FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 124442. July 20, 2001.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO

COMPACION y SURPOSA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Vic J. Agravante & Emiliano A. Mariano for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that Armando

S. Compacion (herein accused-appellant) was growing and cultivating
marijuana plants, members of the Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) of the Bacolod City Detachment conducted a surveillance
of the residence of accused-appellant, who was then the barangay captain of
barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. During the said
surveillance, they saw two (2) tall plants in the backyard of the accused-
appellant, which they suspected to be marijuana plants. They immediately
formed a team who applied for a search warrant but were not able to do so.
Nonetheless, the team proceeded to the residence of the accused-appellant and
were allegedly permitted entry to come in. Finding the suspected marijuana
plants, they uprooted them and conducted an initial test on the plant using the
Narcotics Drug Identification Kit. The test yielded a positive result. Thereafter,
accused-appellant was charged with violating Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425
(known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). Upon arraignment, the accused
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued. The trial court
convicted the accused and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of half a million (P500,000.00) pesos. The accused appealed his conviction
to the Supreme Court and asked the Court to reverse the same. HAaECD

Turning to the legal defenses of accused-appellant, the Supreme Court

considered his allegation that his constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures had been violated by the police authorities. In the instant
case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in the house of
accused-appellant was not authorized by a search warrant. It did not appear
either that the situation fell under any of the recognized exceptions thereto.
Consequently, accused-appellant's right against unreasonable search and
seizure was clearly violated. Since the evidence was secured on the occasion of
an unreasonable search and seizure, the same was tainted and illegal and
should, therefore, be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
Accused-appellant Armando S. Compacion was acquitted of the crime charged
on grounds of reasonable doubt.

SYLLABUS
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 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SEARCH AND SEIZURE;
WHEN UNREASONABLE; EFFECT THEREOF. — The relevant constitutional
provisions are found in Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which read as follows: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. Sec. 3. . . . (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Said
constitutional provisions are safeguards against reckless, malicious and
unreasonable invasion of privacy and liberty. The Court, in Villanueva v.
Querubin, underscored their importance: It is deference to one's personality
that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked upon as a
recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not
necessarily thereto confined. What is sought to be guarded is a man's
prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of
refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be
welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the
state, however powerful, does not as such have access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house,
however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling
and to respect the privacies of his life. In the same vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the
embodiment of "a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home
and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must
not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under
stringent procedural safeguards." A search and seizure, therefore, must be
carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and
seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the constitutional
provision. Evidence secured thereby, i.e., "fruits" of the search and seizure, will
be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL WARRANT REQUIRED; EXCEPTIONS. — The
requirement that a warrant must be obtained from the proper judicial authority
prior to the conduct of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are
several instances when the law recognizes exceptions, such as when the owner
of the premises consents or voluntarily submits to a search; when the owner of
the premises waives his rights against such incursion; when the search is
incidental to a lawful arrest; when it is made on vessels and aircraft for
violation of customs laws; when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of
preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; when it involves
prohibited articles in plain view; when it involves a "stop and frisk" situation;
when the search is under exigent and emergency circumstances; or in cases of
inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary
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 and building regulations. In these instances, a search may be validly made
even without a warrant.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VALID WAIVER THEREOF MUST BE MADE
VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY; ABSENT IN CASE AT BAR. —
While the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like
every right, be waived either expressly or impliedly, such waiver must
constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The act
of the accused-appellant in allowing the members of the military to enter his
premises and his consequent silence during the unreasonable search and
seizure could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied
acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure especially so when members of
the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed. His implied
acquiescence, if any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity
given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently,
herein accused appellant's lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to
the warrantless search and seizure.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; AS A GENERAL RULE, OBJECTS IN THE "PLAIN VIEW" OF
AN OFFICER WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO BE IN THE POSITION TO HAVE THAT VIEW
ARE SUBJECT TO SEIZURE WITHOUT A WARRANT; WHEN APPLICABLE. — As a
general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Thus, the following elements must be present before the doctrine may be
applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) "plain
view" justified were seizure of evidence without further search.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WARRANTLESS ARREST; NOT VALID IN CASE AT BAR. —

Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into accused-
appellant's premises without the latter's consent. It is undisputed that the
NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant
on July 9, 1995 on the suspicion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana
when they allegedly came in "plain view" of the marijuana plants. When the
agents entered his premises on July 13, 1995, their intention was to seize the
evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant
but could not simply wait for one to be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore,
did not come across the marijuana plants inadvertently when they conducted a
surveillance and barged into accused-appellant's residence. It was not even
apparent to the members of the composite team whether the plants involved
herein were indeed marijuana plants. After said plants were uprooted, SPO1
Linda had to conduct a field test on said plants by using a Narcotics Drug
Identification Kit to determine if the same were indeed marijuana plants. Later,
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 Senior Inspector Villavicencio, a forensic chemist, had to conduct three (3)
qualitative examinations to determine if the plants were indeed marijuana.
Since the evidence was secured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and
seizure, the same is tainted and illegal and should therefore be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J : p

Armando S. Compacion was charged with violating Section 9 of R.A. No.

