5 Abella v. CSC
5 Abella v. CSC
*
G.R. No. 152574. November 17, 2004.
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* EN BANC.
508
509
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 509
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Case
1
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of2 Court, challenging the November3
16, 2001
Decision and the March 8, 2002 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals
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511
“WHEREFORE,
4
the petition for review is DENIED for lack of
merit.”
The Facts
x x x x x x x x x
512
“Two years after his retirement, petitioner was hired by the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) on a contractual basis. On
January 1, 1999, petitioner was issued by SBMA a permanent
employment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment
Center. However, when said appointment was submitted to
respondent Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. III, it
was disapproved on the ground that petitioner’s eligibility was not
appropriate. Petitioner was advised by SBMA of the disapproval
of his appointment. In view thereof, petitioner was issued a
temporary appointment as Department Manager III, Labor and
Employment Center, SBMA on July 9, 1999.
“Petitioner appealed the disapproval of his permanent
appointment by respondent to the Civil Service Commission,
which issued Resolution No. 000059, dated January 10, 2000,
affirming the action taken by respondent. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied by the CSC in Resolution No.
001143 dated May 11, 2000.”
“x x x x x x x x x
“Undaunted, petitioner filed with [the CA] a petition for review
seeking the reversal of the CSC Resolutions dated January 10,
2000 and May 11, 2000 on the ground that CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 21, s. 1994 is unconstitutional as it rendered his
earned civil service eligibility ineffective
5
or inappropriate for the
position of Department Manager [III]”
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513
The Issues
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6 Id., pp. 56 & 1112 (citing People v. Pinca, 376 Phil. 377; 318 SCRA
270, November 17, 1999).
7 371 Phil. 17; 312 SCRA 91, August 9, 1999.
8 Assailed Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 11.
9 Assailed Resolution, p. 2; Rollo, p. 15.
10 This case was deemed submitted for decision on July 23, 2003, upon
this Court’s receipt of the Office of the Solicitor General’s Memorandum,
signed by Assistant Solicitor General Renan E. Ramos and Associate
Solicitor Tomas D. Tagra, Jr. Respondent CSC’s Memorandum, signed by
Director Engelbert Anthony D. Unite and Atty. Bonifacio O. Tarenio, Jr.,
was filed on June 30, 2003. Petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Attys.
A.B.F. Gaviola, Jr. and Marie Josephine C. Suarez, was filed on July 3,
2003.
514
First Issue:
Who May File Reconsideration or Appeal
Preliminary Observation
Petitioner imputes to the CA “grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction” for ruling that he had no
legal standing12
to contest the disapproval of his
appointment. Grave abuse of discretion is a ground for a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Nevertheless, this Court resolved to grant due course to the
Petition and to treat it appropriately as a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The grounds shall be deemed “reversible errors,” not “grave
abuse of discretion.”
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515
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516
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19 Aquino v. Civil Service Commission, 208 SCRA 240, 247, April 22,
1992; Mitra v. Subido, supra.
517
the appointment
20
must be approved; if not, it should be
disapproved.
According to the appellate court, only the appointing
authority had the right to challenge the CSC’s disapproval.
It relied on Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum
Circular 40, s. 1998 (Omnibus Rules on Appointment and
Other Personal Actions), which provides:
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20 Guieb v. Civil Service Commission, 229 SCRA 779, February 9, 1994; Lapinid
v. Civil Service Commission, infra, p. 388; p. 113; Central Bank of the Philippines
v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744, 752, April 10, 1989; Luego v. Civil
Service Commission, infra, p. 333.
21 Sevilla v. Parina, 128 Phil. 639, 643; 21 SCRA 598, 602, October 30, 1967;
Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903, 911, April 30, 1954.
22 227 Phil. 303; 143 SCRA 327, August 5, 1986.
518
involving considerations
23
of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide.”
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23 Id., p. 307; 332. See also Rimonte v. Civil Service Commission, 314
Phil. 421, 430; 244 SCRA 498, May 29, 1995.
24 Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission, 274 Phil. 381, 387; 197 SCRA
106, 113, May 14, 1991, per Cruz J. See also Jimenez v. Francisco, 100
Phil. 1025, 1032, February 28, 1957; Braganza v. Commission on
Elections, 127 Phil. 442, 447; 20 SCRA 1023, 1026, August 15, 1967.
25 Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission, supra; Amponin v. Commission
on Elections, 128 Phil. 412, 415; 21 SCRA 389, 392, September 29, 1967.
26 Sevilla v. Parina, supra; Manalang v. Quitoriano, supra. See also
Torio v. Civil Service Commission, 209 SCRA 677, 691, June 9, 1992;
Medalla v. Sto. Tomas, 208 SCRA 351, 357, May 5, 1992.
27 171 SCRA 744, 756, April 10, 1989.
28 Id., p. 757, per Gancayco, J.
519
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29 Ibid.
30 See Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, 366 Phil. 86, 104; 306 SCRA 425,
437, April 29, 1999.
31 316 Phil. 652; 246 SCRA 541, July 17, 1995.
520
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32 Id., pp. 695696; pp. 562563, per Mendoza, J. See also Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., G.R. No. 155001,
January 21, 2004, 420 SCRA 575.
33 This Court has recognized that while public office is not property to
which one may acquire a vested right, it is nevertheless a protected right.
Bince, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 218 SCRA 782, 792, February 9,
1993 (citing Cruz, I.A., Constitutional Law [1991], 101; and Bernas, J.,
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines [1987], Vol. 1, 40).
According to existing jurisprudence, protection begins upon the
favorable action of the CSC. Thus, no title to the office may be
permanently vested in favor of the appointee without the favorable
approval of the CSC. Until it has become a completed act through the
CSC’s approval, an appointment can still be recalled or withdrawn by the
appointing authority (Grospe v. Secretary of Public Works &
Communications, 105 Phil. 129, 133, January 31, 1959). It would likewise
be precipitate to invoke the rule on security of tenure or to claim a vested
right over the position (Tomali v. Civil Service
521
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522
Appointee Allowed
Procedural Relief
Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s.
1998 should not be interpreted to restrict solely to the
appointing authority the right to move for a
reconsideration of, or to appeal, the disapproval of an
appointment. PD 807 and EO 292, from which the CSC
derives the authority to promulgate its rules and
regulations, are silent on whether appointees have a
similar right to file motions for reconsideration of, or
appeals from, unfavorable decisions involving
appointments. Indeed, there is no legislative intent to bar
appointees from challenging the CSC’s disapproval.
The view that only the appointing authority may request
reconsideration or appeal is too narrow. The appointee
should have the 38 same right. Parenthetically, CSC
Resolution 991936 recognizes the right of the adversely
affected party to appeal to the CSC Regional Offices39 prior
to elevating a matter to the CSC Central Office. The
adversely affected party necessarily includes the appointee.
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523
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 523
Abella, Jr. vs. Civil Service Commission
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40 Supra.
41 Then Item I (3) of Memorandum Circular 38, s. 1993. Id., pp. 2627.
42 Id., pp. 2628.
524
Second Issue:
Constitutionality of
Section 4, CSC Memorandum
Circular 21, Series of 1994
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43 Ibid. §1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, states that a petition for
certiorari may be availed of when a tribunal, a board or an officer has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
44 §4, paragraph (3), Article VIII of the Constitution, states: “No
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered
en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court
sitting en banc.”
45 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 14; Rollo, p. 191.
46 The Memorandum Circular, addressed to “All Heads of Departments,
Bureaus and Agencies of the National and Local Government including
GovernmentOwned and Controlled Corporations and State Colleges and
Universities,” was issued pursuant to CSC Resolution 942925, dated May
31, 1994.
525
Career Service
Classified by Levels
Positions in the career service, for which appointments
require examinations, are grouped into three major levels:
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527
Rights Protected
The challenged Circular protects the rights of incumbents
as long as they remain in the positions to which they were
previously appointed. They are allowed to retain their
positions in a permanent capacity, notwithstanding the
lack of CSEE. Clearly, the Circular
53
recognizes the rule of
prospectivity of regulations; hence, 54
there is no basis to
argue that it is an ex post facto law or a bill of at
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51 §8, Title I, Book V, EO 292; §7, PD 807. See also CSC Resolution 94
2925.
52 Memorandum Circular 37, s. 1998, dated October 20, 1998;
Memorandum Circular 1, s. 1997, dated January 24, 1997.
53 Article 4 of the Civil Code states: “Laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided.”
54 An ex post facto law is one (1) which criminalizes an action that was
done before the passing of the law and that was innocent when done, and
punishes such action; (2) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater
than when it was committed; (3) which changes the punishment and
inflicts a greater punishment than that imposed by the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed; or (4) which
528
55
tainder. These terms, which have settled meanings in
criminal jurisprudence, are clearly inapplicable here.
The government service of petitioner ended when he
retired in 1996; thus, his right to remain in a CES position,
notwithstanding his56
lack of eligibility, also ceased. Upon
his reemployment years later as department manager III
at SBMA in 2001, it was necessary for him to comply with
the eligibility prescribed at the time for that position.
Security of Tenure
Not Impaired
The argument of petitioner that his security of tenure is
impaired is unconvincing. First, security of tenure in the
Career Executive Service—except in the case of first and
second level employees in the civil service—pertains only to
rank, not 57to the position to which the employee may be
appointed. Second, petitioner had neither rank nor
position prior to his reemployment. One cannot claim
security of tenure if one held no tenure prior to
appointment.
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529
Due Process
Not Violated
Petitioner contends that his due process rights, 58
as
enunciated59
in Ang Tibay v. Court of Appeals, were
violated. We are not convinced. He points in particular to
the CSC’s alleged failure to notify him of a hearing relating
to the issuance of the challenged Circular.
The classification of positions in career service was a
quasilegislative, not a quasijudicial, issuance. This
distinction determines whether prior notice and hearing
are necessary.
In exercising its quasijudicial function, an
administrative body adjudicates the rights of persons
before it,60 in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law. The determination of facts and the applicable
law, as basis for official action and the exercise of judicial
discretion,61
are essential for the performance of this
function. On these considerations, it is elementary that
due process requirements, as enumerated in
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530
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62 See Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 119
Phil. 304, 313; 10 SCRA 46, 53, January 30, 1964.
63 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals; supra, p.
1019; p. 256.
64 Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, 347
Phil. 333, 342; 283 SCRA 31, 41, December 12, 1997; Philippine
Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, 153 SCRA 622, 628, August 31, 1987. Taxicab Operators of Metro
Manila, Inc. v. Board of Transportation, 202 Phil. 925, 934; 117 SCRA
597, 604, September 30, 1982; Central Bank of the Philippines v. Cloribel,
150A Phil. 86, 101; 44 SCRA 307, 315, April 11, 1972.
65 Tañada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528, 535; 146 SCRA 446, December 29,
1986. See also Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,
supra, p. 1018; p. 256. At any rate, Memorandum Circular 21, s. 1994, was
allegedly published in the Manila Standard on June 14, 1994. CSC’s
Memorandum, p. 21; Rollo, p. 165.
531
Final Issue:
Disapproval of Appointment
Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly
denied his permanent appointment. The appointee need
not have been previously heard, because the nature of the
action did not involve the
66
imposition of an administrative
disciplinary measure. The CSC, in approving or
disapproving an appointment, merely examines the
conformity of the appointment with the law and the
appointee’s possession of all the67 minimum qualifications
and none of the disqualifications.
In sum, while petitioner was able to demonstrate his
standing to appeal the CSC Resolutions to the courts, he
failed to prove his eligibility to the position he was
appointed to.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it
seeks legal standing for petitioner, but DENIED insofar as
it prays for the reversal of the CSC Resolutions
disapproving his appointment as department manager III
of the Labor and Employment Center, Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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532
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