REMREV Doctrines (Weeks 1-4)

G.R. No. 204314 April 6, 2016

Heirs of Danilo, et al., v. Rosario Kalaw

The RTC has jurisdiction over Danilo Arrienda’s appeal of the MTC Decision. Under Section 19 of BP 129, as amended, it provides for the RTCs’ exclusive original jurisdiction in civil
cases involving title to or possession of real property or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Php20,000.00 or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Php50,000.00, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon MeTC, MTC, and MCTC.
On the other hand, the RTCs’ appellate jurisdiction, as contrasted to its original jurisdiction, is provided in Section 22 of BP 129, as amended, thus: Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by MeTC, MTC, and MCTC in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Therefore, it is clear that the RTC exercises appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by first level courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions.

When the RTC took cognizance of Arrienda's appeal from the adverse decision of the MTC in the ejectment suit, RTC was unquestionably exercising its appellate jurisdiction as
mandated by law. Therefore, its decision may not be annulled on the basis of lack of jurisdiction as the RTC has jurisdiction to decide the appeal and its decision should be deemed
promulgated in the exercise of that jurisdiction. In the present case, the RTC was exercising its appellate, not original, jurisdiction when it took cognizance of Arrienda's appeal and Section 22 of
BP129 does not provide any amount or value of the subject property which would limit the RTC's exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases decided by first level courts. Indeed, all cases
decided by the MTC are generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the amount involved.

G.R. No. 206992 June 11, 2018

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Herederos de Ciriaco Chunaco, Inc.

A fresh 15-day period is available to commence an action in the Special Agrarian Court. Special Agrarian Courts (SACs) are vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in the
determination of just compensation under RA 6657. The Supreme Court may designate more branches to constitute additional SACs and shall give preference to the RTCs which have been
assigned to handle agrarian cases or whose presiding judges were former judges of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations. As the taking of property under RA 6657 is an exercise of the
power of eminent domain by the State, the valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function, which is vested with the
courts and not with administrative agencies. While RA 6657 itself does not provide for a period within which a landowner can file a petition for the determination of just compensation before the
SAC, it cannot be imprescriptible because the parties cannot be placed in limbo indefinitely. Indeed, Section 57 of RA 6657 clearly vests on the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. The DAR has no authority to qualify or undo the RTC-SAC's jurisdiction over the determination of just compensation
under RA 6657. Thus, the 15-day reglementary period under Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules cannot be sustained. The RTC-SAC cannot simply be reduced to an appellate court that
reviews administrative decisions of the DAR within a short period to appeal.

As the 15-day reglementary period under the DARAB Rules had been set aside, it is now immaterial to determine whether a fresh 15-day period should be given to a party when the
PARAD denies its Motion for Reconsideration to file a petition for judicial determination of just compensation.

GR 187464 November 25, 2015

CABIB ALONTO TANOG v. HON. RASAD G. BALINDOG

The pertinent issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of judicial hierarchy.

The Court held that the petition for certiorari should have been filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) and not with the Supreme Court (SC) pursuant to the doctrine of judicial hierarchy of
courts. The Court also reiterated that although the SC, the CA and the RTC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, the commonality does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice in the forum to be used. In the case at bar, the petitioner evidently failed to offer any explanation on why
he failed to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy and gave no justification why he did not challenge the RTC decision before the CA.
The judicial policy that the Court will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts below, and exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify the resort to the Court through the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari.

GR No. 210736 September 5, 2018

HERARC CORPORATION v. THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF BATANGAS, et.al.

The relevant issue in this case whether or not the petitioner erred in its appeal before the Supreme Court (SC) under Rule 45 raising the issue of legality or the validity of the assessment
of real property tax.

In the case at bar, the Court found that the petitioner erred in filing its appeal before the SC instead of filing a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The Rules
provide that any appeal from the RTC decision with respect to the legality or validity of a tax assessment must be brought before the CTA Division and may be further reviewed by the CTA En
Banc and it is only after these remedies have been exhausted that the case may be elevated to the SC. The Court stressed that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
permitted by law is mandatory and jurisdictional such that failure to do so renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Further, the right to appeal is a statutory right, not a natural or a
constitutional right which is why the party who intends to appeal must comply with the procedures and rules governing appeals; otherwise, the right of appeal may be lost or squandered.

GR 159926 January 20, 2014

Pinausukan Seafoodhouse v. Far East Bank & Co.

