the
moral, spiritual and social well-being of our youth. (Article II,
other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of
Section 13, 1987 Constitution) (Harvey v. Defensor Santiago,
Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable the offender while the other is for the reparation of damages
162 SCRA 840, 848 [1989]). Pedophiles, especially thrill
to the accused should be duly taken into account. This rule suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so
seeking aliens have no place in our country.
applies even to hardened criminals or those whose bizarre different from each other that article 1813 of the present
behaviour violates the mores of civilized society. The evidence (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise
against the accused must survive the test of reason. The In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action
strongest suspicion must not be allowed to sway judgment. appellant committed acts injurious not only to Rosario Baluyot for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be
(See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]). As but also to the public good and domestic tranquility of the extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the
stated in the case of People v. Ng (142 SCRA 615 [1986]): people. The state has expressly committed itself to defend the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should
right of children to assistance and special protection from all be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense
. . . [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized
conditions prejudicial to their development. (Art. XV, Section 3 also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or
the rule that reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be
[2] . . . (Harvey v. Santiago, supra). The appellant has abused violation of every private right to be proved only by a
resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof
Filipino children, enticing them with money. The appellant preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved
beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. It has
should be expelled from the country. person any less private because the wrongful act is also
been defined as meaning such proof "to the satisfaction of the punishable by the criminal law?
court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as
precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is
given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption
probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is of the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in
likely to be true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of that a person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice—a
the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty—a certainty that liable. We reiterate what has been stated in Urbano v. IAC, cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable
convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those supra. persons injured or wronged.
who are to act upon it. (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary,
1972 Edition, p. 379, citing U.S. v. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). . . .
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her appellant and to immediately expel him thereafter with another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right
grandmother's house.1âwphi1 Circumstances forced her to prejudice to re-entry into the country. of redemption claimed by her brother. 6
succumb and enter this unfortunate profession. Nonetheless,
she has left behind heirs who have certainly suffered mental
The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground
anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and
that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within
incredulous death as reflected in the records of the case.
thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge
with homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is
of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the
innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners, law. 7
of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an
vs.
airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA
of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there is the In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot
PADUA, respondents.
likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left be plausibly denied. The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua,
inside Rosario's vaginal canal and that the vibrator may have lived on the same lot, which consisted of only 604 square
caused her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities or Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners. meters, including the portions sold to the
possibilities but civil liability does not require proof beyond petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was
reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of staying in the same house with her sister Tecla, who later
indemnity on the facts found in the records of this case. Luis R. Reyes for private respondent. claimed redemption petition. 9 Moreover, the petitioners and the
private respondents were close friends and neighbors whose
children went to school together. 10
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good
customs, public order or public policy (see Article 21 Civil
Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino CRUZ, J.: It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of
children, enticing them with money. We can not overstress the the sales and that they thought, as they alleged, that the area
responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in the Philippines, occupied by the petitioners had merely been mortgaged by
including the appellant towards young children. The sexual The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it
exploitation committed by the appellant should not and can not curious conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of was impossible for Tecla not to know that the area occupied by
be condoned. Thus, considering the circumstances of the case, justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we the petitioners had been purchased by them from the other. co-
we are awarding damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do heirs. Especially significant was the erection thereon of the
amount of P30,000.00. not equivocate. The answer is that we do neither because we permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son,
are a court both of law and of justice. We apply the which was done without objection on her part or of any of the
law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the other co-heirs.
And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which scheme of our Republic. This case is an illustration.
will adequately protect street children from exploitation by
pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct
guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies. The Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares interpretation and application of the pertinent law as invoked,
provisions on statutory rape and other related offenses were a parcel of land registered in 'the name of their deceased interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the private
never intended for the relatively recent influx of pedophiles parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as
taking advantage of rampant poverty among the forgotten Tarlac. 1 follows:
segments of our society. Newspaper and magazine articles,
media exposes, college dissertations, and other studies deal at On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
length with this serious social problem but pedophiles like the his undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
appellant will continue to enter the Philippines and foreign P550.00 by way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22, subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
publications catering to them will continue to advertise the 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of
availability of Filipino street children unless the Government same vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale
acts and acts soon. We have to acquit the appellant because Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00. 3 by the vendor.
the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. We, however, express
the Court's concern about the problem of street children and
the evils committed against them. Something must be done By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that
about it. the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said the notice required by the said article was written notice and
lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing the
subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with same case of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals 11 applied by
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a the trial court, the respondent court held that that decision,
SET ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.4 interpreting a like rule in Article 1623, stressed the need for
ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is
written notice although no particular form was required.
ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and
exemplary damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs,
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation is hereby sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was
directed to institute proper deportation proceedings against the complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an the ponente of the Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of
American citizen .5 On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua,
the deed of sale of the property subject to redemption would functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By
satisfy the requirement for written notice. "So long, therefore, their language. What we do instead is find a balance between requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our
as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is informed in writing of the the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of
sale and the particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days is obeyed. ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose.
for redemption start running. " The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the
redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed,
In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to
although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964,
through the same learned jurist, emphasized that the written the literal command without regard to its cause and
and that such notice was sufficient.
notice should be given by the vendor and not the vendees, consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to
conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623, the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes
reading as follows: again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
them." 13 While we admittedly may not legislate, we
nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not While we do not here declare that this period started from the
as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not
be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime
read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless
by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for
have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In
be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed
doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit
Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running
that vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.
he has given written notice thereof to all possible and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time
redemptioners. during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other
construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the
spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter but redemption had already been extinguished because the period
adjoining owners.
although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is for its exercise had already expired.
within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter;
and that notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within
notice given by the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. 14 While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in
the running of the 30-day period. the assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should
have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the
if the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry,
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the
and the means of ascertaining the truth were readily available
Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of
upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be
petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really
chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the
was really no written notice given by the vendors to their co- necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is
facts. 15
heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays,
only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
30 day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why
expired in 1977. the spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should
The instant case presents no such problem because the right
enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house
of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales
of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla
temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly
results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen
looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first years after the second sale. The delay invoked by the
situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming of course
inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It
in tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period
took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim the
be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is of redemption.
right of redemption, but then it was already too late.
never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that
intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the
legislature, is to render justice. We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are
notice to be written, would such notice be necessary in this
deviating from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent
case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not in
court understandably applied pursuant to existing
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in writing. would there be any question that the 30-day period for
jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in
competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in
we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, 1977?
the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero
particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an
situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
private respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the
exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is
circumstances of this case. the street as she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also
to the defendant used for the purpose of transportation of for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
fodder by the defendant, and to which was attached a pair of
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales
horses, came along the street in the opposite direction to that
although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable
the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon
doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the for the damages caused by the minors who live with them.
the driver of the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that the
14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the
delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed,
complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs
crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or
exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications
street and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live
for this exception.
an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the with them.
defendant's wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely
Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are
the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head,
equally liable for the damages caused by the employees in the
due." 16 That wish continues to motivate this Court when it and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the
service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or
assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for horse which was drawing it.
on account of their duties.
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in
x x x           x x x          x x x
a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be agent, but not when the damages should have been caused by
dispensed with justice. So we have done in this case. These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act
evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article
delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good shall be applicable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the
servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that
respondent court is REVERSED and that of the trial court is
the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage at Paco
reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the
Livery Stable on Calle Herran, and that for the purpose of
ordered. damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are
delivery thereof the cochero driving the team as defendant's
under their custody.
employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of
the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon for
the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the
unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out, persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the
Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.
public policy shall not be countenanced. (n) and made some other noises, which frightened the horses
Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the
rules of evidence. (n) driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the Passing the question whether or not an employer who has
rear upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses; that furnished a gentle and tractable team and a trusty and capable
the horses then ran up and on which street they came into driver is, under the last paragraph of the above provisions,
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong liable for the negligence of such driver in handling the team, we
de Martinez, was riding. are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed upon the
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE ground that the evidence does not disclose that the cochero
MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees, was negligent.
vs. The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant. question.
While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may
possibly be some what different from that in Anglo-Saxon
Lionel D. Hargis for appellant. Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of countries, a question we do not now discuss, the rules under
Sanz and Oppisso for appellee. negligence and gave judgment against him for P442.50, with which the fact of negligence is determined are, nevertheless,
interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the generally the same. That is to say, while the law designating
17th day of October, 1908, and for the costs of the action. The the person responsible for a negligent act may not be the same
case is before us on an appeal from that judgment. here as in many jurisdictions, the law determining
what is a negligent act is the same here, generally speaking,
MORELAND, J.: as elsewhere. (Supreme court of Spain, 4 December, 1903; 16
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands
May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9 April, 1896; 14 March, 1901; 2
except that embodied in the Civil Code. The provisions of that
March, 1904; 7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905;
The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party code pertinent to this case are —
13 April, 1903; 7 March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907;
in this case. They are — 18 March, 1898; 3 June, 1901.)
Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage
That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to
Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, repair the damage so done.
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in . . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to
caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero finding that the horse was quite and gentle, and that the driver the case before the jury, was that if the steamboat, on a calm
was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the was upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon, at time of day and in smooth water, was thrown with such force against a
horses several years and the other five or six months; that he the alleged injury, and that the horse had been used for years wharf properly built, as to tear up some of the planks of the
had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the in that way without accident. The refusal of the trial court to flooring, this would be prima facie evidence of negligence on
condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that charge as requested left the jury free to find was verdict against the part of the defendant's agent in making the landing, unless
they had never run away up to that time and there had been, the defendant, although the jury was convinced that these facts upon the whole evidence in the case this prima facie evidence
therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the were proven.lawphil.net was rebutted. As such damage to a wharf is not ordinarily done
horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner by a steamboat under control of her officers and carefully
described on the day of the accident was the custom of all managed by them, evidence that such damage was done in
In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was
cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that this case was prima facie, and, if unexplained, sufficient
held:
which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on evidence of negligence on their part, and the jury might
the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their properly be so instructed.
employers. That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to
deliver goods, upon stopping with his horse and wagon to
There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs
deliver a parcel at a house from fifty to a hundred rods from a
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not themselves, not only the fact of the runway and the accident
railroad crossing, left the horse unfastened for four or five
negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the resulting therefrom, but also the conditions under which the
minutes while he was in the house, knowing that it was not
evidence in this case, either under Spanish or American runaway occurred. Those conditions showing of themselves
afraid of cars, and having used it for three or four months
jurisprudence. (Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422; that the defendant's cochero was not negligent in the
without ever hitching it or knowing it to start, is not conclusive,
Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590; Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L., management of the horse, the prima facie case in plaintiffs'
as a matter of law, of a want of due care on his part.
442; Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. vs. Lally, 48 N. J. L., favor, if any, was destroyed as soon as made.
604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y.,
212.) lawphi1.net The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is
respect in question, is to exercise reasonable care and
the universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of
prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act
In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the
not itself illegal or inherently likely to produce damage to
170), Lord Kenyon said: manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the
others, there will be no liability, although damage in fact
universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which
ensues. (Milwaukee Ry. Co. vs. Arms, 91 U. S., 489;
they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in
He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524; Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing,
all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The
house, and, if every person who suffered a cart to remain in the 292; Jackson Architectural Iron Works vs. Hurlbut, 158 N. Y.,
public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has
street while he took goods out of it was obliged to employ 34 Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La. An., 63; Niosi vs. Empire
acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the public now,
another to look after the horses, it would be impossible for the Steam Laundry, 117 Cal., 257.)
through the courts, without prior objection or notice, to be
business of the metropolis to go on.
permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby make
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance
In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court manner proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the
said: performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people? We think
and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for not.
so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be
The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged
held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the
of his horse, at the time of the injury, is that which would be The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs.
very reason why they have been permitted by society is that
exercised by a person of ordinary care and prudence under like So ordered.
they beneficial rather than prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents
circumstances. It can not be said that the fact of leaving the
sometimes happen and injuries result from the most ordinary
horse unhitched is in itself negligence. Whether it is negligence
acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary results. Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or
to leave a horse unhitched must be depend upon the
To hold that, because such an act once resulted in accident or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred
disposition of the horse; whether he was under the observation
injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far. The fact sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four
and control of some person all the time, and many other
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.
circumstances; and is a question to be determined by the jury
invoked in such a case, does not in any sense militate against
from the facts of each case.
the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed
a prima facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the
by the number of days which they respectively have.
In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held circumstances under which the act complained of was
that it was error on the part of the trial court to refuse to charge performed. It is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff
that "it is not negligence for the driver of a quite, gentle horse to before defendant's case showing the conditions and In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the
leave him unhitched and otherwise unattended on the side of a circumstances under which the injury occurred, the creative last day included. (7a)
public highways while the driver is upon the sidewalk loading reason for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears. This is
goods on the wagon." The said court closed its opinion with demonstrated by the case of Inland and Seaboard Costing Co.
Revised Administrative Code (EO No. 292) Book 1, Sec. 31
these words: vs. Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court said (p. 554):
 Sec. 31. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on
twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers reconsideration.3 April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit
to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed commenced on that date.13
according to the number of days the specific month contains;
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent
"day," to a day of twenty-four hours; and "night," from sunset to
Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
sunrise.chanrobles virtual law library
of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to
petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights,
District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-
(BIR),4 he explained that the increase in the cost of labor and
five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four
materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and
hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.
collecting receivables caused the real estate industry to
slowdown.5 As a consequence, while business was good during
the first quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses amounting If the months are designated by their name, they shall be
to ₱71,879,228 that year.6 computed by the number of days which they respectively have.

RULE 22 of ROC According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the
not liable for income taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its last included. (emphasis supplied)
quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable
Computation of Time withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period
amount of ₱26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent was entitled
under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims
Section 1. How to compute time. — In computing any period of to tax refund or tax credit.9
was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap
time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the
year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days 14 after
court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the
from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be respondent to submit additional documents to support its reglementary period.15
excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day claim.10 Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon.
of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday a Sunday, Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review11 in the
or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
shall not run until the next working day. (a) denied.16 Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA.17

On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it

Section 2. Effect of interruption. — Should an act be done On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision
was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a
which effectively interrupts the running of the period, the of the CTA.18 It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not
judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit.12 It invoked Section
allowable period after such interruption shall start to run on the distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According
229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC):
day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof. to the CA:

Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected.

