Civ Pro Full Text Week 7
Civ Pro Full Text Week 7
Civ Pro Full Text Week 7
ROBERTO OTERO, Petitioner,
vs.
ROGER TAN, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Despite receipt of the summons and a copy of the said complaint, which
per the records of the case below were served through his wife Grace R.
Otero on August 31, 2005, Otero failed to file his answer with the MTCC.
On November 18, 2005, Tan filed a motion with the MTCC to declare Otero
in default for his failure to file his answer. Otero opposed Tan’s motion,
claiming that he did not receive a copy of the summons and a copy of Tan’s
complaint. Hearing on the said motion was set on January 25, 2006, but
was later reset to March 8, 2006, Otero manifesting that he only received
the notice therefor on January 23, 2006. The hearing on March 8, 2006
was further reset to April 26, 2006 since the presiding judge was attending
a convention. Otero failed to appear at the next scheduled hearing, and the
MTCC issued an order declaring him in default. A copy of the said order
was sent to Otero on May 9, 2006. Tan was then allowed to present his
evidence ex parte.
Undeterred, Otero appealed the MTCC Decision dated February 14, 2007
to the RTC, asserting that the MTCC’s disposition is factually baseless and
that he was deprived of due process.
The case was set for hearing on January 23, 2006, but defendant through
counsel sent a telegram that he only received the notice on the day of the
hearing thereby he was unable to appear due to his previous scheduled
hearings. Still, for reasons only known to him, defendant failed to lift the
Order of Default.
The hearing on January 23, 2006 was reset on March 8, 2006 and again
reset on April 26, 2006 by agreement of counsels x x x.
It is not therefore correct when defendant said that he was deprived of due
process.7
Otero then filed a petition for review 9 with the CA asserting that both the
RTC and the MTCC erred in giving credence to the pieces of evidence
presented by Tan in support of his complaint. Otero explained that the
statements of account, which Tan adduced during the ex parte presentation
of his evidence, were prepared by a certain Betache who was not
presented as a witness by Tan. Otero avers that the genuineness and due
execution of the said statements of account, being private documents, must
first be established lest the said documents be rendered inadmissible in
evidence. Thus, Otero asserts, the MTCC and the RTC should not have
admitted in evidence the said statements of account as Tan failed to
establish the genuineness and due execution of the same.
The CA Decision
On April 29, 2011, the CA rendered the assailed Decision 10 which denied
the petition for review filed by Otero. In rejecting Otero’s allegation with
regard to the genuineness and due execution of the statements of account
presented by Tan, the CA held that any defense which Otero may have
against Tan’s claim is already deemed waived due to Otero’s failure to file
his answer. Thus:
Otero never denied that his wife received the summons and a copy of the
complaint. He did not question the validity of the substituted service.
Consequently, he is charged with the knowledge of Tan’s monetary claim.
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that defenses and
objections not pleaded are deemed waived. Moreover, when the defendant
is declared in default, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting
the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant.
Due to Otero’s failure to file his Answer despite being duly served with
summons coupled with his voluntary appearance in court, he is deemed to
have waived whatever defenses he has against Tan’s claim. Apparently,
Otero is employing dilatory moves to defer the payment of his obligation
which he never denied.11 (Citation omitted)
Issues
The CA, in denying the petition for review filed by Otero, held that since he
was declared in default by the MTCC, he is already deemed to have
waived whatever defenses he has against Tan’s claim. He is, thus, already
barred from raising the alleged infirmity in the presentation of the
statements of account.
We do not agree.
A defendant who fails to file an
answer loses his standing in court.
The effect of a defendant’s failure to file an answer within the time allowed
therefor is primarily governed by Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,
viz:
Sec. 3. Default; declaration of. – If the defending party fails to answer within
the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party
with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the
defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render
judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant,
unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence.
Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. x x x
(Emphasis ours)
Nonetheless, the fact that a defendant has lost his standing in court for
having been declared in default does not mean that he is left sans any
recourse whatsoever. In Lina v. CA, et al.,15 this Court enumerated the
remedies available to party who has been declared in default, to wit:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and
before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default
on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec 3, Rule
18)
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant
discovered the default, but before the same has become final and
executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become
final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule
38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary
to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of
default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)16 (Emphasis ours)
A defendant who has been declared in default is precluded from raising any
other ground in his appeal from the judgment by default since, otherwise,
he would then be allowed to adduce evidence in his defense, which right he
had lost after he was declared in default. 18 Indeed, he is proscribed in the
appellate tribunal from adducing any evidence to bolster his defense
against the plaintiff’s claim. Thus, in Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina, Inc. v.
Land Bank of the Philippines,19 this Court explained that:
Here, Otero, in his appeal from the judgment by default, asserted that Tan
failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint. He contends that
the lower courts should not have given credence to the statements of
account that were presented by Tan as the same were not authenticated.
