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People - v. - Compacion - y - Surposa
People - v. - Compacion - y - Surposa
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
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1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SEARCH AND SEIZURE;
WHEN UNREASONABLE; EFFECT THEREOF. — The relevant constitutional
provisions are found in Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which read as follows: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. Sec. 3. . . . (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Said
constitutional provisions are safeguards against reckless, malicious and
unreasonable invasion of privacy and liberty. The Court, in Villanueva v.
Querubin, underscored their importance: It is deference to one's personality
that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked upon as a
recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not
necessarily thereto confined. What is sought to be guarded is a man's
prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of
refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be
welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the
state, however powerful, does not as such have access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house,
however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling
and to respect the privacies of his life. In the same vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the
embodiment of "a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home
and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must
not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under
stringent procedural safeguards." A search and seizure, therefore, must be
carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and
seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the constitutional
provision. Evidence secured thereby, i.e., "fruits" of the search and seizure, will
be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL WARRANT REQUIRED; EXCEPTIONS. — The
requirement that a warrant must be obtained from the proper judicial authority
prior to the conduct of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are
several instances when the law recognizes exceptions, such as when the owner
of the premises consents or voluntarily submits to a search; when the owner of
the premises waives his rights against such incursion; when the search is
incidental to a lawful arrest; when it is made on vessels and aircraft for
violation of customs laws; when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of
preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; when it involves
prohibited articles in plain view; when it involves a "stop and frisk" situation;
when the search is under exigent and emergency circumstances; or in cases of
inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary
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and building regulations. In these instances, a search may be validly made
even without a warrant.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VALID WAIVER THEREOF MUST BE MADE
VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY; ABSENT IN CASE AT BAR. —
While the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like
every right, be waived either expressly or impliedly, such waiver must
constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The act
of the accused-appellant in allowing the members of the military to enter his
premises and his consequent silence during the unreasonable search and
seizure could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied
acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure especially so when members of
the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed. His implied
acquiescence, if any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity
given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently,
herein accused appellant's lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to
the warrantless search and seizure.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; AS A GENERAL RULE, OBJECTS IN THE "PLAIN VIEW" OF
AN OFFICER WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO BE IN THE POSITION TO HAVE THAT VIEW
ARE SUBJECT TO SEIZURE WITHOUT A WARRANT; WHEN APPLICABLE. — As a
general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Thus, the following elements must be present before the doctrine may be
applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) "plain
view" justified were seizure of evidence without further search.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J : p
Upon arraignment on August 16, 1995, the accused pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged.
It would seem that the penalty imposed upon the accused in the
instant case for having planted, cultivated and cultured just two (2)
marijuana plants is extremely harsh. But there is nothing in the law
which allows the Court to impose a lesser penalty in view of the
peculiar facts and circumstances in this particular case. Hence, dura
lex, sed lex. The law is, indeed, harsh but it is the law.
The obvious message of the law is that people should not have a
nonchalant or cavalier attitude towards dangerous prohibited drugs.
They should not dabble in it as if they were a flippant thing. These
dangerous and prohibited drugs are a terrible menace to the minds and
morality of our people for their distortive and pervertive effects on
them resulting in rampant criminality. That is why the government
wants this evil exterminated from our country. It is too bad that the
accused instead of helping the government in this drive, in his capacity
as barangay captain of his barangay, made a mockery of it by planting,
cultivating and culturing said two (2) marijuana plants himself.
A word of counsel and hope for the accused. This is a time of
reflection forced upon him by the result of his own act in violating the
law. It is time for him to humbly submit to the compassion of God and
of his only begotten Son, whose birth on earth to become the Saviour
of all sinners, we have just celebrated, to change and transform his
own life by his coming to Him for the purpose, so that with a changed
life, God might be gracious enough to move the heart of His
Excellency, the President, of this Country, to pardon and let him walk
out of prison a freeman. It would be good for him to read God's Word
daily while in prison for his guidance, comfort and hope.
Accused convicted of the crime whereof he is charged in the
information in the instant case.
SO ORDERED. 2
The accused now appeals from the above judgment of conviction and asks
the Court to reverse the same on the following grounds, viz:
The lower court erred:
1. In holding that Exhibit "F" of the prosecution, consisting of
two marijuana plants wrapped in plastic, is admissible in evidence
against the accused as the corpus delicti in the instant case, inspite of
the fact that the prosecution failed to prove that the specimens of
marijuana (Exhibit "F") examined by the forensic chemist were the
ones purportedly planted and cultivated by the accused, and of the
fact that the prosecution failed to establish the evidence's chain of
custody; and
At around ten o'clock that same morning, they brought him with them to
the city hall. Accused-appellant saw that one of the two (2) service vehicles
they brought was fully loaded with plants. He was later told by the military men
that said plants were marijuana. 12 Upon arrival at the city hall, the men met
with the mayor and then unloaded the alleged marijuana plants. A picture of
him together with the arresting team was taken with the alleged marijuana as
back drop. Soon thereafter, he was taken to Hda. Socorro at the SAF
Headquarters. 13
In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite
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team in the house of accused-appellant was not authorized by a search
warrant. It does not appear either that the situation falls under any of the above
mentioned cases. Consequently, accused-appellant's right against
unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated.
It is extant from the records that accused-appellant did not consent to the
warrantless search and seizure conducted. While the right to be secure from
unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived either
expressly or impliedly, 27 such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The act of the accused-appellant in
allowing the members of the military to enter his premises and his consequent
silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as
voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and
seizure especially so when members of the raiding team were intimidatingly
numerous and heavily armed. His implied acquiescence, if any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, herein accused-appellant's lack of
objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and
seizure. 28 The case of People v. Burgos, 29 is instructive. In Burgos, the Court
ruled that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful
search "simply because he failed to object." There, we held:
. . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. De
Garcia v. Locsin , 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to
object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to
make a search therein ( Magoncia v. Palacio , 80 Phil. 770). As pointed
out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. De Garcia v. Locsin
(supra);
xxx xxx xxx
Neither could the members of the composite team have justified their
search of accused-appellant's premises by invoking the necessity and urgency
of the situation. It was admitted by the members of the arresting team that the
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residence of accused-appellant had already been put under surveillance
following a tip from a confidential informant. The surveillance was conducted
on July 9, 1995 while the alleged marijuana plants were seized four (4) days
later or on July 13, 1995. Surely, the raiding team had all the opportunity to
have first secured a search warrant before forcing their way into accused-
appellant's premises. In fact, they earlier had approached then Executive Judge
Ponferrada of Bacolod City who declined to issue one on the ground that the
matter was outside his territorial jurisdiction. Then, they went to Executive
Judge Javellana of San Carlos City in the evening of July 12, 1995 who asked
them to come back in the morning as it was already nighttime and outside of
office hours. However, in their haste to apprehend the accused-appellant on
the pretext that information of his impending arrest may be leaked to him, the
team proceeded to go to his residence to arrest him and seize the alleged
marijuana plants. The team's apprehension of a tip-off was unfounded. It is far-
fetched that one could have gone to accused-appellant's place before the
following morning to warn him of his impending arrest as barangay Bagonbon is
an isolated and difficult to reach mountain barangay. The road leading to it was
rough, hilly and eroded by rain and flood. 31 A few hours delay to await the
issuance of a warrant in the morning would not have compromised the team's
operation.
In justifying the validity of the warrantless arrest, search and seizure on
July 13, 1995, the trial court ruled that the accused-appellant was caught "in
flagrante delicto of having planted, grown and cultivated the marijuana plants"
which was "easily visible from outside of the residence of the accused." 32 Thus,
the trial court concluded that:
. . . (T)he said two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. "F", were the very
corpus delicti of the crime the accused has been committing since the
time he planted them in the backyard of his residence for whatever
reason — a corpus delicti which the NARCOM agents saw with their
very own eyes as the same were in plain view when they made a
surveillance in the accused's place on July 9, 1995. Said corpus delicti
has remained on the spots in accused's backyard where they had been
growing since the time they were planted there and, therefore, any
peace officer or even private citizen, for that matter, who has seen said
plants and recognized them as marijuana, was by law empowered and
authorized to arrest the accused even without any warrant of arrest.
The accused was caught in flagrante delicto for he was
carrying marijuana, hence, committing a crime, at the time of his
arrest. The warrantless search which was conducted following a
lawful arrest, was valid.
— People vs. Bandin (Dec. 10, 1993)
As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure without a
warrant. 34 It is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. 35 Thus, the following elements must be present before the
doctrine may be applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified were seizure of evidence without further
search. 36
Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into
accused-appellant's premises without the latter's consent. It is undisputed that
the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-
appellant on July 9, 1995 on the suspicion that he was growing and cultivating
marijuana when they allegedly came in "plain view" of the marijuana plants.
When the agents entered his premises on July 13, 1995, their intention was to
seize the evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search
warrant but could not simply wait for one to be issued. The NARCOM agents,
therefore, did not come across the marijuana plants inadvertently when they
conducted a surveillance and barged into accused-appellant's residence.
In People v. Musa, 37 the Court held:
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt.
The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. [Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971)] Furthermore, the
U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application
of the doctrine:
While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and
seizure may be held criminally and civilly liable, the Stonehill case
observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary
rule is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction" against abuse. This approach is based on the justification
made by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution which
itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong, will the wrong be repressed."
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against
which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the
power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public
welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is
too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes
declared: "I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that
the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in
free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law
violated is the Constitution itself. 42
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City,
Branch 58 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Armando S.
Compacion is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on ground of reasonable
doubt. He is ordered released from confinement unless he is being held for
some other legal grounds. The subject marijuana is ordered disposed of in
accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
2. Id., at 147-148.
3. Rollo , pp. 117-118.
4. TSN, September 7, 1995, pp. 65.
5. Id., at 5-9.
6. Id., at 9.
7. Id, at 11-19.
8. Id., at 18; TSN, September 14, 1995, pp. 6-13.
9. TSN, October 25, 1995, pp. 8-10.