The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the
-- No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the
excluded in the computation of the period. (n) fact that a particular year is a leap year.19
recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged
to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or
of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the
or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April
manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days
G.R. No. 162155               August 28, 2007 has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit
proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, shall be neither interpreted nor construed.20
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
PARCERO in his official capacity as Revenue District Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.21 Thus,
Officer of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners, In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after this appeal.
vs. the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent. the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause
that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an
Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor, refund or exemption, should be strictly construed against
DECISION claimants.22 Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly
credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which
payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have applied against respondent inasmuch as it has been
CORONA, J.: been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied) consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax
refunds and tax credits) begins to run on the day claimants file
their final adjusted returns.23 Hence, the claim should have
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the been filed on or before April 13, 2000 or within 730 days,
August 1, 2003 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the month 15, 1998 1999
return. Administrative Code of 1987.1avvphi1
calendar January 15, February 14,
  10th to
The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal month 1999 1999
review in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive period must have been clearly and unmistakably intended by the
calendar February 15, March 14,
provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law   11th to
month 1999 1999
however, is not. encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law and
they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled.33 calendar March 15,
  12th to April 14, 1999
The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned month 1999
from the filing of the final adjusted return.24 But how should the Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII,
two-year prescriptive period be computed? Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same calendar April 15,
Year 2 13th to May 14, 1999
subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the month 1999
Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that calendar June 14,
regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of   14th May 15, 1999 to
when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent month 1999
1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.
to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,25 we
Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the calendar June 15,
ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of   15th to July 14, 1999
number of days is irrelevant. month 1999
whether it is a regular year or a leap year.26
calendar August 14,
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner   16th July 15, 1999 to
However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 month 1999
of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the
was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that calendar August 15, September
Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of   17th to
month 1999 14, 1999
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of
twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori. calendar September October 14,
refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be   18th to
month 15, 1999 1999
computed according to the number of days the specific month
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative
contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from calendar October 15, November 14,
Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period   19th to
sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied) month 1999 1999
(reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted
return34 on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, calendar November December 14,
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar computed as follows:   20th to
month 15, 1999 1999
without regard to the number of days it may contain." 28 It is the
"period of time running from the beginning of a certain calendar December January 14,
numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding calendar April 15,   21st to
Year 1 1st to May 14, 1998 month 15, 1999 2000
numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient month 1998
number of days in the next month, then up to and including the calendar January 15, February 14,
calendar June 14,   22nd to
last day of that month." 29 To illustrate, one calendar month from   2nd May 15, 1998 to month 2000 2000
December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January month 1998
31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be calendar February 15, March 14,
calendar June 15,   23rd to
from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008.30   3rd to July 14, 1998 month 2000 2000
month 1998
calendar March 15,
calendar August 14,   24th to April 14, 2000
A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration   4th July 15, 1998 to month 2000
that the law is revoked and abrogated by another) or impliedly month 1998
(when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be
reasonably reconciled with the previous one).31 Section 27, calendar August 15, September We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14,
  5th to
Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 month 1998 14, 1998 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from
states: the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was
calendar September October 14,
  6th to filed within the reglementary period.
month 15, 1998 1998
Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules
and regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code calendar October 15, November 14, Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case
  7th to
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. month 1998 1998 is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered to
expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113
calendar November December 14, entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of
  8th to
A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express month 15, 1998 1998 Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the
laws to be abolished.32 Thus, the provision above   9th calendar December to January 14,
No costs. PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that
vs. the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought
SO ORDERED.
priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to
validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to
celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place,
REYES, J.B.L., J.: because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by
a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter
Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the
shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil
territory, subject to the principles of public international law and and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and
Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant,
to treaty stipulations. (8a) thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and
Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona.
pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while
defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena, 1 all Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948
RPC Article 2. Application of its provisions. - Except as surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was
provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was
provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the aflame.
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the
Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior
following:
waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction,
against those who: Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being
University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters
enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta
airship became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the
Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the
Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a
Government of the Philippine Islands; undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator
before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the
one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered
these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the with the local civil register.
presiding number;
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single,
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu
indicate that the couple were deeply in love. Together with a
offense in the exercise of their functions; or City, and that she intended to return after two years. The
friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they
had planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be application was approved, and she left for the United States.
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce
and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court
Code. engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the
ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21
Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was
reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then issued in open court by the said tribunal.
elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of
her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the
was their usual trysting place. Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a) elopement did not, however, materialize because when Vicente
went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell
got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California,
the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that
G.R. No. L-19671           November 29, 1965 and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American
she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño citizenship on 8 August 1958.
were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status,
at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent. condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the
amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her (Emphasis supplied) citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit
husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman
formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does
Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive
decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
said marriage act, which provided the following: policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed
admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or
a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to
concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the
her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No
present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV,
denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of
Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages. one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art.
was performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good
106, subpar. 1).
faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but
empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or
property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim
effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino
of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the
citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy
damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is
of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17
the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745;
of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Court. Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here
that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the
solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop those which have for their object public order, policy and good
of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant original action for annulment and subsequently suing for promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon
Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and in dismissing the divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was in a foreign country.
complaint;. valid and binding.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating
the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for damages;. the marriage she was under the undue influence of Pacita and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to
Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do
appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the
truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent outside the Philippines.
damages to the defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.
was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not
render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil
Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court.
by the plaintiff. court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for
Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by
annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was
acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and
dismissed for non-prosecution.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident
Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had
validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both parties between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained
were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law,
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a
and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife
necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta
Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second
Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to
competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on
recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff
not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages. grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At
Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It
the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like
follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties,
her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband
to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time,
irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil
expressly provided:
Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit
Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the
expressly provided that — husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo
Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in
husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles sustained. good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not
under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents,
Art. 333). extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even
Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño,
where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the
alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her
separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible
annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation,
marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the previous evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the
or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or
doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely
unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable
those that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own
for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good
of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and
faith take his child into his home and afford him or her
Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he
protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously
recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them"
enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause
became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive
him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has
in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic].
more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a
the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court
married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of
rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would
advice given to a son.
above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked
decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even
interest. Said this Court in that case: after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents
shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted
proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce,
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it
strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them
results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro,
that the previous one was canonically defective. If no to recover damages. While this suit may not have been
celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations;
recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless
and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband
to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions
and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or
significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the
seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the spleen.
estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right
recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by
to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged
her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of
natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by
affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her
excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escaño, it
money while she was in the United States; for it was natural
Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born is proper to take into account, against his patently
that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if
of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied) unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the
they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27
marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not
Am. Jur. 130-132).
characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children,
part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there
begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the
divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is
improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was
authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ.
jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal
acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this
separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first
judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union
marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather
declaring, the trial court committed error.
charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of
unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations being always presumed until the contrary is proved. of moral damages and attorney's fees.
where the status of a person (whether divorced or not) would
depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the
this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them
distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himself in defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the
was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the
stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could
Islands are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise
the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common
by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been
say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72) daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that
he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the
whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the As to Ikdal’s liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10
damages awarded to P5,000 only. position of medical technologist under a two-year contract, of Republic Act No. 8042, the "Migrant and Overseas Filipinos’
denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a Act of 1995," corporate officers, directors and partners of a
monthly salary of US$1,200.00. recruitment agency may themselves be jointly and solidarily
Summing up, the Court rules:
liable with the recruitment agency for money claims and
damages awarded to overseas workers.
Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and
probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by
decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act
Kuwait’s Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by
386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction;
the appellate court by Resolution7 of June 27, 2007, the present
and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the
petition for review on certiorari was filed.
divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was
entitled to validity in the country; terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she not
having allegedly passed the probationary period. Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because
respondent’s employment contract specifically stipulates that
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation
her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and
with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to As the Ministry denied respondent’s request for
Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent
a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law; reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March 17,
error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply the
2001, shouldering her own air fare.
Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree deciding the present case.
by one consort entitles the other to recover damages; On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint 2 for illegal dismissal
Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas
against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency,
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative to master employment
represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry,
parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations)
as the foreign principal.
malice or unworthy motives on their part. accord respect to the "customs, practices, company policies
and labor laws and legislation of the host country."
By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified
that petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to
as follows; Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine
warrant respondent’s dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as
labor laws are applicable, given that the foreign principal is a
a regular employee, held that respondent was illegally
government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her
not sign any document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily
decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño; US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months
liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more so
unexpired portion of her contract.
since the Ministry’s liability had not been judicially determined
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay as jurisdiction was not acquired over it.
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the
damages and attorneys' fees; Labor Arbiter’s decision by Resolution4 of January 26, 2004.
The petition fails.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by
Resolution5 of April 22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the Appeals, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade
appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, responsibility for the money claims of Overseas Filipino workers
deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and the immunity extended to them; and that respondent was (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of
attorneys' fees. validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency
within the one-year period as required under Kuwait’s Civil clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principal’s
G.R. No. 178551               October 11, 2010 Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that Ikdal should liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be held
not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI. jointly and solidarily liable.
ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT Petitioners, By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private
vs. the NLRC Resolution. recruitment agencies with their foreign principals, Republic Act
MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent. No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and
assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of what is
In brushing aside petitioners’ contention that they only acted as
due them. Skippers United Pacific v. Maguad8 explains:
DECISION agent of the Ministry and that they cannot be held jointly and
solidarily liable with it, the appellate court noted that under the
law, a private employment agency shall assume all . . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment
CARPIO MORALES, J.: responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of agreement entered into by and between the local agent and
employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of
Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any violation such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide
Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties
towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not
at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as a
the employment contracts of the employees recruited and of presumed-identity approach or processual probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service
employed pursuant to the said recruitment presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti
agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is labor laws duly authenticated and translated by Embassy
purpose for which the law governing the employment of that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what
workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted. (emphasis labor laws in determining the issues presented before us. petitioners submitted were mere certifications attesting
supplied) (emphasis and underscoring supplied) only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and
the termination letter which does not prove at all that
Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws,
that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly
policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To
terminated. Thus the subject certifications read:
working class.9 Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy
immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
judicial determination of the foreign principal’s liability before Revised Rules of Court which reads: xxxx
petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and
solidary liability inutile.
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice versa was/were
As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official presented to this Office for review and certification and the
probationary employment are not applicable since it was publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having same was/were found to be in order. This Office, however,
expressly provided in respondent’s employment contract, which the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the
she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a document/s.
shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested
rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
party for whatever legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis
not substantiated. general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
supplied)1avvphi1
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law
seal of his office. (emphasis supplied) Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate
between the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses,
officer, the same is in order too following the express provision
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including
of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:
the laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations, SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a
as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the
public order or public policy. evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the SEC. 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the
seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90)
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law,
of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising
under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this
out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any
case, petitioners failed to discharge. The Court’s ruling in EDI-
law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
Staffbuilders Int’l., v. NLRC10 illuminates: To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following:
deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and
MOA between respondent and the Ministry, as represented by
other forms of damages.
ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran
probationary period of one (1) year and that the host country’s
specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters
Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a translated The liability of the principal/employer and the
not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for
copy11 (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to respondent recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this
termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law
stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the
specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall
contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating
certificate of termination,12 both of which documents were be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance
to the termination of the employment of Gran.
certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as
Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law and Translation Unit; and respondent’s letter 13 of damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate
foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to first eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall
be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter "Excellent" albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to schedule. partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. (emphasis
know only domestic or forum law. and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Indonesian Patent No. ID0003911 xxx wishes to form an pay CLAIMANT the total sum of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY
alliance with Sponsors for purposes of enforcing his three NINE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY FIVE
aforementioned patents, granting licenses under those patents, DOLLARS AND NINETY CENTS ($229,355.90) which is 20%
SO ORDERED.
and collecting royalties. of MOA assessments since September 1, 2005[;]

