EN BANC

[A.M. No. P-01-1472. June 26, 2003.]

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-688-P)

ADRIANO V. ALBIOR , complainant, vs . DONATO A. AUGUIS, Clerk of

Court II, 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Talibon-Getafe,
Bohol , respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Adriano Albior charged Clerk of Court Donato Auguis with usurpation of judicial
function and negligence in the performance of o cial duties. He claimed that respondent
usurped judicial functions when he issued the order for the detention of Edilberto Albior
and committed negligence when he failed to inform Acting Presiding Judge Avelino N.
Puracan regarding the ling of cases that necessitated the issuance of the detention
order. In his comment, respondent claimed that he issued the detention order only after
the PNP Chief and PNP Trial Officer of Talibon, Bohol, repeatedly requested him to do so.
The Court ruled that nowhere in the Rules is the clerk of court authorized to issue an
order of detention, as such function is purely judicial. In fact, the Court had occasion to rule
that a clerk of court, unlike a judicial authority, has no power to order the commitment of a
person charged with a penal offense.
Further, the Court cannot treat lightly the actions of the respondent for he has
admitted doing them repeatedly, in fact many times in the past. The implication of his
action as an o cial of the court is not only disturbing but shocking, for it involves no less
than a violation of the constitutional right to liberty. Thus, the respondent's unauthorized
issuance of the detention order and his failure to inform the Presiding Judge about said
order constituted not merely gross neglect of duty but outright grave misconduct.
Accordingly, Donato Auguis was dismissed from service.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; COURT PERSONNEL; CLERK OF

COURT HAS NO POWER TO ORDER THE COMMITMENT OF A PERSON CHARGED WITH A
PENAL OFFENSE. — [N]owhere in the Rules is the clerk of court authorized to issue an
order of detention, as such function is purely judicial. In fact, we already had occasion to
rule that a clerk of court, unlike a judicial authority, has no power to order the commitment
of a person charged with a penal offense.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CLERK OF COURT VIOLATED RIGHT OF ACCUSED WHEN HE
ISSUED ORDER OF DETENTION. — Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere
desire to help the accused and his relatives. But as an o cer of the court, he should be
aware that by issuing such detention order, he trampled upon a fundamental human right
of the accused. Because of the unauthorized order issued by respondent, the accused
Edilberto Albior was deprived of liberty without due process of law for a total of 56 days,
counted from his unlawful detention on January 27, 1999 until the issuance of the
appropriate order of commitment by the municipal judge on March 25, 1999. Thus, the
Court cannot condone nor take lightly the serious violation committed by the respondent.
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 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTIES OF CLERK OF COURT AND OTHER COURT PERSONNEL;
EVERYONE CONNECTED WITH AN OFFICE CHARGED WITH THE DISPENSATION OF
JUSTICE SHOULD BE CIRCUMSCRIBED WITH A HIGH DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY. —
Once again, it bears emphasizing that the behavior of everyone connected with an o ce
charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the clerk of lowest
rank, should be circumscribed with a high degree of responsibility. Their conduct at all
times must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but above all else must be
in accordance with the Constitution and the law. A clerk of court, such as herein
respondent, is a ranking and essential o cer in the judicial system. His o ce is the hub of-
activities. He performs delicate administrative functions essential to the prompt and
proper administration of justice.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLERK OF COURT SHOULD BE MINDFUL OF HIS DUTY TO ENSURE
THAT BASIC RIGHTS ARE PROTECTED. — Respondent needs no reminder that as an
important o cer in the dispensation of justice, one of his primary duties is to uphold the
fundamental law of the land. His defense that he is not a lawyer or law graduate and so is
excusably ignorant of the legal implications of his detention order, deserves scant
consideration. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith, especially
a clerk of court who ought to know better than an ordinary layman. . . . The respondent's
issuance of the detention order not only deprived the accused of liberty, it also
considerably diminished the people's faith in the judiciary. For the very o cer of the court
on whom they depended to safeguard their human and constitutional rights was also the
one who violated these rights. Respondent should be mindful of his ineluctable duty, as a
ranking officer in the judicial system, to ensure that basic rights are protected.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT CANNOT COUNTENANCE ANY ACT OR
OMISSION WHICH TENDS TO DIMINISH THE PEOPLE'S FAITH IN THE JUDICIARY. — This
Court has assiduously condemned any omission or act which tends to undermine the faith
and trust of the people in the judiciary. The Court cannot countenance any act or omission
on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the
norms of public accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the people in
the judiciary.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; GRAVE MISCONDUCT; CLERK OF COURT'S UNAUTHORIZED
ISSUANCE OF THE DETENTION ORDER AND HIS FAILURE TO INFORM THE PRESIDING
JUDGE ABOUT SAID ORDER CONSTITUTES GRAVE MISCONDUCT. — . . . [W]e cannot treat
lightly the actions of the respondent for he has admitted doing them repeatedly, in fact
many times in the past. The implication of his action as an o cial of the court is not only
disturbing but shocking, for it involves no less than a violation of the constitutional right to
liberty. We hold that respondent's unauthorized issuance of the detention order and his
failure to inform the Presiding Judge about said order constitute not merely gross neglect
of duty but outright grave misconduct. Misconduct is a violation of some established and
de nite rule of action, more particularly unlawful behaviour as well as gross negligence by
the public o cer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be serious,
important, weighty, momentous and not tri ing. It must also have direct relation to, and
connected with the performance of o cial duties amounting either to maladministration
or willful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of the o ce. Because of the
order for the arrest of the accused and resultant con nement in police custody, the
respondent unduly usurped the judicial prerogative of the judge, and such usurpation is
equivalent to grave misconduct. EcSaHA

