FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 161916             January 20, 2006

ARNELITO ADLAWAN, Petitioner, 

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review is the September 23, 2003 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which set aside the September 13, 2002 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-27806, and reinstated the February
12, 2002 Judgment3 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case
No. 392, dismissing petitioner Arnelito Adlawan’s unlawful detainer suit against respondents
Emeterio and Narcisa Adlawan. Likewise questioned is the January 8, 2004 Resolution 4 of the
Court of Appeals which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties’ dispute over Lot 7226 and the house built
thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8842, 5 registered in the name of the late
Dominador Adlawan and located at Barrio Lipata, Municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu. In his
complaint, petitioner claimed that he is an acknowledged illegitimate child 6 of Dominador who
died on May 28, 1987 without any other issue. Claiming to be the sole heir of Dominador, he
executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and the house built thereon. 7 Out of
respect and generosity to respondents who are the siblings of his father, he granted their plea to
occupy the subject property provided they would vacate the same should his need for the
property arise. Sometime in January 1999, he verbally requested respondents to vacate the
house and lot, but they refused and filed instead an action for quieting of title 8with the RTC.
Finally, upon respondents’ refusal to heed the last demand letter to vacate dated August 2, 2000,
petitioner filed the instant case on August 9, 2000. 9

On the other hand, respondents Narcisa and Emeterio, 70 and 59 years of age,
respectively,10 denied that they begged petitioner to allow them to stay on the questioned
property and stressed that they have been occupying Lot 7226 and the house standing thereon
since birth. They alleged that Lot 7226 was originally registered in the name of their deceased
father, Ramon Adlawan11 and the ancestral house standing thereon was owned by Ramon and
their mother, Oligia Mañacap Adlawan. The spouses had nine 12 children including the late
Dominador and herein surviving respondents Emeterio and Narcisa. During the lifetime of their
parents and deceased siblings, all of them lived on the said property. Dominador and his wife,
Graciana Ramas Adlawan, who died without issue, also occupied the same. 13 Petitioner, on the
other hand, is a stranger who never had possession of Lot 7226.
Sometime in 1961, spouses Ramon and Oligia needed money to finance the renovation of their
house. Since they were not qualified to obtain a loan, they transferred ownership of Lot 7226 in
the name of their son Dominador who was the only one in the family who had a college
education. By virtue of a January 31, 1962 simulated deed of sale, 14 a title was issued to
Dominador which enabled him to secure a loan with Lot 7226 as collateral. Notwithstanding the
execution of the simulated deed, Dominador, then single, never disputed his parents’ ownership
of the lot. He and his wife, Graciana, did not disturb respondents’ possession of the property until
they died on May 28, 1987 and May 6, 1997, respectively.

Respondents also contended that Dominador’s signature at the back of petitioner’s birth
certificate was forged, hence, the latter is not an heir of Dominador and has no right to claim
ownership of Lot 7226.15 They argued that even if petitioner is indeed Dominador’s acknowledged
illegitimate son, his right to succeed is doubtful because Dominador was survived by his wife,
Graciana.16

On February 12, 2002, the MTC dismissed the complaint holding that the establishment of
petitioner’s filiation and the settlement of the estate of Dominador are conditions precedent to the
accrual of petitioner’s action for ejectment. It added that since Dominador was survived by his
wife, Graciana, who died 10 years thereafter, her legal heirs are also entitled to their share in Lot
7226. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:

In View of the foregoing, for failure to prove by preponderance of evidence, the plaintiff’s cause
of action, the above-entitled case is hereby Ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.17

On appeal by petitioner, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC holding that the title of
Dominador over Lot 7226 cannot be collaterally attacked. It thus ordered respondents to turn
over possession of the controverted lot to petitioner and to pay compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises. The decretal portion thereof, provides:

Wherefore, the Judgment, dated February 12, 2002, of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla,
Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392, is reversed. Defendants-appellees are directed to restore to plaintiff-
appellant possession of Lot 7226 and the house thereon, and to pay plaintiff-appellant, beginning
in August 2000, compensation for their use and occupation of the property in the amount of
P500.00 a month.

So ordered.18

Meanwhile, the RTC granted petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal 19 which was
opposed by the alleged nephew and nieces of Graciana in their motion for leave to intervene and
to file an answer in intervention.20 They contended that as heirs of Graciana, they have a share in
Lot 7226 and that intervention is necessary to protect their right over the property. In addition,
they declared that as co-owners of the property, they are allowing respondents to stay in Lot
7226 until a formal partition of the property is made.

The RTC denied the motion for leave to intervene. 21 It, however, recalled the order granting the
execution pending appeal having lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the petition filed by
respondents with the Court of Appeals.22

On September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the RTC and reinstated
the judgment of the MTC. It ratiocinated that petitioner and the heirs of Graciana are co-owners
of Lot 7226. As such, petitioner cannot eject respondents from the property via an unlawful
detainer suit filed in his own name and as the sole owner of the property. Thus –
WHEEFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated September 13, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-27806 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the Judgment dated February 12, 2002 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392 is REINSTATED. Costs against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.23

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner can validly maintain the instant
case for ejectment.

Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador. He
in fact executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the controverted property. In ruling for the
petitioner, the RTC held that the questioned January 31, 1962 deed of sale validly transferred
title to Dominador and that petitioner is his acknowledged illegitimate son who inherited
ownership of the questioned lot. The Court notes, however, that the RTC lost sight of the fact that
the theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner
of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his
legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987. 24 By
intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226. 25 The death of
Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the
share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she
had no blood relations. The Court of Appeals thus correctly held that petitioner has no authority
to institute the instant action as the sole owner of Lot 7226.

Petitioner contends that even granting that he has co-owners over Lot 7226, he can on his own
file the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.

This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible
entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and
recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion).26 A co-owner may bring such an action without
the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to
have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, however, that where the suit is for
the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of
the litigated property, the action should be dismissed. 27

The renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, explained –

A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as
co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for
the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for
the co-ownership, the action will not prosper. (Emphasis added)28

In Baloloy v. Hular,29 respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title claiming exclusive

Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion
publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity
of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for
the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others but if
such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. If
the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to
the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who
are indispensable parties.

In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject
property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other
co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the
respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered
judgment declaring the respondent as the sole owner of the property and entitled to its
possession, to the prejudice of the latter’s siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is
erroneous.

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to implead his
siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties. The respondent failed to comply with the
rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the Philippines is also an indispensable
party as defendant because the respondent sought the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which
was issued based on Free Patent No. 384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant,
any decision of the Court would not be binding on it. It has been held that the absence of an
indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of
the complaint including the judgment. The absence of the respondent’s siblings, as parties,
rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof, including the judgment of the court,
ineffective for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.30

In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his
name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed
an affidavit of self- adjudication over the disputed property. It is clear therefore that petitioner
cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-
ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his father,
Dominador.

In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioner’s claim that he has the legal personality to file the
present unlawful detainer suit because the ejectment of respondents would benefit not only him
but also his alleged co-owners. However, petitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to
acquire possession of the property and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain
possession of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of
the heirs of Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to
his co-owners. Incidentally, it should be pointed out that in default of the said heirs of Graciana,
whom petitioner labeled as "fictitious heirs," the State will inherit her share 31 and will thus be
petitioner’s co-owner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property.

The present controversy should be differentiated from the cases where the Court upheld the right
of a co-owner to file a suit pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code. In Resuena v. Court of
Appeals,32 and Sering v. Plazo,33 the co-owners who filed the ejectment case did not represent
themselves as the exclusive owner of the property. In Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa
Santiago,34 the complaint for quieting of title was brought in behalf of the co-owners precisely to
recover lots owned in common.35 Similarly in Vencilao v. Camarenta,36 the amended complaint
specified that the plaintiff is one of the heirs who co-owns the controverted properties.

