THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 189272. January 21, 2015.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , appellee, vs . CHI CHAN LIU a.k.a.

CHAN QUE and HUI LAO CHUNG a.k.a. LEOFE SENGLAO , appellants.

DECISION

PERALTA , J : p

For this Court's consideration is the Decision 1 dated January 9, 2009 and
Resolution 2 dated April 24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00657
a rming the Decision 3 dated June 21, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) , Branch 44,
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, in Criminal Case No. Z-1058, nding appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a),
Article IV of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended by RA No. 7659.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
At 10:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998, SPO2 Lazaro Paglicawan and SPO3 Isagani
Yuzon, the o cers-on-duty at the Philippine National Police ( PNP) Station, Looc,
Occidental Mindoro, received a radio message from the Barangay Captain of Ambil Island,
Looc, Maximo Torreliza, that a suspicious looking boat was seen somewhere within the
vicinity of said island. 4 Immediately thereafter, the police o cers headed towards the
speci ed location wherein they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side, one of which
resembled a shing boat and the other, a speedboat. They noticed one (1) person on
board the shing boat and two (2) on board the speed boat who were transferring cargo
from the former to the latter. As they moved closer to the area, the shing boat hurriedly
sped away. Due to the strong waves, the police o cers were prevented from chasing the
same and instead, went towards the speed boat, which seemed to be experiencing engine
trouble. On board the speed boat, the officers found the appellants Chi Chan Liu a.k.a. Chan
Que and Hui Lao Chung a.k.a. Leofe Senglao with several transparent plastic bags
containing a white, crystalline substance they instantly suspected to be the regulated drug,
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu." They requested the
appellants to show their identi cation papers but appellants failed to do so. 5 Thus, the
police o cers directed appellants to transfer to their service boat and thereafter towed
appellants' speed boat to the shore behind the Municipal Hall of Looc, Occidental Mindoro.
On their way, the police o cers testi ed that appellant Chi Chan Liu repeatedly offered
them "big, big amount of money" which they ignored. 6
Upon reaching the shore, the police o cers led the appellants, together with the
bags containing the crystalline substance, to the police station. In the presence of the
appellants and Municipal Mayor Felesteo Telebrico, they conducted an inventory of the
plastic bags which were forty- ve (45) in number, weighing about a kilo each. 7 Again,
SPO3 Yuson requested proper documentation from the appellants as to their identities as
well as to the purpose of their entry in the Philippine territory. 8 However, the appellants did
not answer any of SPO3 Yuson's questions. 9 Immediately thereafter, SPO3 Yuson
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 reported the incident to their superiors, PNP Provincial Command in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro and PNP Regional Command IV in Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna. The PNP
Regional Director General Reynaldo Acop advised them to await his arrival the following
day. 10 HSIDTE