The Sponsors wish to be licensed under the aforementioned (B) For breach of the MOA in failing to cooperate
patents in order to practice the processes claimed in those with CLAIMANT TPI in fulfilling the objectives of the MOA,
patents in the United States, the Philippines, and Indonesia, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total
enforce those patents and collect royalties in conjunction with sum of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR
Licensor. HUNDRED NINETY DOLLARS AND TWENTY CENTS
($271,490.20)[;]14 and
G.R. No. 185582               February 29, 2012
xxx
(C) For violation of THE LANHAM ACT and infringement of
TUNA PROCESSING, INC., Petitioner, the YAMAOKA 619 PATENT, RESPONDENT
4. Establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. The parties
vs. KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum of ONE
hereto agree to the establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc.
PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC., Respondent. MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS
("TPI"), a corporation established in the State of California, in
AND NO CENTS ($1,250,000.00). xxx
order to implement the objectives of this Agreement.
DECISION
xxx15
5. Bank account. TPI shall open and maintain bank accounts
PEREZ, J.: in the United States, which will be used exclusively to deposit
funds that it will collect and to disburse cash it will be obligated To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed on 10 October 2007
to spend in connection with the implementation of this a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of
Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Agreement. Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City. The
Philippines, but which collects royalties from entities in the petition was raffled to Branch 150 presided by Judge Elmo M.
Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign arbitral award? Alameda.
6. Ownership of TPI. TPI shall be owned by the Sponsors and
Licensor. Licensor shall be assigned one share of TPI for the
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,1  purpose of being elected as member of the board of directors. At Branch 150, respondent Kingford filed a Motion to
petitioner Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI), a foreign corporation not The remaining shares of TPI shall be held by the Sponsors Dismiss.16 After the court denied the motion for lack of merit, 17 
licensed to do business in the Philippines, prays that the according to their respective equity shares. 9 respondent sought for the inhibition of Judge Alameda and
Resolution2 dated 21 November 2008 of the Regional Trial moved for the reconsideration of the order denying the
Court (RTC) of Makati City be declared void and the case be motion.18 Judge Alameda inhibited himself notwithstanding
remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. In the assailed xxx
"[t]he unfounded allegations and unsubstantiated assertions in
Resolution, the RTC dismissed petitioner’s Petition for the motion."19 Judge Cedrick O. Ruiz of Branch 61, to which the
Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
The parties likewise executed a Supplemental Memorandum of case was re-raffled, in turn, granted respondent’s Motion for
Award3 against respondent Philippine Kingford, Inc. (Kingford),
Agreement10 dated 15 January 2003 and an Agreement to Reconsideration and dismissed the petition on the ground that
a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Amend Memorandum of Agreement11 dated 14 July 2003. the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.20
Philippines,4 on the ground that petitioner lacked legal capacity
to sue.5
Due to a series of events not mentioned in the petition, the Petitioner TPI now seeks to nullify, in this instant Petition for
licensees, including respondent Kingford, withdrew from Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the order of the trial court
The Antecedents
petitioner TPI and correspondingly reneged on their dismissing its Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and
obligations.12 Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award.
On 14 January 2003, Kanemitsu Yamaoka (hereinafter referred before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the
to as the "licensor"), co-patentee of U.S. Patent No. 5,484,619, State of California, United States and won the case against
Issue
Philippine Letters Patent No. 31138, and Indonesian Patent No. respondent.13 Pertinent portions of the award read:
ID0003911 (collectively referred to as the "Yamaoka Patent"), 6 
and five (5) Philippine tuna processors, namely, Angel Seafood The core issue in this case is whether or not the court a
13.1 Within thirty (30) days from the date of transmittal of this
Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna quo was correct in so dismissing the petition on the ground of
Award to the Parties, pursuant to the terms of this award, the
Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc., and respondent petitioner’s lack of legal capacity to sue.
total sum to be paid by RESPONDENT
Kingford (collectively referred to as the
KINGFORD to CLAIMANT TPI, is the sum of ONE MILLION
"sponsors"/"licensees")7 entered into a Memorandum of
SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED Our Ruling
Agreement (MOA),8 pertinent provisions of which read:
FORTY SIX DOLLARS AND TEN CENTS ($1,750,846.10).
The petition is impressed with merit.
1. Background and objectives. The Licensor, co-owner of
(A) For breach of the MOA by not paying past due
U.S.Patent No. 5,484,619, Philippine Patent No. 31138, and
assessments, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall
The Corporation Code of the Philippines expressly provides: defeated by misplaced technical considerations not found in the In particular, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
relevant laws.24 2004 incorporated the New York Convention in the Act by
specifically providing:
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign
corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a Simply put, how do we reconcile the provisions of
license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to the Corporation Code of the Philippines on one hand, and SEC. 42. Application of the New York Convention. - The New
maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, the New York York Convention shall govern the recognition and enforcement
court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such Convention and the Model Law on the other? of arbitral awards covered by the said Convention.
corporation may be sued or proceeded against before
Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause
In several cases, this Court had the occasion to discuss the xxx
of action recognized under Philippine laws.
nature and applicability of the Corporation Code of the
Philippines, a general law, viz-a-viz other special laws. Thus,
SEC. 45. Rejection of a Foreign Arbitral Award. - A party to a
It is pursuant to the aforequoted provision that the court a in Koruga v. Arcenas, Jr.,25 this Court rejected the application of
foreign arbitration proceeding may oppose an application for
quo dismissed the petition. Thus: the Corporation Code and applied the New Central Bank Act. It
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award in
ratiocinated:
accordance with the procedural rules to be promulgated by the
Herein plaintiff TPI’s "Petition, etc." acknowledges that it "is a Supreme Court only on those grounds enumerated under
foreign corporation established in the State of California" and Koruga’s invocation of the provisions of the Corporation Code Article V of the New York Convention. Any other ground raised
"was given the exclusive right to license or sublicense the is misplaced. In an earlier case with similar antecedents, we shall be disregarded by the regional trial court.
Yamaoka Patent" and "was assigned the exclusive right to ruled that:
enforce the said patent and collect corresponding royalties" in
It also expressly adopted the Model Law, to wit:
the Philippines. TPI likewise admits that it does not have a
"The Corporation Code, however, is a general law applying to
license to do business in the Philippines.
all types of corporations, while the New Central Bank Act
Sec. 19. Adoption of the Model Law on International
regulates specifically banks and other financial institutions,
Commercial Arbitration. International commercial arbitration
There is no doubt, therefore, in the mind of this Court that TPI including the dissolution and liquidation thereof. As between a
shall be governed by the Model Law on International
has been doing business in the Philippines, but sans a license general and special law, the latter shall prevail – generalia
Commercial Arbitration (the "Model Law") adopted by the
to do so issued by the concerned government agency of the specialibus non derogant." (Emphasis supplied)26
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on
Republic of the Philippines, when it collected royalties from
June 21, 1985 xxx."
"five (5) Philippine tuna processors[,] namely[,] Angel Seafood
Further, in the recent case of Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v.
Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council,27 this Court held:
Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc. and respondent Now, does a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in
Philippine Kingford, Inc." This being the real situation, TPI the Philippines have legal capacity to sue under the provisions
cannot be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit Without doubt, the Corporation Code is the general law of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004? We answer
or proceedings in any court or administrative agency of the providing for the formation, organization and regulation of in the affirmative.
Philippines." A priori, the "Petition, etc." extant of the plaintiff private corporations. On the other hand, RA 6657 is the special
TPI should be dismissed for it does not have the legal law on agrarian reform. As between a general and special law,
Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
personality to sue in the Philippines.21 the latter shall prevail—generalia specialibus non derogant.28
2004 provides that the opposing party in an application for
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award may raise
The petitioner counters, however, that it is entitled to seek for Following the same principle, the Alternative Dispute only those grounds that were enumerated under Article V of
the recognition and enforcement of the subject foreign arbitral Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in this case as the Act, as its the New York Convention, to wit:
award in accordance with Republic Act No. 9285 (Alternative title - An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute
Dispute Resolution Act of 2004),22 the Convention on the Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the
Article V
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other
drafted during the United Nations Conference on International Purposes - would suggest, is a law especially enacted "to
Commercial Arbitration in 1958 (New York Convention), and actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or 1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused,
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements to at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if
Arbitration (Model Law),23 as none of these specifically requires resolve their disputes."29 It specifically provides exclusive that party furnishes to the competent authority where the
that the party seeking for the enforcement should have legal grounds available to the party opposing an application for recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
capacity to sue. It anchors its argument on the following: recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award.30
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were,
In the present case, enforcement has been effectively refused Inasmuch as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, a under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the
on a ground not found in the [Alternative Dispute Resolution municipal law, applies in the instant petition, we do not see the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties
Act of 2004], New York Convention, or Model Law. It is for this need to discuss compliance with international obligations under have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the
reason that TPI has brought this matter before this most the New York Convention and the Model Law. After all, both law of the country where the award was made; or
Honorable Court, as it [i]s imperative to clarify whether the already form part of the law.
Philippines’ international obligations and State policy to
strengthen arbitration as a means of dispute resolution may be
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given upholding or declining its jurisdiction" 35 after arbitration has First. There is no need to consider respondent’s contention that
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the already commenced should state "[t]he facts showing that the petitioner TPI improperly raised a question of fact when it
arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his persons named as petitioner or respondent have legal capacity posited that its act of entering into a MOA should not be
case; or to sue or be sued."36 considered "doing business" in the Philippines for the purpose
of determining capacity to sue. We reiterate that the foreign
corporation’s capacity to sue in the Philippines is not material
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the
insofar as the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral
not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it enforecement of a foreign arbitral award, we deny availment by
award is concerned.
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the the losing party of the rule that bars foreign corporations not
submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on licensed to do business in the Philippines from maintaining a
matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those suit in our courts. When a party enters into a contract Second. Respondent cannot fault petitioner for not filing a
not so submitted, that part of the award which contains containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as in this case, in motion for reconsideration of the assailed Resolution dated 21
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the November 2008 dismissing the case. We have, time and again,
recognized and enforced; or contract, by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration, ruled that the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration is not
conceding thereby the capacity of the other party to enter into required in certiorari under Rule 45.41
the contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral
implementation of the result. Although not on all fours with the
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the Third. While we agree that petitioner failed to observe the
instant case, also worthy to consider is the
parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with principle of hierarchy of courts, which, under ordinary
the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or circumstances, warrants the outright dismissal of the case,42 we
wisdom of then Associate Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in opt to relax the rules following the pronouncement in Chua v.
her Dissenting Opinion in Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Ang,43 to wit:
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or
Appeals,37 to wit:
has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of
the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was [I]t must be remembered that [the principle of hierarchy of
made. xxx Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settlement, is gaining courts] generally applies to cases involving conflicting factual
adherents in legal and judicial circles here and abroad. If its allegations. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision
tested mechanism can simply be ignored by an aggrieved cannot be brought immediately before us as we are not triers of
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also
party, one who, it must be stressed, voluntarily and actively facts.44 A strict application of this rule may be excused when
be refused if the competent authority in the country where
participated in the arbitration proceedings from the very the reason behind the rule is not present in a case, as in the
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
beginning, it will destroy the very essence of mutuality inherent present case, where the issues are not factual but purely
in consensual contracts.38 legal.1âwphi1 In these types of questions, this Court has the
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of ultimate say so that we merely abbreviate the review process if
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or we, because of the unique circumstances of a case, choose to
Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral
hear and decide the legal issues outright.45
award should be respected not because it is favored over
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be domestic laws and procedures, but because Republic Act No.
contrary to the public policy of that country. 9285 has certainly erased any conflict of law question. Moreover, the novelty and the paramount importance of the
issue herein raised should be seriously considered. 46 Surely,
there is a need to take cognizance of the case not only to guide
Clearly, not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the
the bench and the bar, but if only to strengthen arbitration as a
capacity to sue of the party seeking the recognition and court a quo correctly observed that the Model Law, not
means of dispute resolution, and uphold the policy of the State
enforcement of the award. the New York Convention, governs the subject arbitral award,39 
embodied in the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, to
petitioner may still seek recognition and enforcement of the
wit:
award in Philippine court, since the Model Law prescribes
Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court on substantially identical exclusive grounds for refusing
Alternative Dispute Resolution,31 which was promulgated by the recognition or enforcement.40 Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy
Supreme Court, likewise support this position. of the State to actively promote party autonomy in the
resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their
Premises considered, petitioner TPI, although not licensed to
Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that "[a]ny party to a own arrangements to resolve their disputes. Towards this end,
do business in the Philippines, may seek recognition and
foreign arbitration may petition the court to recognize and the State shall encourage and actively promote the use of
enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in accordance with
enforce a foreign arbitral award." The contents of such petition Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as an important means to
the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
are enumerated in Rule 13.5.32 Capacity to sue is not included. achieve speedy and impartial justice and declog court dockets.
2004.
Oppositely, in the Rule on local arbitral awards or arbitrations in xxx
instances where "the place of arbitration is in the Philippines," 33 
it is specifically required that a petition "to determine any II
Fourth. As regards the issue on the validity and enforceability
question concerning the existence, validity and enforceability of of the foreign arbitral award, we leave its determination to the
such arbitration agreement"34 available to the parties before the
The remaining arguments of respondent Kingford are likewise court a quo where its recognition and enforcement is being
commencement of arbitration and/or a petition for "judicial relief
unmeritorious. sought.
from the ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary question
Fifth. Respondent claims that petitioner failed to furnish the Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant. deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt
court of origin a copy of the motion for time to file petition for Camus and Delgado for appellee. of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on
review on certiorari before the petition was filed with this the matter.
Court.47 We, however, find petitioner’s reply in order. Thus:
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove
26. Admittedly, reference to "Branch 67" in petitioner TPI’s such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with
"Motion for Time to File a Petition for Review on Certiorari ROMUALDEZ, J.: the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor
under Rule 45" is a typographical error. As correctly pointed out was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent
by respondent Kingford, the order sought to be assailed The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court
originated from Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61. Brimo is in question in this case. in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record
that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was
violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not
27. xxx Upon confirmation with the Regional Trial Court, Makati The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
City, Branch 61, a copy of petitioner TPI’s motion was received partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, executed. lawphil.net
by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 67. On 8 opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
January 2009, the motion was forwarded to the Regional Trial
Court, Makati City, Branch 61.48 Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are: respect was not erroneous.
All considered, petitioner TPI, although a foreign corporation
not licensed to do business in the Philippines, is not, for that (1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the
reason alone, precluded from filing the Petition for participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he
Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be
Award before a Philippine court. approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the
deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; last part of the second clause of the will, which says:
and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated 21 November 2008 of the this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati City in Special scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a
Proceedings No. M-6533 is hereby REVERSED and SET to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to Branch 61 for further reference to the Turkish laws. by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on
proceedings. the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time
in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the
in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's distribution of my property and everything in connection with
will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my
or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel
provides the following: beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.
subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect
to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person property or the country in which it may be situated. the Philippines.
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found. (10a) But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any
testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who,
laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will
G.R. No. L-22595             November 1, 1927 what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his
evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as legacy.
those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs,
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,
36 Phil., 472.)
administrator, petitioner-appellee, The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being
vs. contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant. It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish following:
laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be
given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much
so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of
shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the
heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary
testator otherwise provide. executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's
seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly The facts of the case are as follows:
ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10 On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of
is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
deceased.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him,
even as to the herein oppositor. he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt
Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
It results from all this that the second clause of the will
Palma Bellis.
regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other
imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued
law. On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the an order overruling the oppositions and approving the
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, executor's final account, report and administration and project
and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their
estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) which did not provide for legitimes.
appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
national law.
Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been
and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first
appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law
directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis,
must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis,
of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without shares.1äwphï1.ñët In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even
any pronouncement as to costs. discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a
is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not
probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September
disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
15, 1958.
G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967 domicile thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even
assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. paid all the bequests therein including the amount of same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor. $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts calling for the application of the law of the place where the
vs. totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees. legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting should not be presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants'
appellants. partial advances on account of their respective legacies. position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
A. Bellis, et al. arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration,
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al. circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in
the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account,
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company. relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman. reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
BENGZON, J.P., J.: $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
capacity to succeed. They provide that — foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be California, U.S.A.
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject 4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no
ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article
to the law of the country where it is situated. descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of xxx     xxx     xxx
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the 7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that
said property may be found.
the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me,
nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao,
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in
nation of the decedent. Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be
deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph
Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her
three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine
Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
G.R. No. L-16749             January 31, 1963
those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
xxx     xxx     xxx
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD
agreed upon in a foreign country. E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, 12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved
Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees, daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code
vs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger
afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant. Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions
from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and
of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated
estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or
Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be
while reproducing without substantial change the second Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-
possessed at my death and which may have come to me from
paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. appellant.
any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph
of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in
LABRADOR, J.:
testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the
legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the
1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
by the national law of the decedent. of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
approving among things the final accounts of the executor,
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the
customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by
amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of
her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been
the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime,
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged
and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal
be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance
ones. grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be
with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E.
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order
Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951
of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two and contains the following provisions:
Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-
wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his
half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above
Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that
LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal
such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate
law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the
several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the OF THE PHILIPPINES. Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II.
Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but
Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
IV
domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits
was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-
declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth. DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to
EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a California shortly after the making of his last will and testament
PHILIPPINE LAWS.
citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers'
time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's
the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of V Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to
dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is
of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable
DECLARING THAT UNDER THE the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born
(In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952,
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine
and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he
179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen,
TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN returned to California very rarely and only for short visits
through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but
FULL OWNERSHIP. (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to
these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state,
which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen
The most important assignments of error are as follows: Philippines and make home in the State of California.
of the United States and of the State of California at the time of
his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his
I death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of
following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's meaning from mere temporary presence to the most permanent
brief: abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of
IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
Laws, p. 29)
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts
HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED of record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento,
IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE. "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States
Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
Philippines until 1904. considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that
II
when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a
citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This
States and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913,
ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING conclusion is in accordance with the following principle
during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
Sacramento, California.
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW. Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But
the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical
Philippines for the United States and came back here the
III meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has
following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no
returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING the following year, 1939. his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he
TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER went on business which would require his presence for several
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient
UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear,
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of the particular business in hand, not giving up his former
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances:
as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a
presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties
make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further
with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to
presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court;
insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29) accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be
the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-
question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's 14.)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary
domicile, which is the Philippines.
dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows: X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England,
authors, thus: and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject
distributed among X's next of kin.
to the law of the country where it is situated.
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of
Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus to movables calls for an application of the law of the
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
its Conflict of Laws rules?" deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever
nature of the property and regardless of the country where said On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court
corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution
property may be found. chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws
accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would
rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law.
show that if a French court were called upon to determine how
But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution
the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back
determination of the meaning of the term "national law" is used to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the
should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would
therein. Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of
have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so
things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative
often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the
course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to
There is no single American law governing the validity of renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois,
intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there
and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the
Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference
assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it
and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws
accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter
in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-
course, thus applying its own law.
possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid
refer to no other than the private law of the State of California. this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference
and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the
of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the
The next question is: What is the law in California governing internal law as the rule of reference. conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back
the disposition of personal property? The decision of the court again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower
below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that sense. The German term for this judicial process is
under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-
his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption
571.)
the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that
952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem
Civil Code of California, which is as follows: is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be
basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question
be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few
owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by
the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send
opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the same result would happen, though the courts would switch with back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung",
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the
hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by the renvoi. operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in
a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is
many cases result in returning the main controversy to be Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must
decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.) first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute enforce the law of California in accordance with the express
personal property upon death in accordance with the law of mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal
domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been
distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is domiciled abroad.
advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court
the English law — he must accept this reference back to his
of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take
own law.
into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no
rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated"
question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of
may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary
generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that
Jur. 296) the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, the national law of the deceased should govern. This
each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various
cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and
but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California
the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof.
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or
Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-
down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The
1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted
of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
herein below:
general principle of American law that the domiciliary law precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not
should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the of the owner. Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not
conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only and should not refer the case back to California; such action
the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but would leave the issue incapable of determination because the
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more
its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between
states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of
'the law of a country' means the whole of its law. the two states, between the country of which the decedent was
the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the
a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court
time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions
must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of
xxx     xxx     xxx about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is
the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical
especially as the application of the internal law of California
that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts.
personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules
International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural
should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
following theses: children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the
recognizing them.
domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by
the application of foreign laws. the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156;
for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil.
general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to
the court shall respect: personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar,
anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to that international comity which was one of the first fruits of not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but
bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each
desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the process of accumulating property take but little notice of case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a
law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the
act in question occurred. more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. California Civil Code.
164, pp. 442-443.)
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased
provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged
question to the same system of law. California. But as above explained the laws of California have natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil
therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
xxx     xxx     xxx Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal
law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we
and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that
personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to