6425 (known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by R.A. No.
7659, in an information which reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses ARMANDO COMPACION y Surposa,
Barangay Captain of Barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental, of the crime of "VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF
1972 AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659" committed as follows:

"That on or about 1:30 o'clock A.M., July 13, 1995, at

Barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally plant, cultivate or
culture two (2) full grown Indian Hemp Plants, otherwise known
as "Marijuana plants", more or less eleven (11) feet tall, in gross
violation of Section 9, Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659."
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

Upon arraignment on August 16, 1995, the accused pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged.

Thereafter, trial ensued.

On January 2, 1996, the trial court convicted the accused of the crime
charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREAS, the Court finds the accused ARMANDO COMPACION Y
SURPOSA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of
"Violation of Section 9, R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659" whereof
he is charged in the information in the instant case and sentences him
to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of half a million (P500,000.00)
Pesos, Philippine Currency. The portion of the backyard of his residence
in the poblacion proper of Brgy. Bagonbon this City and Province, in
which the two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. "F", subject-matter of this
case, were planted, cultivated and cultured, is hereby ordered
confiscated and escheated in favor of the State, pursuant to the
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 aforequoted Sec. 13 R.A. 7659. SEHDIC

It would seem that the penalty imposed upon the accused in the
instant case for having planted, cultivated and cultured just two (2)
marijuana plants is extremely harsh. But there is nothing in the law
which allows the Court to impose a lesser penalty in view of the
peculiar facts and circumstances in this particular case. Hence, dura
lex, sed lex. The law is, indeed, harsh but it is the law.
The obvious message of the law is that people should not have a
nonchalant or cavalier attitude towards dangerous prohibited drugs.
They should not dabble in it as if they were a flippant thing. These
dangerous and prohibited drugs are a terrible menace to the minds and
morality of our people for their distortive and pervertive effects on
them resulting in rampant criminality. That is why the government
wants this evil exterminated from our country. It is too bad that the
accused instead of helping the government in this drive, in his capacity
as barangay captain of his barangay, made a mockery of it by planting,
cultivating and culturing said two (2) marijuana plants himself.
A word of counsel and hope for the accused. This is a time of
reflection forced upon him by the result of his own act in violating the
law. It is time for him to humbly submit to the compassion of God and
of his only begotten Son, whose birth on earth to become the Saviour
of all sinners, we have just celebrated, to change and transform his
own life by his coming to Him for the purpose, so that with a changed
life, God might be gracious enough to move the heart of His
Excellency, the President, of this Country, to pardon and let him walk
out of prison a freeman. It would be good for him to read God's Word
daily while in prison for his guidance, comfort and hope.
Accused convicted of the crime whereof he is charged in the
information in the instant case.
SO ORDERED. 2

The accused now appeals from the above judgment of conviction and asks
the Court to reverse the same on the following grounds, viz:
The lower court erred:
1. In holding that Exhibit "F" of the prosecution, consisting of
two marijuana plants wrapped in plastic, is admissible in evidence
against the accused as the corpus delicti in the instant case, inspite of
the fact that the prosecution failed to prove that the specimens of
marijuana (Exhibit "F") examined by the forensic chemist were the
ones purportedly planted and cultivated by the accused, and of the
fact that the prosecution failed to establish the evidence's chain of
custody; and

2. In holding that the warrantless search of the residence of

the accused at 1:30 o'clock in the morning of July 13, 1995 at Barangay
Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, and seizure of two
eleven feet tall, more or less, full grown suspected Indian Hemp,
otherwise known as Marijuana plants, leading to the subsequent arrest
of the accused, were valid on the ground that the accused has
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 committed the crime of cultivating the said marijuana plants in
violation of Sec. 9, RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as
amended by RA 7659 in open view, inspite of the fact that they had to
enter the dwelling of the accused to get to the place where the
suspected marijuana plants were planted, and in admitting in evidence
the said plants, later marked as Exhibit "F", against the accused,
inspite of the fact that the said plants were the fruits of the poisonous
tree. 3

The relevant facts are as follows:

Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that accused-
appellant was growing and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda
and SPO2 Basilio Sarong of the 6th Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) of the Bacolod City Detachment conducted a surveillance
of the residence of accused-appellant who was then the barangay captain of
barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental on July 9, 1995. During
the said surveillance, they saw two (2) tall plants in the backyard of the
accused-appellant which they suspected to be marijuana plants. 4
SPO1 Linda and SPO2 Sarong reported the result of their surveillance to
SPO4 Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr., Chief of NARCOM, Bacolod City, who immediately
formed a team composed of the members of the Intelligence Division Provincial
Command, the Criminal Investigation Command and the Special Action Force.
Two members of the media, one from DYWF Radio and another from DYRL
Radio, were also included in the composite team.
On July 12, 1995, the team applied for a search warrant with the office of
Executive Judge Bernardo Ponferrada in Bacolod City. However, Judge
Ponferrada informed them that he did not have territorial jurisdiction over the
matter. 5 The team then left Bacolod City for San Carlos City. They arrived there
around six-thirty in the evening, then went to the house of Executive Judge
Roberto S. Javellana to secure a search warrant. They were not able to do so
because it was nighttime and office hours were obviously over. They were told
by the judge to go back in the morning. 6
Nonetheless, the team proceeded to barangay Bagonbon and arrived at
the residence of accused-appellant in the early morning of July 13, 1995. SPO4
Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for the accused-appellant. What
happened thereafter is subject to conflicting accounts. The prosecution
contends that the accused-appellant opened the gate and permitted them to
come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about the suspected
marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for
the use of his wife who was suffering from migraine. SPO4 Villamor then told
him that he would be charged for violation of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425 and
informed him of his constitutional rights. The operatives then uprooted the
suspected marijuana plants. SPO1 Linda conducted an initial field test of the
plants by using the Narcotics Drug Identification Kit. The test yielded a positive
result. 7
On July 15, 1995, the plants were turned over to the Philippine National
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 Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Bacolod City Police Command, particularly to
Senior Inspector Reah Abastillas Villavicencio. Senior Inspector Villavicencio
weighed and measured the plants, one was 125 inches and weighed 700 grams
while the other was 130 inches and weighed 900 grams. Three (3) qualitative
examinations were conducted, namely: the microscopic test, the chemical test,
and the thin layer chromatographic test. All yielded positive results. 8

On his part, accused-appellant maintains that around one-thirty in the

early morning of July 13, 1995 while he and his family were sleeping, he heard
somebody knocking outside his house. He went down bringing with him a
flashlight. After he opened the gate, four (4) persons who he thought were
members of the military, entered the premises then went inside the house. It
was dark so he could not count the others who entered the house as the same
was lit only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to sit in the living
room. Some of the men went upstairs while the others went around the house.
None of them asked for his permission to search his house and the premises. 9
After about twenty (20) minutes of searching, the men called him outside
and brought him to the backyard. One of the military men said: "Captain, you
have a (sic) marijuana here at your backyard" to which accused-appellant
replied: "I do not know that they were (sic) marijuana plants but what I know is
that they are medicinal plants for my wife" who was suffering from migraine. 10
After he was informed that the plants in his backyard were marijuana, the
men took pictures of him and themselves. Thereafter, he was brought inside
the house where he and the military men spent the night. 11

At around ten o'clock that same morning, they brought him with them to
the city hall. Accused-appellant saw that one of the two (2) service vehicles
they brought was fully loaded with plants. He was later told by the military men
that said plants were marijuana. 12 Upon arrival at the city hall, the men met
with the mayor and then unloaded the alleged marijuana plants. A picture of
him together with the arresting team was taken with the alleged marijuana as
back drop. Soon thereafter, he was taken to Hda. Socorro at the SAF
Headquarters. 13

A criminal complaint for violation of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425, as

amended by R.A. No. 7659 was filed against accused-appellant. TCSEcI

Turning to the legal defenses of accused-appellant, we now consider his

allegation that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures had been violated by the police authorities.