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CLERK OF COURT'S ADMISSION THAT HE ISSUED
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 DETENTION ORDERS COUNTLESS TIMES IN THE PAST WARRANTS DISMISSAL FROM
SERVICE. — In a previous case, we found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct for
issuing a Release Order without the knowledge and signature of the Presiding Judge
concerned. In another, we ruled that the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct
warranting dismissal from the service when he issued a warrant of arrest without any
order coming from the court that caused the accused to be illegally con ned for three (3)
days. In both cases we held that though the respondents might have been moved by
compassion and might have acted in good faith, the respondent's actuations could not be
condoned, for the committed acts constituted a serious infringement of, and
encroachment upon, judicial authority. In our view, the present case cannot be treated with
leniency, especially in light of the fact that respondent herein admitted he issued detention
orders countless times in the past. In accordance with precedents and Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999, the appropriate. penalty to be
imposed on respondent is dismissal from the service.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM : p

Respondent Donato Auguis, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Branch 4, Talibon-Getafe, 1 Talibon, Bohol, is charged by Adriano Albior, of usurpation of
judicial function and negligence in the performance of o cial duties. According to
complainant, respondent usurped judicial functions when he issued the order for the
detention of one Edilberto Albior, the son of complainant. Further, complainant alleged that
respondent committed negligence when he failed to inform Acting Presiding Judge
Avelino N. Puracan of that court regarding the ling of cases that necessitated issuance of
the detention order.
The antecedent facts of this administrative matter are as follows:
On January 25, 1999, two complaints for rape 2 were led against Edilberto Albior
before the MCTC, Branch 4 in Talibon-Getafe, Talibon, Bohol. As clerk of court of the said
court, respondent Auguis received and led the complaints which were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 9144 and 9145. The following day, respondent issued a detention
order 3 to the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) in San Jose, Talibon,
Bohol, for the commitment of the accused Edilberto Albior. On January 27, 1999, the
BJMP duly issued a receipt of detainee 4 for the person of the accused.
According to complainant, said order was issued without a prior preliminary
investigation and without a warrant of arrest. Neither was there any record in the Police
Blotter of the accused's apprehension, or of his surrender. Nor was there proof that he
signed a waiver for his detention. What's more, the respondent failed to inform Acting
Municipal Judge Avelino Puracan regarding the ling of the complaints for rape before his
sala. 5
On February 23, 1999, counsel for the accused then filed an urgent motion to release
the accused. 6 Two days later, respondent issued a subpoena, directing the accused to
submit counter-a davits for the preliminary investigation of the charges of rape. But no
further action was taken by the court. Accused through counsel led a second motion 7 on
March 1, 1999. Again, the motion was not acted upon.
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 Having no other recourse to regain his liberty, the accused led a petition for habeas
corpus on March 15, 1999, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 52. During the
habeas corpus proceedings, 8 the respondent testi ed that this was not the rst time he
issued a detention order without a warrant of arrest. He testi ed that he has done this
action "many times already" 9 in the past, upon the request of the Chief of Police of the
Philippine National Police in Talibon. He reasoned out that it was in the best interest of the
detainees to be transferred from the PNP jail to the BJMP because the former did not have
meal provisions for detainees.
After due hearing, the RTC Judge Zeta V. Villamayor issued an order 1 0 on March 25,
1999, nding that the accused was being illegally restrained of his liberty and ordering his
immediate release from con nement. On the same day, the MCTC conducted a preliminary
examination of the prosecution's witnesses and issued an Omnibus Order 1 1 con rming