On December 4, 1998, General Acop arrived together with Colonel Damian on a

helicopter. They talked with Mayor Telebrico and the arresting o cers and then brought
the appellants with the suspected illegal drugs to Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, for
further investigation. 11 There, the appellants and the suspected prohibited drugs were
turned over to Police Inspector Julieto B. Culili, of the Intelligence and Investigation
Division, PNP, Regional O ce IV, who attempted to communicate with the appellants
using "broken" English. According to Inspector Culili, appellant Chi Chan Liu only kept
saying the phrase "call China, big money," giving him a certain cellular phone number. 12 He
allowed appellants to call said number in which they spoke with someone using their
native language, which he could not understand. 13 Because of this di culty, Inspector
Culili sought the assistance of Inspector Carlito Dimalanta in nding an interpreter who
knew either Fookien or Cantonese.
On December 5, 1998, the interpreter arrived. With the assistance of said interpreter,
Inspector Culili informed and explained to the appellants their rights under Philippine laws
inclusive of the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, as well as the right to be
informed of the charges against them, and the consequences thereof. 14 Inspector Culili
also requested the interpreter to ask the appellants whether they wanted to avail of said
constitutional rights. However, appellants only kept repeating the phrase "big money, call
China." Apart from their names, aliases and personal circumstances, the appellants did not
divulge any other information. 15 Inspector Culili, with the assistance of the arresting
o cers, then prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of the appellants, requested
for their physical and medical examination, as well as the laboratory examination of the
white, crystalline substance in the bags seized from them. 16 He also assisted the
arresting o cers in the preparation of their a davits. 17 According to Inspector Culili,
moreover, he was able to con rm that the appellants are Chinese nationals from
Guandong, China, based on an earlier intelligence report that foreign nationals on board
extraordinary types of vessels were seen along the sealine of Lubang Island in Cavite, and
Quezon Province. 18
Thereafter, Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo, PNP Chief Forensic
Chemist/Physical Examiner assigned at the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Service O ce,
Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna conducted an examination of the white, crystalline substance in
the forty- ve (45) bags seized from the appellants. 19 After performing three (3) tests
thereon, she positively con rmed in her Chemistry Report that the same is, indeed,
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu." 20
On December 8, 1998, the O ce of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro
led an Information 21 with the RTC of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, against appellants
for violation of Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of RA No. 6425
as amended by RA No. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 3, 1998 at the
coast of Brgy. Tambo, Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc Province of
Occidental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused being then the persons not authorized by law
conspiring and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously import and bring through the use of sea vessel into the
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 above-mentioned place, Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu
contained in forty- ve (45) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags having a total
weight of 46,600 grams (46.60 kilograms) placed inside another forty- ve (45)
separate self-seling (sic) transparent plastic bags which is prohibited by law, to
the damage and prejudice of public interest.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges against them. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued, where the facts earlier stated were testi ed to by the witnesses for the
prosecution, speci cally: SPO2 Paglicawan, SPO3 Yuson, Police Inspector Culili, and Police
Inspector Geronimo.
The testimonies of the witnesses for the defense, namely: Jesus Astorga and
Fernando Oliva, both residents of Ambil Island, Leopoldo S. J. Lozada, a former Supervising
Crime Photographer of the PNP, and Godofredo de la Fuente Robles, a Member of the
Looc Municipal Council, essentially maintain that the subject crystalline substance was
merely recovered by the apprehending police o cers from the house of Barangay Captain
Maximo Torreliza and not actually from the speed boat the appellants were on. 22
The trial court found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt in its Decision dated
June 21, 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, nding both accused CHI CHAN LIU @ "CHAN QUE" AND HIU
LAO CHUNG @ "LEOFE SENG LAO" GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
VIOLATING Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV as
amended by R.A. 7659 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, the Court
hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT OF RECLUSION PERPETUA
and to each pay the FINE of One Million (Php1,000,000.00) Pesos Philippine Currency, with cost de
officio.
SO ORDERED. 23

On appeal, the CA a rmed in toto the Decision of the RTC in its Decision dated
January 9, 2009. On April 24, 2009, it further denied the appellants' Motion for
Reconsideration in its Resolution nding no cogent reason to make any revision,
amendment, or reversal of its assailed Decision. Hence, the present appeal raising the
following issues: aETASc

I.
WHETHER OR NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF IMPORTATION OF
REGULATED DRUGS PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 14, ARTICLE III, IN
RELATION TO SECTION 21 (A), ARTICLE IV OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS
AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7659, ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE.

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES CAN PREVAIL OVER THE GUARANTEES
ENSHRINED AND KEPT SACRED BY THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION IN THIS
CASE.
IV.
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 WHETHER OR NOT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IS VALID.
V.

WHETHER OR NOT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WAS PROVEN

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 24

Appellants maintain that there is no importation of regulated drugs in the instant

case since the elements of the crime of importation, namely: (1) the importation or
bringing into the Philippines of any regulated or prohibited drug; and (2) the importation or
bringing into the Philippines of said drugs was without authority of law, were not
established herein. Appellants assert that unless there is proof that a ship on which illegal
drugs came from a foreign country, the offense does not fall within the ambit of illegal
importation of said drugs. Thus, considering the prosecution's failure to prove the place of
origin of the boat on which appellants were apprehended, appellants cannot be convicted
of the crime charged herein.
Appellants also claim that the prosecution failed to substantiate beyond reasonable
doubt the corpus delicti of the crime charged for the chain of custody of the illegal drugs
subject of this case was not su ciently established. In addition, they emphasize the
irregularities attendant in their arrest and seizure of the illegal drugs in violation of their
constitutionally protected rights. Appellants further call attention to the invalidity of their
arraignment for they were not represented by a counsel of their choice.
This Court finds merit on appellants' first argument.
The information led by the prosecutor against appellants charged appellants with
violation of Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of RA No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 , as amended by RA No. 7659, which
provide:
ARTICLE III
Regulated Drugs