Pinausukan’s failure to include the affidavits of witnesses was fatal to its petition for annulment. Worthy to reiterate is that the objective of the requirements of verification and submission
of the affidavits of witnesses is to bring all the relevant facts that will enable the CA to immediately determine whether or not the petition has substantial merit. In that regard, however, the
requirements are separate from each other, for only by the affidavits of the witnesses who had competence about the circumstances constituting the extrinsic fraud can the petitioner detail the
extrinsic fraud being relied upon as the ground for its petition for annulment. This is because extrinsic fraud cannot be presumed from the recitals alone of the pleading but needs to be
particularized as to the facts constitutive of it.

GR 211966 August 7, 2017

Jose Abagatnan v. Sps. Clarito

The Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged that not all the real parties in interest in the case actually reside in Roxas City; Jimmy resided in Poblacion, Siniloan, Laguna,
while Jenalyn resided in Brgy. de La Paz, Pasig City. As such, the lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior referral of the case for barangay conciliation is not a pre condition to its
filing in court. This is true regardless of the fact that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already authorized their sister and co-petitioner, Josephine, to act as their attorney-in-fact in the ejectment
proceedings before the MTCC. As previously explained, the residence of the attorney-in-fact of a real party in interest is irrelevant in so far as the "actual residence" requirement under the LGC
for prior barangay conciliation is concerned. Section 412(a) of the LGC requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a pre-condition to
the filing of a complaint in court. The LGC further provides that "the lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for
amicable settlement of all disputes," subject to certain exceptions enumerated in the law. One such exception is in cases where the dispute involves parties who actually reside in barangays of
different cities or municipalities, unless said barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon.

Thus, parties who do not actually reside in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays are not required to submit their dispute to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of a
complaint in court.
G.R. No. 168979 December 2, 2013
Rebecca Pacana-Contreras, et al. vs. Rovila Water Supply, Inc.

The motion to dismiss in the present case based on failure to state a cause of action was not timely filed and was thus waived. Applying Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which provides for
the grounds for the dismissal of a civil case, particularly, failure to state a cause of action and failure to comply with a condition precedent, in this case, the substitution of parties. The Court
cannot uphold the dismissal based on the grounds invoked by the respondents, which they have waived for failure to invoke them within the period prescribed by the Rules. The Court cannot
also dismiss the case based on lack of cause of action as this would require at least a preponderance of evidence, which is yet to be appreciated by the trial court. Therefore, the RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders denying the respondents’ motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration. The Court shall not resolve the merits of the
respondents’ grounds for dismissal that are considered as waived.

The operative act that would lead to the dismissal of the case would be the refusal to comply with the directive of the court for the joinder of an indispensable party to the case. The
deceased Pacañas can no longer be included in the complaint as indispensable parties because of their death during the pendency of the case. Upon their death, however, their ownership and
rights over their properties were transmitted to their heirs, including herein petitioners. The Court acknowledged that the heirs, whose hereditary rights are to be affected by the case, are
deemed indispensable parties who should have been impleaded by the trial court.

G.R. No. 166620 April 20, 2020

Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita

The petition failed to show any constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyo’s issuance of EO 378. There was
neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its functions to be transferred to another agency. Under the assailed EO 378, the NPO remains the main printing arm of the government
for all kinds of government forms and publications but in the interest of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability, it must now compete with the private sector for certain
government printing jobs, with the exception of election paraphernalia which remains the exclusive responsibility of the NPO, together with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the COMELEC
may determine. At most, there was a mere alteration of the main function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity of its printing responsibility to election forms. This Court has already ruled in a
number of cases that the President may, by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities under the Executive Department. This is also sanctioned under
the Constitution, as well as other statutes.

A careful review of the records will show that petitioners utterly failed to substantiate their claim that the reorganization of the NPO under EO 378 is tainted with bad faith. The basic
evidentiary rule is that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it. They failed to prove sufficient facts to show that the limitation of the NPO’s budget to its
own income would indeed lead to the abolition of the position, or removal from office, of any employee. Neither did petitioners present any shred of proof of their assertion that the changes in
the functions of the NPO were for political considerations that had nothing to do with improving the efficiency of, or encouraging operational economy in, the said agency.

GR No. 153788 November 27, 2009

ROGER V. NAVARRO v HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, et. al.,

The relevant issue in this case is whether or not Karen Go, the respondent and owner of Kargo Enterprises was a real party-in-interest even if she was not a party to the Lease
Agreement with Option to Purchase entered into between petitioner Roger Navarro and Kargo Enterprises represented by its manager and husband of Karen Go, Glenn Go.

The Court held that Karen Go is the real party-in-interest in this case citing the 1997 Rules of Procedure, it is required that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest- is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises,
Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case contrary to the contention of petitioner Navarro. Further, the Court said that it is legally incorrect to
say that the Complaint filed by respondent Go does not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo
Enterprises.
GR No. 201816 April 8, 2013
HEIRS OF AUSTINO MEDINA, et. al., v HEIRS OF DOMINGO FIAN, JR., et. al.,

The pertinent issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) erred in affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in dismissing the Complaint for its failure to
state a cause of action due to the failure to include all the heirs of Fian who are indispensable parties in the action.

The Court ratiocinated that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the
court at any stage of a judicial proceeding. Non-joinder means the failure to bring a person who is a necessary party or in this case an indispensable party into a lawsuit and in this case, the
infirmity is not the failure to state a cause of action but a non-joinder of the heirs of Fian as indispensable parties. Therefore, the RTC erred in ordering the dismissal of the case for failure to
state cause of action and it should have instead ordered the petitioner to implead all the heirs of Fian as defendants within a reasonable time from notice with a warning that failure to comply
will result to the dismissal of the complaint.

G.R. No. 201248, March 11, 2015,

LETICIA NAGUIT AQUINO, - versus- CESAR B. QUIAZON,.

The trial court may hold a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses. However, such hearing is not necessary when the affirmative defense is failure to state a cause of action. The
reception and the consideration of evidence on the said ground, has been held to be improper and impermissible. The trial court, thus, erred in receiving and considering evidence in connection
with this ground.

The trial court may indeed elect to hold a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses as raised in the answer under Section 6 of Rules 16 of the Rules of Court. It has been held,
however, that such a hearing is not necessary when the affirmative defense is failure to state a cause of action, and that it is, in fact, error for the court to hold a preliminary hearing to determine
the existence of external facts outside the complaint. The reception and the consideration of evidence on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, has been held to be
improper and impermissible. Thus, in a preliminary hearing on a motion to dismiss or on the affirmative defenses raised in an answer, the parties are allowed to present evidence except when
the motion is based on the ground of insufficiency of the statement of the cause of action which must be determined on the basis only of the facts alleged in the complaint and no other. Section
6, therefore, does not apply to the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. The trial court, thus, erred in receiving and considering evidence in connection with this ground.

G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013

HEIRS OF FAUSTINO MESINA -versus- HEIRS OF DOMINGO FIAN, SR.,

Having settled that, Our pronouncement in Pamplona Plantation Company, Inc. v. Tinghil is instructive as regards the proper course of action on the part of the courts in cases of non-
joinder of indispensable parties, viz: The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just,
parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may
dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Thus, the dismissal of the case for failure to state a
cause of action is improper. What the trial court should have done is to direct petitioner Norman Mesina to implead all the heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants within a reasonable time
from notice with a warning that his failure to do so shall mean dismissal of the complaint.

Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading. A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of
action, namely: (a) The legal right of the plaintiff; (b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and (c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right. Non-joinder means the
"failure to bring a person who is a necessary party or in this case an indispensable party into a lawsuit." An indispensable party, on the other hand, is a party-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of the action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant.
G.R. No. 202324, June 4, 2018
Conchita Gloria, et al., v. Builders Savings and Loan Association, Inc.,

On the issue of whether Maria Lourdes is a real party in interest, the Court held in the affirmative. The evidence reveals that Lourdes is the daughter of Juan and Conchita. There is on
record a Certification of Birth issued by the Lipa City Office of the Local Civil Registrar indicating that Lourdes was born to Juan and Conchita; this document was marked as Exhibit "H" during
the proceedings below, and remains uncontested. Moreover, Lourdes categorically testified during trial that she was the natural child of Juan and Conchita. Being the daughter of the deceased
Juan and Conchita, Lourdes has an interest in the subject property as heir to Juan and co-owner with Conchita. As regards the supposed defective verification occasioned by Conchita's failure
to sign the amended complaint with its concomitant verification and certification against forum shopping, the Court has repeatedly held that in a case involving co-owners of property where said
property is the subject matter of the suit, the failure of the other co-owners to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping is not fatal, as the signing by only one or some of them
constitutes substantial compliance with the rule.