In the foregoing cases, the plaintiff never disputed the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed to
be the sole or exclusive owner of the litigated lot. A favorable decision therein would of course
inure to the benefit not only of the plaintiff but to his co-owners as well. The instant case,
however, presents an entirely different backdrop as petitioner vigorously asserted absolute and
sole ownership of the questioned lot. In his complaint, petitioner made the following allegations,
to wit:

3. The plaintiff was the only son (illegitimate) and sole heir of the late DOMINADOR ADLAWAN
who died intestate on 28 May 1987 without any other descendant nor ascendant x x x.

xxxx

5. Being the only child/descendant and, therefore, sole heir of the deceased Dominador
Adlawan, the plaintiff became the absolute owner, and automatically took POSSESSION, of
the aforementioned house and lot x x x. (Emphasis added) 37

Clearly, the said cases find no application here because petitioner’s action operates as a
complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership and not in representation or recognition
thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper. As noted by Former Supreme Court
Associate Justice Edgrado L. Paras "[i]t is understood, of course, that the action [under Article
487 of the Civil Code] is being instituted for all. Hence, if the co-owner expressly states that he is
bringing the case only for himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper." 38

Indeed, respondents’ not less than four decade actual physical possession of the questioned
ancestral house and lot deserves to be respected especially so that petitioner failed to show that
he has the requisite personality and authority as co-owner to file the instant case. Justice dictates
that respondents who are now in the twilight years of their life be granted possession of their
ancestral property where their parents and siblings lived during their lifetime, and where they, will
probably spend the remaining days of their life.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 23, 2003 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, dismissing petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case
No. 392, and its January 8, 2004 Resolution, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 31- 43. Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., and concurred in
by Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Arturo D. Brion.

2
 Id. at 61-65. Penned by Judge Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr.

3
 Id. at 59-60. Penned by Judge Gerardo E. Gestopa, Jr.

4
 Id. at 57-58.

5
 Id. at 71.

6
 Born on April 10, 1967; Rollo, p. 72.

7
 RTC records, p. 103.

8
 Docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-23205 before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 5; Rollo,
pp. 73-81.

9
 RTC records, p. 1.

10
 CA rollo, p. 14.

 Originally covered by OCT No. 3496 (See Deed of Sale of One Parcel of Land, Rollo,
11

p. 70 and TCT No. 8842, at Rollo, p. 71, which cancelled OCT No. 3496).

12
 Except for respondents, the other siblings are already deceased.

13
 RTC records, pp. 20 & 80-81.

14
 Rollo, p. 70.

15
 RTC records, p. 81.

16
 Id.

17
 Rollo, p. 60.

18
 Id. at 65.

19
 Id. at 92.

20
 Id. at 84-89.

21
 Id. at 92.

22
 RTC records, p. 314.

23
 Rollo, p. 43.
 24
 Article 998 of the Civil Code, provides:

ART. 998. If a widow or widower survives with illegitimate children, such widow or
widower shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the illegitimate
children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to the other half.

25
 Article 1078 of the Civil Code, states:

ART. 1078. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent
is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of
debts of the deceased.

26
 De Guia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120864, October 8, 2003, 413 SCRA 114, 125.

27
 Baloloy v. Hular, G.R. No 157767, September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 80, 90-91.

28
 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 Edition, p. 157.

29
 Supra.

30
 Id. at 90-92.

31
 Article 1011 of the Civil Code reads:

Art. 1011. In default of persons entitled to succeed in accordance with the

32
 G.R. No. 128338, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 42.

33
 G.R. No. L-49731, September 29, 1988, 166 SCRA 84.

34
 G.R. No. 161817, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 690.

35
 Id. at 694.

36
 140 Phil. 99, 101-102.

37
 RTC records, pp. 1 & 2.

38
 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. II, 1999 Edition, p. 294.

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