Section 14. Importation of Regulated Drugs. — The penalty of

imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a ne
ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring any regulated drug
into the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE IV
Provisions of Common Application to Offenses Penalized
under Articles II and III

xxx xxx xxx

Section 21. Attempt and Conspiracy. — The same penalty prescribed by
this Act for the commission of the offense shall be imposed in case of any
attempt or conspiracy to commit the same in the following cases:

a) importation of dangerous drugs;

On the basis of the foregoing provisions, the crime of importation of regulated

drugs is committed by importing or bringing any regulated drug into the Philippines
without being authorized by law. According to appellants, if it is not proven that the
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 regulated drugs are brought into the Philippines from a foreign origin, there is no
importation. In support of this, they cite our ruling in United States v. Jose , 25 wherein We
said that: TAcCDI

There can be no question that, unless a ship on which opium is

alleged to have been illegally imported comes from a foreign country,
there is no importation. If the ship came to Olongapo from Zamboanga,
for example, the charge that opium was illegally imported on her into
the port of Olongapo, i.e. , into the Philippine Islands, could not be
sustained no matter how much opium she had on board or how much
was discharged. In order to establish the crime of importation as
de ned by the Opium Law, it must be shown that the vessel from which
the opium is landed or on which it arrived in Philippine waters came
from a foreign port. Section 4 of Act No. 2381 provides that:
Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands, or assist in so doing, shall be
punished . . . .

It is clear that a breach of this provision involves the bringing of

opium into the Philippine Islands from a foreign country. Indeed, it is a
prime essential of the crime de ned by that section. Without it, no
crime under that section can be established . 26

Moreover, the Black's Law Dictionary de nes importation as "the act of bringing
goods and merchandise into a country from a foreign country." 27 As used in our tariff and
customs laws, imported articles, those which are brought into the Philippines from any
foreign country, are subject to duty upon each importation. 28 Similarly, in a statute
controlling the entry of toxic substances and hazardous and nuclear wastes, importation
was construed as the entry of products or substances into the Philippines through the
seaports or airports of entry. 29 Importation then, necessarily connotes the introduction of
something into a certain territory coming from an external source. Logically, if the article
merely came from the same territory, there cannot be any importation of the same.
The CA, in finding that there was importation in the present case, stated:
The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
appellants were, indeed, guilty of importing regulated drugs into the country in
violation of aforesaid law. Appellants were caught by police authorities in
agrante delicto on board a speedboat carrying forty- ve (45) plastic bags of
shabu. The drugs seized were properly presented and identi ed in court.
Appellants' admission that they were Chinese nationals and their
penchant for making reference during custodial investigation to China
where they could obtain money to bribe the police o cers lead this
Court to no other reasonable conclusion but that China is the country of
origin of the con scated drugs. All elements of the crime of illegal
importation of regulated drugs being present in this case, conviction thereof is in
order. 30

We disagree. The mere fact that the appellants were Chinese nationals as well as
their penchant for making reference to China where they could obtain money to bribe the
apprehending o cers does not necessarily mean that the con scated drugs necessarily
came from China. The records only bear the fact that the speed boat on which the
appellants were apprehended was docked on the coast of Ambil Island in the Municipality
of Looc, Occidental Mindoro. But it could have easily come from some other locality within
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 the country, and not necessarily from China or any foreign port, as held by the CA. This
Court notes that for a vessel which resembles a speed boat, it is rather difficult to suppose
how appellants made their way to the shores of Occidental Mindoro from China. Moreover,
an earlier intelligence report that foreign nationals on board extraordinary types of vessels
were seen along the sealine of Lubang Island in Cavite, and Quezon Province, does not
su ciently prove the allegation that appellants herein were, in fact, importing illegal drugs
in the country from an external source. This, notwithstanding, had the prosecution
presented more concrete evidence to convince this Court that the prohibited drugs,
indeed, came from a source outside of the Philippines, the importation contention could
have been sustained.
Appellants' exoneration from illegal importation of regulated drugs under Section
14, Article III of RA No. 6425 does not, however, free them from all criminal liability for their
possession of the same is clearly evident.
At the outset, appellants may argue that as We have ruled in United States v. Jose, 31
possession is not necessarily included in the charge of importation and thus, they cannot
be held liable thereof, to wit:
Counsel for neither of the parties to this action have discussed the
question whether, in case the charge of illegal importation fails, the accused may
still be convicted, under the information, of the crime of illegal possession of
opium. We, therefore, have not had the aid of discussion of this proposition; but,
believing that it is a question which might fairly be raised in the event of an
acquittal on the charge of illegal importation, we have taken it up and decided it.
Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that: ECTIcS