Likewise, the Court found no merit in respondents' argument that the present petition should be dismissed for failure of the other co-heirs/co-petitioners to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping as required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when only
one of the heirs-plaintiffs, who has sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition (complaint), signed the verification attached to it. Such verification is
deemed sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative. The same liberality should likewise be applied
to the certification against forum shopping. The general rule is that the certification must be signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. The rule of
substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions merely underscores its
mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.

G.R. No. 217194, September 6, 2017

Societe Des Produits, Nestle, S.A. v. Puregold Price Club, Inc.,

Nestle failed to properly execute a certification against forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The Court held that failure to comply with the foregoing
requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided,
upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal
with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. The Court has held in several cases that the requirements under the Rules of Court involving
the certification against forum shopping apply both to natural and juridical persons, to wit: "the requirement that the petitioner should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applies even to
corporations, considering that the mandatory directives of the Circular and the Rules of Court make no distinction between natural and juridical persons."

The certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal party. In case the principal party cannot sign, the one signing on his or her behalf must have been duly
authorized, to wit: "the petitioner or the principal party must execute the certification against forum shopping. Juridical persons, including corporations, that cannot personally sign the
certification against forum shopping, must act through an authorized representative. The exercise of corporate powers including the power to sue is lodged with the board of directors which acts
as a body representing the stockholders. For corporations, the authorized representative to sign the certification against forum shopping must be selected or authorized collectively by the board
of directors. The Court ruled that if the real party in interest is a corporation, an officer of the corporation acting alone has no authority to sign the certification against forum shopping. An officer
of the corporation can only validly sign the certification against forum shopping if he or she is authorized by the board of directors through a board resolution or secretary's certificate. A board
resolution authorizing a corporate officer to execute the certification against forum shopping is a necessary requirement under the Rules. A certification signed by a person who was not duly
authorized by the board of directors renders the petition for review subject to dismissal. The authority of the representative of a corporation to sign the certification against forum shopping
originates from the board of directors through either a board of directors' resolution or secretary's certificate which must be submitted together with the certification against forum shopping.
 Nestle, itself, acknowledged in this petition the absence of a board resolution or secretary's certificate issued by the board of directors of Nestle to prove the authority of Barot to sign the
certification against forum shopping on behalf of Nestle, to wit: "[t]hus, while there is no board resolution and/or secretary's certificate to prove the authority of Dennis Jose R. Barot to file the
petition and Verification/Certification of NonForum Shopping on behalf of petitioner-corporation, there is a Power of Attorney evidencing such authority." The power of attorney submitted by
Nestle in favor of Barot was signed by Celine Jorge. However, the authority of Celine Jorge to sign the power of attorney on behalf of Nestle, allowing Barot to represent Nestle, was not
accompanied by a board resolution or secretary's certificate from Nestle showing that Celine Jorge was authorized by the board of directors of Nestle to execute the power of attorney in favor of
Barot.

GR No. 210475 April 11, 2018

RAMON K. ILUSORIO. et al., v. SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO

The relevant issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the petition indubitably failed for lack of principal action on which the prayer for injunction relief
rests.

The Supreme Court held that while the petition did not categorically state the reversal and the setting aside of the Order as one of the specific reliefs desired, it contained a general
prayer “for other and equitable reliefs” and the general prayer should be interpreted to include the plea for the nullity of the Order because it is already evident from the allegations contained in
the body petition. Moreover, a general prayer for “other reliefs just and equitable” appearing on a complaint or pleading normally enables the court to award reliefs supported by the complaint or
other pleadings, by the facts admitted at the trial and by the evidence adduced by the parties even if there reliefs are not specifically prayed for in the complaint.

GR No. 200191 August 20, 2014

LOURDES C. FERNANDEZ v. NORMA VILLEGAS

The pertinent issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition due to a defective verification and certification against forum shopping attached to
the petition.

The Supreme Court opined that under reasonable or justifiable circumstances as in this case wherein the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause
of action or defense, the rule requiring all plaintiffs or petitioners to sign the certification against forum shopping may be relaxed. The rules on forum shopping are designed to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objectives. The requirement of strict compliance
with the provisions on certification against forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature to the effect that the certification cannot altogether be dispensed with or its requirements
disregarded. It does not prohibit substantial compliance with the rules under justifiable circumstances such as in this case.