the arrest of the accused.
On April 12, 1999, counsel for the accused led a motion for reinvestigation 1 2 with
the Department of Justice, assailing the validity of the Omnibus Order. He maintained that
no warrant of arrest was ever issued against his client and as such, no con rmation of
such arrest may be undertaken.
On June 2, 1999, the father of the accused, herein complainant Adriano Albior, led a
letter-complaint 1 3 with the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. Complainant charged
respondent of usurpation of judicial functions and negligence in the performance of duties,
in connection with the detention of his son, Edilberto Albior.
In a resolution dated June 3, 1999, 1 4 the Deputy Ombudsman referred the letter-
complaint to the O ce of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action. On May 8,
2000, the Ombudsman issued a resolution 1 5 dismissing the criminal complaint for
usurpation of judicial function as de ned under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code. 1 6
However, he recommended the ling of an information with the proper court for violation
of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 1 7
Acting on the letter-complaint, the OCA required respondent to le a comment to
the complaint. Respondent led his counter-a davit. 1 8 Respondent claims that he issued
the detention order only after the PNP Chief and PNP Trial O cer of Talibon repeatedly
requested him to do so. The respondent asserts that it was out of honest conviction that
he was only helping the accused and his relatives. He was merely sparing them the trouble
of having to bring meals to the accused, as the municipal jail where the latter was detained
did not serve food to its prisoners.
Respondent also appended the a davit 1 9 of Police Senior Inspector Lecarion P.
Torre el, the PNP Chief of Police of Talibon. In it the Police Chief stated that he personally
requested the respondent to immediately issue a detention order in order to transfer the
accused to the BJMP jail, where he is ensured of three square meals a day. The Chief
explained that the municipality did not have a budget for meals of detainees at the PNP jail,
hence, it is alleged that respondent's action was intended purely for humanitarian reasons.
Nothing is said, however, why the local government unit allows this inhumane practice. The
Chief of Police himself appears blissfully ignorant of the human rights aspects of the
matter for which his command could be held accountable.
On January 29, 2001, the OCA issued its report. 2 0 It found respondent's defense
unconvincing and held him administratively liable for issuing the said detention order prior
to a preliminary investigation conducted by a judge and before a warrant of arrest was
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 issued against the accused. It recommended that the case be re-docketed as an
administrative matter and that a ne in the amount of P3,000.00 be imposed upon
respondent with a warning that the commission of the same or similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
We then required the parties to manifest if they were willing to submit the case for
decision on the basis of the pleadings led. 2 1 The respondent subsequently manifested
his conformity. 2 2
The main issue for our resolution is whether the respondent should be held
administratively liable for the issuance of a detention order resulting in the actual detention
of the accused under the abovementioned circumstances.
The OCA report stresses that respondent clerk of court is not empowered to issue
the questioned detention order. The duties of a clerk of court in the absence of the judge
are defined under Section 5, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 5. Duties of the clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge.
— In the absence of the judge, the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in
receiving applications, petitions, inventories, reports, and the issuance of all
orders and notices that follow as a matter of course under these rules, and may
also, when directed so to do by the judge, receive the accounts of executors,
administrators, guardians, trustees, and receivers, and all evidence relating to
them, or to the settlement of the estates of deceased persons, or to guardianships,
trusteeships, or receiverships, and forthwith transmit such reports, accounts, and
evidence to the judge, together with his ndings in relation to the same, if the
judge shall direct him to make findings and include the same in his report.