The court may nd the defendant guilty of any offense, or of any

frustrated or attempted offense, the commission of which is
necessarily included in the charge in the complaint or information.
As will be seen from this provision, to convict of an offense included
in the charge in the information it is not su cient that the crime may
be included, but it must necessarily be included. While, the case before
us, the possession of the opium by the appellants was proved beyond
question and they might have been convicted of that offense if they
have been charged therewith, nevertheless, such possession was not an
essential element of the crime of illegal importation and was not
necessarily included therein. The importation was complete, to say the least,
when the ship carrying it anchored in Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the
opium be discharged or that it be taken from the ship. It was su cient that the
opium was brought into the waters of the Philippine Islands on a boat destined
for a Philippine port and which subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine
Islands with intent to discharge its cargo. That being the case it is clear that
possession, either actual or constructive, is not a necessary element of
the crime of illegal importation nor is it necessarily included therein.
Therefore, in acquitting the appellants of the charge of illegal
importation, we cannot legally convict them of the crime of illegal
possession. 32

However, in our more recent ruling in People v. Elkanish , 33 this Court held that
possession is inherent in importation. In that case, the accused, who was suspected of
being the owner of sixty- ve (65) large boxes of blasting caps found aboard a ship of
American registry docked inside Philippine territory, was charged with illegal importation
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 of the articles under Section 2702 of the Revised Administrative Code and illegal
possession of the same articles under Section 1 of Act No. 3023, in two (2) separate
informations. Ruling that double jeopardy exists in view of the fact that possession is
necessarily included in importation, this Court a rmed the dismissal of the information on
illegal importation, in the following wise:
Section 9 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court reads:
When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge su cient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to
the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.

With reference to the importation and possession of blasting

caps, it seems plain beyond argument that the latter is inherent in the
former so as to make them juridically identical. There can hardly be
importation without possession. When one brings something or causes
something to be brought into the country, he necessarily has the
possession of it. The possession ensuing from the importation may not
be actual, but legal, or constructive, but whatever its character, the
importer, in our opinion, is a possessor in the juristic sense and he is
liable to criminal prosecution. If he parts with the ownership of interest in the
article before it reaches Philippine territory, he is neither an importer nor a
possessor within the legal meaning of the term, and he is not subject to
prosecution for either offense under the Philippine Laws. The owner of the
merchandise at the time it enters Philippine water is its importer and possessor.
He who puts merchandise on board a vessel and alienates the title thereto while it
is in transit does not incur criminal liability. Possession on ownership of a
prohibited article on a foreign vessel on the high seas outside the jurisdiction of
the Philippines does not constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country.
(U.S. vs. Look Chaw, 18 Phil., 573). 34

As We have explained in our more recent ruling above, there is double jeopardy
therein since the offense charged in the information on possession is necessarily included
in the information on importation in view of the fact that the former is inherent in the latter.
Thus, this Court sustained the dismissal of one of the two informations which charged the
accused with importation to avoid the implications of double jeopardy for possession is
necessarily included in the charge of importation.
Applying the aforequoted ruling, this Court finds that while appellants cannot be held
liable for the offense of illegal importation charged in the information, their criminal liability
for illegal possession, if proven beyond reasonable doubt, may nevertheless be sustained.
As previously mentioned, the crime of importation of regulated drugs is committed by
importing or bringing any regulated drug into the Philippines without being authorized by
law. Indeed, when one brings something or causes something to be brought into the
country, he necessarily has possession of the same. Necessarily, therefore, importation
can never be proven without rst establishing possession, a rming the fact that
possession is a condition sine qua non for it would rather be unjust to convict one of illegal
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 importation of regulated drugs when he is not proven to be in possession thereof. CETIDH

At this point, this Court notes that charging appellants with illegal possession when
the information led against them charges the crime of importation does not violate their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought
against them. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense
as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved included in that which is charged. 35 An offense charged necessarily
includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. 36
Indeed, We have had several occasions in the past wherein an accused, charged with
the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, was convicted of illegal possession thereof. In those
cases, this Court upheld the prevailing doctrine that the illegal sale of dangerous drugs
absorbs the illegal possession thereof except if the seller was also apprehended in the
illegal possession of another quantity of dangerous drugs not covered by or not included
in the illegal sale, and the other quantity of dangerous drugs was probably intended for
some future dealings or use by the accused. 37 Illegal possession of dangerous drugs is
therefore an element of and is necessarily included in illegal sale. Hence, convicting the
accused with the former does not violate his right to be informed of the accusation
against him for it is an element of the latter.
In a similar manner, considering that illegal possession is likewise an element of and
is necessarily included in illegal importation of dangerous drugs, convicting appellants of
the former, if duly established beyond reasonable doubt, does not amount to a violation of
their right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them. Indeed,
where an accused is charged with a speci c crime, he is duly informed not only of such
specific crime but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein. 38
Thus, in view of the fact that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily
included in the illegal importation of regulated drugs, this Court shall determine appellants'
culpability under Section 16, 39 Article III of RA No. 6425.
The elements of illegal possession of regulated drugs are as follows: (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identi ed to be a regulated drug; (b)
such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the regulated drug. 40
The evidence on record clearly established that appellants were in possession of the
bags containing the regulated drugs without the requisite authority. As mentioned
previously, on the date of appellants' arrest, the apprehending o cers were conducting a
surveillance of the coast of Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc, Occidental Mindoro,
upon being informed by the Municipality's Barangay Captain that a suspicious-looking boat
was within the vicinity. Not long after, they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side,
the persons on which were transferring cargo from one to the other. Interestingly, as they
moved closer to the area, one of the boats hurriedly sped away. Upon reaching the other
boat, the police o cers found the appellants with several transparent plastic bags
containing what appeared to be shabu which were plainly exposed to the view of the
officers. Clearly, appellants were found to be in possession of the subject regulated drugs.
Moreover, this Court is not legally prepared to accept the version of the appellants
that they had nothing to do with the incident and that they were being framed up as the
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 drugs seized from them were merely planted by the apprehending o cers. At the outset,
this Court observes that appellants did not provide any explanation as to how the
apprehending o cers were actually able to plant forty- ve (45) bags of regulated drugs
weighing about one (1) kilo each in the speed boat of appellants in the middle of the ocean
without their knowledge. Also, as the trial court noted, they did not even give any
explanation as to the purpose of their presence in the coast of Ambil, Looc, Occidental
Mindoro. More importantly, aside from saying that the con scated bags of regulated
drugs were merely implanted in their speed boat, they did not provide the court with
sufficient evidence to substantiate their claim. In the words of the lower court:
Moreover, the story of defense witnesses Jesus Astorga, Fernando Oliva,
and Godofredo Robles that the subject shabu were taken only by the police
authority from the house of Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza taxes only one's
credulity. Their testimonies appear to be merely a product of an [afterthought].
They have not executed any prior a davit on the matters concerning their
testimonies unlike the prosecution witnesses SPO3 Yuson and SPO2 Paglicawan
who executed their joint a davit almost immediately after their arrest. It is so
apparent from the testimonies of these three (3) above-named defense witnesses
that they [did not] know anything about the case. What is even worse is that Atty.
Evasco, the former counsel of the accused, procured the testimonies of Jesus
Astorga, Fernando Oliva, and Godofredo Reyes. Clear enough their intent or
motivation is not for the truth to come out but for the monetary consideration in
exchange of their testimony. 41CAScIH

This Court has consistently noted that denial or frame up is a standard defense ploy
in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law. This defense has been
invariably viewed with disfavor for it can easily be concocted. In order to prosper, the
defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. 42
Without proof of any intent on the part of the police o cers to falsely impute to appellants
the commission of a crime, the presumption of regularity in the performance of o cial
duty and the principle that the ndings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect, deserve to prevail over the bare denials and self-serving claims of
frame up by appellants. 43
Going now to appellants' arguments that their criminal liability is negated by certain
irregularities in the proceedings of this case. First and foremost, appellants allege a
violation of their constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Due to
the absence of probable cause, their warrantless arrest and consequent search and
seizure on their persons and possession is unjusti ed and hence, the con scated bags of
regulated drugs therefrom are inadmissible against them.
Section 2, Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or a rmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

A settled exception, however, to the above guaranteed right is an arrest made during
the commission of a crime, which does not require a previously issued warrant, under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
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 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace o cer of a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