The relevant constitutional provisions are found in Sections 2 and 3 [2],

Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
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 witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. ...
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Said constitutional provisions are safeguards against reckless, malicious

and unreasonable invasion of privacy and liberty. The Court, in Villanueva v.
Querubin, 14 underscored their importance:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this
right, but it could be also looked upon as a recognition of a
constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not
necessarily thereto confined. What is sought to be guarded is a man's
prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that
haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice
of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants
around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have
access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the
traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus
is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called
upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the
privacies of his life. In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative
work could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the
embodiment of "a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy
of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against
the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity,
and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding
social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards." 15

A search and seizure, therefore, must be carried out through or with a

judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable"
within the meaning of the constitutional provision. 16 Evidence secured thereby,
i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure, will be inadmissible in evidence for
any purpose in any proceeding." 17
The requirement that a warrant must be obtained from the proper judicial
authority prior to the conduct of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute.
There are several instances when the law recognizes exceptions, such as when
the owner of the premises consents or voluntarily submits to a search; 18 when
the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion; 19 when the
search is incidental to a lawful arrest; 20 when it is made on vessels and aircraft
for violation of customs laws; 21 when it is made on automobiles for the
purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; 22 when it
involves prohibited articles in plain view; 23 when it involves a "stop and frisk"
situation; 24 when the search is under exigent and emergency circumstances;
25 or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement

of fire, sanitary and building regulations. 26 In these instances, a search may be

validly made even without a warrant.

In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite
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 team in the house of accused-appellant was not authorized by a search
warrant. It does not appear either that the situation falls under any of the above
mentioned cases. Consequently, accused-appellant's right against
unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated.

It is extant from the records that accused-appellant did not consent to the
warrantless search and seizure conducted. While the right to be secure from
unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived either
expressly or impliedly, 27 such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The act of the accused-appellant in
allowing the members of the military to enter his premises and his consequent
silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as
voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and
seizure especially so when members of the raiding team were intimidatingly
numerous and heavily armed. His implied acquiescence, if any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, herein accused-appellant's lack of
objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and
seizure. 28 The case of People v. Burgos, 29 is instructive. In Burgos, the Court
ruled that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful
search "simply because he failed to object." There, we held:
. . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. De
Garcia v. Locsin , 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to
object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to
make a search therein ( Magoncia v. Palacio , 80 Phil. 770). As pointed
out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. De Garcia v. Locsin
(supra);
xxx xxx xxx

. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any

affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the
position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving
his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful
submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
the law. IADCES

We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable

presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and
that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights." 30

Neither could the members of the composite team have justified their
search of accused-appellant's premises by invoking the necessity and urgency
of the situation. It was admitted by the members of the arresting team that the
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 residence of accused-appellant had already been put under surveillance
following a tip from a confidential informant. The surveillance was conducted
on July 9, 1995 while the alleged marijuana plants were seized four (4) days
later or on July 13, 1995. Surely, the raiding team had all the opportunity to
have first secured a search warrant before forcing their way into accused-
appellant's premises. In fact, they earlier had approached then Executive Judge
Ponferrada of Bacolod City who declined to issue one on the ground that the
matter was outside his territorial jurisdiction. Then, they went to Executive
Judge Javellana of San Carlos City in the evening of July 12, 1995 who asked
them to come back in the morning as it was already nighttime and outside of
office hours. However, in their haste to apprehend the accused-appellant on
the pretext that information of his impending arrest may be leaked to him, the
team proceeded to go to his residence to arrest him and seize the alleged
marijuana plants. The team's apprehension of a tip-off was unfounded. It is far-
fetched that one could have gone to accused-appellant's place before the
following morning to warn him of his impending arrest as barangay Bagonbon is
an isolated and difficult to reach mountain barangay. The road leading to it was
rough, hilly and eroded by rain and flood. 31 A few hours delay to await the
issuance of a warrant in the morning would not have compromised the team's
operation.
In justifying the validity of the warrantless arrest, search and seizure on
July 13, 1995, the trial court ruled that the accused-appellant was caught "in
flagrante delicto of having planted, grown and cultivated the marijuana plants"
which was "easily visible from outside of the residence of the accused." 32 Thus,
the trial court concluded that:
. . . (T)he said two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. "F", were the very
corpus delicti of the crime the accused has been committing since the
time he planted them in the backyard of his residence for whatever
reason — a corpus delicti which the NARCOM agents saw with their
very own eyes as the same were in plain view when they made a
surveillance in the accused's place on July 9, 1995. Said corpus delicti
has remained on the spots in accused's backyard where they had been
growing since the time they were planted there and, therefore, any
peace officer or even private citizen, for that matter, who has seen said
plants and recognized them as marijuana, was by law empowered and
authorized to arrest the accused even without any warrant of arrest.
The accused was caught in flagrante delicto for he was
carrying marijuana, hence, committing a crime, at the time of his
arrest. The warrantless search which was conducted following a
lawful arrest, was valid.
— People vs. Bandin (Dec. 10, 1993)