GR No. 200134, Aug 15, 2012

ROBERTO OTERO v. ROGER TAN

The effect of a defendant's failure to file an answer within the time allowed therefor is primarily governed by Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and
proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the
court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.

A defendant who fails to file an answer may, upon motion, be declared by the court in default. Loss of standing in court, the forfeiture of one's right as a party litigant, contestant or legal
adversary, is the consequence of an order of default. A party in default loses his right to present his defense, control the proceedings, and examine or cross-examine witnesses. He has no right
to expect that his pleadings would be acted upon by the court nor may be object to or refute evidence or motions filed against him.
 A defendant who was declared in default may nevertheless appeal from the judgment by default, albeit on limited grounds. Nonetheless, the fact that a defendant has lost his standing in
court for having been declared in default does not mean that he is left sans any recourse whatsoever.

In Lina v. CA, et al.,[15] this Court enumerated the remedies available to party who has been declared in default, to wit:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec 3, Rule 18)

b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section
1(a) of Rule 37;

c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and

d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2,
Rule 41)

Indeed, a defending party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default. However, the grounds that may be raised in such an appeal are restricted to any of
the following: first, the failure of the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of the complaint; second, the decision is contrary to law; and third, the amount of judgment is excessive or different
in kind from that prayed for.[17] In these cases, the appellate tribunal should only consider the pieces of evidence that were presented by the plaintiff during the ex parte presentation of his
evidence. A defendant who has been declared in default is precluded from raising any other ground in his appeal from the judgment by default since, otherwise, he would then be allowed to
adduce evidence in his defense, which right he had lost after he was declared in default. [18] Indeed, he is proscribed in the appellate tribunal from adducing any evidence to bolster his defense
against the plaintiff's claim. Thus, in Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina, Inc. v. Land Bank of the Philippines, [19] this Court explained that: It bears stressing that a defending party declared in default
loses his standing in court and his right to adduce evidence and to present his defense. He, however, has the right to appeal from the judgment by default and assail said judgment on the
ground, inter alia, that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the
decision is contrary to law. Such party declared in default is proscribed from seeking a modification or reversal of the assailed decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by him in the
Court of Appeals, for if it were otherwise, he would thereby be allowed to regain his right to adduce evidence, a right which he lost in the trial court when he was declared in default, and which
he failed to have vacated. In this case, the petitioner sought the modification of the decision of the trial court based on the evidence submitted by it only in the Court of Appeals.

While it may be said that by defaulting, the defendant leaves himself at the mercy of the court, the rules nevertheless see to it that any judgment against him must be in accordance with the
evidence required by law. The evidence of the plaintiff, presented in the defendant's absence, cannot be admitted if it is basically incompetent. Although the defendant would not be in a position
to object, elementary justice requires that only legal evidence should be considered against him. If the same should prove insufficient to justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be
dismissed. And if a favorable judgment is justifiable, it cannot exceed in amount or be different in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint. [21]

Thus, in SSS v. Hon. Chaves,[22] this Court emphasized that: We must stress, however, that a judgment of default against the petitioner who failed to appear during pre-trial or, for that
matter, any defendant who failed to file an answer, does not imply a waiver of all of their rights, except their right to be heard and to present evidence to support their allegations. Otherwise, it
would be meaningless to request presentation of evidence every time the other party is declared in default. If it were so, a decision would then automatically be rendered in favor of the non-
defaulting party and exactly to the tenor of his prayer. The law also gives the defaulting parties some measure of protection because plaintiffs, despite the default of defendants, are still required
to substantiate their allegations in the complaint.

In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. The parties must rely on the strength of their own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.[26] This rule holds true especially when the latter has had no opportunity to present evidence because of a default
order. Needless to say, the extent of the relief that may be granted can only be so much as has been alleged and proved with preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133.[27]
GR No. 173082, Aug 06, 2014
PALM AVENUE HOLDING CO. v. SANDIGANBAYAN 5TH DIVISION

Since the Republic did not originally include the Palm Companies in Civil Case No. 0035, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution ordering said companies to be impleaded, which was
affirmed by the Court in G.R. No. 90667 on November 5, 1991.  The Court declared in said case that the Palm Companies are real parties-in-interest in Civil Case No. 0035, because they still
appear to be the registered owners of the remaining disputed shares.  That Romualdez is considered as their true or real owner is just a claim that still needs to be proved in court. Section 2,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 2. Parties in interest. A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party- in-interest.