This Court has ruled that for an arrest to fall under the above exception, two (2)
elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. 44
In this case, appellants were actually committing a crime and were caught by the
apprehending o cers in agrante delicto. As previously stated, the records reveal that on
the date of their arrest, the apprehending o cers, while acting upon a report from the
Barangay Captain, spotted appellants transferring cargo from one boat to another.
However, one of the boats hastily sped away when they drew closer to the appellants,
naturally arousing the suspicion of the o cers. Soon after, the police o cers found them
with the illegal drugs plainly exposed to the view of the o cers. When they requested
appellants to show proper documentation as to their identity as well as their purpose for
being there, appellants refused to show them anything much less respond to any of their
questions. In fact, when the o cers were transporting appellants and the illegal drugs to
the shore, the appellant Chi Chan Liu even repeatedly offered the arresting o cers "big, big
amount of money." Hence, the circumstances prior to and surrounding the arrest of
appellants clearly show that they were arrested when they were actually committing a
crime within the view of the arresting o cers, who had reasonable ground to believe that a
crime was being committed.
In addition, this Court does not nd the consequent warrantless search and seizure
conducted on appellants unreasonable in view of the fact that the bags containing the
regulated drugs were in plain view of the arresting o cers, one of the judicially recognized
exceptions to the requirement of obtaining a search warrant. HcaDTE

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an o cer, who has
a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence. 45 It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
o cer in search of the evidence has a prior justi cation for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the o cer that the item he observes may
be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement
officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and
hand, and its discovery inadvertent. 46
In the case at hand, the apprehending o cers were performing their duty of
ascertaining whether a criminal activity was indeed happening at the time and place
reported by the Barangay Captain. In broad daylight, appellants were seen in the act of
transferring bags of illegal drugs from one boat to another and thereafter caught in
possession of the same, which became inadvertently and immediately apparent from the
point of view of the arresting o cers. It is undeniably clear, therefore, that the seizure of
illegal drugs conducted by the o cers falls within the purview of the "plain view" doctrine.
Consequently, the confiscated drugs are admissible as evidence against appellants.
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 As to appellants' assignment of failure on the part of the prosecution to
substantiate beyond reasonable doubt the corpus delicti of the crime charged for the
chain of custody of the illegal drugs was not su ciently established, the same cannot be
sustained as a review of the records of the case provides otherwise. From the time of
appellants' arrest, the seized bags of regulated drugs were properly marked and
photographed. Proper inventory was also conducted in the presence of the appellants and
Mayor Telebrico, who signed a receipt evidencing that the con scated drugs were turned
over to the PNP Regional Headquarters. 47 There, the evidence was sent to the Regional
Crime Laboratory Service O ce for an examination which yielded positive results. The
laboratory report, photographs, and receipts were all made part of the records of this
case. In fact, the bags containing the crystalline substance were presented before the trial
court during the hearing held on October 12, 1999 which was identi ed by SPO3 Yuson,
the o cer who con scated the same. Evidently, an unbroken chain of custody of the
confiscated drugs was established by the prosecution.
Appellants also assail the legality of their detention for being formally charged in an
Information on December 8, 1998 or ve (5) days after their arrest on December 3, 1998,
beyond the thirty-six (36)-hour period in Article 125 48 of the Revised Penal Code. But while
the law subjects such public o cers who detain persons beyond the legal period to
criminal liability, it must be remembered that the proceeding taken against the detained
persons for the act the committed remains unaffected, for the two acts are distinct and
separate. 49 This Court is nevertheless mindful of the di cult circumstances faced by the
police o cers in this case, such as the language barrier, the unresponsiveness of the
appellants, the fact that one of the days fell on a Sunday, as well as the disparity in the
distances between the different o ces. But even assuming that the police o cers
intentionally delayed the ling of the Information, appellants should have taken steps to
report or le charges against the o cers. Unfortunately, they cannot now rely on
administrative shortcomings of police o cers to get a judgment of acquittal for these do
not diminish the fact that illegal drugs were found in appellants' possession. 50
Anent appellants' claim that their constitutional rights were further violated for
during custodial investigation, they did not have counsel of their choice nor were they
provided with one, this deserves scant consideration since the same is relevant and
material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from an accused
becomes the basis of his conviction. 51 In this case, neither one of the appellants executed
an admission or confession. In fact, as the records clearly show, appellants barely even
spoke and merely kept repeating the phrase "call China, big money." The trial court
convicted them not on the basis of anything they said during custodial investigation but on
other convincing evidence such as the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Verily,
there was no violation of appellants' constitutional right to counsel during custodial
investigation.
In this relation, appellants further criticize the legality of the proceedings in saying
that during their arraignment, they were not represented by a counsel of their choice but
were merely represented by a court-appointed government lawyer. Appellants assert that
the trial court likewise appointed a special interpreter, who merely understood a little
Chinese language. As such, considering the absence of any assurance that the interpreter
was able to explain to appellants the charges against them in the language they
understood, appellants therefore did not validly enter their plea.SDHITE