Indeed nowhere in the Rules is the clerk of court authorized to issue an order of
detention, as such function is purely judicial. In fact, we already had occasion to rule that a
clerk of court, unlike a judicial authority, has no power to order the commitment of a
person charged with a penal offense. 2 3
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas aptly pointed out that where a judge is not
available, the arresting o cer is duty-bound to release a detained person, if the maximum
hours for detention provided under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code had already
expired. Failure to cause the release may result in an offense under the Code, to wit:
ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper
judicial authorities. — The penalties provided in the next preceding articles shall
be imposed upon the public o cer or employee who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six
(36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by a ictive or capital penalties, or
their equivalent.

Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to help the accused and
his relatives. But as an o cer of the court, he should be aware that by issuing such
detention order, he trampled upon a fundamental human right of the accused. Because of
the unauthorized order issued by respondent, the accused Edilberto Albior was deprived of
liberty without due process of law for a total of 56 days, counted from his unlawful
detention on January 27, 1999 until the issuance of the appropriate order of commitment
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 by the municipal judge on March 25, 1999.
Thus, the Court cannot condone nor take lightly the serious violation committed by
the respondent. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution mandates:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Italics
ours)

Once again, it bears emphasizing that the behavior of everyone connected with an
o ce charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the clerk of
lowest rank, should be circumscribed with a high degree of responsibility. 2 4 Their conduct
at all times must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but above all else
must be in accordance with the Constitution and the law. A clerk of court, such as herein
respondent, is a ranking and essential o cer in the judicial system. His o ce is the hub of
activities. He performs delicate administrative functions essential to the prompt and
proper administration of justice. 2 5
Respondent needs no reminder that as an important o cer in the dispensation of
justice, one of his primary duties is to uphold the fundamental law of the land. His defense
that he is not a lawyer or law graduate and so is excusably ignorant of the legal
implications of his detention order, deserves scant consideration. Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith, especially a clerk of court who ought to know
better than an ordinary layman.
This Court has assiduously condemned any omission or act which tends to
undermine the faith and trust of the people in the judiciary. 2 6 The Court cannot
countenance any act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of
justice which would violate the norms of public accountability and diminish or tend to
diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary. 2 7
The respondent's issuance of the detention order not only deprived the accused of
liberty, it also considerably diminished the people's faith in the judiciary. For the very officer
of the court on whom they depended to safeguard their human and constitutional rights
was also the one who violated these rights. Respondent should be mindful of his
ineluctable duty, as a ranking o cer in the judicial system, to ensure that basic rights are
protected.
In conclusion, we agree with the ndings of the OCA that respondent is liable as
charged administratively. But we disagree with its recommendation that respondent be
merely meted out the penalty of a ne. We cannot treat lightly the actions of the
respondent for he has admitted doing them repeatedly, in fact many times in the past. The
implication of his action as an o cial of the court is not only disturbing but shocking, for it
involves no less than a violation of the constitutional right to liberty. We hold that
respondent's unauthorized issuance of the detention order and his failure to inform the
Presiding Judge about said order constitute not merely gross neglect of duty but outright
grave misconduct.
Misconduct is a violation of some established and de nite rule of action, more
particularly unlawful behaviour as well as gross negligence by the public o cer. To
warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be serious, important, weighty,
momentous and not tri ing. It must also have direct relation to, and connected with the
performance of o cial duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional
neglect or failure to discharge the duties of the o ce. 2 8 Because of the order for the
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 arrest of the accused and resultant con nement in police custody, the respondent unduly
usurped the judicial prerogative of the judge, and such usurpation is equivalent to grave
misconduct. 2 9
In a previous case, we found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct for issuing a
Release Order without the knowledge and signature of the Presiding Judge concerned. 3 0
In another, we ruled that the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct warranting
dismissal from the service when he issued a warrant of arrest without any order coming
from the court that caused the accused to be illegally con ned for three (3) days. 3 1 In
both cases we held that though the respondents might have been moved by compassion
and might have acted in good faith, the respondent's actuations could not be condoned,
for the committed acts constituted a serious infringement of, and encroachment upon,
judicial authority.
In our view, the present case cannot be treated with leniency, especially in light of
the fact that respondent herein admitted he issued detention orders countless times in the
past. In accordance with precedents and Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular
No. 19, series of 1999, 3 2 the appropriate penalty to be imposed on respondent is
dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, respondent DONATO AUGUIS, Clerk of Court II, MCTC, Branch 4 at
Talibon-Getafe, Talibon, Bohol, is hereby found administratively liable for issuing the
assailed detention order without lawful authority, as well as failing to inform the Presiding
Judge of that court regarding such order, thus committing GRAVE MISCONDUCT in the
discharge of official functions. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE
of all bene ts and privileges, except earned leave credits if any, and with prejudice to
reemployment in the government including government owned and controlled
corporations. TaHDAS