He points out that Betache, the person who appears to have prepared the
said statements of account, was not presented by Tan as a witness during
the ex parte presentation of his evidence with the MTCC to identify and
authenticate the same. Accordingly, the said statements of account are
mere hearsay and should not have been admitted by the lower tribunals as
evidence.
Thus, essentially, Otero asserts that Tan failed to prove the material
allegations of his complaint since the statements of account which he
presented are inadmissible in evidence. While the RTC and the CA, in
resolving Otero’s appeal from the default judgment of the MTCC, were only
required to examine the pieces of evidence that were presented by Tan,
the CA erred in brushing aside Otero’s arguments with respect to the
admissibility of the said statements of account on the ground that the latter
had already waived any defense or objection which he may have against
Tan’s claim.
Contrary to the CA’s disquisition, it is not accurate to state that having been
declared in default by the MTCC, Otero is already deemed to have waived
any and all defenses which he may have against Tan’s claim.
While it may be said that by defaulting, the defendant leaves himself at the
mercy of the court, the rules nevertheless see to it that any judgment
against him must be in accordance with the evidence required by law. The
evidence of the plaintiff, presented in the defendant’s absence, cannot be
admitted if it is basically incompetent. Although the defendant would not be
in a position to object, elementary justice requires that only legal evidence
should be considered against him. If the same should prove insufficient to
justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed. And if a
favorable judgment is justifiable, it cannot exceed in amount or be different
in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint. 21
Thus, in SSS v. Hon. Chaves,22 this Court emphasized that:
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the authenticity
and due execution of a private document, before it is received in evidence
by the court, must be established. Thus:
Here, Tan, during the ex parte presentation of his evidence, did not present
anyone who testified that the said statements of account were genuine and
were duly executed or that the same were neither spurious or counterfeit or
executed by mistake or under duress. Betache, the one who prepared the
said statements of account, was not presented by Tan as a witness during
the ex parte presentation of his evidence with the MTCC.
In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the
burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. The parties must
rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of
the defense offered by their opponent. 26 This rule holds true especially
when the latter has had no opportunity to present evidence because of a
default order. Needless to say, the extent of the relief that may be granted
can only be so much as has been alleged and proved with preponderant
evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133. 27
Well-established is the principle that factual findings of the trial court, when
adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on this Court
and will generally not be reviewed on appeal. 28 The Court sees no
compelling reason to depart from the foregoing finding of fact of the lower
courts.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition
is DENIED. The Decision dated April 29, 2011 rendered by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02244 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Case
Antecedents
x x x x
Issue
The petitioner raises the lone issue of whether or not the CA
gravely erred in upholding the default judgment of the RTC; in
ordering its answer stricken off the records; in allowing the
respondent to adduce her evidence exparte; and in rendering the
default judgment based on such evidence.9chanrobleslaw
The petitioner's logical remedy was to have moved for the lifting
of the declaration of its default but despite notice it did not do the
same before the RTC rendered the default judgment on August
23, 1999. Its motion for that purpose should have been under the
oath of one who had knowledge of the facts, and should show
that it had a meritorious defense,16 and that its failure to file the
answer had been due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence. Its urgent purpose to move in the RTC is to avert the
rendition of the default judgment. Instead, it was content to insist
in its comment/opposition vis-a-vis the motion to declare it in
default that: (1) it had already filed its answer; (2) the order of
default was generally frowned upon by the courts; (3)
technicalities should not be resorted to; and (4) it had a
meritorious defense. It is notable that it tendered no
substantiation of what was its meritorious defense, and did not
specify the circumstances of fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence that prevented the filing of the answer
before the order of default issued - the crucial elements in asking
the court to consider vacating its own order.
The policy of the law has been to have every litigated case tried
on the merits. As a consequence, the courts have generally
looked upon a default judgment with disfavor because it is in
violation of the right of a defending party to be heard. As the
Court has said in Coombs v. Santos:17
A default judgment does not pretend to be based upon the merits
of the controversy. Its existence is justified on the ground that it
is the one final expedient to induce defendant to join issue upon
the allegations tendered by the plaintiff, and to do so without
unnecessary delay. A judgment by default may amount to a
positive and considerable injustice to the defendant; and the
possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful
examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks that it
be set aside.