The facts borne by the records of the case, however, militate against the contention
of the appellants. This Court does not nd a violation of appellants' right to counsel for
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 even in their own narration of facts, appellants stated that when they appeared without
counsel when the case was called for arraignment on January 19, 1999, the trial court gave
appellants time to secure the services of counsel of their choice. It was only when
appellants again appeared without counsel on February 23, 1999 that the court appointed
a counsel from the Public Attorney's O ce. 52 It is clear, therefore, that appellants had
ample opportunity to secure the services of a counsel of their own choice. They cannot
now assign error in the proceedings conducted by the trial court for the fact remains that
they were appointed with counsel in full compliance with the law.
In much the same way, appellants had every opportunity to secure the services of a
Chinese interpreter with such competence at par with their standards. As pointed out by
the CA, the trial court gave appellants the authorization to seek, through their counsel, the
Chinese Embassy's assistance for purposes of procuring a Chinese interpreter. 53
Appellants were even given time, through several postponements, to properly secure the
services of one. If appellants were unsatis ed with the competence of the court-appointed
interpreter, it should have taken the opportunities given by the trial court. In this relation,
the trial court's observations are worth mentioning, to wit:
Another factor that militates against the accused is their failure to testify
on their own behalf, the defense is trying to justify for want of Chinese interpreter.
The instant case has been led in Court since December 8, 1998 or six years more
or less until now. It is highly unbelievable that for such period of time that
this case has been pending in court, accused could not still secure the
services of a Chinese interpreter when as borne out by the records, they
were able to secure the services of several lawyers one after the other.
The accused on two (2) occasions have even submitted written requests in
English (Exhibit "N" and Exhibit "O") which were granted by the Court allowing
them to call their relatives but still they failed to secure the services of an
interpreter. To the mind of the Court, accused can also understand English as
proven by their letters. . . . 54

Indeed, this Court accords the highest degree of respect to the ndings of the lower
court as to appellants' guilt of the offense charged against them, especially when such
ndings are adequately supported by documentary as well as testimonial evidence. It is a
settled policy of this Court, founded on reason and experience, to sustain the ndings of
fact of the trial court in criminal cases, on the rational assumption that it is in a better
position to assess the evidence before it, having had the opportunity to make an honest
determination of the witnesses' deportment during the trial. 55
Moreover, in view of the well-entrenched rule that the ndings of facts of the trial
court, as a rmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court, absent any evidence
that both courts ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances
of substance which, if considered, would warrant a modi cation or reversal of the
outcome of the case, this Court nds no cogent reason to deviate from the above ndings.
5 6 It is clear, therefore, that based on the ndings of the courts below, appellants were, in
fact, in possession of regulated drugs without the requisite authority.
As to the penalty imposed on appellants, Sections 16 and 17 of RA No. 7659,
amending RA No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, provide:
Sec. 16. Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is amended to read as follows:

Section 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. — The penalty of

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 reclusion perpetua to death and a ne ranging from ve hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall
possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or
prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as
follows:

Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Con scation and Forfeiture of the

Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. — The penalties for offenses under
Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in
any of the following quantities:

xxx xxx xxx

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine
hydrochloride;

From the foregoing, considering that appellants were found to have possessed
forty- ve (45) kilograms of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which is more than the two
hundred (200) grams stipulated above, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, in
accordance with R.A. No. 9346, otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines." As regards the ne, We nd that the amount of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for each appellant imposed by the RTC is proper, in view of
the quantity seized from them. ISDHcT

WHEREFORE , premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED . The Decision

dated January 9, 2009 and Resolution dated April 24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR HC No. 00657 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellants herein are
found GUILTY of the crime of illegal possession of regulated drugs.
SO ORDERED .
Velasco, Jr., Villarama, Jr., Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with Associate Justices

Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Romeo F. Barza, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-18.
2. CA rollo, p. 281.