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.

Footnotes
1. Sometimes spelled as "Getate" or "Jetafe" in other parts of the records.
2. Rollo, pp. 10-11.
3. Id. at 9.
4. Ibid.
5. Id. at 13.
6. Id. at 13-14.
7. Id. at 15-16.
8. Id. at 29-31.
9. See Id. at 31.
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 10. Id. at 46-47.
11. Id. at 93.
12. Id. at 94-96.
13. Id. at 3-7.
14. Id. at 100-101.
15. Id. at 117-119.
16. ART. 241. Usurpation of judicial functions. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any
o cer of the executive branch of the Government who shall assume judicial powers or
shall obstruct the execution of any order or decision rendered by any judge within his
jurisdiction.

17. SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public o cers . — In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted bene ts, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his o cial, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to o cers and
employees of o ces or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
xxx xxx xxx
18. Id. at 105-109.
19. Id. at 110.
20. Id. at 120-122.
21. Id. at 127-128.
22. Id. at 129.
23. Judge Vallarta v. Vda. de Batoon , A.M. No. P-99-1302, 28 February 2001, 353 SCRA 18,
22.
24. Lloveras v. Sanchez, A.M. No. P-93-817, 18 January 1994, 229 SCRA 302, 307.
25. Juntilla v. Branch COC Calleja , 330 Phil. 850, 855 (1996); Angeles v. Bantug , Adm.
Matter No. P-89-295, 29 May 1992, 209 SCRA 413, 422-423.

26. Alivia v. Nieto, 121 Phil. 419, 426 (1995).

27. Malbas v. Blanco , A.M. No. P-99-1350, 12 December 2001, p. 9 citing Sy v. Academia ,
A.M. No. P-87-72, 3 July 1991, 198 SCRA 705, 717.
28. Almario v. Resus, A.M. No. P-94-1076, 22 November 1999, 318 SCRA 742, 748-749.
29. Escañan v. Monterola II, A.M. No. P-99-1347, 6 February 2001, 351 SCRA 228, 231.
30. See Biag v. Gubatanga , A.M. No. P-99-1341, 22 November 1999, 318 SCRA 753, 758-
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 759.
31. See Supra, note 29 at 236-237.
32. Section 52. Classi cation of Offenses . — Administrative offenses with
corresponding penalties are classi ed into grave, less grave or light, depending on their
gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.
The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Grave misconduct:

1st offense — Dismissal . . . .

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