This provision has two requirements: 1) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest; and 2) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.
Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about
the question involved. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case
is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Simple justice demands that the Palm Companies must know what the complaint against them is all about. The law requires no less. In the similar case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,[19]
petitioner Virata filed a motion for a bill of particulars, asserting that the allegations against him are vague and are not averred with sufficient definiteness as to enable him to effectively prepare
his responsive pleading. The Court held therein that a complaint must contain the ultimate facts constituting plaintiff's cause of action. A cause of action has the following elements: (1) a right
in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. As long as the complaint contains these three elements, a cause of action exists. Although the allegations therein may be
vague, dismissal of the action is not the proper remedy because the defendant may ask for more particulars. As such, a party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars
of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity. This is to enable him to properly prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial.[20] The Court in said case
found that there were certain matters in the allegations which lacked in substantial particularity. They were broad and definitely vague which required specifications in order that Virata could
properly define the issues and formulate his defenses. The two bills of particulars filed by the Republic were ruled to have failed in properly amplifying the charges leveled against Virata
because, not only are they mere reiteration or repetition of the allegations set forth in the expanded Second Amended Complaint, but, to the large extent, they contain vague, immaterial and
generalized assertions which are inadmissible under our procedural rules. As such, for failure of the Republic to obey the Court's directive and the Sandiganbayan's order to file the proper bill
of particulars which would completely amplify the charges against Virata, the Court deemed it just and proper to order the dismissal of the expanded Second Amended Complaint, insofar as the
charges against Virata are concerned. The Court relied on Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, which provides that:

Sec. 3. Failure to prosecute. If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of
the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise
provided by court.

G.R. No. 191616, April 18, 2016

Francis C. Cervantes v. City Service Corp., et al.,

The rule is where a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding in a court of record, all notices required to be given therein must be given to the attorney of record; and service
of the court's order upon any person other than the counsel of record is not legally effective and binding upon the party, nor may it start the corresponding reglementary period for the
subsequent procedural steps that may be taken by the attorney. Notice should be made upon the counsel of record at his exact given address, to which notice of all kinds emanating from the
court should be sent in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of address. When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must
be made upon said attorney; and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not notice in law.
 The NLRC Rules governing the issuance and service of notices and resolutions is, likewise, no different. In a case decided by the Supreme Court, it held that "the period for filing a
petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the time the counsel of record received a copy of the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration." The Court further clarified that the period
or manner of "appeal" from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals is governed by Rule 65, which states that the "petition may be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, or
resolution sought to be assailed." While in cases of decisions and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel/representative by registered mail, for purposes
of appeal, however, the period shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel or representative of record.

In the instant case, it is not disputed that during the NLRC proceedings, petitioner was represented by counsel, Atty. Romeo S. Occena, as in fact the NLRC albeit belated, furnished a
copy of its July 29, 2009 Resolution to Atty. Occena on November 19, 2009. Petitioner's several motions during the proceedings before the NLRC were likewise all signed by Atty. Occena as
counsel. Consequently, following the policy that the period to appeal shall be counted from receipt of resolution by the counsel of record, considering that petitioner is represented by a counsel,
the latter is considered to have received notice of the NLRC Resolution dated July 22, 2009 on November 19, 2009, the date when his representative and counsel, Atty. Occena was served
notice thereof and not on July 30, 2009, or the date when petitioner's mother received the same decision. Considering that petitioner filed his petition for certiorari on October 7, 2009, the same
was well within the prescribed period to appeal. The petition for certiorari was filed on time.

G.R. No. 172204, July 10, 2014

Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose, Inc.,

The Rules of Procedure govern matters relating to procedures in court. Service of notices and summons on interested parties in a civil, criminal, or special proceeding is court
procedure. Hence, the Rules of Procedure shall govern it. The Cooperative Code provisions may govern matters relating to cooperatives’ activities as administered by the Cooperative
Development Authority. However, they are not procedural rules that will govern court processes. A Cooperative Code provision requiring cooperatives to have an official address to which all
notices and communications shall be sent cannot take the place of the rules on summons under the Rules of Court concerning a court proceeding. Notices may be sent to a cooperative’s
official address. However, service of notices sent to the official address in accordance with the Cooperative Code may not be used as a defense for violations of procedures, especially when
such violation affects another party’s rights. The Rules of Court governs court procedures, including the rules on service of notices and summons. The Cooperative Code provisions on notices
cannot replace the rules on summons under the Rules of Court. Rule 14, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides an exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized to receive summons for
juridical entities. These persons are the juridical entity’s president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

The enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 is exclusive. Service of summons upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is
not sufficient service of summons. If summons may not be served upon these persons personally at their residences or offices, summons may be served upon any of the officers wherever they
may be found. Hence, petitioner cannot use respondent's failure to amend its Articles of Incorporation to reflect its new address as an excuse from sending or attempting to send to respondent
copies of the petition and the summons. The Rules of Court provides that notices should be sent to the enumerated officers. Petitioner failed to do this. No notice was ever sent to any of the
enumerated officers. Petitioner served summons upon respondent by registered mail and, allegedly, by personal service at the office address indicated in respondent’s Certificate of
Registration. Summons was not served upon respondent’s officers. It was also not published in accordance with the Rules of Court. As a result, respondent was not given an opportunity to
present evidence, and petitioner was able to obtain from the Regional Trial Court an order cancelling respondent’s annotations of adverse claims. Respondent was, therefore, not validly served
with summons.

GR No. 191616 April 18, 2016

FRANCIS C. CERVANTES v. CITY SERVICE CORPORATION, et al.,

The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred for reckoning the period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 from receipt of the assailed
resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) by the petitioner’s mother on July 30, 2009.

The Supreme Court reiterated that where a party is represented by an attorney in an action or proceeding in court, all notices required to be given therein must be given to the attorney
of record and service of the court’s order upon any person other than the counsel of record is not legally effective and binding upon the party, nor it may start the corresponding reglementary
period for the subsequent procedural steps that may be taken by the attorney. Thus, following the policy that the period to appeal shall be counted from the receipt of the resolution by the
counsel of record, considering that petitioner is represented by a counsel, the latter is considered to have received the notice of the NLRC on November 19, 2009, the date when his
representative and counsel was served notice thereof and not on July 30, 2009 when the petitioner’s mother received the resolution.

GR No. 194262 February 28, 2018

BOBIE ROSE D.V. FRIAS v. ROLANDO F. ALCAYDE

The significant issue in this case was whether or not there was a valid substituted service of summons over the person of the petitioner.

The Court explained that to warrant the substituted service of summons, the serving officer must first attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person and only after the attempt
at personal service has become impossible within a reasonable time may the officer resort to substituted service. In this case, there is a failure to specify the details of the attendant
circumstances or the efforts exerted to serve the summons. Since substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service and is a method extraordinary in character, it may only be
used as prescribed and in circumstances authorized by the Rules. In this case, the return merely contained a general statement that such efforts were made to serve the summons, it cannot be
considered sufficient for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons. The sheriff failed to faithfully, strictly and fully comply with the requirements of substituted
service, the same is rendered ineffective and the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties which is generally accorded to a sheriff’s return cannot be appreciated in this
case.

G.R. No. 194262 February 28, 2018

Bobie Rose Frias v. Alcayde

It is elementary that courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner once the complaint or petition is filed. On the other hand, there are two ways through which jurisdiction over
the defendant or respondent is acquired through coercive process - either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court. For purposes of summons,
this Court holds that the nature of a petition for annulment of judgment is in personam. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, as in this case, the service of
summons may be done by personal or substituted service as laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14. Indeed, the preferred mode of service of summons is personal service. A perusal, however,
of Sheriff Tolentino's Return discloses that the following circumstances, as required in Manotoc, were not clearly-established: (a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was
impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party's residence or upon a competent
person in charge of the party's office or place of business. The Officer's Return likewise revealed that no diligent effort was exerted and no positive step was taken to locate and serve the
summons personally on the petitioner. Thus, Sheriff Tolentino fell short of the required standards. For her failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted
service, the same is rendered ineffective.

As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional
appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority. In
this case, it is readily apparent that the petitioner did not acquiesce to the jurisdiction of the trial court. It is noteworthy that when the petitioner filed those pleadings and motions, it was only in a
"special" character, conveying the fact that her appearance before the trial court was with a qualification, i.e., to defy the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over her person.

G.R. No. 206653 February 25, 2015

Yuk Ling Ong v. Co

Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court,
jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

Requirements of a substituted service of summons, to wit:

 (1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one month which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite
why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons
behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the
occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted
service.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and
whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of
summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.