3. Penned by Presiding Judge Inocencio M. Jaurigue, id. at 8-19.

4. Rollo, p. 4.
5. CA rollo, p. 9.

6. Rollo, p. 5, citing TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 2-12; and TSN, May 19, 1999, pp. 12-24.
7. CA rollo, p. 10.

8. TSN, March 23, 1999, p. 13.

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 9. Id.

10. Rollo, p. 5, citing TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 12-14; and TSN, May 19, 1999, pp. 24-26, 28.
11. Id., citing TSN, March 23, 1999, pp. 14-15; 26-29.

12. Id., citing TSN, May 20, 1999, pp. 5-14.

13. CA rollo, p. 11.

14. Id.

15. Rollo p. 5 citing TSN, May 20, 1999, pp. 14-17.

16. Id., citing TSN, May 20, 1999, pp. 17-25.

17. CA rollo, p. 12.

18. Rollo, p. 5 citing TSN, May 20, 1999, p. 36.

19. Id. at 6, citing TSN, August 25, 1999, pp. 7-28.

20. Id., citing TSN, August 25, 1999, pp. 38-73.

21. CA rollo, p. 6.

22. Id. at 16.

23. Id. at 19.

24. Rollo, pp. 63-64.

25. G.R. No. L-11737, August 25, 1916.

26. United States v. Jose, supra. (Emphasis ours)

27. http://thelawdictionary.org/importation/ (last accessed November 11, 2014).

28. Section 101, Title 1 of Book 1, Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as "An Act to Revise
and Codify the Tariff and Customs Laws of the Philippines."

29. Section 5 (d) Republic Act No. 6969, otherwise known as "An Act to Control Toxic
Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes, Providing Penalties for Violations
thereof, and for Other Purposes," October 26, 1990.
30. Rollo, pp. 13-14. (Emphasis ours)

31. United States v. Jose, supra note 23.

32. Id. (Emphasis ours)

33. People v. Elkanish, G.R. No. L-2666, September 26, 1951.

34. Id. (Emphasis ours)

35. Rules of Court, Rule 120, Sec. 4.

36. Rules of Court, Rule 120, Sec. 5.

37. People v. Manansala, G.R. No. 175939, April 3, 2013 and People v. Hong Yeng E, G.R. No.
181826, January 9, 2013, citing People v. Lacerna, G.R. No. 109250, September 5, 1997,
278 SCRA 561.
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 38. People v. Noque, G.R. No. 175319, January 15, 2010, citing People v. Villamar, 358 Phil. 886,
894 (1998).

39. Section 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. — The penalty of imprisonment ranging
from six months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six hundred to four
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any
regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription.

40. People v. Lacerna, 344 Phil. 100, 121 (1997).

41. CA rollo, p. 18.

42. People v. Amansec, G.R. No. 186131, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 574, citing People v.
Lazaro, Jr., G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA 250, 269.
43. People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 187047, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 286, citing People v. Chua, 416
Phil. 33, 56 (2001).
44. Miclat v. People, G.R. No. 176077, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 539, 550, citing People v.
Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 775 (2003).
45. Fajardo v. People, G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011, 639 SCRA 194, 209, citing People v.
Go, 457 Phil. 885, 928 (2003), citing People v. Musa, G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993,
217 SCRA 597, 610 and Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 192, 72 L. ed. 231 (1927).

46. Id., at 209-210, citing People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 633-634 (1999).

47. CA rollo, p. 11.

48. Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. — The
penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer
or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver
such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of; twelve (12) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours,
for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent and thirty-
six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or
their equivalent.

49. People v. Cadley , 469 Phil. 515, 528 (2004), citing People v. Mabong, 100 Phil. 1069, 1071
(1957).
50. Id., citing People v. Tejada, 252 Phil. 515, 525-526 (1989).

51. Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 624, and People v.
Vinecario, G.R. No. 141137, January 20, 2004, citing People v. Buluran, 382 Phil. 364,
372 (2000).
52. Rollo, p. 59.

53. Id. at 15.

54. CA rollo, p. 18. (Emphasis ours)

55. Sy v. People, G.R. No. 182178, August 15, 2011, citing People v. Dilao, 555 Phil. 394, 407
(2007).

56. Id. at 439.

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