the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", the trial were omitted, and that they were really interested in the estate
provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees. court ordered that "for the reasons stated in his motion dated of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges".
December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, ...
all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all
3. That in his aforementioned motion of December 11, 1957, he
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed
expressly stated that "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died
by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby
leaving no descendants or ascendants except brothers and
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974 APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to
sisters and herein petitioner as the surviving spouse, to inherit
execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
the properties of the decedent", thereby indicating that he was
mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, not excluding his wife's brothers and sisters from the
Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the
Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton inheritance.
last will and testament of the latter."
Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo), petitioner,
4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and manifestations
vs. Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the
to the United States inheritance tax authorities indicating that
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of corresponding statements of account of his administration, with
he had renounced his inheritance from his wife in favor of her
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA the particularity that in all his motions, he always made it point
other heirs, which attitude he is supposed to have reiterated or
A. MAGNO, respondents. to urge the that "no person interested in the Philippines of the
ratified in an alleged affidavit subscribed and sworn to here in
time and place of examining the herein accounts be given
the Philippines and in which he even purportedly stated that his
notice as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the
SUMMARY reason for so disclaiming and renouncing his rights under his
deceased in accordance with the last will and testament
wife's will was to "absolve (him) or (his) estate from any liability
already probated by the Honorable Court." All said accounts
for the payment of income taxes on income which has accrued
Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive approved as prayed for.
to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", his wife, since her death.
and that the issues herein taken up and resolved are rather
numerous and varied, what with appellant making seventy- Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a
eight assignments of error affecting no less than thirty separate On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next
quo or Hodges until December 25, 1962. Importantly to be the
orders of the court a quo, if only to facilitate proper day, upon motion of herein respondent and appellee, Avelina A.
provision in the will of Mrs. Hodges that her share of the
understanding of the import and extent of our rulings herein Magno, she was appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of
conjugal partnership was to be inherited by her husband "to
contained, it is perhaps desirable that a brief restatement of the the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special
have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural
whole situation be made together with our conclusions in Proceedings No. 1307 and as Special Administratrix of the
lifetime" and that "at the death of my said husband, I give,
regard to its various factual and legal aspects. . estate of Charles Newton Hodges, "in the latter case, because
devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my
the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his
estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to
vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and
both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless
Newton Hodges as well as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, share alike", which provision naturally made it imperative that
Special Administratrix is appointed," (Order of December 26,
who predeceased him by about five years and a half. In their the conjugal partnership be promptly liquidated, in order that
1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on A.) although, soon enough, on
respective wills which were executed on different occasions, the "rest, residue and remainder" of his wife's share thereof, as
December 29, 1962, a certain Harold K. Davies was appointed
each one of them provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise of the time of Hodges' own death, may be readily known and
as her Co-Special Administrator, and when Special
and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder (after identified, no such liquidation was ever undertaken. The record
Proceedings No. 1672, Testate Estate of Charles Newton
funeral and administration expenses, taxes and debts) of my gives no indication of the reason for such omission, although
Hodges, was opened, Joe Hodges, as next of kin of the
estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to relatedly, it appears therein:
deceased, was in due time appointed as Co-Administrator of
my beloved (spouse) to have and to hold unto (him/her) — said estate together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace
during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the condition that 1. That in his annual statement submitted to the court of the net Magno and Davies, only to be in turn replaced eventually by
upon the death of whoever of them survived the other, the worth of C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, petitioner PCIB alone.
remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other is Hodges repeatedly and consistently reported the combined
"give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and income of the conjugal partnership and then merely divided the
sisters of the latter. At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have
same equally between himself and the estate of the deceased
been proceeding jointly, with each administrator acting together
wife, and, more importantly, he also, as consistently, filed
with the other, under a sort of modus operandi. PCIB used to
Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on corresponding separate income tax returns for each calendar
secure at the beginning the conformity to and signature of
May 27, Hodges was appointed special administrator of her year for each resulting half of such combined income, thus
Magno in transactions it wanted to enter into and submitted the
estate, and in a separate order of the same date, he was reporting that the estate of Mrs. Hodges had its own income
same to the court for approval as their joint acts. So did Magno
"allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he distinct from his own.
do likewise. Somehow, however, differences seem to have
was engaged, (buying and selling personal and real properties)
arisen, for which reason, each of them began acting later on
and to perform acts which he had been doing while the 2. That when the court a quo happened to inadvertently omit in separately and independently of each other, with apparent
deceased was living." Subsequently, on December 14, 1957, its order probating the will of Mrs. Hodges, the name of one of sanction of the trial court. Thus, PCIB had its own lawyers
after Mrs. Hodges' will had been probated and Hodges had her brothers, Roy Higdon then already deceased, Hodges lost whom it contracted and paid handsomely, conducted the
been appointed and had qualified as Executor thereof, upon his no time in asking for the proper correction "in order that the business of the estate independently of Magno and otherwise
motion in which he asserted that he was "not only part owner of heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they acted as if all the properties appearing in the name of Charles
the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the Newton Hodges belonged solely and only to his estate, to the
exclusion of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, without pursuant to corresponding "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges' purported renunciation should not be upheld, the
considering whether or not in fact any of said properties Hodges. The said orders are being questioned on jurisdictional estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters
corresponded to the portion of the conjugal partnership and procedural grounds directly or indirectly predicated on the consists of one-fourth of the community estate of the spouses
pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. On the other hand, principal theory of appellant that all the properties of the two at the time of her death, minus whatever Hodges had
Magno made her own expenditures, hired her own lawyers, on estates belong already to the estate of Hodges exclusively. gratuitously disposed of therefrom during the period from, May
the premise that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and 23, 1957, when she died, to December 25, 1962, when he died
dealth with some of the properties, appearing in the name of provided, that with regard to remunerative dispositions made by
On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the
Hodges, on the assumption that they actually correspond to the him during the same period, the proceeds thereof, whether in
trial court's orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 were
estate of Mrs. Hodges. All of these independent and separate cash or property, should be deemed as continuing to be part of
meant to be finally adjudicatory of the hereditary rights of
actuations of the two administrators were invariably approved his wife's estate, unless it can be shown that he had
Hodges and contends that they were no more than the court's
by the trial court upon submission. Eventually, the differences subsequently disposed of them gratuitously.
general sanction of past and future acts of Hodges as executor
reached a point wherein Magno, who was more cognizant than
of the will of his wife in due course of administration. As to the
anyone else about the ins and outs of the businesses and
point regarding substitution, her position is that what was given At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what
properties of the deceased spouses because of her long and
by Mrs. Hodges to her husband under the provision in question are the pertinent laws of Texas and what would be the estate of
intimate association with them, made it difficult for PCIB to
was a lifetime usufruct of her share of the conjugal partnership, Mrs. Hodges under them is basically one of fact, and
perform normally its functions as administrator separately from
with the naked ownership passing directly to her brothers and considering the respective positions of the parties in regard to
her. Thus, legal complications arose and the present judicial
sisters. Anent the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, she said factual issue, it can already be deemed as settled for the
controversies came about.
claims that the applicable law to the will of Mrs. Hodges is that purposes of these cases that, indeed, the free portion of said
of Texas under which, she alleges, there is no system of estate that could possibly descend to her brothers and sisters
Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27 and legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than by virtue of her will may not be less than one-fourth of the
December 14, 1957 as well as the approval by the court a her share or one-half of the conjugal partnership properties. conjugal estate, it appearing that the difference in the stands of
quo of the annual statements of account of Hodges, PCIB She further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had as a the parties has reference solely to the legitime of Hodges, PCIB
holds to the view that the estate of Mrs. Hodges has already matter of fact and of law renounced his inheritance from his being of the view that under the laws of Texas, there is such a
been in effect closed with the virtual adjudication in the wife and, therefore, her whole estate passed directly to her legitime of one-fourth of said conjugal estate and Magno
mentioned orders of her whole estate to Hodges, and that, brothers and sisters effective at the latest upon the death of contending, on the other hand, that there is none. In other
therefore, Magno had already ceased since then to have any Hodges. words, hereafter, whatever might ultimately appear, at the
estate to administer and the brothers and sisters of Mrs. subsequent proceedings, to be actually the laws of Texas on
Hodges have no interests whatsoever in the estate left by the matter would no longer be of any consequence, since PCIB
In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the
Hodges. Mainly upon such theory, PCIB has come to this Court would anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the estate of
issues just summarized, We overrule PCIB's contention that the
with a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the Mrs. Hodges should be less than as contended by it now, for
orders of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957 amount to an
lower court's orders allowing respondent Magno to continue admissions by a party related to the effects of foreign laws,
adjudication to Hodges of the estate of his wife, and We
acting as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges in Special which have to be proven in our courts like any other
recognize the present existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
Proceedings 1307 in the manner she has been doing, as controverted fact, create estoppel.
as consisting of properties, which, while registered in that name
detailed earlier above, be set aside. Additionally, PCIB
of Hodges, do actually correspond to the remainder of the
maintains that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will instituting her
share of Mrs. Hodges in the conjugal partnership, it appearing In the process, We overrule PCIB's contention that the
brothers and sisters in the manner therein specified is in the
that pursuant to the pertinent provisions of her will, any portion provision in Mrs. Hodges' will in favor of her brothers and
nature of a testamentary substitution, but inasmuch as the
of said share still existing and undisposed of by her husband at sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. But
purported substitution is not, in its view, in accordance with the
the time of his death should go to her brothers and sisters neither are We sustaining, on the other hand, Magno's pose
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective and may
share and share alike. Factually, We find that the proven that it gave Hodges only a lifetime usufruct. We hold that by
not be enforced. It is further contended that, in any event,
circumstances relevant to the said orders do not warrant the said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her
inasmuch as the Hodges spouses were both residents of the
conclusion that the court intended to make thereby such brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with the
Philippines, following the decision of this Court in Aznar vs.
alleged final adjudication. Legally, We hold that the tenor of condition, however, that the latter would have complete rights
Garcia, or the case of Christensen, 7 SCRA 95, the estate left
said orders furnish no basis for such a conclusion, and what is of dominion over the whole estate during his lifetime and what
by Mrs. Hodges could not be more than one-half of her share of
more, at the time said orders were issued, the proceedings had would go to the former would be only the remainder thereof at
the conjugal partnership, notwithstanding the fact that she was
not yet reached the point when a final distribution and the time of Hodges' death. In other words, whereas they are not
citizen of Texas, U.S.A., in accordance with Article 16 in
adjudication could be made. Moreover, the interested parties to inherit only in case of default of Hodges, on the other hand,
relation to Articles 900 and 872 of the Civil Code. Initially, We
were not duly notified that such disposition of the estate would Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for them. Clearly
issued a preliminary injunction against Magno and allowed
be done. At best, therefore, said orders merely allowed Hodges then, the essential elements of testamentary substitution are
PCIB to act alone.
to dispose of portions of his inheritance in advance of final absent; the provision in question is a simple case of conditional
adjudication, which is implicitly permitted under Section 2 of simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby the institution of
At the same time PCIB has appealed several separate orders Rule 109, there being no possible prejudice to third parties, Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition the operative
of the trial court approving individual acts of appellee Magno in inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges had no creditors and all pertinent contingency of which is coincidental with that of the suspensive
her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, taxes have been paid. condition of the institution of his brothers and sisters-in-law,
such as, hiring of lawyers for specified fees and incurring which manner of institution is not prohibited by law.
expenses of administration for different purposes and executing
More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances
deeds of sale in favor of her co-appellees covering properties
presently extant in the record, and on the assumption that
which are still registered in the name of Hodges, purportedly
We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges With respect to the appeals from the orders approving consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as
inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than just transactions made by appellee Magno, as administratrix, amended on October 4 and December 6, 1967, is lifted, and
stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper covering properties registered in the name of Hodges, the the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing that petitioner-
application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of details of which are related earlier above, a distinction must be appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of
the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear made between those predicated on contracts to sell executed Charles Newton Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1672, and
that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) by Hodges before the death of his wife, on the one hand, and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the
whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and those premised on contracts to sell entered into by him after Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings
effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the her death. As regards the latter, We hold that inasmuch as the 1307, should act thenceforth always conjointly, never
circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the record payments made by appellees constitute proceeds of sales of independently from each other, as such administrators, is
of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position to make properties belonging to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as may be reiterated, and the same is made part of this judgment and
a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two implied from the tenor of the motions of May 27 and December shall continue in force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal
issues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for further 14, 1957, said payments continue to pertain to said estate, partnership of the deceased spouses and the determination
proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the court a pursuant to her intent obviously reflected in the relevant and segregation from each other of their respective estates,
quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that provisions of her will, on the assumption that the size and value provided, that upon the finality of this judgment, the trial court
pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this of the properties to correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges should immediately proceed to the partition of the presently
stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that would exceed the total value of all the properties covered by combined estates of the spouses, to the end that the one-half
since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband the impugned deeds of sale, for which reason, said properties share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly
could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be may be deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. identified; thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate
adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugal And there being no showing that thus viewing the situation, the remainder of the one-fourth herein adjudged to be her
partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof there would be prejudice to anyone, including the government, estate and cause the same to be turned over or delivered to
during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which the Court also holds that, disregarding procedural technicalities respondent for her exclusive administration in Special
Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than in favor of a pragmatic and practical approach as discussed Proceedings 1307, while the other one-fourth shall remain
one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time above, the assailed orders should be affirmed. Being a stranger under the joint administration of said respondent and petitioner
of her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB has no personality to raise under a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and
been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of the procedural and jurisdictional issues raised by it. And 1672, whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges
third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as inasmuch as it does not appear that any of the other heirs of shall be administered by petitioner exclusively in Special
contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and Mrs. Hodges or the government has objected to any of the Proceedings 1672, without prejudice to the resolution by the
applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones orders under appeal, even as to these parties, there exists no trial court of the pending motions for its removal as
ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free reason for said orders to be set aside. administrator12; and this arrangement shall be maintained until
disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of the final resolution of the two issues of renvoi and renunciation
her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code. hereby reserved for further hearing and determination, and the
DISPOSITIVE PART
corresponding complete segregation and partition of the two
estates in the proportions that may result from the said
The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is resolution.
alternative than to conclude that in predicating its orders on the
hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-
assumption, albeit unexpressed therein, that there is an estate
27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-
of Mrs. Hodges to be distributed among her brothers and Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a
37 and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered to be
sisters and that respondent Magno is the legal administratrix quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in all their actuations in
added after payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the
thereof, the trial court acted correctly and within its jurisdiction. Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views passed and
orders of the trial court under appeal enumerated in detail on
Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and prohibition has to be ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing opinion.
pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision; the existence of
denied. The Court feels however, that pending the liquidation of
the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondent-
the conjugal partnership and the determination of the specific
appellee Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix thereof is Appellant PCIB is ordered to pay, within five (5) days from
properties constituting her estate, the two administrators should
recognized, and it is declared that, until final judgment is notice hereof, thirty-one additional appeal docket fees, but this
act conjointly as ordered in the Court's resolution of September
ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of applying Article decision shall nevertheless become final as to each of the
8, 1972 and as further clarified in the dispositive portion of its
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation obtaining parties herein after fifteen (15) days from the respective notices
decision.
in these cases and (2) the factual and legal issue of whether or to them hereof in accordance with the rules.
not Charles Newton Hodges had effectively and legally
Anent the appeals from the orders of the lower court renounced his inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane Hodges,
Costs against petitioner-appellant PCIB.
sanctioning payment by appellee Magno, as administratrix, of the said estate consists of one-fourth of the community
expenses of administration and attorney's fees, it is obvious properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of
that, with Our holding that there is such an estate of Mrs. the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had
Hodges, and for the reasons stated in the body of this opinion, already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from
the said orders should be affirmed. This We do on the said date until his death, provided, first, that with respect to
assumption We find justified by the evidence of record, and remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue
seemingly agreed to by appellant PCIB, that the size and value to be part of the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed of
of the properties that should correspond to the estate of Mrs. gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and second, that
Hodges far exceed the total of the attorney's fees and should the purported renunciation be declared legally effective,
administration expenses in question. no deductions whatsoever are to be made from said estate; in
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and pay respondent’s money claims.5 Upon appeal by BMSI, the Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the order,
other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed which motion was opposed by respondent. 17 In an Order dated
country in which they are executed. respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of 31 July 2001,18 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion. Thus, it
jurisdiction.6 Respondent elevated the case to this Court but filed a Rule 65 Petition 19 with the Court of Appeals praying for
was dismissed in a Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The the issuance of a writ of certiorari and a writ of injunction to set
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
Resolution became final and executory on 09 November 1998. aside the twin orders of the trial court dated 13 September
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
2000 and 31 July 2001 and to enjoin the trial court from
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
conducting further proceedings.20
observed in their execution. On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union,
instituted an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint,7 docketed as Civil On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
Case No. 1192-BG, named as defendants herein petitioner Decision21 denying the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. It
those which have for their object public order, public policy and
Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The assailed Resolution issued on 10 March 2004.22
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case
agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
that BMSI verbally employed respondent to negotiate the sale
The appellate court held that although the trial court should not
of services in government projects and that respondent was not
have confined itself to the allegations in the complaint and
G.R. No. 162894             February 26, 2008 paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging
should have also considered evidence aliunde in resolving
project which he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint
petitioner’s omnibus motion, it found the evidence presented by
also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, petitioner, that is, the deposition of Walter Browning, insufficient
had combined and functioned as one company.
vs. for purposes of determining whether the complaint failed to
STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent. state a cause of action. The appellate court also stated that it
In its Answer,8 petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s could not rule one way or the other on the issue of whether the
claim, it was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business corporations, including petitioner, named as defendants in the
DECISION in the Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement case had indeed merged together based solely on the evidence
with respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. presented by respondent. Thus, it held that the issue should be
TINGA, J.: Petitioner also denied combining with BMSI and RUST for the threshed out during trial.23 Moreover, the appellate court
purpose of assuming the alleged obligation of the said deferred to the discretion of the trial court when the latter
companies.9 Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision decided not to desist from assuming jurisdiction on the ground
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under which disclosed that per the written agreement between of the inapplicability of the principle of forum non conveniens.
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks the respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as "Special
reversal of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 and the dismissal of the civil Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of
case filed by respondent against petitioner with the trial court. Connecticut.10 Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint
on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
As culled from the records of the case, the following conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO
antecedents appear: counterclaim.11 STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST RAYTHEON
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Preliminary Hearing Based on Affirmative Defenses and for WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Summary Judgment12 seeking the dismissal of the complaint on REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON THE
Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a grounds of forum non conveniens and failure to state a cause GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.24
contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative of action. Respondent opposed the same. Pending the
to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects resolution of the omnibus motion, the deposition of Walter
Incidentally, respondent failed to file a comment despite
in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the Browning was taken before the Philippine Consulate General in
repeated notices. The Ceferino Padua Law Office, counsel on
gross receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a Chicago.13
record for respondent, manifested that the lawyer handling the
service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf case, Atty. Rogelio Karagdag, had severed relations with the
of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo In an Order14 dated 13 September 2000, the RTC denied law firm even before the filing of the instant petition and that it
eruption and mudflows.3 petitioner’s omnibus motion. The trial court held that the factual could no longer find the whereabouts of Atty. Karagdag or of
allegations in the complaint, assuming the same to be respondent despite diligent efforts. In a Resolution25 dated 20
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch admitted, were sufficient for the trial court to render a valid November 2006, the Court resolved to dispense with the filing
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit judgment thereon. It also ruled that the principle of forum non of a comment.
against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court could
Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation
The instant petition lacks merit.
commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment licensed to do business in the Philippines.15
contract.4 On 28 September 1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C.
Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to
Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between whether the application of a substantive law which will after being absorbed by REC. Other documents already
respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. 33 The submitted in evidence are likewise meager to preponderantly
that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the conclude that Raytheon International, Inc., Rust International[,]
State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after Inc. and Brand Marine Service, Inc. have combined into one
elements in the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court. company, so much so that Raytheon International, Inc., the
involved are American corporations and citizens and the surviving company (if at all) may be held liable for the obligation
evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines – of BMSI to respondent Rouzie for unpaid commissions. Neither
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in
that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner these documents clearly speak otherwise.38
conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its
theorizes that the foreign elements of the dispute necessitate
jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available
the immediate application of the doctrine of forum non
forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the question
conveniens.
elsewhere.34 Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in of whether petitioner, BMSI and RUST merged together
the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its requires the presentation of further evidence, which only a full-
Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the Court outlined three jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties blown trial on the merits can afford.
consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts- involved.
of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
instances27 where the Court held that the local judicial
principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 are
machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a
determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
foreign element, the following requisites had to be proved: (1)
matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial
that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it
conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position
should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine
to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and
whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.35
(3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to
Article 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of
enforce its decision.28
Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the
by the provisions of this Code. (16a)
Court of Appeals respected its conclusion that it can assume
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem
jurisdiction over the dispute notwithstanding its foreign
where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court
elements. In the same manner, the Court defers to the sound G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998
has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res,
discretion of the lower courts because their findings are binding
it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of
on this Court.
conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, Petitioner, v. HON. RODOLFO A.
foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, HAJA
the country where the case is filed.29 Petitioner also contends that the complaint in Civil Case No. PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A. TAMANO and the
1192-BG failed to state a cause of action against petitioner. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is
allegation in the pleading.36 As a general rule, the elementary
conferred by the Constitution and the law30 and by the material DECISION
test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief
plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs
demanded.37 BELLOSILLO, J.:
sought therein.31 Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an action for
damages arising from an alleged breach of contract.
Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of The complaint alleged that petitioner had combined with BMSI This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set
damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC. and RUST to function as one company. Petitioner contends aside the decision of the Court of Appeals of 30 September
that the deposition of Walter Browning rebutted this allegation. 1996 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 39656 which affirmed the decision of
On this score, the resolution of the Court of Appeals is the Regional Trial Court-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired
instructive, thus: motion to dismiss as well as the motion for reconsideration filed
jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the
filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the by petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano.
person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its x x x Our examination of the deposition of Mr. Walter Browning
voluntary appearance in court.32 as well as other documents produced in the hearing shows that On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano
these evidence aliunde are not quite sufficient for us to mete a (Tamano) married private respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A.
ruling that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same
shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does remained valid and subsisting until his death on 18 May 1994.
not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign Prior to his death, particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano also
Annexes "A" to "E" by themselves are not substantial,
tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites in
convincing and conclusive proofs that Raytheon Engineers and
action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Malabang, Lanao del Sur.
Constructors, Inc. (REC) assumed the warranty obligations of
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to defendant Rust International in the Makar Port Project in
travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question General Santos City, after Rust International ceased to exist
On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined by Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, 3 Regional relations between husband and wife shall be governed by this
her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib) filed a Complaint for Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the Code and other applicable Muslim laws.
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on contract of marriage and marital relations. 4 Personal actions,
the ground that it was bigamous. They contended that Tamano such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of
As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were
and Estrellita misrepresented themselves marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
married in accordance with the Civil Code. Hence, contrary to
as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the
the marriage contract false and fraudulent. any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of
instant case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano
the plaintiff.5 There should be no question by now that what
were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still
determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the
Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced fall under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by
Zorayda and that Estrellita was not single when she married Courts.
the plaintiff in this case.6 In the complaint for declaration of
Tamano as the decision annulling her previous marriage with
nullity of marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was
Romeo C. Llave never became final and executory for non-
alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation
compliance with publication requirements.
with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.
that Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or Consequently, the sharia courts are not vested with original
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional PD No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages
Trial Court of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under Muslim celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the
subject and nature of the action. She alleged that "only a party laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original
to the marriage" could file an action for annulment of laws was first mentioned only in her Motion for jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which
marriage against the other spouse,1 hence, it was only Tamano Reconsideration. provides -
who could file an action for annulment of their marriage.
Petitioner likewise contended that since Tamano and Zorayda
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall
were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction
jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case despite the exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x (6) In all cases not
to hear and try the instant case was vested in the sharia courts
allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita and within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions x x x x
a courts jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses
The lower court denied the motion to dismissand ruled that the set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of
instant case was properly cognizable by the Regional Trial reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the
the Court of Appeals sustaining the 18 July 1995 and 22
Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were married complaint.7 Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
August 1995 orders of the Regional Trial Court - Br. 89,
in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in determined from the allegations of the complaint as the latter
Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss and
accordance with PD No. 1083 2 or the Code of Muslim Personal comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED. Let the records of this
laws. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied; the plaintiffs causes of action.8cräläwvirtualibräry
case be immediately remanded to the court of origin for further
hence, petitioner filed the instant petition with this Court
proceedings until terminated.
seeking to set aside the 18 July 1995 order of respondent
Petitioner argues that the sharia courts have jurisdiction over
presiding judge of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying
the instant suit pursuant to Art. 13, Title II, PD No. 1083, 9 which
petitioners motion to dismiss and the 22 August 1995 order SO ORDERED.
provides -
denying reconsideration thereof.

Art. 13. Application. - (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply

In a Resolution dated 13 December 1995 we referred the case
to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or
to the Court of Appeals for consolidation with G.R. No. 118371.
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is G.R. No. 169766               March 30, 2011
Zorayda and Adib A. Tamano however filed a motion, which the
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any
Court of Appeals granted, to resolve the Complaint for
part of the Philippines.
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ahead of the other ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
consolidated cases. vs.
(2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA
solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO, Respondents.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the instant case would fall
Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.
under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts only when filed
in places where there are sharia courts. But in places where DECISION
there are no sharia courts, like Quezon City, the instant case (3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the
could properly be filed before the Regional Trial Court. essential requisites and legal impediments to marriage,
divorce, paternity and filiation, guardianship and custody of DEL CASTILLO, J.:
minors, support and maintenance, claims for customary dower
Petitioner is now before us reiterating her earlier argument that
(mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in
it is the sharia court and not the Regional Trial Court which has
and registration of marriage and divorce, rights and obligations the case of subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be
jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action.
between husband and wife, parental authority, and the property impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of
a married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision 1 dated Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of
August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV 1994. She then asked from the court for an extension of 30 Quezon City,25 stating as one of the reasons that as shari’a
No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution2 dated September days to file her answer to be counted from January 4, courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in
13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial 1995,8 and again, another 15 days9 or until February 18, 1995, cases of marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner both of which the court granted.10 PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is not
Estrellita Juliano-Llave’s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our
A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio. Resolution dated August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellita’s
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a
motion for reconsideration27 with finality.
Motion to Dismiss11 on February 20, 1995 where she declared
Factual Antecedents that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were
married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the
latter’s disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano.12 Estrellita RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married
argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Estrellita’s marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.28
Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on
the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or
May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3 and, subsequently, under a civil
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and
Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In their marriage contracts, Sen.
divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts.
Tamano’s civil status was indicated as ‘divorced.’
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen. Tamano’s
The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being
jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity. 13 Thus,
whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines
Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this
widow. and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.29 The
Court questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On
court said:
December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA14 which
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately
Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of shows that the second marriage of the late Senator with
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC
Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda,5 filed a [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of his first
continued to try the case since there can be no default in cases
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage
of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed
nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for void from the very beginning. The fact that the late Senator
to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial
being bigamous. The complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen. declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect
while her opposing parties presented their evidence. When it
Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, the void character of the second marriage because, in this
was Estrellita’s turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for
and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an
such purpose15 were postponed mostly at her instance until the
Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that: acceptable method of terminating the effects of a previous
trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings 16 in
marriage, especially, where the subsequent marriage was
view of the CA’s temporary restraining order issued on
solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.30
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, February 29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the case.17
having been celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore
governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to
Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased
Estrellita in its Decision dated September 30, 1996.18 Estrellita
Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he
then elevated the appellate court’s judgment to this Court by In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right
contracted the same while his prior marriage to Complainant
way of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. to be heard as
Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared as
126603.19
"divorced" has no factual or legal basis, because the deceased
never divorced Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the
could not have validly done so because divorce is not allowed Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC finality of the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
under the New Civil Code; ordered Estrellita to present her evidence on June 26, 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her to
1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing file her answer after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She
was reset to July 9, 1997. 21 The day before this scheduled maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry her as his
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have
hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement.22 marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by
divorced Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of
the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zorayda’s lack of legal
P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal
standing to question the validity of her marriage to the
Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case,
deceased.
with Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for
factually, to have been one contracted under Muslim law as decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the
provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not yet In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17,
and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 2004,32 the CA held that Estrellita can no longer be allowed to
to be thus covered by this law;7 126603.24 file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be heard
but simply ignored it by asking for numerous postponements.
She never filed her answer despite the lapse of around 60
days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further 3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have
also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an Estrellita’s marriage declared void ab initio.
for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an independent answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
and original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in the
Our Ruling
trial court.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with
the late senator is valid as the latter was already divorced
Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts
her right to answer; and her pending petition for
Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being that such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda
certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the
bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. and the deceased without need of registering their consent to
motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all
Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage
suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the
for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first nuptial was solemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen.
RTC of Quezon City.
celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to
celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.38
the CA, had the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of
Tamano’s wife and, hence, the injured party in the senator’s her right to due process. She was never declared in default,
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal
subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita. and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her
standing to file suit because only the husband or the wife can
interest.
file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution, 33 the CA denied Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39
Estrellita’s Motion for Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the
Reconsideration where it debunked the additional errors she suspension of the period to file an answer and of the
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen)
raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public proceedings in the trial court until her petition
defends the CA’s reasoning and stresses that Estrellita was
prosecutor’s report on the existence of collusion in violation of for certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her Motion
never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an
both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court34 and Article 48 to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we
original action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of
of the Family Code35 will not invalidate the trial court’s judgment affirmed the following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is
the main action before the RTC.
as the proceedings between the parties had been adversarial, Estrellita’s basis for her argument, to wit:
negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues
have not been joined before the RTC, the same is attributable As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to
to Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA there is collusion, the Sol Gen says that this is no longer
Dismiss,’ instead of filing an Answer to the complaint. The filing
disregarded Estrellita’s allegation that the trial court essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the
of said motion suspended the period for her to file her Answer
erroneously rendered its judgment way prior to our remand to suit that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen
to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the
the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No. also supports private respondents’ legal standing to challenge
Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent
126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to the validity of Estrellita’s purported marriage with Sen. Tamano,
Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The
Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of Estrellita’s reasoning that any proper interested party may attack directly
marriage to Sen. Tamano. Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying
or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have
the ‘Motion to Dismiss’ of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule
such right to file the action as they are the ones prejudiced by
16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the
the marital union.
The Parties’ Respective Arguments Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in Rule 11
of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment. computed from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now
Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the
argues that the CA erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the
complaint: x x x41 (Emphasis supplied.)
latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity Issues
to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the
allegations against the validity of her marriage. She claims that Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
Judge Macias v. Macias36 laid down the rule that the filing of a therein is that the trial court is mandated to suspend trial until it
motion to dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it.
file an answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to 1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment, Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should
suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the even though the latter was rendered prematurely because: a) suspend its proceedings should the issue of the propriety or
ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with the judgment was rendered without waiting for the Supreme impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the
finality. She maintains that she merely participated in the RTC Court’s final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due
hearings because of the trial court’s assurance that the 126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer and thus was process in the course of the proceeding of the case because
proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever action the denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor did not even after it denied the wife’s motion to dismiss, it immediately
High Court will take on her petition questioning the RTC’s conduct an investigation whether there was collusion; proceeded to allow the husband to present evidence ex parte
jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it and resolved the case with undue haste even when, under the
rendered an adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In
before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the 2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. the instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer,
CA on November 11, 1998.37 She also questions the lack of a Tamano was bigamous; and as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended period
report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there
earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
extension of time to file an answer. collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of
respective counsels, if any. during its effectivity.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its
judgment, as it should have waited first for the resolution of her (2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage
Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD
Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However,
that the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof
the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein
certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a collusion, it shall dismiss the petition. both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a
continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with
judgment complained of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the
explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083
court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the
course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining does not provide for a situation where the parties were married
public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against both in civil and Muslim rites."53
the public respondent from further proceeding in the case." 43 In
fact, the trial court respected the CA’s temporary restraining Records show that the trial court immediately directed the
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4,
order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC public prosecutor to submit the required report,45 which we find
1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code
again require Estrellita to present her evidence. to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City
which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen.
Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated
Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the
March 30, 1995,46 wherein he attested that there could be no
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise
collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence
Rule 45, we never issued any order precluding the trial court provided:
because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private
from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous
respondents.
requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior
refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence when it
to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in
was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar.
force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except
first for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an Even assuming that there is a lack of report of collusion or a
as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or
answer and her refusal to present her evidence were lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in
legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability
attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to Tuason v. Court of Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal
incurred thereby.
benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:
other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly
proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it It has been held that:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of
deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side
of the story. Neither should the lower court wait for the decision marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine
whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that
in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor should
that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is
it wait for its records to be remanded back to it because G.R.
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily
No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the Motion to
the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved
Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.
is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited
or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the
attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the
parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial Civil Code – in respect of civil acts that took place before the
to the non-existence of collusion.
court.48 Muslim Code’s enactment.54

Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section

The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is
3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD Article 186(2) which states:
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the
ab initio.
public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity
specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation of this Code in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be
report to determine whether there is collusion between the The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the
parties: celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.
rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage relationships
between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1) Within Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for
1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can
one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in the marriage to be considered as one contracted under the
exist at any given time.50 Under the marriage provisions of the
paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between
Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to 61762, as well as its subsequent G.R. No. 193902              
Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.57 June 1, 2011
Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil
Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner,
the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen.
No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If vs.
Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita
Estrellita’s interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAMSON R. PACASUM,
married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged
unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what SR., Respondents.
by the CA as void ab initio.
the Rule contemplated.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if
personalities to file the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M.
he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that
No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife G.R. No. 193908
the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage
does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground
benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner,
is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and vs.
thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondent.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous
Philippines,55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all,
others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The G.R. No. 194075
therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity
validity of their own marriage. of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution. SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Respondent.
marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the
However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind son from impugning the subsequent marriage.1âwphi1 But in
the petition is bigamy. the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities DECISION
to file an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution
governs marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is NACHURA, J.:
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the
prospective in application and does not apply to cases already
spouses may file the petition to the exclusion of compulsory or
commenced before March 15, 2003.58
intestate heirs, we said: These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Decision1 dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Estrellita’s marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN, dismissing the petition for
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition certiorari filed by petitioner Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates
for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10- (Zamoranos) in G.R. No. 193902, thus, affirming the Order2 of
on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Lanao del Norte, in
marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy filed by petitioner
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for any interested party may attack the marriage directly or Samson R. Pacasum, Sr. in G.R. No. 194075.
annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even
nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M.
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
[Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a] the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise
considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim
mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for injured by the judgment in the suit.60 Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on April 28, 1982.
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC,
The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal they should be interpreted in a way that would preserve their Quezon City.
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only respective rights which include striking down bigamous
inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered. A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De
hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the marriage was confirmed by the Shari’a Circuit District Court, 1st
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
17, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
Circuit, 3rd District, Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos filed a motion for reconsideration of the City
Divorce on June 18, 1992, as follows: Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and, in 1998, the two Prosecutor’s February 2, 2005 resolution. As a result, the
were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of proceedings before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, were
Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for temporarily suspended. On April 29, 2005, the City Prosecutor
DECREE OF DIVORCE
custody of their minor children. Eventually, on October 18, of Ozamis City, the acting City Prosecutor of Iligan City at the
1999, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise time, issued a resolution granting Zamoranos’ motion for
This is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the reconsideration and dismissing the charge of Bigamy against
Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman against her former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto. Zamoranos.7
husband, the herein respondent, on the ground that the wife,
herein complainant, was previously given by her husband the
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a Not unexpectedly, Pacasum moved for reconsideration of the
authority to exercise Talaq, as provided for and, in accordance
flurry of cases against Zamoranos, to wit: April 29, 2005 resolution of the City Prosecutor, which was
with Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the
denied in a resolution dated August 15, 2005. 8 Posthaste,
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the Office of the
1. Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed on March 31, 2003
Secretary of Justice, assailing the dismissal of his criminal
before the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, docketed as Civil Case
When this case was called for hearing[,] both parties appeared complaint for Bigamy against Zamoranos.9
No. 6249. Subsequently, on May 31, 2004, Pacasum amended
and herein respondent, Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman[,]
the petition into one for Declaration of a Void Marriage,
interposes no objection to confirm their divorce, which they
alleging, among other things, that: (a) Zamoranos, at the time In yet another turn of events, the Secretary of Justice, on
have freely entered into on December 18, 1983.
of her marriage to Pacasum, was already previously married to February 7, 2006, issued a resolution granting Pacasum’s
De Guzman on July 30, 1982; (b) Zamoranos’ first marriage, Petition for Review and reversed the February 2, 2005 and
This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of the herein parties solemnized before the RTC, Quezon City, presided over by April 29, 2005 resolutions of the City Prosecutor. 10 Zamoranos
is fully convinced that both the complainant and the respondent Judge Laguio, subsisted at the time of the celebration of immediately filed an Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the
have been duly converted to the faith of Islam prior to their Zamoranos and Pacasum’s marriage; (c) Zamoranos and Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) for Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in
Muslim wedding and finding that there is no more possibility of Pacasum’s marriage was bigamous and void ab initio; and (d) Abeyance Filing of the Instant Case; and (3) to Hold in
reconciliation by and between them, hereby issues this decree thus, Zamoranos, as the guilty spouse, should forfeit: (i) Abeyance or Quash Warrant of Arrest, respectively dated
of divorce. custody of her minor children to their father, who should have February 20, 2006 and February 24, 2006, before the Secretary
sole and exclusive custody; (ii) her share in the community of Justice.11 Unfortunately for Zamoranos, her twin motions
property in favor of the children; and (iii) her inheritance from were denied by the Secretary of Justice in a resolution dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to the Pacasum by testate or intestate succession. May 17, 2006.12
provisions of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, this petition is hereby granted. Consequently, the
marriage between Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de 2. Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the Zamoranos’ second motion for reconsideration, as with her
Guzman and Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman is hereby Revised Penal Code (RPC), filed on October 25, 2004. previous motions, was likewise denied.
confirmed dissolved.
3. Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos’ dismissal On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void
Issued this 18th day of June, 1992, at Isabela, Basilan from service and disbarment before the Civil Service Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249, the RTC, Branch 2,
Province, Philippines. Commission (CSC), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and Iligan City, rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos,
the Bureau of Finance Revenue Integrity Protection Service, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The
respectively. Parenthetically, the administrative cases were RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De
(signed) dismissed in due course. However, as of the date of the Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their
assailed CA Decision, Pacasum’s appeal from the CSC’s marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by
HON. KAUDRI L. JAINUL dismissal of the administrative case was still pending Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the
resolution. Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines:
Presiding Judge3
Quite ironically, soon after amending his petition in Civil Case From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the Court finds that
No. 6249, Pacasum contracted a second marriage with the allegation of [Pacasum] to the effect that his marriage with
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on Catherine Ang Dignos on July 18, 2004.4 [Zamoranos] on December 28, 1992 is a bigamous marriage
December 20, 1989. As she had previously done in her first due to the alleged subsisting previous marriage between
nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman is misplaced. The previous
(Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City
marriage between Jesus de Guzman and [Zamoranos] has
she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Prosecutor, through Prosecutor Leonor Quiñones, issued a
long been terminated [and] has gone with the wind. The fact
Thereafter, on December 28, 1992, in order to strengthen the resolution dated February 2, 2005, finding prima facie evidence
that divorce by Talaq was entered into by [Zamoranos] and her
ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy.5 Consequently, on
first husband in accordance with PD 1083, x x x their marriage
marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio February 22, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against
is dissolved and consequently thereof, [Zamoranos] and Jesus
Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos’ Zamoranos before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, docketed as
de Guzman can re-marry. Moreover, the second marriage
first marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Criminal Case No. 06-12305.6
entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband Jesus de
Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Guzman under the Family Code on July 30, 1982 is merely
Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
ceremonial, being unnecessary, it does not modify/alter or x x x x" Undaunted, Zamoranos filed a petition for certiorari for the
change the validity of the first marriage entered into by them nullification and reversal of the December 21, 2009 Order of the
under PD 1083. RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City. As previously adverted to, the CA
The above provision of law clearly shows no concurrent
dismissed Zamoranos’ petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety
jurisdiction with any civil courts or other courts of law. And any
of a petition for certiorari to assail the denial of a Motion to
Likewise, in the case of [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos], their divorce proceeding undertaken before the Shari’[a] Court is
Quash the Information:
second marriage on December 28, 1992 under the Family valid, recognized, binding and sufficient divorce proceedings.
Code does not in any way modify, alter or change the validity of
the first marriage on December 20, 1989 entered into by A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an
Moreover, the instant case is one of the several cases filed by
[Pacasum] and [Zamoranos] under PD 1083, as amended. In extraordinary remedy. As such, it is confined to extraordinary
[Pacasum] against [Zamoranos] such as complaints for
fact, according to Ghazali, one of the renowned Muslim author cases wherein the action of the inferior court is wholly void. The
disbarment, for immorality, for bigamy and misconduct before
and jurist in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence and concurred in aim of certiorari is to keep the inferior court within the
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and in the Civil
by retired Justice Ra[s]ul of the Court of Appeals and also a parameters of its jurisdiction. Hence, no grave abuse of
Service Commission which were all similar or [based on] the
Professor on Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, in the case of discretion may be imputed to a court on the basis alone of an
same set of facts. A pure and simple harassment.
combined marriage[s], the first marriage is to be considered alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. To prosper, a
valid and effective as between the parties while the second petition for certiorari must clearly demonstrate that the lower
marriage is merely ceremonial, being a surplusage and In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court is of the court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to
unnecessary. Therefore, the divorce by Talaq dissolved the considered view and so hold that this Court has no jurisdiction deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
marriage between [Zamoranos] and her first husband[,de to hear and decide the above-entitled case for annulment of
Guzman,] being governed by PD 1083, x x x. marriage entered into under PD 1083, x x x. It is the Shari’a
Simply put, in a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court that has the exclusive original jurisdiction.
appellate court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only
Article 13, Chapter I, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve
Laws, provides x x x: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the affirmative defenses questions or issues beyond its competence, such as an error of
which are in the nature of motion to dismiss is hereby granted. judgment which is defined as one in which the court or quasi-
judicial body may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction; as
"Application
opposed to an error of jurisdiction where the acts complained of
The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for lack of were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.
jurisdiction.
The provisions of this title shall apply to marriage and divorce
wherein both parties are Muslims[,] or wherein only the male
xxxx
party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in SO ORDERED.13
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines." In the present case, [w]e have circumspectly examined
On separate appeals, the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed [Zamoranos’] Motion to Quash Information and the action taken
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 6249 by the RTC, Branch 2, by the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City] in respect thereto, and [w]e
Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of Iligan City. On April 3, 2009, the denial by the Supreme Court found nothing that may constitute as grave abuse of discretion
[Zamoranos] and her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[,] shall of Pacasum’s appeal became final and executory and was on the part of the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City]. The Order dated
be governed by the Muslim Code and divorce proceedings recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.14 December 21, 2009, which first denied [Zamoranos’] [M]otion to
shall be properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
[Q]uash Information meticulously explained the factual and
Shari’a Circuit Court.
In the meantime, on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan legal basis for the denial of the issues raised by [Zamoranos] in
City, upon motion of Pacasum, issued an Order reinstating said motion. We find the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City’s] stance in
Art. 155, Chapter 2, Title II, Book 4 of the Muslim code, Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy against Zamoranos.15 upholding the sufficiency of the Information for bigamy and
provides x x x: taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 to be well
within the bounds of its jurisdiction. Even assuming arguendo
Not surprisingly, Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the that the denial of petitioner’s motion to quash is erroneous,
"Jurisdiction – The Shari’a Circuit Courts shall have exclusive Information, arguing that the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, had no such error was, at worst, an error of judgment and not of
original jurisdiction over: jurisdiction over her person and over the offense charged. jurisdiction.18
Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the decision of the
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, in Civil Case No. 6249 categorically
xxxx
declared her and Pacasum as Muslims, resulting in the Interestingly, even Pacasum was not satisfied with the CA’s
mootness of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 and the dismissal of Zamoranos’ petition for certiorari. Hence, these
2. All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are inapplicability of the RPC provision on Bigamy to her marriage separate appeals by Zamoranos and Pacasum.
Muslims or have been married in accordance with Article 13 to Pacasum. In all, Zamoranos claimed that Criminal Case No.
involving disputes relating to: 06-12305 ought to be dismissed.16 We note that Zamoranos is petitioner in two separate cases,
filed by her two counsels, docketed as G.R. Nos. 193902 and
a) Marriage; On December 21, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, denied 193908, respectively, which assail the same CA Decision.
Zamoranos’ Motion to Quash the Information. Zamoranos’ However, upon motion of counsel for Zamoranos, to obviate
motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied.17 confusion and superfluity, we have allowed Zamoranos to
b) Divorce recognized under this Code;
withdraw her petition in G.R. No. 193908 and for her earlier or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or any Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the
petition in G.R. No. 193902 to remain. plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of principle of res judicata. The provision reads:
law.19
Zamoranos posits that it was grievous error for the CA to ignore SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a
the conclusions made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, and The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
affirmed by the CA and this Court, to wit: bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order,
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of may be as follows:
jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts—
1. Zamoranos is a Muslim and was validly married to another
acts which courts have no power or authority in law to
Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites; (a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing,
perform.20
or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the
estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
2. Zamoranos and De Guzman’s marriage ceremony under civil
The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his
rites before Judge Laguio did not remove their marriage from
appealable. It is an interlocutory order which cannot be the relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive
the ambit of P.D. No. 1083;
subject of an appeal.21 upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the
condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the
3. Corollary to paragraph 1, Zamoranos’ divorce by talaq to De probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall
Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and
Guzman severed their marriage ties; only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or
prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a
intestate.
motion to quash an information. The established rule is that,
4. "Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the
[Zamoranos] and her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[, are] remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but The requisites for res judicata or bar by prior judgment are:
governed by the Muslim Code and [the] divorce proceedings to continue with the case in due course and, when an
properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Shari’a unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
Circuit Court." manner authorized by law.22

(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;

5. Zamoranos remarried Pacasum, another Muslim, under However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that
Islamic rites; and in certain situations, certiorari is considered an appropriate
remedy to assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of (3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
a motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of the over the subject matter and the parties; and
6. On the whole, regular courts, in particular, RTC, Branch 6, following exceptions: (a) when the court issued the order
Iligan City, have no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case for without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
declaration of nullity of marriage entered into under P.D. No. (4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity
discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is patently
1083 because it is the Shari’a Circuit Court that has original of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.26
erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate
jurisdiction over the subject matter. and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a "more enlightened
and substantial justice";23 (d) to promote public welfare and The second and fourth elements of res judicata are not present
For his part, Pacasum, although he agrees with the dismissal of public policy;24 and (e) when the cases "have attracted in this case. Suffice it to state that the judgment rendered by
Zamoranos’ petition, raises a quarrel with the aforementioned nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, was not a judgment on the merits.
conclusions of the CA. Pacasum vehemently denies that dispatch in the consideration thereof."25 The first four of the The lower court simply dismissed the petition for declaration of
Zamoranos is a Muslim, who was previously married and foregoing exceptions occur in this instance. nullity of marriage since it found that the Shari’a Circuit Court
divorced under Islamic rites, and who entered into a second had jurisdiction to hear the dissolution of the marriage of
marriage with him, likewise under Islamic rites. Muslims who wed under Islamic rites.
Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6,
Iligan City, committed an error of jurisdiction, not simply an
We impale the foregoing issues into the following: error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos’ motion to quash. Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the
case for Bigamy, should have taken cognizance of the
categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that
1. Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos’ petition for First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos
Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another
certiorari; and on the conclusiveness of judgment made by the RTC, Branch
Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic
2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of nullity
law. In fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos’
of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage
2. Whether the RTC’s, Branch 2, Iligan City and the CA’s divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties.
to Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, the
separate factual findings that Zamoranos is a Muslim are Apart from that, Zamoranos presented the following evidence:
decision of which is already final and executory, the RTC,
correct. Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter 1. Affidavit of Confirmation 27 executed by the Ustadz, Abdullah
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer by the regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, Ha-Ja-Utto, who solemnized the marriage of Zamoranos and
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, declared that it was the Shari’a Circuit Court which had De Guzman under Islamic rites, declaring under oath that:
board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
1. I am an Ustadz, in accordance with the Muslim laws and as 3. The Sharia’s Circuit Council in the Island Province of Basilan RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the
such, authorized to solemnize the marriages among Muslims; was housed at the old Capitol Building, in the City of Isabela, proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of
Basilan, Philippines;
2. On May 3, 1982, after I was shown the documents attesting Zamoranos and De Guzman’s marriage before the Shari’a
that both parties are believers of Islam, I solemnized the 4. As the Clerk of Court of the Sharia’s Circuit Court since Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it had not been
marriage of Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman and Marietta 1985, I can recall that in 1992, Mr. Jesus (Mohamad) de dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by
(Mariam) Zamoranos in accordance with Muslim Personal Guzman, who is a province mate of mine in Basilan, and his Zamoranos and De Guzman.
Laws in Isabela, Basilan; former wife, Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos, jointly asked for the
confirmation of their Talaq, by the wife; which divorce became
Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before
irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree
3. Sometime in 1992[,] Mr. Mohamad de Guzman and his the CA when her liberty was already in jeopardy with the
No. 1083;
former wife, Mariam Zamoranos came to see me and asked my continuation of the criminal proceedings against her.
assistance to have their marriage and the subsequent Talaq by
the wife, which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the 5. In June of 1993, all the records of the Sharia’s Circuit Court
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083; registered [by] the were lost by reason of the fire that gutted down the old Capitol
Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal
Shari’a Circuit Court in the province of Basilan; and, after I was Building in the City of Isabela;
Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and effective
convinced that their divorce was in order, I accompanied them
participation of the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and]
to the [C]lerk of [C]ourt of the Shari’a Circuit Court;
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and
the above statements of fact. interests in the formulation and implementation of its policies."
4. Satisfied that their marriage and the subsequent divorce
were in accordance with Muslim personal laws, the Clerk of
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular
Court registered their documents;
authority, two of whom are officers of the court, it is evident that criminal courts have jurisdiction over the offense defeats the
Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal
5. In June of 1993, the old Capitol building, where the Shari’a Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on
Circuit Court was housed, was razed to the ground; and, I consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed by Muslim Filipinos.
found out later that all the records, effects and office P.D. No. 1083.
equipments of the Shari’a Circuit Court were totally lost [in] the
Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides:
fire;
True, the Shari’a Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction
over offenses penalized under the RPC. Certainly, the RTC,
TITLE II.
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish Branch 6, Iligan City, is correct when it declared that:
CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
the above statements of fact; and
The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original
Article 3. Conflict of provisions.
7. This is issued upon the request of Mr. De Guzman for jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive original
whatever legal purposes it may serve. jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg.
129] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the (1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and
Sharia District Courts and Sharia Circuit Courts with limited laws of general application, the former shall prevail.
2. Certification28 issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge
jurisdiction. Neither court was vested jurisdiction over criminal
Jainul), which confirmed the divorce agreement between
prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal Code. There is
Zamoranos and De Guzman. (2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code
nothing in PD 1083 that divested the Regional Trial Courts of
and special laws or laws of local application, the latter shall be
its jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy. Hence, this
liberally construed in order to carry out the former.
3. Affidavit29 executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge Court has jurisdiction over this case.30
Usman), former Clerk of Court of Judge Jainul at the time of the
confirmation of Zamoranos and De Guzman’s divorce (3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases,
agreement by the latter. Judge Usman’s affidavit reads, in Muslims and nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the
the trial court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of
pertinent part: prejudice of a non-Muslim.
the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on
Pacasum’s claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her
1. I am the presiding Judge of the Sharia’s Circuit Court in the marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazali’s
City of Pagadian; obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos’ Muslim Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the
status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the Philippines, the two experts on the subject matter of Muslim
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA. personal laws expound thereon:
2. The first time that a Sharia’s Circuit court was established in
the Island Province of Basilan was in 1985, with the Honorable
Kaudri L. Jainul, as the Presiding Judge, while I was then the The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict
First Clerk of Court of the Basilan Sharia’s Circuit Court; accused contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one between any provision of this Code and laws of general
still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the application, this Code shall prevail. For example, there is
conflict between the provision on bigamy under the Revised
Penal Code which is a law of general application and Article 27 date of divorce. However, if she is (a) The marriage bond shall be severed
of this Code, on subsequent marriage, the latter shall prevail, in pregnant at the time of the divorce, she and the spouses may contract another
the sense that as long as the subsequent marriage is may remarry only after delivery. marriage in accordance with this Code;
solemnized "in accordance with" the Muslim Code, the
provision of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy will not apply.
xxxx (b) The spouses shall lose their mutual
The second provision refers to a conflict between the provision
rights of inheritance;
of this Code which is a special law and another special law or
laws of local application. The latter should be liberally Chapter Three
construed to carry out the provision of the Muslim Code.31 DIVORCE (TALAQ) (c) The custody of children shall be
determined in accordance with Article 78 of
this Code;
On Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No. Section 1. Nature and Form
1083 provides:
(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover
Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is
from the husband her whole dower in case
TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE the formal dissolution of the marriage bond
the talaq has been effected after the
in accordance with this Code to be granted
consummation of the marriage, or one-half
only after the exhaustion of all possible
Chapter One thereof if effected before its consummation;
means of reconciliation between the
APPLICABILITY CLAUSE
spouses. It may be effected by:
(e) The husband shall not be discharged
Article 13. Application. – from his obligation to give support in
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband
accordance with Article 67; and
(talaq);
(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply
to marriage and divorce wherein both (f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in
xxxx
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the the marriage settlements, shall be
male party is a Muslim and the marriage is dissolved and liquidated.
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law Article 46. Divorce by talaq.
or this Code in any part of the Philippines.
For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and
(1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by Dr. Ghazali’s Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim
(2) In case of marriage between a Muslim the husband in a single repudiation of his Code of the Philippines:
and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in wife during her non-menstrual period (tuhr)
accordance with Muslim law or this Code, within which he has totally abstained from
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the
the Civil Code of the Philippines shall carnal relation with her. Any number of
Muslim Code or Muslim law is complied with. If together with it
apply. repudiations made during one tular shall
or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in
constitute only one repudiation and shall
accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called
become irrevocable after the expiration of
xxxx combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is
the prescribed ‘idda.
the validating rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial one.
But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this
Chapter Two
(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the
MARRIAGE (NIKAH)
either for the first or second time, shall application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when
have the right to take her back (ruju) within both parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim
Section 1. Requisites of Marriage. the prescribed ‘idda by resumption of and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim
cohabitation without need of a new Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil
contract of marriage. Should he fail to do Code of the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of
xxxx
so, the repudiation shall become the parties, if the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
irrevocable (talaq bain sugra). solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.32
Section 3. Subsequent Marriages
xxxx Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally
xxxx state that one of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as
other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond,
Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq; or entitling one to remarry.331avvphi1
Article 29. By divorcee. faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it
becomes irrevocable, shall have the
following effects: It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos’ divorce from De
(1) No woman shall contract a subsequent Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the
marriage unless she has observed an ‘idda Shari’a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was
of three monthly courses counted from the
valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. name.3 At the time of the purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia District Court set aside the decision dated June 11, 2008 on the
Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without occupied the parcel of land.4 ground of mistake.16
jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.
By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Vivencio
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. Blg. P-60192 issued by the Land Registration Authority "intentionally [waived] his right to defend himself."17 It noted that
The petition in G.R. No. 194075 is DENIED. The Decision of allegedly covering the same parcel of land.5 he was duly served with summons and had notice of the
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN is following: Roldan’s motion to present evidence ex parte,
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s decision dated June
On October 30, 2006, Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed.
Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for 11, 2008, and the writ of execution. However, Vivencio only
In a report, Geodetic Engineer Dennis P. Dacup found that
Bigamy is GRANTED. went to court "when he lost his right to assail the decision via
Vivencio occupied the parcel of land covered by Roldan’s
certiorari."18
certificate of title.6
SO ORDERED.
According to respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, Vivencio
To settle his conflicting claim with Vivencio, Roldan initiated
cited the wrong provision of law. Article 155, paragraph (2) of
Resolution issued on September 13, 2005, are hereby barangay conciliation proceedings before the Office of the
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines refers to
AFFIRMED. Barangay Chairman of Poblacion II, Parang, Shariff
the jurisdiction of Shari’a Circuit Courts, not of Shari’a District
Kabunsuan. Failing to settle with Vivencio at the barangay
Courts.19 It ruled that it had jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for
level, Roldan filed an action to recover the possession of the
SO ORDERED. recovery of possession. Regardless of Vivencio being a non-
parcel of land with respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court.7
Muslim, his rights were not prejudiced since respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court decided the case applying the provisions
In his petition, Roldan alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim; that of the Civil Code of the Philippines.20
he is the registered owner of the lot covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15633; and that Vivencio occupied his
Thus, in its order21 dated May 29, 2009, respondent Fifth
G.R. No. 188832               April 23, 2014 property, depriving him of the right to use, possess, and enjoy
Shari’a District Court denied Vivencio’s petition for relief from
it. He prayed that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court order
judgment for lack of merit. It reiterated its order directing the
Vivencio to vacate his property.8
VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA, Petitioner, issuance of a writ of execution of the decision dated June 11,
vs. 2008.
FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E. Respondent court took cognizance of the case and caused
MALA, represented by his father Hadji Kalam T. service of summons on Vivencio. However, despite service of
Vivencio received a copy of the order denying his petition for
Mala, Respondents. summons, Vivencio failed to file his answer. Thus, Roldan
relief from judgment on June 17, 2009.22
moved that he be allowed to present evidence ex parte, which
motion respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court granted in its
DECISION order9 dated January 30, 2008.10 On August 6, 2009, Vivencio filed the petition for certiorari with
prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order with this
LEONEN, J.: court.23
In its decision11 dated June 11, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court ruled that Roldan, as registered owner, had the
Shari' a District Courts have no jurisdiction over real actions better right to possess the parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to In his petition for certiorari, Vivencio argued that respondent
where one of the parties is not a Muslim. vacate the property, turn it over to Roldan, and pay ₱10,000.00 Fifth Shari’a District Court acted without jurisdiction in rendering
as moderate damages and ₱5,000.00 as attorney’s fees. the decision dated June 11, 2008. Under Article 143, paragraph
(2)(b) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
This is a petition for certiorari with application for issuance of Philippines,24 Shari’a District Courts may only take cognizance
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to set On December 15, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a Distict Court
of real actions where the parties involved are Muslims.
aside the Fifth (5th) Shari'a District Court's decision 1 dated issued the notice of writ of execution12 to Vivencio, giving him
Reiterating that he is not a Muslim, Vivencio argued that
June 11, 2008 and order2 dated May 29, 2009 in SDC Special 30 days from receipt of the notice to comply with the decision.
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction over
Proceedings Case No. 07-200. He received a copy of the notice on December 16, 2008.13
the subject matter of Roldan’s action. Thus, all the proceedings
before respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, including the
The facts as established from the pleadings of the parties are On January 13, 2009, Vivencio filed a petition for relief from decision dated June 11, 2008, are void.25
as follows: judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction.14 In his petition for relief from judgment, Vivencio
In the resolution26 dated August 19, 2009, this court ordered
cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal
On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300- Roldan to comment on Vivencio’s petition for certiorari. This
Laws of the Philippines15 and argued that Shari’a District Courts
square-meter parcel of land located in Poblacion, Parang, court subsequently issued a temporary restraining order
may only hear civil actions and proceedings if both parties are
Maguindanao, now Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres enjoining the implementation of the writ of execution against
Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio argued
Cañete. On March 3, 1996, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- Vivencio.27
that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to
15633 covering the parcel of land was issued in Roldan’s take cognizance of Roldan’s action for recovery of possession
of a parcel of land. He prayed that respondent Fifth Shari’a
On September 21, 2011, Roldan filed his comment28 on the 5. That the main issue in the instant action for certiorari is Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and
petition for certiorari. He allegedly filed the action for recovery whether or not herein petitioner (respondent below) has determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings
of possession with the Shari’a District Court where "a more effectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings in question belong."36 This power is conferred by law,37 which
speedy disposition of the case would be obtained":29 below and had lost his right to appeal via Certiorari; and the may either be the Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter
issue on whether or not the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose, consent
has jurisdiction over an action where one of the parties is a to, or agree as to what court or tribunal should decide their
1. That SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200 (Quieting of Title…) was
non-muslim; disputes.38 If a court hears, tries, and decides an action in
duly filed with the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato
which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the
City at the option of herein private respondent (petitioner
judgment rendered, are void.39
below) who believed that a more speedy disposition of the case 6. That the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato City
would be obtained when the action is filed with the Shariah acquired jurisdiction over the case and that the same Court had
District Court than in the Regional Trial Courts considering the correctly ruled that herein petitioner (respondent) intentionally To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject
voluminous pending cases at the Regional Trial Courts[.]30 waived his right to defend himself including his right to appeal matter of the action, the material allegations of the complaint
via certiorari; and the character of the relief sought are examined.40
On Vivencio’s claim that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court
had no jurisdiction to decide the action for recovery of 7. That it is humbly submitted that when the Shariah District The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is
possession because he is a non-Muslim, Roldan argued that Court took cognizance of an action under its concurrent the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Court, the law rules applied Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts
Philippines prohibited non-Muslims from participating in Shari’a is not the Code on Muslim Personal Laws but the Civil Code of have concurrent original jurisdiction with "existing civil courts"
court proceedings, especially in actions where the Shari’a court the Philippines and the Revised Rules of Procedure, hence the over real actions not arising from customary contracts41 wherein
applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. same would not prejudice the right of herein petitioner the parties involved are Muslims:
Thus, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court validly took (respondent below)[.]33
cognizance of his action:
ART 143. Original jurisdiction. – x x x x
In the resolution dated November 21, 2011, this court ordered
2. That the Shariah District Court is not a court exclusively for Vivencio to reply to Roldan’s comment. On February 3, 2012,
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District
muslim litigants. No provision in the Code on Muslim Personal Vivencio filed his manifestation,34 stating that he would no
Court shall have original jurisdiction over:
Laws which expressly prohibits non-muslim to participate in the longer file a reply to the comment as he had "exhaustively
proceedings in the Shariah Courts, especially in actions which discussed the issue presented for resolution in [his petition for
applies the civil code and not the Code on Muslim Personal certiorari]."35 xxxx
Laws;
The principal issue for our resolution is whether a Shari’a (b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in
3. The Shariah District Courts has jurisdiction over action for District Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one of paragraph 1(d)42 wherein the parties involved are Muslims
quieting of title filed by a muslim litigant since the nature of the the parties is not a Muslim. except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which
action involved mere removal of cloud of doubt upon one’s shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Certificate of Title. The laws applied in this case is the Civil Municipal Circuit Court; and
We also resolve the following issues:
Code and other related laws, and not the Code on Muslim
Personal Laws[.]31
xxxx
1. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and
decide a real action where one of the parties is a non-Muslim if
Since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had jurisdiction to
the District Court decides the action applying the provisions of When ownership is acquired over a particular property, the
decide the action for recovery of possession, Roldan argued
the Civil Code of the Philippines; and owner has the right to possess and enjoy it.43 If the owner is
that the proceedings before it were valid. Respondent Fifth
dispossessed of his or her property, he or she has a right of
Shari’a District Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
action to recover its possession from the dispossessor. 44 When
Vivencio upon service on him of summons. When Vivencio 2. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and
the property involved is real, 45 such as land, the action to
failed to file his answer, he "effectively waived his right to decide a real action filed by a Muslim against a non-Muslim if
recover it is a real action; 46 otherwise, the action is a personal
participate in the proceedings [before the Fifth Shari’a District the non-Muslim defendant was served with summons.
action.47 In such actions, the parties involved must be Muslims
Court]"32 and he cannot argue that his rights were prejudiced:
for Shari’a District Courts to validly take cognizance of them.
We rule for petitioner Vivencio.
4. That it is not disputed that herein petitioner (respondent
In this case, the allegations in Roldan’s petition for recovery of
below) was properly served with summons, notices and other
I possession did not state that Vivencio is a Muslim. When
court processes when the SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200 was filed
Vivencio stated in his petition for relief from judgment that he is
and heard in the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato
not a Muslim, Roldan did not dispute this claim.
City, but petitioner (respondent below) intentionally or without Respondent Fifth Shari’a District
known reason, ignore the proceedings; Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try,
and decide Roldan’s action for When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim,
recovery of possession respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court should have motu
proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, if it appears that the court has no jurisdiction real property. The proceedings before it are void, regardless of actively participated in the proceedings before the Labor
over the subject matter of the action based on the pleadings or the fact that it applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Arbiter. When the Labor Arbiter ruled against Metromedia
the evidence on record, the court shall dismiss the claim: Philippines in resolving the action. Times, it appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission, arguing for the first time that the Labor Arbiter had
no jurisdiction over the complaint. According to Metromedia
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses True, no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Times, the case involved a grievance issue "properly
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in Philippines expressly prohibits non-Muslims from participating
cognizable by the voluntary arbitrator." 63 This court set aside
the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears in Shari’a court proceedings. In fact, there are instances when
the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground of lack of
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has provisions in the Muslim Code apply to non-Muslims. Under
jurisdiction over the subject matter despite the fact that the
no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another Article 13 of the Muslim Code, 52 provisions of the Code on
issue of jurisdiction was raised only on appeal.
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, marriage and divorce apply to the female party in a marriage
or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of solemnized according to Muslim law, even if the female is non-
limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. Muslim.53 Under Article 93, paragraph (c) of the Muslim There are exceptional circumstances when a party may be
Code,54 a person of a different religion is disqualified from barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the court to decide a
inheriting from a Muslim decedent.55 However, by operation of case. In the 1968 case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 64 the Spouses
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority under
law and regardless of Muslim law to the contrary, the Tijam sued the Spouses Sibonghanoy on July 19, 1948 before
the law to decide Roldan’s action because not all of the parties
decedent’s parent or spouse who is a non-Muslim "shall be the Court of First Instance of Cebu to recover ₱1,908.00. At
involved in the action are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction
entitled to one-third of what he or she would have received that time, the court with exclusive original jurisdiction to hear
over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession. All its
without such disqualification."56 In these instances, non- civil actions in which the amount demanded does not exceed
proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are
Muslims may participate in Shari’a court proceedings.57 ₱2,000.00 was the court of justices of the peace and municipal
void.
courts in chartered cities under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948.
Nonetheless, this case does not involve any of the previously
Roldan chose to file his action with the Shari’a District Court,
cited instances. This case involves an action for recovery of
instead of filing the action with the regular courts, to obtain "a
possession of real property. As a matter of law, Shari’a District As prayed for by the Spouses Tijam in their complaint, the
more speedy disposition of the case." 48 This would have been a
Courts may only take cognizance of a real action "wherein the Court of First Instance issued a writ of attachment against the
valid argument had all the parties involved in this case been
parties involved are Muslims."58 Considering that one of the Spouses Sibonghanoy. However, the latter filed a counter-bond
Muslims. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, the jurisdiction
parties involved in this case is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth issued by Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. Thus, the Court
of Shari’a District Courts over real actions not arising from
Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide of First Instance dissolved the writ of attachment.
customary contracts is concurrent with that of existing civil
the action for recovery of possession of real property. The
courts. However, this concurrent jurisdiction over real actions
judgment against Vivencio is void for respondent Fifth Shari’a
"is applicable solely when both parties are Muslims"49 as this After trial, the Court of First Instance decided in favor of the
District Court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
court ruled in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong.50 When one of the Spouses Tijam. When the writ of execution returned
action.
parties is not a Muslim, the action must be filed before the unsatisfied, the Spouses Tijam moved for the issuance of a writ
regular courts. of execution against Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.’s bond.
That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the The Court of First Instance granted the motion. Manila Surety
subject matter only after respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court and Fidelity Co., Inc. moved to quash the writ of execution,
The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
had rendered judgment is immaterial. A party may assail the which motion the Court of First Instance denied. Thus, the
Philippines by respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court does not
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over a subject matter at any surety company appealed to the Court of Appeals.
validate the proceedings before the court. Under Article 175 of
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.59 The reason is that
the Muslim Code, customary contracts are construed in
"jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very
accordance with Muslim law.51 Hence, Shari’a District Courts The Court of Appeals sustained the Court of First Instance’s
authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render
apply Muslim law when resolving real actions arising from decision. Five days after receiving the Court of Appeals’
judgment on the action."60
customary contracts. decision, Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing for the first time that the Court of First Instance
In Figueroa v. People of the Philippines,61 Venancio Figueroa had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The
In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims,
was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this court for resolution.
there is no reason for Shari’a District Courts to apply Muslim
before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The trial court
law. In such real actions, Shari’a District Courts will necessarily
convicted Figueroa as charged. On appeal with the Court of
apply the laws of general application, which in this case is the This court ruled that the surety company could no longer assail
Appeals, Figueroa raised for the first time the issue of
Civil Code of the Philippines, regardless of the court taking the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance on the ground of
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to decide the case.
cognizance of the action. This is the reason why the original estoppel by laches. Parties may be barred from assailing the
Ruling that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the
jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over real actions not jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action if it
crime charged, this court dismissed the criminal case despite
arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of took them an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
the fact that Figueroa objected to the trial court’s jurisdiction
regular courts. object to the court’s jurisdiction. 65 This is to discourage the
only on appeal.
deliberate practice of parties in invoking the jurisdiction of a
court to seek affirmative relief, only to repudiate the court’s
However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction arises only
In Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,62 Johnny jurisdiction after failing to obtain the relief sought. 66 In such
if the parties involved are Muslims. Considering that Vivencio is
Pastorin filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against cases, the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is
not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no
Metromedia Times Corporation. Metromedia Times Corporation
jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of
overlooked in favor of the public policy of discouraging such x x x estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored respect to the defendant, he or she must have been duly
inequitable and unfair conduct.67 by law. It is to be applied rarely — only from necessity, and served with summons to be considered properly impleaded;
only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be otherwise, the proceedings in personam, including the
applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its judgment rendered, are void.87
In Tijam, it took Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. 15 years
favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a
before assailing the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. x x
As early as 1948, the surety company became a party to the On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person is not necessary
x a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject
case when it issued the counter-bond to the writ of attachment. for a court to validly try and decide actions in rem. 88 Actions in
matter is void. x x x. No laches will even attach when the
During trial, it invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of First rem are "directed against the thing or property or status of a
judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction x x x.78
Instance by seeking several affirmative reliefs, including a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the
motion to quash the writ of execution. The surety company only whole world."89 In actions in rem, the court trying the case must
assailed the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in 1963 In this case, the exceptional circumstances similar to Tijam do have jurisdiction over the res, or the thing under litigation, to
when the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. not exist. Vivencio never invoked respondent Fifth Shari’a validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the res is
This court said: District Court’s jurisdiction to seek affirmative relief. He filed the acquired either "by the seizure of the property under legal
petition for relief from judgment precisely to assail the process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or
jurisdiction of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court over as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the
x x x x Were we to sanction such conduct on [Manila Surety
Roldan’s petition for recovery of possession. power of the court is recognized and made effective."90 In
and Fidelity, Co. Inc.’s] part, We would in effect be declaring as
actions in rem, summons must still be served on the defendant
useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it
but only to satisfy due process requirements.91
was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel [the spouses Thus, the general rule holds. Vivencio validly assailed the
Tijam] to go up their Calvary once more. jurisdiction of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court over the
action for recovery of possession for lack of jurisdiction over the Unlike objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter which
subject matter of Roldan’s action. may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, objections to
The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be raised at
revolting.68
the earliest possible opportunity; otherwise, the objection to the
II
court’s jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is deemed
After this court had rendered the decision in Tijam, this court waived. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
observed that the "non-waivability of objection to That respondent Fifth Shari’a "defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
jurisdiction"69 has been ignored, and the Tijam doctrine has District Court served summons on dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived."
become more the general rule than the exception. petitioner Vivencio did not vest it
with jurisdiction over the person of
In this case, Roldan sought to enforce a personal obligation on
petitioner Vivencio
In Calimlim v. Ramirez,70 this court said: Vivencio to vacate his property, restore to him the possession
of his property, and pay damages for the unauthorized use of
Roldan argued that the proceedings before respondent Shari’a his property.92 Thus, Roldan’s action for recovery of possession
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and
District Court were valid since the latter acquired jurisdiction is an action in personam. As this court explained in Ang Lam v.
upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction
over the person of Vivencio. When Vivencio was served with Rosillosa and Santiago,93 an action to recover the title to or
of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of
summons, he failed to file his answer and waived his right to possession of a parcel of land "is an action in personam, for it
law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the
participate in the proceedings before respondent Fifth Shari’a binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right
parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
District Court. Since Vivencio waived his right to participate in to a tangible thing."94 Also, in Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr.,95 this court
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has
the proceedings, he cannot argue that his rights were said that "a judgment directing a party to deliver possession of
been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed
prejudiced. a property to another is in personam. It is binding only against
principally from the ruling in the cited case of [Tijam v. the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent
Sibonghanoy]. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in to the commencement of the action."96
said case had been applied to situations which were obviously Jurisdiction over the person is "the power of [a] court to render
not contemplated therein. x x x.71 a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular
action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the This action being in personam, service of summons on
action."79 A court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the Vivencio was necessary for respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Thus, the court reiterated the "unquestionably accepted" 72 rule
plaintiff once he or she files the initiatory pleading. 80 As for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over Vivencio’s person.
that objections to a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter
defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his or her person
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
either by his or her voluntary appearance in court81 or a valid
appeal. This is because jurisdiction over the subject matter is a However, as discussed, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court
service on him or her of summons.82
"matter of law"73 and "may not be conferred by consent or has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, with
agreement of the parties."74 Vivencio not being a Muslim. Therefore, all the proceedings
Jurisdiction over the person is required in actions in before respondent Shari’a District Court, including the service
75 personam83 or actions based on a party’s personal of summons on Vivencio, are void.
In Figueroa,  this court ruled that the Tijam doctrine "must be
liability.84 Since actions in personam "are directed against
applied with great care;"76 otherwise, the doctrine "may be a
specific persons and seek personal judgments,"85 it is
most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice":77 III
necessary that the parties to the action "are properly impleaded
and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard." 86 With
 The Shari’a Appellate Court and the "must be rendered in precise accordance with precedent."113 In
Office of the Jurisconsult in Islamic the Philippines where only Muslim personal laws are codified, a
law must now be organized to legal officer learned in the Qur’an and Hadiths is necessary to
effectively enforce the Muslim legal assist this court as well as Shari’a court judges in resolving
system in the Philippines disputes not involving Muslim personal laws.

We note that Vivencio filed directly with this court his petition All told, Shari’a District Courts have jurisdiction over a real
for certiorari of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s action only when the parties involved are Muslims. Respondent
decision. Under the judicial system in Republic Act No. Fifth Shari’a District Court acted without jurisdiction in taking
9054,97 the Shari’a Appellate Court has exclusive original cognizance of Roldan E. Mala’s action for recovery of
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of decisions of the possession considering that Vivencio B. Villagracia is not a
Shari’a District Courts. He should have filed his petition for Muslim. Accordingly, the proceedings in SDC Special
certiorari before the Shari’a Appellate Court. Proceedings Case No. 07-200, including the judgment
rendered, are void.
However, the Shari’a Appellate Court is yet to be
organized.1âwphi1 Thus, we call for the organization of the WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
court system created under Republic Act No. 9054 to Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s decision dated June
effectively enforce the Muslim legal system in our country. After 11, 2008 and order dated May 29, 2009 in SDC Special
all, the Muslim legal system – a legal system complete with its Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are SET ASIDE without
own civil, criminal, commercial, political, international, and prejudice to the filing of respondent Roldan E. Mala of an action
religious laws98 – is part of the law of the land,99 and Shari’a with the proper court.
courts are part of the Philippine judicial system.100

Shari’a Circuit Courts and Shari’a District Courts created under

the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines shall
continue to discharge their duties.101 All cases tried in Shari’a
Circuit Courts shall be appealable to Shari’a District Courts.
[[102]

The Shari’a Appellate Court created under Republic Act No.

9054 shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in
the Shari’a District Courts.103 It shall also exercise original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
habeas corpus, and other auxiliary writs and processes in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction.104 The decisions of the Shari’a
Appellate Court shall be final and executory, without prejudice
to the original and appellate jurisdiction of this court.105

This court held in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong106 that "until such

time that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall have been
organized,"107 decisions of the Shari’a District Court shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals and "shall be referred to a
Special Division to be organized in any of the [Court of
Appeals] stations preferably composed of Muslim [Court of
Appeals] Justices."108 However, considering that To m a w i s
was not yet promulgated when Vivencio filed his petition for
certiorari on August 6, 2009, we take cognizance of Vivencio’s
petition for certiorari in the exercise of our original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari.109

Moreover, priority should be given in organizing the Office of

the Jurisconsult in Islamic law. A Jurisconsult in Islamic law or
"Mufti" is an officer with authority to render legal opinions or
"fatawa"110 on any questions relating to Muslim law.111 These
legal opinions should be based on recognized authorities 112 and