226 SCRA 299, at p. 300

The accused was caught in flagrante delicto growing, cultivating
and culturing said two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. "F", in the backyard of
his residence, which the NARCOM agents uprooted from there at the
time they arrested and apprehended him. Under said circumstances, a
search warrant and/or warrant of arrest were not legally needed before
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 the NARCOM agents could effect the arrest of the accused. 33

As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure without a
warrant. 34 It is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. 35 Thus, the following elements must be present before the
doctrine may be applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified were seizure of evidence without further
search. 36
Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into
accused-appellant's premises without the latter's consent. It is undisputed that
the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-
appellant on July 9, 1995 on the suspicion that he was growing and cultivating
marijuana when they allegedly came in "plain view" of the marijuana plants.
When the agents entered his premises on July 13, 1995, their intention was to
seize the evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search
warrant but could not simply wait for one to be issued. The NARCOM agents,
therefore, did not come across the marijuana plants inadvertently when they
conducted a surveillance and barged into accused-appellant's residence.
In People v. Musa, 37 the Court held:
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt.
The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. [Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971)] Furthermore, the
U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application
of the doctrine:

What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the

police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an
intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves
to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant
for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected
with a search directed against the accused — and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent
to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain
view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating
at last emerges. [Id., 29 L. Ed. 2d 583. See also Texas v . Brown,
460 U.G. 730, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983)]
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 It was not even apparent to the members of the composite team whether
the plants involved herein were indeed marijuana plants. After said plants were
uprooted, SPO1 Linda had to conduct a field test on said plants by using a
Narcotics Drug Identification Kit to determine if the same were indeed
marijuana plants. 38 Later, Senior Inspector Villavicencio, a forensic chemist,
had to conduct three (3) qualitative examinations to determine if the plants
were indeed marijuana. 39

Since the evidence was secured on the occasion of an unreasonable

search and seizure, the same is tainted and illegal and should therefore be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. 40 In People v. Aruta,
41 we held that:

The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of

enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and
spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and
seizure may be held criminally and civilly liable, the Stonehill case
observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary
rule is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction" against abuse. This approach is based on the justification
made by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution which
itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong, will the wrong be repressed."
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against
which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the
power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public
welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is
too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes
declared: "I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that
the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in
free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law
violated is the Constitution itself. 42

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City,
Branch 58 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Armando S.
Compacion is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on ground of reasonable
doubt. He is ordered released from confinement unless he is being held for
some other legal grounds. The subject marijuana is ordered disposed of in
accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

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 Footnotes
1. Records, p. 1.

2. Id., at 147-148.
3. Rollo , pp. 117-118.
4. TSN, September 7, 1995, pp. 65.

5. Id., at 5-9.
6. Id., at 9.
7. Id, at 11-19.
8. Id., at 18; TSN, September 14, 1995, pp. 6-13.
9. TSN, October 25, 1995, pp. 8-10.

10. Id., at 11-12.

11. Id., at 14.
12. Id., at 15.
13. Id., at 16.
14. 48 SCRA 345 (1972).

15. Id., at 350.

16. People v. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791, 798 (1992).
17. People v. Aminnudin , 163 SCRA 402 (1988).
18. People v. Malasugui , 63 Phil 221(1936).
19. Bagcal v. Villaraza , 120 SCRA 525 (1983).
20. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
21. Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336 (1975).
22. Caroll v. U. S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
23. Harris v. U. S., 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
24. People v. Salayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996).
25. People v. De Gracia , 233 SCRA 716 (1994).
26. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
27. People v. Malasugui, supra; People v. Donato , 198 SCRA 130 (1991); People
v. Rodrigueza, supra; People v. Aruta , 288 SCRA 626 (1998).
28. People v. Aruta , supra; Aniag v. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 424
(1994).

29. 144 SCRA 1 (1986).

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 30. Id., at 16; Also cited in People v. Aruta, supra and People v. Barros , 231
SCRA 557 (1994).
31. TSN, November 9, 1995, p. 22.

32. Decision, p. 26, Rollo , p. 76.

33. Rollo , pp. 80-81.

34. Harris v. U .S., supra.
35. Collidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971).
36. People v. Bolasa , 321 SCRA 459 (1999); People v. Doria , 301 SCRA 668
(1999); Padilla v. Court of Appeals , 269 SCRA 402(1997).

37. 217 SCRA 597, 611 (1993).

38. See Note 7.

39. TSN, September 14, 1995, pp. 6-13, 22.

40. People v. Montilla , 285 SCRA 703 (1998).

41. Supra.
42. Id., at 652-653.

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