In implementation of the policy against defaults, the courts have
admitted answers filed beyond the reglementary periods but
before the declaration of default.18chanrobleslaw
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The assailed June 28, 2012 decision dismissed for lack of merit
the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure filed by petitioners Benedict and Sandra Manuel (the
Spouses Manuel) and sustained the November 30, 2010 and
February 16, 2011 orders of the Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad,
Benguet.4 The assailed December 19, 2012 resolution of the
Court of Appeals denied the Spouses Manuel's motion for
reconsideration. The Regional Trial Court's November 30, 2010
order denied their motion to lift order of default, while its
February 16, 2011 order denied their motion for reconsideration. 5
The Spouses Manuel did not deny the occurrence of the events
narrated in the sheriffs return but claimed that no valid service of
summons was made. They claimed that they did not reside in
Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet, where the service of
summons, was made. From this, they surmised that the "Sandra
Manuel" who was specifically identified in the sheriffs return was
someone other than petitioner Sandra Manuel.
(1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to declare the defending
party in default;
(2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare him in default;
(3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party has failed to answer
within the period provided by the Rule."28
All these requisites were complied with by respondent Ramon
Ong.
(1) it must be made by motion under oath by one that has knowledge of the facts;
(2) it must be shown that the failure to file answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence; and
(3) there must be a proper showing of the existence of a meritorious
defense."[34 (Citations omitted)
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
N
G.R. No. 144568 July 3, 2007
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This case traces its roots to a complaint for judicial partition, inventory and
accounting filed by respondents Esterlita S. Sablas and Rodulfo S. Sablas
against petitioner spouses Pascual Lumanas and Guillerma S. Sablas in
the Regional Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte, Branch 14 1 on October 1, 1999.2
Petitioner spouses were served with summons and a copy of the complaint
on October 6, 1999. On October 21, 1999, they filed a motion for extension
of time requesting an additional period of 15 days, or until November 5,
1999, to file their answer. However, they were able to file it only on
November 8, 1999. While the trial court observed that the answer was filed
out of time, it admitted the pleading because no motion to declare petitioner
spouses in default was filed.3
In a decision dated July 17, 2000, 8 the appellate court ruled that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion because, pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the trial court had no recourse but to declare
petitioner spouses in default when they failed to file their answer on or
before November 5, 1999. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the petition,
vacated the December 6, 1999 order and remanded the case to the trial
court for reception of plaintiffs’ evidence.
Aggrieved, petitioner spouses (defendants in the trial court) now assail the
July 17, 2000 decision of the Court of Appeals in this petition for review on
certiorari.9
Petitioner spouses contend that the Court of Appeals decision was not in
accord with the rules of procedure as it misconstrued Section 3, Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court and was in contravention of jurisprudence.
We agree.
1. the court has validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party either by service of summons or voluntary
appearance;10
2. the defending party failed to file the answer within the time allowed
therefor and
3. a motion to declare the defending party in default has been filed by the
claiming party with notice to the defending party.
An order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming party. 11 It
can be properly issued against the defending party who failed to file the
answer within the prescribed period only if the claiming party files a motion
to that effect with notice to the defending party.
Three requirements must be complied with before the court can declare the
defending party in default: (1) the claiming party must file a motion asking
the court to declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party
must be notified of the motion to declare him in default and (3) the claiming
party must prove that the defending party has failed to answer within the
period provided by the Rules of Court.12
The rule on default requires the filing of a motion and notice of such motion
to the defending party. It is not enough that the defendant fails to answer
the complaint within the reglementary period. 13 The trial court cannot motu
proprio declare a defendant in default 14 as the rules leave it up to the
claiming party to protect his or its interests. The trial court should not under
any circumstances act as counsel of the claiming party.
It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit the defendant to
file his answer and to be heard on the merits even after the reglementary
period for filing the answer expires. 15 The Rules of Court provides for
discretion on the part of the trial court not only to extend the time for filing
an answer but also to allow an answer to be filed after the reglementary
period.16
Thus, the appellate court erred when it ruled that the trial court had no
recourse but to declare petitioner spouses in default when they failed to file
their answer on or before November 5, 1999.
The rule is that the defendant’s answer should be admitted where it is filed
before a declaration of default and no prejudice is caused to the
plaintiff.17 Where the answer is filed beyond the reglementary period but
before the defendant is declared in default and there is no showing that
defendant intends to delay the case, the answer should be
admitted.181avvphi1
In Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Hon. Romillo, Jr.,19 the Court ruled that it
was error to declare the defending party in default after the answer was
filed. The Court was in fact even more emphatic in Indiana Aerospace
University v. Commission on Higher Education:20 it was grave abuse of
discretion to declare a defending party in default despite the latter’s filing of
an answer.
The policy of the law is to have every litigant’s case tried on the merits as
much as possible. Hence, judgments by default are frowned upon. 21 A case
is best decided when all contending parties are able to ventilate their
respective claims, present their arguments and adduce evidence in support
thereof. The parties are thus given the chance to be heard fully and the
demands of due process are subserved. Moreover, it is only amidst such
an atmosphere that accurate factual findings and correct legal conclusions
can be reached by the courts.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: